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EUROPE SINCE 1815

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BY
CHARLES DOWNER HAZEN
PROFESSOR OF HISTORY IN COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

WITH FIFTEEN COLORED MAPS

Revised and Enlarged Edition



LONDON
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PREFACE TO NEW EDITION

ON Sunday, August 2, 1914, in the King of Roumania's summer residence at Sinaia, situated among the pine forests of the lower Carpathian Mountains, an interesting prophecy was made. The Queen, "Carmen Sylva," asked Take Jonescu, the brilliant lawyer and statesman, what the results of the war which was then just breaking out would be. Jonescu replied that no mortal could have the presumption to claim to know or to divine all the consequences of such a conflict: "However, I know four," he said, "and these four I can state in a few words. First, there will be such a revival of hatred among nations as has not been seen in centuries. This is as inevitable as the light of day. Secondly, there will be a *lurch to the left*, toward those ideas which are called Socialistic. Certainly in the long run nothing that is absurd can permanently triumph, but in every country the drift toward the extreme left is certain, once the governing classes seem in the eyes of the masses — because of the letting loose of this frightful catastrophe — more incapable than they had thought. In the third place, Madame, there will be what I may call a *cascade of thrones*. Your Majesty, who has so often told me that she is a republican, will not be surprised at this prophecy. Only those monarchies which are in reality merely hereditary presidencies of republics, like the British monarchy, have a chance of escaping this terrible cascade which will justly issue from a war provoked by absolute sovereigns."

Jonescu then explained to the Queen that because of this war the revolutionary movement, which for several decades had deserted the field of politics in order to limit itself to the field of economics, would inevitably become political once more.

"Finally, I said," continues this discerning critic, "this war will hasten by fifty years the arrival of the United States at the moral leadership of the white race, an event which was inevitable in any case, but which the war will have accelerated. . . . As far as I am concerned this event will not be at all displeasing as the experiment which the United States is making of a new civilization, without prejudices, without castes, without monarchical or aristocratic institutions, is the most interesting experiment which mankind has ever yet seriously undertaken."

The history of the past ten years is a sufficient commentary upon the power of precise prevision of this particular prophet.

It is for the purpose of telling this later history that this new edition of *EUROPE SINCE 1815* has been prepared. The original edition appeared in 1910. Since then the face of the world has been strangely and amazingly changed, and the process of accelerated evolution is still in full swing. This culminating, crowded, and strictly contemporary chapter in the annals of the race constitutes a challenge to the historian, — and perhaps a trap.

In this new edition I have reproduced the earlier one substantially intact, making, however, whatever additions and alterations have seemed desirable; enlarging, for example, my previous treatment of the Industrial Revolution, of Socialism, and of the German Empire under William II. In recounting the years from 1910 to 1919 I have freely used the material contained in my later book, *MODERN EUROPE*, abridging here and amplifying there. The chronicle of events since the middle of 1919 is entirely new and constitutes more than a fourth of the book. The space allotted to the events of the past few years may by some be considered disproportionate but, in my opinion, it is justified by the exceptional importance of the period. It would, I think, be entirely mechanical and needlessly inept for the historian to seek to give the same space in his narrative to equal spans of time, for the simple reason that equal chronological periods differ greatly from one another in significance of content. The French Revolutionists thought, and complacently announced, that they had made greater progress in six years than their predecessors had made in six centuries. They exaggerated — but not as much as their predecessors would have thought. Since the French Revolution there has been no period so replete with shattering events, so charged with dynamic force, so remarkable for the changes it has witnessed, as that which began in 1914. New factors, or old factors singularly intensified, have recently entered in profusion into contemporary history, to complicate and confuse; the astounding consequences of the war, the resurrection of old states, like Poland, long supposed to be extinct, the rise of new ones, like Czecho-Slovakia, the great enlargement of others, such as Roumania or Jugo-Slavia, the radical transformation of still others, like Austria and Hungary and Germany and Russia; the new breezes that are blowing with varying velocity throughout the vast reaches of the British Empire, subjecting the flexible framework of that structure to exceptional

stress and strain; all the varied phenomena connected with that lurch to the left of which the Roumanian statesman spoke in that fateful summer of 1914, the disruption of Socialistic parties into factions under the disintegrating alchemy of the war, the subsequent wranglings of those factions, the varying fortunes and misfortunes of the Socialist movement in different countries ranging from the establishment of arbitrary, undemocratic and militaristic Communism in Russia to the stalemating of Socialism by "big business" in Germany and by Fascism in Italy, and to the constitutional agitation of the Labor Party in England. All these and many other topics demand notice in any survey of the history of Europe since the war and such notice cannot be unduly brief if it is to be really illuminating and explanatory. No succinct summary could possibly suffice to give a comprehensible picture.

I have, in general, brought the history of Europe down to the mid-summer of 1923, obviously no logical or fixed terminus, there being none such at this end of the historic process. Contemporary history has only one definite terminus, namely its point of departure, and that, after all, is itself not so very definite, its proper location being the subject of much dispute.

C. D. H.

NEW YORK
July 30, 1923

PREFACE TO FIRST EDITION

THE purpose of this book is the presentation of the history of Europe since the downfall of Napoleon. Needless to say, only the broader lines of the evolution of so crowded a century can be traced in a single volume. I have, moreover, omitted many subjects, frequently described, in order to give a fuller treatment to those which, in my opinion, are more important. I have endeavored to explain the internal development of the various nations, and their external relations in so far as these have been vital or deeply formative. I have also attempted to preserve a reasonable balance between the different periods of the century and to avoid the danger of over-emphasis.

The great tendencies of the century, the transference of power from oligarchies to democracies, the building up of nations like Germany and Italy and the Balkan states which was the product of long trains of causes, of sharp, decisive events, and of the potent activity of commanding personalities, the gradual expansion of Europe and its insistent and growing pressure upon the world outside, shown in so many ways and so strikingly in this age of imperialism and world-politics, the increasing consciousness in our day of the urgency of economic and social problems, all these and other tendencies will, I trust, emerge from the following pages, with clearness and in just proportion.

The problem of arranging material covering so many different countries and presenting such varieties of circumstance and condition is one of the greatest difficulty. It arises from the fact that Europe is only a geographical expression. The author is not writing the history of a single people but of a dozen different peoples, which, having much in common, are nevertheless very dissimilar in character, in problems, in stages of development, and in mental outlook. If he adopts the chronological order (and events certainly occurred in chronological sequence), if he attempts to keep the histories of a dozen different countries moving along together as they did in fact, he must pass continually from one to the other and his narrative inevitably becomes jerky, spasmodic, and confused. If on the other hand he takes each nation in turn, recounting its history from starting

point to point of conclusion, he gains the great advantage of continuity, which begets understanding, but he writes a dozen histories, not one. He therefore compromises, perforce, with his intractable problem and works out a method of presentation of whose vulnerability he is probably quite as acutely conscious as any reader could be. My method has been to bring down more or less together the histories of those countries which have so intimately and significantly interacted upon each other, Austria, Prussia, France, and Italy, that the evolution of one cannot be, even approximately, understood apart from a knowledge of the current evolution of the others. I then return to my starting point, 1815, and trace the histories of England, Russia, Turkey and the lesser states separately, gaining the advantage of being able to show their continuous development. I hope that this method has at least the merit of rendering clearness of exposition possible.

My narrative is based to some extent upon an examination of the sources, although, considering the vast extent of the original material available, this has been necessarily comparatively limited. It is based chiefly, as probably any synthetic work covering so large a field must be, on the elaborate general histories of different periods or countries, on biographies, and on the special monographic literature. These are indicated in the bibliography at the end of the volume which I have attempted to make critical and descriptive rather than extensive. It has been impossible for me to employ footnotes freely and consequently I am restricted to a general recognition of my great and constant indebtedness to the authorities used, a recognition which I wish to make as explicit and as grateful as it must be brief and comprehensive.

C. D. H.

NORTHAMPTON, MASSACHUSETTS,
December 31, 1909.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

THE RECONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE

	PAGE
The Congress of Vienna — The Claims of Russia and Prussia — Austrian Acquisitions — Disappointment of the Germans — The Holy Alliance — The Quadruple Alliance — Three Monarchs and a Prince — Prince Metternich.....	1 ✓

CHAPTER II

REACTION IN AUSTRIA AND GERMANY

The Hapsburg Monarchy — Repression in Austria — The German Confederation — Germany Not a Nation — The States-Rights Feeling in Germany — Constitutions in the Minor States — The Wartburg Festival — The Carlsbad Decrees — The Metternich System in Germany.....	18 ✓
---	------

CHAPTER III

REACTION AND REVOLUTION IN SPAIN AND ITALY

Ferdinand the Seventh — Revolutionary Movements in Spain — Napoleon's Influence Upon Italy — The Italian States — Revolution in Naples — The Congresses — Revolution in Piedmont — The Monroe Doctrine....	36 ✓
--	------

CHAPTER IV

THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

Inventions and the Textile Industries — The Invention of the Railroad — The Factory System of Production — A Slow Revolution — The Expansion of English Commerce — The Importance of Coal and Iron — Consequences of Industrial Revolution — History Knows No Golden Age....	53 ✓
--	------

CHAPTER V

FRANCE DURING THE RESTORATION

The Constitutional Charter — Louis XVIII — Parties in France — Reorganization of the Army — The Election of Abbé Grégoire — The Law of the Double Vote — Compensation of the Émigrés — Proposed Law of Hereditary — The Martignac Ministry — Conflict Between King and Chamber — The July Ordinances — Abdication of Charles X.....	71 ✓
---	------

CHAPTER VI

REVOLUTIONS BEYOND FRANCE

The Kingdom of the Netherlands — Rise of the Kingdom of Belgium — Poland a Constitutional Kingdom — The Polish Insurrection — Revolution in Italy.....	PAGE 98
--	------------

CHAPTER VII

THE REIGN OF LOUIS PHILIPPE

Changes in the Constitution — Parties Under Louis Philippe — The Pol... of Order — Republican Insurrections — The Revival of ... — Boulogne Fiasco — The Eastern Question — The ... — Economic Problems — The Opposition Parties — Fall of the July Monarchy.....	109
---	-----

CHAPTER VIII

CENTRAL EUROPE BETWEEN TWO REVOLUTIONS

The Question of the Tariff — The United Landtag — The Growth of Nationalism — The Constitution of Hungary — Louis Kossuth — Giuseppe Mazzini — The Aims of "Young Italy" — The Problem of Italy — A Year of Revolutions.....	132
--	-----

CHAPTER IX

CENTRAL EUROPE IN REVOLT

The Overthrow of Metternich — Revolution in Italy — Austria Recovers Lost Ground — Accession of Francis Joseph — Hungary Conquered — The Parliament of Frankfort — The Prussian Constitution.....	132
---	-----

CHAPTER X

THE SECOND REPUBLIC AND THE FOUNDING OF THE SECOND EMPIRE

Louis Blanc and the Socialists — The Labor Commission — The Constituent Assembly — The Framing of the Constitution — Louis Napoleon Bonaparte — The President and the Assembly — The Coup d'État of 1851 — Napoleon the Third — The Powers of the Emperor — Policies of Napoleon III — Napoleon III and Italy.....	166
--	-----

CHAPTER XI

CAVOUR AND THE CREATION OF THE KINGDOM OF ITALY

Count Camillo di Cavour — Piedmont and the Crimean War — The National Society — The Diplomacy of Cavour — The Armistice of Villafranca — Napoleon III and Piedmont — Giuseppe Garibaldi — Garibaldi Conquers Naples — The Kingdom of Italy Proclaimed — Cavour and Liberty....	198
--	-----

CHAPTER XII

BISMARCK AND GERMAN UNITY

	PAGE
Reaction in Germany — Economic Evolution of Prussia — The National Union — Army Reform — Bismarck's Political Opinions — The Period of Conflict — The Schleswig-Holstein Question — The Future of the Duchies — Preparations for War with Austria — The Austro-Prussian War — Prussian Annexations — The North German Confederation.....	208 ✓

CHAPTER XIII

THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SECOND EMPIRE

Beginning of the Liberal Empire — The Mexican Expedition — The Emergence of Gambetta — The Liberal Empire.....	233 ✓
--	-------

CHAPTER XIV

THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR

A Momentous Year — The Hohenzollern Candidacy — France Declares War — Disorganization of the French Army — The Government of National Defense — The Siege of Paris — The Treaty of Frankfort.....	243 ✓
---	-------

CHAPTER XV

THE RISE OF SOCIALISM

Formers — Robert Owen — Saint-Simon — Failures of the Early Socialism — Karl Marx — Marxian Ideas — The "Communist Manifesto" — Development of Marxian Theories — The First International — Ferdinand Lassalle — Liebknecht and Bebel — Growth of the Socialist Party.....	257 ✓
--	-------

CHAPTER XVI

THE GERMAN EMPIRE UNDER WILLIAM I

The Constitution of the Empire — The Kulturkampf — Bismarck's Retreat — The Policy of Protection — Growth of the Socialist Party — State Socialism — Bismarck's Foreign Policy.....	282 ✓
---	-------

CHAPTER XVII

GERMANY UNDER WILLIAM II

William II and Bismarck — Resignation of Bismarck — William II and the Socialists — Industrial Expansion — Germany's Supply of Iron — The Hunt for Markets — Germany a Naval Power — German Colonies — Germany and Turkey — A Spirited Foreign Policy — The Pan-German League — The Personality of William II — Disaffected Elements — The Government of Prussia — The Demand for Reform — The Impotence of German Legislatures.....	297 ✓
--	-------

CHAPTER XVIII

FRANCE UNDER THE THIRD REPUBLIC

PAGE

The Idea of the Commune — The War of the Commune — The Rivet Law — Army Reform — The Count of Chambord — Growth of the Republican Party — A Parliamentary Republic — MacMahon's Policy — Republican Legislation — Discontent with the Republic — Collapse of Boulangism — The Dreyfus Case — Retrial of Dreyfus — Growth of Religious Orders — Anti-Clerical Legislation — Separation of Church and State — Colonial Expansion — The Question of Morocco	331 ✓
--	-------

CHAPTER XIX

THE KINGDOM OF ITALY

Problems Confronting Italy — The "Prisoner of the Vatican" — Colonial Policy — Industrial Expansion	369 ✓
---	-------

CHAPTER XX

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AFTER 1849

Policy of Francis Joseph — The Resistance of Hungary — The Dual Monarchy — The Demands of Bohemia — The Taaffe Ministry — The Policy of the Magyars — Racial Animosities	379 ✓
--	-------

CHAPTER XXI

ENGLAND TO THE REFORM BILL OF 1832

The Renown of Parliament — The House of Commons — The Church of England — Critics of English Institutions — Suspension of Habeas Corpus — The Dawn of Liberalism — Removal of Religious Disabilities — Catholic Emancipation — Introduction of Reform Bill — Debates on Reform Bill — Second Reform Bill — Passage of Reform Bill	394 ✓
---	-------

CHAPTER XXII

ENGLAND BETWEEN TWO GREAT REFORMS
(1832-1867)

1833 Abolition of Slavery — Municipal Government — Accession of Queen Victoria	1836	1834	
1838 — The Chartists — The Free Trade Movement — The Campaign for Free Trade — Labor Legislation — Growth of Collectivism — Extension of the Suffrage			3846 3847 419 ✓

CHAPTER XXIII

ENGLAND UNDER GLADSTONE AND DISRAELI

PAGE

The Complex Irish Problem — The Irish Church — The Land Question — The Land Act of 1870 — Educational Reform — The Education Act of 1870 — The Secret Ballot — Opposition to the Ministry — Disraeli and Imperialism — Gladstone's Second Ministry — Reform Bill of 1884 — State of the Suffrage.....	439 ✓
---	-------

CHAPTER XXIV

ENGLAND FROM 1886 TO 1914

The Home Rule Party — Home Rule Bill — Defeat of Home Rule Bill — Land Purchase Act — Defeat of Second Home Rule Bill — The Rosebery Ministry — Education Act of 1902 — Old Age Pensions — The Budget of 1909 — The Parliament Bill — Passage of the Home Rule Bill.....	464 ✓
--	-------

CHAPTER XXV

THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

The Empire of India — The Population of India — Canadian Unrest — Lord Durham's Report — The Dominion of Canada — The Australian Colonies — Dominion of New Zealand — Cape Colony — The London Convention — The Jameson Raid — The Union of South Africa.....	486 ✓
---	-------

CHAPTER XXVI

THE PARTITION OF AFRICA

David Livingstone — The Congo Free State — Extravagance of the Khedive — English Intervention in Egypt — Recovery of the Soudan.....	509 ✓
--	-------

CHAPTER XXVII

SPAIN AND PORTUGAL

The Pragmatic Sanction — A Constitutional Monarchy — The Reign of Amadeo — Constitution of 1876 — Revolution in Portugal — Portugal a Republic.....	520 ✓
---	-------

CHAPTER XXVIII

HOLLAND AND BELGIUM AFTER 1830

Political Institutions — Belgian Independence — Accession of King Albert — The Neutralization of Belgium.....	532 ✓
---	-------

CHAPTER XXIX

SWITZERLAND

	PAGE
The Era of Regeneration — Swiss Democracy — Neutrality of Switzerland..	538 ✓

CHAPTER XXX

THE SCANDINAVIAN STATES

The Problem of a Constitution — Constitution of Eidsvold — Friction Between Norway and Sweden — Universal Suffrage.....	544 ✓
---	-------

CHAPTER XXXI

THE DISRUPTION OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE
AND THE RISE OF THE BALKAN STATES

<i>mean War</i> The Subject Peoples — Secret Societies — Greek War of Independence — Foreign Intervention — Coalition Against Russia — The Congress of Paris — Union of the Principalities — Eastern Question Reopened — Russo-Turkish War — The Congress of Berlin — Russo-Bulgarian Relations — Dictatorship of Stambuloff — Conditions in Serbia — The Young Turks.....	552 ✓
--	-------

CHAPTER XXXII

RUSSIA TO THE WAR WITH JAPAN

The Congress Kingdom — Accession of Nicholas I — Policy of Nicholas I — The System of Land Tenure — Emancipation of the Serfs — Establishment of Zemstvos — Insurrection of Poland — Reaction in Russia — The Nihilist Propaganda — Reversion to Absolutism — Progress Under Alexander III — Economic Evolution of Russia — Russian Policy Toward Finland.....	581 ✓
--	-------

CHAPTER XXXIII

THE FAR EAST

The Civilization of China — Breaking into China — Japan a Feudal State — Opening of Japan — Adoption of European Institutions — Intervention of Russia — Apprehensions of Japan — The Russo-Japanese War — China a Republic.....	609 ✓
--	-------

CHAPTER XXXIV

RUSSIA AFTER THE WAR WITH JAPAN

Widespread Disorder — The General Strike — The Opening of the Duma — The Third Duma.....	629 ✓
--	-------

CHAPTER XXXV

THE BALKAN WARS OF 1912 AND 1913

	PAGE
The First Hague Conference — The Second Hague Conference — The Action of Austria-Hungary — Failure of the Young Turks — Policy Toward Albania — The Balkan Union — Breakdown of the Balkan Union — Treaty of Bucharest.....	637

CHAPTER XXXVI

THE WORLD WAR

The Austrian Demands — Austria and Russia — German Declarations of War — Ultimatum to Belgium — England's Decision — Seven States at War — The War of Positions — A War of "Frightfulness" — Egypt a British Protectorate — Appointment of Haig — Poland Conquered — The Gallipoli Campaign — Serbia Conquered — Italian Declarations of War — The Importance of Verdun — Austria Attacks Italy — Roumania Conquered — Portugal Enters the War — America and the War — German Offenses — The Lusitania — The United States at War — The Russian Soviet — The Bolshevik Coup d'État — German Devastations — Campaign in Mesopotamia — Treaty of Brest-Litovsk — Final Campaign in the West — German Successes — American Reinforcements — The Final Campaign — Allied Victories — Elimination of Bulgaria — The German Armistice — The Armistice Signed.....	652
---	-----

CHAPTER XXXVII

MAKING THE PEACE

Terms of the Armistice — Recovery of Alsace-Lorraine — The New Map of Europe — Peace Problems — The War to End War — The Fourteen Points — Composition of the Conference — Proceedings of the Conference — Council and Assembly — Reduction of Armaments — Arbitration or Inquiry — Secret Diplomacy — The Labor Bureau — Free City of Danzig — German Renunciations — Restrictions of Armament — The Reparation Commission — Early Breaches of the Treaty — The Senate and the League — Treaty of Saint-Germain — Widespread Unrest.....	726
---	-----

CHAPTER XXXVIII

GERMANY SINCE THE REVOLUTION

Revolution in Germany — The Socialists Divided — Popular Commotion — A Succession of Ministries — German Particularism — The Constitution of Weimar — Changes in the Map of Germany — The Presidency — The Constitution of Weimar — Economic Councils — Demand for Socialization — The Vertical Trust — Super-Capitalism — Germany and the Treaty of Versailles — Monetary Inflation — Present Political Parties — Ministerial Instability.....	769
---	-----

CHAPTER XXXIX

THE REPUBLIC OF CZECHO-SLOVAKIA

	PAGE
Hapsburg Policy — Collapse of the Hapsburg Monarchy — The Succession States — The Slovaks — Czechs and Germans — The Constitution — Racial Rights — Thomas Garrigue Masaryk — Masaryk During the War — Foreign Policy — The Little Entente — The Educational Problem — Social Legislation — The Religious Situation.....	804

CHAPTER XL

THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND

Polish Prospects — The Polish Corridor — Poland and Danzig — The Question of Upper Silesia — Galicia — The Problem of the Future — Lack of Political Education — Joseph Pilsudski — The Paderewski Ministry — The Russians Invade Poland — The Polish Constitution — The Agrarian Questions — Polish Anti-Semitism — The Minorities Treaties.....	832
---	-----

CHAPTER XLI

ROUMANIA

A Policy of Watchful Waiting — The Conference of Paris — Attitude of the Small States — Roumanian Occupation of Hungary — The New Provinces — An Illiterate Peasantry — Take Jonescu's Policies.....	860
--	-----

CHAPTER XLII

JUGO-SLAVIA

The Southern Slavs — Slavic Nationalism — Croats, Serbs and Slovenes — Hapsburgs and Jugo-Slavs — Attitude of the Entente Powers — The Corfu Manifesto — The Conference of Paris — Racial Minorities.....	875
---	-----

CHAPTER XLIII

THE REPUBLIC OF AUSTRIA

Austria and Self-Determination — Proposed Union with Germany — Acute Distress — The Constitution of Austria.....	893
--	-----

CHAPTER XLIV

HUNGARY SINCE THE WAR

Revolution in Hungary — Communists in Power — Roumanian Occupation of Hungary — Adventures of Charles IV — Triumph of Reaction.....	903
---	-----

CHAPTER XLV

BULGARIA AND THE TREATY OF NEUILLY

	PAGE
Bulgaria Enters the War — Territorial Losses — A Land of Peasants — "Green" Socialism — Radical Legislation.....	914

CHAPTER XLVI

SOVIET RUSSIA

The Communist Party — Communist Ideas — Nationalization of Factories — Resistance of the Peasants — Compulsory Labor — The "Economic Retreat" — The Hunt for Capital — The Treaty of Rapallo — The Disruption of Russia — Sweep of the Russian Revolution.....	925
--	-----

CHAPTER XLVII

FRANCE SINCE THE WAR

Georges Clemenceau — French Criticism of the Covenant — The Elections of 1919 — Paul Deschanel — Extent of the Destruction — The Work of Reconstruction — The New Resources of France — France Defender of the Treaties.....	946
--	-----

CHAPTER XLVIII

GREAT BRITAIN AND HER EMPIRE

Significance of the Entente — Widespread Unrest — Problem of Unemployment — Unrest Throughout the Empire — Egypt a British Protectorate — Rebellion in Egypt — The Ferment in India — Reform in India — Passive Resistance — South Africa and the World War — Racial Problems — The Sinn Fein Movement — Chaos in Ireland — The Articles of Agreement — Civil War in Ireland — The Free State Constitution.....	962
---	-----

CHAPTER XLIX

TURKEY SINCE THE WAR

Disruption of the Empire — Treaty of Sèvres — Venizelos — Return of Constantinople — Turkish Triumph over Greece — The Conference of Lausanne	995
---	-----

CHAPTER L

BELGIUM DURING AND SINCE THE WAR

A Reign of Terror — Destruction of Belgian Industry — Racial Divisions — The University of Ghent — Belgian Alliance with France.....	1009
--	------

CHAPTER LI

CONTEMPORARY ITALY

	PAGE
Participation in the War — Intervention of President Wilson — Albania — Italian Disappointment — Widespread Discontent — Ministerial Instability — Prevalence of Disorder — Growth of Fascism — Mussolini in Power — Mussolini and Parliament.....	1021

CHAPTER LII

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

The Secretariat — Varied Activities — A Permanent International Court — The Jurisdiction of the Court — An Agent of the Governments — The Amending Process — Proposed Amendments — The Future of the Council — The Labor Organization.....	1042
--	------

CHAPTER LIII

THE CONFERENCE OF WASHINGTON

A Conference of Nine States — Naval Competition — Speech of Secretary Hughes — Objections of France — Question of Submarines — Attitude of France — Japan and the World War — The Four-Power Treaty — The Demands of China — Japan's Position in the Orient.....	1060
--	------

CHAPTER LIV

THE ECLIPSE OF THE ENTENTE

The Problem of Reparations — German Delinquencies — The Security of France — The British Labor Party — French Occupation of the Ruhr — Conclusion.....	1081
--	------

LIST OF MAPS

	PAGE
EUROPE IN 1815	<i>Frontispiece</i>
DISTRIBUTION OF RACES IN AUSTRIA-HUNGARY	25
THE GERMAN CONFEDERATION, 1815-1866	31
ITALY, 1815-1859	145
THE UNIFICATION OF ITALY	205
THE GROWTH OF PRUSSIA SINCE 1815	229
THE GERMAN EMPIRE	327
COLONIAL POSSESSIONS OF THE EUROPEAN POWERS IN 1815	491
AFRICA. EUROPEAN POSSESSIONS IN 1884	511
AFRICA, 1910	521
THE RISE OF THE BALKAN STATES	579
ASIA IN 1914	621
EUROPE IN 1912	641
COLONIAL POSSESSIONS OF THE EUROPEAN POWERS IN 1910 . .	659
EUROPE IN 1923	1069

CHAPTER I

THE RECONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE

IN March 1814, the enemies of Napoleon entered his capital and bivouacked in triumph in the streets. The long struggle was over which had forced the Emperor back step by step from the plains of Russia through Germany, and was now sweeping him from France. Slowly the states of Europe had come to see that Napoleonic domination could be ended only by a generous and unswerving co-operation. Reading this useful lesson in the defeats of many fields, they had built up the Great Coalition, and finally the political system, fashioned with such a varied display of talent by the Emperor of the French, had given way beneath the impact of a united and resolute Europe.

But the overthrow of Napoleon brought with it one of the most complicated and difficult problems ever presented to statesmen and diplomatists. As all the nations of Europe had been profoundly affected by his enterprises, so all were profoundly affected by his fall. For nearly a quarter of a century the Continent had been harried by war, involving, directly or indirectly, all the powers, great and small. During that period boundaries had been changed and changed again with bewildering rapidity, old states had been destroyed, or cut up, or re-fashioned arbitrarily, several historic dynasties had been swept from their thrones, new legal and social systems had been established, largely after French models, and now the power that had led in this vast transformation had been humbled, its sovereign forced to strike arms. The destruction of the Napoleonic régime must be followed by the reconstruction of Europe, and it is with this difficult work that this history begins. This reconstruction was foreshadowed more or less clearly in the treaties concluded with each other by the various states as they entered the Great Coalition. Particularly important, however, were the Treaties of Paris and Vienna, to the making of which the powers now directed their attention.

The first step, naturally, was to determine the future status of France. What should be done with this arch-enemy of Europe,

now that the decision no longer lay with her but with her conquerors? What should be her future government, how large her territory, how severe her punishment?

The question of the government was the first to arise, and had agitated the Allies for weeks before they entered Paris. There were several possible solutions. One was the continuance of Napoleon in power, but only after having given sufficient guarantees for good behavior. Such an outcome was possible up to the middle of March, when the conditions were presented him for the last time. After he rejected them the Allies determined to have done with him forever. There were the alternatives of a Regency for the little King of Rome, Napoleon's son, or of a successful French general as the new monarch, such as Bernadotte, now patronized by the Tsar. Some proposed to leave the whole matter to the French people, others to the determination of the legislative chambers sitting in Paris. But as the discussion went on it gradually became clearer and clearer that it must be either Napoleon or Louis XVIII, the founder of the new royal family or the representative of the old. Bernadotte upon the throne would mean an undue influence of Russia in the affairs of France; a Regency, an undue influence of Austria. An appeal to the French people, it was said, would let loose the Revolution once more, the very thing to which it was proposed to administer a definite and complete quietus. Gradually the cry of the French royalists in favor of Louis XVIII, "the legitimate king is there," to restore him is imperatively necessary, "all else is intrigue," carried all before it, and the first step in the reconstruction of Europe was taken by the restoration of the Bourbons to the throne from which they had been absent for twenty-two years.

On May 30, 1814, the Treaty of Paris was concluded between the Allies on the one hand, and France, under Louis XVIII, on the other. The boundaries of France were to be those of January 1, 1792, with slight additions toward the southeast in Savoy and in the north and northeast. On the other hand she was to relinquish all her conquests beyond that line, which meant the extensive territories of the Netherlands, Italy, and parts of Germany, containing in all a population of about thirty-two millions. The distribution of these territories was to be determined later, but it was already decided in principle, and so stated in the treaty, that the Netherlands should form a single state by the addition of the Belgian provinces to Holland, that Lombardy and Venetia should go to Austria, that the Republic

of Genoa should be incorporated in Sardinia, that the states of Germany should be united in a federation, that England should keep Malta and certain French colonies, returning others, that the German territories on the left bank of the Rhine, united to France since 1792, should be used for the enlargement of Holland, and as compensation to Prussia and other German states, and that Italy, outside those regions that were to go to Austria, should be "composed of sovereign states." The definite elaboration of these intentions of the Allies was to be the work of a general international congress to be held, later in the year, in Vienna.

The Congress of Vienna (September 1814–June 1815) was one of the most important diplomatic gatherings in the history of Europe, by reason of the number, variety, and gravity of the questions presented and settled. The worldly brilliancy of its membership was remarkable even for an age accustomed to the theatrical diplomacy of Napoleon. There had rarely been seen before such an assemblage as gathered in Vienna in the autumn of 1814. There were the emperors of Austria and Russia, the kings of Prussia, Bavaria, Württemberg, Denmark, a multitude of lesser princes, and all the diplomats of Europe, of whom Metternich and Talleyrand were the most conspicuous. All the powers were represented except Turkey. So brilliant an array merited consideration, and partly because men needed relaxation after the tense and desperate years through which they had just passed, and partly to oil the wheels of diplomacy, the court of Austria was most profuse and ingenious in its entertainment. Gaiety was the order of the day. It has been estimated that this Congress cost Austria about sixteen million dollars, spent for pageantry and amusement, and this when the state was virtually bankrupt. 220

Slowly the work for which these men had come together was accomplished. The Congress of Vienna was not a congress in the ordinary meaning of the word. There was never any formal opening nor any general exchange of credentials. The representatives of the powers did not assemble day after day and deliberate upon the many problems pressing for solution. There were no general sessions of all the powers. A large number of treaties were made between the various states and these were brought together in their essential features in the so-called Final Act of June 9, 1815, a kind of codification of the work of the Congress. Everything was arranged outside in special committees, and in the intimate interviews of sovereigns and diplo-

mates. Particularly important were the agreements of the Great Powers with each other, Russia, Prussia, Austria, and England, the Allies who had conquered Napoleon, for their decisions were the main work of the Congress, and were forced upon the lesser states, which were simply expected to accept what they could not themselves arrange. The dramatic interest of the Congress lies in the fact that these Great Powers were not in harmony with each other, that their interests at times were so divergent, their ambitions so intense and conflicting, that at one moment war seemed likely to be the outcome of this meeting called to give peace to Europe.

By the first Treaty of Paris of May 30, 1814, France had renounced all rights of sovereignty and protection over thirty-two millions of people. The diplomats of Vienna reserved the right to distribute these millions as they saw fit. This was the main work of the Congress as it was also the one which occasioned the greatest discord. The division of the spoils was a troublesome affair. The territories which France had renounced were widely scattered. They included what are now Belgium, certain Swiss cantons, large parts of Italy, extensive regions of Germany on both sides of the Rhine, and the Duchy of Warsaw, a creation of Napoleon out of former Poland. In addition to these, Saxony, an independent kingdom, which had remained faithful to Napoleon when the other German states had turned against him, and the Kingdom of Naples, of which Napoleon's brother-in-law, Murat, was still sovereign, were also considered properly at the disposal of the powers, by reason of their connection with the fallen star.

Certain questions had been decided in principle in the first Treaty of Paris, and needed now but to be carried out. The King of Piedmont, a refugee in his island of Sardinia during Napoleon's reign, was restored to his throne, and Genoa was given him that thus the state which borders France on the southeast might be the stronger to resist French aggression. Belgium, hitherto an Austrian possession, was annexed to Holland and to the House of Orange, now restored, that this state might be a barrier in the north. It was understood that, in general, the doctrine of legitimacy should be followed in determining the re-arrangement of Europe, that is, the principle that princes deprived of their thrones and driven from their states by Napoleon should receive them back again at the hands of collective Europe, though this principle was ignored whenever it might suit the interest of the Great Powers. Thus many of

the German and Italian princes recovered their authority. But in the determination of the legitimacy of a government great elasticity prevailed. In general, those states which in Germany had been destroyed before 1803, and in Italy before 1798, were not restored. This alone meant that the map of Europe was far more simple than at the outbreak of the French Revolution.

The Allies who had, after immense effort and sacrifice, overthrown Napoleon, felt that they should have their reward. The most powerful monarch at Vienna was Alexander I, Emperor of Russia, who, ever since Napoleon's disastrous invasion of Russia, had loomed large as a liberator of Europe. He now demanded that the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, whose government fell with Napoleon, be given to him. This state had been created out of Polish territories which Prussia and Austria had seized in the partitions of that country at the close of the eighteenth century. Alexander wished to unite them with a part of Poland that had fallen to Russia, thus largely to restore the old Polish kingdom and nationality to which he intended to give a parliament and a constitution. There was to be no incorporation of the restored kingdom in Russia, but the Russian emperor should be king of Poland. The union was to be merely personal.

Prussia was willing to give up her Polish provinces if only she could be indemnified elsewhere. She therefore fixed her attention upon the rich Kingdom of Saxony to the south, with the important cities of Dresden and Leipsic, as her compensation. To be sure there was a King of Saxony, and the doctrine of legitimacy would seem clearly to apply to him. But he had been faithful to his treaty obligations with Napoleon down to the battle of Leipsic, and thus, said Prussia, he had been a traitor to Germany, and his state was lawful prize. Prussia preferred to receive her increase of territory in Saxony rather than in the west along the Rhine, because Saxony was contiguous. She would thus consolidate and become more compact, whereas any possession she might acquire along the Rhine would be cut off from the rest of the kingdom by intervening states, and would only render more straggling and exposed her boundaries, already unsatisfactory. Moreover, she wished no common boundary with France, feeling that she would always be weak along the Rhine.

Russia and Prussia supported each other's claims, the one to the Duchy of Warsaw, the other to the Kingdom of Saxony. But Austria and England were opposed to the demands of the northern courts, Austria not only because she was reluctant to give up her own Polish territory, her own part of the Duchy of

Warsaw, but because she feared the power of Russia, and the growth of Prussia in northern and central Germany, England because she desired to prevent Russia from increasing in strength, and Prussia from threatening Hanover. The Polish and Saxon questions, thus closely connected with each other, formed the most thorny subject before the Congress, the very pivot on which everything turned. So heated did the discussion become that Talleyrand, utilizing the opposition of the Great Powers to each other, succeeded in forming a secret alliance between England, Austria and France, to resist these pretensions by arms if necessary (January 1815). The situation into which the powers had come over this Polish-Saxon question was manifestly so full of danger for all concerned that they began to recede from their extreme positions. This prepared the way for concessions, but the concessions were forced largely from Prussia. The opposition to Russia was much less vehement, owing to her great military power. With three hundred thousand men ready for action she spoke with emphasis, and moreover, in the general state of exhaustion, Europe had no desire to go to war on account of Poland. The final decision was that Russia should receive the lion's share of the Duchy of Warsaw, Prussia retaining only the province of Posen, and Cracow being erected into a free city; that the King of Saxony should be restored to his throne; that he should retain the important cities of Dresden and Leipsic, but should cede to Prussia about two-fifths of his kingdom; that, as further compensation, Prussia should receive extensive territories on both banks of the Rhine. Prussia also acquired Pomerania from Sweden, thus rounding out her coast line on the Baltic.

Russia emerged from the Congress with a goodly number of additions. She retained Finland, conquered from Sweden during the late wars, and Bessarabia, snatched from the Turks; also Turkish territories in the southeast. But, most important of all, she had now succeeded in gaining most of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. Russia now extended farther westward into Europe than ever, and could henceforth speak with greater weight in European affairs.

As Vienna was honored by being chosen the seat of the mighty Congress the House of Hapsburg profited greatly by the arrangements concluded there. Austria refused to take back her former possessions in southern Germany and Belgium, considering them too distant and too difficult to defend, and preferring to consolidate her power in southern and central Europe. She recovered her Polish possessions and received, as compensation

for the Netherlands, northern Italy, to be henceforth known as the Lombardo-Venetian Kingdom, comprising the larger and richer part of the Po valley. The Illyrian provinces along the eastern coast of the Adriatic were erected into a kingdom and given to her. This enlargement of her coast line increased her importance as a maritime power. She also extended westward into the Tyrol and Salzburg, planting herself firmly upon the Alps. Thus, after twenty years of war, almost uninterruptedly disastrous, she emerged with considerable accessions of strength, and with a population larger by four or five millions than she had possessed in 1792. She had obtained, in lieu of remote and unprofitable possessions, territories which augmented her power in central Europe, the immediate annexation of a part of Italy, and indirect control over the other Italian states. The policy followed by Austria in the negotiations was indicated by Metternich, who said, "We wished to establish our empire without there being any direct contact with France." This was accomplished.

England, the most persistent enemy of Napoleon, the builder of repeated coalitions, the pay-mistress of the Allies for many years, found her compensation in additions to her colonial empire. She retained much that she had conquered from France or from the allies or dependencies of France, particularly Holland. She occupied Heligoland in the North Sea, Malta and the Ionian Islands in the Mediterranean; Cape Colony in South Africa; Ceylon, Isle of France, Demerara, St. Lucia, Tobago, and Trinidad. It was partially in view of her colonial losses that Holland was indemnified by the annexation of Belgium on the Continent, as already stated.

Another question of great importance, decided at Vienna, was the disposition of Italy. The general principle of action had already been laid down in the Treaty of Paris, that Austria should receive compensation here for the Netherlands, and that the old dynasties should be restored. Austrian interests determined the territorial arrangements. Austria took possession, as has been said, of the richest and, in a military sense, the strongest provinces, Lombardy and Venetia, from which position she could easily dominate the peninsula, especially as the Duchy of Parma was given to Marie Louise, wife of Napoleon, and as princes connected with the Austrian imperial family were restored to their thrones in Modena and Tuscany. The Papal States were also re-established. Austrian influence was henceforth substituted for French throughout the peninsula.

No union or federation of these states was effected, as in


Germany, largely because Austria feared that she would not be allowed the presidency of two confederations. It was Metternich's desire that Italy should simply be a collection of independent states, should be only a "geographical expression." The doctrine of legitimacy, appealed to for the restoration of dynasties, was ignored by this congress of princes in the case of republics. "Republics are no longer fashionable," said the Tsar to a Genoese deputation which came to protest against this arrangement. Genoa and Venice were handed over to others. Romilly mentioned in the English House of Commons that the Corinthian horses which Napoleon had brought from St. Mark's to Paris were restored to the Venetians, but that it was certainly a strange act of justice "to give them back their statues, but not to restore to them those far more valuable possessions, their territory and their republic," which had been wrested from them at the same time.

Other changes in the map of Europe, now made or ratified, were these: Norway was taken from Denmark and joined with Sweden: Switzerland was increased by the addition of three cantons which had recently been incorporated in France, thus making twenty-two cantons in all. The frontiers of Spain and Portugal were left untouched.

Such were the territorial re-adjustments decreed by the Congress of Vienna, and which were destined to endure, with slight changes, for nearly fifty years. It is impossible to discover in these negotiations the operation of any lofty principle. Self-interest is the key to this welter of bargains and agreements. Not that these titled brokers neglected to attempt to convince Europe of the nobility of their endeavors. Great phrases, such as "the reconstruction of the social order," "the regeneration of the political system of Europe," a "durable peace based upon a just division of power," were used by the diplomats of Vienna in order to reassure the peoples of Europe, and to lend an air of dignity and elevation to their august assembly, but the peoples were not deceived. They saw the unedifying scramble of the conquerors for the spoils of victory. No ignominy was spared the people of Germany. The diplomats quarreled over the question whether some of the subjects of certain princes, who were not to be restored, (the mediatized princes), subjects who paid small taxes, were to be reckoned as "whole souls," or "half souls." Germans were indignant as they saw themselves considered merely as numbers and articles of taxation. A German editor denounced this "heartless system of statistics,"







and glorious Blücher grimly compared this congress to the annual cattle fair. The doctrine of legitimacy was one of the rhetorical shibboleths, but, as already said, it was applied only capriciously as suited the Great Powers. Republics need not invoke it, and even kings were curtly excluded from its benefits. Gustavus IV, of Sweden, dethroned, claimed in vain his restoration. The King of Denmark was forced to acquiesce in the grievous dismemberment of his kingdom. For years the monarchs of Europe had denounced Napoleon for respecting neither the rights of princes nor those of peoples. They now paid him the flattery of hearty imitation. They ignored as cavalierly as he had done the prescriptive rights of rulers, whenever it seemed to them advantageous to do so. The principle of nationality which Napoleon had contemned to his own undoing, they treated with similar disdain. It was in defiance of this principle that Austria was given a commanding position in Italy, that Norway was handed from Denmark, whose language she spoke, to Sweden, as compensation for Finland, which the latter was forced to renounce to Russia, and for Pomerania, which she was forced to cede to Prussia, that the Belgians were united with the Dutch.

Europe generally acquiesced willingly in the work of this Congress, ardently desirous as it was, after the long, sickening wars, for peace at almost any price, and that work proved reasonably durable. Yet the settlement of Vienna had pronounced enemies from the start, anxious to overthrow it. Among the disaffected were the French, who saw what they regarded as their natural boundary taken from them. They alone, among the important nations, came forth from this international liquidation with no accessions of territory. Prussia, Russia, Austria, and England, all received additions and important ones. But not so France, and thus relatively to the others France was weakened. For Frenchmen these treaties of 1815 were "odious," and to be torn up when the propitious time should come. Multitudes, also, of Germans and Italians were embittered as they saw their hopes of unity and liberal government turn to ashes. The Belgians resented being handed about without even being consulted. They rose in revolt in 1830, and destroyed this artifice of 1815. The arrangements concerning Germany and Italy were demolished in the great decade of 1860 to 1870.

Though the division of territories and the determination of the map of Europe constituted the main work of the Congress of Vienna, other subjects were passed upon as well. Though it did not abolish the slave trade, it condemned it in a solemn utter-

ance "as contrary to the principles of civilization and human right." It was something to have the traffic thus officially branded. The Congress also established a federal form of government for Germany, which will be described in a succeeding chapter. It adopted certain articles concerning the future organization of Switzerland. The Final Act, codifying the work of the Congress during its many months of activity, was signed June 9, 1815, a few days only before the battle of Waterloo. All the governments of Europe accepted its provisions, except Spain and the Papacy, whose opposition was treated by the others with easy-going indifference.

While the Congress of Vienna was slowly elaborating the system that should succeed the Napoleonic on the basis of a certain balance of power, Napoleon escaped from Elba, made straight for Paris, seized the government of France from the hands of the fleeing Louis XVIII, and entered upon the reign of a "Hundred Days." The Allies once more forgot their wranglings, indignantly gathered themselves together to end this menace once for all, and Waterloo was their reward. This sudden flash had, however, proved the necessity of legislation supplementary to that of the Congress before peace could be considered secure. The first Treaty of Paris had not proved a solid basis for a reconstructed Europe. A restored Bourbon had not been able to keep his throne. Now France must give sufficient bonds that in the future she would not disturb the tranquillity of the Continent. The result was the second Treaty of Paris (November 20, 1815), concluded, like the first, between Louis XVIII, restored once more, and the Allies, but, unlike the first, imposing heavy and humiliating burdens upon France. Her territory was reduced, involving a loss of about half a million inhabitants, though it was still larger than at the outbreak of the Revolution. She was forced to cede a number of strategic posts on her northern and eastern frontier. She was to pay a war indemnity of 700,000,000 francs and eighteen fortresses were to be occupied by 150,000 troops of the Allies for a maximum of five years, a minimum of three, these troops to be supported by the French. It has been estimated that the total cost of the "Hundred Days" to France, resulting from these stipulations and certain additional claims of the Allies, amounted in the end to 1,570,000,000 francs, the equivalent in purchasing power of about 6,000,000,000 francs, as the franc was valued before the great World War.

Before quitting Paris in the fall of this eventful year of 1815, the Allies signed two more documents of great significance in the

future history of Europe, that establishing the so-called Holy Alliance, and that establishing the Quadruple Alliance. The former proceeded from the initiative of Alexander I, of Russia, whose mood was now deeply religious under the influence of the tremendous events of recent years and the fall of Napoleon, which to his mind seemed the swift verdict of a higher power in human destinies. He himself had been freely praised as the White Angel, in contrast to the fallen Black Angel, and he had been called the Universal Saviour. He now submitted a document to his immediate allies, Prussia and Austria, which was famous for a generation, and which gave the popular name to the system of repression which was for many years followed by the powers that had conquered in the late campaign, a document unique in the history of diplomacy. Invoking the name of "the very holy and indivisible Trinity," these three monarchs, "in view of the great events which the last three years have brought to pass in Europe, and in view, especially, of the benefits which it has pleased Divine Providence to confer upon those states whose governments have placed their confidence and their hope in Him alone," having reached the profound conviction that the policy of the powers, in their mutual relations, ought to be guided by the "sublime truths taught by the eternal religion of God our Saviour" solemnly declare "their unchangeable determination to adopt no other rule of conduct, either in the government of their respective countries, or in their political relations with other governments than the precepts of that holy religion, the precepts of justice, charity, and peace"; solemnly declare, also, that those principles "far from being applicable exclusively to private life, ought on the contrary to control the resolutions of princes, and to guide their steps as the sole means of establishing human institutions, and of remedying their imperfections." Henceforth, accordingly, "conformably to the words of Holy Scripture" the three monarchs will consider themselves as brothers and fellow citizens, "united by the bonds of a true and indissoluble fraternity," and will lend "aid and assistance to each other on all occasions and in all places, regarding themselves, in their relations to their subjects and to their armies, as fathers of families." Hence, their "sole principle of conduct" shall be that "of rendering mutual service and testifying by unceasing good will the mutual affection with which they should be animated. Considering themselves all as members of one great Christian nation, the three allied princes look upon themselves as delegates of Providence called upon to govern three

branches of the same family," namely, Austria, Prussia, and Russia. "Their majesties recommend, therefore, to their peoples, as the sole means of enjoying that peace which springs from a good conscience and is alone enduring, to fortify themselves each day in the principles and practice of those duties which the Divine Saviour has taught to men." "All those powers who wish solemnly to make avowal" of these "sacred principles shall be received into this Holy Alliance with as much cordiality as affection."¹

This document, born of the religious emotionalism of the Tsar, has no parallel. Written in the form of a treaty, it imposes none of the practical obligations of a treaty, but is rather a confession of faith and purpose. Diplomats were amazed at its unworldly character. Ultimately, nearly all the powers of Europe signed it, more out of compliment to the Tsar than from any intellectual sympathy. Metternich pronounced it a "sonorous nothing," a "philanthropic aspiration clothed in a religious garb," an "overflow of the pietistic feelings of the Emperor Alexander"; Castlereagh, a "piece of sublime mysticism and nonsense"; Gentz, a bit of "stage decoration." Yet for a generation this Holy Alliance or "diplomatic apocalypse" stood in the mind of the world as the synonym for the régime of absolutism and repression which prevailed in Europe. But that régime was not the outcome of the treaty of the Holy Alliance, but rather that of the treaty of the Quadruple Alliance concluded in the same year. The former was a dead letter from the moment of issue, and did not influence the policy, either domestic or foreign, of any state. Its author, Alexander I, was, moreover, in 1815 a liberal in politics who had been largely instrumental in forcing the restored Bourbon, Louis XVIII, to grant a constitution to France, and who was himself about to grant one to Poland. He was certainly at this moment far from thinking of inaugurating a system of repression. But the latter, the treaty of the Quadruple Alliance, became under the manipulation of Metternich a stern and forbidding reality, as we shall see. The liberal newspapers of the Continent confused the two treaties, naturally enough, as Russia, Austria, and Prussia were signatories of both, and they came to speak with hatred of the Holy Alliance. The name excepted, however, the Holy Alliance is much less important than the Quadruple Alliance concluded November 20, 1815.

¹ Univ. of Penn. *Translations, etc.* I, 3. Edit. by J. H. Robinson.

Napoleon had been overthrown only by collective Europe, bound together in a great coalition. The episode of the "Hundred Days," occurring while the Congress of Vienna was laying the foundations of the new Europe, proved the necessity of the prolongation of that union. Hence, there appeared the "Concert of Powers," which for the next few years is the central fact in the international affairs of Europe. In the eyes of the victorious monarchs there were two dangers menacing the system they were resolved to restore: France as a military power; and "French ideas," the ideas of the Revolution, of the rights of peoples and individuals which, operating upon the masses of the different states, might lead them to attempt to remold the different governments along French lines. Against the first danger ample precautions had been taken. France was now surrounded by a ring of states sufficiently strong in a military sense to hold her in check temporarily, and to prevent any such invasions of the French as had occurred during the previous years. Moreover, many of her frontier fortresses had been taken from her, leaving weak spots in her line of defense, particularly toward Germany. She had also been forced to consent to the occupation of her territory for several years by a large army under the command of the powers that had just humbled her. As if this were not enough, she was herself to pay for the support of those troops, and also to pay a large indemnity. It was believed that all this would be sufficient to compel her to keep the peace, that she would have domestic problems severe and exacting enough to absorb her entire attention.

The control or extinction of the so-called "French ideas" was a more baffling and subtle problem, but one which the Allies felt it necessary to attack. For this purpose they, Russia, Prussia, Austria, and England, signed a Treaty of Alliance on November 20, 1815, engaging to employ all their means to prevent the general tranquillity from being again disturbed, binding themselves "to maintain in full vigor, and should it be necessary, with the whole of their forces," the permanent exclusion of Napoleon and his family from the throne of France, promising to concert necessary measures "in case the same Revolutionary Principles, which upheld the last criminal usurpation," should again, "under other forms, convulse France." Expressing themselves as "uniformly disposed to adopt every salutary measure calculated to secure the tranquillity of Europe by maintaining the order of things re-established in France," they agreed, in order "to consolidate the connections, which at the present

moment so closely unite the four Sovereigns for the happiness of the world," to renew their meetings "at fixed periods . . . under the immediate auspices of the sovereigns themselves or by their respective ministers, for the purpose of consulting upon their interests, or for the consideration of the measures which, at each of these periods, shall be considered the most suitable for the repose and prosperity of Nations and for the maintenance of the Peace of Europe."¹

This was virtually an assertion that the four Great Powers would henceforth control Europe in the interests of the powers they represented. The Alliance whose object had been to overthrow Napoleon, was to be projected into the time of peace. There was thus started that series of congresses which, for the next eight years, exercised a rigid inquisition into the political movements of Europe, and a pitiless repression of such movements as appeared dangerous. This alliance was contracted with a view particularly to keeping France harmless. The important provision is that concerning future congresses, and it was the institutionalization of these congresses in the interest of reaction, the transformation of this alliance into an engine of universal repression, brought about by the adroit diplomacy of Metternich, that made the powers which consistently co-operated, and had first signed the Treaty of the Holy Alliance, Russia, Prussia, and Austria, so odious to the Liberals of the Continent. In 1815 this Quadruple Alliance appeared as a warning only to France, but the congress held under the agreement disclosed a compact of the three eastern states against the spirit of reform everywhere. England's policy rapidly diverged, as we shall see, from that of her allies.

The fate of Europe in the period after 1815 was largely controlled by the powers that had thus proclaimed the principles of the Christian religion their favorite rule of conduct, yet the probable character of their policy could be more accurately foretold by a study of the character of their rulers rather than of the biblical principles to which they were amiably inclined to append their signatures. Each was an absolute monarch, recognizing no trammels upon his power, save such as he himself might be willing to concede. To each the fundamental idea of the Revolution, the sovereignty of the people, was incomprehensible and loathsome. Each had suffered repeatedly and grievously from that Revolution. Each was sure to be its enemy, should

¹ Quotations are from Treaty of Alliance and Friendship. Signed Paris, November 20, 1815. Hertslet, *Map of Europe by Treaty*, I, 372-375.

it break forth again. Yet there were variations. The Emperor of Russia, Alexander I, appeared, in 1815, the most powerful monarch of Europe. Young, imaginative, impressionable, he had received in his early education a tincture of western liberalism which, in the years immediately after Waterloo, seemed likely to deepen. This at first made Metternich regard him as little less than a Jacobin, all the more dangerous because crowned. Yet he was known as changeable, as egoistic, as influenced by fear. Frederick William III, King of Prussia, slow, timid, conceiving government in a parental, patriarchal sense, was a weak ruler, but a ruler whose views were those of the eighteenth century, who did not see the change that had come over the world, who was disposed to plod along contentedly in the traditional path of the absolute Prussian monarchy, distrusting innovations, deferential toward Austria. The other member of the Holy Alliance was Francis I, of Austria, the most narrow-minded, liberal of the three. He, too, had learned nothing from the aggestive vicissitudes of his career. His mind was commonplace, barren, even mean. The spirit of his rule is mirrored in certain well-known utterances: "The whole world is mad and wants new constitutions." "Keep yourselves," he said to a group of professors in 1821, "to what is old, for that is good; if our ancestors have proved it to be good why should not we do as they did? New ideas are now coming forward of which I do not nor ever shall approve. Mistrust these ideas and keep to the positive. I have no need of learned men. I want faithful subjects. Be such: that is your duty. He who would serve me must do what I command. He who cannot do this, or who comes full of new ideas, may go his way. If he does not I shall send him."

Though Francis I was a commonplace character he possessed in his chief minister, Prince Metternich, a man far out of the ordinary, a man who appeared to the generation that lived between 1815 and 1848 as the most commanding personality of Europe, whose importance is shown by the phrases, "era of Metternich," "system of Metternich." He was the central figure not only in Austrian and German politics, but in European diplomacy, dominating his age as Napoleon had dominated his, though by a very different process. Metternich was the most famous statesman Austria produced in the nineteenth century. A man of high rank, wealthy, polished, he was the prince of diplomatists "without a peer in his age or in his style," says a French historian and critic, "who deserved to govern Europe

as long as Europe deserved to be governed by diplomacy. In this respect everything about him is interesting. . . . Metternich remains by exterior grace, by the excellence of tone, the perfection of attitude, and the subtle knowledge of the proprieties, an incomparable master. The great comedy of the world, the high intriguing of the European stage, has never had so fertile an author, an actor so consummate."¹

Metternich's reputation was based on his long and tortuous diplomatic duel with Napoleon. Claiming to have correctly read that bewildering personality from his earliest observation of him, and to have lured him slowly yet inevitably to his doom by playing skilfully upon his weaknesses, Metternich considered himself the conqueror of the conqueror. An achievement so notable imposed upon many, nor did Metternich do aught to dim the brilliancy of the exploit. His imperturbability, his prescience, his diplomatic dexterity were everywhere praised. He came to be considered the one great oracle, whose every word was full of meaning, if only you could get it. Diplomats bowed like acolytes before this master of their craft, and rulers also made their obeisance, though somewhat more slowly, as obviously befitted those who ruled by nothing less than divine right. A few years after 1815, Alexander I, of Russia, whose liberal vagaries had sorely tried this infallible high priest, made his penance. "You are not altered," he said. "I am. You have nothing to regret, but I have."

Metternich played this lofty rôle with becoming gravity and grandeur. His cynicism, so corroding for his contemporaries, never turned upon himself. Humility is hardly a proper weakness for a primate. No adulation could equal his own self-appreciation. He speaks of himself as being born "to prop up the decaying structure" of European society. He feels the world resting on his shoulders. "My position has this peculiarity," he says, "that all eyes, all expectations are directed to precisely that point where I happen to be." He asks the question: "Why, among so many million men, must I be the one to think when others do not think, to act when others do not act, and to write because others know not how." Traveling in Italy in 1817, he records: "My presence in Italy produces an incalculable effect." Traveling in Germany in 1818, he notes: "I came to Frankfort like the Messiah." Elsewhere he says: "Happy is he who can say of himself that he has never strayed

¹ Sorel, *Essais d'Histoire et de Critique*, 21-22.

from the path of eternal law. Such testimony, my conscience cannot refuse me." His assurance stood the test of all experience. Even in 1848, after the revolutions of Italy and Germany, the abdication of his emperor, and his own overthrow and flight to London, he said: "My mind has never entertained error."

As an historical figure Metternich's importance consists in his execration of the French Revolution. His life-long rôle was that of incessant, lynx-eyed opposition to everything comprehended in the word. He lavished upon it a wealth of metaphorical denunciation. It was "the disease which must be cured, the volcano which must be extinguished, the gangrene which must be burned out with the hot iron, the hydra with jaws open to swallow up the social order." He had a horror of parliaments and representative régimes. "France and England," he said, "may be considered as countries without a government." He defined himself as the man of the status quo. His was a doctrine of pure immobility. The new ideas ought never to have come into the world, but the past could not be helped. Prevention of their further spread was, he felt, the imperative requirement of European politics. He was the minister of European conservatism. His strength lay in the fact that repose was the passionate desire of the men of 1815. Nothing seemed more fearful to Europe than a recurrence of war. Only it was safe to say that a Europe, invigorated, electrified as this had been, however exhausted, however desirous of rest for the time being, would not be willing to be forever quiescent. The ideal of immobility as a permanent thing is the paralysis of thought. Metternich failed in the end, though for a while Europe was blinded by his success, because, while he could imprison revolutionists, he could not imprison ideas. He failed to understand the impalpable forces of his age.

Considering the work of the Congress of Vienna as largely his, his concrete task was, henceforth, to consolidate that work, to repel all attacks upon it. He saw only one side of the Revolution, the destructive. The constructive side he never understood. This, however, was for the future the more important. A comprehension of it was most essential for a statesman who felt the world resting on his shoulders.

How Metternich worked out his system will be seen in succeeding chapters. His lever was Austria. Austria's legal rights and commanding authority in Germany and Italy, and his own remarkable powers of persuasion, suggestion, and intimidation were the instruments used in the erection of the international fabric which took its name from him.

CHAPTER II

REACTION IN AUSTRIA AND GERMANY

AUSTRIA emerged from the Napoleonic wars stronger, larger, more populous than ever. She had been repeatedly shattered, her boundaries repeatedly redefined during the last twenty years, but the result was favorable. She had relinquished her possessions in the Netherlands (modern Belgium) and some of her westernmost German lands, but had been indemnified by lands in Germany and Italy, which were contiguous and more advantageous. At the very moment that her great German rival, Prussia, was becoming more straggling and loosely extended, Austria was attaining a territorial compactness she had never before enjoyed. Planted firmly upon the Alps and the Carpathians, and with an extensive coast line along the Adriatic, she was admirably situated for an assertive rôle in European politics.

The Austrian Empire, however, presented to the eye certain complexities, offered by no other state in Europe, a knowledge of which is essential to an understanding of her history in the nineteenth century. The empire was conspicuously lacking in homogeneity, political, racial, or social. It was not a single nation like France but was composed of many nations. To the west lay the Austrian duchies, chiefly German, the ancient possessions of the House of Hapsburg; to the north Bohemia, an ancient kingdom acquired by the Hapsburgs in 1526; to the east the Kingdom of Hungary, occupying the immense plain of the middle Danube; to the south the Kingdom of Lombardy-Venetia, purely Italian. None of these even was a unit but each was composed of several parts. Bohemia included, beside Bohemia proper, Moravia and Silesia; Hungary included far to the east the principality of Transylvania, and to the southwest the kingdom of Croatia. Many of these constituent elements preserved special privileges, thus rendering the government confused and unequal.

More important still was the fact that this empire was inhabited by many peoples which differed greatly in origin, in language, in history, in customs and institutions. At best these racial and linguistic differences rendered difficult, if not impos-

sible, the growth of a national consciousness, a common patriotism; at the worst they might become mutually antagonistic and tend to disrupt the empire. The two leading races were the Germans, forming the body of the population in the Austrian duchies, and the Magyars, originally an Asiatic folk, encamped in the Danube valley since the ninth century, and forming the dominant people in Hungary. Yet also in the eastern part of Hungary were Roumanians, reputed descendants of early Roman colonists and speaking a language of Latin origin, and there were Slavic peoples north and south of the Germans and Magyars in both Austria and Hungary. In this medley of states, races, and languages there lay numberless possible causes of division and contention. They had almost nothing in common save allegiance to the emperor and, for most of them, to the Roman Catholic Church. If the desire for a separate national life should spring up among these various peoples, the Empire might be disrupted, would at any rate be transformed. In 1815, however, there was not the rivalry in nationality and language that later became so acute.

This empire was not a German empire, though it had the appearance of so being. The Germans were the most influential element, the ruling house was German, Vienna, the capital, was a German city, the German language was used for official intercourse. An attempt had been made in the eighteenth century, under Joseph II, thoroughly to Germanize the empire, but it had completely and quickly failed and it was not likely to be made again in the nineteenth century, as the balance between the German and the non-German elements had been altered since, considerably in favor of the latter. The Germans were in a decided numerical minority, but by reason of their greater wealth, intelligence, and general advancement they remained the leading element in the state. But the nineteenth century was to see their leadership contested and gradually weakened by the rise of strong national and race movements in Hungary and Bohemia. The Slavs formed the majority of the population of the entire empire, but they were not homogeneous, were geographically scattered, were in civilization inferior, and were for the time quiescent.

To rule so conglomerate a realm of twenty-eight or twenty-nine million people was a task of great difficulty. This was the first problem of Francis I (1792-1835) and Metternich. Their policy in the main was to keep things as they were. To innovate was to enter a lane that might know no turning. They made no attempt to reform the government. They allowed the

various parts of the political machine to continue, lacking as it was in symmetry and in efficiency. This machinery was both chaotic and unscientific. There was no central, coherent cabinet, or group of ministers. There were, of course, various departments, but some had jurisdiction over the whole empire, some only over parts. In any case the boundaries were not carefully defined. Government was exceedingly slow, cumbrous, disjointed, inefficient.

Austria was now the classic land of the old régime. Her boundaries had been repeatedly changed at the hands of Napoleon, but the internal structure of the state and of society had remained unaltered. The people were sharply divided into classes, each resting on a different legal basis. Of these the nobility occupied a highly privileged position. They enjoyed freedom from compulsory military service, large exemptions from taxation, a practical monopoly of the best offices in the state. They possessed a large part of the land, from which in many cases they drew enormous revenues. Upon their estates they exercised many of the same feudal rights as had their ancestors, such as those of the police power and of administering justice through their own courts. They exacted the *corvée* and other services from the peasants. The condition of the peasants, indeed, who formed the immense mass of the population, was deplorable. It has been stated that in Bohemia, for instance, they owed half of their time and two-thirds of their crops to the lords, and in certain parts it was not uncommon for human beings and cattle to be sheltered by the same roof. The peasants had indeed been refused the right to purchase release from their heaviest burdens. These were the two classes into which Austrian society was divided, for the bourgeoisie, or middle class, was only slightly developed and of little importance. Industry was in a backward state, hampered at every point by official regulations.

There were throughout the empire various local bodies called estates, which, however, constituted no real check upon the absolutism of the central government. They in no sense constituted local self-government. They were composed almost entirely of nobles, and their powers were slight. Their sessions were brief, perfunctory, and furnished no political training. Hungary occupied a somewhat special position. She had a central Diet or parliament and long-established county governments. They, however, were no great barrier to the working of the central government, which, indeed, for thirteen years, from 1812 to 1825, refused in spite of the law to call the Diet together. Moreover,

these Hungarian assemblies did not represent the Hungarian people but merely the privileged classes. Absolutism in government, feudalism in society, special privileges for the favored few, oppression and misery for the masses, such was the condition of Austria in 1815.

It was the fixed purpose of the Government to maintain things as they were and it succeeded largely for thirty-three years, during the reign of Francis I, till 1835, and of his successor, Ferdinand I (1835-48). During all this period Metternich was the chief minister, the accomplished and resourceful representative of the status quo. His system, at war with human nature, at war with the modern spirit, rested upon a meddlesome and ubiquitous police, upon elaborate espionage, upon a vigilant censorship of ideas. The head of this department boasted that he had "perfected" the system of Fouché, an achievement similar to that of painting the lily. Censorship was applied to theaters, newspapers, books. The frontiers were guarded that foreign books of a liberal character might not slip in to corrupt. Political science and history practically disappeared as serious studies. Spies were everywhere, in government offices, in places of amusement, in educational institutions. Particularly did this Government fear the universities, because it feared ideas. Professors and students were subjected to humiliating regulations. Spies attended lectures. The Government insisted on having a complete list of the books that each professor took out of the university library. Text-books were prescribed. Foreign scholars might not be appointed to professional positions, nor even become tutors in private families. Students might not study in foreign universities, nor might they have societies of their own. A clerical inquisition was added to that of the police. Students must attend church and go to confession at stated times. Confession papers were required at all examinations. Confession became a regular business for poor students, who sold their papers to comrades needing them on such occasions. As examination periods approached such papers rose and fell according to supply and demand, like stocks and bonds. Obviously, under a system where there was no freedom of teaching or of learning, science withered. It was accordingly perfectly appropriate for a friend of Metternich to congratulate him on the entire exclusion of the scientific spirit from the universities of Austria. Austrians might not travel to foreign countries without the permission of the Government, which was rarely given. Austria was sealed as nearly hermetically as possible against the liberal

thought of Europe. Intellectual stagnation was the price paid. A system like this needed careful bolstering at every moment and at every point. The best protection for the Austrian system was to extend it to other countries. Having firmly established it at home, Metternich labored with great skill and temporary success to apply it in surrounding countries, in Germany through the Diet and the state governments, in Italy through interventions and treaties, binding Italian states not to follow policies opposed to the Austrian, and in general by bringing about a close accord of the Great Powers on this illiberal basis.

We shall now trace the application of this conception of government in other countries. This will serve among other things to show the dominant position of the Danubian empire in Europe from 1815 to 1848. Vienna, the seat of rigid conservatism, was now the center of European affairs, as Paris, the home of revolution, had been for so long.

GERMANY

One of the most remarkable changes of the nineteenth century was the transformation of Germany, from a loose and inefficient federation into an imposing, powerful empire. Germany, like Italy, was long a geographical expression rather than a nation. The map of Germany was for centuries the wonder of the world. It was a tangle of lilliputian and irrational states, many of them "archeological curiosities." Since the outbreak of the Revolutionary Wars these had disappeared in large numbers, greedily absorbed by their more powerful neighbors. Thus the knights of the empire, the ecclesiastical states, and nearly all the free cities, had disappeared, so that between 1798 and 1815 the number of German states had decreased to less than forty. This work of simplification had been largely furthered by the spirit of aggrandizement of the German princes themselves, who were anxious to increase their dominions, no matter by what means, and who eagerly co-operated with Napoleon, the purpose of whose manipulations was not the welfare of Germany. The German states of 1815 were of all shapes and sizes and of various denominations. There were free cities, electorates, margravates, duchies, grand duchies, and five kingdoms, Prussia, Hanover, Saxony, Württemberg, and Bavaria. The last three had been raised to regal rank by the all-powerful Napoleon, and at his fall it was found impossible to reduce to duchies again what he had so greatly exalted.

Down to 1806 the German states had been bound together in

a loose union called the Holy Roman Empire, about which clustered the brilliant, but diaphanous, unsubstantial memories of centuries. That had been succeeded from 1806 to 1813 by the Confederation of the Rhine, a creation and instrument of Napoleon, which included ultimately nearly all Germany except the two great states, Prussia and Austria. This confederation fell with its creator, and the question of the future organization was one much discussed at the Congress of Vienna and settled there, not by the restoration of the Holy Roman Empire, which many advocated, but by the erection of the so-called German Confederation, composed of thirty-eight states.¹ The central organ of the government was to be a Diet, meeting at Frankfort. This was to consist not at all of representatives chosen by the people, but of delegates appointed by the different sovereigns and serving during their pleasure. They were to be not deputies empowered to decide questions, but simply diplomatic representatives, voting as their princes might direct. Austria was always to have the presidency of this body. The method of procedure within the Diet was complicated and exceedingly cumbrous. It sat sometimes as an Ordinary Assembly, sometimes as a General Assembly or Plenum. The difference was mainly in the character of the business transacted and in the method of voting. In the former only ordinary business was considered and matters were decided by a majority vote. Each of the eleven large states had one vote, while the remaining states were divided into six groups, called *curiæ*, each group having a single vote. There were thus seventeen votes in all. In the Plenum were considered all questions of greater importance. Here a two-thirds vote was necessary for a decision. The total number of votes was sixty-nine, divided among the different states. Austria, Prussia, Saxony, Bavaria, Hanover, and Würtemberg, had four each, others three, two, and each state had at least one. The distribution was grossly unfair if it was intended to show the relative importance of the several states. Prussia and Austria, great European powers, had no more weight than Saxony, a small state, and only four times as much as Liechtenstein, a state of a few thousand inhabitants. Thus it came about that the seven larger states, having five-sixths of the population of Germany, could be outvoted decisively by the smaller states representing one-sixth.


¹ Made 39 by the admission of Hesse-Homburg in 1817, remaining such only until 1825, when the line of Saxe-Gotha died out. Reduced by subsequent extinction of other houses to 33 before its dissolution in 1866.

The Congress of Vienna, having thus created an assembly, did not proceed to define its powers. The jurisdiction of the Diet was left to be decided by the Diet itself. It was decided that the first business of the Diet should be the framing of the fundamental laws of the confederation and the establishment of the organic institutions. This might seem to be unduly elastic and to be giving to the assembly an opportunity to claim the largest powers for itself. But this was not to be feared, as in the adoption and in the change of any fundamental law, a unanimous vote was required, and all the delegates were dependent upon home governments which were averse to a strong union and which had now the absolute power to prevent the rise of one.

This Federal Act did not create a fatherland. There was no king or emperor of Germany. There was no German flag. No one was, properly speaking, a German citizen. He was a Prussian, or Austrian, or Bavarian citizen, as the case might be. The federal government had no diplomatic representatives in the other countries of Europe, but each state had, or could have, its own diplomatic corps. The German as German had no legal standing abroad,—only as a citizen of a separate state that might, but generally did not, command respect. Each state had the right to make alliances of every kind with the others or with non-German states. The only serious obligation they assumed toward each other was that they should enter into no engagement that should be directed against the safety of the Confederation or that of any individual state within the union; that they should not make war upon each other upon any pretext, but should submit their contentions to the Diet; that if the Confederation should declare war, all the states should support it, and that none should negotiate separately with the enemy or alone make peace.

Such was the constitution given to Germany by the Congress of Vienna. It created a government in which obstruction was easy, positive action very difficult. Each state possessed powers of delaying decisions of the Diet interminably, even, in many cases, of rendering them impossible. Moreover this government, weak as it was, was not even purely German. Three rulers of foreign states were members of it and could influence its deliberations, particularly in those cases where an individual veto would prove decisive, that is, in all the most fundamental and organic matters. The king of England was represented for Hanover, a possession of the English royal family; the king of





Denmark for Holstein, the king of the Netherlands for Luxemburg. Prussia and Austria too might be influenced to look upon the Confederation in the light of their international position and interests, Austria particularly, as only one-third of the Austrian Empire was within the bounds of the Confederation. The other two-thirds, mainly non-German, were not included, yet their interests might dictate the policy of the Austrian delegates. Thus Hungarians, Poles, and Italians might indirectly influence the determination of purely German questions in the German Diet. The international rather than national character of this Confederation was further manifested in the fact that the chief articles of the Federal Act establishing it were inserted in the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna, and as such were under the collective guaranty of the powers and therefore presumably not to be altered without their consent.

It is clear that a Germany so organized was not a nation but only a loose confederation of states expressly declared to be independent and sovereign, a confederation designed simply for mutual protection, and poorly adapted even for that. "Judged by the requirements of a practical political organization," says von Sybel, "this German Act of Confederation, produced with so much effort, possessed about all the faults that can render a constitution utterly useless." He adds that it "was received by the German nation at large, partly with cold indifference, and partly with patriotic indignation."

This indignation was vehemently felt by the Liberals, who, under the influence of the tremendous struggles with Napoleon, had come passionately to demand a close and firm union of all Germans that thus they might realize in their institutions and in the face of all the world the greatness which they felt was in them. The exaltation of the final struggle with Napoleon had only heightened the demand of the more progressive spirits for national unity, that thus Germany might never henceforth be subjected to the humiliations of the past at the hands of foreigners. This longing for unity and strength, which in the patriotic atmosphere of the late wars had seemed so near realization, was now seen to be a hope deferred. German unity was, according to Metternich, an "infamous object," and the views of the diplomats at Vienna were more those of Metternich than of the Liberals. The latter were indignant at what they called the great deception of Vienna, and their bitterness was to be a factor in the later development of Germany.

That they were from the very force of circumstances, the

very nature of existing conditions, inevitably destined to disappointment we can see more clearly than did they, swept along as they were by the strong patriotic current of the hour, little appreciating the bewildering, baffling complexity of their problem. The object they aimed at was one of supreme difficulty. German unity was not simply a matter of sentiment, however fine and just, but was a hard, practical question only to be answered, if at all, by ripe political sense and wisdom. It involved the adjustment of many conflicting and perhaps irreconcilable interests. Traditions, centuries old, must be overcome. Mere inertia was a powerful obstacle. And another was the fact that the future of Germany was not left for the Germans to work out alone. It was a part of the work of the Congress of Vienna, of the general settlement of Europe. This brought it about that the Act of Federation was hastily framed and that, too, partially by powers careless of German interests or hostile to them. It was no desire of neighboring states to have a strong and united Germany. But the main obstacle lay in one of the oldest, most persistent facts of German political life and history, the strong states-rights or particularist feeling. No effective union could be established unless the various members would surrender some of their authority. Not one of the German princes was willing to pay the price. Austria, more non-German than German, could not for that very reason hope to be the supreme power in a really united Germany, therefore she favored a loose union wherein she might, by playing upon rival passions, enjoy a lesser leadership. Prussia could not be given the leadership in a new empire, as Austria would not consent and the lesser states would be alarmed. Obviously, none of the smaller states could hope to exercise a power they would not grant to either of the greater. Moreover, they believed that any sacrifice of sovereignty would only leave them exposed to the aggrandizing passions of the great. At first these lesser states, indeed, wished to be entirely independent, to have no union at all, even that of a loose confederation. The conclusive argument against this was that Germany must at least be strong enough so that no second series of events like that of the Napoleonic invasions and conquests should again occur.

Thus it is seen that the radical evil of the German situation was the particularism or excessive individualism of the states. This was nothing new, but had been for centuries the most powerful fact. This feeling was now even more pronounced than ever, for the reason that the lesser states had latterly

grown stronger by their absorption of their neighbors in the period just elapsed. National unity had been wrecked by it. It could only be restored, says Sybel, by the further extreme development of this spirit — till one state should become so large that it would overshadow all the rest and force them to recognize its ascendancy — then the selfishness of one would end in the unity of all. Now the unity of England and France had been brought about in precisely this way, by the absorption by one state of all its rivals, but the outcome of German evolution had been peculiar, in that it had seen the rise of two great powers, not one, Prussia and Austria, neither able to conquer or push the other aside, and each most jealous of any increase of the other's power. Such was the play of ambition and interest, baffling the ingenuity and ability of those who desired a real and fruitful union of all Germans. A Prussian field-marshal, Clausewitz, wrote about this time: "Germany can achieve political unity only in one way, by the sword; by one of its states subjugating all the others," a thought put later into a more resounding phrase by Bismarck, and expressing approximately the method by which unity was finally achieved. But so hard a doctrine lay beyond the range of understanding of the early nineteenth century.

The Liberals of Germany, eager for national unity, thus suffered a severe defeat at Vienna. They were given a confederation, looser than that of the Holy Roman Empire, and with none of the glory and lustre of the latter, a union only nominal, inefficient, and prosaic, containing no vital force. The Liberals were also eager for reforms within the states, for constitutional government, for parliaments with real powers, for the end of absolutism. Here again they were disappointed. They had hoped to get a mandatory provision in the Federal Act establishing representative legislatures in each one of the states of Germany. In appealing to his people to rally around him in the war against Napoleon, the King of Prussia had very recently promised his people a constitution and had urged at the Congress of Vienna that the Federal Act should require every member of the Confederation to grant a representative constitution to his subjects within a year. Metternich, even more opposed to free political institutions than to a strong central government, succeeded in thwarting the reformers at this point also, by having this explicit and mandatory declaration made vague and lifeless. Thus the famous Article XIII of the Federal Act was made to read: "A constitution based upon the system of estates will

be established in all the states of the union." The character of the new constitutions was not sketched; and the time limit was omitted. A journalist was justified in saying that all that was guaranteed to the German people was an "unlimited right of expectation." The future was to show the vanity even of expectation, the hollowness of even so mild a promise. The Liberals had desired something more substantial than hope. Austria and Prussia, the two leading states, governing the great mass of the German people, never executed this provision. Nor did many of the smaller states.

Germany, then, in 1815, consisted of thirty-eight loosely connected states. Some of these were very large, some exceedingly small. Prussia and Austria ranked with the greatest powers of Europe. Some of them were old, had their individual history, traditions, and prestige. Others were new, or had recently undergone such sweeping changes as to be practically new. Their future was highly problematical. Their boundaries were intertwined and complicated. Some were what are called enclaves, that is, were entirely surrounded by another state, having no egress to the outside world save through the neighbor's territory. Economic life could not flourish owing to the tariffs and change of coinage that met merchant and trader at every border, and owing also to the wretched means of communication and transportation. These states presented many varieties of governments. There were some where absolutism prevailed, where the prince was the law-giver, the executor, and the judge, ruling without the aid of any assembly, without outside restraints. Such were the two greatest, Austria and Prussia, and such were several of the smaller. There were others where the prince was assisted in his work by assemblies, bodies which the people had no right to claim, but which the ruler in his condescension saw fit to call about him, in no sense popular bodies, chosen by the people, but composed mainly of nobles. These exercised little control over the acts of the prince, but were at least in a position to present grievances. Most of the states of Germany, as Hanover, Mecklenburg, and Saxony, were of this kind. There were other states where the prince granted a written constitution, somewhat after the French model, providing for an elective assembly to which was given some power over the government's proposals for taxes and laws. Such an assembly was not to control the Government, as did the English Parliament, by forcing the ruler to choose his ministers from persons satisfactory to it. The prince was the government in every instance

but he preferred to ask the co-operation of his people up to a certain point, and he granted them rights, such as freedom of the press and of speech, which were coming to be more and more demanded by Europeans generally. Saxe-Weimar was the most prominent state of this class. Its prince received the sincere laudation of the Liberals and the sincere aversion of Metternich.

In none of these systems was the principle of popular sovereignty recognized. Germany was thoroughly monarchical. The only question was whether monarchy should undergo a change of nature more or less extensive, or should assert its old prerogatives in all their fulness. After the disappointments of the Vienna Congress the Liberals of Germany pinned their hope to the increase of states of the Saxe-Weimar class. It was clear that Germans were not to have unity. Might they not have political and civil liberty? There seemed some ground for optimism. Constitutions were granted in the states of southern Germany in the next few years, in Bavaria and Baden in 1818, in Würtemberg in 1819, and in Hesse-Darmstadt in 1820. It matters not whether the princes granted these for selfish reasons in order to gain popular support for a struggle which they felt was imminent with their more powerful colleagues, Prussia and Austria, for the advantage to their people remained the same.

But it soon became evident after 1815 that while there were signs of progress there were more signs of a menacing reaction. Austria having set her house in order, having put a Chinese wall about her empire, marked innovation in the neighboring lands for special hostility when the favorable moment should arrive. Metternich's programme was stated in one of his confidential reports to his Emperor: "We must lead Germany to adopt our principles without our appearing to impose those principles upon her." This could not be done abruptly and harshly. Two personages were too powerful to be treated summarily, Alexander I of Russia and Frederick William III of Prussia. The former was in 1815 nothing less than a "Jacobin" in Metternich's opinion, as he was himself granting a constitution to Poland and favoring constitutionalism in Germany and Italy and elsewhere. Reaction could not be successful unless he should come to see the error of his ways. The King of Prussia had promised a constitution to his country as explicitly as a man could. Metternich was pre-eminently a man who knew how to bide his time, and who knew how, when the proper moment arrived, to strike hard. His time was not long in coming. Frederick William III was both procrastinating and timid.

Moreover, the reactionary party shortly after 1815 won ascendancy at his court. Two years went by before he appointed the special committee to undertake the preparation of the promised constitution. Its report after a long and slow investigation was unfavorable to the project, which was finally allowed to drop. The Prussian Government slipped back easily into the old familiar autocratic grooves. According to Metternich the king's chief mental trait was "the repressive," and this gradually reasserted itself. More important was the change in Alexander I, who by 1818, for reasons that are somewhat obscure, had gone over to conservatism. With the rulers of Russia and Prussia in this state of mind Metternich's course was made easy. He was able to use certain current events to render himself incontestably the dominant personality in Europe, and to secure the prevalence of the Austrian principles of government far beyond the confines of Austria itself.

The years immediately succeeding 1815 were years of restlessness and uncertainty. The German Liberals were, as we have seen, indignant at the "great deception" of Vienna. But they hoped that at least the various states of Germany might be reformed along constitutional lines. Article XIII of the Federal Act rendered this possible, though it did not, to their great regret, ensure it. Here again was hope deferred, for as the years went by the signs that little had been gained in the direction of larger liberty multiplied. Only a few states entered the new path. The large ones stood aloof, and in many of the small ones the old régime was restored in its entirety by the returning princes and with a lamentable lack of humor. The disappointment of Liberals was intense, their criticism trenchant. The chief seat of disaffection was found in the universities and in newspapers edited by university men. As the subjection of these centers of agitation was to be the main object of Metternich's German policy, it is well to describe their activity.

The students of Jena had during the Napoleonic wars founded a society called the Burschenschaft, whose purpose was the inculcation of an intense national patriotism, the constant exaltation of the ideal of a common fatherland. Societies were nothing new in German universities, but the previous ones, the Corps, had included in their membership only those coming from the same state or province. They thus preserved that sense of localism which was the bane of German life. The Burschenschaft was based on the opposite principle of membership derived from all the different states, thus ignoring local lines, and teaching

a larger duty, a larger devotion, a larger idea of association. Glowing patriotism was the characteristic of the new organization. It soon succeeded in establishing chapters in sixteen universities. It was decided to hold a meeting of representatives of all the chapters and to give it the character of a patriotic celebration. The place chosen was the Wartburg, a castle famous as the shelter of Luther after his outlawry at the Diet of Worms, and the date chosen was October 18, 1817, famous as being the fourth anniversary of the battle of Leipsic, and approximately the three hundredth of the posting of Luther's Theses. Several hundred students met. Their festival was religious as well as patriotic. They partook of the Lord's Supper together and listened to impassioned speeches commemorating the great moments in German history, the liberation from Rome and the liberation from Napoleon. In the evening they built a bonfire and threw into it various symbols of the hated reaction, notably an illiberal pamphlet of which the King of Prussia had expressed his approval. They then dispersed, but their deed lived after them. This student performance had unexpected consequences. What was apparently a harmless and exuberant jollification seemed to conservative rulers and statesmen evidence of an unhealthy and dangerous ferment of opinion, and the rumors that gained currency about this celebration made it famous. It enjoyed a reputation altogether out of proportion to its real importance, which was slight. Metternich described it to the German rulers as a portent of far greater dangers sure to come. Shortly an event much more alarming occurred which seemed to justify this prognostication, the murder of Kotzebue, a journalist and playwright, who was hated by the students as a spy of Russia in Germany. A divinity student, Karl Sand, went to his house in Mannheim and stabbed him in the heart, March 23, 1819. Later an attempt was made to assassinate an important official of the government of Nassau. These and other occurrences played perfectly into the hands of Metternich, who was seeking the means of establishing reaction in Germany as it had been established in Austria. They gave him what he most needed, a weapon whereby to dissuade Alexander I and Frederick William III from all further toying with liberalism and to convert the Holy Alliance, hitherto a mere trumpet for biblical phrases, into an engine of oppression. Were not all of these occurrences manifestations of the same anarchical spirit, the desire to overthrow monarchical institutions? All were indiscriminately ascribed to the Burschenschaft, whereas it had only been responsible for the

Wartburg festival. The steps now taken to combat liberalism, which was charged with such unequal misdeeds, form a landmark in German history.

Metternich, having previously had an interview with Frederick William III, in which he was assured of the latter's support in the policy to be outlined to silence the opposition, called the ministers of those German governments of which he felt sure to a series of conferences at Carlsbad. In these conferences was fashioned the triumph of reaction in Germany. By the decrees which were adopted Metternich became the conqueror of the Confederation. Only eight states were represented, those upon which Metternich could count. The decrees there drawn up were then submitted to the Diet at Frankfort, all the customary modes of procedure of that body were cast aside, and a vote with no preceding debate was forced, so that the representatives of the states who had not been at Carlsbad did not have time to ask instructions of their Governments. Thus the decrees, rushed by illegal and violent methods through the Diet, became the law of Germany, binding upon every state. They were the work of Austria, seconded by Prussia. The small states resented the indignity to which they had been subjected but could do nothing. Carlsbad signifies in German history the suppression of liberty for a generation. As these decrees really determined the political system of Germany until 1848, they merit a full description.

It was stated once for all that the famous Article XIII of the act establishing the German Confederation, namely, that "a constitution based upon the system of estates will be established in all the states of the union" should not be interpreted as meaning constitutions of a foreign pattern, but representation of estates such as had been customary in German states even earlier. It was the earnest desire of the Liberals to get away from such old and useless assemblies. The great forces active against the prevalence of Metternich's system were free parliaments, free speech, and a free press. It was hoped that the first of these was thus prevented.

It was next provided that there should be at every university in the land a special representative to watch both professors and students. The function of these agents should be "to see to the strictest enforcement of existing laws and disciplinary regulations; to observe carefully the spirit which is shown by the instructors in the university in their public lectures and regular courses, and, without directly interfering in scientific matters, or in the methods of teaching, to give a salutary direction to

the instruction, having in view the future attitude of the students." It was provided that all teachers who should "propagate harmful doctrines hostile to public order or subversive of existing governmental institutions," that is, all who should not hold absolutism, as Metternich understood it, to be the only legitimate form of government, should be removed from their positions, and that once so removed they should not be appointed to positions in any other educational institution in any state. Other provisions were directed against secret or unauthorized societies in the universities, particularly that "association established some years since under the name" of the Burschenschaft, "since the very conception of the society implies the utterly unallowable plan of permanent fellowship and constant communication between the various universities." Furthermore "no student, who shall be expelled from a university by a decision of the University Senate which was ratified or prompted by the agent of the government, or who shall have left the institution in order to escape such a decision, shall be received in any other university."¹

By these provisions it was expected that the entire academic community, professors and students, would be reduced to silence. The universities had become the centers of political agitation. That agitation would now cease under compulsion. There was one other enemy, the press, and drastic provisions were adopted to smother its independence beneath a comprehensive censorship. Finally, a special commission was created to ferret out all secret revolutionary societies and conspiracies that might threaten the nation, and this commission was to have full powers to examine and arrest any German, no matter of what state he might be a citizen. It discovered very little, but it pursued for years a policy as vexatious as it was petty.

The Carlsbad Conference is an important turning point in the history of central Europe. It signalized the dominance of Metternich in Germany as well as in Austria. Its most important feature is the surrender of Prussia to Austrian leadership. Down to 1819 there was ground for hope that Prussia might be a leader, though a cautious one, in the liberalization of Germany. That hope now vanished. Reaction was henceforth the order of the day in this great state. Frederick William III shortly abandoned definitely all idea of granting the constitution which he had promised in 1815. In the period of national humiliation

¹ Quotations are from *University of Pennsylvania Translations and Reprints*, Vol. I, No. 3. Edited by J. H. Robinson.

from 1807 to 1813 a notably liberal spirit had characterized the actions of the Prussian Government. Many reforms had been effected at the instigation of such men as Stein. But the period was too brief and the reforms remained incomplete. It was expected that they would be perfected after 1815, but now it was clear that they would not. Indeed, in some respects, though fortunately not in all, the liberal achievements of those years were curtailed. But after 1819 the period of full reaction came in. In many respects this period was more odious in Prussia than in any other state. The persecution of "demagogues" was a sorry spectacle, as it was in reality largely a persecution of men who should have had all honor shown them as national heroes. Jahn, the founder of gymnastic societies, which had been most effective in nerving the young men of Prussia to heroic action, was for five years subjected to the inquisition of the police and to severe imprisonment, only to be discharged because nothing could be found against him meriting punishment. Arndt, whose impassioned poems had intensified the national patriotism in the wars against Napoleon, was shamefully treated. His house was searched, his papers were ransacked. The charges against him show the triviality of this petty police inquisition. One official discovered revolution in the expression "that lies beyond my sphere." Sphere meant a ball, a ball, a bullet. Was not that a summons to insurrection and murder? Arndt indignantly protested that he hated "all secret intrigues like snakes of hell." Nevertheless he was removed from his professorship and for twenty years was prevented from pursuing his vocation. Private letters were systematically opened by the police in the search for some trace of revolution. Even Gneisenau, despite his brilliant record as a soldier, had four years to experience this invasion of his private rights. Spies went to hear the sermons of the most popular preacher in Berlin, Schleiermacher, and reported it as a highly suspicious circumstance that he had said that we owe to Christ the liberation of all spiritual forces and that every true Christian must believe that the kingdom of truth will conquer the kingdom of darkness. A publisher was forbidden to bring out a new edition of Fichte's *Address to the German Nation*, which had so splendidly stirred the youth of Prussia in the years of Napoleon's supremacy.

This was, in the opinion of all Liberals, the great treason of Prussia, this abdication of independent judgment, this docile surrender to the leadership of Austria. "Prussia," said Metternich to the Russian ambassador, "has left us the place which many Germans wished to give to her."

The situation was much the same in the other German states. With Austria and Prussia hand in glove, there was little opportunity for the lesser states. The spirit of the Carlsbad Decrees hung heavily over all Germany. Made even stronger the following year by the Vienna Conference of 1820, this system remained in force until the decade beginning with 1840. The revolutions of 1830 brought forth additional decrees in 1832 and 1834 intensifying the persecution of the academic world and of politicians suspected of liberalism. Metternich had succeeded in extending his system over the German Confederation. We shall now see how other countries were affected by the same system, how its influence expanded still further.

CHAPTER III

REACTION AND REVOLUTION IN SPAIN AND ITALY

SPAIN

THE fundamental purpose of the rulers of Europe after 1815, as we have seen, was to prevent the "revolution," as they called it, from again breaking out; in other words, to prevent democratic and constitutional ideas from once more becoming dominant. The precautions taken by these conservatives passed in the political language of the time as the Metternich system. Sufficient precautions had been taken, as we have seen, in central Europe. France was powerless to disturb for a long while to come. England was stiffly loyal to her old régime. But just as order seemed solidly re-established events occurred in the two southern peninsulas of Europe, Spain and Italy, which showed that a system of repression to be successful must be Argus-eyed and omnipresent. It is necessary, therefore, at this point to trace briefly the history of southern Europe that we may understand the events of 1820, the first real challenge of the Metternich system. •

In 1808 Napoleon had by an act of violence seized the crown of Spain, and until 1814 had kept the Spanish king, Ferdinand VII, virtually a prisoner in France, placing his own brother Joseph on the vacant throne. The Spaniards rose against the usurper and for years carried on a vigorous guerilla warfare, aided by the English, and ending finally in success. As their king was in the hands of the enemy they proceeded in his name to frame a government. Being liberally minded they drew up a constitution, the famous Constitution of 1812, a document thoroughly saturated with the principles of the French Constitution of 1791. It asserted the sovereignty of the people, vesting the executive power in the king, the legislative in the Cortes or Assembly, a body consisting of a single chamber and elected by indirect universal suffrage, the citizens of the colonies having the same right to vote as did those of the mother country. Some of the features of the French Constitution which had worked

badly were nevertheless adopted. Deputies were to be chosen for two years and to be ineligible for re-election. Ministers might not be members of the chamber. Henceforth the Cortes were to be the central organ of government, the king being very subordinate. He might not leave the country without their consent, nor marry, nor might he dissolve or prorogue the Assembly, and in the intervals between the sessions a committee of the Cortes was to watch over the execution of the Constitution and the laws. The Constitution proclaimed the principles of liberty and equality before the law, thus abolishing the old régime. The extreme liberality of this Constitution is explained by the fact that it was the work of deputies coming in the main from the coast provinces, which were more democratic than the others. The classes hitherto dominant in Spain, the nobility and the clergy, for the time being lost their supremacy. The Constitution was the work of a small minority, was never submitted to the people for ratification, and its durability was therefore problematical. Indeed, its doom was sealed by the re-appearance in Spain, on the downfall of Napoleon, of the legitimate king, Ferdinand VII.

This prince, now restored to his throne, was ill-fitted for rule, both by temperament and training. Cruel, suspicious, deceitful, unscrupulous, his character was odious, his intellect lacked all distinction. His education had been woefully neglected, nor had experience taught him anything of statesmanship. He had not used his leisure as Napoleon's prisoner for reading or the study of political questions. But, instead, he had embroidered with his own hands a robe of white silk with ornaments of gold for the Madonna of the altar of the church at Valençay, a fact which was made known to the Spanish people by his confessor. Indeed, the pamphlet which contained this edifying announcement went through seven editions in a short time, — a fact that not only paints the King but his people as well.

There was every reason to expect that such a man would thrust aside the paper constitution which so greatly limited his power, if he felt able to do so. The boundlessly enthusiastic, even hysterical manner in which the Spaniards received him convinced him that he could go to any length. The Constitution of 1812 had the support of only a very small minority of the educated people. The nobility, the clergy, many of the leaders of the army, and the ignorant and fanatical populace wanted a king of the old type. The King, seeing the way made plain, promptly took action. Before he reached his capital he de-

*con el corazón de un tigre y la cabeza
de una mula*

clared the Constitution and the decrees of the Cortes null and void, "as if these things had never been done." By this stroke and the rapturous acquiescence of the people absolutism was restored. A furious reaction began, a wild hunt for everyone in any way connected with the recent history of Spain. Liberals and those who had adhered to Joseph, Napoleon's brother, were persecuted. The Inquisition was re-established; the Jesuits returned in triumph. The press was gagged once more. Liberal books were destroyed wherever found, and particularly all copies of the Constitution. Thousands of political prisoners were punished with varying severity. Ferdinand would probably have been forced into a reactionary policy by his own people and by the other powers of Europe, even had his personal inclinations not prompted him to it. But this reaction was much too furious, lasted too long, and in the end weakened the King's position.

The Government of Ferdinand, vigorous in punishing Liberals, was utterly incompetent and indolent in other matters. Spain, a country of about eleven million people, was wretchedly poor and ignorant. Agriculture was primitive. Commerce and industry were shackled by monopolies and unreasonable prohibitions upon exportation and importation. Industrial activity was further lessened by the large number of saints' days, which were carefully observed. What education there was was in the hands of ecclesiastics. The Government of Ferdinand made no attempt to improve these deplorable conditions. But in addition to all this it failed to discharge the most fundamental duty of any government, that is, to preserve the integrity of the empire. The vast transatlantic possessions of Spain had risen in revolt. The reasons for this revolt, which presaged the downfall of the proud Spanish Empire, were: the continued and varied misgovernment of the home country which regarded the colonies as simply sources of wealth to be ingeniously exploited for the benefit of the home government, the taste of relative freedom they had enjoyed between 1810 and 1815 when the home government was otherwise occupied, the example of the United States and its successful war of independence, and the encouragement of England, seeking wider markets. Ferdinand could probably have kept his empire intact had he been willing to make the concessions demanded by the Americans, larger commercial liberty and considerable political autonomy. This he would not do. He would rule his empire as it had always been ruled, his colonies as he ruled the mother country. The result was revolution from Mexico to the southern tip of South America. Ferdinand's task

was to reconquer this vast region by force. This force he did not have. He hoped for the support of the Holy Alliance, which, however, was not forthcoming. He, therefore, was thrown upon his own resources. By 1819 he had collected an army of over twenty thousand men at Cadiz. Suddenly the army rose in revolt against the Government, and the first of those revolutions of southern Europe against the restored monarchs occurred.

With singular lack of perspicacity, the restored Bourbons of Spain had neglected or insulted the army, the very weapon which reaction in the other countries of Europe had taken every means to conciliate and win. Many of the ablest officers had been degraded; poor rations, poor barracks, insufficient pay, in arrears at that, had created a feeling of deep irritation in the army, which became the breeding place of conspiracies, the real revolutionary element in the state. The navy, too, so essential for the preservation of a transoceanic colonial empire, had been allowed to fall into the most shameful decay until it consisted of but little else than the king's own pleasure yachts. The officers were utterly poor. The only relief the Government granted them was permission to support themselves by fishing.

Under such conditions military outbreaks were natural. Insurrections occurred repeatedly, in 1814, 1815, 1816, 1817, 1818 and 1819. The failure in each case only increased the severity with which the Government pursued all those suspected of liberalism. In 1820 the army rose again, driven to desperation by the stories of horror told by soldiers returning from America, and believing that they were about to be sent to certain death.

On January 1, 1820, Riego, a colonel in the army, proclaimed the Constitution of 1812 and led a few troops through the province of Andalusia, endeavoring to arouse the south of Spain. He was unsuccessful. His force gradually dwindled away, attracting no popular support. But it had served its purpose. As the revolution was dying out in the south it kindled in the opposite end of the peninsula, under the Pyrenees and along the Ebro. The Constitution of 1812 was proclaimed there and the flames spread eastward to the great cities of Saragossa and Barcelona. Shortly riots broke out in Madrid itself. The King, learning that he could not rely upon his soldiers even in his capital, and thoroughly frightened, yielded to the demands of the scattered and incoherent revolution, and on the evening of March 7, 1820, proclaimed the Constitution of 1812, promised to maintain it, and declared that he would harry out of the country those who would not support it. "Let us advance

frankly," he said, "myself leading the way, along the constitutional path." The text of the Constitution was posted in every city, and parish priests were ordered to expound it to their congregations.

Thus revolution had triumphed again, and only five years after Waterloo. An absolute monarchy, based on divine right, had been changed into a constitutional monarchy based on the sovereignty of the people. Would the example be followed elsewhere? Would the Holy Alliance look on in silence? Had the revolutionary spirit been so carefully smothered in Austria, Germany, and France, only to blaze forth in outlying sections of Europe? Answers to these questions were quickly forthcoming.

ITALY

In the leisure of St. Helena, Napoleon I wrote, concerning Italy: "Italy is surrounded by the Alps and the sea. Her natural limits are defined with as much exactitude as if she were an island. Italy is only united to the continent by one hundred and fifty leagues of frontier and these one hundred and fifty leagues are fortified by the highest barrier that can be opposed to man. Italy, isolated between her natural limits, is destined to form a great and powerful nation. Italy is one nation; unity of language, customs and literature, must, within a period more or less distant, unite her inhabitants under one sole government. And Rome will, without the slightest doubt, be chosen by the Italians as their capital."¹

Napoleon was now in a position where he was powerless to aid in this achievement, even had he been so disposed. But the time was very fresh in men's minds when they believed that the great commander was to use his talent and opportunity to give them unity and freedom. He had not done so. Yet in a very real sense modern Italy began under his empire. He took the country a long step forward toward its ideal.

Napoleon's activity in Italy had been most revolutionary. He had driven all the native princes from the peninsula. Only the kings of Naples and Piedmont still retained some semblance of authority, for each fortunately had an island to which he could flee, whence the French could not drive him, as the British controlled the sea. The former spent several years in Sicily, the latter in the island of Sardinia. Napoleon did not formally

¹ Cesaresco, *The Liberation of Italy*, 3.

unite all Italy, but he annexed a part directly to the French Empire, a part he made into the Kingdom of Italy, with himself as King and his step-son, Eugène Beauharnais, as Viceroy, and the remainder constituted the Kingdom of Naples, over which Murat, brother-in-law of Napoleon, ruled. Thus, though there was not unity, there were only three states where formerly there had been a dozen. Yet, in an important sense, there was unity, for it was the directing mind of the French Emperor that permeated and largely controlled the policy of all three. The French did much for the regeneration of Italy. They abolished feudalism, they gave uniform and enlightened laws, they opened careers to talent, they stimulated industry. New ideas, political and social, penetrated the peninsula with them. Italians henceforth would never be the same as they had been. Barriers, physical, material, intellectual, had been thrown down, and could never be permanently set up again. Of course there was the reverse. The burdens imposed in the place of those removed were heavy. Napoleon made the Italians a part of his general European system and forced them to give freely of their money and their men for purposes that concerned them only slightly, if at all. Sixty thousand Italians perished in his wars in Spain and Russia. His shameless robbery of their works of art gave deep offense. His treatment of the Pope wounded many in their religious sensibilities, and he ignored the national sentiment whenever he chose. Yet the later achievement of unity and liberty was made much easier because Napoleon had passed that way. He shook the country out of its century-old somnolence. Service in his armies increased the strenuousness of the Italians and taught them the art of war. The very fact that they had witnessed and participated in great events imparted an unknown energy to these easy-going sons of the south. Napoleon had exiled every one of the Italian princes. They might be restored, but their prestige was irrevocably gone. He had even driven the Pope from his states, and had abolished the temporal power. What had been done once might perhaps be done again. There had been for a few years a state bearing the name Kingdom of Italy. The memory of that fact could not be uprooted by all the monarchs of Christendom. It was an augury full of hope, a beacon pointing the sure and steadfast way.

Of all this the Allies, at their famous Congress of Vienna, took no note. They were playing the short politics of the hour. They paid no attention to the impalpable forces of the human spirit. They looked upon the future of Italy as a matter quite

at their disposal and they reconstructed the peninsula without asking its opinion or consent. A people numbering more than seventeen million had nothing to say about its own fate. The mighty men of Europe sitting in Vienna considered that their affair. And they arranged it by returning Italy to the state of a geographical expression. They did not give it even as much unity as they gave Germany, not even that of a loose confederation. They made short shrift of all such suggestions and restored most of the old states. There were henceforth ten of them: Piedmont, Lombardy-Venetia, Parma, Modena, Lucca, Tuscany, the Papal States, Naples, Monaco, and San Marino. Genoa and Venice, until recently independent republics, were not restored, as republics were not "fashionable." The one was given to Piedmont, the other to Austria.

These states were too small to be self-sufficient, and as a result Italy was for nearly fifty years the sport of foreign powers, dependent, henceforth, not upon France but upon Austria. This is the cardinal fact in the situation and is an evidence, as it is a partial cause, of the commanding position of the Austrian monarchy after the fall of Napoleon. Austria was given outright the richest part of the Po valley as a Lombardo-Venetian kingdom. Austrian princes or princesses ruled over Modena, Parma, and Tuscany, and were easily brought into the Austrian system. Thus was Austria the master of northern Italy; master of southern Italy, too, for Ferdinand, King of Naples, concluded an offensive and defensive treaty with Austria, pledging himself to make no separate alliances and to grant no liberties to his subjects beyond those which obtained in Lombardy and Venetia. Naples was thus but a satellite in the great Austrian system. The King of Piedmont and the Pope were the only Italian princes at all likely to be intractable. And Austria's strength in comparison with theirs was that of a giant compared with that of a pigmy.

Thus the restoration was accomplished. Italy became again a collection of small states, largely under the dominance of Austria. Each of the restored princes was an absolute monarch. In none of the states was there a parliament. Italy had neither unity nor constitutional forms, nor any semblance of popular participation in the government. The use which the princes made of their unfettered liberty of action was significant.

Of these several states the four most important were: the Lombardo-Venetian Kingdom, the Kingdom of Sardinia or Piedmont, the Papal States, and the Kingdom of Naples.

The first was ruled by a viceroy, who carried out orders received from Vienna. It paid into the Austrian treasury taxes far out of proportion to its population or its extent. Here French laws were largely abrogated, and an attempt was made to make the people forget that they were Italians, and to consider themselves Austrians. Children were taught in their textbooks of geography that Lombardy and Venetia were geographically a part of Austria. Industries were repressed in favor of Austrian manufacturers. Austrians were appointed to the university professorships, and they and their students, as well as other persons, were watched by numerous and proficient spies. It was even considered necessary to edit Dante that he might be read with safety.

The King of Piedmont, Victor Emmanuel I, had been for many years an exile in the island of Sardinia, and his states had been annexed by Napoleon to France. He returned to Turin enraged against the author of all his woes. Saying jokingly that he had slept fifteen years, he resolved that Piedmont should regard the interval as a dream. Most of the laws and institutions introduced by France were abolished by a stroke of the pen, almost the only ones retained being those which the Piedmontese would gladly have seen go, the heaviest taxes and the police system. Most of those connected with the government and the army during the French period were removed from their positions, thus constituting at the outset a disaffected class. Religious liberty was narrowly circumscribed; political liberty did not exist, nor did liberty of education. The universities were shortly placed under the control of the Jesuits, and professors and students were spied upon. Some of the deeds of reaction were so absurd as to become classical illustrations of the stupidity of the restored princes. Gas illumination of the Turin theater was abandoned because it had been introduced by the French. French plants in the Botanic Gardens of Turin were torn up, French furniture in the royal palaces destroyed, and a certain custom house official would let no merchandise be brought over the new Napoleonic road over the Mont Cenis pass, lest revolutionary ideas might thus be smuggled in. But, however unwise and retrogressive this government might be, it followed in foreign affairs a policy of independence of Austrian influence as far as this was possible. Piedmont was a military state, having an army altogether disproportionate to its size. Indeed, three-fourths of the revenues of the state went to the support of the army and navy.

The Papal States were peculiar among the governments of Europe. The Pope was their ruler. The Government was in the hands of the priests. Over each of the provinces and legations was a prelate. All the higher officials were of the clergy. The laity were admitted only to the lower positions. Taxes were high, yet papal finances were badly disorganized, and the Government had difficulty in meeting running expenses. An important source of income of this Christian, priestly state was the lottery, which was administered with religious ceremonies, and was even kept running Sundays. The Government could not even assure the personal safety of its citizens. Brigandage was rife, and the Pope was forced finally to make a formal treaty with the brigands, by which they were to give themselves up as prisoners for a year, after which they were to be pensioned. Though bigoted and corrupt, the Government had a keen scent for the evils of the French régime. It repealed most of the French laws, and even forbade vaccination and gas illumination, as odious reminders of that people. The police were numerous and vexatious, paying particular attention to what one of their documents characterized as "the class called thinkers." The Inquisition was restored and judicial torture revived. Education was controlled by the clergy. Even in the universities most of the professors were ecclesiastics and the curriculum was carefully purged of all that might be dangerous. This excluded, among other subjects, modern literature and political economy. Niebuhr, the German historian, thus recorded his impression of that state: "No land of Italy, perhaps of Europe, excepting Turkey, is ruled as is this ecclesiastical state." Rome was called "a city of ruins, both material and moral."

In the south, covering three-eighths of the peninsula, was the Kingdom of Naples, or the Two Sicilies. The king, Ferdinand I, was of the Spanish Bourbon line. He was incredibly ignorant, and in character detestable. Returning from Sicily, however, he did not imitate his contemporaries by abolishing everything French. "Civil institutions," says a recent historian, "had advanced four centuries in the nine years of French rule."¹ But while in theory much of the work of those years was allowed to remain, in practice the Government was hopelessly corrupt. The King's treatment of the army was such as to raise up in it many enemies to his power. Many who had served under Murat were cashiered. Whipping was restored, which angered the common

¹ King, *History of Italian Unity*, I, 87.

soldier. Thus there grew up rapidly a military faction ripe for revolt.

Obviously the policy of the various princes, as just described, made many enemies: all the progressive elements of the population who believed in freedom in education, in religion, in business, and who saw special privileges restored, obsolete commercial regulations revived, arbitrary and ignorant government substituted for the freer and more intelligent administration of the French; and all those thrown out of employment in the civil service or the army. The malcontents joined the Carbonari, a secret society which first rose in the Kingdom of Naples, spreading thence over Italy and to other European countries. Their weapons were conspiracy and insurrection. In a country where no parliaments, no political parties, no public agitation for political ends were permitted, such activity was necessarily driven into secret channels. The Carbonari had an elaborate but loose and ineffective organization. Their rules and forms were frequently childish and absurd. Their purposes were not clear or definite. They were a vast liberal organization much better adapted for spasmodic movements of destruction than for the construction of new institutions. Into this society poured the dissatisfied of every class. It was a revolutionary leaven working in Italian society, spreading abroad a hatred of the restored princes, a desire for change.

Among a people living under such depressing conditions the news of the successful and bloodless Spanish Revolution of 1820 spread quickly. It was the spark to the tinder. In Naples a military insurrection broke out, of such apparent strength that the king yielded at once. The revolutionists demanded the Spanish Constitution of 1812, not because they knew much about it save that it was very democratic but because it possessed the advantage of being ready-made. The King conceded the demand, saying that he would have been glad to have granted a constitution before had he only known there was a general desire for one. He was apparently as enthusiastic as were the revolutionists. He went out of his way to show this in a most extraordinary fashion. On July 13, 1820, having heard mass in the royal chapel, he approached the altar, took the oath, and then, fixing his eyes upon the cross, he added of his own accord, "Omnipotent God, who with infinite penetration lookest into the heart and into the future, if I lie, or if I should one day be faithless to my oath, do Thou at this instant annihilate me." It seemed as if the era of constitutional government had come for more than a third of Italy.

THE CONGRESSES

Thus in 1820 the Revolution, so hateful to the diplomats of 1815, had resumed the offensive. Spain and Naples had overthrown the régime that had been in force five years, and had adopted constitutions that were thoroughly saturated with the principles and mechanism of Revolutionary France. There had likewise been a revolution against the established régime in Portugal. There was shortly to be one in Piedmont.

A matter of greater importance than the attitude of these peoples toward their governments was that of the governments toward the peoples. The powers had united to put down Napoleon. They had then taken every precaution to check the activity of so-called French principles. They had been in the main successful, but now those principles were asserting themselves triumphantly in outlying parts of Europe. It had been thought that future trouble would come from France; but, instead, it was coming from Spain and Italy.

Metternich, the most influential personage in Europe, had very clear views of the requirements of the situation. "The malady," as he called it, the unrest of the times, was not local or peculiar to one part of Europe, to any single country. To suppress this malady the Great Coalition had been built up which, after endless suffering and sacrifice, had overcome it, though it had not extirpated it. What it had cost so much to check, must be kept in check. The vitality of these subversive revolutionary principles was evident to all. Energetic measures were necessary and, to be successful, they must be applied everywhere and at all times. If a monarch in one state yielded to revolution the effects were not limited to that state or that monarch, but the revolutionary parties everywhere were encouraged and the stability of every throne, of the established order everywhere, was threatened. This was conspicuously shown by the recent events. A revolution in Spain encourages a revolution in Naples. The movement may spread northward sympathetically, may reach the Italian possessions of Austria, may reach Austria itself, France, and the other countries, and the world, supposed to have been quieted at Vienna, will riot once more in anarchy. Metternich thus showed that no state can in the modern age lead an isolated life. The life of Europe henceforth must be collective and anything that threatens its peace is a very proper subject for the discussion of Europe, collected in congresses.

Metternich in this way developed the doctrine of the "right of intervention," a doctrine new in international law, yet one to which he succeeded in giving great vitality for many years. The doctrine was that, as modern Europe was based upon opposition to revolution, the powers had the right and were in duty bound to intervene to put down revolution not only in their own states respectively but in any state of Europe, against the will of the people of that state, even against the will of the sovereign of that state, in the interests of the established monarchical order. A change of government within a given state was not a domestic but an international affair.

This doctrine did not originate in 1820. The principle was clearly laid down in the treaty of Quadruple Alliance of 1815 as far as France was concerned. It had been elaborated at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818. There the five Great Powers had declared their purpose to maintain the general peace which was "founded on a religious respect for the engagements contained in the Treaties, and for the whole of the rights resulting therefrom." The phrase was vague because the powers could not agree on anything more definite. How much did it mean or might it be made to mean? Would revolutionary movements in any country be considered as justifying intervention in the interests of the sacred treaties? The opportunity to test the matter had now arisen. Metternich, as usual, was quite equal to the occasion. A congress was called at Troppau to consider the affairs of the Kingdom of Naples. Austria, Russia, Prussia, France, and England were represented. Unanimity was lacking but there was a majority for the ominous principle. The three eastern powers, Russia, Prussia, and Austria, absolute monarchies, now formally accepted the principle of intervention as laid down by Metternich. They would refuse to recognize as legal changes brought about in any state by revolution, even if the king of that state himself consented. They asserted their right to intervene to overthrow any such changes, first by using conciliatory methods, then by using force. This probably meant an immediate armed intervention wherever and whenever revolution might break out. And the right so to intervene was held to be implicit in the treaties of 1815 on which the European system rested. From this view England dissented vigorously, declaring that in her opinion the powers by those treaties intended to guarantee to each other only their territorial possessions, not at all their form of government. That was a domestic concern. England and France, though not signing the

new declaration, remained, however, merely passive and the absolute monarchies had their way.

Having established the principle the Congress next decided to apply it to the Kingdom of Naples. They accordingly adjourned to Laibach, inviting the King of Naples to meet them there. The Neapolitan Parliament was opposed to letting him leave the kingdom and only finally consented after he had again sworn to the constitution, and had with facile duplicity declared that he wished to go solely to intercede for his people and "to obtain the sanction of the powers for the newly acquired liberties." Falsehoods with Ferdinand I were redundant and superfluous. "I declare to you," he said, "and to my nation that I will do everything to leave my people in the possession of a wise and free constitution." Parliament, deceived by the royal mendacity, permitted him to go. No sooner was he out of his realm than he retracted all his promises and oaths and appealed to the Allies to restore him to absolute power, which was precisely what they had already determined to do. Austria was commissioned to send an army into the kingdom. It did so. The opposition of the Neapolitans was ineffective and Ferdinand was restored to absolutism by foreigners in 1821. He broke his return journey at Florence in order to make the *amende honorable* to a probably outraged Deity by placing a votive lamp in the Church of the Annunciation.

The political results were for the Neapolitans most deplorable. The reaction that ensued was unrestrained. Hundreds were imprisoned, exiled, executed. Arbitrary government of the worst kind was henceforth meted out to this unfortunate kingdom.

Just as this Neapolitan revolution was being snuffed out an insurrection blazed forth at the opposite end of the peninsula, in Piedmont. The causes of this movement were discontent at the stupid reaction of the last five years, the desire for constitutional government, and dislike of Austria. The insurgents were led to believe that they would have the support of Charles Albert, Prince of Carignan, head of a younger branch of the royal family and heir presumptive to the crown, as his relations with Liberals were known to be intimate. His political importance was considered great owing to his nearness to the throne. As the king, Victor Emmanuel I, had no son, the crown would upon his death pass to his brother, Charles Felix, and upon the latter's death, he, too, being without direct heir, Charles Albert would himself become king.

The Piedmontese revolution broke out in Alessandria on

March 10, 1821. The revolutionists demanded the Spanish Constitution and war against Austria as the great enemy of Piedmont and of Italy. The King wavered for several days. He did not wish a civil war, Piedmontese fighting Piedmontese, which would surely come if he should refuse the demands and attempt to put down the movement. On the other hand, he knew that if he should grant those demands, the powers would intervene to suppress constitutionalism here as they had done in Naples and his promises would have been in vain. Unable to decide between the cruel alternatives of civil war or foreign intervention and conquest, and discovering no other course to follow, he abdicated on March 13, in favor of his brother Charles Felix. As the latter was not in Piedmont at the time, Charles Albert was appointed regent, until his arrival. Charles Albert, therefore, exercised the royal power for the moment and in a manner favorable to the revolutionists. He allowed the Spanish Constitution to be proclaimed from the royal palace in Turin "with such modifications as His Majesty, in agreement with the national representation, shall consider advisable." The new King shortly disavowed these concessions. The whole imbroglio was cut short by the action of the powers. An Austrian army was already on the borders and a hundred thousand Russians were ordered forward from Galicia. The revolutionists clashed at Novara with an army composed of Austrians and Piedmontese loyal to the King. They were easily routed and the revolution was over. Charles Felix, an absolutist king, was upon the throne, and Austria had again showed her resolution and her power. Once more the demand for constitutional freedom had been suppressed, once more Metternich had triumphed.

Thus both the Italian movements for a freer political life had ended in disaster. The reasons for their failure are instructive and are important for an understanding of the Italian problem. The Neapolitan revolution failed because of the European coalition forbidding its success, because of the treachery of the King, because of the illiberal treatment of Sicily by the revolutionists. That of Piedmont failed because it was the work of a small clique, had no broad basis of appeal to the people, lacked leadership and definite aims, neglected details, and also because of the opposition of the powers.

Thus two revolutions had been overcome and the system of the Congress of Vienna preserved in Italy. There remained the more remote problem of Spain. The principle there, however, was the same and the Allies felt obliged to assert it. This was the

work of the Congress of Verona. The revolution in Spain was still triumphant. The King and the reactionary parties could not by their own strength regain their old position. They appealed to the allied monarchs and by 1822 the latter, thoroughly committed to the policy involved, decided at the Congress of Verona, that Russia, Austria, Prussia, and France, should send to their ministers in Madrid identical notes demanding the immediate restoration of Ferdinand VII to the fulness of his powers. In the event of the expected refusal the ministers should quit Madrid and war should be declared. England opposed this policy with high indignation, but in vain. France, now a thoroughly reactionary country, was commissioned to carry out the work of restoring Ferdinand. The Spaniards refused to accede to the demand of the powers, and in April 1823 a French army of a hundred thousand under the Duke of Angoulême, heir presumptive to the French throne, crossed the Pyrenees. The Spanish Government had no army and no money and could not oppose the advance of the invaders with any vigor. The French spent six months in traversing the peninsula from north to south, meeting no serious resistance. The Cortes retired from Madrid to Cadiz before the invaders, taking the King with them. The siege of Cadiz was now begun. The war was soon over with the seizure of the fort of the Trocadero and Ferdinand was back upon his absolute throne, by act of France, supported by the Holy Alliance.

There now began a period of odious reaction. All the acts passed by the Cortes since 1820 were annulled. An organization called the "Society of the Exterminating Angel" began a mad hunt for Liberals, throwing them into prison, shooting them down. The war of revenge knew no bounds. "Juntas of Purification" helped it on. Thousands were driven from the country, hundreds were executed. The French Government, ashamed of its protégé, endeavored to stop the savagery, but with slight success. This is an odious chapter in the history of Spain.

The Holy Alliance by these triumphs in Naples, Piedmont, and Spain, showed itself the dominant force in European politics. The system, named after Metternich, because his diplomacy had built it up and because he stood in the very center of it, seemed firmly established as the European system. But it had achieved its last notable triumph. It was now to receive a series of checks which were to limit it forever. Against the decisions of the congresses we have passed in review, one power, England, had protested, though to no effect. England's prestige had steadily

declined since the Congress of Vienna. The three eastern powers simply filed her protests against their intentions in their archives, paying no further heed. England, which had driven the French out of Spain ten years before, now saw them coming in again, this time with ease and success. As England's influence abroad decreased the wrath of Englishmen grew, and with the advent of Canning to the cabinet England delivered some swift blows in retaliation, showing that she was still a power to be reckoned with. It was, of course, useless for her to think of opposing the three great military monarchies by arms. But the contest between her and them was now removed to a field where her authority would unquestionably prove decisive.

Having restored the King of Spain to absolute power, the next wish of the Holy Alliance was to restore to Spain, and thus to monarchy, the revolted Spanish-American colonies. England let it be known that she would oppose any steps having this end in view, save those of the Spaniards themselves, and, as she controlled the sea, her declaration virtually was that she would keep the Holy Alliance restricted to the continent of Europe and would prevent it from sending ships and troops to the scene of the revolt. She sought and received the co-operation of the United States in this purpose, though no alliance was formed and each power acted independently. The United States had approved the secession of the countries to the south of her, so plainly to her advantage and so evidently in imitation of her example. Her government had also in 1819 virtually forced Spain to cede Florida, hitherto a Spanish possession. And now, just after the close of the successful French invasion and the restoration of Ferdinand, the President of the United States, James Monroe, in a message to Congress destined to become one of the most famous documents ever written in the White House, gave emphatic notice to the Holy Alliance of the attitude this country would assume in case it should endeavor to win back her colonies for Spain, should Spain herself be unable to do so. We should consider any attempt on the part of these absolute monarchies of Europe "to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety," and we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing the South American states "or controlling in any other manner, their destiny, by any European power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States." These suggestions from England and the United States were sufficient to prevent the summoning of any

new congress to consider the reconquest of America and thus to add new laurels to the Holy Alliance. The doctrine of intervention had reached its high water mark as applied to the interests of reaction, had received an emphatic defiance — a defiance made the more resounding by the recognition shortly by England and the United States of the independence of the South American republics. Austria, Russia, and Prussia protested against a course which “tended to encourage that revolutionary spirit it had been found so difficult to control in Europe.” Canning proudly said, “We have called in the New World to redress the balance of the Old.” On the other hand, Metternich’s opinion of Canning was that he was a “malevolent meteor hurled by an angry Providence upon Europe.”

The Metternich system, thus checked, was to receive before long a series of blows from which it never recovered, in the overthrow of the restored Bourbons in France, in the Belgian revolution of 1830, and, in a certain way, in the Greek war of independence.

CHAPTER IV

THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

WHILE the tremendous changes from the institutions of the old régime to those of the modern were being accomplished amid the turbulence of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars, other changes of vast though incalculable significance were being accomplished silently in the economic life of that country which was the one constant enemy of France and Napoleon, namely, England. Indeed England's ability to endure the strain of the long struggle with her enemy across the channel, and in the end to emerge victorious, was owing to this generally unnoticed but radical transformation in the conditions of English industry, in the methods used by Englishmen in earning their living, in creating wealth. These changes, first occurring in Great Britain and later on the Continent, began to be conspicuous in the last quarter of the eighteenth century and have been proceeding ever since. They constitute what has been generally called the Industrial Revolution.

The transformation of industry and commerce accomplished since George III came to the throne in 1760 is unique in the history of the world, a transformation so sweeping that in this respect the present age differs more from that of George III than did his from that of Rameses II. This transformation has been the result of a long series of discoveries and inventions. Among these one stands preëminent, the placing at the disposition of man of a new motive force of incomparable consequence, steam, rendered available by the perfection of an engine for the transmission of its power. Steam engines had been in existence since early in the eighteenth century, the invention of a mechanic named Newcomen. But they were poorly constructed, wasteful in their use of fuel. The device of Newcomen was studied and so greatly improved by James Watt (1736-1819) that the latter is generally considered the inventor of the steam engine. Watt made it a practical machine, and thereby inaugurated a new age, the age of steam.

Consider for an instant the significance of this new agency. Up to the advent of the age of steam, industry and commerce

were essentially what they had been for many centuries. Previously the only motive force had come from animal strength, and from wind and falling water, exploited by windmills and water-wheels. Mankind possessed very few machines, but manufacture was literally, as the word indicates, production by hand and was carried on in small shops generally connected with the home of the manufacturer. There, in the midst of a few workmen, the proprietor himself worked. The implements were few, the relation of master and journeyman and apprentice intimate and constant, the differences of their conditions comparatively slight. Industry was truly domestic. In general each town produced the commodities which it required. Production was on a small scale and was designed largely for the local market. Necessarily so, for the difficulty of communication restricted commerce. Down to the nineteenth century men traveled and goods were carried in the way with which the world had been familiar since time began. Only by horse or by boat could merchandise be conveyed. Roads were few in number, poor in quality, bridges were woefully infrequent, so that traveler and cart were stopped by rivers, over which they were carried slowly, and often with danger, by boats and ferries. Practically no great improvement had been made in locomotion since the earliest times, save in the betterment of roadbeds and the establishment of regular stage-routes. Napoleon, fleeing from Russia in 1812, and anxious to reach Paris as quickly as possible, left the army, and with a traveling and sleeping carriage and constant relays of fresh horses, succeeded, by extraordinary efforts day and night, in covering a thousand miles in five days, which was an average rate of eight or nine miles an hour, a remarkable ride for an age of horse conveyance. Where the Emperor of the French, commanding all the resources of his time, could do no better, of course the average traveler moved much more slowly and merchandise more slowly still.

The transmission of information could not be more rapid than the means of locomotion. The postal service was primitive, postage was high and very variable, and was paid by the receiver. In France, after 1793, there was a kind of aerial telegraph which, by means of signals, operated from the tops of poles, like those along the lines of modern railroads, could transmit intelligence from Paris to other cities rapidly. But this invention was monopolized by the State and moreover ceased to operate when darkness or rain came on.

Into this world of small industries and limited commerce came

the revolutionary steam engine, destined to effect an economic transformation unparalleled in the history of the race. It was applied to industry, then to commerce. First employed in mining, it was early adopted by the manufacturers of cotton and woolen goods to give the force for the inventions of Crompton and Arkwright and Hargreaves and Cartwright, inventions which succeeded each other rapidly after 1767, and which completely revolutionized one of the world's basic industries, the manufacture of textiles.

The making of cloth consists of two main processes, first the *spinning* of the thread out of the raw material, cotton, wool, or flax, then the *weaving* of the thread into a solid fabric, cloth. The art of spinning had been known for ages, but it had not greatly developed. With the distaff and spindle, or with the spinning wheel, a person could make a thread, but he could only make one thread at a time. In 1767 James Hargreaves, an English spinner, invented the so-called spinning jenny which enabled him to make eight or ten threads at once, thus doing the work of eight or ten men. In 1769 Richard Arkwright invented a "water frame" or a machine which spun a stronger and firmer thread and which, moreover, was immensely more productive as it was run by water power instead of by hand or foot. But Arkwright's machines were so heavy that they had to be installed in special buildings or factories. Later inventions resulted in machines spinning two hundred threads at the same time. At this rate spinning outdistanced weaving and improvements must be made in the processes of weaving or this enormous increase in the output of thread could not be utilized. The crying need produced the man to solve it. Dr. Edmund Cartwright, a clergyman, constructed a self-acting loom, run by water power, and increasing greatly the rapidity with which weaving could be done.

Since these revolutionary innovations of the eighteenth century in the arts of spinning and weaving other inventions too numerous to mention have been made, perfecting and facilitating every part of the general process of textile manufacture. A single machine now does the work which formerly required the labor of a hundred or two hundred men.

What was thus accomplished in the textile industries was later accomplished in others, particularly in the manufacture of iron. Wherever possible the machine was substituted for the human being. A single individual could tend many machines and thus several other individuals were released for other work. The productive power of the race was greatly, in some lines fabulously,

augmented. It was inevitable that these improved processes would be applied on a larger and larger scale and to more and more branches of activity and that the grand total of manufactured articles would exceed the wildest imaginations of men.

But no sooner did machines become common than it was seen that a new motive force was necessary to run them. They were usually too heavy to be operated by human strength, by the arm or by the foot. Moreover wind and water power were restricted in amount and were precarious. The wind might cease, the river might run dry. The new industry that was developing needed a new motive force, always procurable, inexhaustible in amount, and capable of easy regulation. This new force was, as already indicated, at hand, — steam, now rendered available for the new and enormous work by the inventions of James Watt. The steam engine became the center of the modern factory system of production, the throbbing heart of every industry. The machine superseded the hand of man as the chief element in production, increasing the output ultimately in certain lines a hundred, even a thousand-fold. Domestic industry waned and disappeared. Manufacturing became concentrated in large establishments employing hundreds of men, and ultimately thousands.

But there was a limit imposed upon the utility of the steam engine in industry. Production on the large scale involved necessarily two other factors — larger sources of supply from which to draw the raw materials, larger markets for the finished products. Right here the inadequate means of communication called halt. The necessity for improvement was imperative. A single illustration is sufficient evidence. The port of Liverpool and the great manufacturing city of Manchester were separated by only about thirty miles. Three canals connected them, yet traffic on them was so congested that it sometimes took a month for cotton to reach the factories from the sea. The new machine industry was in danger of strangulation.

The steam engine, applied to locomotion, came to the rescue of the steam engine applied to looms and spindles. And first to locomotion on water. Fulton's steamboat, the *Clermont*, leaving New York August 7, 1807, arrived at Albany, a hundred and fifty miles distant, in thirty-two hours. The practicability of steam navigation was thus, after much experimenting, definitely established. But steam navigation only slowly eclipsed navigation by sail. In 1814 there were only two steamers, with a tonnage of 426 tons, in the whole British Empire. In 1816

Liverpool, which now has the largest steam fleet in existence, did not have a single steamer. It is impossible here to trace the growth of this method of locomotion. Its expansion was reasonably rapid. It was at first thought impossible to construct ships large enough to carry sufficient coal for long voyages. It was not until 1838 that a ship relying solely upon steam propulsion crossed the Atlantic Ocean. The *Great Western*, a British vessel, sailed from Bristol to New York in fifteen days, to the discomfiture of those who were at that very moment showing the impossibility of such a feat. "It was proved by fluxionary calculus," wrote Carlyle, "that steamers could never get across from the farthest point of Ireland to the nearest of Newfoundland; impelling force, resisting force, maximum here, minimum there; by law of nature, and geometric demonstration;—what could be done? The *Great Western* could weigh anchor from Bristol Port; that could be done. The *Great Western*, bounding safe through the gullets of the Hudson, threw her cable out on the capstan of New York, and left our still moist paper demonstration to dry itself at leisure." The experimental stage was over. In 1840, Samuel Cunard, a native of Nova Scotia, living in England, founded the first regular transatlantic steamship line, thus raising his name out of obscurity forever. In 1847 the Hamburg-American, in 1857 the North German Lloyd, in 1862 the French lines began their notable careers, ultimately constituting veritable fleets and serving all parts of the globe. ✓

But more important still was the application of steam to locomotion on land, the invention of the railroad. This, like most inventions, was a slow growth. In the mines and quarries of England carts had for some time been drawn on rails made at first of wood, later of iron. It was found that horses could thus draw much heavier loads, the friction of the wheel being reduced. The next step was to substitute the steam engine for the horse. Several men were studying this problem in the early nineteenth century. William Hedley, chief engineer of a colliery near Newcastle, constructed in 1813 a locomotive, *Puffing Billy*, which worked fairly well. The significance of George Stephenson lies in the fact that by his inventions and improvements, extending through many years, he made it "actually cheaper," to use his own words, "for the poor man to go by steam than to walk." His first locomotive, constructed in 1814, proved capable of hauling coal at the rate of three miles an hour, but at such a rate was not commercially valuable. He perfected his machine by increasing the power of the boiler so that the *Rocket*

was able to make thirty miles an hour at the opening of the Liverpool and Manchester railway in 1830. The experimental stage was over. The railway was a proved success. Construction began forthwith and has continued ever since. The development of the new means of locomotion has proceeded with the development of chemistry, metallurgy, mechanics, engineering, electricity. Rails have been constantly improved, locomotives augmented in drawing power, bridges flung over rivers and ravines, tunnels cut through mountains. Navigation, too, has had its record of triumph. Steamships, plying regularly and in all directions, have become larger and larger, swifter and swifter, more and more numerous. Traveling and transportation have thus been revolutionized by methods entirely dissimilar from those in existence during all the previous history of mankind. They represent not a difference of degree, but of kind.

The Industrial Revolution, begun in the closing quarter of the eighteenth century, and resting on these inventions, has been in progress ever since. It had progressed far in England by the time of the overthrow of Napoleon and it had been one of the causes of England's final victory because of the great increase in wealth which it had brought her. This union of machinery with steam power multiplied tremendously the resources of mankind. Gradually the new methods, the new system of production, have been introduced into other countries, first into France, after 1815, and later into Germany. There were several important consequences of the new system, some of which have already been indicated.

The Industrial Revolution meant a change from home work to factory work. Previously spinning, weaving, and other industries had been carried on in homes or in small shops, and frequently all the members of the family, not only the men but the women and the children, had taken part in the process. The head of the group himself owned the tools outright, bought the raw materials, and marketed the produce. It was truly a "domestic system" of manufacture, offering in general no great rewards, but insuring on the whole, a sound and healthy life under conditions favorable for the development of mind and body. Under the new system, the workers must leave home for the day's labor, were gathered together in large numbers in factories which were at first poorly ventilated and poorly lighted, and were frequently exposed to conditions that endangered health. They no longer owned their own shops and tools, for the new factories were too large, the new machines too expensive, for any but the rich to own. Thus

the independent worker became a wage earner, selling his labor to another, and forced to sell it, if he would avoid starvation. Under the factory system women and children became competitors of the men, as they could tend the machines in most industries as well as the men, and would accept lower wages. This dislocation of the family from the home to the factory brought with it many evils and abuses, as did also the long hours of labor, and the frequent lack of employment, owing to causes which the worker could not control, such as bad management of the business or glutting of the market. An entirely new set of problems arose out of the factory system, problems which will appear frequently in the course of this narrative, some of which have been solved more or less satisfactorily. Others await solution.

Of course the great advantage of the factory system is that it has enabled men to produce in immensely greater quantities the necessities and comforts and even the luxuries of life. The application of machinery to production, in agriculture, in manufacture, in transportation, has increased vastly the quantity and reduced the price of most commodities. Many products which only the well-to-do could formerly enjoy are now within the reach of the millions. The plane of living has been distinctly raised, but the higher standard begets a desire for a standard higher still.

But while this was and is the great advantage of the new system of production, its disadvantages to all but a few were more apparent in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century. By differentiating more sharply than they had been differentiated before the two classes engaged in the process of production, namely the wage earners and the capitalists, the factory system raised a large number of difficult, contentious questions concerning the relations of capital and labor, questions which have preoccupied and perplexed the world for a full century and whose solution is not yet in sight. By collecting together in large factories hundreds and even thousands of men, women, and children, who had previously worked in small shops or at home, it created grave problems concerning the health and morals and mental development of the workers. By bringing the workers together it caused them to know each other better, to sympathize more with each other, and it inevitably led them to organize into unions for the protection and furtherance of their collective and individual interests. By bringing about a more and more minute subdivision of labor, eighty or a hundred persons, for instance, being employed in making the different parts of a shoe where formerly

under the old system of hand labor the shoemaker made the entire shoe, the factory system has greatly multiplied the output by increasing the dexterity of the individual laborer, who, however, repeating the same motions over and over again finds his work less interesting, more tedious — which is one of the reasons why he demands a shorter working day. But by increasing the output it has reduced prices and brought many commodities within the reach of the laboring man which previously were quite beyond it. By building up large factory towns, by encouraging emigration from the country to the city, the factory system has affected municipal life profoundly, introducing new factors into politics, both local and national. Many were the good features of the new industrial régime, many the evil. That régime has gone on steadily developing ever since it was introduced in the eighteenth century for the reason that it offered more to humanity than the system it displaced. But on the other hand the undeniable evils which it brought in its train have aroused a more and more determined and more and more widespread discontent and opposition, and a prolonged, varied, and increasingly successful campaign against those evils has been, as we shall see, one of the conspicuous features of modern history.

The description that has just been given of the nature and the progress of that industrial revolution which, within a century and a half, transformed the conditions of life in Europe and in America and, to some extent, in other continents, is too briefly to explain the amazing phenomenon. So rapid a presentation of a complex subject has the merit, it is hoped, of bringing out in high relief, its more significant and characteristic features, of emphasizing, as it should be emphasized, the all-pervasive, epoch-making character of the change, but it errs necessarily in the direction of an undue simplification of multitudinous facts and of social and economic interrelations which are most intricate and sometimes more or less obscure. Obviously justice cannot be done within the space of a single chapter to a subject which would require a volume for its proper and adequate treatment. In the interest, therefore, of a fuller comprehension, of a more precise appreciation of one of the mighty movements in the annals of the race it is desirable to consider somewhat further a few of its more salient aspects.

In the first place the very term, Industrial Revolution, may be misleading. That term was first used by Blanqui, a French

socialist, in 1837, with the evident intention of indicating as complete a break with the past of mankind in the economic sphere as the French Revolution indicated in the realm of politics and law and government. French Revolution, Industrial Revolution, these in Blanqui's opinion, these and all that they connote are the two great facts of modern history, differentiating the nineteenth century sharply from all the centuries that had gone before, and creating a distinctly new civilization. The term was later adopted by Arnold Toynbee (1852-1883), an English social reformer and economist, as a title for a book, which was published after his death and which effectively described the momentous change in economic thought and method. The term has become popular and is definitely lodged in contemporary usage. Moreover, it possesses the merit, after all, of being substantially accurate. But the word revolution means in the minds of most people something sudden, violent, and quite swift, soon over. The Industrial Revolution does not at all conform to this conception. This movement might more properly be called Industrial Evolution. It was not sudden, only its most striking manifestations occurred within the brief span of a few decades. It had its beginnings over two centuries ago, its period of great acceleration in the reign of George III, and it ought properly to be understood as continuing throughout the whole of the nineteenth century. Each one of the inventors mentioned above had had many precursors and was to have innumerable successors, all of whom contributed, obscurely or conspicuously, to the new development. The Industrial Revolution was a long, slow process of change, beginning obscurely, we cannot say precisely when, and only ending recently, if indeed it has ended yet. However, having indicated the necessary corrective, we will not quarrel further with the accepted terminology.

Another fact to be constantly borne in mind is that this Industrial Revolution, this remarkable series of changes in industrial processes and organization, did not occur at the same time in all countries and in some it has not even yet occurred. It began in England, but it was forty years or more before it appeared in the United States and France, sixty years before it affected Germany and many more before it began the transformation of Japan. The rate of growth and the character of the growth have not been uniform throughout the world.

In considering this subject of the Industrial Revolution a preliminary question naturally arises. Why was it that this change occurred first in England? Because all the

factors favorable to change were present there, and did not exist, in the same combination, in any other country. During the seventeenth and early part of the eighteenth centuries commerce, rather than agriculture or manufacturing, had been the outstanding feature of English economic life. Shipbuilding was the most famous English industry and, when Peter the Great visited England, it was that which most attracted his attention. Great were the international conflicts generated in that age by the rivalry for the carrying trade. England was a great importing and exporting country. Importing tobacco, tea, coffee, sugar, cotton, rice and other commodities which she could not produce, she was forced to pay for them by exports, and her exports were chiefly woolen goods, and later cotton. English woolens had long been famous and formed a lucrative branch of the national economy. When Englishmen spoke of the staple trade, they meant the woolen trade. The Lord Chancellor of England sits upon a woolsack, said to have been placed in the House of Lords in the reign of Edward III as a symbol, lest the peers forget the importance to the nation of this particular industry.

But if the staple trade of England had long been this trade in wool, a usurper of this historic primacy was growing up, which was ultimately to become king — cotton. Cotton had from time immemorial been used in the Orient, in India, in China. Herodotus, who lived in the fifth century before Christ, informs us that "there are trees which grow wild there [in India] the fruit of which is a wool surpassing in beauty and excellence that of sheep." But while cotton was known in the earliest ages in Asia and in America, it did not become an article of clothing in Europe until the modern period. The Middle Ages dressed in silk or linen or wool. The English, according to a leading English historian, were the last people in Europe to introduce the manufacture of cotton goods into their own homes. Its progress was slow indeed, hampered at every step by the jealousy of established rivals, who had their influence in Parliament, the manufacturers of woolen, silk, and linen goods. Moreover, the so-called cotton cloths that came gradually to be made in England were not solely of cotton, but were a mixture of wool or linen and cotton, the reason being that no Englishman was able to produce a cotton thread strong enough to serve as the warp. "In the middle of the eighteenth century," says Walpole, "a piece of cotton cloth, in the true sense of the term, had never been made in England." A century later the manufacture of

cotton was England's leading industry. It is interesting to discover why.

Keeping in mind the fact that England had long been at home upon the ocean, that she had long had a thriving carrying trade, that she understood the art of navigation as did no other nation, that within her spacious and far-flung empire she had long been busy exchanging the products of her native industry for the products of the colonies, the reader should recall the tremendous expansion of the British Empire in the eighteenth century and should seek to grasp its vast significance. From 1701 to 1815 England was frequently at war, and, contrary to a more or less prevalent idea, war is sometimes highly profitable. In the middle of the eighteenth century England acquired India and Canada, and the harvest which she reaped from the Napoleonic wars was considerable and valuable. Vast new areas were opened to her traders; her mercantile marine, her carrying trade developed rapidly, and were susceptible of far greater development, if only her home industries should be equal to the increased demand. The new opportunities beckoning from every direction constituted the challenge to the domestic producers to improve their processes in order to enlarge their output and thus to assure the superiority which England enjoyed in the markets of the world. Here we have at least a partial explanation of that remarkable series of inventions described above which multiplied so many times England's industrial productivity. The inventive qualities of the human mind respond to stimulus as do the other qualities, and no stimulus could be greater than that which lay in the situation which confronted England, great riches within grasp if only the mechanical means could be provided that would enable her to grasp them. When men seek an end intently they frequently find the means to attain it, and the case of England in the eighteenth century was no exception to the rule. The ingenuity of John Hargreaves, who began life as a poor weaver, of Richard Arkwright, who began it as a barber's apprentice, of Samuel Crompton, who while yet a boy lost his father and was forced to contribute to the family resources by spinning yarn, of Edmund Cartwright, an obscure country clergyman, of James Watt, a mathematical instrument maker of Glasgow, and of many others who preceded and who followed them, each contributing something to the stupendous whole, enabled Great Britain to meet the unrivalled opportunity, by revolutionizing, by modernizing, by enormously enlarging and energizing her woollen and cotton and other industries, by fabulously increasing their output so

that the needs of an expanding empire, of a growing carrying trade, of a world-wide commerce could be as easily satisfied as local or national needs had been satisfied under the previous conditions. ✓

But beside the ingenuity and enterprise of her people another reason why England was the predestined birthplace of the Industrial Revolution lay in her natural resources. If numerous and elaborate machines were henceforth to supplant the few and simple ones which had previously sufficed for industry, new materials were necessary and those materials proved to be coal and iron. Not that coal and iron had never been known, had never been used before, but their use had been limited and difficult. The steam engine demanded coal in quantity if it was to give the force necessary for the new industry and transportation. The steam engine also, and the new and heavy machines, demanded iron. These commodities England possessed in apparently inexhaustible quantities and in happy juxtaposition, so that the co-operation of the two could be effected under the most favorable, most economical conditions. The age of steam was destined to be an age of coal and iron. These two elements were to exert the most obvious and profound influence upon the development and the relations of nations all through the nineteenth century and after, an influence which we shall be at pains to point out as this narrative proceeds. The extent to which the various industries have been developed in different countries has been determined, in a very large degree, by the natural resources of those countries. And the primacy of coal and iron among those resources has been abundantly demonstrated. Any one living under the shadow of the memories of the World War must be vividly conscious of their significance in determining the fate of nations, in shaping the issues of history.

Suffice it to say here that in the north of England lay large deposits of coal and iron, comparatively untapped. Hitherto her southern counties had been the most populous and most industrious part of England. Now, as a result of the new type of industrialism, the path of empire was to take its way northward. Yorkshire, Lancashire, were to enter into their own, were to become the hives of industry, the busy haunts of men. The southern and eastern counties had been the manufacturing centers of the nation as long as iron had been smelted with wood and not with coal, because there were the great forests which, however, were becoming exhausted. But now that coal was substituted for wood the industries of the nation migrated to the

region where coal and iron were near neighbors. And, be it said in passing, the climate of south Lancashire made that region the home of the new cotton industry, because it furnished the moisture necessary to certain of its processes. The successful utilization of coal and the construction of the varied machines required for the new industry necessitated an enormous development of the science of metallurgy. The metal industries of modern England owe their predominance to the requirements of the new type of manufacture. Coal for the engines, iron for the engines and the tools, iron in increasingly finer, stronger forms, such as the steel made by the Bessemer process discovered in 1856, these have been the two basic factors of the present industrial system, of large-scale manufacturing. They have also tended to concentrate industry in those districts where the two factors co-exist, in Northern England, in Northern France, in Westphalia, along the river Ruhr, and in Silesia. Expanding markets resulting from an expanding empire, commercial changes, mechanical inventions, natural resources, all these factors favorable to change existed in the England of the closing eighteenth century and did not exist in a similar combination in any other country. Hence English leadership in the new industrial era. ✓

Some of the consequences of the new industrial system began to show themselves quite early, while others were late in appearing. Because coal and iron lay side by side in Northern England, there was a shifting of population, as already stated, from the southern counties which had hitherto played the leading rôle in English history. With this shifting in population went a corresponding shifting of political power, as we shall see more clearly when we take up the great political struggles of the second quarter of the nineteenth century. Read Macaulay's famous third chapter if you wish to get a panoramic view of Old England before the changes occurred that created the New England of Macaulay's own time, which was the first sixty years of the nineteenth century and in which the seeds now being widely sown came to a rich and full fruition. And read that distinguished historian's parliamentary speeches in 1831 if you wish to see what changes a shifting and a growth of population rendered necessary, in the orator's opinion, in the time-honored institutions of the land. The cities of Northern England, which grew rapidly in size under the stimulus of the new industrial development, would not be content permanently to remain unrepresented in the English Parliament while decayed boroughs, whose

population had dwindled almost to the point of complete extinction, continued to send up each two members to the House of Commons. Political emancipation was to be one of the results of the Industrial Revolution.

A conspicuous feature of the new industrial system was the specialization it introduced into the processes of manufacturing. This specialization has tended steadily to become more and more pronounced. Under the old system labor was little divided or specialized. Now it is divided and sub-divided until scores of individuals are involved in the fabrication of a shoe or a watch, each worker making only a single and restricted contribution to the finished article. An English historian has summarized as follows some of the results: "Not only have most workers but one kind of work; that work becomes a smaller and smaller part of increasingly complex industrial processes; and concentration thereon makes it more and more difficult for the worker to turn to other labor, if his employment fails. The specialist's lack of all-round capacity is natural and notorious. Hence most serious results follow the slightest dislocation of national economy. This specialization has also important psychological effects. A farmer, with his varied outdoor occupations, feels little craving for relief and relaxation. The factory hand, with his attention riveted for hours at a stretch on the wearisome iteration of machinery, requires recreation and distraction; naturally he is a prey to unwholesome stimulants, such as drink, betting or the yellow press. The more educated and morally restrained, however, seek intellectual stimulus, and the modern popular demand for culture arises largely from the need of something to relieve the grey monotony of industrial labor."¹

Not only do individuals specialize, but different regions of a nation specialize, and even nations themselves do the same. Specialization means interdependence. If England gives her main attention to manufacturing certain things for which she possesses particular advantages, then she must rely on other nations for the things she does not produce. Her prosperity depends upon the co-operation in exchange of other nations, and if that co-operation fails, or threatens to fail, her situation may become critical or desperate. As a matter of fact industrial England must sell her products to foreigners if she is to live and must also buy from them necessary raw materials and food

¹ Pollard, *History of England*, 197.

supplies. But whether the foreigners will either buy or sell is for the foreigners themselves to decide.

What is true of England is also true, in greater or less degree, of other nations which have experienced the transforming touch of the Industrial Revolution. It is obvious, therefore, that that revolution has brought with it certain acute problems in international relations from which the old system which it has displaced was relatively free.

The Industrial Revolution has had another consequence. It has led to the growth of cities, one of the striking features of the modern age. The convenience of having similar industries in close proximity caused this growth. From the social point of view this is perhaps the most important aspect of the Industrial Revolution, this extraordinary increase of urban population and consequent growing desertion of the country. In most of the leading nations today the majority or a large minority of the population is to be found in cities. In Great Britain more than two-thirds of the people now live in cities of 10,000 or more inhabitants. The rise of these big industrial centers has been accompanied by numerous evils, such as objectionable housing conditions, slums, bad sanitation, defective water supply, poor policing. The development of the factory system, the requirements of machine production on a large scale have made the modern city, but they have also revealed the fact that human beings cannot be crowded together in enormous aggregations without serious menace to body and soul. If the majority of men must live in cities they will not be content unless they can live there decently and with due regard to health. Now in the early decades of the nineteenth century the demoralization of municipal life was extreme. Great masses of men lived under conditions that were a disgrace to civilization. Huddled together in crowded and desolate habitations, with little knowledge of the most elementary principles of economics and hygiene, they were necessarily exposed to all the diseases and vices and dangerous influences that flourish in such environment. The old forms of municipal government were found totally inadequate to the situation. The capacity of men to produce commodities, their ability to exploit as never before the forces of nature had outrun their powers of social organization. Municipal reform was destined to be one of the insistent and perplexing problems of the nineteenth century, a challenge to its intelligence and good will. The attempts to eradicate these evils constitute a long and important chapter in social history.

Gradually a long series of laws has in certain respects transformed urban life, one of the characteristic products of the Industrial Revolution.

The Industrial Revolution has contributed enormously to human progress but, as Lecky says, human progress rarely means more than a surplus of advantages over evils. Now the evils which accompanied the rapid growth of manufactures were very great and were, at the outset, more striking than the advantages. It is an unquestionable advantage that a large part of the difficult and dangerous work of the world is now done by machines which would otherwise have to be done by men. It is also an advantage that this relief can continue as long as science and its practical applications continue to develop. Modern industrialism shows increasingly its close dependence upon science and also increasingly contributes to the development of science. The Industrial Revolution has vastly augmented production and employment. Millions and millions of men have by it been enabled to live who otherwise could not possibly have subsisted with the more primitive tools at their disposal.

But there is another side to the story. That Revolution made sharper the division between capitalists and wage-earners; the former were few, the latter many. The conflict between labor and capital, of which we hear so much to-day, is certainly nothing new in the world and is not the product of the Industrial Revolution. That conflict can be observed at the very dawn of history. From time immemorial and in all lands the greatest differences have existed between individuals, in wealth, in social power, in happiness. The well-being of the working classes has, indeed, been demonstrably much improved by the inventions of the past two centuries and the new type of industry which those inventions have introduced into the world. But a period of transition from an old system of society to a new one is always painful and always exacts its tribute of human sacrifice. Many who are accustomed to the old system and who have been trained for it are not required by the new or cannot adapt themselves to it. Unemployment, discouragement, poverty, distress ensue. A machine almost by definition throws people out of work because a machine does the work of several men. In the end it creates employment on a greater scale than ever, but there is an intervening period when it does the contrary, and the evidence is overwhelming that the closing years of the eighteenth and the opening years of the nineteenth centuries were very costly in human suffering.

These undoubted and grave evils have often been depicted by historians and should not be forgotten. But they have often been presented as forming a tragic contrast to the times that had gone before. The idealizing instinct of man is unconquerable, and the two things which he is prone to paint in more glowing colors than they deserve are the past and the future, to the lamentable disadvantage of the present. But it may reasonably be expected that at least the student of history shall keep himself free from this illusion. He should leave this particular infirmity to the reformer. Macaulay tells us that one of the characteristics of the seventeenth century was "the bitter cry of labor against capital," that in that century the employment of children in industry prevailed to an extent which, in proportion to the number of persons employed in manufacturing, would in the nineteenth century seem almost incredible, that the number of men, women and children receiving poor relief was greater in the former century than in the latter. The background against which the modern age is to be viewed was anything but fair and golden. The difference between the seventeenth century and the nineteenth is that what shocked the latter did not shock the former. "The more carefully we examine the history of the past," says Macaulay, "the more reason shall we find to dissent from those who imagine that our age has been fruitful of new social evils. The truth is that the evils are, with scarcely an exception, old. That which is new is the intelligence which discerns and the humanity which remedies them."

There is another fact that should be borne in mind in our effort to form a just and balanced judgment of the advantages and disadvantages of the new industrial system. Many writers have uncritically and indiscriminately ascribed to the industrial revolution evils whose causes should be sought elsewhere. Labor conditions were, in all conscience, bad enough in England in 1815, but they were worse in other countries in which no trace of the Industrial Revolution was to be seen. Writers on this subject frequently overlook the history of that period, examine the evils, apart from their setting, and thus leave a false impression. The truth is that the long Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars had destroyed much accumulated wealth and had impoverished Europe. The widespread misery of the working classes is largely to be ascribed to that. England, indeed, came through that quarter century of wars in better condition than her neighbors on the Continent, and she came through better largely because of the Industrial Revolution itself, which had

developed her manufactures to an unprecedented degree and had enabled her to replace the wastage of the wars with unusual rapidity.

With these reservations, however, with this caution against the tendency to idealize the economic system which existed before the rise of the factory system, it must be admitted that the new system spelled misery for multitudes. The gain in productive power was undoubted but the gravity of the new social problems was equally undoubted. Among those evils were widespread unemployment, low wages for those fortunate enough to get work, sordid and indecent conditions of living of people herded together promiscuously in mushroom cities and in habitations unworthy of the name, and particularly the employment under barbarous conditions of women and children. All these and an alarming prevalence of drunkenness and vice, were formidable and repellant blotches upon the picture. But evils generate a desire for their cure. "All the great sources of human suffering," says John Stuart Mill, who has been correctly characterized as a temperate optimist and a wise social reformer, "are in a great degree, many of them entirely, conquerable by human care and effort." Some of the efforts which have been made to harmonize the new industrial order with the requirements of the best social thought and feeling of an age progressively enlightened and exacting will be described in the pages that are to follow.

Renouncing any attempt to describe this great change in history which is summarized under the title of the Industrial Revolution and which has meant indisputably a larger and fuller life for the race we may close this chapter with the opinion of a distinguished French philosopher, M. Bergson:

"A century has elapsed since the invention of the steam engine and we are only just beginning to feel the depths of the shock it gave us. But the revolution it has effected in industry has nevertheless upset human relations altogether. New ideas are arising, new feelings are on the way to flower. In thousands of years, when, seen from the distance, only broad lines of the present age will be visible, our wars and our revolutions will count for little, but the steam engine and the procession of inventions which accompanied it, will perhaps be spoken of as we speak of the bronze or chipped stone of pre-historic times; it will serve to define an age."

CHAPTER V
FRANCE DURING THE RESTORATION
THE REIGN OF LOUIS XVIII

No country in Europe had undergone between 1789 and 1815. so sweeping and so vital a transformation as had France, the birthplace of that famous Revolution which takes its name from her. Institutions, feelings, aspirations, mental outlook of a kind quite new in Europe, had been adopted by millions of Frenchmen as a new evangel. Much had been irrevocably destroyed by that Revolution, much had been created, much had been merely sketched. It remained for the nineteenth century to fill in this outline. The old form of society to which France had been accustomed for centuries was gone and a type new to Europe, of immense proselytizing power, had been unfolded. The old had been one of privileged classes. The new was democratic. The three great institutions, agencies of the privileged few, which had long weighed down with paralyzing effect upon the mass of Frenchmen, the monarchy, the nobility, and the church, had been brought into subjection to the people, had been weakened immeasurably as controlling forces in the life of modern France. France had made a passionate effort to free herself from all forms of aristocracy, temporal and ecclesiastical. France in 1815 was by far the most democratic country in Europe, in her feelings, her thoughts, her customs, and her institutions.

These changes had, however, not been brought about by the unanimous consent of the French people. The old privileged classes were, from the very nature of the case, sworn enemies of the new order which had been erected at their expense, and it was precisely because men were not agreed as to the permanence of the principles and decisions of the Revolution that the contest between the adherents of the old and the supporters of the new was to be carried over into the new era, and indeed still continues. The war of opinions which began with the Revolution was not ended in 1795 or in 1815, nor has it entirely ended yet, for the reason that not all Frenchmen have at any time been ready to accept the present fact, the status quo, but have tried repeatedly to re-open the discussion, and to modify, if not to reverse, the

decision. This warfare is the warp and woof of French history in the nineteenth century.

One thing, however, was settled at the outset. The old régime was not to be restored. The Bourbons recovered the right to rule only on condition that their monarchy should be a constitutional one. The Allies who, as the phrase ran, had "brought back the Bourbons in their baggage," insisted on this, believing it the only means of assuring the continuance of their rule, and Louis XVIII, rather than have a constitution forced upon him by the representatives of the French people, granted one himself. This procedure had the manifest advantage for him that he did not appear to receive his throne from the people on conditions imposed by them, that he did not at all recognize the revolutionary principle of popular sovereignty, that he appeared to rule solely by right of birth, by divine right, as had his ancestors. In the plenitude of his powers he would graciously grant certain privileges to his people. The monarchical principle would remain unblemished. Consequently, on his first return to France in 1814, he issued the most famous document connected with his name, the Constitutional Charter, which, suspended later during the Hundred Days, was revived in 1815 and remained in force until 1848, under three kings, Louis XVIII (1815-1824), Charles X (1824-1830), and Louis Philippe (1830-1848), only altered in some details in 1830 as a result of the revolution of that year.

By this act the King decreed that his own person should be inviolable, that his ministers might be impeached by the chambers, that he alone should possess all executive power, that he should command the army and navy, declare war, make treaties, and appoint to all positions in the public services; that the legislative power should be exercised by himself and a legislature consisting of two houses, a Chamber of Peers and a Chamber of Deputies; that the king alone should propose all laws; that they then should be discussed by the chambers and accepted or rejected according to their desire, but not amended save with his consent. If he should not propose a law desired by the chambers they might petition him to do so and might suggest the provisions they would like to see it contain, but if the king should reject this petition it should not be again presented during the same session. No tax could be levied without the consent of the chambers.

The Chamber of Peers was to be appointed by the king for life, or for hereditary transmission, as he might see fit. Its

sessions were to be secret. The Chamber of Deputies was to consist of representatives chosen for a period of five years. The suffrage was carefully restricted by an age and property qualification. Only those who were at least thirty years of age and paid at least three hundred francs in direct taxes should have the right to vote for deputies, and only those were eligible to become deputies who were forty years of age or over and paid a direct tax of at least one thousand francs. These provisions were very favorable to the wealthy. Indeed, they made the chamber a plutocratic body. There were less than 100,000 voters in France out of a population of 29,000,000, and not more than 12,000 were eligible to become deputies.

The Charter proclaimed the equality of all Frenchmen, yet only a petty minority were given the right to participate in the government of the country. France was still in a political sense a land of privilege, only privilege was no longer based on birth but on fortune. Nevertheless, this was a more liberal form of government than she had ever had under Napoleon, and was the most liberal to be seen in Europe, outside of England. The number of voters and of those eligible as deputies increased with the increase of wealth. The influence of English example is apparent in many of the provisions of the Charter.

There was another set of provisions in this document of even greater importance than those determining the future form of government, namely, that in which the civil rights of Frenchmen were narrated. These provisions show how much of the work of the Revolution and of Napoleon the Bourbons were prepared to accept. They were intended to reassure the people of France, who feared to see in the Restoration a loss of liberties or rights which had become most precious to them. They were thus intended to win for the restored monarchy a popular support and a guarantee of permanence it thus far lacked. It was declared that all Frenchmen were equal before the law, whatever their titles or rank, and thus the cardinal principle of the Revolution was preserved; that all were equally eligible to civil and military positions, that thus no class should monopolize public service, as had largely been the case before the Revolution; that no one should be arrested or prosecuted save by due process of law, that thus the day of arbitrary imprisonment was not to return; that there should be complete religious freedom for all sects, though Roman Catholicism was declared to be the religion of the state; that the press should be free "while conforming to the laws which are necessary to restrain abuses of

that liberty" — a phrase suspiciously elastic. Those who had purchased the confiscated property of the crown, the church, and the nobles, during the Revolution were assured that their titles were inviolable. The Napoleonic nobility was placed on an equality with the old nobility of France, and the king might create new peers at will, but nobility was henceforth simply a social title carrying with it no privileges and no exemptions from taxation or the other burdens of the state.¹

Such were the concessions that Louis XVIII was willing to make to the spirit of the times and the demands of the people. They constituted an open recognition of the fact that the France of 1815 was not to be a restoration of the France of 1789. Certain phrases of the Charter gave offense, but they were mainly those of the preamble in which the King labored to maintain the claim of the divine right of monarchy and to connect his act with medieval precedents. These phrases were far-fetched and curiously archaic, but the fact remained that with all its limitations the Charter granted France a larger portion of self-government than it had enjoyed before, except during a brief period in the Revolution. And it put the Bourbon monarchy on record as recognizing the principal results of the democratic evolution of society. The Restoration started out by accepting the centralized administrative system, the great law codes, the concordat, and the nobility of Napoleon, and the social organization created by the Revolution.

The political condition of France after 1815 was exceedingly troubled. The nation was divided into several parties whose animosity toward each other had only been embittered by the Hundred Days. Louis XVIII, restored for a second time by the victorious enemies of France, was eminently qualified to calm the seething passions of his countrymen and lead them in the necessary work of recuperation. He was naturally a man of moderate opinions. A thorough believer in the divine right of monarchs and asserting the belief with fervor, he was, however, too clear-sighted to think that monarchy of the type historic in France could be restored. He saw as clearly as any one in the realm the greatness of the changes that had latterly been effected in France, and that his very throne would be imperiled if he attempted to undo any of the important work of the Revolution. He willingly granted a constitution to his people,

¹ The Charter may be found in full in Anderson, *Constitutions and Documents*, No. 93, or in University of Pennsylvania *Translations and Reprints*, Vol. 1, No. 3.

sharing with them the power which his ancestors had wielded alone. He preferred to rule as a constitutional king than not to rule at all. He had known the bitterness of the exile's life too well to desire to be compelled to "resume his travels" owing to any illiberal conduct on his part. The throne was for him only the "softest of chairs." Cold-blooded, sceptical, free from illusions, free from the passion of revenge, indolent by nature, he desired to avoid conflicts and to enjoy his power in peace. His policy, which from the beginning he attempted to carry out, was expressed by himself a few years later in these words: "The system which I have adopted . . . is based on the maxim that it will never do to be the king of two peoples, and to the ultimate fusion of these — for their distinction is only too real — all the efforts of my government are directed."

The personality of the King seemed, therefore, admirably adapted for the problem that confronted France in 1815. But there were difficulties in the situation that foreboded trouble. Louis XVIII had been restored by foreign armies. His presence on the throne was a constant reminder of the humiliation of France. Moreover, his strength lay not in himself but in the historic rôle of his house, in immemorial prescription, and the power of mere custom over the French mind had been greatly lessened during the past twenty-five years. But a more serious feature was his environment. The court was now composed of the nobles who had suffered greatly from the Revolution, who had been robbed of their property, driven from the country, who had seen many of their relatives executed by the guillotine. It was but natural that these men should have come back full of hatred for the authors of their woes, that they should detest the ideas of the Revolution and the persons who had been identified with it. These men were not free from passion, as was Louis XVIII. More eager to restore the former glory of the crown, the former rank of the nobility and the clergy, more bitter toward the new ideas than the King himself, they were the Ultra-royalists, or Ultras — men more royalist than the King, as they claimed. They saw in the Revolution only robbery and sacrilege and gross injustice to themselves. They bitterly assailed Louis XVIII for granting the Charter, a dangerous concession to the Revolution, and they secretly wished to abolish it, meanwhile desiring to nullify its liberal provisions as far as possible. They constituted the party of the Right. Their leader was the Count of Artois, brother of Louis XVIII, who, the King being childless, stood next in line of succession. These men, not very numerous, but

very clamorous, formed the natural entourage of the monarch. The matter of most pressing importance to France was what power of resistance the King would show to this resolute and revengeful band. Would he in the end give way to them or would he be able to control them?

The other parties in France in 1815 were shortly differentiated. There was the party of the Left. This was not so much a coherent group as a conglomeration of the disaffected. It included those who believed in a republic, who, however, were for some time so few as to be a negligible quantity. It also included the adherents of Napoleon. This class was numerous and composed chiefly of old soldiers who saw themselves, the glory of the Napoleonic state, now degraded, put on half-pay, thrown into the background. These radical and discontented elements were opposed to the very existence of the Bourbon monarchy. But they were hopelessly discredited by the abuses and the failures of both the Republic and the Empire.

There were two other parties, called the Right Center and the Left Center. They comprised the body of moderate men who stood between the two extremes and were opposed to both. They were united by one bond — common loyalty to the Charter which the King had granted. They were the convinced supporters of the constitutional régime, but they differed from each other in their interpretation of what the Charter should mean. The Right Center accepted it as a finality, to be carried out honestly and to the letter. The Left Center believed in its honest execution, but also believed that, while the Charter should be thus observed, men should work for its further expansion, that as the years went by larger constitutional liberty should be accorded to the people. The Charter was for them not a finality but a stepping-stone. But further progress should be attempted only slowly and after full reflection. Of these four parties, two were distinctly unconstitutional — the Ultras and the Radicals or Left. The former, professing a momentary lip service to the Charter, were resolved to alter it as soon as possible in fundamental and comprehensive ways. They were in principle opposed to a written constitution. They wished to restore the absolute authority of the king and the former privileged positions of clergy and nobility. The Charter stood bluntly in the way. Consequently, however much they might dissemble, they favored its ultimate abrogation. The Radicals favored its destruction for the opposite reason — that the Republic or the Empire might

be restored, the Revolution made triumphant once more. The two middle parties were the friends of the new régime.

The events of the first year seemed to show the great power of the Ultras. Reaction set in fast and furiously in 1815. There occurred a series of outrages that have come down in history as the White Terror, in contradistinction to the Red Terror of the Revolution. Immediately after the battle of Waterloo rioting broke out in Marseilles, led by Royalists, and resulting in much plundering and many murders. The movement spread to other departments in the south. Religious motives were added to the political, as the Protestants, particularly numerous in the south, had been strongly attached to the Revolution and to Napoleon and had welcomed the return of the latter from Elba. The white flag of the Bourbons was disgraced by these atrocities committed by Royalists. The Government was in no sense the cause of them, but it was criminally negligent in not trying to repress them.

With the meeting of the first legislative chambers this campaign of revenge and reaction became systematic and frenzied. The Chamber of Deputies was overwhelmingly Ultra-royalist, elected, as it had been, amid the terror and demoralization of the crashing Empire. It demanded satisfaction for the treachery of the Hundred Days. As a result Marshal Ney, "the bravest of the brave," and other distinguished French soldiers, were condemned to death and shot—an everlasting disgrace to the Bourbon monarchy. The Chamber demanded repressive measures of various kinds from the King and got them. It demanded still more violent ones which the King would not concede. The dissension between the Moderate Royalists, represented by the King, the ministry, and the Chamber of Peers, on the one hand, and the Ultras, represented by the Count of Artois and the Chamber of Deputies on the other, soon reached a climax. The King himself said bitterly, "If these gentlemen had full liberty, they would end by purging even me." The representatives of the foreign governments intervened to say that so unreasonable a reaction must cease, in the interest of the stability of the Bourbon monarchy and of the peace of Europe. They feared that the revolutionary elements of France would break out again, stung by such insane legislation. The Ultras even went so far as to reject the budget, a blazing indiscretion, as it offended all who were financially interested in France, foreigners and Frenchmen. The King now took a decisive step, prorogued the Chamber, and then dissolved it. He then appealed to the people to return

a moderate Chamber. The appeal was wholly successful and this mad reaction was speedily brought to a close. The Ultra majority was swept away and a large majority of Moderate Royalists was returned. France had weathered her first crisis in parliamentary government but the temper of the Ultras had been shown with the vividness of lightning. France had had emphatic warning of the danger that would lie in the triumph of that party.

From 1816 to 1820 the Government of France was able to advance along more liberal lines. The two chief ministers, Richelieu and Decazes, both convinced adherents of the Bourbon monarchy, were men who saw the utter folly of attempts at reaction such as those just witnessed and who believed that the pressing needs of France were very different from those of a faction bent on revenge. The two Centers now controlled Parliament, and for several years worked in harmony with the King.

They accomplished much for the rehabilitation of France. In 1815, it will be recalled, the Allies had imposed a large war indemnity on France, and had insisted that she support an army of occupation of 150,000 in eighteen fortresses of the northern and eastern departments for a minimum of three, a maximum of five, years. This was a great financial burden and a greater humiliation. The liberation of the soil of the foreign armies was a task which the King and the ministry had very much at heart. To effect this the people had to make great sacrifices, for before it could be accomplished the national credit must be re-established and to effect this Frenchmen must pay higher taxes. This they did, and France proceeded to pay off the immense war indemnity more rapidly than the powers that had imposed it had expected would be possible. By 1817 the Allies agreed to withdraw thirty thousand of their troops, and at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818 they agreed to withdraw the remainder before the close of that year. Thus the outward evidence of the appalling national humiliation was removed. "I can die at peace," said Louis XVIII, "since I shall see France free and the French flag floating over every city of France." France was, for the first time since 1815, mistress in her own house. The foreign ambassadors ceased their weekly meetings in Paris, designed for the drafting of advice to be given to the French Government. The foreign tutelage was over.

The reorganization of the army was undertaken at this time. The military power of France had been sadly shattered in the

general downfall of the Napoleonic system. The army was reduced to a few corps kept up by voluntary enlistment. Now that the foreign troops were to be withdrawn and France was to resume her full place in international affairs it was necessary to create an army that should command respect. There were, however, difficulties in the way. A large army could not be raised by volunteering. And yet forced military service had become, under Napoleon, so hateful a burden that it had been expressly forbidden in the Charter. A combination of the two methods lay at the basis of the new law. Voluntary enlistments were still to furnish the bulk of the army. If these should not be sufficient recourse should be had to compulsion to complete the corps. All young men of twenty years of age should draw lots. The "bad numbers" alone would be forced to serve for six years. Forty thousand might thus by these two processes be enrolled every year. Having served in the active army six years, they should pass into the reserve army for six years more. This reserve should be used only in defense of the soil of France, should not be ordered out of the country. It was estimated that thus there would be an army of 240,000 men on a peace footing. Promotion was to be for service and merit and was to be equally open to all. The bill was violently opposed by the Ultras for the reason that it destroyed all hope of the nobility monopolizing the positions in the army. Their chances were simply the same as those of other men. The bill became law in 1818. Thus the basis of the military institutions was firmly laid. The army as thus constituted lasted with some alterations of detail down to 1868, surviving many violent changes in French history.

On two other subjects this moderate ministry of Richelieu carried important legislation, the electoral system and the liberty of the press. Concerning both matters the Charter had merely laid down general principles, leaving the manner in which they should be applied to be determined by the legislature in special laws. A liberty so large enabled the legislature to determine the real character, the range, and effect of two fundamental privileges, and as the different parties soon saw that by framing the laws in this way, or in that, they could further their own interests, both matters became the subject of passionate contention in parliament all through the period of the Restoration, and laws very dissimilar in character and in effect were passed as first one party, then another, gained ascendancy in the state. Moderates and Ultras differed on these questions as on others.

Concerning the electoral system, the ideas of the Moderates

was shown in the law of 1817, passed by the Richelieu-Decazes ministry. The Charter merely stated the qualifications required of voters and of deputies. The manner in which the voters should elect the deputies was not defined. The law of 1817 established the system of the so-called general ticket (*scrutin de liste*); that is, the voters of each department should meet in the chief town of the department, and there elect all the deputies to which the department was entitled. This system favored the Moderates and Liberals, who belonged generally to the bourgeoisie, to the industrial and trading classes, largely an urban population, whereas the country gentlemen, the landed proprietors and their tenants, living in the country, were chiefly Ultras, members or adherents of the aristocracy of the old régime. Many of these found it difficult or expensive or annoying to make the trip to the chief town of the department, where alone they could cast their votes. Thus the law, which remained in force from 1817 to 1820, favored the Moderates as each succeeding election showed.

There was passed in 1819 a press law, much more liberal than that of the Napoleonic period, which had, in the main, been carried over into the first years of the Restoration. The censorship was abolished, and press cases were henceforth to be tried before juries. But even under this system newspapers were a luxury, enjoyed only by the rich and well-to-do, as they were not sold by the single copy but only to subscribers at a high price, and in addition there was a stamp tax on each copy of two cents, and a postage duty of one cent. Moreover, while freedom in establishing newspapers was guaranteed, as a matter of fact only the well-to-do could establish them, owing to the large preliminary deposit required of their proprietors, which was to serve as a guaranty fund for the payment of fines that might be inflicted as a result of damage suits.

But this body of liberal legislation rested upon an insecure basis, the favor of the King, and the coherence of the great mass of moderate men, the Centers. The Ultras did not relinquish their activity and were alert to seize upon every incident that might discredit the party in power. Nor had they long to wait. Events shortly occurred that aroused misgivings among the most timid of the Moderates, tending to drive them over to the Ultras, events, too, that shook the firmness of the King. According to the Charter there was to be a partial renewal of the Chamber of Deputies each year, one-fifth of that body passing out, and their places being filled by new elections. These elections showed

a distinct trend in favor of the Radical party, or party of the Left. At the first renewal in 1817, twenty-five "independents" of the Left were returned; in 1818 the result was similar, the Left increasing to forty-five. Among them were Lafayette and Manuel, both prominent figures in the Revolution. Now the principles of the Left were not only liberal, but were largely anti-dynastic. While that wing acquiesced in the existence of the Bourbon monarchy, it might at any time become actively opposed to it.

The elections in 1819 added greatly to the growing Left — it numbering now ninety of a total of 258. But more damaging than the number was the character of some of the members chosen, particularly of Grégoire. Grégoire had played a prominent rôle in the Revolution, having been a member of the Constituent Assembly and of the Convention. He had aided in the overthrow of the Roman Catholic Church. He had shown himself a fervid republican. A remark of his that kings are in the moral world what monsters are in the physical had had an immense notoriety, and was not yet forgotten. He was not a regicide, as he was absent from Paris at the time of the trial of Louis XVI, but he was, owing to his utterances, commonly considered one. No man was more odious to the Ultras and his election to the Chamber outraged their deepest feelings. Some of them had themselves helped bring about his election, believing that the triumph of so notable a revolutionary would help them in upsetting the mild policy of the ministry and bring about the longed-for reaction. In this they were largely right, as this election aroused consternation in the ranks of those who had hitherto been moderate, and drove many into the camp of the Ultras. The chief minister, Decazes (Richelieu having previously resigned), was convinced that some change must be made in the policy of the Government. The Ultras raged against this "regicidal priest," declared that either he must yield to the dynasty or the dynasty to him, and in a stormy session and amid shouts of "Long live the King," voted his exclusion from the Chamber, to which he had been chosen. The freedom of elections was thus grossly violated, as well as the promise of the Charter that the past should be forgotten.

But an event far more damaging to the Moderates now occurred — the murder of the Duke of Berry. The Duke was the younger son of the Count of Artois, and as his elder brother, the Duke of Angoulême, had no heir, he was the hope of the dynasty. At about eleven o'clock on the evening of February 13,

1820, as he was helping his wife into a carriage at the door of the Opera, he was violently attacked by a man, named Louvel, who plunged a dagger into his breast. The Duke died in the opera house at five o'clock, surrounded by the royal family, and demanding pardon for the murderer. The murderer desired to cut off the Bourbon line, which he thought he could do as the Duke had no children. His act was his own; he had no accomplices. But the Royalists at once asserted that the Liberal party was responsible and that anarchy was the natural result of the policy of liberalism. Their opposition was directed against the ministry under Decazes, whom they succeeded in forcing to resign. At his resignation Louis XVIII is said to have remarked, "It is over with me," meaning that from that time on his policy of reconciliation was impossible, that the party headed by the Count of Artois would control. This was virtually to be the case. In 1820 began the great royalist reaction, started in 1815, suspended from 1816 to 1820, when the more moderate policies prevailed, and destined now to last with but a single slight interruption until 1830, when it culminated in a new revolution.

The Right, now in control, proceeded to undo much of the work of the preceding ministries. By the electoral law of 1820 that of 1817 was rescinded, and a new system brought into existence. The Chamber of Deputies was enlarged from 258 members to 430, an increase of 172. The electors of deputies were no longer to meet together in the chief town of the department and vote for all the deputies from that department, but were to be divided into as many groups or colleges as there were arrondissements or districts in the department. Each voter was therefore to vote for one deputy only, the one from his district. Thus the principle of single-member constituencies was adopted. This arrangement would be advantageous to the Ultras, as the country gentlemen and their tenants, supporters of that party, no longer having to make the journey to the chief town, but enabled to vote at places nearer home, would come to the polls in larger numbers. In this way 258 members were to be chosen. The other 172 were to be elected in a special manner. At the chief town of each department were to meet one-fourth of the voters, those who paid the heaviest taxes, and they were to choose the additional 172. This method, of course, greatly augmented the power of the rich. It thus happened that about twelve thousand voters had the right to vote twice, once in the district and once in the department college, and

similarly were twice represented — by the deputies chosen in both ways, in both of which elections they participated. Hence this electoral law of 1820 was called the law of the double vote. Moreover, the president of each electoral college was to be chosen by the central government and the voters must write out their ballots in his presence and hand them to him unfolded — an excellent device for enabling the Government to bring pressure upon them in favor of its candidates. This bill was hotly contested in the Chamber and outside. The debate was long and impassioned, participated in by over a hundred and twenty members. The principle of the law, the double vote, was adopted only by a majority of five. Hailed with enthusiasm by the Ultras it assured their ascendancy. By 1824 the independents, or Radicals, numbered only seven.

The liberal press law of 1819 went the same way after a brief existence of ten months. It was rescinded. The censorship was restored. No journal could be founded without the Government's consent, no single issue could appear without the censor's permission, the Government might suspend its publication for six months, and even under certain conditions suppress it (1820). This control, which would appear sufficient, was strengthened two years later by an additional law which enabled the Government to suppress publication even for "tendencies" when no definite infraction of the law could be proved.

Armed with these powerful instruments for the control of elections and of the organs of opinion and agitation, the Ultras pushed confidently forward, and their future appeared assured by the birth of a posthumous son of the Duke of Berry. They forced the King to send an army into Spain to restore Ferdinand VII to an absolute throne in the interests of the Holy Alliance (1823). They thus hoped to throw military glamour over the restored House of Bourbon, to efface by dazzling exploits the uncomfortable memory of those performed by Napoleon. Flushed with an easy victory in Spain, the Ultras resumed the policy of political and religious reaction at home with great enthusiasm.

Thinking that a new election of the Chamber of Deputies held during the war fever would result overwhelmingly in its favor, the Villèle ministry (1822–1828) caused the existing Chamber to be dissolved and new elections to be ordered. They were held in February 1824, and resulted as desired in a sweeping triumph of the Ultras. Of the 430 deputies elected only fifteen were Liberals. This triumph had been achieved only by the grossest

abuse of power on the part of the Government, which stopped at nothing to gain its ends. It even went so far as to relieve many prominent Liberals of taxes, so that they could not meet the tax qualification for voters or for membership in the Chamber.

A law was now passed decreeing that the new Chamber should last seven years, to be entirely reconstructed at the end of that time. This was an arbitrary change in the Charter.

The reactionary party, now overwhelmingly in the majority in the Chamber, and declaring that that Chamber should not be altered for seven years, thus lengthening the term and suppressing the annual partial renewal, considered that it could safely advance to the realization of its most cherished plans, too long held in abeyance. Their project was helped by the death in 1824 of Louis XVIII, and the accession to power of his brother, the Count of Artois, who assumed the title of Charles X. Charles had virtually directed the policy of his brother for several years. His accession, however, would necessarily give it additional impetus. He needed only six years thoroughly to uproot the elder branch of the House of Bourbon. ✓

THE REIGN OF CHARLES X

The characteristics of the new King were well known. He was the convinced leader of the reactionaries in France from 1814 to 1830. He had been the constant and bitter opponent of his brother's liberalism, and had finally seen that liberalism forced to yield to the growing strength of the party which he led. He was not likely to abandon lifelong principles at the age of sixty-seven, and at the moment when he seemed about to be able to put them into force. Louis XVIII had made an honest effort to reconcile the two social régimes and systems into which Frenchmen were divided — the old pre-revolutionary régime and the new régime, the product of the Revolution, the old nobility and the modern middle class with its principle of equality before the law. The nobility had returned from abroad unchanged, with ideas of feudal privileges, with the determination to restore as much as possible of the old power of the landed aristocracy and of the church, faithful support of the monarchy by divine right. The policy of reconciliation had been badly shattered during the closing years of Louis XVIII's reign. With the accession of Charles X it was entirely abandoned, and that of restoration vigorously attempted. Not that this was proclaimed from the housetops. Charles rather at first attempted to re-

assure the somewhat perturbed mind of the nation. He announced his firm intention to support the Charter, and declared that all Frenchmen were, in his eyes, equal. He liberated political prisoners and won great applause by abolishing the censorship of the press. But these halcyon days were limited to the inauguration of the new Government. At the coronation of the King, France was treated to a spectacle of medieval mummery that impressed most unpleasantly a people that had for a generation been living in the positive realities of the modern spirit. It seemed the most incredible height of absurdity to see the King anointed on seven parts of his person with sacred oil, miraculously preserved, it was asserted, and dating from the time of Clovis. Nor could France, in the modern scientific atmosphere, gravely believe, as it was asked to, in the power of the king's touch. Béranger's witty poem on Charles the Simple was on everybody's lips.

But the legislation now brought forward by the King, and largely enacted, showed the belated political and social ideas of this Government. It was first proposed to grant nine hundred and eighty-eight million francs to the nobility whose lands had been confiscated during the Revolution and sold as "national property" to private individuals. The Charter explicitly assured the purchasers of this land that they should not be molested in their possession. But the courtiers, despite this assurance, were demanding the restoration of their estates to themselves. The King expressed the belief that by this act the last wounds of the Revolution would be closed. The émigrés should not receive their lands, but they should receive a money indemnification.

The debates on this proposal were heated. Many of the Ultra-royalists criticised it, saying that the sum proposed was entirely insufficient. Many rejected the very idea of indemnification, but demanded that the "stolen goods" themselves be given back. That there was an article in the Charter preventing this they did not consider a legitimate obstacle.

The Opposition, however, did not lack arguments. Had the descendants of those whose property had been seized after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes ever been indemnified? Had the émigrés suffered so much more than others from the Revolution that they alone should be compensated for their losses? It might be right to compensate those who had had to flee from France to save their lives, but many of these émigrés who were now to help themselves out of the public treasury had fled voluntarily in order to bring about an invasion of France by

foreigners, and, when that invasion had occurred, had themselves joined it and borne arms against France. Confiscation of property was a very proper punishment for such persons. Again, those who had remained at home and defended the fatherland had suffered as much as those who had emigrated and then invaded it. Furthermore, this measure would aid only the landed proprietors, but many fortunes, based upon personal property, had likewise been destroyed by the Revolution.

The bill passed (1825) and became law, though the Opposition in the Chamber of Deputies was larger than had been expected. Charles called it "an act of justice." It was perhaps wise in the sense that all purchasers of national domains, who, despite the assurance of the Charter, were constantly threatened, were henceforth safe. The value of these properties immediately rose in the market. But while the act pleased the émigrés and satisfied the purchasers of their domains, it offended the great mass of Frenchmen.

The manner in which the transaction was to be carried into effect was as follows: the sum involved was estimated at about a billion francs; the financial condition of the state did not permit the outright payment of so immense a capital; it was decided, therefore, to pay not the capital but the interest each year. This, it was estimated, would increase the annual expenditures of the state by about thirty millions.¹ This sum was procured by the conversion of the existing debt of France from a five per cent. to a three per cent. basis, thus saving about 28,000,000 francs in interest charges. In this way the indemnification of the émigrés would be effected without an increase in taxes. But this new act offended the nation's bondholders, who saw their income arbitrarily reduced by two-fifths. Thus the monarchy made enemies of a powerful class of capitalists, particularly the bankers of Paris. Money was taken from Peter to pay Paul. The strength of this class, which felt itself outrageously defrauded, was to be shown in 1830 to the great discomfiture of the Bourbon monarchy.

Another law that cast discredit upon this reign, and helped undermine it with the great mass of Frenchmen, was the law against sacrilege. By this act burglaries committed in ecclesiastical buildings and the profanation of holy vessels were, under certain conditions, made punishable with death. This barbaric

¹ As a matter of fact, interest was paid not on a billion but on about 625,000,000 francs.

law was, as a matter of fact, never enforced, but it bore striking witness to the temper of the party in power, and has ever since been a mark of shame upon the Bourbon monarchy. It helped to weaken the hold of the Bourbons upon France. It created a feeling of intense bitterness among the middle and lower classes of society, which were still largely dominated by the rationalism of the eighteenth century. They began to fear the clerical reaction more even than the political and social. The renewed missionary zeal of the church, the denunciation by Catholic bishops of civil marriage as concubinage, the open and great activity of the Jesuits, a society that had been declared illegal in France, all indicated the growing influence of the clergy in the state, an impression not decreased when, in 1826, the Papal Jubilee was celebrated with great elaborateness, and Frenchmen saw the King himself, clad in the violet robe of a prelate and accompanied by the court, walking in a religious procession through the streets of Paris. The university was under the control of the local bishop, who kept watch over professors whose opinions were denounced as dangerous, and who suspended many of their courses, as, for instance, those of Cousin and Guizot. Was it the purpose of the dominant party to restore both the nobility and the church to the proud position they had occupied before the Revolution?

Criticism of the evident policy of the Government was becoming general and ominous. But the ministry proceeded with its plans with unusual fatuousness. It now attacked what was regarded as one of the most precious acquisitions of the Revolution, the right to an equal division of an inheritance among all the heirs. The ministry brought forward a proposal, quite modest in its scope, to re-establish the principle of primogeniture. The Civil Code provided that in case the deceased died without leaving a will, his real estate should be apportioned equally among his heirs; and this equal division was to be made of most of his property in land, even if he did leave a will. He was given liberty freely to dispose by will of only a portion larger or smaller, according to the number of children.

The proposal now made was that this disposable part, which a man might will to his eldest son if he chose, should go to him likewise, if there were no will, as a legal advantage over the other children. This was to be the law only for those who paid three hundred francs in direct taxes. As a matter of fact this law would affect probably not more than eighty thousand families out of six million. Furthermore, the father was in no way forced

to constitute this preference for his eldest son, since he was left full liberty of testamentary disposition. Yet the mere suggestion threw the country into commotion. The prevailing thought was expressed by the Duke of Broglie, who said: "This is no law. It is a manifesto against existing society. It is a forerunner of twenty other laws which, if your wisdom does not prevent it, will break in upon us and will leave no rest to the society of France, which has been the growth of the last forty years." The proposition was defeated in the Chamber of Peers. For several nights the streets of Paris were illuminated in gratitude for this escape from feudalism.

These measures and failures, which were costing the ministry much popularity, were crowned by an attempt to render the press law more stringent. Charles X had long since regretted his act in abolishing the censorship. A bill was now proposed which wound an amazing mesh around the printing presses of France. So sweeping was it in character, giving the Government a practically unlimited control of all publications, both periodical, like the daily papers, and non-periodical, that it aroused immediately a remarkable opposition. It was denounced as barbaric by Chateaubriand, the foremost man of letters in France. "Printing," said Casimir-Périer, "is suppressed in France to the advantage of Belgium." Those engaged in this business, as well as the prominent writers and members of the French Academy, protested with vigor. The bill passed the Chamber of Deputies, but in the Chamber of Peers an opposition so intense developed that the ministry deemed it wise to withdraw the measure before it came to a vote. Paris was illuminated in honor of this escape. The provinces imitated the capital. These outbursts of joy were occasioned not only by the withdrawal of the press law. The people were already celebrating the fall of the hated Villèle ministry, which was felt to be imminent.

The mistakes of this ministry, however, were not yet over. A few days after the withdrawal of this press bill the National Guard was reviewed by the King. The King was personally received with much warmth, but cries of "Long live the Charter," "Down with the Ministers, down with the Jesuits," were heard from the troops. Villèle at once demanded that these troops be disbanded. The King consented and it was done. This was a mistake for two reasons: because it offended the bourgeoisie of Paris, thus far opposed to the ministry but loyal to the King, and because the men were permitted to retain their arms, of which three years later they were to make effective use.

The ministry, conscious of rapidly waning power, did not propose to yield, but attempted to crush the opposition. It had been unable to get the press bill through Parliament. The chief resistance the ministry had encountered had come from the Chamber of Peers, which had favored a moderate policy. Villèle thought to overcome this by packing that chamber with men who would support the ministry through thick and thin. Consequently seventy-six new peers were created, enough, it was thought, to enable the ministry to control that body henceforth. But it was also clear that the opposition was growing in the Chamber of Deputies too. Although the ministry was able to get its measures through that chamber, its majority was gradually becoming smaller. Villèle therefore decided to dissolve the Chamber, although it had yet four years to run. He expected by manipulation of the election to get an assembly in its place overwhelmingly in favor of the ministry. Thus, with the press shackled, and the Chamber of Peers and Chamber of Deputies controlled, the ministry could retrieve the rebuffs it had recently experienced and carry out its policy in all its vigor.

Never did a minister make a greater mistake. The ministry was overwhelmingly defeated in the elections. Its supporters numbered only 170; the combined opposing elements counted 250. Villèle retired from office.

The Martignac ministry now came in, in January 1828. The difficulties in its way were numerous. It had neither the favor of the King, nor the hearty support of the Chambers. Charles X. told the new ministers, "Villèle's policy was mine, and I hope you will endeavor to carry it out as best you can." Martignac, however, made no such attempt, but strove rather to carry out a liberal policy, somewhat like that of the years 1816-20. The professors, Guizot, Villemain, whose courses Villèle had stopped, were reinstated. A somewhat more liberal press law was carried, abolishing censorship and the offense of "tendency." An educational law was enacted directed against the Jesuits and intended to please the more liberal religious element. But Martignac's course suited neither the Right nor the Left, and he shortly resigned. This pleased Charles X., who resented the liberalism of the ministry. Charles believed that he had the right to choose the ministers to suit himself, whether they pleased the Chamber or not. "I would rather saw wood," he said, "than be a king of the English type."

With the fall of the Martignac ministry in 1829 fell also the last attempt made under the rule of the Bourbon Legitimists

to fuse old and new France, to reconcile monarchy and constitutional freedom. The announcement of the new ministers was received with great popular indignation. The chief minister was Polignac, son of the Countess of Polignac, the friend of Marie Antoinette. Polignac had been one of the leaders of the émigrés at the outbreak of the Revolution, had joined in the Cadoudal conspiracy against Napoleon, had been sentenced to death, but had escaped with simply imprisonment, owing to the intervention of Josephine. In 1815 he had protested against the Charter, and had long refused to take the oath to support it. He had for years been very closely identified with Charles X, and had favored the most extreme laws proposed by him. Other ministers were Bourmont in the War Office, a man who was commonly supposed to have been a traitor to Napoleon, consequently to France, in 1815, and Labourdonnaye, Minister of the Interior, connected in the popular mind with the White Terror of 1815. Even Metternich, who could ordinarily view a policy of reaction with fortitude, considered the advent of such a ministry a matter of considerable gravity. "The change in the ministry is of the first importance," he wrote. "All the new ministers are pure royalists. Everything about the episode means counter-revolution." The feeling, that the appointment of this ministry was virtually a declaration of war to the bitter end against the modern society of France, was widespread, and was shared by all parties. Journals whose loyalty to the Bourbon monarchy was unimpeachable attacked the new ministry at once and in the most vigorous fashion.

Liberals of every shade began to organize to meet the dangers which they felt were coming. Old societies, like the Carbonari, renewed their activity. Men began to say that the House of Bourbon and a constitution were two incompatible terms. A faction was organized to prepare the way to the throne of the Duke of Orleans. Men began to study those chapters of English history which told how one prince could be put aside for another more to the liking of the nation. The groups opposed to the new ministry differed widely from each other in belief and purpose, Orleanists, Bonapartists, Republicans; but they were temporarily united in a common opposition. Indignation at the appointment of such a ministry was both widespread and deep, and became all the more vehement when Polignac declared his object to be "to reorganize society, to restore to the clergy its former preponderance in the state, to create a powerful aristocracy and to surround it with privileges."

For the time being, however, the ministry remained inactive, apparently amazed and checked by the remarkable ebullition of hostile feeling its appointment had called forth with the meeting of the Chambers. Early in March 1830 began a conflict which, short and sharp, ended in the overthrow and exile of Charles X. The King opened the session with a speech which clearly revealed his irritation at the Opposition, and his emphatic intention to support the ministry. The Chamber of Deputies, not at all intimidated, replied by an Address to the King, passed by a vote of 221 to 181, which was virtually a demand for the dismissal of the unpopular ministry, that thus "constitutional harmony" might be restored. The King replied by declaring that "his decisions were unchangeable," and by dissolving the Chamber, hoping by means of new elections to secure one subservient to his will. But the people thought otherwise. The elections resulted in a crushing defeat for the King and his ministry. Of the 221 who had voted for the Address, 202 were returned; of the 181 who had voted against it only 99 were returned. The total Opposition was increased from 221 to 270. The ministry could count on less than 150 votes in the new Chamber. The voters had spoken decisively.

This Liberal majority was not opposed to the monarchy. Had the King been willing to make some concessions, had he dismissed the ministry, the majority of the Opposition would have been satisfied. Charles X was urged to take this course by the most absolute of rulers, the Emperor Nicholas I, and by the most absolute of ministers, Metternich. Polignac was willing to go. But Charles had so conspicuously identified himself with his minister that yielding on that point seemed to him like abdicating. His own brother, Louis XVI, had come to a tragic end, he said, because he had made concessions. The ministry remained.

Charles was unconquerably stubborn. Other methods of gaining his ends having failed, he now determined upon coercion. He resolved to issue a series of ordinances to meet the demands of the situation. The ordinances consequently appeared in the *Moniteur*, the official organ, July 26, 1830. They were four in number. The first suspended the liberty of the press. For the publication of any periodical a preliminary authorization of the Government was thenceforth to be required. This authorization must be renewed every three months and might be revoked at any moment. Thus the editors of France could not lawfully publish another issue without obtaining the permission

of the Government. This, it was supposed, would effectually silence the opposition press. The second ordinance dissolved the Chamber of Deputies, just elected and overwhelmingly against the ministry, before that Chamber had ever met. This was to sport with the voters' rights to choose the deputies whom they desired. The reason assigned for this step was that during the late elections methods had been used "to deceive and mislead the electors." To prevent the recurrence of such manœuvres a third ordinance was issued gravely altering the electoral system. The number of deputies was reduced again to 258, one-fifth renewable each year. The property qualification for the suffrage was so manipulated as practically to exclude the rich bourgeoisie, merchants, and manufacturers, liberals and partisans of the new régime born of the Revolution, and to lodge political power almost entirely in the hands of the class of great landed proprietors, chiefly members of the nobility of the old régime. The electorate was hereby reduced by about three-fourths. Instead of about 100,000 voters there were now to be about 25,000. The fourth ordinance ordered new elections and fixed the date for the meeting of the new Chamber of Deputies that would emerge from those elections.

The King had persuaded himself that in issuing these ordinances he was acting not against the Charter but in conformity with it. He based his right upon an interpretation of Article 14, which gave him the power to make "the necessary regulations and ordinances for the execution of the laws and the safety of the state." He held that the king alone had the right to interpret the Charter, as the king alone had granted it. His interpretation was monstrous and his application of it pure absolutism, since, if the ordinances were legal, the most carefully safeguarded clauses of the Charter could be made null and void by the monarch's act. Needless to say, the Charter did not give the king the right to alter or abolish the fundamental provisions of the Charter. If so the French people would enjoy their liberties simply at the humor of the monarch. Not to have opposed these ordinances would have been to acquiesce quietly in the transformation of the French government into the absolute monarchy of the time of Louis XIV. If the French cared for the liberties they enjoyed, they could not permit this action of the King to stand. They must repel the assault upon their political system to whatever extent might be necessary, for the first and third ordinances were plainly violations of the Charter.

Yet Charles X and his minister, Polignac, were confident that

there would be no trouble. The ordinances affected, they said, only a few people — newspaper men and those who had the right to vote — an exceedingly small minority. No right that the masses of the people enjoyed was infringed. The people, therefore, would have no motive or desire to rise to aid simply the privileged few. It was the belief of the ministry that the mass of the nation was indifferent to the electoral law and was satisfied with material prosperity. The Government, entertaining this view of the situation, took no serious precautions against trouble. The Minister of Police assured his colleagues that Paris would not stir. Charles X, having signed the fateful decrees, and feeling secure, went off to hunt at Rambouillet. On his return that evening everything was quiet and the Duchess of Berry congratulated him that at last he was king.

The constitutional party, in truth, was poorly organized for resistance and moved slowly. The ordinances were aimed at the newspapers and the Chamber. The Chamber had not yet met. Its members were scattered over France, although some were in Paris. The first step in resistance was taken by the liberal editors of Paris. Under the leadership of Thiers they published a protest. "The reign of law has been interrupted; that of force has begun. The Government has violated the law; we are absolved from obedience. We shall attempt to publish our papers without asking for the authorization which is imposed upon us. The Government has this day lost the character of legality which gives it the right to exact obedience. We shall resist it in that which concerns ourselves. It is for France to decide how far her own resistance shall extend." On the following day the liberal members of the Chamber of Deputies drew up a formal protest against the ordinances, but outlined no course of action. The Revolution of 1830, however, was not to be accomplished by the journalists or the deputies.

As the significance of the ordinances came to be more clearly seen, popular anger began to manifest itself. Crowds assembled in the streets shouting "Down with the Ministry!"; "Long live the Charter!" Fuel was added to the rising flame by the appointment of Marmont, odious as a traitor to France in 1814, to the command of the troops in Paris. The workmen of the printing establishments, thrown out of employment, began agitating, and other workmen joined them.

On Wednesday, July 28, civil war broke out. The insurgents were mainly old soldiers, Carbonari, and a group of republicans and workmen — men who hated the Bourbons, who followed

the tricolor flag as the true national emblem, rather than the white flag of the royal house. This war lasted three days. It was the July Revolution — the Glorious Three Days. It was a street war and was limited to Paris. The insurgents were not very numerous, probably not more than ten thousand. But the Government had itself probably not more than fourteen thousand troops in Paris. The insurrection was not difficult to organize. The streets of Paris were narrow and crooked. Through such tortuous lanes it was impossible for the Government to send artillery, a weapon which it alone possessed. The streets were paved with large stones. These could be torn up and piled in such a way as to make fortresses for the insurgents. In the night of the 27th-28th the streets were cut up by hundreds of barricades made in this manner of paving stones, of overturned wagons, of barrels and boxes, of furniture, of trees and objects of every description. Against such obstacles the soldiers could make but little progress. If they overthrew a barricade and passed on, it would immediately be built up again behind them more threatening than before because cutting their line of reinforcements and of possible retreat. Moreover, the soldiers had only the flint-lock gun, a weapon no better than that in the hands of insurgents. Again, the officers had no knowledge of street fighting, whereas the insurgents had an intimate knowledge of the city, of its streets and lanes. Moreover, the soldiers were reluctant to fight against the people. The fighting continued two days amid the fierce heat of July. About six hundred lives were lost. Finally Charles, seeing his troops worsted and gradually driven back out of the city, determined to withdraw the ordinances. His messengers, who were bringing this news to the insurgents, were greeted with cries of "Too late, too late!" The insurgents were no longer content with the withdrawal of the odious measures that had precipitated the contest. They would have nothing more to do with Charles X. But the determination of the government to succeed his was a delicate matter. Those who had done the actual fighting undoubtedly wanted the republic. But the journalists and deputies and the majority of the Parisians were opposed to such a solution. They now took the aggressive and skilfully brought forward the candidacy of Louis Philippe, Duke of Orleans, representing a younger branch of the royal family, a man who had always sympathized with liberal opinions. On July 30 appeared a manifesto written by Thiers in the interest of this candidacy, running as follows: "Charles X may no longer return to Paris: he has caused the blood of the people

to flow. The Republic would expose us to frightful divisions; it would embroil us with Europe. The Duke of Orleans is a prince devoted to the cause of the Revolution. . . . The Duke of Orleans is a citizen king. The Duke of Orleans has borne the tricolors in the heat of battle. The Duke of Orleans alone can again bear them; we wish no others. The Duke of Orleans makes no announcement. He awaits our will. Let us proclaim that will and he will accept the Charter, as we have always understood it and desired it. From the French people will he hold his crown."

On the following day the deputies who were in Paris met and invited the Duke of Orleans "to exercise the functions of Lieutenant-General of the Kingdom." In a proclamation announcing this fact to the people it was stated: "He will respect our rights, for he will hold his from us." The Duke of Orleans accepted the position until the opening of the Chambers which should determine upon the future form of government for France. He added, "The Charter shall henceforth be a reality." But the transition from the old to the new was not yet completed. The people, who, during these three hot July days, had done the actual fighting, desired a republic. They had their quarters at the Hôtel de Ville and must be reckoned with. The final decision between monarchy and republic lay in the hands of Lafayette, the real leader of the Republicans. It was of the highest importance to know his attitude.

On July 31 Louis Philippe rode to the Hôtel de Ville dressed in the uniform of a general and wearing the tricolor cockade. He appeared on the balcony. Lafayette appeared with him and embraced him. The effect of the little pantomime was instantaneous. The crowd shouted for Louis Philippe. This popular applause ended the brief hope of the Republicans. The crowd virtually gave another sovereign to France.

Charles X now accepted the revolution. He abdicated, as did his eldest son, the Duke of Angoulême, in favor of the posthumous son of the late Duke of Berry, the Duke of Bordeaux, later well known in the history of France as the Count of Chambord and as Henry V, the title he would have worn had he ever become king. The leaders of the movement had, however, other ideas concerning the future government of France. They wished to be entirely rid of this legitimate royal line. Their first step was directed against Charles X and his immediate family. Desiring no repetition of the experience of the former revolutionists of having a king as prisoner they sent troops

against him to frighten him out of the country. The method succeeded. Slowly the King and his family withdrew toward the coast, whence they embarked for England (August 14). For two years Charles X lived in Great Britain, keeping a melancholy court in Holyrood Palace, Edinburgh, of sombre memory in the life of Mary, Queen of Scots. Removing later to Austria, he died in 1836.

The Chamber of Deputies, whose dissolution by Charles X before it had ever come together, had been one of the causes of this revolution, organized itself August 3 and undertook a revision of the Charter. It then called Louis Philippe to the throne, ignoring the claims of the legitimate prince, the nine-year-old Duke of Bordeaux. The revolution was now considered over. It had had no such scope as had that of 1789. It grew out of no deep-seated abuses, out of no crying national distress. France was growing every day richer and more prosperous. It was an unexpected impromptu affair. Not dreamed of July 25th, it was over a week later. One king had been overthrown, another created, and the Charter slightly modified. Parliamentary government had been preserved; a return to autocracy prevented.

The essential weakness of the monarchy of the Restoration was shown by the ease with which it was terminated. It always labored under the odium of its origin, having been brought back, as the phrase went, "in the baggage of the Allies," the enemies and vanquishers of France. The very presence of Louis XVIII and Charles X in France was a reminder of the humiliations of that country, was a trophy of her enemies' victories. Moreover, it was an inevitable fatality of this monarchy that its natural representatives and counselors had been long in exile, did not understand the complete intellectual transformation of their countrymen, had themselves always lived in a world of ideas alien to modern France, viewed the country they had to rule through a distorting though inevitable medium of preconceptions, prejudices, and convictions. The Bourbon monarchy accomplished much that was salutary. It restored the sadly disordered finances of the nation. Its policy in foreign affairs, in Greece, in Algeria, even in Spain, gave general satisfaction. But its ideal in government was the old, aristocratic régime and it was impelled by its very nature to seek to approach that ideal. When it approached too near it suddenly found itself toppled over.

Thus ends the Restoration and the reign of Louis Philippe now begins. Those who brought about the final overthrow of the elder Bourbons received no adequate reward. They had

the tricolor flag once more, but the rich bourgeoisie had the government. The Republicans yielded, but without renouncing their principles or their hopes. Cavaignac, one of their leaders, when thanked for the abnegation of his party, replied, "You are wrong in thanking us; we have yielded because we are not yet strong enough. Later it will be different." The revolution, in fact, gave great impetus to the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people.

CHAPTER VI

REVOLUTIONS BEYOND FRANCE

THE influence of the Revolution of 1830 was felt all over Europe — in Poland, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, England, and the Netherlands. It was the signal and encouragement for widespread popular movements which for a short time seemed to threaten the whole structure erected in 1815 at Vienna. It created an immediate problem for the rulers of Europe. They had bound themselves in 1815 to guard against the outbreak of "revolution," to watch over and assure the "general tranquillity" of Europe. They had adopted and applied since then, as we have seen, the doctrine of intervention in the affairs of countries infected by revolutionary fever, as the great preservative of public order. Would this self-constituted international police acquiesce in the overthrow of the legitimate king of France by the mob of Paris? Now that revolution had again broken out in that restless country, would they "intervene" as they had done in Spain and Italy? At first they were disposed to do so. Metternich's immediate impulse was to organize a coalition against this "king of the barricades." But when the time came this was seen to be impracticable, for Russia was occupied with a revolution in Poland, Austria with revolutions in Italy, Prussia with similar movements in Germany, and England was engrossed in the most absorbing discussion of domestic problems she had faced in many decades. Moreover, England approved the revolution. All the powers, therefore, recognized Louis Philippe, though with varying indications of annoyance. In one particular, consequently, the settlement of 1815 was undone forever. The elder branch of the House of Bourbon, put upon the throne of France by the Allies of 1815, was now pushed from it, and the revolution, hated of the other powers, had done it.

THE RISE OF THE KINGDOM OF BELGIUM

Another part of the diplomatic structure of 1815 was now overthrown. The Congress of Vienna had created an essentially artificial state to the north of France, the Kingdom of the

Netherlands. It had done this explicitly for the purpose of having a barrier against France. The Belgian provinces, hitherto Austrian, were in 1815 annexed to Holland to strengthen that state in order that it might be in a position to resist attack until the other powers should come to its rescue. The Congress had also declared and guaranteed the neutrality of the new state as an additional protection against an aggressive France.

But it was easier to declare these two peoples formally united under one ruler than to make them in any real sense a single country. Though it might seem by a glance at the map that the peoples of this little corner of Europe must be essentially homogeneous, such was not at all the case. There were many more points of difference than of similarity between them. Their historic evolution had not been at all the same. Except under the overpowering rule of Napoleon they had not been under the same government since 1579. Holland had been a republic. The Belgian provinces had remained subject to Spain at the time that Holland had acquired her independence, and had later passed under Austrian rule. They were also divided by language. The Dutch spoke a Teutonic tongue, the Belgians either Flemish, a Teutonic speech, yet differing from the Dutch, or Walloon, allied to the French. They were divided by religion. The Dutch were Protestants and Calvinists; the Belgians devoted Catholics. They differed in their economic life and principles. The Dutch were an agricultural and commercial people and were inclined to free trade; the Belgians a manufacturing people and inclined toward protection. There was one form of union, however, under which such dissimilar peoples might have lived harmoniously together—that of a personal union. Each might have had the same monarch but have kept its own institutions and followed its own line of development. But at Vienna no thought was given to such an arrangement. It was decided that the union should be “close and complete.”

This was the first disappointment for the Belgians. They had hoped that henceforth they would have a large measure of independence. They had never yet constituted a nation. For centuries they had been subject to the Spaniards and the Austrians. But the French Revolution had powerfully aroused the longing for a national existence. This desire for liberty and independence, thwarted in 1815, operated with growing force throughout the period of their connection with Holland. The Belgians saw themselves simply added to and subjected to another people inferior in numbers to themselves.

Friction began at once. The King, William I, had promised a constitution to his united kingdom and appointed a commission to draw it up. The commission consisted of an equal number of Dutch and Belgian members. There were discussions as to the capital. The Dutch desired Amsterdam; the Belgians, Brussels. No decision was possible, and it was decided consequently to make no mention of the subject in the Constitution. It was agreed that there should be a legislature consisting of two chambers, an Upper Chamber appointed by the king, a Lower elected by the provincial states. The latter was to be composed of 55 Dutch and 55 Belgian members. The Belgians objected to this equality, saying that they were a population of over three million, while Holland had less than two million. Holland replied that she had been a sovereign and independent state for over two centuries and that she would not admit Belgian predominance; also that wealth and general state of civilization must be taken into account; moreover, that if population were regarded as the sole basis of the state she had a right to count in her colonies. She insisted upon a representation at least equal to that of the newly incorporated territories. As neither would recognize the predominance of the other, equality of representation was the only possible outcome.

Equal rights were granted all forms of worship. This was denounced by the Belgian Catholics. The Constitution gave great power to the king. The legislative bodies could reject but not amend bills. The right of trial by jury was not guaranteed, a right the Belgians had enjoyed under the French rule. The Constitution was now submitted to assemblies of the two peoples for approval. The Dutch assembly accepted it but the Belgian rejected it. Nevertheless, by an arbitrary exercise of power the King declared it in force.

A union so inharmoniously begun was never satisfactory to the Belgians. Friction was constant. The Belgians objected with justice that the officials in the state and army were almost all Dutch. They objected to the King's attempts to force the Dutch language into a position of undue privilege. They objected to the system of taxation. Religious differences inflamed passions still further. Though the fact remains that during this period and largely because of this union the material prosperity of the Belgians advanced greatly, still the union never became popular. The evident desire of the King to fuse his two peoples into one was a constant irritation. The system was more and more disliked by the Belgians as the years went by.

Thus, long before the revolution in France, there was a strong movement in Belgium in favor of larger liberty, of self-government. Few as yet, however, dreamed of a disruption of the kingdom. There was a lively sense of grievances too long endured. The July Revolution now came as a spark in the midst of all this inflammable material. On August 25, 1830, rioting broke out in Brussels. It was not at first directed toward independence. The Belgians would have been satisfied if each country could have been given its own government under the same king. The King rejected this proposal to change a "real" into a "personal" union. His troops attempted to put down the insurrection. There were in September several days of fighting in Brussels as there had been in Paris, and of the same character. The royal troops were driven out, and on October 4 the Provisional Government that had arisen out of the turmoil declared Belgium independent and called a congress to determine the future form of government. The King now prepared to make concessions, but it was too late. The congress decided in favor of a monarchy as the form of government, adopted a liberal constitution, and at the suggestion of England and France elected as king Leopold of Coburg, who had just declined the new throne of Greece, but who accepted this.

The task of greatest difficulty was to get the new kingdom recognized by the Great Powers, which in 1815 had added Belgium to Holland. Would they consent to the undoing of their own work? The King, William I, was resolved not to give up Belgium and was preparing to reconquer it, which he probably could have done, as Belgium had no army. Everything, therefore, depended on the powers which had suppressed revolution in Spain and Italy ten years before. Would they do it again in the interest of the treaties of 1815? Now, however, they were divided, and in this division lay the salvation of the new state. The Tsar wished to intervene in order "to oppose an armed barrier to the progress of revolution." Prussia seemed similarly inclined, but Louis Philippe, knowing that his own throne would be overthrown by the Parisians if he supinely allowed these absolute monarchies to crush the new liberties of the Belgians, gave explicit warning that if they intervened France also would intervene against them "in order to hold the balance even" until the whole question should be settled by the powers, in congress assembled.

In November, 1830, an insurrection broke out in Poland, which effectually prevented Russia from acting in the Belgian

matter, caused Prussia to fix her attention upon her eastern boundaries, and filled Austria with apprehension. Thus the Holy Allies, hitherto so redoubtable as the opponents of revolutionary movements everywhere, were in no position to stamp out such a movement in Belgium. This part of the work of the Congress of Vienna had consequently been undone. A new state had arisen in Europe as a result of revolution. Its revolutionary origin, however, was covered up by the action of the powers in now consenting to it. Conferences of the powers, held in London at the close of 1830 and in 1831, accepted the separation of Belgium from Holland, guaranteed the neutrality of the new kingdom, and sanctioned the choice by the Belgians of Leopold as their ruler. The powers had the satisfaction of knowing that though the territorial arrangements of Vienna were altered, France, the arch-enemy, had gained nothing. Moreover, the monarchical principle was saved, as Belgium had been prevented from becoming a republic; but the new monarchy was constitutional, a fact pleasing to England and France, but odious to the three eastern powers.

The success of the Belgian revolution had to a considerable extent been rendered possible by a revolution in Poland, which ended in disastrous failure. Neither Russia, nor Prussia, nor Austria would have acquiesced so easily in the dismemberment of the Kingdom of the Netherlands had they not feared that if they went to war with France concerning it, France would in turn aid the Poles, and the future of the Poles was of far greater immediate importance to them than the future of the Netherlands. The French Revolution of 1830 was followed by the rise of the Kingdom of Belgium; but it was also followed by the disappearance of the Kingdom of Poland.

REVOLUTION IN POLAND

Poland had been, down to the last quarter of the eighteenth century, an independent state. During that quarter its independence had been destroyed and its territory seized by its three neighbors, Russia, Prussia, and Austria, in the famous partitions of 1772, 1793, and 1795. But the Polish people's passionate love of country was not destroyed and their hope that Revolutionary and Napoleonic France would restore their independence was intense. It was, however, destined to disappointment. But with the fall of Napoleon hope sprang up in another quarter. Alexander I, Tsar of Russia, was in 1815 filled with

generous and romantic aspirations and was for a few years a patron of liberal ideas in various countries. Under the influence of these ideas he conceived the plan of restoring the old Kingdom of Poland. Poland should be a kingdom entirely separate from the Empire of Russia. He should be Emperor of Russia and King of Poland. The union of the two states would be simply personal.

Alexander had desired to restore Poland to the full extent of its possessions in the eighteenth century. To render this possible Prussia and Austria must relinquish the provinces they had acquired in the three partitions. This, as we have seen, was not accomplished at the Congress of Vienna. There were henceforth four Polands — Prussian Poland, Austrian Poland, Russian Poland, and a new small independent Poland, created by the Congress of Vienna, the Republic of Cracow. The new Polish kingdom, erected by Alexander I in 1815, was then simply a part of historic Poland, nor did it indeed include all of the Polish territories that Russia had acquired.

Of this new state Alexander was to be king. To it he granted toward the close of 1815 a constitution. There was to be a Diet meeting every two years. This was to consist of a Senate, nominated by the king, and of a Chamber of Nuncios, elected by the assemblies of the nobles and by the communes. The latter chamber was to be elected for six years, one-third renewable every two years. Roman Catholicism was recognized as the state religion; but a generous measure of toleration was given to other sects. Liberty of the press was guaranteed, subject to laws designed to prevent its abuse. The Polish language was made the official language. All positions in the government were to be filled by Poles, not by Russians. No people in central Europe possessed such liberal institutions as those with which the Poles were now invested. A prosperous career as a constitutional monarchy seemed about to begin. The Poles had never enjoyed so much civil freedom, and they were now receiving a considerable measure of home-rule.

But this régime, well-meant and full of promise, encountered obstacles from the start. The Russians were opposed to the idea of a restored Poland, and particularly to a constitutional Poland, when they themselves had no constitution. Why should their old enemy be so greatly favored when they, the real supporters of the Tsar, were not? The hatred of Russians and Poles, a fact centuries old, continued undiminished. Moreover, what the dominant class of Poles desired, far more than liberal

government, was independence. They could never forget the days of their prosperity. Unfortunately they had not the wisdom or self-control to use their present considerable liberties for the purpose of building up the social solidarity which Poland had always lacked by redressing the crying grievances of the serfs against the nobles, by making all Poles feel that they were a single people rather than two classes of oppressors and oppressed. They did not seek gradually to develop under the ægis of their constitution a true and vigorous nationality, which might some day be strong enough to win its independence, but they showed their dissatisfaction with the limited powers Alexander had granted and shortly became obstructive and censorious — conduct lacking in tact and judgment.

The Diet criticized certain acts of the Tsar's officials and the Tsar warned the Diet. Friction developed from time to time, and, moreover, as the years went by, Alexander's early liberalism faded away. His successor, Nicholas I, who came to the throne in 1825, was a thorough-going absolutist. The spirit of unrest was strong among the mass of the lesser Polish nobility, a class little accustomed to self-control and also strongly influenced by the democratic ideas of Western Europe. This party was now inflamed by the reports of the successful revolution in France; by the belief that the French would aid them if they strove to imitate their example. When, therefore, the Tsar summoned the Polish army to prepare for a campaign whose object was the suppression of the Belgian revolution, the determination of the Liberals was quickly made. They rose in insurrection on the 29th of November, 1830. The Russian Grand Duke Constantine was driven from Warsaw. The revolutionists first tried negotiation with the Tsar, hoping in this way to secure their demand for larger political liberty. The attempt failed, but consumed time which the revolutionists could have used to much better advantage in arousing and organizing the country. When the Tsar sent word that Poland had but two alternatives — unconditional submission or annihilation — then the more radical revolutionists seized control of the movement, declared that the House of Romanoff had ceased to rule in Poland, and prepared for a life and death struggle.

Russia's military resources, however, were so great that Poland could not hope alone to achieve her national independence. The Poles expected foreign intervention, but no intervention came. Enthusiasm for the Poles was widespread among the people in France, in England, and in Germany. But the gov-

ernments, none of which was controlled by public opinion, refused to move. Louis Philippe, feeling his new throne quite insecure, did not wish to hazard it in the vicissitudes of a war. The revolution from which he had himself profited was a half-way affair. Revolutionary flames feed each other. If France should aid Poland the restless elements at home would be encouraged to go further and insist upon a thorough change in France which would endanger his position. England was not disposed to injure Russia, which might somewhere else wreak vengeance upon her. Prussia and Austria felt that an independent Poland would be a menace to them, as it would seek to win their Polish possessions. Moreover, patrons of reaction as they were, ought they to become, for no reason better than a popular sentiment, patrons of revolution?

Thus Poland was left to fight alone with Russia and of the outcome there could be no doubt. The Poles fought with great bravery, but without good leadership, without careful organization, without a spirit of subordination to military authorities. The war went on from January 1831 until September of that year, when Warsaw fell before the Russians. The results of this ill-advised and ill-executed insurrection were deplorable in the extreme. Poland ceased to exist as a separate kingdom and became merely a province of the Russian Empire. Its Constitution was abolished and it was henceforth ruled with great severity and arbitrariness. The insurgents were savagely punished. Many were executed, many sent to Siberia. Thousands of Polish officers and soldiers escaped to the countries of western Europe and became a restless element in Paris, Berlin, and Vienna, always ready to fight for liberty. Even the Polish language seemed doomed, so repressive was the policy now followed by Russia. The Poles' sole satisfaction was a highly altruistic one, that by their revolt they had contributed greatly to the success of the revolutions in France and Belgium.

REVOLUTION IN ITALY

Another country which felt the revolutionary wave of 1830 was Italy. The revolutions of 1820 and 1821 had occurred in northern and southern Italy. They had been easily crushed, largely by Austrian arms. During the next decade Austrian influence weighed ever more heavily upon the peninsula. Discontent with existing conditions was general. The various governments were despotic, reactionary, unenlightened. The Car-

bonari were constantly plotting new insurrections. In 1830 Prince Metternich declared Italy to be of all European lands the one which had the greatest tendency to revolution.

Metternich's diagnosis was destined to immediate vindication. Revolutions broke out in the states of central Italy in 1831. The Prince of Modena and the Duchess of Parma, Marie Louise, the former Empress, were forced to flee from their states. More serious was the rising in the Papal States against the government of the priests. In the Romagna, the northern part of the Papal States, Bologna, the center of the disturbance, declared the temporal power of the Papacy at an end. Nearly every town in the States except Rome joined the movement.

The revolutionists expected the inevitable hostility of Austria but hoped for the support of France as well as of the people in other Italian states. But France was a most uncertain reed. Louis Philippe desired peace above all things, not wishing to risk his newly acquired power in the chances of a war so far away and with so strong a state as Austria. His prime minister declared in a celebrated speech that "French blood belongs to France alone," a phrase odious to all Liberals as in it there was only egoism. Louis Philippe, too, was probably influenced by fear of the rise anew of Bonapartism out of an Italian war. The two sons of Louis Napoleon of Holland had offered their services to the Italian insurgents. Further, might not Austria, irritated, permit Napoleon's son, the Duke of Reichstadt, now a virtual prisoner at Vienna, to return to France, in which case Louis Philippe's power would probably founder quickly? Feeling his position strong, Metternich decided to intervene and suppress the insurrection. Austrian troops were sent southward. The exiled rulers were easily restored. The Pope recovered his provinces. But a conference of the five great powers at this juncture demanded that he carry out extensive reforms, mainly in the direction of putting the government into the hands of laymen. The Austrian forces were then withdrawn. But the papal promises, not being kept, insurrection broke out again in 1832. Again the Papal Government was powerless to maintain itself. The Austrians once more crossed the frontier, at the request of the Pope. But this time France intervened, not in the interest of the Italians, but, as she held, in the general interest of the European equilibrium which would be upset by the predominance of Austria in Italy. Asserting that she had as good a right to be in the Papal States as had Austria, she seized the fortress of Ancona, announcing that she proposed to stay there

as long as Austrian troops remained. All this was a mere episode in the game of the balance of power. The two powers watched each other on the Pope's domains until 1838, when, the Austrians having withdrawn their troops, France gave up Ancona. Absolutism was restored in the Papal States and in the duchies.

Thus another attempt of Italians to direct their own affairs had failed. The leaders were incapable, the odds too great. But there were certain results of importance. The absolute necessity of driving Austria out of the peninsula, if the peninsula was ever to have a career of its own, was proved once more; also the difficulty of driving her out. The hostility of the papacy to any such project was again shown. The temporal power of the Pope had by some of his own subjects been declared at an end — a suggestive precedent. The ambition of the leaders, too, had been to make Rome the capital of a new state of Italy. The revolutions of 1820 and 1821 had mainly been the work of military circles. The movements of 1831 and 1832 were joined by many merchants and laborers. Liberalism was appealing with increasing force to classes of the population hitherto passive or ignored. Liberalism was becoming more democratic. But for the time being reaction again held sway in Italy.

REVOLUTION IN GERMANY

Thus in 1830 revolution raged with varying vehemence all about Germany — in France, in Belgium, in Poland, and in Italy. The movement also affected Germany itself. In Brunswick, Saxony, Hesse-Cassel, and in two Saxon duchies revolutionary movements broke out with the result that several new constitutions were added to those already granted. The new ones were chiefly in North Germany, whereas the earlier ones had been mainly in South German states. But the two great states, Austria and Prussia, passed unscathed and set themselves to bring about a reaction, as soon as the more pressing dangers in Poland and Italy and France were over, and they themselves felt secure. Using certain popular demonstrations, essentially insignificant, with all the effect with which he had previously used the Wartburg festival, Metternich succeeded in carrying reaction further than he had been able to even in the Carlsbad Decrees of 1819. Those decrees were aimed chiefly at the universities and the press. New regulations were adopted in 1832 and 1834 by which he secured not only the renewal of these but the enactment of additional repressive measures.

In 1832 six new articles were adopted by the Diet of the Confederation, by which the suppression of liberalism was rendered more thorough than ever. By them every German sovereign was bound to refuse any petition of his local assembly that might impair his sovereignty; every assembly was forbidden to refuse its sovereign the taxes necessary to carry on the government or to use the taxing power to force concessions from the prince, or to pass any laws prejudicial to the objects of the Confederation. A committee was to be appointed by the Diet to watch over the legislation of the different states, and to report all measures that threatened the rights of the Diet or of the individual sovereigns. The Federal Diet was made a kind of Supreme Court with power to interpret the fundamental laws of the Confederation and to decide what state laws were inconsistent with them, that is, were unconstitutional.

The Diet also passed other repressive measures forbidding political societies, public meetings, and revolutionary badges, and promising aid to sovereigns in case of need. The decrees against the universities were enforced with renewed vigor. Thus not only universities, but chambers of deputies were now under the Metternich system. This was Metternich's crowning achievement in Germany. Again a persecution of professors, students, and journalists, surpassing previous ones, was instituted. Obstinate chambers of deputies were dissolved. Constitutional life in the few states where it existed was reduced to a minimum. The political history of Germany offers but little interest until the great mid-century uprising of 1848 shook this entire system of negation and repression to the ground.

CHAPTER VII

THE REIGN OF LOUIS PHILIPPE

LOUIS PHILIPPE, the new monarch of the French, was already in his fifty-seventh year. He was the son of the notorious Philippe Egalité, who had intrigued during the Revolution for the throne occupied by his cousin, Louis XVI, had, as a member of the Convention, voted for the latter's execution, and had himself later perished miserably on the scaffold. In 1789 Louis Philippe was only sixteen years of age, too young on the whole to play a political rôle, though he became a member of the Jacobin Club. Later, when the war broke out, he joined the army of his country and fought valiantly at Valmy and Jemappes. Becoming suspected of treason he fled from France in 1793 and entered upon a life of exile that was to last twenty-one years. He went to Switzerland, where he lived for a while, teaching geography and mathematics in a school in Reichenau. Leaving there when his incognito was discovered he traveled as far north as the North Cape, and as far west as the United States. He finally settled in England and lived on a pension granted by the British Government. Returning to France on the fall of Napoleon he was able to recover a large part of the family property, which, though confiscated during the Revolution, had not been actually sold. During the Restoration he lived in the famous Palais Royal in the very heart of Paris, cultivating relations that might some day prove useful, particularly appealing to the solid, rich bourgeoisie by a display of liberal sentiments and by a good-humored, unconventional mode of life. He walked the streets of Paris alone, talked, and even drank with workmen with engaging *bonhomie*, and sent his sons to the public schools to associate with the sons of the bourgeoisie — a delicate compliment fully appreciated by the latter. His palace was the meeting place for the liberal, artistic, intellectual society of Paris. Here certainly was a prince as nearly republican as a prince could be. The rights won by the Revolution would surely not be endangered by a man who so easily adapted himself to the new ideas that had come into the world with the great upheaval. Frenchmen, who dreaded the idea of a republic, dis-

credited by the horrors of the Revolution, and who wished to do away with the old-style monarchy, revived by Charles X, might naturally be hopeful of combining the advantages of both and avoiding the evils of both by placing so amiable and enlightened a prince in power.

Thus the legend grew up, carefully fostered, that here was a prince who put patriotism above self-interest, who had fought and suffered for his country. It was not known then, or in 1830, that he had sought to fight against it during Napoleon's reign, nor was it known that under this exterior of ostentatious liberalism there lay a strong ambition for personal power, a nature essentially autocratic, thoroughly imbued with extreme monarchical principles. Louis Philippe had learned the arts of intrigue, of self-control, of silent, incessant exploitation of circumstances for his own advancement.

Such was the man who in 1830 became king, called upon to govern a country in a sea of troubles. His legal title to the throne was very weak, his actual position for many years most precarious. He had been invited to ascend the throne simply by the Chamber of Deputies — a chamber, moreover, which had been legally dissolved, which, furthermore, had never been authorized to choose a king, which was, therefore, giving away something it did not possess. Moreover, of that chamber of 430 members only 252 took part in the vote, 219 in favor of Louis Philippe, 33 opposed. The Chamber of Peers concurred, but its concurrence merely emphasized its nullity in the whole proceeding. The choice of the new king was never submitted to the people for ratification, was never even submitted to the voters, who numbered about a hundred thousand. Louis Philippe was virtually the elect of 219 deputies, who, in turn, had no legal standing. Though the people of France acquiesced in the new régime, they never formally sanctioned it. The new king, in order to show clearly the break with the past, assumed the name Louis Philippe, rather than Philip VII.

The Chamber of Deputies, before calling Louis Philippe to the throne, drew up a Constitution to which he took oath. The Constitution was really a revision of the Charter of 1814 in those articles which had occasioned trouble during the last fifteen years, or which seemed inconsistent with the new monarchy. The fatal Article 14 was modified to read, "The king issues the ordinances necessary for the execution of the laws but never has power to suspend the laws or prevent their execution." Another change was that the right of initiating

legislation should no longer belong simply to the king, but should be enjoyed by both chambers. The sessions of the Chamber of Peers were made public like those of the Chamber of Deputies.

Instead of the formula, "the Catholic religion is the religion of the state," a phrase that denoted a position of privilege, a new formula appeared to the effect that that religion was "professed by the majority of the French." It was explicitly provided that the censorship should never be re-established. Article 67 said, "France resumes its colors. For the future, no other cockade shall be worn than the tricolor cockade." Thus the flag of the Revolution, lustrous with victories on a hundred battlefields, replaced the white banner of the Bourbons. The preamble of the Charter of 1814 was suppressed because it sanctioned the theory of monarchy by divine right and because in it the king condescended to grant Frenchmen rights as an act of royal pleasure, which they considered belonged to them inherently. In most other respects the Charter of 1814 remained unaltered. The age qualification was reduced for deputies to thirty years, for voters to twenty-five. It was, however, stated in the revision that the electoral system should be determined by ordinary law, thus providing for a supersession of the existing method.¹

A law was accordingly passed in 1831 establishing the system that was destined to remain in force until 1848. The law of the double vote was rescinded. The franchise, hitherto given only to those paying a direct property tax of 300 francs, was now extended to those paying one of 200 francs. The qualification was reduced to 100 francs in the case of certain professional classes, the "capacities," so-called, lawyers, physicians, judges, professors. Thus the electorate was doubled. But France was still far from democracy. At the beginning of the reign the voters numbered about two hundred thousand out of a population of about thirty millions. France was still governed by the propertied classes, by an aristocracy of wealth. Under the July Monarchy the bourgeoisie enjoyed a practical monopoly of power.

There was from the beginning a division of opinion as to the character of the new monarchy. Did Louis Philippe rule by divine right, or did he rule by the will of the people, expressed by their deputies? The very nature of the July Revolution showed that the former claim was untenable. That revolution

¹ The Constitution is given in full in Anderson, *Constitutions and Documents*, No. 105.

had been made by the people of Paris against the monarch who ruled by divine right. Even with Charles X out of the way his legitimate successor was not Louis Philippe but the little Duke of Bordeaux. But did the accession of this prince to the throne prove on the other hand that all sovereignty was vested in the people? Many claimed that such was the case, that the people of France had virtually elected Louis Philippe king, that they might with equal propriety have elected any one else, that having elected him they could dismiss him. The opponents of those who held this view declared that this was to make the July Monarchy virtually a republic, and the fact remained that the republic had been deliberately rejected. This party argued that the new monarchy was peculiar—that the basis of the new system was a kind of contract between the king and the nation; that neither was absolutely sovereign, but that each possessed a part of the sovereignty; that thus each was indispensable to the other, each incomplete without the other; that France did not recognize without qualification the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people, or that of the sovereignty of the monarch; that the fusion of the two, inevitable, complete, was the basis of the state; that the true theory of the monarchy was that expressed in Louis Philippe's phrase that he was "king by the grace of God *and* the will of the nation."

Not only was the legal basis of the July Monarchy uncertain, but its practical hold on France was most precarious. It was forced to devote the first half of its life to the problem of getting solidly established. Improvised at the moment of revolution, cleverly set up in the midst of general confusion, it was singularly lacking in all the qualities that impose upon mankind, that command immediate respect, that indicate the possession of authority and power. There was nothing majestic about its origin. It had no roots. Devised by the rich bourgeoisie, it seemed the expression of purely business considerations. Whether it could captivate the sentiments of France, could throw about itself the glamour that usually hovers over a throne, remained to be seen. It certainly possessed no prestige at the moment of its inception. Metternich analyzed the situation with keenness. "Louis Philippe finds himself at his accession to the throne in an untenable position," wrote the Austrian Chancellor, "for the basis upon which his authority rests consists only of empty theories. His throne lacks the weight of the plébiscite which was behind all the forms of government from 1792 to 1801; lacks the tremendous support of historical right, which was be-

hind the Restoration; lacks the popular force of the republic, the military glory of the empire, the genius and the arm of Napoleon, the Bourbon support of a principle. Its durability will rest solely upon accidents."

Its durability, however, proved greater than had that of the Napoleonic Empire or of the Restoration. Yet it had first to pass through a long period of storm and stress. It had enemies without, who denied its very right to exist. And even the supporters of the new régime were divided into two parties who could not long co-operate, so different were their views of the policies that ought to be followed by the Government both at home and abroad. There was the so-called party of movement or progress, with Laffitte, a rich Parisian banker, and Lafayette, at its head. This party did not consider that the revolution was over as soon as Louis Philippe sat upon a throne. They wished at home to effect many reforms in a democratic sense, not with revolutionary haste but gradually; and abroad, they wished to aid those peoples which were revolting against misrule — as in Belgium, Poland, and Italy. Thus by making France more democratic and by supporting democratic movements elsewhere, France would resume in the world her position of leadership in liberalism, which she had held under the Revolution of 1789.

The other party was called the party of resistance, of conservatism. It believed that the Revolution of 1830 had terminated on August 9, when Louis Philippe accepted the revised constitution and became king. It held that the Revolution had simply substituted for a king who wished to overthrow the parliamentary system established in 1814, a king who wished to maintain that system; that the Revolution meant the preservation of existing institutions, did not at all mean the expansion of those institutions in a democratic direction; that it was a popular revolution designed to prevent a royal revolution. It believed that France ought immediately to recover her normal condition, that the revolutionary passions which disturb men's minds and injure business ought to be quieted at once. Abroad, as well as at home, it would pursue a policy of peace. Casimir-Périer, Guizot, and the Duke of Broglie were leaders of this group.

Louis Philippe's preferences were decidedly for the latter party. Yet he could not at first break openly with the former. For some time, therefore, he called members of both to the ministry. Such a ministry could not from the very nature of the case have a clear, coherent policy. Revolutionary passions still ran riot in Paris. Crowds demanded the execution of the min-



isters of Charles X, who had advised the autocratic actions of that monarch. Mobs attacked Legitimists in the streets of Paris. These outbreaks resulted in business stagnation. The working classes suffered. It is said that 150,000 of them left Paris in search of employment. Public credit sank rapidly. Government bonds fell. No one could foresee what would happen either at home or abroad. The bourgeoisie felt insecure and rallied to the party of resistance.

Finally, March 13, 1831, Casimir-Périer and the party of resistance came into power. That party was destined to remain in power, with some variations, more or less marked, during the rest of the reign of Louis Philippe. Its policy truly expressed the essential character of the July Monarchy, which fell after eighteen years because it had not accomplished the democratic reforms demanded by the party of progress.

Casimir-Périer was a man of great wealth, of imperious temper, of positive opinions, of incisive speech. The principles according to which he intended to administer the government were boldly and clearly stated in an address delivered in the Chamber of Deputies shortly after the formation of his ministry. His declarations formed virtually the programme of the party of resistance. He announced his intention to carry out without weakness and without exaggeration the principle of the July Revolution. Now that principle was not insurrection; it was resistance to executive aggression. "France was exasperated, she was defied; she defended herself, and her victory was the victory of law basely outraged. Respect for plighted faith, respect for law, that is the principle of the Revolution of July, the principle of the government founded by it. For that Revolution founded a government and did not inaugurate anarchy. It did not overthrow the form of society, it affected only the political system. It aimed at the establishment of a government that should be free but orderly. Thus violence must not be, either at home or abroad, the character of our government. At home every appeal to force, abroad every encouragement of popular insurrection, is a violation of its principle. Such is the thought, such the rule of our home and foreign policy. Order must be maintained, the laws must be executed, authority respected. Public security and tranquillity must be revived. The Revolution has not begun for France the reign of force. The blood of the French belongs to France alone. The first result of this Revolution has been to render monarchy more popular by reconciling it with liberty."

Casimir-Périer formulated for foreign affairs the principle of

non-intervention, promising not to intervene in favor of peoples in insurrection, but asserting that foreign powers had likewise no right to intervene beyond their own frontiers. This principle was absolutely opposed to that on which the Holy Alliance had been acting. Later Casimir-Périer did intervene in Italy and in Belgium in the name of the principle of non-intervention.

This policy of rigorous restoration of order was begun at once. Casimir-Périer died in 1832 after a service of only fourteen months, but the policy he outlined with such clearness and firmness, and put into force, was continued in large measure by his successors.

The Government needed whatever strength it could get from a concentration of all its forces for the preservation of its existence, for the parties that desired the overthrow of the Orleanist Monarchy were active and daring. These parties, the Legitimists and the Republicans, it finally succeeded in silencing, though not until after much shedding of blood.

For the Legitimists, those who defended the rights of Charles X and his descendants, Louis Philippe was a usurper, a thief who had treacherously stolen the crown of the Duke of Bordeaux, the legitimate king. This party was numerically small, but it had in the Duchess of Berry a dauntless and resolute, if imprudent leader. A woman of unusual personal charm, attracting people to her and her plans despite their better judgment, she now, an exile in England, conceived the idea of winning a throne for her son, the Duke of Bordeaux. That the accomplishment of this would be the very climax of adventure did not sober her romantic, passionate nature. She believed that foreign monarchs would aid in asserting the principle of legitimacy, which lay at the basis of their own power. The magic of Napoleon's return from Elba was fresh in the mind of Europe. Might not a beautiful woman, representative of the House of Bourbon, succeed where the audacious soldier had succeeded? The Duchess won the reluctant consent of Charles X. She counted for success upon the favorable situation of the European powers, upon the supposed strength of the Bourbon party in France, upon the co-operation of the clergy and the nobility, and upon the support of the Vendée, considered the home of chivalric devotion to the white flag of the Bourbons. She felt so sure of success that she had already prepared a new constitution. She was warned in vain by prominent Legitimists of the total lack of effective preparations for so desperate an undertaking. Crossing the continent from England to Italy, she landed in France April 28, 1832, and, con-

cealed in a hut, waited for the promised rising of Marseilles. Even the news that this had failed and that the leaders were prisoners did not daunt her. She had told the faithful to be ready for her in Vendée on the first of May. She must keep the promise. Eluding the spies who were upon her heels, after great hardship, constant danger, and numerous adventures, she succeeded in reaching her destination. But the Government knew of the plan and the few hundred defenders of the legitimate monarchy were put down after a brave resistance. The Duchess escaped, reached Nantes after great exertions, and eluded the police for several months. She was betrayed by a person whom she had employed on several errands, was arrested, and was imprisoned until it was thought that she was dishonored and rendered politically impotent by the birth of a daughter and the avowal of a secret marriage.

At the very time this royalist insurrection was being put down in the west, a republican insurrection burst out in Paris. Lafayette had won the acquiescence of the Republicans in the erection of the July Monarchy, but only by assuring them that it would be the "best of republics." But this did not prove to be the case. By 1832 it seemed clear to them that they had been duped, and that the July Monarchy promised no growth in liberty for France. They then became its bitter enemies.

An insurrection broke out in Paris in June 1832 on the occasion of the funeral of General Lamarque, a prominent Republican. It was not sanctioned by the prominent men of the Republican party. The generals, known to be Republicans, remained inactive. The insurgents, therefore, were obscure, and their number was small, yet they fought with desperation for two days in the streets of the capital. They were defeated because they were unable to gain the co-operation of any considerable body of men. The workmen of Paris did not rise. The leaders refused to lead. Yet an insurrection so ill-timed and so ill-directed occasioned considerable loss to the Government. It was important as being the first frankly republican insurrection since 1815, and it was the strongest opposition the Government of July had thus far had to overcome. The Republicans were not discouraged by this failure, but went on preparing for the future. The Government favored a law aimed at breaking up the secret societies which were spreading republican principles, by restricting the right of association. Henceforth, any association, whatever might be its nature and whatever the number of its members, must submit its constitu-

tion and by-laws to the Government, and might not exist without its consent. Hardly had the new law been passed than new insurrections burst forth in several cities. Particularly important was that in Lyons in April 1834, which grew out of labor troubles but quickly took on a political character. For five days the riot raged in that city, finally, after great exertions, being put down by the Government. Insurrections also occurred in several other cities.

The Government was successful in suppressing these republican upheavals. It made no attempt to conciliate the discontented. It did not study the labor problem, which was one of the causes of the prevalent unrest, but determined to crush this annoying faction once for all. Republicanism must be stamped out. To this end the press must be controlled. The revised Charter of 1830 had provided for freedom of the press, and had declared the censorship abolished forever; yet the July Monarchy from the very moment of its inception had vigorously prosecuted republican journals, instinctively recognizing in them its most dangerous enemy. From July 1830 to September 1834 it had instituted over five hundred trials of journalists alone, had imposed heavy fines and long terms of imprisonment upon editors. The *Tribune*, the most aggressive republican sheet, had been prosecuted 111 times and had been forced to pay 157,000 francs in fines. Such prosecutions were more frequent than ever after the futile insurrections of April 1834. In addition to press prosecutions the Government determined to prosecute some of those who had been arrested in the recent riots. It instituted a monster trial of 164 accused, not before the jury courts, distrustful of the results in that case, but before the Chamber of Peers. Over four thousand witnesses were called. The defendants refused to recognize the jurisdiction of the Peers, or to defend themselves. The case dragged on for months, from March 1835 to January 1836, creating much bitterness of feeling. Finally the accused were condemned to various terms of imprisonment or to deportation. But the decision was not enforced. A general amnesty, proclaimed a little later on the occasion of the marriage of the King's eldest son, liberated them. By these vigorous methods, however, the Republican party were effectually silenced for many years. Its impotence was increased still further by divisions among the members themselves.

Not only were attacks made upon the Government during these stormy years, but attempts upon the life of the King were frequent. These were ascribed to the Republicans and served

to discredit them still further. They were not the acts of the party but of isolated individuals. From 1835 to 1846 six different attempts to assassinate the monarch were made and numerous other plots were discovered before they could be put into operation. The most horrible of these was that of Fieschi in 1835. An infernal machine composed of many gun-barrels was discharged by a Corsican, Fieschi, at the King as he was passing with his three sons and many members of the court and army through the streets of Paris, July 28, 1835. Eighteen persons were killed on the spot, many more were injured. The King and his sons escaped as by a miracle.

The Government, encouraged by the widespread execration of this fiendish crime, determined to strike hard at all opponents. It secured the passage in September 1835 of new laws concerning the assize courts, the jury system, and the press. The Minister of Justice was empowered to establish as many of these assizes or special courts as might be necessary to judge summarily all those attacking the security of the state. The accused might be judged even though absent. In jury trials the decision might henceforth be given by a mere majority, seven, instead of the two-thirds vote, eight, previously required. The third and most important law concerned the press. It was designed to protect the king, the constitution, and the fundamental principles of society from attack. Heavy fines, as high as 50,000 francs, were imposed for various offenses — for a summons to insurrection, even if the insurrection should not occur; for attacks upon the king, even allusions to his person, or caricatures; for publication of jury lists; for the collection of subscriptions to aid newspapers to pay their fines. The law went even further and forbade Frenchmen under heavy fines the right to defend other forms of government than the existing one; to declare themselves adherents of any fallen royal house; to question the principle of private property. The censorship was re-established for drawings, caricatures and plays. The preliminary deposit required of newspapers was raised to 100,000 francs.

These September Laws gave great offense to all liberal and moderate men. After five years of freedom of the press to return to so far-reaching a suppression of that freedom seemed unjustifiable. The most careful defense of the king and the constitution was certainly desirable, but did it require any such drastic measures at this time? Would not the very multiplicity of crimes tend to encourage crime?

These laws greatly weakened the July Monarchy. Men felt

that individual liberty was only an empty word. The press law was aimed particularly at the Legitimists and the Republicans. The papers of the former party, well supplied with capital, survived the persecution to which they were now subjected. The republican organs, lacking this resource, largely disappeared. The press in France was in as deplorable a condition as in the worst days of the Restoration.

The Government might now feel secure against the attempts of the Legitimists and the Republicans. The only other party that was an inevitable opponent of the July Monarchy was the Bonapartist. But of this Louis Philippe entertained no fear. Indeed, with what proved to be singular fatuity, he distinctly promoted by his actions the growth of a sentiment that in the end was to prove very costly both to himself and to France. With the evident intention of showing that the July Monarchy, unlike that of the Restoration, was truly national, that it had no desire to eliminate all reminders of the Napoleonic era, but rather regarded them as among the priceless glories of France, he completed the Arc de Triomphe, begun by Napoleon, named streets and bridges after Napoleon's battles, and caused the Napoleonic history to be portrayed on the walls of the palace at Versailles, side by side with that of Louis XIV. Literature was already busy creating the Napoleonic legend, which, ignoring the evils and the frightful cost to France of the great Emperor's rule, was immortalizing his achievements and mourning his tragic end. It was singular policy, indeed, for a descendant of Capetian kings to foster the reviving interest in the career of the illustrious founder of a rival family. But that no danger lay that way seemed to be proved by two attempts on the part of the heir to the Napoleonic throne to overthrow the July Monarchy, which was showing itself so complaisant to the Napoleonic sentiment, attempts which resulted in ridiculous failures.

Napoleon I had died in 1821, and his son, the King of Rome, known after 1818 as the Duke of Reichstadt, had died in 1832. The headship of the family thus passed to Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, the son of Louis Napoleon, formerly King of Holland, and of Hortense Beauharnais, daughter of the Empress Josephine. Napoleon had indicated that the succession should be in this line in case he should leave no direct descendant. Prince Louis, born in the Tuileries in 1808, had been educated in Germany, and had gone to Italy, where, in 1831, he had participated on the popular side in the revolutionary movements described above. He was now living in Switzerland, brooding

over his fortune, taking seriously his rôle of pretender, publishing his political views. Suddenly he appeared before the garrison of the fortress of Strasbourg in 1836, wearing the familiar Napoleonic coat and hoping to win the support of the soldiers by the very magic of his name. Thus having a lever he could perhaps topple Louis Philippe from his throne. He failed miserably, and was brought to Paris a prisoner. The Government thinking it wise to treat this episode as a childish folly did not prosecute him but allowed him to sail to the United States. But Louis returned next year to Switzerland. He removed to England upon the threat of Louis Philippe, taking part there in fashionable or semi-fashionable life, elaborating his political theories and planning for his political future. His undertaking had failed but he had at least announced himself to France as the heir of the Great Napoleon. He believed firmly in his star and felt that he would some day be called to finish the interrupted work of his uncle.

The Government of Louis Philippe proceeded to inject still further vitality into the growing Napoleonic legend. It secured the consent of the English Government to the removal of the remains of Napoleon from St. Helena to Paris, where they might repose, according to the wish which the Emperor had himself expressed in his last testament, on the banks of the Seine, "in the midst of the French people whom I have loved so well," and in December 1840 they were deposited beneath the dome of the Invalides with elaborate funeral pomp and amidst evidences of extraordinary popular excitement. A minister of Louis Philippe said in the Chamber of Deputies, "He was Emperor and King, the legitimate sovereign of this land; as such he might rest in Saint-Denis. But he is entitled to more than the usual burial place of kings." The question put by Lamartine was pertinent. What was the Government thinking of "to allow the French heart and imagination to be so fired?"

Meanwhile, Louis Bonaparte, pretender to the throne, had resolved to take advantage of this renewed interest in Napoleon. Declaring that the ashes of the Emperor ought to rest only in an Imperial France, he made another attempt to overturn the Government of Louis Philippe. On August 6, 1840, he landed with about sixty companions near Boulogne, hoping to win over the garrison of that town and then to enact another "return from Elba," an event whose fascination for adventurers was lively, but an achievement difficult to repeat. He brought

with him proclamations declaring the House of Orleans dethroned. The failure of this attempt was more humiliating than that of Strasbourg, four years earlier. The little group was scattered by the appearance of troops. They fled toward the beach, where most of them surrendered. But a few, among them the Prince, plunged into the water in order to get to a boat nearby, which capsized as they were attempting to scramble into it. They were seized by the authorities. But the Prince, brought before the Chamber of Peers for trial, had a chance to make a speech. "For the first time in my life," he said, "I am at last able to make my voice heard in France and to speak freely to Frenchmen. . . . The cruel and undeserved proscription which for twenty-five years has dragged my life from the steps of a throne to the prison which I have just left has not been able to impair the courage of my heart. . . . I represent before you a principle, a cause, a defeat. The principle is the sovereignty of the people: the cause is that of the Empire: the defeat is Waterloo." His eloquence, however, was unavailing. He was condemned to imprisonment for life in the fortress of Ham. He escaped, however, six years later disguised as a mason, named Badinguet. Two years after that he was the most important figure in France.

The parliamentary history of France during the ten years from 1830 to 1840 was marked by instability. There were ten ministries within ten years. Yet there was a fairly continuous policy. Ministries might disappear and new ones come on the scene, but all after the fall of Laffitte, 1831, were composed of men of the party of resistance, such as Casimir-Périer, Broglie, Thiers, and Guizot. The chief work was to consolidate the July Monarchy, to put down its enemies, and to keep the peace with foreign countries. When, however, the members of this party had finally triumphed over their adversaries, they divided against each other. The personal rivalry of two men, Thiers and Guizot, was largely the cause of this. Each desired the leading place in the Government. Out of this rivalry arose two parties, one called the Left Center, with Thiers as leader, the other called the Right Center, under Guizot. The division, however, was not based simply upon the personal ambitions of the two men. Each had its theory of the constitution. Thiers held that the king reigns but does not govern; in other words, the king must always choose his ministers from the party that is in the majority in the Chamber and must then let them govern without intervening personally in affairs. Guizot, on the other hand, held that the

king should have the greatest consideration for the opinions of the majority but that he was not bound strictly to follow that majority. "The throne," he said, "is not an empty chair."

Louis Philippe had no desire to be simply an ornamental head of the state, as he was according to Thiers' view. He desired to be the real ruler, to govern as well as to reign. He insisted upon conducting foreign affairs himself, and he endeavored to exercise a controlling influence in other ways through his ministers. But for several years after his accession to the throne he was careful to guard himself from all appearance of assuming personal power. But now that his enemies were overthrown and crushed, now that these street insurrections were stamped out, he began to reveal his real purpose more clearly, which was to be ruler in fact as well as in theory. Taking advantage of the party divisions just alluded to, he forced Thiers, the chief minister and a man too independent to be a mere spokesman of the King, to resign in 1836, and called to the ministry Molé, a man who, as he correctly supposed, would, because of his political convictions, be very willing to be the representative of the King's personal views. Men began at once to talk of "personal government," of the interference of the monarch in the realm that properly, they held, belonged to parliament. References to Charles X became frequent. A vigorous opposition to this "court policy" and "court ministry" finally brought about its fall in 1839. Thereupon Soult became chief minister, but was looked upon as as much the representative of the King as Molé had been. His brief ministry was notable for a direct rebuff administered through him to the monarch. Louis Philippe asked for an appropriation for his son, the Duke of Nemours. The Chamber rejected the request by a vote of 226 to 220. The Soult ministry then retired and at last the King, appearing to renounce his personal ambition, called Thiers to the ministry.

The chief feature of the short Thiers ministry was its treatment of the Eastern Question, which, in a new phase, had been for several years before Europe again. The existence of the Turkish Empire was once more threatened, this time by a powerful vassal of the Sultan. After the Greek war of independence, in which the viceroy of Egypt, Mehemet Ali, had greatly aided the Sultan, the former was dissatisfied with his reward. He began to extend his possessions by arms. He conquered all of Syria (1832). He pushed forward into Asia Minor, defeating the Turkish generals sent against him. He prepared to go still further, to Constantinople. At once the Euro-

pean powers began to take sides. Russia offered her aid and succeeded in making a treaty with the frightened Sultan, the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, 1833, whereby, for certain obligations she was to assume, she acquired an almost complete control of the Turkish government. England, hostile as ever to Russian influence in Turkey and also wishing to maintain her own commercial prestige in the East, came to the aid of Turkey. Russia and England, therefore, declared their intention of maintaining the integrity of the Sultan's dominions, though their motives were contradictory. Prussia and Austria took the same side, asserting that the rights of legitimate monarchs must be maintained. On the other hand, France supported Mehemet Ali. The French had been attracted toward Egypt ever since Napoleon's expedition. The Egyptian army was organized and drilled by Frenchmen. France had just conquered Algiers. A close connection between Mehemet Ali and France would probably offer considerable commercial and political advantage in the Mediterranean. Thus France became the patron of Mehemet. But she stood alone. Her isolation was shown to all the world when the powers met in conference in London in 1840 and, ignoring her, because they knew that she was hostile, made a treaty with Turkey, pledging themselves to force Mehemet Ali to terms. The publication of this treaty aroused a warlike feeling in France, as it seemed to exclude her from the concert of powers, as in 1815. Thiers urged the adoption of warlike measures, but the King vigorously opposed such proposals, which would involve France and the July Monarchy in the greatest danger. Thiers resigned and Guizot now became chief minister. France adopted a policy of peace and the danger of a war passed. Thus the King rather than the ministry had determined the policy of the Government. Incidentally, Louis Philippe found himself relieved of the minister who believed that the king should reign but should not govern, and he gained in Guizot, who now became the leading minister and who remained in power until 1848, an instrument through which he was enabled to carry out with great skill his personal policy during the remainder of his reign.

With the elevation of Guizot to the leading position in the Government, France attained ministerial stability. The administration of which he was the real head remained in power from 1840 to 1848. Guizot was now fifty-three years of age. He had been a Liberal at the time of the Empire and the Restoration. Eminent as a professor, an historian, and an orator, he was a man of strong and rigid mind, holding certain political prin-

ciples with the tenacity of a mathematician. In a world of change he remained immutable. He refused to recognize that France needed any alteration in her political institutions. He believed in the Charter of 1814, as revised in 1830. Any further reform was unnecessary and would be dangerous. To preserve order within and peace without, that the wealth of France might increase, was his programme. His policy was, as he said in his opening speech in the Chamber, the "maintenance of peace everywhere and always."

These were also the views of Louis Philippe. The King could in no sense use Guizot as a pliant tool. Guizot was a man of far too great independence of thought, of far too vigorous and original character, to be the tool of any man. But this harmony of opinions was so complete that the King could complacently watch his minister carry out the royal programme, and Louis Philippe was always far more concerned with the reality than with the appearance of power.

Moreover, the Government was scrupulous in its adherence to parliamentary forms, in which Guizot was a strict believer. This ministry always had a majority in the Chamber of Deputies. That majority, indeed, increased at each election. There was no attempt to defy the Chamber and exalt the royal prerogative. The King could not be accused of aspiring to play a personal rôle as in the days of Molé, for the ministry directed the Government and the ministry constantly had a majority of the Deputies to approve its actions. What France witnessed was a policy of stiff conservatism, of immobility, constantly supported by the Chamber.

The attention of the country consequently became riveted on that majority. How was it obtained? It was clear that it did not represent public opinion, did not at all express the convictions of France as a whole. It became evident on examination that that majority, the never failing support of the ministry, was obtained by an elaborate system of corruption. Louis Philippe and Guizot took no account of public opinion. They fixed their attention solely upon what was called the *pays légal*, that is, upon the body which possessed political rights under the constitution, namely, the voters and the deputies whom the voters chose. Now the number of voters was about 200,000, the number of deputies 430. Bodies so small could be manipulated and the manipulation was the supreme task of Guizot, the very foundation of his system. It was accomplished without difficulty. France was a highly centralized state, with local

government largely controlled by the central power. Consequently, the ministry had at its disposal an immense number of offices and it could do numberless favors to individuals and to communities. The electoral colleges, which chose the deputies, were small bodies frequently consisting of not more than two hundred members, many of whom were office-holders. The office-holders did as they were told by the Government, and other members were bribed in various ways by appeals to their self-interest. If they elected the candidate desired by the minister they might be rewarded by seeing a railway built in their district, for this was the period of railway building; or they might obtain tobacco licenses or university scholarships or petty offices for their friends. Many were the attractions held out to the self-interest of the voters, the *pays légal*. This was plainly corruption of the electorate, but it worked well in the opinion of the ministry. It insured the election to the Chamber of a large number of deputies pleasing to the ministry. Within the Chamber the same methods were used. About two hundred deputies, nearly half the assembly, were at the same time office-holders. The Government controlled them, as all promotions or increases of salary were dependent upon its favor. The ministry only needed to gain a few more votes to have a majority, and this was easily accomplished by a tactful distribution of its favors among those who had an eye to the main chance. There were plums enough for the purpose, offices to be bestowed, railroad franchises to be granted, lucrative contracts for government supplies to be awarded. "What is the Chamber?" said a deputy in 1841. "A great bazaar, where every one barter his conscience, or what passes for his conscience, in exchange for a place or an office."

Such a system was a mockery. The forms of the constitution were observed but its spirit was nullified. Self-interest was exalted above the interests of the nation. The ministry commanded a servile parliament. It is one of the ironies of history that Guizot, a man of most scrupulous honesty in private life, should have been the master mechanic of so corrupt and demoralizing a political machine.

Opposition to this system was, of course, inevitable, and is the main feature of the domestic politics of France from 1841 to 1848, when Louis Philippe and Guizot and the entire régime were violently overthrown. Reformers demanded that there be a change in the composition of the Chamber of Deputies and in the manner of electing it, parliamentary reform and electoral reform. Electoral reform should be effected by increasing the

body of voters, by lowering the property qualification, and by adding certain classes which could safely be intrusted with the suffrage, even if they could not meet the property qualification. Thus with an increased body of voters corruption would be more difficult. The ministry absolutely refused to consider this proposition. According to Guizot there were voters enough; moreover, the number was increasing with the increase of wealth. He even rejected a proposition that would have added only fifteen thousand voters to the existing electorate. It was demanded that the reform of the Chamber itself should be effected by forbidding deputies to hold office. Against this also the ministry set itself. Both plans, therefore, were rejected and the policy of immobility complacently continued. Year after year the two demands were brought forward in the Chamber; year after year they were voted down by the pliant majority. Reformers appeared to be hopelessly checkmated by the smooth operation of the machine they were denouncing. Well might Lamartine exclaim to Guizot, "According to you, the genius of the politician consists of only one thing—placing yourself in a position created by chance or by a revolution, and there remaining immobile, inert, implacable to all improvement. If in truth that were all the merit of a statesman directing a government, there would be no more need of statesmen: a post would do as well." This inertia ultimately disgusted some of the conservatives themselves. One of the members who had hitherto followed the ministry, summing up its work in 1847, said, "What have they done for the past seven years? Nothing, nothing, nothing." "France is bored," said Lamartine.

Yet this July Monarchy with its negative policy of resistance in season and out of season, resistance to lawlessness in the streets, to attacks of Legitimists and Republicans, to demands for an active foreign policy favorable to liberty, to demands for constitutional reform at home, was living in a world fermenting with ideas, apparently oblivious of the fact. Not only did its policy alienate many former supporters by its rigid and peremptory refusal of all concessions, and augment and sharpen more and more the antagonism of the Republicans, but its complete indifference to a new set of demands in the economic sphere, demands for social reform, was creating bitter enmities in another quarter and preparing a troublous future. There was growing up in France a party more radical than the republican, a party that looked forward not only to a change in the political form of the government but to a sweeping alteration in the form of

society, in the relation of the great mass of the population who were wage-earners to the privileged few, the capitalists and employers. The July Monarchy was a government of the bourgeoisie, of the well-to-do, of the capitalists. They alone possessed the suffrage. Consequently, the remainder of the population was in a political sense of no importance. The legislation enacted during these eighteen years was class legislation, which favored the bourgeoisie and which made no attempt to meet the needs of the masses. Yet the distress of the masses was widespread and deep and should have appeared clear and ominous to the Government. Under the Restoration, but chiefly under Louis Philippe, France was passing from the old industrial system of small domestic manufacture to the new factory system, the application of machinery to industry on a large scale, the employment of the new motive force, steam. This transition was in every country painful, involving as it did a dislocation and clumsy maladjustment of forces, and giving rise to most vexatious labor questions. Capitalists who could give or withhold the chance of employment had the upper hand and knew it. Grossly excessive hours of labor were required, and women and children who could tend machines were sacrificed to the new system in a manner that had never been possible under the old. The strange new conditions, the manifest evils dangerous to mind and body, required new laws for the protection of the weaker class. But legislation lagged far behind. Employers were intent on exploiting their factories, their machines, their workmen to the fullest possible extent, and many were amassing large fortunes. They were not interested in lessening the misery which the new order provisionally caused. And the law of France forbade the workmen themselves to combine for purposes of improving their condition. Ignorant, poor, lacking leadership, without political power, smarting under a sense of oppression and injustice, they were the inevitable enemies of a régime that passed them by, giving them no heed. In 1831 the silk-weavers of Lyons, earning the pitiful wage of eighteen sous a day for a day of eighteen hours, had risen in insurrection under the despairing banner, "We will live by working or die fighting."

Such conditions provoked discussion and many writers began to preach new doctrines concerning the organization of industry and the crucial question of the relations of capital and labor, doctrines henceforth called socialistic, and appealing with increasing force to the millions of laborers who believed that society weighed with unjustifiable severity upon them, that their

labor did not by any means receive its proportionate reward. Saint-Simon was the first to announce a socialistic scheme for the reorganization of society in the interest of the most numerous class. He believed that the state should own the means of production and should organize industry on the principle of "Labor according to capacity and reward according to services." Saint-Simon was a speculative thinker, not a practical man of affairs. His doctrine gained in direct importance when it was adopted by a man who was a politician, able to recruit and lead a party, and to make a programme definite enough to appeal to the masses. Such a man was Louis Blanc, who was destined to play a great part in the overthrow of the July Monarchy and in the Republic that succeeded. In his writings he tried to convince the laborers of France of the evils of the prevailing economic conditions, a task which was not difficult. He denounced in vehement terms the government of the bourgeoisie as government of the rich, by the rich, and for the rich. It must be swept away and the state must be organized on a thoroughly democratic basis. This was the condition precedent to all success. Only then and with the full power of the state at their disposal could the laboring classes work out their own salvation. The state, organized as a democratic republic, should then create so-called national or social workshops, advancing the necessary capital. These would be controlled by the workers who would share the proceeds. They would gradually supersede the existing workshops or factories, controlled and directed by the private individuals who had supplied the capital and who appropriated the profits. Private competition would give way to co-operative production. The individual producers would disappear. Louis Blanc's theories, propounded in a style at once clear and vivid, were largely adopted by workingmen. A socialist party was thus created. This party threatened the existence of the monarchy; it also threatened the industrial and commercial system in vogue. It believed in a republic as the only government that the democracy could hope to control; but it differed from the other republicans in that, while they desired simply a change in the form of government, it desired a far more sweeping change in society. As early as 1842 a German named Stein wrote: "The time for purely political movements in France is past; the next revolution must inevitably be a *social* revolution."

Thus it is evident that the amount of discontent with the government of France was great and growing. From nearly every quarter enemies arose. These enemies differed from each

other — they might not be able to co-operate in constructive work, but they could co-operate in destroying the existing system. There were the moderate Orleanists, convinced friends of monarchy, who were repelled by the prevalent corruption of parliament and wished to end it; there were the convinced Republicans, silenced but not suppressed; there were the Socialists, democratic, republican. The volume of discontent was increased by the unpopular character of the foreign policy of the ministry, which appeared humiliatingly submissive to England on certain occasions, too desirous of pleasing the absolute and reactionary monarchs of central Europe on others, too cold towards Liberals everywhere, too pettily personal, also, in that one of its aims was the advancement of the dynastic ambitions of Louis Philippe, who sought to promote by marriage alliances the fortunes of his family, even at the expense of the interests of the nation which he ruled.

These various groups, exceedingly dissatisfied with the existing order, converged in 1848, though unintentionally and unsympathetically, toward the most violent and reckless upheaval France had known since 1789 — a movement initiated by the moderate Monarchists, rapidly furthered by the Republicans, and in the end partly dominated by the Socialists. Each of these parties was by conviction and by temperament violently opposed to the other. The immediate occasion for their co-operation was furnished by the continued demand for electoral and parliamentary reform.

The electoral and parliamentary corruption of the July Monarchy has been described. Year after year the ministry had proved itself stronger and had defiantly resisted all proposals. The King was fatuously opposed to reform in itself. Guizot, believing in growth, nevertheless held that the time had not yet come for any alteration in the prevailing system. Beating against this wall, which seemed to grow higher and more solid each year, the Opposition came to see that there was no hope of overthrowing the obstructionist ministry by ordinary parliamentary methods.

Guizot constantly asserted that the demand for reform was simply brought forward for political purposes, that it was the work of a few, that the people as a whole were entirely indifferent. To prove the falsity of this assertion the Opposition instituted in 1847 a series of "reform banquets," which were to be attended by the people and addressed by the reformers. Petitions for reform were to be circulated on these occasions. Thus popular

pressure would be brought to bear on Parliament and King. These banquets were instituted by those loyal to the monarchy, but hostile to its policy. They simply wished to change the latter. Similar meetings, however, were instituted by the Republicans, who were opposed to the very existence of the monarchy. On the 18th of July, 1847, Lamartine, now rapidly advancing as a popular leader, prophesied a coming revolution. "If the monarchy," said he, "is unfaithful to the hopes that the wisdom of the country reposed in 1830, less in its nature than in its name, if it surrounds itself with an electoral aristocracy rather than unites the entire nation, if it allows us to descend into the abyss of corruption, rest assured that the monarchy will fall, not in its own blood as did that of 1789, but in the trap it itself has set. And after having experienced revolutions of liberty and counter-revolutions of glory, you will have a revolution of the public conscience and a revolution of contempt."

Great enthusiasm was aroused by these informal plébiscites all over the country during the summer and fall of 1847. It was conclusively shown that the people were behind this demand for reform. But the monarchy remained unaffected — still gave its systematic refusal. The King denounced in his speech from the throne this agitation "fomented by hostile or blind passions." He denied the legal right of the people to hold such meetings. To test this right before the courts of law the Opposition arranged a great banquet for February 22, 1848, in Paris. Eighty-seven prominent deputies promised to attend. All were to meet in front of the church of the Madeleine and march to the banquet hall. In the night of February 21-22 the Government posted orders forbidding this procession and all similar meetings. Rather than force the issue the deputies who had agreed to attend yielded, though under protest. But a vast crowd congregated, of students, workingmen, and others. They had no leader, no definite purpose. The crowd committed slight acts of lawlessness, but nothing serious happened that day. But in the night barricades arose in the workingmen's quarters of the city. Some shots were fired. The Government called out the National Guard. It refused to march against the insurgents. Some of its members even began to shout, "Long live Reform!" "Down with Guizot!" The King, frightened at this alarming aspect, was willing to grant reform. Guizot would not consent and consequently withdrew from office. This news was greeted with enthusiasm by the crowds and, in the evening of February

23d, Paris was illuminated and the trouble seemed ended. The contest thus far had been simply between Royalists, those who supported the Guizot ministry, and the reformers, and the fall of Guizot was the triumph of the latter. But the movement no longer remained thus circumscribed. The Republicans now entered aggressively upon the scene, resolved to arouse the excited people against Louis Philippe himself and against the monarchy. They marched through the boulevards and made a hostile demonstration before Guizot's residence. Some unknown person fired a shot at the guards. The guards instantly replied, fifty persons fell, more than twenty dead. This was the doom of the monarchy. The Republicans seized the occasion to inflame the people further. Several of the corpses were put upon a cart which was lighted by a torch. The cart was then drawn through the streets. The ghastly spectacle aroused everywhere the angriest passions; cries of "Vengeance!" followed it along its course. From the towers the tocsin sounded its wild and sinister appeal.

Thus began a riot which grew in vehemence hourly, and which swept all before it. The cries of "Long live Reform!" heard the day before, now gave way to the more ominous cries of "Long live the Republic!" Finally, on February 24th, the King abdicated in favor of his grandson, the little Count of Paris, who should be King Louis Philippe II, and whose mother, the Duchess of Orleans, should be regent. The royal family left the Tuileries and escaped from Paris in safety. Another French king took the road to England and entered upon a life of exile, which was to end only with death in 1850.

The government of France had been swallowed up by another revolution. The King and the minister were overthrown. Who would succeed them? The King had abdicated in favor of his grandson. But would the revolutionists recognize him? The Duchess of Orleans with great bravery went directly to the Chamber of Deputies with her two sons, nine and seven years old. A painful scene followed. The majority of the deputies hailed her as regent and her son as king, but soon the mob, consisting of the students, the Republicans, and Socialists who had forced the abdication, invaded the Chamber. The president declared the session closed. The mob continued in the hall, reinforced by new armed bands, which denounced the idea of a regency, denounced the Chamber and the deputies, and cried "No more Bourbons; a Provisional Government and after that the Republic." Out of this wild turmoil by no legal method arose

a new system. The republican deputies finally declared the House of Orleans deposed and proclaimed a Provisional Government and Lamartine read a list of seven names of those who should compose it. All were deputies. This list had been previously drawn up at the office of the *National*, the leading liberal newspaper. The crowd in the hall shouted its approval. This assembly did not proclaim the Republic.

While this government was arising in the Chamber, another movement was in progress, in another part of the city. The republican Socialists, meeting in the office of the *Reform*, their organ, had drawn up a list which had included the names on the list of the *National*, but had added to them three of their own number, among whom was Louis Blanc. These established themselves in the Hôtel de Ville and proclaimed the Republic. Thus there were two governments as a result of the insurrection. The members chosen in the Chamber traversed the streets of Paris to the Hôtel de Ville. There the two groups were fused. Positions were found in the new government for the members of both. The Republic was immediately proclaimed, subject to ratification by the people.

CHAPTER VIII

CENTRAL EUROPE BETWEEN TWO REVOLUTIONS

PRUSSIA

THE French Revolution of 1848 was the signal for the most wide-reaching disturbance of the century. Revolutions broke out from the Baltic to the Mediterranean, from France to the Russian frontier. The whole system of reaction, which had succeeded Waterloo and which had come to be personified in the imperturbable Metternich, crashed in unutterable confusion. But in order to understand the swiftness and completeness of this collapse, one must know something of the evolution of central Europe between 1830 and 1848, for the revolutions of 1848 were no sudden and accidental improvisations, but were simply the decisive and dramatic culmination of movements everywhere making for change. The Revolution of 1848 was a signal and an encouragement to other peoples to attempt similar things; it was not a cause. Particularly necessary is it to trace the inner evolution of Germany, Austria, and Italy during this period, which was not at all one of stagnation, but one characterized by a great and fruitful fermentation of ideas.

The interest of German history between 1830 and 1848 does not lie in the evolution of political liberty, for political repression and absolutism were the order of the day. It lies rather in growth along economic lines, in intellectual achievements outside the domain of politics, and in those movements of opinion and of racial aspiration which rendered so notable and far-reaching the vast turmoil of 1848.

For German history the all-important matter is the evolution during those years of a remarkable situation in both Prussia and Austria, which was highly favorable to revolutions in the fulness of time. The Confederation as a whole had no evolution, but was a sleeping, hollow mockery. The evolution of the lesser states, important no doubt, must be neglected in a study of this scope. The ideas, personalities, tendencies, and situations that were to prove determinant for central Europe, came not from them but from the two first-class powers already named, which stood confronting each other in the Confederation and in

Europe as a whole, rendering unity impossible, and both opposed to liberty.

And first of the evolution of Prussia during these years. Political liberty, as we have seen, was denied. No constitution was granted, no parliament created, but it would not be reasonable to emphasize that fact unduly. Their absence was not acutely felt save by a small enlightened minority. Such liberties Prussians had never known, and there were few serious practical grievances. The state was well administered. The king, Frederick William III (1797-1840), was honest and beloved, the administration hard-working and economical, the policies enlightened. The period between 1815 and 1848, though politically unimportant, was immensely significant in other ways. While university professors and students suspected of dabbling in politics were shamefully persecuted, the régime was not opposed to intellectual progress. Under it great advances were made in all branches of education from the lowest to the highest. Intellectual activity, forbidden to enter the political field, overflowed into others. It was a period of great and durable conquests in the domain of science, rich in leaders who held high the best traditions of scholarship and widened the bounds of human knowledge.

The great political achievements of the period lay in the administrative and economic questions met and solved by Prussian statesmen. Prussia had to undergo the most thorough reorganization. Before German unity could be achieved Prussian unity must be secured. The treaties of 1815 had transformed Prussia by almost doubling her territory and her population. Out of ten million inhabitants five million were new subjects, difficult to assimilate: the inhabitants of the Rhenish provinces had been for twenty years a part of the French Empire and were strongly attached to French ideas; the Poles still bitterly regretted the loss of their former independence; the Saxons resented their annexation to Prussia. These peoples did not feel themselves Prussians, though fate had put them under a Prussian king. The task of building anew the Prussian state out of such varied elements, of making a thoroughly homogeneous kingdom, was rendered all the more difficult from the fact that Prussia was divided into two separate, unconnected parts, an eastern and a western, separated by Hanover, Brunswick, and Hesse-Cassel. Her boundaries were not those of a healthy state. These were the problems whose solution would require time. Meanwhile certain definite reforms were undertaken.

The financial question was the most urgent, and this was faced heroically. The burden of the Napoleonic wars had been tremendous. The Prussian debt was large; deficits were usual. By revising her system of taxation, and by rigid economy, order was finally brought about, there were surpluses instead of deficits, and in 1828 government bonds stood at par.

The great interest of the Prussian Government in the material development and prosperity of the country was best shown in its tariff policy. Prussia, as has been said, was divided into two unequal and unconnected parts. The boundaries were very extensive, increased still further by the fact that entirely within her territory lay states or fragments of other states independent of her. Moreover, the economic conditions in the eastern part of the realm were essentially different from those in the western; the one agricultural, the other industrial. There was nothing like freedom of trade between the different parts. Indeed, there were in old Prussia alone sixty-seven different tariff systems in operation, separating district from district. Cities were shut off from the surrounding country districts by tariff walls, and province from province. All this meant that commerce could not flourish, hampered on every side, and that industries, the support of commerce, could not expand, owing to narrow and uncertain markets. Under these conditions one industry thrived — smuggling. The smugglers' trade was easy, owing to the fact that the frontiers to be guarded were over 4,000 miles long, a line that could only be guarded by a very large number of customs officials, which would involve great expense. All this was changed in 1818, under the influence of a great financial reformer, Maassen. All internal customs were abolished and free trade was established throughout all Prussia. Then a tariff, very simple and covering few commodities, was established against the rest of the world. This tariff was put low enough to make smuggling unprofitable. Products that would be brought over sea were taxed higher, as they must enter by the few ports, which could be easily guarded. Having established a common tariff for her own kingdom, Prussia sought to induce other German states to enter into union with her, to adopt the same tariff against other nations and free trade with each other. She offered to share the total revenues collected pro rata according to population. The other states protested vehemently at first against what they considered the high-handed measures of the larger state, but they finally saw the advantage of union. The first to join were those which were entirely inclosed or

which had parts entirely inclosed by Prussia; whose commerce with the outside world must be through Prussian territory. Between 1819 and 1828 the little Thuringian duchies entered this Zollverein, or Tariff Union. The southern and central states of Germany held aloof and even formed rival tariff unions of their own. These, however, did not prosper. One by one the other states joined the Prussian Union, led thereto by the apparent advantages of free trade with each other and by Prussia's liberal terms. By 1842 all, save the Hanseatic towns and Mecklenburg, Hanover, and Austria, had joined. The treaties between the co-operating states upon which the union rested were made for brief periods, but were constantly renewed.

The advantages of the Zollverein were both economic and political. Industry grew rapidly by the application of the principle of free trade to the states of Germany. It created a real national unity in economic matters, at a time when Germany was politically only the semblance of a union; it accustomed German states to co-operate without Austria, and it taught them the advantages of Prussian leadership. Men began to see that a Germany could exist without Austria. The Zollverein is generally considered in a very real sense to have been the beginning of German unity.

As long as Frederick William III lived it was recognized that no changes would be made in the political institutions of Prussia. It was tacitly understood that his declining years should not be disturbed, that the demands for reforms should not be pressed. But when he died in 1840, says von Treitschke, "all the long pent-up grievances and hopes of Prussia overflowed irresistibly, gushing and foaming like molten metal when the spigot is knocked out." All eyes were now turned upon his son and successor, Frederick William IV.

The new King, forty-five years of age, was already well known as a man of unusual intellectual gifts — quick, mobile, enthusiastic, imaginative, an eloquent conversationalist and public speaker. He was a patron of learning, surrounding himself with scholars, artists, and writers. Goethe had said of him that "so great a talent must awaken new talents in others." From his general intellectual restlessness and liberality much was hoped, as it was also known that he had latterly not approved the policy of his father. This impression he confirmed by his acts at the opening of his reign. He issued an amnesty pardoning political prisoners. He restored Arndt to his professorship at Bonn. He released Jahn. In a series of impassioned utterances

he spoke glowingly of Prussia's destiny. It seemed that a new and liberal era was dawning.

But disillusionment soon began. The people wanted reforms and expected them from the new King. His predecessor had consented to the creation of local diets for local concerns in each of the provinces into which Prussia was divided. He had promised a central parliament but had not kept the promise. The demand now was for this. Would Frederick William IV grant it? This question was asked him by the estates of the Province of Prussia. His answer was kindly and vague. A little later a real answer came in the form of an ordinance which somewhat increased the powers of the provincial estates and provided that delegations from each should unite in Berlin. This was not at all what was wanted. Several of the provincial estates demanded the fulfilment of the promises of 1815. Books appeared discussing constitutional questions. The press took the matter up vehemently, the censorship having been somewhat slackened. The King apparently made no effort to win back the favor of his people. His policy was evidently purely reactionary. Popular meetings were forbidden in certain provinces; the press, too free for his satisfaction, was shackled again. Even the independence of the judiciary was threatened.

Year after year went by and the people became impatient because no parliament was created. The King, meanwhile wavering between the most exalted notions of the divine origin and nature of his position and his desire to live in harmony with his age, sketched plan after plan of an assembly which should not be representative, which should co-operate with him, and which should quiet the insistent clamor of his people. Finally, on February 3, 1847, he issued a Letter Patent which marks the beginning of the constitutional history of Prussia. By this Patent it was announced that the king would summon all the provincial assemblies to meet in one general assembly or United Landtag whenever the needs of the state should demand new loans, the levying of new taxes, or the augmentation of those already existing. The United Landtag was to have the right of petition, and the king might consult it in regard to new legislation. There were to be two chambers, meeting apart, except when considering financial questions, the former a chamber of lords, the other of the three estates. At first enthusiastic, the people were shortly chagrined at the outcome of all their efforts. The Landtag was not to meet at definite periods but only when the king should summon it. It was to resemble a medieval diet

more than a modern parliament. Even its power in financial matters was greatly limited. All discussion involving the tariff was reserved for the Zollverein. Provincial and local taxes remained to be determined absolutely by the crown. In case of war the Government might increase the existing taxes, being merely obliged to bring the matter to the attention of the next Landtag. Even the right of petition was carefully restricted. The king would receive petitions only when two-thirds of both houses had agreed upon them.

This was not the constitution the people had been so long demanding. By it the king was not required ever to call the United Landtag together. Moreover, he retained the complete law-making power and an almost unrestricted power over the nation's purse. The new parliament was to represent, not the people, but social classes.

Moreover, in the speech from the throne, with which Frederick William IV opened this assembly in the following April, he took particular pains to state that this Patent was no constitution creating a parliament representing the people of Prussia. "Never will I allow," he said, "a sheet of written paper to come, like a second Providence, between our Lord God in Heaven and this land, to govern us by its paragraphs. The crown cannot and ought not to depend upon the will of majorities. I should never have called you together if I had the least idea that you could dream of playing the part of so-called representatives of the people."

A conflict began at once between the King and the United Landtag, which developed into a deadlock. The Landtag demanded a real parliament. The King demanded loans. Neither yielded to the other, and in June 1847 the Landtag was dissolved. Nothing had been accomplished. A grave constitutional crisis had been created. The monarch stood in direct opposition to the Liberals. Such was the dangerously overheated state of the public mind when news of the revolution in Paris reached Berlin.

AUSTRIA

The history of Austria between 1815 and 1848 resembles in some respects that of the German Confederation in that it was not the evolution of a single homogeneous state. Movements proceeded from several local centers. For purposes of simplification it is well to examine each in turn. In the provinces of Austria proper, in the western part of the empire, the movement

took the form of a demand for the diminution of the autocratic system. There, as elsewhere in Europe, after 1840 a popular feeling that the time had come for larger liberty was distinctly perceptible. Yet there the difficulty of its achievement was at its maximum. For as long as Francis I lived there was no hope of sympathy from the throne. His successor, Ferdinand I (1835-48), was a man of less ability and was, moreover, mentally incapacitated for rule. This meant that Metternich and his colleagues exercised nearly uncontrolled power.

During this period little change occurred in the conditions of the Austrian provinces. Liberal opinions could not be freely published owing to the severity of the censorship; yet there were a few journalists and lawyers who managed to express a desire for some measure of political freedom and for a constitution. One significant feature of the time was the transition from the old to the new in the economic sphere. The introduction of machinery, bringing with it the factory system, was now accomplished, and was accompanied by the terrible evils which had marked this transition in England and France. Many laborers were thrown out of work, wandered about the country, demoralized, starving, and drifted to the cities, particularly to Vienna, forming a desperate element, easily incited to deeds of violence, as the issue was to show. An industrial crisis preceded the political crisis of 1848 and profoundly influenced its course.

The period preceding 1848, politically of slight interest, was rendered notable by the development of the spirit of nationality among several of the varied peoples who had hitherto been quiescent under the House of Hapsburg. This was the most significant phenomenon of these years, as it was to be the most permanent in its effects. This feeling of separate individuality, this assertion of the rights of nationality, which was one of the principal features of the history of the nineteenth century everywhere, had come to be the most salient characteristic of Austrian evolution in particular. Under the ægis of the House of Hapsburg several nations were arising and were struggling for a larger and more independent place in the collective state. This spirit was particularly pronounced in Bohemia and Hungary.

Bohemia had been united with Austria since 1526. Its population consisted of a German minority and of a branch of the Slavic race called Czechs. The Germans had for more than two centuries been preponderant. Their language was that of the government, of educated people, the language of literature and

science, the Czechish being regarded as fit only for peasants. But after 1815 the popular consciousness gradually awoke. The idea that the Czechish nationality could be revived took strong hold of a few educated men, who believed that Bohemia should be torn from German control and that the native Czechish element should be put in its place. The movement was at first confined to university men, was literary and scientific. A group of historians arose, of whom Palacky was the leader, who by their histories of Bohemia when she had been an independent kingdom, inculcated the wish that she might again be one. Pride was enlisted, too, by reviving a knowledge of the ancient native literature. Henceforth every Czech should cease to use German and speak his own native tongue. This movement grew, passing from university circles to the mass of the people. It was directed against the German office-holders in Bohemia and against the use of German in the government and in education. While during the period from 1815 to 1848 it accomplished no practical reform, it created a public opinion and a vehement aspiration for national independence that constituted an important factor in the general situation of that year.

A more pronounced national and racial movement within the empire was going on at the same time in Hungary, a country peopled by several different races speaking different languages and possessing different institutions. The leading races were the Magyars; the Slavs, broken up into several branches, north and south of the Magyars; the Germans or Saxons; and the Roumanians. The Magyars, though numerically a minority of the whole people, were more numerous than any other race, were the most developed politically, and had, ever since they had come into the country in the ninth century, regarded it as their own and had paid scant attention to the other races. Two sections of Hungary, Croatia, peopled almost entirely by Slavs, and Transylvania, the majority of whose inhabitants were Roumanians, were somewhat differentiated from Hungary proper, where the Magyars predominated, in that, though annexed countries and subject to the king of Hungary, they enjoyed a certain measure of autonomy. Croatia, for instance, had a viceroy or ban and a Diet of its own. Transylvania had its Estates, infrequently convoked.

Hungary had a constitution dating in part from the thirteenth century. It was in 1222 that the Golden Bull of Andreas II was issued, nearly contemporary with Magna Charta. There was a Diet or Parliament meeting in Presburg in two chambers,

or Tables, as they were called; a Table of Magnates, composed of the highest nobility, of certain of the higher clergy and office-holders; and a Table of Deputies, chosen by the congregations or county assemblies, and by the free cities. Hungary was divided into more than fifty counties, each one of which had its local assembly or congregation.

The nobility alone possessed political power. Only nobles sat in the national Diet, and only nobles were members of the county assemblies. The nobility was itself divided into two sections, the very wealthy, the Magnates, about five hundred in number, and the petty nobility, numbering perhaps seven hundred thousand, poor, in many cases uneducated and hardly to be distinguished from the peasants among whom they lived, save by their privileges. Everywhere feudalism flourished in its most flagrant form and perhaps as nowhere else in Europe. The aristocracy not only constituted all the assemblies, national and local, but they filled all the offices. They enjoyed old feudal dues and paid no taxes themselves. The very tax intended to defray the expense of the local administration, which they monopolized, was laid upon the class beneath. Their lands could be alienated only to members of their own order. Their palaces in the cities were not subject to municipal jurisdiction. The entire class of the bourgeoisie had only one vote in the Diet. Neither bourgeoisie nor the laboring class possessed any power. The immense mass of the population, the peasantry, were subject to a most oppressive serfdom.

It is evident that though Hungary had a constitution it was not of the modern type but of the medieval. To take a place among the progressive lands of Europe, Hungary needed to be brought within the region of modern ideas. One of those who saw this and whose whole activity was to contribute powerfully to this modernization, was Count Stephen Széchenyi, a great Hungarian Magnate who, himself an aristocrat, boldly told his fellow-aristocrats that the time for reform had come, that they must reform themselves, and must change radically the conditions of their country. He was rather a social than a political reformer, interested chiefly in the encouragement of material prosperity, which necessitated the removal of many abuses from which the aristocracy profited. He devoted his time, his money, and his immense prestige to social and economic improvement, to the draining of marshes, the building of roads and tunnels and bridges, the clearing of the Danube for navigation. His aim was to make Hungary a busy, prosperous, modern industrial

state instead of an illustration of belated medievalism. He encouraged the foundation of learned societies, the use of the national language, the establishment of a national theater. His work was mainly outside the Diet and consisted chiefly of his vigorous writings and his example. He was not a political revolutionist, not an enemy of Austria. The spirit in which he worked was shown by his admonition to his countrymen: "Do not constantly trouble yourselves with the vanished glories of the past, but rather let your determined patriotism bring about the prosperity of the beloved fatherland. Many there are who think that *Hungary has been*, but I for my part like to think that *Hungary shall be*."

Meanwhile the Diet, controlled in both houses by the Magyar aristocracy, accomplished little in the direction of reform. It was not willing to curtail its own privileges. But, on the other hand, it was willing to assert itself against the Austrian Government, to attempt to gain a larger independence for Hungary in the collective state. One gain it made—that concerning the Magyar language.

Latin was the language used in the Hungarian Diet. It was the language of the Roman Catholic Church and had formerly been the language of diplomacy. In a country where so many tongues were spoken its use seemed a felicitous arrangement, favoring no one race. It was neutral. But the Magyars, now alive with the spirit of self-assertion, sought to depose Latin and to place Magyar in its stead as the official language. This they finally achieved in 1844. The Croatian deputies, on the other hand, wished still to speak Latin, but were not permitted to. The Magyars showed that their desire was not the freedom of the several peoples of which Hungary was composed, but only their own freedom, indeed, the freedom to impose their will upon others. Their object was the complete Magyarization of all who lived in Hungary, were they Croats, Serbians, Roumanians, or what else. In this struggle over language lay the germ of a conflict of races which was later to be most disastrous to the Magyars themselves. They were not willing to grant to others the rights which they had demanded for themselves.

While the Hungarian Diet was zealous in asserting the claims of Hungary against Austrian domination, and was eager to air Hungarian grievances against the Imperial Government, it refused to undertake any large measure of internal reform. The Magnates, intent upon the preservation of their unrivaled position, blocked the way of even those changes which the other

chamber, representative of the numerous lower nobility, was disposed to grant. Gradually there grew up as a result a party much more radical, nourished in the ideas of western Europe, democratic, and believing that the existing medieval institutions, the Diet and the county assemblies, must be thoroughly reorganized or swept away before the new ideas could be worked out. This Liberal party was led by Louis Kossuth, one of Hungary's greatest heroes, and Francis Deák, whose personality is less striking, but whose services to his country were to be more solid and enduring. Kossuth had first come into notice as the editor of a paper which described in vivid and liberal vein the debates in the Diet. When it was forbidden to print these reports he had them lithographed. When this was forbidden he had them written out by hand by a corps of amanuenses and distributed by servants. Finally he was arrested and sentenced to prison. During his imprisonment of three years Kossuth applied himself to serious studies, particularly to that of the English language, with such success that he was able later to address large audiences in England and the United States with remarkable effect. In 1840 he was released and obtained permission to edit a daily paper.

After 1840 the mass of the nation turned away from Széchenyi and toward Kossuth and Deák. Széchenyi, a Magnate, wished the gradual reform of his country from above, and had no sympathy with democratic movements. Kossuth, on the other hand, was the very incarnation of the great democratic ideas of the age. Sharing fully Széchenyi's desire to place Hungary in the front rank of modern nations, to develop its material prosperity, its civilization, he did not believe it possible to accomplish this by the methods hitherto followed, and without a thoroughly modern constitutional government. He believed that free political institutions contribute directly to material well-being and to civilization.

Kossuth, now as a brilliant editor and as an even more brilliant orator, conducted an agitation that had little in common with the reform movement of the Liberals up to this time. He did not believe that the necessary reforms could ever be brought about by existing agencies — either by the Diet or by the powerful county assemblies, both controlled by the nobility. He wished to erase all distinctions between noble and non-noble, to fuse all into one common whole. He demanded democratic reforms in every department of the national life; abolition of the privileges of the nobility and of their exemption from taxa-

tion; equal rights and equal burdens for all citizens; trial by jury; reform of the criminal code. Kossuth's impassioned appeals were made directly to the people. He sought to create, and did create, a powerful public opinion clamorous for change. This vigorous liberal opposition to the established order, an opposition ably led and full of fire, grew rapidly. In 1847 it published its programme, drawn up by Deák. This demanded the taxation of the nobles, the control by the Diet of all national expenditures, larger liberty for the press, and a complete right of public meeting and association; it demanded also that Hungary should not be subordinate to Austrian policy, and to the Austrian provinces. Such was the situation when the great reform wave of 1848 began to sweep over Europe.

ITALY

The Italian revolutions of 1820 and 1821, and of 1831 and 1832 had had no depth of root, no powers of endurance and had been easily crushed out by a few thousand Austrian bayonets. The humiliation of liberal-minded Italians was great indeed. It was clear to all that the methods hitherto employed would be inadequate to the end. The next fifteen years were devoted to a deeper study of the problem, to the elaboration of several plans for its solution, to the long and patient processes of preparing for an independent national existence a people sorely lacking the most essential elements characteristic of such a state. During this period a group of writers figure with unusual prominence. The previous revolutions had failed, partly at least, because of the narrow basis on which they rested. Disaffected army circles and members of a loosely organized, incompetently directed secret society, the Carbonari, had attempted these insurrections. The basis was narrow at best; moreover, the Italians had not yet learned the fundamental necessity of solidarity. Insurrections were pitifully local; Italians of different states rendered each other no assistance, or only the slightest, in movements that would have a common advantage for all and that to succeed must have the support of all. It was imperative that a universal mental state be created, that a common aspiration characterize the liberal elements everywhere, that an Italy of the imagination and affection should exist, even if the Italy of reality was only an expression of geography. All Italians must hold a common set of political ideas, whether they be Piedmontese, Sicilians, Venetians, or subjects of the Pope. To bring this about was





the work of several gifted men, working mainly through the channel of literature.

Foremost among these was Joseph Mazzini. Mazzini was the spiritual force of the Italian resurrection, the prophet of a state that was not yet but was to be, destined from youth to feel with extraordinary intensity a holy mission imposed upon him. He was born in 1805 in Genoa, his father being a physician and a professor in the university. Even in his boyhood he was morbidly impressed with the unhappiness and misery of his country. "In the midst of the noisy, tumultuous life of the students around me I was," he says, in his interesting though fragmentary autobiography, "somber and absorbed and appeared like one suddenly grown old. I childishly determined to dress always in black, fancying myself in mourning for my country." It was after the failure of 1821 that Mazzini first became conscious of the mission of his life. While walking one Sunday with his mother and a friend in the streets of Genoa, they were addressed, he says, "by a tall, dark-bearded man with a severe, energetic countenance and a fiery glance that I have never since forgotten. He held out a white handkerchief towards us, merely saying, 'For the refugees of Italy.'" The incident, simple as it was, made a profound impression upon Mazzini's ardent nature. "The idea of an existing wrong in my country against which it was a duty to struggle, and the thought that I, too, must bear my part in that struggle, flashed before my mind on that day, for the first time, never again to leave me. The remembrance of those refugees, many of whom became my friends in after life, pursued me wherever I went by day and mingled with my dreams by night. I would have given, I know not what, to follow them. I began collecting names and facts, and studied as best I might the records of that heroic struggle, seeking to fathom the causes of its failure."

As Mazzini grew up all his inclinations were toward a literary life. "A thousand visions of historical dramas and romances floated before my mental eye." But this dream he abandoned, "my first great sacrifice," for political agitation. He joined the Carbonari, not because he approved even then of their methods, but because at least they were a revolutionary organization. As a member of it, he was arrested in 1830. The governor of Genoa told Mazzini's father that his son was "gifted with some talent," but was "too fond of walking by himself at night absorbed in thought. What on earth has he at his age to think about? We don't like young people thinking without

our knowing the subject of their thoughts." Mazzini was imprisoned in the fortress of Savona. Here he could only see the sky and the sea, "the two grandest things in Nature, except the Alps," he said. After six months he was released, but was forced to leave his country. For nearly all of forty years he was to lead the bitter life of an exile in France, in Switzerland, but chiefly in England, which became his second home.

After his release from prison Mazzini founded in 1831 a society, "Young Italy," destined to be an important factor in making the new Italy. The Carbonari had led two revolutions and had failed. Moreover, he disliked that organization as being merely destructive in its aim, having no definite plan of reconstruction. "Revolutions," he said, "must be made by the people and for the people." His own society must be a secret organization; otherwise it would be stamped out. But it must not be merely a body of conspirators; it must be educative, proselyting, seeking to win Italians by its moral and intellectual fervor to an idealistic view of life, a self-sacrificing sense of duty. Only those under forty were to be admitted to membership, because his appeal was particularly to the young. "Place youth at the head of the insurgent multitude," he said, "you know not the secret of the power hidden in these youthful hearts, nor the magic influence exercised on the masses by the voice of youth. You will find among the young a host of apostles of the new religion." With Mazzini the liberation and unification of Italy was indeed a new religion, appealing to the loftiest emotions, entailing complete self-sacrifice, complete absorption in the ideal, and the young were to be its apostles. Theirs was to be a missionary life. He told them to travel, to bear from land to land, from village to village, the torch of liberty, to expound its advantages to the people, to establish and consecrate the cult. He told them to "climb the mountains and share the humble food of the laborer; to visit the workshops and the artisans; to speak to them of their rights, of the memories of their past, of their past glories, of their former commerce; to recount to them the endless oppression of which they were ignorant, because no one took it upon himself to reveal it." Let them not quail before the horrors of torture and imprisonment that might await them in the holy cause. "Ideas grow quickly when watered with the blood of martyrs." Never did a cause have a more dauntless leader, a man of purity of life, a man of imagination, of poetry, of audacity, gifted, moreover, with a marvelous command of persuasive language. The response was

overwhelming. By 1833 the society reckoned 60,000 members. Branches were founded everywhere. Garibaldi, whose name men were later to conjure with, joined it on the shores of the Black Sea. This is the romantic proselyting movement of the nineteenth century, all the more remarkable from the fact that its members were unknown men, bringing to their work no advantage of wealth or social position. But, as their leader wrote later, "All great national movements begin with the unknown men of the people, without influence except for the faith and will that counts not time or difficulties."

The programme of this society was clear and emphatic. First, Austria must be driven out. This was the condition precedent to all success. War must come—the sooner the better. Let not Italians rely on the aid of foreign governments, upon diplomacy, but upon their own unaided strength. Austria could not stand against a nation of twenty millions fighting for their rights.

At a time when the obstacles seemed insuperable, when but few Italians dreamed of unity even as an ultimate ideal, Mazzini declared that it was a practicable ideal, that the seemingly impossible was easily possible if only Italians would dare to show their power; and his great significance in Italian history is that he succeeded in imparting his burning faith to multitudes of others. "The one thing wanting to twenty millions of Italians, desirous of emancipating themselves, is not power, but *faith*," he said. His life was one long apostolate, devoted to the preaching of the true gospel. His writings thrilled with confidence and hope. "Young Italy must be neither a sect nor a party, but a faith and an apostolate." But if Italy were united what should be its form of government? Mazzini believed that it should be a republic, because sovereignty resides essentially in the people, and can only completely express itself in that form. Moreover, "our great memories are republican," and "there are no monarchical elements in Italy," no dynasty rendered illustrious by glory or by important services to Italy, "no powerful and respected aristocracy to take the intermediate place between the throne and the people." That a solution of the Italian problem lay in combining the existing states into a federation, Mazzini did not for a moment believe. Every argument for federation was a stronger argument for unity. "Never rise in any other name than that of Italy and of all Italy."

Mazzini's work, when it passed from the realms of exhortation, of ideas, to practice, proved ineffective. Young Italy

attempted several insurrections which were less important and less successful than those conducted by the Carbonari. He himself lacked some of the qualities of practical leadership. He was dogmatic, intolerant. He underestimated the strength of the opposition. As a man of action he was not successful. Nevertheless is he one of the chief of the makers of Italy. He and the society which he founded constituted a leavening, quickening force in the realm of ideas. Around them grew up a patriotism for a country that existed as yet only in the imagination. Their influence even reached the king of Piedmont, who had driven Mazzini into exile and who kept him there. "Ah, Ricci," said Charles Albert, "the form of governments is not eternal; we shall march with the times."

But to many serious students of the Italian problem Mazzini seemed far too radical; seemed a mystic and a rhetorician full of resounding and thrilling phrases, but with little practical sense. Men of conservative temperament could not follow him. Repelled by the needless waste of life in small and pitifully weak insurrections, alienated by the sweeping character of his demands, these moderate reformers thought that the problem was of a different nature and ought to receive a different solution. They began about 1840 to express their views in books which were widely read and much discussed and which exerted a considerable influence.

One of these was "The Moral and Civil Primacy of the Italians," a book by a Piedmontese priest, Gioberti, forced, like Mazzini, to live abroad in exile many years because of his radicalism. Gioberti believed that as Italy had been the fatherland of Dante and Napoleon, so it must always be the "home of creative genius." If so, it must occupy no less a position in the world than independence. He believed in independence as fervidly as did Mazzini, but he did not believe in the possibility of Italian unity, for Italy had been too long divided. The divisions were deep-seated, historic, insuperable. Unity could never be brought about by peaceful methods, and ought never to be attempted by force. Gioberti believed in a federation of the states of Italy under the presidency or leadership of the Pope. Thus Italy would be secure from foreign aggression or control and a free field would be opened for all kinds of internal improvement. He held that the genius of Italy was monarchical and aristocratic, whereas Mazzini had declared it to be republican and democratic. He believed that the futility of conspiracies and secret societies and insurrections had been proved, that they

did not further but hindered the cause. He concurred with Mazzini in believing in independence.

But to many who did not agree with Mazzini, Gioberti's idea that hope lay in the Pope seemed preposterous. This attitude was expressed by D'Azeglio in his "Recent Events in Romagna" (1846), a scathing commentary on the wretched misgovernment of the Pope within his own dominions, a vivid portrayal of the evils under which his subjects groaned. D'Azeglio also denounced the republican attempts at insurrection. Hope lay, in his opinion, in the king of Piedmont.

Still another point of view was represented by Cesare Balbo in his "Hopes of Italy" (1844). He too was a Piedmontese. He did not believe in unity; that was a madman's dream. Like Gioberti, he believed in federation, but federation could not be accomplished as long as Austria remained an Italian power. "Without national independence other good things are as nought." Austria, therefore, must be eliminated, but how could this be done? Not by a war against her of the Italian people or of the Italian princes, nor yet by foreign aid, but by the disruption of the Turkish Empire, which Balbo felt to be near at hand. Might not Austria expand eastward at the expense of the Sultan, and might she not then "make Italy a present of her independence?" Certainly a fanciful idea. Balbo pointed out the defects of the Italian character, and urged his countrymen to cast off their indolence, to cease to be "the land of the olive and the orange," and to develop strength and earnestness of character.

Out of this fermentation of ideas grew a more vigorous spirit of unrest, of dissatisfaction, of aspiration. This is the beginning of what is called in Italian the *Risorgimento* — the resurrection. Although ideas of how that resurrection should be brought about were at variance with each other, every utterance urged it forward. No political party was organized, but a general state of mind was created which held that Italy must become independent, which meant that Austrian influence must be eliminated, and that the Italians could do this themselves, if they only would. The watchword was given by Charles Albert, King of Piedmont. When asked how this great work could be accomplished, he said, "*Italia farà da sè*," Italy will do it alone.

Events in the realm of politics only intensified the effect of these books, seeming to open wide the door of hope. In 1846 a new Pope was elected, Pius IX. It was considered auspicious

that he was chosen by the anti-Austrian members of the conclave. He was known to have read Gioberti. His first acts were liberal. He pardoned political offenders, thus condemning his predecessor's policy. He appointed a commission to consider the question of railways, whose introduction had been opposed by his predecessor, one reason having been, it was said, his belief that they would "work harm to religion." He protested against the Austrian occupation of Ferrara. Metternich viewed this tendency with alarm. He had previously said that a liberal Pope was an impossibility. Now that there appeared to be one, he declared it the greatest misfortune of the age. The Pope's statement "that he was resolved to preserve all his authority" passed unheeded in the momentary enthusiasm. "Be a believer," wrote Mazzini to him, "and unite Italy."

Reforms were speedily granted in Tuscany and in Piedmont by the princes, stimulated by the spectacle of a reforming Pope. A citizens' guard was established in the former, that is, the people were given arms. This they believed would henceforth make despotism impossible. Charles Albert of Piedmont, hitherto called the "Hesitating King," because of his constant vacillation between absolutism and liberalism, now veered toward the latter, influenced by the action of the Pope and by the consensus of ideas represented in the Risorgimento. In October 1847 he issued a decree granting many reforms in local government, the organization of the police, and the censorship of the press. Shortly afterward he proclaimed the civil emancipation of Protestants. These reforms were received with great enthusiasm, an enthusiasm vastly augmented by a letter which he sent at this time to a scientific congress in which he said: "If Providence sends us a war of Italian independence I will mount my horse with my sons. I will place myself at the head of an army. . . . What a glorious day it will be in which we can raise the cry of a war for the independence of Italy!"

In January 1848 a revolution broke out in the Kingdom of Naples, the first of that year of revolutions. The king, Ferdinand II, was forced to yield to the demand for a constitution.

Such was the condition of Italy at the opening of 1848. The demand for reform was universal, but now news arrived which caused Italians speedily to pass on from this to a far greater undertaking, the ending of foreign domination. The news was that the monarchy of Louis Philippe was overthrown; that the Second Republic was declared; that Germany had risen; that

Austria was in the throes of dismemberment; that Metternich's system had collapsed, and that he himself had been driven into exile whither he had previously driven so many. The hour for Italy seemed to have struck in the hour of the distress of Austria. For the year 1848 was to be one of revolution the like of which Europe had not known since the Napoleonic period. Events were to succeed each other of a most sensational character, and the reaction of these events upon each other, of nation upon nation, of parts of nations upon other parts, was to be the most distinguishing as well as the most confusing characteristic of the time.

*Quand la France éternue
toute l'Europe s'enthume.*

CHAPTER IX

CENTRAL EUROPE IN REVOLT

CENTRAL EUROPE at the opening of 1848 was then in a restless, disturbed, expectant state. Everywhere men were wearied with the old order and demanding change. A revolutionary spirit was at work, the public mind in Germany, Italy, and Austria was excited. Into a society so perturbed and so active came the news of the fall of Louis Philippe. It was the spark that set the world in conflagration. The news was received with joy by the discontented everywhere, who by it were themselves nerved to resistless energy. Revolution succeeded revolution in the various countries with startling rapidity. The whole political system of conservatism seemed about to founder utterly. The great mid-century uprising of the peoples had begun.

The storm-center of this general convulsion proved to be Vienna, hitherto the proud bulwark of the established order. Here in the Austrian Empire one of the most confused chapters in European history began. A wild welter of disintegrating forces threatened for a while the very submersion of the Danubian state. The movement was so complicated and intricate that to give a clear account of it is exceedingly difficult. The immediate impulse came from Hungary. There the Diet had been in session since 1847, engaged in working out moderate reforms for the kingdom. The effect of the news of the fall of Louis Philippe was electrifying. The passion of the hour was expressed in a flaming speech by Kossuth, who proved himself a consummate spokesman for a people in revolt. Of impressive presence, and endowed with a wonderful voice, he was revolutionary oratory incarnate. In a speech in the Diet, March 3, 1848, he voiced the feelings of the time, and seized the leadership from more moderate men. With bitter execration he fulminated against the Austrian Government as a charnel house whence issued suffocating vapors and pestilential winds benumbing the senses, deadening the national spirit. Only with a free constitution could the various races of Austria have a happy future and live together in brotherhood. The effect of this speech in Hungary and throughout the Austrian states was immediate and profound.

Translated into German, and published in Vienna, it inflamed the passions of the people. Ten days later a riot broke out in Vienna itself, organized largely by students and workingmen. The soldiers fired and bloodshed resulted. Barricades were erected and the people and soldiers fought hand to hand. The crowd surged about and into the imperial palace, and invaded the hall in which the Diet was sitting, crying "Down with Metternich!" Metternich, who for thirty-nine years had stood at the head of the Austrian states, who was the very source and fount of reaction, imperturbable, pitiless, masterful, was now forced to resign, to flee in disguise from Austria to England, to witness his whole system crash completely beneath the onslaught of the very forces for which he had for a generation shown contempt.

The effect produced by the announcement of Metternich's fall was prodigious. It was the most astounding piece of news Europe had received since Waterloo. His fall was correctly heralded as the fall of a system hitherto impregnable.

As Hungary, under the spell of Kossuth's oratory, had exerted an influence upon Vienna, so now the actions of the Viennese reacted upon Hungary. The Hungarian Diet, dominated by the reform and national enthusiasm just unchained and constantly fanned by Kossuth, passed on March 15th and the days succeeding the famous March Laws, by which the process of reforming and modernizing Hungary, which had been going on for some years, was given the finishing touch. These celebrated laws represented the demands of the Hungarian national party led by Kossuth. They concerned two great subjects, the internal reorganization of Hungary and the future relations of that kingdom to the empire as a whole. They swept away the old aristocratic political machinery and substituted a modern democratic constitution. Henceforth there was to be a Diet meeting annually, not at Presburg, a town near Austria, but at Budapest, in the very heart of the kingdom, a Diet, moreover, to be elected, not by the privileged nobility but by every Hungarian owning property to the value of about one hundred and fifty dollars. The feudal services owed the nobility by the peasants were abolished, and nothing was said of compensation, save that it was a "debt of honor," presumably to be discharged by the nation later. Religious freedom, liberty of the press, trial by jury, a national guard were all proclaimed. And as regards the relations of Hungary to the empire, it was declared that Hungary should henceforth have its own ministry, not only for

domestic business, but also for war, finance, and foreign affairs. These latter departments had hitherto belonged to the central government. The March Laws made Hungary practically an independent nation. The only connection with Austria was in the person of the monarch, who could act in Hungary, however, only through this Hungarian ministry. The consent of the Vienna Government was all that was now needed to complete this virtual separation, and this consent was shortly given under the compulsion of dire necessity (March 31). Thus, with remarkable swiftness and without bloodshed Hungary had practically won her independence. Henceforth she would be mistress of her own destinies. That she so understood the matter was shown by her creation of a national army with a national flag, and by the appointment of Hungarian ambassadors to foreign countries.

The example of Hungary was speedily followed by Bohemia. Here there were two races: the Germans, wealthy, educated, but a minority, and Czechs, poorer, but a majority, ambitious to make Bohemia a separate state, subject only to the Emperor. The movement for the revival of Czechish nationality had been growing since 1830, expressed particularly by the revival of the Czechish language as a mark of distinction from the German, as a method of spiritual unification. This had been accompanied, as we have seen, by a revival of interest in Czechish and Slavic history. The Bohemians now sent a deputation to Vienna March 19th, to ask for the complete equality of Czechs and Germans, for the familiar liberal reforms relating to the Diet, the press, taxation, and religion, and for local autonomy. The Emperor a few days later conceded most of these demands.

Meanwhile, recognizing the opportunity, the liberals of Vienna and the Austrian provinces snatched at advantages for themselves. They demanded a constitution for the whole empire, and larger local self-government for the Austrian provinces. These demands, too, were granted, of course because of the helplessness of the Government. That helplessness was due chiefly to the critical situation in Italy. In Hungary, Bohemia, and the Austrian provinces extensive rights in the direction of self-government, of constitutional reform, of personal freedom, had been won. But there had in no case been a repudiation of the empire. The emperor's legitimate headship was not questioned. But in Italy it was just this that was denied. There, Austria possessed the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom. The leading city of Lombardy was Milan, of Venetia, Venice. These

states had long resented Austrian rule. Moreover, the other states of Italy had, since 1815, been practically dominated by Austria. In the peninsula the desire to expel the foreigner completely, and to achieve unity, was strong and growing. This is an important chapter of Italian history, which, however, can only be briefly treated here. The Italian reformers saw their opportunity in the disturbances of 1848. Milan rose in insurrection, and expelled the Austrian troops, which were unprepared. Venice, under the inspiring leadership of Daniel Manin, threw off the Austrian allegiance and declared itself a republic once more. Piedmont, an independent state, threw in its lot with these rebels, and sent its army into Lombardy. The other Italian states, Tuscany, the Papacy, and Naples, being compelled thereto by the popular demand, sent troops forward to northern Italy to co-operate. The moment seemed to have arrived for the liberation of the peninsula from Austrian control. The peoples and governments appeared to be unanimous in their determination to drive out the Austrians once for all. Italy had practically declared its independence. Here, then, was the critical point that must be defended at all costs. Fortunately for Austria she had in northern Italy a commander equal to the task, Radetzky, a man who had served with credit in every Austrian war for sixty years, and who now at the age of eighty-two was to increase his reputation. Radetzky, forced out of Milan, retired to the famous Quadrilateral, the fortresses on the Adige and the Mincio, Legnago, Peschiera, Verona and Mantua, one of the strongest military positions in Europe. Temporarily on the defensive, he believed he could win in the end if properly supported. He succeeded in convincing the Austrian Government that the crucial point was Italy, that here the fate of the empire would be decided. //

Meanwhile, there were March Days in Germany, too. Austria's distress was Germany's opportunity as it was Italy's. As we have seen, the personality and system of Metternich had imposed themselves upon the German Confederation, and through it upon the states of which it was composed. The news of his fall had immediate and resounding effect, and particularly in Prussia, for months kept fevered by its struggle with Frederick William IV for a real parliament. On March 15th barricades were erected in Berlin and for a week the capital was the scene of great turbulence and some bloodshed. The King, who had begun to waver even before the outbreak, issued on the 18th a proclamation in which he summoned the United Landtag to co-

operate in framing a constitution for the realm, guaranteeing the political and civil liberties that had been demanded for years. He also promised to lead in the attempt to achieve unity for Germany.

For the moment seemed to have come when this, also, might be wrung out of the chaos of the times, when the loose confederation erected by the Congress of Vienna might be transformed into a strong and vigorous union. The Liberals had always desired this, and had recently become unusually active in outlining plans and preparing for the future. The revolution in France gave them encouragement. The fact that Austria, interested in the preservation of the old Confederation, was now impotent, that the princes everywhere in Germany were powerless to oppose, greatly advanced the cause. A self-constituted committee of Liberals met at Heidelberg early in March and decided to call a preliminary assembly to consider the whole question. This preliminary assembly, or *Vorparlament*, met from March 31st to April 4th and arranged for the election, directly by the people, of an assembly that should draw up the constitution for a united Germany. The princes of the different states were forced to sanction this proceeding, as was also the Diet. In April and May the elections were held, and on May 18th the first German National Assembly or Parliament of Frankfort met amid the high hopes of the people.

Thus by the end of March 1848 revolution, universal in its range, was everywhere successful. The famous March Days had demolished the system of government that had held sway in Europe for a generation. Throughout the Austrian Empire, in Germany and in Italy the revolution was triumphant. Hungary and Bohemia had obtained sweeping concessions; a constitution had been promised the Austrian provinces; several Italian states had obtained constitutions; the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom had declared itself independent of Austria, and the rest of Italy was moving to support the rebels; a constitution had been promised Prussia, and a convention was about to meet to give liberty and unity to Germany.

But the period of triumph was brief. At the moment of greatest humiliation Austria began to show remarkable powers of recovery. In the rivalries of her races and in her army lay her salvation. The Government won its first victory, not in Italy, which was the critical point, but in Bohemia. There, in March, the Germans and the Czechs had worked together for the acquisition of the reforms described above. But shortly serious

differences drove the two races apart. The Germans wished to have Bohemia represented in the Frankfort Parliament, and included within the new Germany that was expected to issue from the deliberations of that body. To this the Czechs, however, were strongly opposed, fearing that this would only mean the complete submersion of their own nationality in that of Germany, the Germans being overwhelmingly predominant. What they aspired to was ultimately a Czechish or Slavic kingdom of their own. Fearing this very thing the Germans in Bohemia redoubled their efforts to make the connection between Bohemia and Germany close. Racial animosities were thus vigorously fanned. The result was street disturbances in Prague between the Germans and Czechs, culminating in an insurrection June 12. Windischgrätz, commander of the troops in Prague, proclaimed the city in a state of siege. Unable to restore quiet by negotiation he bombarded the city on the 17th, soon subdued it and was dictator. The army had won its first victory, and that, too, by taking advantage of the bitter racial antagonisms in which the Austrian Empire so abounded.

In Italy also the army was victorious. Radetzky had correctly foreseen the future. The Italians, after the first flush of enthusiasm, began to be torn by jealousies and dissensions. The Papal, Neapolitan, and Tuscan troops were recalled and northern Italy was left to itself. The rulers of those states had sent their armies forward to join Piedmont in the war with Austria, not because they had wished to, but because of popular pressure which they now felt able to defy. Charles Albert was no match for Radetzky, and was defeated badly at Custoza, July 25th. Austria recovered Lombardy and could even have invaded Piedmont had it not been for the opposition of France and Great Britain. Hostilities were brought to a close by an armistice August 9th. By the middle of the summer of 1848 the Austrian Government was again in the saddle in Bohemia, and had partially recovered its power in Italy. But in Vienna itself and in Hungary its position was still most precarious.

Hungary, as we have seen, had won by the March Laws of 1848 a position of practical independence of Austria. It possessed its own ministry, which constituted the real government. The rôle of the Emperor was most circumscribed, yet he was forced to endure this humiliation for the present. But the Austrian ministry was only biding its time to humble this arrogant Magyar Government. The opportunity came with the outbreak of civil dissension within Hungary itself. There racial and

national rivalries rose to the highest pitch. The Magyars, though a minority of the whole people, had always been dominant and the victory of March had been their victory. But the national feeling was strong and growing with Serbs, Croatsians, and Roumanians. These, in the summer of 1848, demanded of the Hungarian Diet much the same privileges which the Magyars had won for themselves from the Vienna Government. They wished local self-government and the recognition of their own languages and peculiar customs. To this the Magyars would not for a moment consent. They intended that there should be but one nationality in Hungary—that of the Magyars. Individual civil equality should be guaranteed to all the inhabitants of the kingdom of whatever race, but no separate or partly separate nations, and no other official language than their own. They, therefore, refused these demands point-blank. As a consequence, the bitterest race hatreds broke out in this Hungarian state, whose power had been so recently established, and was so lightly grounded. The Magyars insisted that the Magyar language should be taught in the schools in Croatia and should be used in all official communications between that province and the central government in Budapest. The Croatsians resented this uncompromising and ungenerous policy and their resentment rapidly became rebellion. The Austrian Government appointed Jellachich, a Croatian colonel and a bitter opponent of the Magyars, as governor or ban of Croatia. This the Hungarians felt to be an insult, and their relations with the Vienna Government became very much strained. Jellachich labored from the outset to fan the flames of this hatred of Croat and Magyar. Would the Austrian Government sanction these acts of one of its subjects against Hungary? That Government had approved the March Laws which gave large powers to Hungary, and Hungary included Croatia, Slavonia, and other Slavic areas. The Hungarian Government was entirely within its rights when it demanded that Jellachich be dismissed and that the agreement of March be loyally applied. But Austria had made those concessions only from compulsion. It saw now in Jellachich a means of recalling them. But its own position was still too insecure to permit it to proceed openly and aboveboard to that direct end. The policy that it followed was most tortuous,—now apparently conceding the Hungarian demands, at the same time not discrediting Jellachich. It would be impossible in our space to trace these manœuvres in detail. Suffice it to say that conduct so uncandid increased daily the tension between Hungary and

Austria, considered by Hungary responsible for the actions of Jellachich. A change consequently occurred in the inner politics of Hungary, which was resolved to maintain itself against the rebellious Slavs and, if Austria supported them, against Austria itself. The Hungarian ministry since March had been a moderate one, in favor of maintaining peace. It included all the more important Magyar statesmen. But the perilous position into which the Magyars were drifting naturally favored the more warlike and revolutionary leaders who embodied the passionate hatred of the Slavs and the Austrians. Peaceful negotiation between the various parties to the conflict failed, and in September 1848 matters were precipitated by Jellachich, who began a civil war by leading an army of Croats and Serbs against the Magyars. The effect of this action was to arouse the Magyars to a fever heat, and to play directly into the hands of the aggressive war party. Kossuth and the extreme radicals now came into power. Those who stood for peaceful relations with Austria, like Deák, gave up in despair. The Austrian Government finally assumed the aggressive. On October 3d the Emperor declared the Hungarian Diet dissolved. At the same time Jellachich, so odious to all Magyars, was given the command of all the imperial troops in Hungary. The immediate effect, however, of this action was not what had been intended, but was rather another outbreak in Vienna itself. There the revolutionists, sympathizing with the Magyars, rose and actually controlled the city for several weeks. The Emperor fled to Olmütz. But now the army appeared upon the scene. Windischgrätz, recalled from Prague, besieged Vienna for five days, finally forcing its surrender October 31, 1848. Austria had won her third victory; for in Bohemia, in Italy, and now in Vienna the army had intervened with decisive effect and had either crushed or checked the revolutionary parties, and had won back for the Government some of the ground lost in March.

The reactionary party in Austria now became stronger and more determined to finish with this ubiquitous revolution. It forced the Emperor Ferdinand to abdicate. He was succeeded December 2, 1848, by his nephew, Francis Joseph I, a lad of eighteen, destined to one of the longest reigns known to history, a reign that was to end only with his death in 1916. The purpose of this manœuvre was to permit by a show of legality the abrogation of the March Laws in Hungary. Promises made by Ferdinand, it was held, were not binding upon his successor, and the promises of March were henceforth to be repudiated.

Schwarzenberg, one of the most reckless, daring, and autocratic ministers of the nineteenth century, now became the real leader of the Government. The Austrian ministry, at last confident of its power, retracted the March Laws and prepared to subdue Hungary as it had subdued Bohemia and Vienna. Hungary stiffened for the coming conflict. She declared Francis Joseph a usurper. Only that person was King of Hungary who had been crowned in Hungary with the crown of St. Stephen. She therefore refused to recognize the new ruler until he should be crowned and take the oath to the constitution, and she held that Ferdinand was still King, and prepared to fight in his defense and that of the March Laws which he had sanctioned.

Thus it came about that the year 1849 saw a great war in Hungary. Austrian armies were sent into that country from various directions. The ungenerous conduct of the Magyars toward the other races in Hungary was now given its reward. Not only did the Hungarian armies have to face Austrian troops, flushed with victory, but in the south the Serbs were in full revolt, in the east the Roumanian peasantry favored the Austrians, in the south and southwest the Croats and Slavonians under Jellachich were eager for revenge. The result was that the Hungarian armies in the period from January to March 1849 were in the main unsuccessful. In April, however, they gained several victories and drove back the Austrians. Then, in a frenzy of excitement, the Hungarian radicals, led by Kossuth, induced the Diet to take the momentous step of declaring that the House of Hapsburg, as false and perjured, had ceased to rule, and that Hungary was an independent nation. Kossuth was appointed President of the indivisible state of Hungary. While the word republic was not uttered, such would probably be the future form of government if the Hungarians succeeded in achieving their independence. The Hungarian victories still continued for a while, but the action of the Diet in declaring independence altered the situation disastrously. The matter became international. Foreign intervention brought this turbulent chapter abruptly to a close. The young Francis Joseph I made an appeal for aid to the Tsar of Russia. Nicholas I showed the greatest alacrity in responding. The reasons that determined him were various: He was both by temperament and conviction predisposed to aid his fellow-sovereigns against revolutionary movements, if asked. He was an autocrat and interested in the preservation of autocracy wherever it existed. Also he had no desire to see a great republic on his very borders.

Furthermore, a successful Hungary might make a restless Poland. Many Poles were fighting in the Hungarian armies.

Russian troops, variously estimated at from 100,000 to 200,000 now poured into Hungary from the east and north. The Austrians again advanced from the west. The Hungarians fought brilliantly and recklessly, urged on by the eloquence of Kossuth. They sought the aid of the Turks but did not receive it. They even appealed to the Slavs, promising them in adversity the rights they had refused in prosperity, but in vain. The overwhelming numbers of their opponents rendered the struggle hopeless. Kossuth resigned in favor of Görgei, a leading general. The latter was forced to capitulate at Világos, August 13, 1849. The war of Hungarian Independence was over. Kossuth and others fled to Turkey, where they were given refuge. Nicholas proudly handed over to Francis Joseph his troublesome Hungary, which Austria, if left to her own resources, would probably have been unable to conquer. The punishment meted out to the Hungarians had no quality of mercy in it. Many generals and civilians were hanged. The constitutional privileges were entirely abolished. Hungary became a mere province of Austria, and was crushed beneath the iron heel. The catastrophe of 1849 seemed the complete annihilation of that country.

Meanwhile Italy also had been reconquered by the revived military power of Austria. The armistice concluded in August 1848 between Austria and Piedmont, after the battle of Custoza, lasted seven months, during which time diplomacy was vainly attempting to effect a peace. Austria crushed Lombardy as never before beneath a harsh military rule. Charles Albert considered himself now so deeply pledged to deliver Italy that he resolved to reopen the war and did so in the spring of 1849. But his chances were much poorer than in 1848. During those months absolutism in its severest form had been restored in Naples, and Naples consequently would send no aid; also the Pope had fled from Rome, his prime minister, Rossi, having been murdered, and had gone to Naples as the guest of Ferdinand. Rome had been declared a republic, with Mazzini as one of the *Triumvirs*, as the executive was called. Tuscany, also, had been declared a republic, the Grand Duke having likewise taken refuge with Ferdinand of Naples. Tuscany and Rome were consequently involved in such internal complications that they could not be counted on in a renewal of the war. Moreover, there was little sympathy between the republicans of these states and the monarchists of Piedmont, for one of the causes here, as everywhere,

of Austrian success lay in the fact that the revolutionists were divided among themselves. When Charles Albert took the field, therefore in 1849 he took it alone. No help came from the states to the south. The result was not long doubtful. At Novara, March 23, 1849, the Sardinian army was utterly overthrown. The King himself sought death on the battlefield, but in vain. "Even death has cast me off," he said. Believing that better terms could be made for his country if another sovereign were on the throne, he abdicated in favor of his son, Victor Emmanuel II, whose reign, begun in the darkest adversity, was destined to be glorious. Passing into exile, Charles Albert died a few months later. He had rendered, however, a great service to his house and to Italy, for he had shown that there was one Italian prince who was willing to risk everything for the national cause. He had enlisted the interest and the faith of the Italians in the Government of Piedmont, in the House of Savoy. He was looked upon as a martyr to the national cause.

The battle of Novara was followed shortly by the overthrow of the Florentine Republic and the restoration of the Grand Duke of Tuscany. But the restoration of the Pope and the extinction of the Roman Republic was a more difficult task. That republic, under the leadership of Mazzini, was becoming popular with the former subjects of the Pope, and would no doubt have lived had foreign powers been willing to let it alone. But they were not. France, believing that Austria would intervene if she did not, and wishing to assert something like a balance of power in the peninsula, decided to send an expedition to restore the Pope, but at the same time to preserve the free institutions that had recently been won by the Romans. The president of the republic, Louis Bonaparte, favored this for personal reasons. He wished to win the favor of the Catholics and conservatives of France. And thus France, pledged by its very constitution "never to employ its forces against the liberties of another people," went to work to destroy a sister republic. It should be said that the true Republicans in France strove to prevent the Government from embarking upon this policy, but in vain. At first the French were repulsed, but then, reinforced and far superior to the Romans, they began a siege of the city which lasted about three weeks, ending in its capture June 30, 1849.

With the fall of Venice before the Austrians in August 1849 this chapter of Italian history closes. The hopes of 1848 had withered fast. A cruel reaction now held sway throughout most of the peninsula. The power of Austria was restored, greater

apparently than ever. Piedmont alone preserved a real independence, but Piedmont was for the time being crushed beneath the burdens of a disastrous war and a humiliating peace.

Meanwhile the victories of the Liberals in Germany were being succeeded by defeats. Their hope had centered in the deliberations of the Parliament of Frankfort, consisting of nearly six hundred representatives, elected by universal suffrage. The assembly was composed of many able men, but it possessed only a moral authority. Though its existence had not been prevented by the rulers of the various states, because they had not dared to oppose what the people so plainly desired, still those rulers gave it no positive support and played a waiting game, hoping to be able to prevent the execution of any decisions unfavorable to themselves. The assembly aspired to give unity and a constitution to Germany. But having no draft ready to discuss, much time was lost. Debates on rather abstract questions, too, which might better have been postponed, consumed many weeks, during which the old order was beginning to win back its old position, particularly in Austria. Gradually, however, the constitution was elaborated. It reduced considerably the powers of the several rulers and created a fairly strong federal state. Two most thorny questions long baffled the assembly: what territory should be included in the new Germany, and who should be its head? The difficulties were extreme in either case. They lay in the fact that there were two great powers, Austria and Prussia, the fundamental fact, as we have seen, of the historical evolution of Germany. Any decision of either question would probably offend one or the other. Austria was the chief problem. Should she be admitted into the new union? If so, wholly or only in part? If wholly, that would mean that millions of Italians, Croatsians, Hungarians, Poles, Roumanians would come in, would participate in the making of the laws. It would mean, too, that the new central parliament would have to legislate for a most motley aggrégation of peoples. Moreover, the empire thus created would be no *Germany*, but a nondescript. Austria, largely non-German, had a population of 38,000,000. The rest of Germany would number only about 32,000,000. Austria would, therefore, have an absolute majority in the parliament, and the actions of that majority might be determined by the desires of Hungarians and Slavs. Obviously such an unity would be a mockery. Moreover, to permit such dissimilar elements to live together the loosest confederation would be necessary, and Germans were tired of loose confederations. On the

other hand, to admit only the German provinces of Austria would be to break up the unity of Austria, and to this the Austrian Government objected. It was finally decided, however, to include those provinces only. The boundaries of the new union were to be the same as those of the German Confederation.

The other most important question was what should be the form of the new government, and who should be the executive? Should there be an emperor or a president or a board, and, if an emperor, should his office be hereditary, or for life, or for a term of years? Should he be the ruler of Prussia or of Austria, or should first one and then the other rule? The final decision was that Germany should be an hereditary empire, and on March 28, 1849, the King of Prussia was chosen to be its head. Austria announced curtly that it "would neither let itself be expelled from the German Confederation, nor let its German provinces be separated from the indivisible monarchy."

The center of interest now shifted to Berlin, whither a delegation went to offer to Frederick William IV the imperial crown of a united Germany. Would he accept it? If he should, the new scheme to which twenty-eight minor states had already assented would go into force, though it might involve a war with Austria, by this time largely recovered from her various troubles. Frederick William had declared in 1847 that he was willing to settle the German question, "with Austria, without Austria, yes, if need be, against Austria." Now, however, he was in a very different mood. He declined the offer of the Frankfort Parliament. The reasons were varied. Austria protested that she would never accept a subordinate position, and this protest alarmed him. And he disliked the idea of receiving a crown from a revolutionary assembly; rather, in his opinion, ought such a gift to come from his equals, the princes of Germany.

Thus the two great German powers, Austria and Prussia, rejected the work of the Frankfort Parliament. Rebuffed in such high quarters, that body was unable to impose its work upon Germany, and it finally ended its existence wretchedly. In session for over a year it accomplished nothing. But the responsibility for the failure of Germans to achieve a real unity in 1848 and 1849 rests primarily not with it, but with Prussia and Austria. Its failure, however, and its mistakes probably made it easier for the next generation to solve the problem.

The King of Prussia now attempted to form a union along his own royal lines, an attempt which he soon abandoned, on peremptory orders from Vienna. This was the famous

"humiliation of Olmütz." Austria then demanded that the old German Confederation, which had been suspended in 1848, be revived with its Diet at Frankfort. This was done in 1851.

The permanent results of this mid-century uprising of central Europe were very slight. Everywhere the old governments slipped back into the old grooves and resumed the old traditions. Two states, however, emerged with constitutions which they kept, Sardinia, whose Constitutional Statute, granted by Charles Albert on March 4, 1848, established a real constitutional and parliamentary government, the only one in Italy; and Prussia, whose Constitution issued by the King in its final form in 1850 was far less liberal, yet sufficed to range Prussia among the constitutional states of Europe. By it the old absolutism of the state was changed, at least in form. There was henceforth a parliament consisting of two chambers. In one respect this document was a bitter disappointment to all Liberals. In the March Days of 1848 the King had promised universal suffrage, but the Constitution as finally promulgated rendered it illusory. It established a system unique in the world. Universal suffrage was not withdrawn, but was marvelously manipulated. The voters were divided in each electoral district throughout Prussia into three classes, according to wealth. The amount of taxes paid by the district was divided into three equal parts. Those voters who paid the first third were grouped into one class, those, more numerous, who paid the second third into another class, those who paid the remainder into still another class. The result was that a few very rich men were set apart by themselves, the less rich by themselves, and the poor by themselves. Each of these three groups, voting separately, elected an equal number of delegates to a convention, which convention chose the delegates of that constituency to the lower house of the Prussian Parliament. Thus in every electoral convention two-thirds of the members belonged to the wealthy class. There was no chance in such a system for the poor, for the masses. This system, established by the Constitution of 1850, continued to exist in Prussia down to the revolution brought about by the World War. It gave an enormous preponderance of political power to the rich. The first class consisted of very few men, in some districts of only one; the second class was sometimes twenty times as numerous; the third sometimes a hundred, or even a thousand times. Thus though every man twenty-five years of age possessed the suffrage, the vote of a single rich man might have as great weight as the votes of a thousand workingmen.

CHAPTER X

THE SECOND REPUBLIC AND THE FOUNDING OF THE SECOND EMPIRE

THE SECOND REPUBLIC

THE Revolution of 1848 in France was extraordinarily swift, entirely unexpected, and extremely radical. "Though the February Revolution," says de Tocqueville, "was of all our revolutions the shortest and the least sanguinary, yet far more than any other it filled the minds and hearts of men with the idea and feeling of its omnipotence." Beginning as a moderate demand for a larger electorate, it soon passed far beyond this into the realm of the new and the uncertain. A revolution of three days, it was made without premeditation, without definite plan or accredited leaders. The day of the 24th of February was made memorable by events crowding upon each other with irresistible pressure. On the morning of that day there was no public demand for a republic; by sunset a republic, the second in the history of France, had been proclaimed. This spectacular outcome was the one least imagined, as it had seemed for the past few years that the republican party which had so troubled Louis Philippe's early years as king was now moribund. Suddenly under the pressure of circumstances it awoke, and, though the party of a small Parisian minority, it won the triumphs of the day and established its régime.

The Second Republic lasted nominally nearly five years, from February 24, 1848, to December 2, 1852, when the Second Empire was proclaimed. Practically, however, as we shall see, it came to an end one year earlier, December 2, 1851. During this period the state was administered successively by the Provisional Government, chosen on February 24th, and remaining in power for about ten weeks, then for about a year by the National Constituent Assembly, which framed the Constitution of the Republic, and then by the President and Legislative Assembly, created by this constitution. The history of the Republic was to be a very troubled one.

The Provisional Government was from the first composed of two elements. The larger number, led by Lamartine, were simply Republicans, desirous of a republican form of government in place of the monarchical. "I regard the republican government," says Lamartine, "that is to say, the government of peoples by their own reason and their own will, as the sole aim and the sole end of the great civilizations, as the sole means of realizing the great general truths that a people desires to inaugurate in its laws. Other forms of government are states of tutelage, confessions of the eternal minority of peoples, imperfections in the sight of philosophy, humiliations in the sight of history." The other element of the Provisional Government was represented by Louis Blanc, Flocon, Albert, men who believed in a republic, but as a means to an end, and that end a social, economic revolution; men who wished primarily to improve the condition of the laboring classes, to work out in actual laws and institutions the socialistic theories propounded with such effectiveness during the later years of the reign of Louis Philippe, and particularly the principles represented in Louis Blanc's famous phrase, "the right to labor." What these men most desired was not a mere political change, but a thoroughgoing reconstruction of society in the interest of the largest and weakest class, the poor, the wage-earners. Blanc's conception of the republic he thus expressed: "It has always been my opinion that the republican form of government is not the sole object to be aimed at, even by politicians of the republican school, if their love for the commonwealth be sincere and disinterested. I believed then, as I do now, that the chief end to be kept in view is to make him that works enjoy the fruits of his work; to restore to the dignity of human nature those whom the excess of poverty degrades; to enlighten those whose intelligence, from want of education, is but a dim, vacillating lamp in the midst of darkness; in one word, to enfranchise the people, by endeavoring to abolish this double slavery, ignorance and misery."¹

Blanc was a convinced Socialist, intelligent and thoughtful. The interests of the working classes constituted, in his opinion, the supreme problem of government. He wished to replace private property by public property in the interest of the greater number. He would do this by co-operative societies. Production should not be carried on by capitalists, employing laborers

¹ Quotations are from Dickinson, *Revolution and Reaction in Modern France*, pp. 176, 178.

for wages and retaining profits for themselves. The laborers should manage the various industries themselves, reaping whatever rewards there were. To start these co-operative societies the aid of the state, furnishing capital, would be necessary. But in the end, gradually and without violence, the whole process of production would be transferred from the control of the few to that of the many.

A scheme so novel and so opposed to the habits and institutions of the ages was bound to be misconceived and misrepresented. Believers in the existing order would denounce every economic change as robbery; believers in change would be more dominated by passion, by hatred of the rich, by a desire for a division of property, than by moderate or equitable plans of economic reform.

The Provisional Government, divided as it was into Socialists and Anti-Socialists, ran the risk of all coalitions, that of being reduced to impotence by internal dissensions, as was to be immediately shown. Certain great reforms were, however, carried with practical unanimity. The death penalty for political offenses was abolished. Universal suffrage was proclaimed, and thus political power passed suddenly from the hands of about two hundred thousand privileged wealthy persons to over nine million electors. Negro slavery throughout the French colonies was abolished, as it had been in the first French Revolution. The freedom of the press was established, as were the freedom of public meeting and association and the right of all citizens to become members of the National Guard. The results were almost instantaneous and completely changed the character of political life in Paris. Newspapers and party pamphlets, sold cheaply, appeared in profusion, expressing the most varied and in many cases most radical ideas, and influencing far greater numbers than the French press had previously done. Political clubs, similar to those of the Revolution, were opened and formed additional clearing-houses for opinion and debate, and the National Guard rose in a few weeks from 50,000 to about 200,000. In other words, the masses of Parisian workmen now had weapons in the hand, as members of the Guard, and means of self-expression and propaganda in clubs and newspapers.

Conflicts between the two great currents of opinion began on the very day of the proclamation of the Republic. Armed workmen came in immense numbers to the Hôtel de Ville and demanded that henceforth the banner of France should be the red flag, emblem of Socialism. Lamartine repelled this demand

in a brilliant speech. "You desire," he said, "to replace a revolution marked by unanimity and fraternity with one of revenge and suffering. You demand that the Government raise as a sign of peace the standard of war to the bitter end among citizens of the same country. Never will I sign such a decree. I will repel to the last moment of my life this bloody flag, and you ought to reject it more than I, for the red flag has never been borne elsewhere than around the Champ-de-Mars, imbrued with the blood of the people in 1791 and 1793, while the tricolor has made the circuit of the world with the name, the glory, and the liberty of France." Lamartine's eloquence was overwhelming. The workmen themselves stamped upon the red flag.

But the Government, achieving an oratorical victory, saw itself forced to yield to the Socialist party in two important respects. On motion of Louis Blanc, it recognized the so-called "right to labor." It promised work to all citizens, and as a means to this end it established, against its own real wishes, the famous National Workshops. Blanc demanded that a Ministry of Progress be established, to organize co-operative associations of the kind which he had advocated. But, instead, the Government established a Labor Commission, with Blanc at its head and with its place of meeting the Luxembourg Palace. This was a mere debating society, a body to investigate economic questions and report to the Government. It had no power of action, or of putting its opinions into execution. Moreover, by removing Louis Blanc from the Hôtel de Ville to another part of Paris, the Government really reduced his influence and that of his party. Yet this Labor Commission, thus lamed at the start, set loyally to work. It was composed of delegates of workingmen representing different crafts, of political economists, and even of employers. Declaring that "manual labor too prolonged ruins the health of the laborer, and by preventing the cultivation of his mind, undermines the dignity of man," it demanded the reduction of the working day from eleven to ten hours in Paris, and from twelve to eleven throughout the country. The Provisional Government then decreed this change, but the decree remained a dead letter, as employers ignored it. The Commission persuaded the Government to abolish the "sweating" system. It also acted as a court of arbitration in certain labor disputes with some measure of success. But as time wore on it became irritated over its general lack of achievement, which contrasted so lamentably with the endless hopes it had aroused. The irritation constantly deepened, and the Commission became

in the end a center of much inflammatory talk. Looked to for leadership by tens of thousands of workmen, it was a source of danger to the Government. Deprived of all modes of legal action, it might become the seat of conspiracies and illegal proceedings.

The National Workshops, too, were a source of ultimate disappointment to those who had looked to them to solve the complex labor problems of the modern industrial system. Conceded by the Provisional Government against its will, and to gain time, that Government did not intend that they should succeed. Their creation was intrusted to the Minister of Commerce, Marie, a personal enemy of Louis Blanc, who, according to his own admission, was willing to make this experiment in order to render the latter unpopular and to show workingmen the fallacy of his theories of production, and the dangers of such theories for themselves. The scheme was represented as Louis Blanc's, though it was denounced by him, was established especially to discredit him, and was a veritable travesty of his ideas. Blanc wished to have every man practise his own trade in real factories, started by state aid. They should be engaged in productive enterprises; moreover, only men of good character should be permitted to join these associations. Instead of this, the Government simply set men of the most varied sorts — cobblers, carpenters, metal workers, masons, to labor upon unproductive tasks, such as making excavations for public works. They were organized in a military fashion, and the wages were uniform, two francs a day.

It was properly no system of production that was being tried, but a system of relief for the unemployed, who were very numerous owing to the fact that many factories had had to close because of the generally disturbed state of affairs. The number of men flocking to these National Workshops increased alarmingly: 25,000 in the middle of March; 66,000 in the middle of April; over 100,000 in May. As there was not work enough for all, the number of working days was reduced for each man to two a week, and his total wage for the week fixed at eight francs. The result was that large numbers of men were kept idle most of the time, were given wretched wages, and had plenty of time to discuss their grievances. They furnished excellent material for socialist agitators. This experiment wasted the public money, accomplished nothing useful, and led to a street war of the most appalling kind.

The Provisional Government was, as the name signified, only

a temporary organization whose duty was to administer the state until an assembly should be elected by the new universal suffrage, which assembly should then frame a Constitution. The elections were held April 23d, and the National Constituent Assembly met on May 4, 1848. The assembly consisted of nine hundred men, about eight hundred of them moderate Republicans. The Socialists had almost disappeared.

The Assembly showed at once that it was bitterly opposed to the opinions of the Socialists of Paris. The Provisional Government now laid down its powers, and the Assembly chose five of its members, all Anti-Socialists, with Lamartine as the head, as the new executive until the Constitution should be drawn up. All these men had been opposed to Louis Blanc. The Assembly also refused to create the Ministry of Labor demanded by the latter. The workingmen of Paris, irritated at this refusal and at the outcome of the elections, and seeing that they had nothing to hope for from this Assembly, rose in insurrection, endeavoring to accomplish a new revolution which should bring in the socialistic state as that of February had brought in the republican democratic. On May 15th they invaded the Chamber, drove out the representatives, and declared the Assembly dissolved and proclaimed a new Provisional Government of their own. But their victory was short-lived. The National Guard came to the rescue of the Assembly, and some of the leaders of the insurgents were made prisoners.

The Assembly, irritated in turn by the humiliation to which it had been subjected, resolved to root out the great source of danger, the National Workshops. The Government announced their immediate abolition, giving the workmen the alternative of enrolling in the army or going into the country to labor on public works. If they did not leave voluntarily, they would be forced to leave. The laborers, goaded to desperation, prepared to resist and to overthrow this Government which they had helped bring into existence, and which had proved so unsympathetic. Organized as a semi-military force, angered at the hostility of the bourgeois to all helpful social reform that could make their lives easier, they began a bitter fight. The Assembly saw the terrible nature of the conflict impending. General Cavaignac was given dictatorial powers by the Assembly, the Executive Commission of five resigning. During four June days (June 23-26, 1848) the most fearful street fighting Paris had ever known went on behind a baffling network of barricades. The issue was long doubtful, but finally the insurgents were put down.

The cost was terrible. Ten thousand were killed or wounded. Eleven thousand prisoners were taken, and their deportation was immediately decreed by the Assembly. The June Days left among the poor an enduring legacy of hatred toward the bourgeoisie.

The republic of order had definitely triumphed over the socialistic agitation. But so narrow had been its escape, so fearful was it with anxiety for the future that the dictatorship of Cavaignac was continued until the end of October. Thus the Second Republic, proclaimed in February 1848, after ten troubled weeks under a Provisional Government, passed under military leadership for the next four months. One-man power was rapidly emerging.

The results of this socialist agitation and of the sanguinary days of June were lamentable and far-reaching. They greatly contributed to the overthrow of the Republic. Many of the bourgeois had during these months experienced the most acute financial distress. Many manufacturers and merchants were ruined by the economic crisis created by the disturbed state of affairs. Bonds depreciated in two months from 116 francs to 50, with the result that fortunes invested in these securities were suddenly cut in two. Their holders became enemies to the Republic, because they wished above everything a government of order, under which alone business could flourish and property be secure. This class was very influential.

The peasants also turned against the Republic. They were told that the Socialists were going to take their lands from them and divide them. They were as strongly attached to the principles of private property as were the rich, and for the same reason desired a government of order. But more important, because alienating the peasants from the Republic, was the action of the Provisional Government in levying a new tax.

The financial situation of France at the close of the July Monarchy was unsatisfactory, and was rendered worse by the Revolution, which caused widespread business uncertainty, undermined credit, and made the collection of taxes difficult. Bankruptcy was not to be thought of, as the Government did not wish to have the Second Republic mean, in the opinion of mankind, the repudiation of debts, as had the First. On the other hand, no new loan could be raised. The Government, therefore, did the only thing it could do; it increased the direct taxes by almost one-half (forty-five centimes supplementary to each franc hitherto paid). This fell not only upon the middle class,

but also upon the peasants. Nothing could have been more disastrous for the Republic, which thus lost its popularity with the most numerous class. If the Republic meant increased taxes, it was, in their opinion, inferior to monarchy. The effect of this tax was shown more clearly later. It had had but a small influence upon the elections for the Constituent Assembly, not being widely known.

After the suppression of the Socialists in June the Assembly proceeded to frame the Constitution, for which task it had been chosen. It proclaimed the Republic as the definitive government of France. It declared universal suffrage. It provided that there should be a legislature consisting of a single chamber. A second chamber seemed aristocratic, and, moreover, likely to be a check upon the first, that is, upon the people seeking to legislate, and therefore was rejected. The Assembly was to consist of 750 members, chosen for three years, to be renewed in full at the end of that period.

The executive was to be a President of the Republic elected for four years and ineligible for re-election save after a four years' interval. He was given very considerable powers. It was felt that the danger in giving him these would be neutralized by the shortness of his term and by his inability to be immediately re-elected. He was given the right to propose legislation to the Assembly, to "dispose of the armed force," to negotiate and ratify treaties, though these should become binding only when sanctioned by the Assembly, to appoint and dismiss ministers and other officials, civil and military. The President therefore was to be a person of power. How he should be chosen was the most important question before the Constituent Assembly, and was long debated. The Assembly, dominated by its fundamental dogma of universal suffrage and popular sovereignty, was disposed to have the President chosen by all the voters. The danger in this procedure lay in the lack of political experience of the French electorate, and the probability that they would be blinded by some distinguished or famous name in making their choice, not guided by an intelligent analysis of character and of fitness for the high office. Moreover, if the people should choose both the legislature and the President, they would create two co-ordinate authorities, likely to disagree, and in that case with the chance of victory resting with the President, a single individual, knowing his own mind, acting directly and swiftly, rather than with the legislature divided into parties, and necessarily acting slowly. This likelihood that the President, wielding the

military and civil power, might overturn the Republic and make himself a despot, was distinctly foreseen by some members, who explicitly warned the Assembly against it, notably by Jules Grévy, later a President of the Third Republic, who urged that the President be chosen by the legislature and that he be removable at any time by it. Thus Parliament would be the supreme body in the state, not simply a co-ordinate and rival power, and presidential usurpation would be impossible. "Are you quite sure," said Grévy, "that in that series of men who are to succeed each other every four years to the presidential throne, there will be only devoted republicans anxious to descend from it? Are you sure that there will never be any one sufficiently ambitious to try to perpetuate his power? . . . And if this man is a member of one of those families which have ruled over France, if he has never expressly renounced what he calls his rights, if commerce is languishing, if the people are suffering, if they are passing through one of those crises in which misery and deception deliver them over to those who conceal by promises their projects against liberty, will you guarantee that this man of ambition will not succeed in overthrowing the Republic?" Events were shortly to prove Grévy's clear right to the title of prophet, but his proposition was now voted down overwhelmingly. "Something must be left to Providence," answered Lamartine. Another amendment was suggested that at least no member of any of the families which had ruled France should ever be chosen President. This, too, for doctrinaire reasons, and because it seemed to limit the national sovereignty, was voted down, and it was definitely decided that the people should choose the President and should be entirely untrammelled in their choice. Thus in the very act of drawing up a Constitution for the Second Republic, the Assembly rendered easy, if not inevitable, its overthrow.

Though the Republicans of 1848 committed many grave errors, owing partially to their inexperience, partially to their indisposition to abate any of their traditional political principles in the face of the extraordinary exigencies of a tumultuous and turbulent year, yet their work had certain consequences destined to survive. For fifty years the Republic had been associated in the minds of multitudes of Frenchmen with the Reign of Terror, had signified violence, disorder, and confiscation of property. It now became evident that it might mean something very different, for here was a Republic which suppressed insurrection and restored order with a resolution and thorough-

ness that the monarchy had not shown under Charles X or Louis Philippe, one, moreover, which preferred unpopularity to bankruptcy. The June Days and the tax of the forty-five centimes were direct causes of its downfall. Yet by them the Republic as an ideal of government ultimately gained strength, though the present experiment proved ephemeral and weak.

For, in leaving the choice of the President to universal suffrage, this republican assembly was playing directly into the hands of a pretender to a throne, of a man who believed he had the right to rule France by reason of his birth, Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, nephew of the Great Napoleon and legitimate heir to his pretensions. At the time of the February Revolution this man was practically without influence or significance, but so swiftly did events move and opinion shift in that year 1848 that by the time the mode of choosing the President was decided upon, he was already known to be a leading candidate, a fact that stamped that decision as all the more foolhardy.

Louis Napoleon Bonaparte had become chief of the house of Bonaparte in 1832 at the age of twenty-four. He conceived his position with utmost seriousness. He believed that he had a right to rule over France, and that the day would come when he would. He adhered to this belief for sixteen years, though those years brought him no practical encouragement, but only the reverse. Gathering about him a few adventurers, he attempted in 1836, at Strasbourg, and in 1840 at Boulogne, to seize power. Both attempts, already described, were puerile in their conception, and were bunglingly executed. Both ended in fiasco. He had gained the name of being ridiculous, a thing exceedingly difficult for Frenchmen to forgive or forget. As a result of the former attempt he had been exiled to the United States, from which he shortly returned. As a result of the latter, he was imprisoned in the fortress of Ham in northern France, from which he escaped in 1846, disguised as an ordinary mason, named Badinguet. He then went to England and in 1848, at the time of the Chartist risings, he was a special constable stationed in Trafalgar Square. This was certainly no record of achievement. But the stars in their courses were fighting for him. The Revolution of 1848 created his opportunity, as that of 1789 had created that of the First Napoleon. Like his great prototype, whom he constantly sought to imitate, he offered his services to the Republic. He was elected a member of the Constituent Assembly, where the impression he created was that of a mediocre man, with few ideas of his own, who could probably be controlled

by others. His name, however, was a name to conjure with. This was his only capital, but it was sufficient. The word Napoleon was seen to be a marvelous vote-winner with the peasants, who, now that universal suffrage was the law of the land, formed the great majority. "How should I not vote for this gentleman," said a peasant to Montalembert, "I whose nose was frozen at Moscow?" Louis Napoleon was an avowed candidate for the presidency, and, as the most colorless, was the strongest. Cavaignac was the candidate of the democratic Republicans, who had governed France since February, but he was not popular, and, moreover, he was hated by the workingmen for his part in the June Days. Ledru-Rollin was the candidate of the Socialists, an aggressive party, but made odious to law-abiding citizens by the events of the year, and always in the great minority. Lamartine was also a candidate. His sun had mounted swiftly to full meridian splendor in February, but was as swiftly paling. Moreover, the parties opposed to the very idea of a republic now rallied about Louis Napoleon—the Legitimists and the Orleanists, as they preferred even an Empire to a Republic, an unknown man who seemed pliable to a man known for firmness, rigidity, and strenuous republicanism, as was Cavaignac. Moreover, the enigmatic candidate was most profuse in pleasing promises to various groups. There were other causes for Louis Napoleon's overwhelming triumph. The Republic had been proclaimed by a faction in Paris, though later ratified by the Constituent Assembly. It was associated in the minds of men with grave uncertainty as to rights of property, rights to which the French have always held tenaciously. Louis Napoleon, by his professions and his family traditions, seemed to stand for order and stability. Again, for many years a series of brilliant writers had been portraying in history and in poetry the wonders of the Napoleonic era. Men's actual knowledge of the evils and oppressions of that era was growing less as the older generation, which could have told the true tale, was disappearing, and a new Napoleonic legend, fair, thrilling, and altogether admirable had grown up. It mattered little that this legend was vitiated through and through by mendacity and distortion of history.

For these reasons, when the presidential election of December 1848 occurred, Louis Napoleon was found to be overwhelmingly the elect of the people. He had over 5,400,000 votes, while Cavaignac, his nearest competitor, had less than 1,500,000, Ledru-Rollin 370,000, and Lamartine less than 18,000. The new President entered upon his duties December 20, 1848. On

that day before the Assembly he swore "to remain faithful to the democratic republic," and said: "My duty is clear. I will fulfil it as a man of honor. I shall regard as enemies of the country all those who endeavor to change by illegal means that which France has established."

The French had thus selected a Prince as President, an innovation in the art of government. In the following May they did an equally astonishing thing in the election of a Legislative Assembly. This Assembly of 750 members contained about 500 Monarchists, who were divided into Legitimists, Orleanists, and a few Bonapartists; about 70 moderate Republicans of the kind that had thus far controlled the Republic, and about 180 Socialists. Thus the first legislature elected under the new Constitution of the Republic was overwhelmingly monarchical. Only 70 could be held to be sincerely attached to the present form of government. The explanation of this remarkable result lies in the fact that the Days of June were still very vivid in men's minds. The mass of Frenchmen voted for monarchical candidates because they believed that the Republic was dangerous to order and property.

Thus both the President and the majority of the Assembly were, by reason of their very being, enemies of the Constitution under which they were elected. The situation was one that could not permanently endure. The three years that elapsed between the inauguration of the President and the coup d'état of 1851, which virtually ushered in the Empire, though it was not formally proclaimed until a year later, were a period not of legislative and social reform, but of adroit and tortuous factional politics, played not for the advancement of France, but for the advantage of party. Not particularly instructive, a brief treatment of them will suffice.

At first the President and the monarchical majority cooperated against the republican party, which each felt to be the real enemy. Opportunities for doing this were not slow in presenting themselves. Some of the Republicans unwisely attempted an insurrection against the Government, June 13, 1849. This was easily put down. Following up their victory, the authorities proceeded to cripple the Opposition severely. Thirty-three of their representatives were arrested and deprived of their seats in the Legislative Assembly. Their journals were suppressed. Public meetings were forbidden for a year, an order renewed several times later. As school-teachers had been effective friends of the Republic all over France, education was largely reorgan-

ized with a view of bringing it more closely under the control of the clergy, friends of monarchy. Paris was declared under martial law, which gave greater actual power than ever to the President.

This removal of the republican leaders rendered easy the passage of further repressive legislation. The Assembly next enacted the Franchise Law of 1850. This provided that to be a voter one must have resided in a given commune for three years, and that that fact must be proved by the presence of one's name on the tax list. This law virtually abolished universal suffrage and re-established in a round-about way a property qualification. It deprived over three million workingmen, one-third of the electorate, of the suffrage, either because they paid no taxes or because to get work they had frequently to change their residence and could not, therefore, meet the three-year residence qualification. Those thus disfranchised, of course, bitterly hated the Assembly. Another law was then passed restricting the freedom of the press by re-establishing the requirement of a preliminary deposit of 50,000 francs from all editors. This stamped out of existence most of the cheap newspapers of the Republicans and Socialists, as they could not meet the qualification.

Having silenced the Republicans, the victors, President and Assembly, fell to warring with each other. This conflict, showing itself in many minor matters, became most pronounced and bitter over the question of a revision of the Constitution. The Constitution forbade the re-election of the President at the end of his four-year term. Louis Napoleon had no desire to retire to private life. He believed that if only this article were stricken out the immense majority of Frenchmen would re-elect him. He demanded that this clause be revised by the Assembly. The Assembly refused. The President was balked in his ambition of continuing in power by peaceful means. He now showed that he was ready to resort to any means to that end. He planned and carried out with extraordinary precision and success a remarkable coup d'état. In order to discredit the Assembly with the people, he demanded that the law limiting the suffrage, which he himself had strongly urged, be repealed. This was refused, the Assembly not wishing to stultify itself so conspicuously. The President, with audacious duplicity, then posed as the guardian of the Constitution, as the representative of the principle of universal suffrage. He believed that the workmen would not intervene in behalf of the Assembly if he should attack it.

For a successful coup d'état secrecy was the absolute pre-

requisite, and never was secrecy better guarded. Possessing the power of appointment to civil and military positions, the President filled the more important ones with creatures of his own, who had everything to gain and little to lose from the overthrow of the existing system. Such were the Minister of War, who controlled the army; the Minister of the Interior, who controlled the officials in the departments; and the Prefect of Police, who controlled the police of Paris.

The 2d of December, 1851, anniversary of the coronation of Napoleon I and of the battle of Austerlitz, was chosen as the fateful day. During the early morning hours many of the military and civil leaders of France, Republican and Monarchist, were arrested in bed and taken to prison. A battalion of infantry was sent to occupy the Legislative Chamber. Placards were posted on all the walls of Paris, pretending to explain the President's purposes. The Assembly was pronounced dissolved, universal suffrage was declared re-established, the people were convoked in their primary assemblies. The President explained that he must save the Republic from its enemies, the Monarchists and the Anarchists, who put "in jeopardy the repose of France," that he made the people of France arbiter between the Assembly and himself, "by invoking the solemn judgment of the only sovereign that I recognize in France, the people." To accomplish the security the nation sorely needed after so much turmoil, he proposed the following changes in the constitution: the President should hold office for ten years; ministers should be solely dependent upon him; there should be a council of state to prepare the laws and to discuss them before the legislative body; a legislative body to discuss and vote the laws, elected by universal suffrage; another assembly, "composed of all the illustrious persons of the country," to be the "guardian of the fundamental compact," and of the public liberties. "This system, created by the First Consul at the beginning of the century, has already given to France repose and prosperity; it will guarantee them to her again." The people were called upon to approve or disapprove these suggestions.

The significance of all this was at first not apparent to those who read the placards. But signs of opposition began to show themselves as their meaning became clearer. Some of the deputies, going to their hall of meeting, found entrance prevented by the military. Withdrawing to another place, and proceeding to impeach the President, they were attacked by the troops, who arrested a large number, and took them off to

prison. Thus the leaders of France, civil and military, were in custody, and the President saw no organized authority erect before him. This was the work of the 2d. Would the people resent the high-handed acts of this usurper?

The President had not neglected to make unprecedented preparations for this contingency. His police controlled all the printing establishments, whence usually in periods of crisis emerged flaming appeals to revolt; also all the bell towers, whence in revolutionary times the tocsin was accustomed to ring out the appeal to insurrection. Nevertheless, on the 3d, barricades were raised. On the 4th occurred the famous "massacre of the boulevards." Over 150 were killed and a large number wounded. Paris was cowed. The coup d'état was crowned with success. To prevent any possible rising of the provinces martial law was proclaimed in thirty-two departments, thousands of arbitrary arrests were made, and the work on which the Prince President entered on the night of December 2d was thoroughly carried out. Probably a hundred thousand arrests were made throughout France. All who appeared dangerous to Louis Napoleon were either transported, exiled, or imprisoned. This vigorous policy was aimed particularly at the Republicans, who were for years completely silenced.

Having thus abolished all opposing leadership, Louis Napoleon appealed to the people for their opinion as to intrusting him with power to remodel the Constitution along the lines indicated in his proclamation. On December 20, according to the official statement, 7,439,216 voted in favor of so doing, and only 646,737 voted in the negative. While the election was in no sense fair, while the issue presented was neither clear nor simple, while force and intimidation were resorted to, yet it was evident that a large majority of Frenchmen were willing to try again the experiment of a Napoleon.

The Republic, though officially continuing another year, was now dead. Louis Napoleon, though still nominally President, was in fact an absolute sovereign. It was a mere detail when a year later (November 21, 1852) the people of France were permitted to vote on the question of re-establishing the imperial dignity, and of proclaiming Louis Napoleon Bonaparte emperor, under the name of Napoleon III. 7,824,189 Frenchmen voted yes; 253,145 voted no. On the anniversary of the coup d'état, December 2d, a day so fortunate for Bonapartes, Napoleon III was proclaimed Emperor of the French, and the Second Empire was established.

THE SECOND EMPIRE

The President, who, by the endless witchery of a name, by a profitable absence of scruples, and by favorable circumstances, had known how to become an Emperor, was no mere vulgar adventurer, but was a man of ideas as well as audacity, of generosity as well as egoism, of humanitarian aspirations for the betterment of the world, as well as of a vivid perception of the pleasures of personal advancement. His ideas, expounded gracefully in writings and in speeches, were largely derived from a study of the life of the Great Napoleon. Long before he became President of the Republic he published a book called "Napoleonic Ideas," an appraisal of the historic significance of the First Emperor. It appears from this that Napoleon I had two purposes in life. One was the preservation of all that was valuable in the Revolution, the foundation of the state and of society upon a solid enduring basis — which could only be accomplished by the exercise of absolute power on the part of the ruler — and the other was that this great end having been attained, the preliminary probationary period of despotism would give way, and the edifice would then be "crowned with liberty," which it were unsafe earlier to bestow — that through the training received from an active and intelligent despot France would be fitted to enter upon the life of freedom, which appears to be the goal as well as the dream of modern times.

That the latter part of Napoleon's plans, the bestowal of free institutions upon France, had not been achieved, was, in his nephew's opinion, no fault of his, but of those ignorant and reactionary nations which had waged war upon him, had defeated him at Waterloo, and had thus cut right athwart his beneficent activity. However inaccurate a judgment this may have been, it was of importance, as it furnished the new ruler with a programme. He declared his desire to finish the work his uncle had been forced to leave unfinished, to restore order, so sadly compromised by the unstable, feverish régimes since 1815 — and this he could only do, he held, by exercising autocratic power — and then to cap the structure with liberty in all its plenitude. The history of the Second Empire falls into these two divisions — autocracy unlimited from 1852 to 1860, and a growing liberalism from 1860 to 1870, when the Empire collapsed, its programme woefully unrealized.

The political institutions of the early Empire merit descrip-

tion. They were adopted largely from the Consulate. The machinery was elaborate, and mainly valuable for purposes of deception. The principle of universal suffrage, proclaimed by the Republic of 1848, was preserved, was indeed in theory made the basis of the whole imperial régime, but was ingeniously rendered quite innocuous to the autocrat. There was a Legislative Body of 251 members elected every six years by universal suffrage. But most modest was to be the rôle of this assembly. It was to be no real parliament, such as had existed under Louis XVIII, Charles X, Louis Philippe, and the late Republic. It could not even elect its own president, who was appointed, as were the vice-presidents, by the Emperor. It could not propose legislation. All bills were laid before it by the Emperor. It could not question the ministers, or by adverse votes overthrow them, as they were appointed by the Emperor and were responsible to him alone. Its sessions were public, but might be made secret upon the request of five members. Thus when discussion became exciting it could be prevented from becoming noised abroad that there was dissension within the state; indeed, no reports of these debates might be published by the newspapers, save an official minute, dry, analytical, concise, drawn up by the presiding officer, himself, as has been said, an appointee of the Emperor. Political eloquence was the evil spirit carefully to be exorcised. No more speeches of a Lamartine, inflaming and shaping outside opinion. Parliament was absolutely insulated from the public. Even the subjects of legislation on which it might express approval or disapproval were carefully limited, a large legislative power belonging to the Emperor alone. It did not even control taxation. Though it voted the budget each year, the Emperor had the right during its recesses to contract extraordinary loans, which, of course, meant that he virtually possessed the vital power of taxation. This was really the old régime back again.

There was also a Senate, composed of the Emperor's appointees — marshals, admirals, cardinals, and others, irremovable, serving for life. This body had no legislative power, no executive power, no judicial power. It was declared "the guardian of the fundamental law"; that is, the Constitution. All laws must be submitted to it, not for discussion and possible amendment, but that it might oppose their promulgation if it found them opposed to the Constitution. It was to interpret doubtful or obscure phrases of the Constitution; it might propose amendments, *senatus consulta*, which would become definite when

sanctioned by the Emperor. Its powers were nominally extensive, purposely vague, and might easily become entirely inoperative. The Senate, as a matter of fact, was the mere tool of the Emperor.

There was also a Council of State, appointed by the Emperor and removable by him, with power to frame laws to be submitted by the ministers to the Legislative Body, but with no power of legislating.

In the midst of these numerous wheels stood the master mechanic, the Emperor, Napoleon III. His attributes were real and sweeping in their range. He had the command of the army and the navy, decided upon war and peace, could alone conclude treaties of peace, of commerce, of political alliance. He was the fountain of justice, possessing the full power of pardon. He appointed to all important offices. The ministers were absolutely dependent on him. He appointed the Council of State, the Senate, the High Court, and, as we have seen, could largely manipulate the Legislative Body, which, moreover, he alone could convene, adjourn, and dissolve. He alone had the right to propose laws; the Council of State worked them out in detail, and the Legislative Body approved; after that he, as if his power were not already sufficient, could sanction and promulgate them. Having dissolved the legislature, he need not call another for six months.

In short, the Emperor was the state. All this machinery did not disguise, but rather accentuated his autocracy. The important fact for several years was not the activity of these various bodies, but of the one man. Parliamentary institutions, until 1860, were little else than a sounding-board for the wishes of the monarch.

It is true that France had a Legislative Body, which was, however, thoroughly bottled up, as we have seen. This body was elected by universal suffrage, but the elections were controlled in various ways by the Government. It proposed in every district an official candidate, whom it forced all office-holders to support actively. It hampered in numerous and ingenious ways independent candidates. All meetings for campaign purposes were prohibited as "prejudicial to the free exercise of the suffrage." The press, so essential an aid in any free political life, was thoroughly shackled, so that practically only those newspapers favorable to the Government could flourish. No new journal might be established without the preliminary permission of the Government. Every change of editor or manager must likewise

be officially approved. Also, as a guarantee for good behavior, a deposit must be made, proportioned to the importance of the place of publication, which might be as high as 50,000 francs for Paris, as high as 15,000 for the departments. A system of warnings was developed, whereby, after two warnings that articles had appeared disagreeable to the Government, the publication might be indefinitely suspended. New press misdemeanors were created. To describe the sessions of the Legislative Body other than by the publication of the official minutes was one of these. To publish false news another. Press cases were taken from juries, which showed a tendency to be just, and handed over to special courts which had the right to act summarily.

Under this system political life was completely stamped out, intellectual independence well-nigh extinguished. Repression was all-powerful and endlessly pervasive. France was no longer a land of freedom. For several years she breathed a mephitic atmosphere of intellectual humiliation and effacement.

In return for all this Napoleon sought to entertain and divert and enrich France. His government was "both repressive and progressive — repressive of whatever imperiled his power, progressive in devotion to whatever might adorn and strengthen it."¹ Marrying at this time a young Spanish woman of twenty-six years, of remarkable beauty and of noble birth, Mlle. Eugénie de Montijo, "a marriage of love," as he told the French people, the Tuileries immediately became the center of a court life probably the most brilliant and luxurious of the nineteenth century. Fête followed fête in swift succession. Life could not be more lavish or more gay. Sumptuous and showy, the balls, dinners, military parades, illuminations, were, it was given out, not mere self-indulgence for the favored few, but were of advantage to all France. Did they not encourage business and trade? A shower of gold wherever it fell was considered highly fructifying. Some criticized, asking if it was worth while to overthrow parliament in order to put an orchestra in its place, but, in the main, joy was unconfined; and bourgeois society paid court society the genuine compliment of imitation.

But pleasure did not engross the attention of the new sovereign. His reign was distinguished by a spirit of great enterprise, kindly feeling for the masses, good works of benefit to the different classes of society. The Emperor was no incorrigible conservative like Metternich, but a very modern man, anxious that his reign should be memorable for works of utility, of improvement.

¹ Gorce, *Histoire du Second Empire*, II, 3.

He had a genuine love for humanity, a sincere desire to help those who were heavy laden. He founded hospitals and asylums freely, and relief societies of various kinds for the poor. The free distribution of medicines was provided for. In 1864 laborers were given for the first time in French history the right to strike, which has proved a most important weapon in their hands for the betterment of their conditions. Banks were organized from which landed proprietors, both great and small, might obtain loans on easy terms to enable them to carry on improvements in agriculture. The railways, denounced by Thiers as "the costly luxury of the rich," "toys for the Parisians," were extended in a few years from a mileage of 2,000 to one of 6,000. Steamboat lines were established to enlarge the markets of France by transatlantic commerce. Canals were begun. For the Emperor was distinctly a man of his age, responsive to new ideas, and sincerely enthusiastic in promoting all the progress in the arts and trades which the marvelous discoveries of modern science rendered possible. No class of the population was ignored in these schemes. In Napoleon's opinion, preceding governments had failed precisely because they had considered only a class—the Legitimist monarchy only the aristocracy, the Orleanist monarchy only the rich bourgeoisie. The Empire, he said, stood for no class, but for the nation in all its entirety. A great international exposition was held in Paris in 1855, bringing thousands of visitors to Paris, and giving a distinct impulsion to material progress by its impressive revelation of the wealth of the tools at man's disposal.

A grandiose scheme for the modernization and beautification of Paris was projected, which, carried out by Baron Haussmann, made it the most attractive and comfortable capital in Europe. This transformation of the capital, indeed, was one of the principal undertakings of the Second Empire, an undertaking in process of execution during the entire course of the reign.

All these enterprises greatly stimulated commerce. An era of unwonted speculation now set in. The Stock Exchange reflected vividly the buoyancy and daring of the period. Fortunes were made quickly, and of a size hitherto unknown in France. Thus, in an air of general prosperity, of economic expansion, of multifarious activity, men forgot their loss of liberty, and even the great famines, great floods, and important business failures which occurred during this period did not produce the usual unrest. They were regarded as merely the reverse of what was, in the main, a most attractive picture.

In 1856 Napoleon III was at the zenith of his power. The Empire had been recognized by all the other states of Europe. The Emperor had, with England and Piedmont as allies, waged a successful war against Russia in the Crimea.¹ He was supposed to have the best army in Europe, and he was honored in the face of all the world by having Paris chosen as the seat of the congress which drew up the treaties at the end of that war. And now an heir was born to him, the Prince Imperial, as interesting to his day and as ill-fated as the King of Rome had been in his. Fortune seemed to have emptied her full horn of plenty upon the author of the coup d'état.

But the Empire had already reached its apogee, though this was not evident for some time. The Emperor's policy had thus far been dominated by a very clear perception of self-interest. Now it was to change, become less precise, bolder, and more uncertain, calculated to arouse criticism and to create a lack of confidence, a general sense of insecurity. In preparing France for the Empire while yet he was the dictatorial President of 1852, Napoleon had taken special care to reassure her on one point. As the First Empire had been a period of unexampled war, would not the Second be the same? In a speech at Bordeaux, which became famous, Napoleon had with great deliberation treated this subject. "Nevertheless," said he, "there is a fear to which I ought to reply. In a spirit of distrust certain people say: the Empire is war. But I say: the Empire is peace. I confess, however, that I, like the Emperor, have many conquests to make. I wish, like him, to win and to reconcile the hostile parties," and to achieve economic and moral victories of various kinds. . . . "Such are the conquests that I contemplate, and all of you who surround me, who desire, like myself, the welfare of the fatherland, you are my soldiers." To the latter sort of conquests the Emperor gave himself, as we have seen, with energy and success. But the other part of his promise he did not adhere to. Wars were frequent in his reign, wars not forced upon him but created by him, wars disastrous to himself and to his dynasty, as the more famous ones of the First Empire had been to the First Napoleon.

The policy of the Empire at home after 1860 was determined by the policy abroad. This was determined by the Emperor, who had uncontrolled rights of making war, which rights he unwisely used. The beginning of his serious troubles was his participation in the Italian war of 1859.

¹ See Chapter XXXI.

To understand the course of the Second Empire from 1860 to 1870 one must study the part played by Napoleon III in the making of modern Italy, the consequences of which were to be for him so unexpected, so far-reaching, and in the end so disastrous. And correctly to appraise that policy we must first trace the history of the rise of the Kingdom of Italy.

CHAPTER XI

CAVOUR AND THE CREATION OF THE KINGDOM OF ITALY

CAVOUR AND NAPOLEON III

WITH the failure of the revolutions of 1848-9 Italy returned to her former condition, of division into small states, arbitrary government, and domination by Austria. The punishment of Liberals was general, and at times savage, particularly in Lombardy-Venetia and in Naples. In the latter case the proceedings were so iniquitous that Gladstone, in a flaming pamphlet, denounced the Neapolitan government as the very negation of God erected into a system. After the Pope's return to Rome, his government was guilty of such misdeeds that its supporter, Louis Napoleon, protested, though in vain. In Tuscany the government was characterized by severity, in Lombardy and Venetia by long-continued persecutions. Constitutions that had been granted were generally revoked. One state in the peninsula formed a brilliant exception to this sorry system of reaction — Piedmont. Though badly defeated on the battlefield at Custoza in 1848, and at Novara in 1849, it had gained an important moral victory. An Italian prince had risked his throne twice for the cause of Italian independence, conduct which for multitudes of Italians marked the House of Savoy as the leader of the future. Moreover, the king who had done this, Charles Albert, had also granted his people a constitution. He had abdicated after the battle of Novara, and his son, Victor Emmanuel II, then twenty-nine years of age, had come to the throne.

Austria offered Victor Emmanuel easy terms of peace if he would abrogate this constitution, and prospects of aggrandizement were dangled before him. He absolutely refused. This was a turning point in his career, in the history of Piedmont, and in that of Italy. It won him the popular title of the Honest King. It made Piedmont the one hope of Italian Liberals. She was national and constitutional. Henceforth her leadership was assured. For the next ten years her history is the history of the making of the Kingdom of Italy. Thither Liberals who were

driven out of the other states took refuge, and their number was large.

Victor Emmanuel was a brave soldier, a man, not of brilliant mind, but of sound and independent judgment, of absolute loyalty to his word, of intense patriotism. And he had from 1850 on, in his leading minister, Count Camillo di Cavour, one of the greatest statesmen and diplomatists of the nineteenth century.

Cavour was born in 1810. His family belonged to the nobility of Piedmont. He received a military education and joined the army as an engineer. But by his liberal opinions, freely expressed, he incurred the hostility of his superiors and was kept for a time in semi-imprisonment. He resigned his commission in 1831, and for the next fifteen years lived the life of a country gentleman, developing his estates. By studying the new scientific processes of agriculture, by introducing and inducing others to introduce machinery, by experimenting with canal irrigation and artificial fertilizers, he was largely instrumental in revolutionizing farming in Piedmont. During these years, to vary the monotony of existence, he visited France and England repeatedly, interested particularly in political and economic questions. He was anxious to play a part in politics himself, though he saw no chance in a country as yet without representative institutions. "Oh! if I were an Englishman," he said, "by this time I should be something, and my name would not be wholly unknown." Meanwhile, he studied abroad the institutions he desired for his own country, particularly the English parliamentary system. Night after night he sat in the gallery of the House of Commons, seeking to make himself thoroughly familiar with its modes of procedure. Cavour's mind was the opposite of Mazzini's, practical, positive, not poetical and speculative. He wrote on social and economic questions. Particularly did he advocate the building of railroads as tending effectively to promote the moral unity of Italy, which must precede political unity. They would sweep away local jealousies and bind the Italians of different sections together commercially. Rome ought to be the center of the system, which should unite the whole peninsula. In all these plans for the material enrichment of Piedmont and of Italy, he was dominated by the patriotic consideration that they would contribute to the achievement of independence and unity. In 1847, when the censorship of the press was abolished in Piedmont, Cavour saw that his opportunity had come, left his retirement, and founded a liberal newspaper called *Il Risorgimento*. Its aims were "independence, union between the princes

and people, and reforms." He welcomed with enthusiasm the creation in 1848 of a parliament for Piedmont and of a constitution, which he had, indeed, been one of the boldest to demand. "Italy," he said, "must make herself by means of liberty, or we must give up trying to make her." This belief in parliamentary institutions Cavour held tenaciously all through his life, even when at times they seemed to be a hindrance to his policies. He believed that in the end, sooner or later, the people reach the truth of a matter. He was elected to the first Piedmontese Parliament, was taken into the cabinet in 1850, and became prime minister in 1852. He held this position for the remainder of his life, with the exception of a few months, proving himself a great statesman and an incomparable diplomat.

Cavour had said in 1850, with an optimism and a courage not daunted by the disastrous defeats of Custoza and Novara, that if Piedmont would "gather to itself all the living forces in Italy it would be in a position to lead our mother country to those high destinies whereunto she is called." To accomplish this, he now said, "Piedmont must begin by raising herself, by re-establishing in Europe as well as in Italy a position and a credit equal to her ambition." He threw himself with enthusiasm and intelligence into his preliminary work of making Piedmont, a small and poor country, strong, vigorous, modern, of calling the attention of the great powers to this little state beneath the Alps. To accomplish this the army must be reorganized and strengthened, the fleet built up, fortifications erected. This would involve immense expenditure. But Piedmont's debt had been greatly increased by the late war. The interest on it had mounted from about two million lire in 1847 to thirty million in 1852. There were large annual deficits; bankruptcy appeared imminent. Economy rather than expenditure seemed imperative. Not so thought Cavour. He believed in spending freely on improvements, because they were necessary, and because in the end larger revenues would result. He urged large appropriations not only for the army, but for public works. He encouraged agriculture, completed the railway system of Piedmont, stimulated commerce and industry by treaties of commerce with other states, secularized some of the monastic lands, levied new taxes, all this, of course, by securing the necessary laws from Parliament. The result of all this activity was that Piedmont entered upon a period of rapid growth in material prosperity, and the new burdens were as easily borne as the old had been. Cavour was thus able to create a large and well-equipped army of ninety

thousand men, remarkable for a state whose population was only five million. And this facilitated his next object, which was to secure for Piedmont an ally among the great powers, for this he considered absolutely necessary if she were to accomplish her high mission. Cavour believed, as did all true patriots, that Austria must be driven out of Italy before any Italian regeneration could be achieved. But he did not believe with Mazzini and others that the Italians could accomplish this feat alone. In his opinion the history of the last forty years had shown that plots and insurrections would not avail. It was essential to win the aid of a great military power comparable in strength and discipline to Austria. This explains why he urged that Piedmont participate in the Crimean War.

The Crimean War was fought in 1854 and 1855 by France and England against Russia, to prevent the latter power from dismembering the Turkish Empire. There seemed to be no reason for a small and struggling state like Piedmont to interfere. It had no serious quarrel with Russia. The preservation or dismemberment of Turkey was for it a matter of only remote concern. Yet Cavour, looking beyond the immediate question, believed that Piedmont's and Italy's interests would be subserved by an alliance offensive and defensive with the two western powers against Russia. For he believed that thus Piedmont would win the good will of her two allies, and might take her place as an equal at the council board of European diplomacy. Such a position this state, petty and poor, in comparison with France and England and Austria and Russia, with barely five millions of people, had hitherto not held. Among the "powers" she was practically unrecognized. For reasons, then, quite remote from the real question at issue, and reasons, therefore, which Cavour could not publicly give, he wished to use this opportunity. His plan was bitterly denounced and generally condemned. It was said that the quarrel was none of Piedmont's, that by sending her army to the Crimea she would be exposing her own frontiers, that her finances would be ruined by this additional strain, that she should husband her money and her men for her own struggle, which must ultimately come with Austria. Her resources would be none too great at best. Cavour himself called the risks of the venture "enormous."

But he succeeded in carrying it through. Seventeen thousand Sardinians were sent to the Crimea, where they proved excellent soldiers and won distinction. But Cavour was not aiming primarily at military glory, but at moral and diplomatic

victories. Piedmont had entered the alliance unconditionally. She was not promised that, participating in the war, she would be permitted to participate in the making of the peace, and when the Congress of Paris was called in 1856 Cavour started out not knowing whether he would be admitted to it owing to Austria's opposition. He was going to Paris, he said, in order "to sniff the air." But a few days after his arrival he was informed that he would be received. The two great powers could not well consent to the ignoring of their ally. Cavour had won the interest of Napoleon III, who in 1855 had asked him, "What can be done for Italy?" Cavour had replied by a memorandum. Now in Paris, after the treaty had been made, Napoleon caused the question of Italy — a question foreign to the purpose of the Congress — to be brought before it. This was Cavour's chance. The Italian situation was to be discussed in a congress in which Austria sat. Clarendon, representing England, indignantly denounced the Papal Government as a "disgrace to Europe," and Ferdinand's misrule in Naples as crying for the intervention of the civilized world. This speech created an extraordinary sensation. Moreover, by bringing the Italian question forward, it furnished Cavour an opportunity to speak. His speech was brief, cautious, and bold. The main cause of the evils from which Italy suffered was Austria, he declared. "Austria is the arch-enemy of Italian independence; the permanent danger to the only free nation in Italy, the nation which I have the honor to represent."

Cavour returned from Paris with no material advantage gained, but his moral victory was complete. Piedmont had participated in a council of the great powers. Austria had been indicted publicly in a great international congress. So had the Pope, and so had the King of Naples. Piedmont had again shown that she was the champion of all Italy. Many who, influenced by Mazzini, had hitherto believed that Italy's salvation lay in a republic, began to change their opinion, and to entertain an increasing confidence in the patriotism and statesmanship and military power of the Piedmontese monarchy. Cavour had gained for himself a great reputation as a diplomatist. Prince Metternich, now in retirement, and a connoisseur in such matters, is said to have remarked: "There is only one diplomatist in Europe, but unfortunately he is against us; it is M. de Cavour." Cavour was now one of the commanding personalities of Europe. His position in his own country was more solid than ever.

After the Congress of Paris Piedmont proceeded still further to make herself the model state of Italy. Laws were passed strengthening the army. Industry expanded under wise legislation. Education was stimulated, and the National Society was organized to encourage the growth in the other states of Italy of a sentiment in favor of Piedmont. The motto of this society was: "Independence and Unity; out with the Austrians and the Pope." The subjects of other states were to be won from their loyalty to their own princes to loyalty to Piedmont. A revolution in opinion and sentiment was to be effected that later a political revolution might be easier. This society was successful. Many, like Manin, who had hitherto been Republicans, renounced their republicanism and declared themselves willing under certain conditions to follow Piedmont. "Make Italy," wrote Manin, "and we are with you; if not, not." The National Society spread rapidly throughout the other states. By it Liberals everywhere were drawn together under the banner of the House of Savoy, and a state of mind was created favorable to the overthrow of the petty princes and the exaltation of Piedmont.

Cavour had returned from Paris hoping that France might shortly be induced to aid Piedmont. The Emperor had in 1855 asked what he could do for Italy, and Cavour had responded with all explicitness. Suddenly all hope of this consummation seemed dashed to the ground by a murderous attempt upon the life of Napoleon by certain Italians, led by Orsini (January 14, 1858). This, however, did not deflect Napoleon from the alliance with Sardinia toward which he had been tending for some time. The motives that influenced him to take the step momentous for himself as well as for Italy were numerous. The principle of nationality which he held tenaciously, and which largely determined the foreign policy of his entire reign, prompted him in this direction — the principle, namely, that peoples of the same race and language had the right to be united politically. He sought, as we shall see, to further this principle in several cases, with results very disastrous to himself and to France.

Further, Napoleon had long been interested in Italy. He had himself taken part in the revolutionary movements there, in 1831, and had probably been a member of the Carbonari. Moreover, it was one of his ambitions to tear up the treaties of 1815, treaties that sealed the humiliation of the Napoleonic dynasty. These treaties still formed the basis of the Italian political system in 1858. Again, he was probably lured on by a desire to win glory for his throne, and there was always

the chance, too, of gaining territory. Fear, also, may have influenced him. Orsini had not been the first Italian who had tried to assassinate the Emperor; he might not be the last, if he should do nothing for Italy.

At any rate, the Emperor decided to draw closer to Piedmont. Hardly six months after Orsini's attempt, he invited Cavour to meet him at Plombières, a watering place in the Vosges mountains. The meeting, which occurred July 21, 1858, was shrouded in utmost mystery. Only four persons in Piedmont knew of it, including Victor Emmanuel and La Marmora. The ministers of Napoleon were kept in ignorance of it. The Emperor, always a dreamer and conspirator, was now closeted with a conspirator far more skilful than himself. The interview of Plombières is one of the most famous in the history of the century. There were long conversations, a memorable description of which was contained in a letter which Cavour immediately sent to Victor Emmanuel and which constitutes our chief source of information concerning the intrigues of two unscrupulous men conspiring for different reasons to bring about a war.¹ No written agreement or treaty of alliance was made, but it was agreed verbally that France and Piedmont should go to war with Austria, but only upon some pretext which could be justified before Europe, and which would make it appear that the two powers were not bent upon revolution, but that they were merely repelling Austrian aggression. A rising in Massa and Carrara was to serve as the pretext. If Austria should begin war against Piedmont, France would come to the latter's assistance, and if the allies were victorious Italy should be reconstituted as follows: Lombardy and Venetia should be added to Piedmont, as should also the duchies and parts of the Papal States, the Romagna and the Legations. Austria would thus be completely expelled from the peninsula, and Victor Emmanuel would rule over a kingdom of Northern Italy. The rest of the Papal States, with the exception of Rome and a region round about, should be added to Tuscany, which would thus form a kingdom of Central Italy. These two kingdoms and that of Naples and the Papal States should then be united into an Italian Confederation under the presidency of the Pope who might consequently feel compensated for the loss of most of his possessions. In return for her aid France was to receive Savoy and possibly Nice. The Emperor urged a marriage between his cousin Prince Napoleon and the daughter of Victor Emmanuel. No definite agreement was then

¹ Chiala, *Lettere edite ed inedite di Camillo Cavour*, II, 568 seq. 2nd edit.

made. Prince Napoleon was a debauchee of forty-three. Princess Clotilde was a young girl of sixteen. Ultimately this sacrifice was made—so revolting to Victor Emmanuel and the Piedmontese. Early in December 1858 these verbal agreements were put into writing, though not, it would seem, although the matter is most obscure, into a binding treaty.

Though Cavour had apparently achieved the dream of his life, an alliance with a great military power, his position during the next few months, between the meeting at Plombières, July, 1858, and the final declaration of war, April 1859, was one of extraordinary difficulty. He had invoked a powerful spirit. Could he control it, or would he become the mere sport of it? Might not Napoleon, notably of a changeable mind, change it now at the critical time, leaving Piedmont high and dry, at the mercy of her powerful neighbor, Austria, leaving Cavour and all his policy a wreck? Might not the other powers, getting wind of the conspiracy, step in to prevent war, the necessity of which was the very basis of Cavour's policy for the creation of modern Italy, as it was of Bismarck's policy later for the creation of modern Germany? If the war should come and Napoleon should be faithful to his engagements, might not the greatest danger lie right there? Might not a victorious Napoleon in Italy do what a victorious Napoleon had done in Italy before, use his opportunity for his own advantage and not for that of the Italians, whom he ostensibly came to succor? Cavour did not wish to play a game for Napoleon. The risk at any rate must be run.

It had been stipulated by Napoleon that he would support Piedmont in a war with Austria if Austria appeared as the aggressor. Cavour's policy therefore for the next months was to provoke Austria to this end. It was a period of great tension for the Piedmontese minister, in which he displayed extraordinary resourcefulness, coolness, craft, unscrupulousness. He wove ceaselessly a marvelous web of tortuous intrigue. Now Napoleon seemed about to withdraw; now a congress of the powers to cut clean through the projects of these conspirators. Into the interesting details of these machinations we cannot go. In the end they were successful, and Austria was goaded by Cavour's conduct to take the fatal step. She demanded that Piedmont disarm within three days, otherwise war would be declared. War was precisely the thing Cavour wanted, and for which he had for months been ceaselessly working. He had contrived to make Austria appear the aggressor and now the case had arisen for

which Napoleon had promised his aid. Piedmont refused the Austrian ultimatum, and at the end of April 1859 war began. The public opinion of other nations blamed Austria and exonerated Piedmont, most unjustly, for this war was Cavour's, desired by him and brought about by him with extraordinary skill. That he had succeeded in throwing the whole responsibility for it on his enemy was only further evidence of the cunning of his fine Italian hand.

The Austro-Sardinian War lasted only about two months. The Austrian armies were large but incompetently led. They wasted the time before the arrival of the French troops when Piedmont was at their mercy. When the French arrived, the Emperor at their head, active fighting began. The theater of war was limited to Lombardy. The battles of Magenta (June 4) and of Solferino (June 24) were victories for the Allies. The latter was one of the greatest battles of the nineteenth century. It lasted eleven hours, more than 260,000 men were engaged, nearly 800 cannon. The Allies lost over 17,000 men, the Austrians about 22,000. All Lombardy was conquered, and Milan was occupied. It seemed that Venetia could be easily overrun and the termination of Austrian rule in Italy effected, and Napoleon's statement that he would free Italy "from the Alps to the Adriatic" accomplished. Suddenly Napoleon halted in the full tide of success, sought an interview with the Emperor of Austria at Villafranca, and there on July 11th, without consulting the wishes of his ally, concluded a famous armistice. The terms agreed upon by the two Emperors were: (1) The creation of an Italian Confederation under the honorary presidency of the Pope. (2) The cession to France, and the transfer by France to Sardinia, of the province of Lombardy. (3) The inclusion of Venetia in the Italian Confederation, as a province, however, under the Crown of Austria. (4) The restoration of the Grand Duke of Tuscany and the Duke of Modena to their respective states, whence they had just been driven by popular uprisings.

The considerations that determined Napoleon to stop in the middle of a successful campaign, and before he had attained the object for which he had come into Italy, were many and serious. While victorious on five battlefields he had no reason to feel elated. Magenta and Solferino had been victories, but he saw that they might easily have been defeats. He had conquered Lombardy, but Austria had 150,000 men in Venetia, and 100,000 more were advancing to join them. Austria's troops would then

outnumber his. Moreover Austria would now plant herself firmly in the famous Quadrilateral, whose fortresses could only be taken, if at all, after long and difficult sieges. Furthermore, the control of events was plainly slipping from him. The effect of the Piedmontese propaganda in the other states of Italy was already becoming apparent. During the war the Romagna had thrown off its allegiance to the Pope, the authority of the rulers of Modena and Parma had been renounced by their rebellious subjects, and all three — the Romagna, the two duchies, and Tuscany also, were clamoring for annexation to Piedmont. If the war should continue the other Italians might show the same determination and Napoleon might find that, instead of an enlarged kingdom of Piedmont, a kingdom of all Italy had been created, and many of the leading men in France were denouncing as very dangerous to France this possible creation of a powerful state on her southeastern border. The French Catholics were opposed to the continuation of a war so full of menace to the Pope. Moreover, Prussia was mobilizing her troops on the Rhine and was contemplating intervention, and France was in no condition to fight Austria and Prussia combined. Also, the Emperor had been touched by the horrors of the battlefield. "The poor people, the poor people, what a horrible thing is war," he was heard to say more than once at Solferino.

Austria was eager for peace. Her army was badly led. She was involved in trouble with Hungary. She did not relish being saved by Prussia, for Prussia might then seize her leadership in Germany. Francis Joseph, too, like Napoleon, was horrified by war. "Better lose a province," he said after Solferino, "than be present again at so awful a spectacle." Thus both rulers were willing to come to terms.

The news of the armistice came as a cruel disappointment to the Italians, dashing their hopes just as they were apparently about to be realized. The Government of Victor Emmanuel had not even been consulted. In intense indignation at the faithlessness of Napoleon, overwrought by the excessive strain under which he had long been laboring, Cavour completely lost his self-control, urged desperate measures upon the King, and, when they were declined, in a fit of rage, threw up his office. The King by overruling Cavour showed himself wiser than his gifted minister. As disappointed as the latter, he saw more clearly than did Cavour that though Piedmont had not gained all that she had hoped to, yet she had gained much. It was wiser to take what one could get and bide the future than to imperil all

by some mad course. Here was one of the great moments where the independence and common sense of Victor Emmanuel were of great and enduring service to his country.

Napoleon had not done all that he had planned for Italy, yet he had rendered a very important service. He had secured Lombardy for Piedmont. It should also be noted that he himself acknowledged that the failure to carry out the whole programme had cancelled any claim he had upon the annexation of Savoy and Nice to France.

ANNEXATIONS AFTER VILLAFRANCA

Thus by the preliminaries of Villafranca, embodied later in the Peace of Zurich, November 10, 1859, the Emperor of the French and the Emperor of Austria put an end to the process of Italian unification shortly after it had begun. Piedmont had grown by the addition of Lombardy and that was all. Austria was still an Italian power, and by the terms agreed upon was to be a member of the projected Italian Confederation. That she could use that position to continue her leadership in Italy was proved by her success in using the German Confederation for purposes of leadership in Germany. The Pope was still a temporal ruler and his power indeed was to be augmented by the presidency of the Confederation. Thus the Austrian Emperor and the Pope stood in the way of Italian aspirations as before. No wonder that Cavour said, though incorrectly, that all the efforts Piedmont had made during the past ten years had gone for nought. But the Peace of Zurich was destined never to be carried out save in the one respect that Lombardy was added to Piedmont. Victor Emmanuel saw what Cavour failed to see, that the chapter was not closed but that it might be carried further, that central Italy at least might be drawn into the enlarged kingdom of Piedmont.

The situation in central Italy was this: during the war the rulers of Modena, Parma, Tuscany, had been overthrown, and the Pope's authority in Romagna, the northern part of his dominions, had been destroyed. Assemblies called in those states by revolutionary leaders voted, in August 1859, in favor of annexation to Piedmont. Thus the provinces of central Italy hurled defiance at the two Emperors who had decided at Villafranca that the rulers of those countries should be restored. Piedmont declined their offer at the time, knowing the opposition of Napoleon, and fearing to offend him, lest he might then

withdraw from Italy entirely, thereby leaving Piedmont alone and exposed to Austrian attack. But unofficially Piedmont gave them encouragement to hold out for annexation.

The Italians of the central states stood firm. It was evident that the former rulers could only be restored by force and Napoleon promised that force should not be used, either French or Austrian, to accomplish their restoration. For months this anomalous situation continued, harassing to every one. The central states, under the leadership of Piedmontese statesmen who had gone to them to assume direction, revised and rendered uniform their laws, and created a common military force that they might in the end bring about fusion with Piedmont. Diplomacy suggested a congress which was never convened, and for some time things drifted. Slowly the whole confused situation began to clarify. Napoleon came to see that if the peoples were left to themselves they would never restore their rulers but would insist upon union with Piedmont; that, moreover, the federation under the presidency of the Pope could never be brought about except by force. He saw also that the restoration of the rulers to their duchies would be an advantage to Austria but not at all to France. He had no desire that Austria should be again predominant in the peninsula. Other events co-operated to hasten a solution. In England, in June 1859, a new election had occurred and a ministry had come into office which was very friendly to the cause of Italian unity, and which particularly wished the Italians to be strong enough to be independent of the French. The English Government protested against the employment of French or Austrian forces to repress the clearly expressed will of the people of central Italy and to restore the princes. This was England's great service to the Italians. "The people of the duchies have as much right to change their sovereigns," said Lord Palmerston, "as the English people or the French, or the Belgian or the Swedish. The annexation of the duchies to Piedmont will be an unfathomable good to Italy."

Another event tending toward the solution of the question was the return of Cavour to power in January 1860, after an absence of six months. Cavour saw that the annexation of central Italy to Piedmont could be effected only with Napoleon's consent, which, therefore, must be secured. But Napoleon would not yet give it. It was clear that a bargain must be made. Piedmont could have the annexations for a price and that price was the cession of Savoy and Nice to France, which Napoleon

had not claimed before as he had not carried out the agreement of Plombières, but which he now demanded as compensation for the creation of an important state on the southeastern border of France, and because he wished, by enlarging the national boundaries, to allay the sharp criticism which his Italian policy had aroused at home. It was finally agreed that plébiscites should be taken in the states of central Italy to see if they wished annexation to Piedmont, and in Savoy and Nice to see if they wished annexation to France. Thus, in theory, the principle would be upheld that peoples have a right to dispose of themselves.

These plébiscites in Italy resulted as was expected. (March 11-12, 1860.) The vote was almost unanimous in favor of annexation.

Modena, Parma, Tuscany and the Romagna were thus added to the Kingdom of Piedmont, which had already received Lombardy. The Pope issued the major excommunication against the authors of this spoliation of his dominions (Romagna), but Victor Emmanuel accepted the sovereignty thus offered him, and on April 2, 1860, the first parliament of the enlarged kingdom met in Turin. A small state of less than 5,000,000 had grown to one of 11,000,000 within a year. This was the most important change in the political system of Europe since 1815. As far as Italy was concerned it made waste paper of the treaties of 1815. It constituted the most damaging breach made thus far in the work of the Congress of Vienna. What that congress had decided was to be a mere "geographical expression" was now a nation in formation. And this was being accomplished by the triumphant assertion of two principles utterly odious to the monarchs of 1815, the right of revolution and the right of peoples to determine their own destinies for themselves, for these annexations were the result of war and of plébiscites.

But Piedmont's triumph was not without an element of bitterness for it had been bought with a price, and that price was the cession of Savoy and Nice, with a population of about 700,000, to France. Savoy was the cradle of the ruling house and its abandonment was a great humiliation, but it was, in Cavour's opinion, inevitable. Because of it Garibaldi, a citizen of Nice, attacked him in Parliament with remarkable vehemence. "You have made me," he said, "a stranger in the land of my birth." "The act," replied Cavour with impressive dignity, "that has made this gulf between us, was the most painful duty of my life. By what I have felt myself I know what Garibaldi must have

felt. If he refuses me his forgiveness I cannot reproach him for it." Parliament supported Cavour, ratifying the cession by a majority of 229, more than four-fifths of the entire chamber. The plébiscites in Savoy and Nice took place a few days later and resulted in an almost unanimous vote for annexation to France. One result of this annexation of Savoy and Nice was to prove very important for France. It alienated England from Napoleon completely. England did not wish to see her powerful neighbor grow larger. The depth and unfortunate effect of this estrangement Napoleon was to feel fully before many months had passed. Moreover, might not this acceptance of Italian territory involve him in further Italian complications? Was he not morally compromised? That Cavour appreciated the advantage of the situation was shown by his reported remark to the French ambassador, "Now you are our accomplices." What had Cavour in mind for accomplices to do? He did not explain the cryptic utterance, but every one knew that he was still far from his cherished goal. Napoleon III would still be very useful. Sophisticated Guizot, then living in retirement, made at about this time an observation: "There are," he said, "two men upon whom the eyes of Europe are fixed, the Emperor Napoleon and M. de Cavour. The game is being played. I back M. de Cavour."

THE CONQUEST OF THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES

Much had been achieved in the eventful year just described, but much remained to be achieved before the unification of Italy should be complete. Venetia, the larger part of the Papal States, and the Kingdom of Naples still stood outside. In the last, however, events now occurred which carried the process a long step forward. Early in 1860 the Sicilians rose in revolt against the despotism of their new king, Francis II. This insurrection created an opportunity for a man already famous but destined to a wonderful exploit and to a memorable service to his country, Giuseppe Garibaldi, already the most famous military leader in Italy, and invested with a half mythical character of invincibility and daring, the result of a very spectacular, romantic career.

Garibaldi was born at Nice in 1807. He was therefore two years younger than Mazzini and three years older than Cavour. Destined by his parents for the priesthood he preferred the sea, and for many years he lived a roving and adventurous sailor's life. He early joined "Young Italy." His military experience was chiefly in irregular, guerilla fighting. He took part in the

unsuccessful insurrection, organized by Mazzini in Savoy in 1834, and as a result was condemned to death. He managed to escape to South America where, for the next fourteen years, he was an exile. He participated in the abundant wars of the South American states with the famous "Italian Legion," which he organized and commanded. Learning of the uprising of 1848 he returned to Italy, though still under the penalty of death, and immediately thousands flocked to the standard of the "Hero of Montevideo" to fight under him against the Austrians. After the failure of that campaign he went, in 1849, to Rome to assume military defense of the republic. When the city was about to fall he escaped with four thousand troops, intending to attack the Austrian power in Venetia. French and Austrian armies pursued him. He succeeded in evading them, but his army dwindled away rapidly and the chase became so hot that he was forced to escape to the Adriatic. When he landed later, his enemies were immediately in full cry again, hunting him through forests and over mountains as if he were some dangerous game. It was a wonderful exploit, rendered tragic by the death, in a farm-house near Ravenna, of his wife Anita, who was his companion in the camp as in the home, and who was as high-spirited, as daring, as courageous as he. Garibaldi finally escaped to America and began once more the life of an exile. But his story, shot through and through with heroism and chivalry and romance, moved the Italian people to unwonted depths of enthusiasm and admiration.

For several years Garibaldi was a wanderer, sailing the seas, commander of a Peruvian bark. For some months, indeed, he was a candle maker on Staten Island, but in 1854 he returned to Italy and settled down as a farmer on the little island of Caprera. But the events of 1859 once more brought him out of his retirement. Again, as a leader of volunteers, he plunged into the war against Austria and immensely increased his reputation. He had become the idol of soldiers and adventurous spirits from one end of Italy to the other. Multitudes were ready to follow in blind confidence wherever he might lead. His name was one to conjure with. There now occurred, in 1860, the most brilliant episode of his career, the Sicilian expedition and the campaign against the Kingdom of Naples. For Garibaldi, the most redoubtable warrior of Italy, whose very name was worth an army, now decided on his own account to go to the aid of the Sicilians who had risen in revolt against their king, Francis II of Naples.

His determination created a serious problem for Cavour. The Government of Piedmont could not sanction an attack upon the Kingdom of Naples, with which it was at peace, without seeming a ruthless aggressor upon an unoffending state, and without running the risk of a European intervention which might undo all the work thus far accomplished. In Cavour's opinion the newly enlarged kingdom needed time for consolidation before undertaking any further task. On the other hand, if Garibaldi determined to go it would be dangerous to try to prevent him, and yet the result of a successful campaign might make him a rival of Cavour and might be used to checkmate Piedmont. It was imperative that Piedmont should still direct the evolution of Italy toward her future destiny. Cavour could not approve the expedition, and he was not prepared to condemn it. He therefore adopted the plan of secretly conniving at the preparations, at the same time holding Piedmont officially aloof from all connection with it. Thus he could assure the powers that Piedmont had nothing to do with it. If it should fail, he could not be reproached, whereas if successful, he might profit by it. He had need of all his customary wariness in this juncture.

On May 5, 1860, the expedition of "The Thousand," the "Red Shirts," embarked from Genoa in two steamers. These were the volunteers, nearly 1,150 men, whom Garibaldi's fame had caused to rush into the new adventure, an adventure that seemed at the moment one of utter folly. The King of Naples had 24,000 troops in Sicily and 100,000 more on the mainland. The odds against success seemed overwhelming. But fortune favored the brave. After a campaign of a few weeks, in which he was several times in great danger, and was only saved by the most reckless fighting, Garibaldi stood master of the island, helped by the Sicilian insurgents, by volunteers who had flocked from the mainland, and by the incompetency of the commanders of the Neapolitan troops. Audacity had won the victory. He assumed the position of Dictator in Sicily in the name of Victor Emmanuel II (August 5, 1860).

Garibaldi now crossed the straits to the mainland determined to conquer the entire Kingdom of Naples (August 19, 1860). The King still had an army of 100,000 men, but it had not even the strength of a frail reed. There was practically no bloodshed. The Neapolitan Kingdom was not overthrown; it collapsed. Treachery, desertion, corruption did the work. On September 6th, Francis II left Naples for Gaeta, and the next day Garibaldi entered it by rail with only a few attendants, and drove through

the streets amid a pandemonium of enthusiasm. In less than five months he had conquered a kingdom of 11,000,000 people, an achievement unique in modern history.

Garibaldi now began to talk of pushing on to Rome. To Cavour the situation seemed full of danger. Rome was occupied by a French garrison. An attack upon it would almost necessarily mean an attack upon France. A clash between Garibaldi's followers and the French troops which were maintaining the Pope's power in Rome would probably bring an intervention of Napoleon, this time against the Italians. There must, therefore, be no attack upon Rome. But while Rome itself and its immediate neighborhood must be preserved inviolate for the Pope, Cavour did not think that the two eastern provinces of the Papal States, Umbria and the Marches, need be. They desired annexation to Piedmont and were only kept down by an army of volunteers, drawn from Ireland, Austria, France and other Catholic countries. Ought people who wished to be free from the Pope's rule to be kept in subjection by an army of mercenaries?

Cavour felt that Victor Emmanuel must act. It would not do to leave Garibaldi to act as he wished, for that would mean an attack upon Rome and probably upon Venetia, and that would range Italy against, not only France, but Austria, two great empires, and everything that had been so painfully accomplished would be imperiled. To prevent Garibaldi's advance, which, once under way, would be beyond control, Victor Emmanuel must take charge of the revolution in southern Italy. Yet if Victor Emmanuel's troops entered the Papal States all the Catholic countries of Europe, outraged at the despoiling of the Pope, might intervene and undo what had been already done. Cavour believed that if he left the Pope unmolested in Rome, Napoleon would have no objection to the rest of the Papal States going into the new kingdom, if the population so desired. In this estimate he was correct. Understanding finally that Napoleon approved, if only the thing were done quickly, Victor Emmanuel's army crossed into the Papal States and defeated the Papal troops at Castelfidardo (September 18, 1860). They then entered the territory of Naples. The climax to all this unification movement was now at hand. On October 11, 1860, Parliament voted overwhelmingly in favor of the annexation of all the provinces in central and southern Italy whose people should declare in favor of it by plébiscite. The plébiscite took place in the Kingdom of Naples on October 21-22, 1860, and was overwhelmingly in favor of annexation. On the mainland ap-





proximately 1,300,000 voted yes, 10,000 no; in Sicily 432,000 yes, 600 no. A few days later the Pope's former subjects in the Marches voted for annexation by 133,000 to 1,200; and in Umbria by 97,000 to 380. Majorities so staggering showed how unanimous was the desire for unification.

After having conquered the Papal army at Castelfidardo, Victor Emmanuel had advanced with his army into the Kingdom of Naples for the double purpose of defeating the army still under Francis II at Capua and Gaeta, which Garibaldi had not been able to conquer, and of taking the direction of affairs of state out of the hands of Garibaldi, who, successful in war, was eminently lacking in political sagacity. It was imperative that Victor Emmanuel's authority should be supreme in Naples, that he might control the evolution of events. Both purposes were now achieved. The troops of Francis II were defeated at Capua on the first and second of November, and the siege of Gaeta, where Francis took his last stand, began.

Garibaldi had demanded the resignation of Cavour from Victor Emmanuel, and seemed disposed to insist upon certain conditions before handing over his conquest to him. The King's attitude was firm. He declined to consider the dismissal of Cavour. Moreover, now that Victor Emmanuel was himself in the Kingdom of Naples with a large army, and was backed by the vote of the Parliament and the plébiscites favoring annexation, Garibaldi yielded. On November 7, Victor Emmanuel and Garibaldi drove together through the streets of Naples. The latter refused all rewards and honors and with only a little money and a bag of seed beans for his farm he sailed away to Caprera. Gaeta fell on February 13, 1861, and the King fled to Rome, entering upon a life of exile which was to end only with his death in 1894.

On the 18th of February, 1861, a new Parliament, representing all Italy except Venetia and Rome, met in Turin. The Kingdom of Sardinia now gave way to the Kingdom of Italy, proclaimed March 17th. Victor Emmanuel II was declared "by the grace of God and the will of the nation, King of Italy."

A new kingdom, comprising a population of about twenty-two millions, had arisen during a period of eighteen months, and now took its place among the powers of Europe. The Pope refused to recognize this "creation of revolution," and excommunicated the criminal invaders of his states. Victor Emmanuel he denounced as "forgetful of every religious principle, despising every right, trampling upon every law." Against his assumption

of the title of King of Italy, with which he has sought to seal his "sacrilegious usurpations," Pius IX formally protested.¹

But the Kingdom of Italy was still incomplete. Venetia was still Austrian and the Patrimony of St. Peter was still subject to the Pope. This was a strip along the western coast, between Tuscany and Naples, twenty or thirty miles wide, and included the incomparable city of Rome. The Pope's power rested on the French garrison. The new Kingdom, however, was not strong enough to take Venetia from Austria, nor disposed to defy the Emperor Napoleon by an attack upon Rome.

There were, indeed, some Italian nationalists who were willing to forego permanently the possession of Rome as the capital. D'Azeglio called the desire for it simply "a classical fantasticality." Moreover, it was "a malarial town fit only for a museum." Not so thought Cavour, who believed that "without Rome there was no Italy." He declared that now that national independence had been secured the great object must be "to make the Eternal City, on which rest twenty-five centuries of glory, the splendid capital of the Italian Kingdom." The position of the capital was not to be determined by the character of the climate or topography, but by moral reasons, and the moral primacy of Rome among all Italian cities was unquestionable. They must have Rome, but on two conditions, that France should consent and that the Catholic world should have no just ground to believe that it meant the subjection of the Pope. Cavour hoped that the Pope would be willing to give up his temporal power on the guarantee that his spiritual authority should be carefully guarded and even extended. The principle of "a free church in a free state" absorbed his thought at this time. At his request Parliament voted the principle that Rome should be the capital of Italy, a solemn official declaration from which there could be no retreat. This was Cavour's last great act, for he now fell ill. Overwork, the extraordinary pressure under which he had for months been laboring, brought on insomnia; finally fever developed and he died on the morning of June 6, 1861, in the very prime of life, for he was only fifty-one years of age.

"Cavour," said Lord Palmerston, in the British House of Commons, "left a name 'to point a moral and adorn a tale.' The moral was, that a man of transcendent talent, indomitable industry, inextinguishable patriotism, could overcome difficulties which seemed insurmountable, and confer the greatest, the most

¹ Robinson and Beard, *Readings in Modern European History*, II, 130.

inestimable benefits on his country. The tale with which his memory would be associated was the most extraordinary, the most romantic, in the annals of the world. A people who had seemed dead had arisen to new and vigorous life, breaking the spell which bound it, and showing itself worthy of a new and splendid destiny.”¹

Throughout his life Cavour remained faithful to his fundamental political principle, government by parliament and by constitutional forms. Urged at various times to assume a dictatorship he said he had no confidence in dictatorships. “I always feel strongest,” he said, “when Parliament is sitting.” “I cannot betray my origin, deny the principles of all my life,” he wrote in a private letter not intended for the public. “I am the son of liberty and to her I owe all that I am. If a veil is to be placed on her statue, it is not for me to do it.”

¹ Quoted by Cesaresco: *Cavour*, 216.

CHAPTER XII

BISMARCK AND GERMAN UNITY

IN 1848 and 1849 the reformers of Germany, as of other countries, had made a vigorous effort to effect profound alterations in the political and social institutions of their country. Momentarily successful, their day of power proved brief, and by 1850 the old authorities were once more solidly established in their old positions. A practical absolutism reigned again throughout most of central Europe. In place of the German unity so long desired and for which the Frankfort Parliament had struggled with such earnest futility, the old Diet of 1815, slow, cumbrous, impotent save for repression, quietly slipped back into the familiar, well-worn grooves, resuming its sessions in May 1851, and devoting its attention to the removal of the débris left by the revolutionary hurricane which had just swept by. A period of reaction began again, even more far-reaching in its scope than that which had followed the Congress of Vienna of 1815. This period may be considered to have lasted from the diplomatic defeat of Prussia at Olmütz in 1850 to 1858, when William I assumed the regency of Prussia, and to 1859 when Austria, now as formerly the strong tower of ultra-conservatism, suffered an important diminution of power and prestige in the military defeats in Italy which have been described above.

During this period the work of 1848 and 1849 was undone wherever possible, and a persecution of Liberals carried out so thoroughly that tens of thousands left the country. This inspired some alarm at first, but consolation was found in the thought that the removal of these disturbers of the public mind would only leave the fatherland politically in peace. This was the beginning of the large German emigration to the United States, which later attained such impressive proportions and was attended by such important consequences. Austria and Prussia took the lead in the familiar work of repression.

The King of Prussia, Frederick William IV, had, as we have seen, granted a Constitution and created a Parliament during the recent convulsion, but it quickly became evident that he had

no intention of establishing the parliamentary system as it had been developed in England. He did not for a moment propose to weaken the royal power by dividing it with any assembly, even with one which, like this, represented only the rich. No new taxes or laws might be passed without the consent of the new chamber, but old ones might be continued without that consent. The Chamber had no control whatever over the ministry. With machinery like this Parliament could not have prevented reaction even had it so desired; but constituted as it was, it became itself one of the instruments of reaction.

That reaction began at once. The King was urged to abolish the Constitution outright, but this, mindful of his oath, he never did. However, a method of "interpreting" it virtually achieved the same end. The ministers gained great skill in the art of ruling with the Constitution against the Constitution. Laws which they disapproved were simply not executed or their contents were by "interpretation" molded to the heart's desire. The Constitution had proclaimed the right of association and public meeting, but as a matter of fact this right was permitted only to those favorable to the Government. Public meetings were watched by agents of the Government, who, on the least pretext, might dissolve them. Everywhere the police were active and unscrupulous. Arbitrary arrest and imprisonment were frequent. A Berlin police regulation in 1851 permitted the application to prisoners of torture, deprivation of light, the strait-jacket, and corporal punishment up to forty strokes. Men who were supposed to be democrats were hounded in every way. "No lawyer would give me work," wrote one of them; "no business man had the courage to seek the aid of my legal knowledge; no editor would consent to publish a book of mine." With great difficulty he succeeded in bringing out three novels. At once the Government forbade their introduction into public libraries, forbade their sale. Certain physicians were denied the certificates necessary to the practice of their profession because, as democrats, their "morality" could not be guaranteed. Abuses of power succeeded each other rapidly. "God in Heaven," wrote Bunsen, "what a frightful situation for Germany!" The mails were not respected. Postmen were ordered not to deliver letters to Liberals. Even reactionaries themselves felt the pinch at times. "I cannot write you much about politics," Bismarck informed his wife, "for all letters are opened." And again, "Do not forget, when you write me, that your letters are not read simply by myself but are also read

at the post office, by spies of every feather; be, without exception, prudent in your remarks."

The censorship abolished by the Constitution was not restored, but the same end was otherwise achieved. Methods were followed in this respect, as in many others, which were copied from Napoleon III, who was applying them successfully in France. Much ingenious reasoning was displayed at times by government officials. In one case the police announced that the law permitted the publication of newspapers but not their sale, and thus one Liberal paper was suppressed. By such means virtual absolutism was restored in Prussia after the liberal awakening of 1848 and 1849. No relief was found in the Chamber, for the Government secured large and dependent majorities there, by the same methods which Napoleon III used in France, by official candidacies and by various forms of bribery and intimidation. The system was thoroughly established. Prussia, with a Constitution, was really ruled with very little regard for its provisions.

The governing forces were the King and the landed nobility. These were the "Junkers," whom Bismarck later called the "pariahs of modern civilization," hide-bound conservatives, completely dominated by the ideas of old-time feudalism. The House of Lords was now one of their seats of power. Its members, indignant at the former freeing of their serfs, labored with much success to regain old rights, such as the police power on their estates, and hunting privileges. They had a monopoly of the higher grades in the army. All these measures irritated various classes of society and unrest, not peace, was the ominous result. No wonder that Bernhardt exclaimed, "The Constitution is nothing but a name," and that another who lived through it all wrote a little later, "The period from 1849 to 1858 was the most shameful in the history of Prussia."

But signs were not lacking of the dawning of a new day. The economic evolution of the country was proceeding on the whole unimpeded and quietly, and that evolution tended directly toward liberty, for it meant the transformation of Germany from an agricultural, feudal, and patriarchal into a great industrial nation. Even the Government itself facilitated this transformation which was in the end to be so prejudicial to its system, imitating in this, as in so many other respects, the example of Napoleon III, who thought that the best way to make people forget their loss of liberty was to enable them to get rich. But in the main this transformation was effected, not by governmental

measures, but by the unseen, unconscious operation of the ordinary laws of business.

This economic transformation is the most important feature of German history in the decade from 1850 to 1860, for it began the creation of that industrial Germany which was to be so tremendous a fact in the contemporary world. This transformation was apparent in many ways. Rich deposits of gold had been discovered in California, in 1848, and in Australia in 1851. It has been estimated that the world's production of the precious metal was about four times as great in 1856 as in 1847. The increase in the quantity of the medium of exchange had, among other important results for Germany this, the sudden creation of a large number of banks and business corporations. In Bavaria, for instance, only six stock companies with a capital of five millions had been founded between 1839 and 1848; but from 1849 to 1858 forty-four were established with a capital of one hundred and seventy millions. The capital of the banks created in Germany from 1853 to 1857 aggregated about 750 millions. All this meant an immense increase in the resources available for industry.

Germany had for various reasons remained industrially far behind neighboring countries, particularly France and England. Her population was largely rural, two-thirds of her inhabitants were agriculturalists. Whatever industries existed were small. There were few large cities. Berlin, the capital of Prussia, had a population of about 450,000, and in the entire Confederation there were only six or seven cities of more than 100,000 inhabitants. Both exports and imports were few. Germany sold little but raw materials. All this was now rapidly changed. Capital being easily procured, hundreds of new enterprises were started. Particularly was the exploitation of the immense mineral resources of the country, thus far largely neglected, undertaken with great energy. Coal mines were opened up, factories and foundries arose on all sides. Alfred Krupp made the steel foundry, begun by his father in 1810, one of the most famous establishments of the kind in the world. Workmen, attracted by higher wages than could be procured in agriculture, flocked to the cities, which increased rapidly. Economists state that the period of speculation succeeding the revolution of 1848 was the most remarkable Germany has ever seen. The Germans took naturally to modern business, showing their usual qualities of patience, order, adaptability, and an abounding faith in the advantages to be derived from the application to economic life

of the discoveries of science and from the use of scientific methods. The mileage of railroads rapidly increased, in Prussia alone in a few years from 114 miles to over 800, and the number of travelers increased fourfold.

All this had important political and intellectual consequences. It meant the rise of a modern capitalist class, a rich bourgeoisie, which would insist and which would have the power to insist that the state should no longer be run along medieval lines for the benefit of a feudal monarchy, and a feudal nobility of landlords. And the result of this economic revolution was to broaden men's horizon, and to weaken the local states-rights feeling. Manufacturers and merchants were anxious for the widest markets, and impatient of laws and institutions that hindered business. They saw the inconveniences that flowed from the existing political organization of Germany, the petty state animosities and the powerlessness of the Confederation abroad. They wished a reorganization of the country so that Germany should have the weight in international affairs that was necessary for the development of her wealth. That they might compete in the world markets they must have the support of the Government. The Government of the Confederation was impotent. This growing class therefore would hail with enthusiasm any attempt to strengthen it. Thus business was undermining the established order in politics. The requirements of modern industrialism were potent factors in the ultimate creation of German unity.

At the same time a similar trend was unmistakable in the intellectual evolution of Germany, and was shown in the various fields of theology, science, history and literature. From the romantic, the metaphysical, the speculative people they had been, Germans were becoming practical, positive, realist. The boldest innovations in the economic life were matched by the boldest discoveries in science. A new heaven and a new earth were taking the place of the old. The German intellect was showing its enterprise, its daring in every line, and was heaping up great riches. An intellectual environment was being created in which the great realist of the century in Germany could breathe and work successfully. It would be difficult to show all this except at length, and this would be impossible in the present treatise. But the fact remains that Schopenhauer in philosophy, and Helmholtz and Virchow in science, were laying intellectual foundations for the unification of Germany and the hegemony of Prussia.¹ The historians of the period, Sybel, Treitschke.

¹ Denis, *La Fondation de l'Empire Allemand*, Chap. III.

Droysen, Freytag, produced histories in abundance which were really great patriotic pamphlets, therefore less valuable as histories than as organs for shaping public opinion toward great and decisive action in the field of politics. They were vigorously patriotic, nationalistic in tone, Prussian in sympathy. Even Mommsen and Curtius, who wrote in the field of ancient history, distinctly revealed the current preconceptions and aspirations of the day.¹

Opinion in Germany was greatly stimulated by the events in Italy. The Italian war of 1859, and the formation of the Italian Kingdom exerted a remarkable influence upon events outside of the peninsula. Here was a successful application of the doctrine of nationalities. Might not the precedent receive wider application? Poland, Denmark, Germany felt a powerful impulsion from beyond the Alps. This influence was shown in the very month of Villafranca. For July 1859 saw the genesis in Hanover of a new patriotic society, called the National Union, whose purpose was to create a national party for the purpose of "achieving the unity of the fatherland and the development of its liberties." The society soon spread throughout Germany. Unity and liberty were its watchwords. Did not the Italian campaign prove the necessity of the former? If Napoleon III could invade Italy, might he not with equal ease invade Germany? There must be a thorough military reorganization so that Germany should be safe from possible aggression, and to accomplish this the Confederation, as a whole, must first be reorganized. Cavour was, in the opinion of the members of the National Union, the model whom German statesmen should imitate. Prussia ought to do for Germany what Piedmont had done for Italy. Let her become frankly liberal, then Liberals everywhere would support her, and she could make the fatherland. This was not the method followed, as we shall see. Germany was made by an autocratic not by a liberal government. And the reason was that the conservative class was stronger in Germany than in Italy, and happened to find two able leaders, William I and Bismarck, as the Liberals in Italy had found two of their kind, Victor Emmanuel and Cavour. Though the National Liberals in Germany influenced public opinion extensively and thus facilitated in the end the rise of German unity, they clashed with those who actually carried out the work, and were themselves defeated. The achievement of German unity was to be no imitation of an Italian example.

¹ Guillard, *L'Allemagne Nouvelle et Ses Historiens*.

The full import of all these changes in the economic life and in the intellectual outlook, this fermentation of ideas, was shortly to be shown in the reign, destined to prove most illustrious, of William I of Prussia. The preliminary stage was over, the period of action was about to begin. ✓

In 1857, Frederick William IV became, by reason of mental disease, incapable of administering the Government. As the King had no son, his brother, William I, became his representative. The following year William became Regent, which gave him complete independence of action. It was recognized that the King would never recover. He died in January 1861, and William became sovereign. The accession of the new prince was hailed with great enthusiasm, so deep and general had been the disappointment in Prussia over the timidity, the reactionary character, and the fruitlessness of his predecessor's rule. The new ruler was intellectually the very antipodes of his brother, slow, solid, persistent, firm, rather than brilliant and imaginative. Common sense was his strongest quality as versatility had been that of his brother. William was the son of the famous Queen Louise, was born in 1797, and had served in the campaign against Napoleon in 1814. He was now over sixty years of age. His entire lifetime had been spent in the army, which he loved passionately. In military matters his thorough knowledge and competence were recognized. He had resented deeply the action of his brother at Olmütz, action dictated by the military weakness of Prussia. William believed that Prussia's destiny depended upon her army. The army was necessary for his purpose, which was to put Prussia at the head of Germany. "Now," he had written in 1849, "whoever wishes to rule Germany must conquer it; and that cannot be done with phrases." The mobilization of the Prussian troops in 1859 convinced him more than ever that the army needed strengthening. He now brought forward a definite military programme.

Prussia had been the first state, and was thus far the only one, to adopt the principle that all male citizens must be soldiers. By the law of 1814 universal compulsory three years' service in the active army was established. The soldier then passed into the reserve for two years, which meant that he would be summoned to military exercise for several weeks each year; he then passed into the *landwehr* for several years (from the ages of twenty-six to thirty-nine), receiving some little training intermittently. Then he passed into the *landsturm*, where he re-

mained until the age of fifty, to be called out only in the case of direst necessity. This system had been in existence for forty-six years, with only slight modification. But the system had not, in practice, been thoroughly carried out. No account had been taken of the increase of population. In 1820 the population of Prussia was about 12,000,000. The number of yearly recruits had been fixed at 40,000 and regiments for that number had been established. But in 1860 the population was about 18,000,000, and if all able-bodied men of military age were recruited, as by law they should be, there would be 63,000. As a matter of fact, however, the number of recruits had been kept at 40,000, which meant that many thousand young men, by law required to serve three years under the colors, had been excused in practice from service, and that others had been required to serve only two years. This kept the army down to about 130,000 active soldiers on a peace footing, 215,000 in time of war.

William I believed such a condition full of danger for Prussia. Considering himself primarily a soldier, the first soldier of Prussia, and responsible for her defense, he resolved to carry through certain reforms. In 1859 he appointed Albrecht von Roon Minister of War, in politics a convinced reactionary, in military matters a man of great knowledge and ability. In 1860 a plan for the reform of the army was submitted to the Prussian Parliament. Henceforth the law requiring universal military service was to be rigorously enforced.

This would mean 63,000 recruits each year instead of 40,000, and would give an army of 190,000 in time of peace, 450,000 in time of war, the service in the reserve being lengthened from two to four years. Thus the military forces of Prussia would be doubled. To do this necessitated the creation of new regiments with their officers and colors. This would involve an increase in the budget, which could only be sanctioned by Parliament. But the Chamber of Deputies was from the beginning opposed to this change, though it voted appropriations once on the understanding that they were provisional only. The Government acted as if they were permanent. In 1862 the Chamber refused the moneys entirely. This meant that the new regiments must be disbanded, their officers dismissed, that what had been done must be undone, that the royal plan of army reform must be abandoned, although it had been put into force at least provisionally, that the Government must, in a most conspicuous matter, retrace its steps. Over this question a bitter and prolonged controversy arose between the Crown and the Chamber of

Deputies, each side growing stiffer as the contest proceeded. The King was absolutely resolved not to abate one jot from his demands. He believed that the organization of the army, and the system of national defense belonged exclusively to himself, as they had undoubtedly to previous Prussian kings; that the fact that in 1850 a Constitution had come into existence creating a Parliament in no respect altered the situation; that indeed the right had been expressly confirmed by that Constitution; that Parliament was in duty bound to vote all appropriations necessary for him to discharge his duties as supreme executive and commander-in-chief. Parliament, on the other hand, held that by the Constitution all grants must be voted by it, that if it were bound to vote them on the mere demand of the King its discretion and power would simply disappear entirely. Parliament must, in the interests of the people, insist upon the preservation intact of its delegated powers, and the control of the purse was the chief of these. A deadlock ensued. The King was urged to abolish Parliament altogether. This he would not do because he had sworn to support the Constitution which established it. He thought of abdicating. He never thought of abandoning the reform. He had written out his abdication and signed it, and it was lying upon his desk when he at last consented to call to the ministry as a final experiment a new man, known for his boldness, his independence, his devotion to the monarchy, Otto von Bismarck. Bismarck was appointed President of the Ministry September 23, 1862: on that very day the Chamber rejected anew the credits asked for by the King for the new regiments. The conflict entered upon its most acute phase and a new era began for Prussia and for the world.

In this interview Bismarck told the King frankly that he was willing to carry out his policy whether the Parliament agreed to it or not. "I will rather perish with the King," he said, "than forsake your Majesty in the contest with parliamentary government." His boldness determined the King to tear up the paper containing his abdication and to continue the struggle with the Chamber of Deputies.

The man who now entered upon the stage of European politics was one of the most original and salient characters of his century. Born in 1815, he came of a noble family in Brandenburg, and as a young man seemed completely imbued with all the narrowness of his order, its vigorous insistence upon the preservation of existing institutions, its tenacious adherence to forms of belief that had long been undermined in Europe. Re-

ceiving a university education, he entered the civil service of Prussia only shortly to turn from its monotonous routine with invincible disgust. He then settled upon his father's estate as a country squire. For years he gave himself up to the problem of retrieving the family fortune, and with ultimate success. In 1847 he emerged from his country life and began his political career as a member of the United Diet. He now had an opportunity to expound his political views, which he did with emphasis. No compromise with the Revolution was his watchword. More royalist than the King he resented the King's act of granting a Constitution to Prussia but, once granted, he would abide by it. But he had no notion that the Constitution should transform Prussia into a state like England, the model which Liberals were constantly urging other people to follow. "The references to England are our misfortune," he said. If Prussians were only Englishmen, and possessed all the institutions and qualities of Englishmen, then "you might govern us in the English fashion." Bismarck's political ideas centered in his ardent belief in the Prussian monarchy. It had been the Prussian kings, not the Prussian people, who had made Prussia great. This, the great historic fact, must be preserved. What Prussian kings had done, they still would do. The reduction of royal power would only be damaging to the state. "The Prussian Crown must not allow itself," he said, "to be thrust into the powerless position of the English Crown, which seems more like a smartly decorative cupola on the state edifice, than its central pillar of support, as I consider ours." When the democrats declared that England had been made great by democracy he flatly contradicted them. England had grown great under an aristocratic constitution. "It remains to be seen whether this reformed constitution (1832) will maintain itself for centuries as did the earlier rule of the English aristocracy." He defended vehemently the Prussian nobility, a class at that time bitterly attacked. By them, and by their blood, the Prussian state had been built up. Bismarck was the uncompromising foe of the attempts made in 1848 to achieve German unity, because he believed those attempts involved a diminution in the importance of Prussia, and he was above all a Prussian. "The Frankfort crown may be very brilliant," he said, "but the gold which would give truth to its brilliancy can only be gained by melting down the Prussian crown," something he could not contemplate without horror. "The scheme for a union annihilates the integrity of the Prussian kingdom . . . Prussians we are and Prussians we will remain." His attitude

toward the assembly, of which he was a member, is shown by the words, "I know that what I have said to you will have no influence on your votes, but I am equally convinced that your votes will be as completely without influence on the course of events." No European state had suffered a more complete humiliation than Prussia at Olmütz, yet Bismarck vigorously defended the action of the Government. "Prussia ought to unite with Austria in order to crush the common enemy, the Revolution." "I regard Austria as the representative and inheritor of an ancient German power which has often gloriously wielded the German sword." The reason for this defense of Olmütz is highly significant. "The only sound principle of action for a great state is political egoism, and not romanticism, and it is unworthy of such a state to strive for anything which does not directly concern it."¹ A war with Austria in 1850 would have meant the ruin of Prussia. Therefore egoism, the sole legitimate motive force in politics, justified the convention of Olmütz. "According to my conviction," he said in a speech which he incorporated in part more than forty years later in his *Reminiscences*, "Prussian honor does not consist in Prussia's playing the Don Quixote all over Germany for the benefit of mortified parliament celebrities who consider their local constitution in danger. I look for Prussian honor in Prussia's abstinence before all things from every shameful union with democracy; in Prussia's refusal to allow, in the present and all other questions, anything to happen in Germany without her consent; and in the joint execution by the two protecting powers of Germany, with equal authority, of whatsoever they, Prussia and Austria, after joint independent deliberation, consider reasonable and politically justifiable."

By such utterances, poorly delivered, for he was no orator, Bismarck made himself immensely disliked by all Liberals. On the other hand, such downright and uncompromising flouting of all the popular phrases of the day, such unqualified and defiant adherence to monarchy and aristocracy commended him to the King, who appointed him, in 1851, Prussian delegate to the Diet at Frankfort. Bismarck's career now broadened, and during the next eight years he studied and practised the art of diplomacy, in which he was later to win many sweeping vic-

¹ Bismarck's political principles may be best studied in the speeches which he delivered during the years 1847-1851, and which may be found in Kohl, *Die politischen Reden des Fürsten Bismarck*, Vol. I. Particularly interesting are the speeches of September 24, 1849, and December 3, 1850.

tories. He made the acquaintance of all the important statesmen and politicians of Germany and studied their characters and ambitions.

He had not been long in Frankfort before his views in regard to Austria changed. He came to regard her as the constant and determined enemy of Prussia, and to believe that her policy was to reduce Prussia to the position of a mere satellite, and Bismarck had no notion that a nation of 17,000,000 should occupy that position. At once this jingo Prussian bent all his energies to convince his superiors in Berlin of this fact. He soon saw that, though bound together in the same federation, the harmony of the two great German powers had been destroyed by the events of 1848. As early as 1853 he said in a report to Berlin that there was not room in Germany for the two powers — that one or the other must bend. Three years later he expressed his opinion even more clearly, "I only desire to express my conviction that ere long we shall have to fight Austria for our very existence; it is not in our power to avert that eventuality, for the course of events in Germany can lead to no other result."¹ In 1859, as he was leaving the Diet for the mission to St. Petersburg, he summed up the situation, "I see in our federal alliance that Prussia has an infirmity which sooner or later we shall have to heal *ferro et igni*, unless we begin in good time to seek a remedy for it." "Bismarck," wrote the Austrian delegate at the Diet, "believes that Prussia forms the center of the world." He did so regard it, and his activity largely made it so for others.

Such was the man, who in 1862 at the age of forty-seven, accepted the position of President of the Prussian Ministry at a time when King and Parliament confronted each other in angry deadlock, and when no other politician would accept the leadership. For four years, from 1862 to 1866, the conflict continued. The Constitution was not abolished, Parliament was called repeatedly, the Lower House voted year after year against the budget, supported in this by the voters, the Upper House voted for it, and the King acted as if this made it legal. The period was one of virtual dictatorship and real suspension of parliamentary life. The King continued to collect the taxes, the army was thoroughly reorganized and absolutely controlled by the authorities, and the Lower House had no mode of opposition save the verbal one, which was entirely ineffective.

Thus the increase in the army was secured. But an army is a mere means to an end. The particular end that Bismarck had

¹ Quoted by Murdock, *The Reconstruction of Europe*, 190.

in view was the creation of German unity by means of Prussia and for the advantage of Prussia. There must be no absorption of Prussia in Germany, as there had been of Piedmont in Italy, Piedmont as a separate state entirely disappearing. And in Bismarck's opinion this unity could only be achieved by war.

He boldly denied in Parliament the favorite theory of the Liberals, that Prussia was to be made great by a liberal, free, parliamentary government, by setting an example of progressiveness, as Piedmont had done, which would rally Germans in other states about her, rather than about their own governments. In what was destined to be the most famous speech of his life he declared in 1863 that what Germans cared about was not the liberalism of Prussia but her power. Prussia must concentrate her forces and hold herself ready for the favorable moment. The boundaries of the kingdom, as determined by the Congress of Vienna, were not favorable to a sound political life. "Not by speeches and majority votes are the great questions of the day decided — that was the great blunder of 1848 and 1849 — but by blood and iron."

This "blood and iron" policy was bitterly denounced by Liberals, but Bismarck ignored their criticisms and shortly found a chance to begin its application. Displaying remarkable diplomatic astuteness and subtlety, unfolding surprising resourcefulness in using the exceedingly complicated international relations of his day in such a way as to further his Prussian and German plans, he proceeded to reshape Europe in most important particulars. He was favored in this by the jealousies of the powers and the general incompetence of their ministers. It was fortunate for Prussia that at a time when it was directed by one of the geniuses of the century, other countries were directed by mediocrities. His own ability, great as it was, would not alone have sufficed to accomplish the work of the next few years.

The German Empire is the result of the policy of blood and iron as carried out by Prussia in three wars which were crowded into the brief period of six years, the war with Denmark in 1864, with Austria in 1866, and with France in 1870, the last two of which were largely the result of Bismarck's will and diplomatic ingenuity and unscrupulousness, and the first of which he exploited consummately for the advantage of Prussia.

The first of these grew out of one of the most complicated questions that have ever perplexed diplomatists and statesmen, the future of Schleswig and Holstein. These were two duchies in the Danish peninsula, which is itself simply an extension of

the great plain of northern Germany. Holstein was inhabited by a population of about 600,000, entirely German; Schleswig by a population of from 250,000 to 300,000 Germans and 150,000 Danes. These two duchies had for centuries been united with Denmark, but they did not form an integral part of the Danish kingdom. Their relation to Denmark was personal, arising from the fact that a Duke of Schleswig and Holstein had become King of Denmark, just as an Elector of Hanover had become a King of England. The King of Denmark was, in the duchies, simply duke. The Danes naturally wished to make this union a real one, to incorporate entirely the duchies with the kingdom. But there were plain obstacles in the way. Holstein (not Schleswig) was a part of the German Confederation; the King of Denmark as Duke of Holstein was represented in the Diet of Frankfort, as were the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Austria. Now the Germans in Schleswig wished to have that duchy also a part of the German Confederation, and were warmly supported in this desire by the public opinion of Germans everywhere. On the other hand, the Danes of Schleswig wished to have the duchy annexed to Denmark, and were naturally supported in this by the Danes of that kingdom.

The question had long been before Europe, but in 1863 it became acute, when on November 13, 1863, the Danish Parliament adopted a new Constitution, which incorporated Schleswig with Denmark. Two days later the King, Frederick VII, died, but his successor, Christian IX, signed the Constitution. What would Germany do? Would it allow Germans to be annexed to a foreign country outright? The Diet at once protested, and ordered an army sent into the duchies to prevent this consummation, and in doing this it had the enthusiastic support of public opinion throughout Germany. Bismarck, however, declined to join in this policy. He saw in the situation a chance for the eventual aggrandizement of Prussia, and for a possible future quarrel with Austria. He, therefore, wished Prussia to follow an independent line. He urged Austria to join with Prussia in upholding the London Protocol of 1852, which both powers had signed, as had the other powers of Europe, a treaty which regulated the succession to the duchies, under certain conditions, the main condition being that Christian might be King of Denmark and Duke of Schleswig, but that the duchy should preserve its separateness from Denmark. Bismarck's position was that Austria and Prussia had a right to demand the observance of the treaty which they had signed, and that

they would support Christian if he would live up to the conditions. He induced Austria to join him in supporting this Treaty of London, claiming that they were simply upholding the sacredness of international agreements. The two powers proclaimed their intention to adhere to that treaty, but demanded that the Danes withdraw the recent Constitution, which they declared was in defiance of it. The duplicity of Bismarck's policy lay in the fact that he had assured himself that the Danes would not make this concession, which, moreover, he did not wish them to make, as his whole purpose was to pick a quarrel from which Prussia might profit. To make assurance doubly sure, the ultimatum presented to Denmark demanded the withdrawal within forty-eight hours of the Constitution incorporating Schleswig. This, as a matter of fact, was impossible, even if the Danes had unanimously desired it. The King could not do this of his own prerogative: he must have the assent of his Parliament. His Parliament had been dissolved and a new one had not been elected. Naturally, this could not be done in two days. At the expiration of that time Prussia and Austria declared war against Denmark in the name of the Treaty of London of 1852. But Bismarck knew that a war between two countries abrogates existing treaties between them, a fact which he was prepared to utilize to Prussia's advantage in time. In the name of the Treaty of 1852 he made war against Denmark for the real purpose of breaking that very treaty.

A war between one small state and two large ones could not be doubtful. Sixty thousand Prussians and Austrians invaded Denmark in February 1864, and, though their campaign was not brilliant, they easily won. The only danger was in a European intervention. A conference was held in London for the purpose of arranging a settlement by diplomacy. But nothing was accomplished. Russia was grateful for Prussian aid in the recent Polish insurrection; France and England were full of reproaches for each other. In such troubled waters Bismarck could fish successfully. He was able to block the proposed intervention. The war was successful for Prussia and Austria, and Denmark on October 30, 1864, signed the Treaty of Vienna, whereby she renounced all rights to Schleswig, Holstein, and the little duchy of Lauenburg, contiguous to the latter, in favor of Austria and Prussia, and agreed to recognize any disposition they should make concerning them. Bismarck later regarded his handling of the Schleswig-Holstein matter as the diplomatic masterpiece of his career.

The question now was what should be the future of the duchies? Their inhabitants wished to form a separate state under the Duke of Augustenburg and be admitted as such to the German Confederation. The people of Germany were overwhelmingly in favor of this arrangement, and Austria favored it. But Bismarck's ideas were very different. He did not care for another German state. There were too many already, and this one would only be another enemy of Prussia and ally of Austria. Moreover, Bismarck wished to annex the duchies wholly or in part to Prussia. He desired aggrandizement in general, but this particular addition would be especially advantageous, as it would lengthen the coast line of Prussia, would bring with it several good harbors, notably Kiel, and would enable Prussia to expand commercially. Thus the two powers were at variance over the disposition of their spoils. Bismarck, recognizing the impossibility of gaining his end directly, agreed to recognize the rights of Augustenburg on certain conditions, which he knew Augustenburg would never accept. Prussia and Austria thus differed from the outset as to the future of Schleswig and Holstein. Sources of friction were so numerous, tension became so great, that war between them seemed imminent in 1865. But Austria did not feel in condition for war, and, though Bismarck favored it, the King of Prussia opposed it. He was not yet prepared for a fratricidal contest which did violence to his patriotic and national feelings. Consequently, the Convention of Gastein was made by the two parties August 14, 1865. Joint rule was given up in practice, though not in principle. The duchies belonged to the two powers, but henceforth Austria alone should administer Holstein and Prussia Schleswig. Lauenburg was sold outright to Prussia by Austria for two and a half million thalers. This was the first of Prussian annexations. The treaty also signified a virtual abandonment of the Duke of Augustenburg.

Bismarck approved the Treaty of Gastein, because, in his opinion, it ended nothing. He called it a mere "stopping of cracks." He regarded it simply as a new trick in the game with Austria. That the Convention was universally denounced abroad and in Germany as merely cold-blooded bargaining was a matter of indifference to him. Out of the situation which it created he hoped to bring about the war with Austria, which he had desired for the past ten years as being the only means whereby German unity could be achieved by Prussia and for its advantage. In this he was successful within a year. There was not room

in Germany, he thought, for both powers, "one or the other must bend." He now directed his attention to the creation of an international situation which would leave Austria isolated in the event of a conflict. He turned to diplomacy, and the result was an interview with Napoleon III, and an alliance with Italy. The attitude of France he regarded as most important. Consequently, he took occasion to seek a conference with Napoleon III at Biarritz. The meeting at Biarritz (October 1865) has been considered, though incorrectly, to have had somewhat the same importance in German history that that of Plombières has in Italian. What passed we know only imperfectly. No formal, written engagements were made. Bismarck returned with the conviction that Napoleon would remain neutral in case of a war between Prussia and Austria, that the annexation of Schleswig and Holstein would call forth no opposition from him, that he would even view it with approval as being in harmony with his favorite doctrine of nationalities. Bismarck told the Emperor that the constitution of the German Confederation ought to be completely reformed. Napoleon seems to have entered no protest. Bismarck, holding that statesmanship is simply enlightened egoism, believed that in return for permission to make these changes France must be paid. Consequently, he dangled before the Emperor chances of enlarging the boundaries of France, but all this was very vague, though quite friendly, and resulted in no precise agreements.

Bismarck sought a treaty of alliance with Italy for the coming encounter. Italy coveted Venetia, and in April 1866, after much diplomatic manœuvring, arising from the fact that neither power had confidence in the honesty of the other, a treaty was made and signed on April 8, 1866. It was to the effect that if Prussia should within three months go to war with Austria for the sake of reforms in the German Confederation, Italy should also declare war against Austria; that neither would make a separate peace; that, if the allies were successful, Italy should receive Venetia from Austria and Prussia an equivalent amount of Austrian territory.

From the moment this treaty was signed Bismarck devoted all his efforts to bringing about the war with Austria within the three months. It was not difficult to find pretexts. The Treaty of Gastein proved a most convenient aid. Prussia protested vigorously against Austria's method of administering Holstein. Austria resented the criticism as an impertinent interference in her own affairs. Relations between the two powers

thus became strained to the breaking point, and both began to arm. Still some weeks went by before hostilities commenced.

Bismarck's ultimate purpose in all his actions was the acquisition of the leadership in Germany for Prussia away from Austria. He was preparing a German civil war for that end; but he wished to give it a broader basis than a mere sordid quarrel about the northern duchies, in which no idea was apparent save self-aggrandizement. He now sought to give a new turn and a more important character to this rivalry of Austria and Prussia. He preferred to appear to be fighting for the reform of the German Confederation rather than for the duchies. On April 9th, the very day after the signature of the treaty with Italy, and in consonance with one of its provisions, that very one, indeed, on which the whole treaty rested, he caused the Prussian plan for the reform of the Confederation to be introduced into the Diet at Frankfort. The plan was entirely unexpected. It was vague in all that concerned the relations of the princes to each other, but definite in that it proposed that in addition to the Diet there should be chosen by universal suffrage a popular chamber to share in the management of common affairs. The amazement of German Liberals was unbounded. Here was the man who had spent his life deriding and defying parliaments and ridiculing democracy now adopting its extreme demand — universal suffrage. The Liberals thought this a mere trick and did not take the proposal seriously. This was a turning point in Bismarck's career. He was now presenting a scheme for the reorganization of Germany, and he saw that if Prussia was to gain the leadership she must make some sacrifices to the feelings of the other states. They would not willingly accept the leadership of an autocratic, parliament-defying Prussia. By conceding universal suffrage, liberal opinion, hitherto hostile to Prussia, might be won. The full effect of this proposal was not seen until later. Prussia's power was not immediately increased, owing to the distrust which Bismarck's career inspired in the minds of Liberals. It seems likely that Bismarck did not now fear universal suffrage, as he had seen how favorably it had worked in France for a despotic Emperor.

Even after this there was delay. Bismarck was still waiting for the provocation to come from Austria. He wished to throw upon her the odium of beginning the civil war which he was doing everything in his power to render inevitable. At last the moment came. On June 1, 1866, Austria brought the Schleswig-Holstein question before the Diet. At once Bismarck declared that this

was a breach of the Treaty of Gastein. That agreement was, therefore, void and Prussian troops were sent into Holstein, Austria's jurisdiction. Austria on June 11 moved in the Diet that the Federal forces be sent against Prussia. Prussia announced to the other states that every vote in favor of this motion would be regarded as a declaration of war. On June 14 the vote was taken and the motion carried. Pronouncing this levying of war by the Confederation against one of its members illegal, Prussia declared the Confederation dissolved, again brought forward her reform plans, and prepared for immediate action.

Thus the German civil war began. Bismarck had brought about his dream of a conflict between peoples of the same race to determine the question of control. It proved to be one of the shortest wars in history, one of the most decisive, and one whose consequences were most momentous. It is called the Seven Weeks' War. It began June 16, 1866, was virtually decided on July 3d, was brought to a close before the end of that month by the preliminary Peace of Nikolsburg, July 26th, which was followed a month later by the definitive Peace of Prague, August 23. Prussia had no German allies of any importance. Several of the North German states sided with her, but these were small and their armies were unimportant. On the other hand, Austria was supported by the four kingdoms, Bavaria, Würtemberg, Saxony, and Hanover; also by Hesse-Cassel, Hesse-Darmstadt, Nassau, and Baden. But Prussia had one important ally, Italy, without whose aid she might not have won the victory. The Prussian army, however, was better prepared. For years the rulers of Prussia had been preparing for war, perfecting the army down to the minutest detail, and with scientific thoroughness, and when the war began it was absolutely ready. Moreover, it was directed by the greatest military genius Europe had seen since Napoleon, General von Moltke. Moltke had studied profoundly Napoleon's methods. A thorough master of the principles of war, he was particularly remarkable as an organizer. He had carefully worked out the relation to war of the modern means of rapid communication, the railway and the telegraph. Devoting endless time and thought to elaborate, minute preparation, so that it happened that no army ever in history had been able to get under way with the quickness of the one he commanded, he also displayed audacity in action. He had, moreover, under him men similarly trained in theory, in the actual

handling of troops, and with similar qualities of intelligence, judgment, and daring.

On the other hand, the Austrian army had as commander Benedek, who said of himself that he could command a division, but felt unable to command an army, forced, however, by loyalty to the Emperor to accept a command which he had at first refused. His army also had no such perfection of organization as had that of Prussia. Moreover, Austria had two enemies to fight — one in front, Prussia; one in the rear, Italy, a condition always full of danger.

Prussia had many enemies. Being absolutely prepared, while her enemies were not, she could assume the offensive, and this was the cause of her first victories. War began June 16th. Within three days Prussian troops had occupied Hanover, Dresden, and Cassel, the capitals of her three North German enemies. The Hanoverian army defeated the Prussian at Langensalza June 27th, but was compelled to capitulate two days later, the Prussians having received large reinforcements. The King of Hanover and the Elector of Hesse were taken prisoners of war. All North Germany was now controlled by Prussia, and within two weeks of the opening of the war she was ready to attempt the great plan of Moltke, an invasion of Bohemia. The rapidity of the campaign struck Europe with amazement. Moltke sent three armies by different routes into Bohemia, and on July 3, 1866, one of the great battles of history, that of Königgrätz, or Sadowa, was fought. Each army numbered over 200,000, the Prussians outnumbering the Austrians, though not at the beginning. Since the battle of Leipsic in 1813, so many troops had not been engaged in a single conflict. King William, Bismarck, Roon, and Moltke took up their position on a hill, whence they could view the scene. The battle was long and doubtful. Beginning early in the morning, it continued for hours, fought with terrific fury, the Prussians making no advance against the Austrian artillery. Up to two o'clock it seemed an Austrian victory, but with the arrival of the Prussian Crown Prince with his army the issue was turned, and at half-past three the Austrians were beaten and their retreat began. They had lost over forty thousand men, while the Prussian loss was about ten thousand. The Prussian army during the next three weeks advanced to within sight of the spires of Vienna.

On June 24th the Austrians had been victorious over the Italians at Custozza. Yet the Italians had helped Prussia in

detaining 80,000 Austrian troops, which, had they been at Königgrätz, would probably have turned the day. The Italian fleet was also defeated by the Austrian at Lissa, July 20th.

Prussia still had enemies, the Confederate armies, and the troops of the South German states, notably Bavaria. But she made equally short work of these obstacles. The Bavarian army was defeated at Kissingen July 10th. Finally Frankfort, hitherto the seat of the German Confederation, was entered July 16th. The southern states sued for peace.

The causes of the overthrow of Austria were numerous. Some have already been indicated. The armies which Moltke commanded were among the best that had ever appeared upon the field of battle, and they were directed by a single master-mind which gave coherence and harmony to their movements. The Austrian army, on the other hand, was, in point of military instruction, inferior. Moreover, it was not pervaded by the same single, national enthusiasm. Austria was not a single people, but a collection of peoples, who were separated by jealousies and animosities, and the army exemplified these divisions. The Hungarians gave no enthusiastic support, for, since 1849, they had been alienated from the Empire which had taken away their Constitution. The Slavs were lukewarm, hating the Government of Vienna, which was largely German. The allies of Austria in Germany were poorly equipped, poorly commanded, and unable to co-operate heartily. Again, while the Austrian artillery and cavalry were superior to the Prussian, the infantry was equipped with a weapon far inferior. The "needle gun is king," said the *London Times* after the news of Königgrätz. This gun was superior to the Austrian in that, being more easily loaded, it could be discharged four or five times a minute, while the Austrian gun could be discharged only once. In almost all the encounters of the war the losses were proportionate to the rapidity of fire. Again, the tactics of the Austrians increased their losses immensely. They fought in serried ranks, while the Prussians, having learned that the progress in firearms rendered such methods very costly, fought in loose order, taking advantage of the inequalities of surface, and of the protection afforded by trees and thickets.

The results of the Seven Weeks' War were momentous. Fearing the intervention of Europe, and particularly that of France, which was threatened, and which might rob the victory of its fruits, Bismarck wished to make peace at once, and consequently offered very lenient terms to Austria. His moderation was





bitterly opposed by the military leaders of Prussia,¹ but finally won the day, and the Preliminaries of Nikolsburg were agreed to, July 26th. Austria was to cede Venetia to Italy, but was to lose no other territory. She was to pay a small indemnity and was to withdraw permanently from the German Confederation, which, indeed, was to cease to exist. She was to allow Prussia to organize and lead a new confederation, composed of those states which were north of the river Main. The South German states were left free to act as they chose. Thus Germany, north of the Main, was to be united.

Having accomplished this, Prussia proceeded to make important annexations to her own territory. The Kingdom of Hanover, the Duchies of Nassau and Hesse-Cassel, and the free city of Frankfort, as well as the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, were incorporated in the Prussian kingdom. Her population was thereby increased by over four and a half million new subjects, and thus was about twenty-four million. Her territory was increased by thirteen hundred square miles, almost a fourth of her former area. Her western and eastern provinces were thus finally united by the absorption of those states that lay between, and she now gained a cohesion she had always lacked. She henceforth controlled the northern coast of Germany, with brief gaps, from Russia to Holland. There was no thought of having the people of these states vote on the question of annexation, as had been done in Italy, and in Savoy and Nice. They were annexed forthwith by right of military conquest. Reigning houses ceased to rule on order from Berlin. With singular fatuity European nations allowed the swift consummation of these changes, which altered the balance of power and the map of Europe—a mistake that France in particular was to repent most bitterly. “I do not like this dethronement of dynasties,” said the Tsar, but he failed to express his dislike in action.²

¹ This is explicitly asserted by Bismarck in one of the most dramatic sections of his *Reflections and Reminiscences* (II, 47-54). On the other hand the correctness of his assertion has been subjected to very damaging criticism by Professor Max Lenz. See Lenz, *Zur Kritik der Gedanken und Erinnerungen des Fürsten Bismarck*, 58-132.

² The Russian Government, declaring that, as the German Confederation had been founded in 1815 by the Congress of Vienna, to which all the powers were parties, it could not be abolished by Prussia alone, proposed a new international congress to settle the terms of peace. Against this proposal Bismarck assumed an attitude so highly belligerent, threatening war *à outrance*, that it was dropped.

Bismarck, now wishing the support of the Liberals in his future work, came before the Chamber of Deputies and asked and received an indemnity for having governed without a budget. Thus he recognized the rights of the Chamber under the Constitution. But this action was more formal than real. The Crown had won these amazing successes in the face of the bitter opposition of the Chamber, opposition to the reorganization of the army, to the war with Denmark, and to the war with Austria. The Crown had defeated Parliament morally, as well as practically. The confidence of the German people in parliamentary government was seriously undermined.

The German Confederation, established in 1815, disappeared forever in the cataclysm of 1866. The Diet of Frankfort was no more. Austria was excluded from Germany by the Treaty of Prague. There was now formed a new confederation, more limited geographically, but of far greater power than the old — a real federal state. This North German Confederation included all Germany north of the river Main, twenty-two states in all: i.e., two kingdoms, Prussia and Saxony; ten duchies, seven principalities, and the free cities of Hamburg, Lübeck, and Bremen. Not included were Bavaria, Würtemberg, Baden, and that part of Hesse-Darmstadt south of the boundary river.

The Constitution of this new state merits examination, as, with certain slight and formal changes, it was later to become the constitution of the German Empire. Bismarck was its author. After some amendments were made in it with Prussia's consent, it was accepted by the Governments of the several states, and was then submitted in 1867 to a National Assembly chosen by manhood suffrage for the purpose. Passed by this body with some slight alterations, it was finally ratified without further amendment by the legislatures of the several states.

The new federal organization was to consist of a President, the King of Prussia, of a Federal Council (Bundesrat), and a Parliament (Reichstag). The Federal Council was really the old Diet of Frankfort, preserved in the new scheme. It was to be composed of delegates sent by the sovereigns of the different states, to be recalled at their pleasure, bound by instructions given them by their princes. The voting power of the different states was fixed arbitrarily and not according to population, differing from the Senate of the United States in that the number of votes allotted the different states greatly varied. There were to be 43 votes in all. Of these Prussia was to have 17, Saxony 4, Mecklenburg-Schwerin and Brunswick 2, each of the

others 1. In order to have a majority, Prussia would have to gain the support of five little principalities, which she could easily do. In regard to military organization, no change might be made in the laws without the consent of Prussia.

Associated with this Bundesrat, or Council of Princes, as it really was, was the Reichstag, or Parliament, composed of 297 members, elected by direct manhood suffrage and by secret ballot, for three years. Of the two bodies the Reichstag was much the less important, therein differing from the popularly elected chamber in other countries. The emphasis in this new organization of Germany was put upon the princes, the sovereigns, not upon the people. The people were given a place in the system, but a subordinate one. Bismarck always considered the Bundesrat the key to the Constitution. Large powers of legislation were given to the new government. All laws and all taxes must pass both chambers.

The new Constitution went into force July 1, 1867. "Let us work quickly," Bismarck said, while the Constitution was under discussion, "let us put Germany in the saddle; she will soon learn to ride," another Bismarckian prophecy destined to come true. Germany now entered upon a period of remarkable progress, which continued down to the outbreak of the World War. Legislative activity supplemented and clinched the triumphs of diplomacy and war. The old Confederation had failed in two particulars, said Bismarck in the Parliament of 1867: it had failed to insure the national safety, and it had failed to develop adequately the prosperity of the nation. These were not to be the failures of the new. Its military strength was amply assured. The armies of the different states were now all organized on the Prussian model, with the President of the Confederation as chief. He now commanded an army of 800,000 men. Moreover, Bismarck was able, by playing upon their fear of France, to induce the South German states to enter into a military alliance, offensive and defensive, with the North German Confederation. This increased the army to over a million. In a military sense Germany was unified.

Laws were rapidly passed aiming to increase the material well-being, to enlist firmly on the side of the new experiment the capitalist, industrial classes. The growth of the modern industrial system had been, as we have seen, one of the forces making for unity. It had greatly helped to create the situation in which Bismarck had been able to work so effectively. The

business world now demanded that the state reward it by the removal of many restrictions which had survived the Zollverein and which hampered economic activity. Certain laws which restricted the free movement of the people were repealed, passports being suppressed, the absolute, unqualified right of every citizen to reside anywhere in the Confederation guaranteed. This aided industries by providing them a free and mobile labor market. In place of the medley of weights and measures of the different states, which were a hindrance to commerce, a uniform plan was adopted, based upon the metric and decimal systems. A single monetary system was also decreed in place of the great variety of currencies in vogue. The formation of business corporations was encouraged. Laws limiting the rate of interest were abolished. The postal system was reorganized. Commercial treaties were made with other nations. Workingmen were given the right to form unions. The results of all this activity were notable. The pecuniary advantage of large and influential classes lay in the success of the Confederation. Economic life bound the different states every year more tightly together.

Meanwhile Germans were biding the time when by the addition of the South German states the political unity would be complete. This was to be the result of the Franco-German war of 1870.

CHAPTER XIII

THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SECOND EMPIRE

WE have traced the rise of Italy, the rise of Prussia. We have now to trace the decline and fall of the French Empire. The history of that Empire from its foundation in 1852 to 1860 has been described. It was a period of despotic government, and of great and uninterrupted success. The period from 1860 to 1870 witnesses the gradual transformation of the Empire from autocracy to liberalism, the rise of a vigorous party of opposition, a disastrous foreign policy, a growing demoralization within the state, and a final, tragic collapse.

The turning point in the history of the Empire was the Italian war. However beneficial to Italy, that war raised up for Napoleon a host of enemies in France. One of its features had been the attack upon the temporal power of the Papacy. That power was not overthrown in fact, but it was in principle. The Pope had lost most of his states, the rest were in danger. Catholics were bitter in their denunciation of Napoleon. This was most damaging for him, as his strongest supporters had hitherto been the clergy, the clerical press, and the faithful. But other groups also were offended: monarchists, because of the overthrow of the kingdom of Naples and the duchies; patriots of various affiliations and members of the liberal constitutional party in Parliament, because they believed the erection of a strong state to the southeast of France prejudicial to her best interests, it being better to have several weak states as neighbors than a single strong one.

Only the democratic party in France seemed pleased with this venture, and for reasons that might well give the Emperor pause. This was the smallest of all the parties. It was by its fundamental principles opposed to the very existence of the Empire. "To find partisans of an Italian war, one must seek them in those circles which are plotting the overthrow of the Empire," an official had reported to the Emperor before ever the war had begun. These democrats approved a war against Austria, the traditional opponent of liberalism. They favored a war that might damage another enemy of theirs, the Roman

Catholic Church. They applauded it warmly because its tendency seemed to be inevitably democratic and anti-clerical. They were pleased to have the Emperor enter upon a doubtful adventure, believing that one adventure might lead to others, that he would alienate former supporters, and would therefore be forced to seek new ones, and that thus a situation favorable to themselves might be created. But even they were disappointed at the outcome of the war and were therefore critical. The Austrians were still in Venetia; the Pope was still in Rome.

The Emperor's reputation as a ruler, of intelligent views and of decision of character, was damaged both at home and abroad. As the war progressed it revealed the lack in its author of any definite purpose to be vigorously adhered to, Napoleon III at first agreeing to drive the Austrians out of the peninsula and to free Italy from the Alps to the Adriatic, then stopping midway in the process and dictating the Preliminaries of Villafranca and the Peace of Zurich, only to permit them both to become immediately dead letters, and watching the revolution, unchained by his act, progress until the most sweeping change in Italian history had been effected and unification had been practically achieved. By a policy, alternately so reckless and so pusillanimous, he lessened his prestige, for he showed that though he could inaugurate momentous movements, he had not the power or sagacity or courage to control them. By participating in the overthrow of long-established, legitimate governments, he made legitimate governments everywhere suspicious and even hostile; by declaring that he was seeking only justice and not aggrandizement and then adding Savoy and Nice to France as payment for his services, he alienated England, as well as other states, which saw only hypocrisy in his acts and which feared that he was desirous of repeating the policy of conquest of his illustrious uncle. Such was the outcome of a policy, fortunate for the Italians, unfortunate for the Emperor. The next decade is a long commentary upon Napoleon's initial error. For ten years he was to experience to the full the embarrassments created by his ill-advised Italian policy.

It was at this time that in a different sphere he offended another powerful interest at home. He made in 1860, with unusual secrecy, a treaty of commerce with England. This treaty involved a great reduction of duties on many articles, and was a step in the direction of free trade. While popular with political economists, and while probably advantageous to France as a whole, it was bitterly resented by the great manufacturers, who,

given no warning and therefore no time to adapt themselves to changed conditions, believed that they would be utterly ruined. Four hundred of them came to Paris to seek an audience with the Emperor in order to present their cause. They were unsuccessful. The audience was not granted, but they published a vehement protest against the new policy. "We are about to be condemned without having been heard." But while the manufacturers were indignant, many in France were grateful, notably the wine producers, who, according to the new treaty, would have a larger market in England than ever. But the Emperor had thus by 1860 offended large and influential classes: Catholics in their beliefs by his Italian policy; manufacturers, protectionists, in their interests by his treaty of commerce, a treaty which, it was declared, sacrificed French interests to English, as the war, it was likewise declared, had subordinated the welfare of France to that of Italy.

Feeling that he was losing strength with the Conservatives, Napoleon now began to seek the support of the Liberals, hitherto his bitter opponents. This was the beginning of the so-called Liberal Empire, marked, as the years went, by ever greater concessions, until at the end the character of the government was completely transformed. Thus in 1859 Napoleon issued an amnesty which permitted the Republicans who had been driven from France by the coup d'état of 1851 to return. Many were prisoners in Algeria, in Guiana. Many were exiles in Belgium, Switzerland, England. From these countries the exiles now came back, but not all of them. "I shall return," said Victor Hugo, "when Liberty returns."

Napoleon next took a step which seemed to indicate that he was finally to enter upon the work of crowning his régime with liberty, which he had declared to be the ideal of the Napoleonic system. In November 1860 he slightly enlarged the power of the legislature. By the decree of November 24th he gave the Senate and Legislative Body the right at the opening of each session to frame an address to the monarch in reply to his address from the throne. Such was the custom in England, and such had been the custom in France under the parliamentary monarchy from 1815 to 1848. This gave the legislature the chance once a year to discuss the whole policy of the Government, as each phrase of the address was being composed and debated. Everything could be passed in review at that time. Another innovation, hardly less noteworthy, was made at the same time. A full stenographic report of the sessions of the

Legislative Body was henceforth to be published. The people were no longer to be required to content themselves with a concise, dry, analytical report of these sessions, relegated to the most obscure part of the newspaper, but now the eloquence of the Chamber might be known to all the country, impassioned, incisive, instructive. Another article provided that henceforth ministers, representing the Government, should appear before the Chambers authorized to explain and defend its policy.

Though by this famous decree Napoleon III divested himself of none of his prerogatives, nevertheless the importance of Parliament was henceforth increased. This was the first and most important of the successive steps in the evolution of the autocratic into the liberal Empire. But the Emperor was mistaken in supposing that he could win the Liberals to his side. He was simply giving them greater opportunities for opposition. Under the operation of this decree parliamentary life awoke again in France. Communication between the Legislative Body and the country, broken since 1852, was re-established. Extraordinary interest was shown by the people in the next session of that chamber, which was characterized by much brilliant oratory and keen criticism. It was noted with surprise that many of the most effective speeches were directed against this or that phase of the imperial government. The Emperor had evoked a spirit which it would be difficult to suppress. The Opposition in the chamber was small numerically, but was aggressive. That it produced some effect was shown by the next elections, those of 1863, when its number increased from five to thirty-five, of whom seventeen were out-and-out Republicans. This was, of course, a powerless minority in a chamber of nearly 260 members. But the popular vote was significant. The opponents of the Empire, Catholics, Protectionists, Monarchists, Republicans, had obtained about two million votes — almost a third of those cast.

It was just this time, when various difficulties were arising about him more troublesome than any which he had previously encountered, that Napoleon chose for another enterprise most unnecessary, most reckless, and in the end most disastrous. He undertook to erect an empire five thousand miles away, in a country of which he knew but little, and in which political institutions had for half a century rested on a very shifting basis — Mexico.

England, Spain, and France had certain grievances against Mexico for her unjust treatment of their citizens resident there, and when the Mexican government suspended by arbitrary de-

creed the payment of interest on bonds held abroad, they proceeded to organize an intervention. They were the more able to do this than in ordinary times, owing to the fact that the United States, the natural opponent of any such intervention, was then involved in a civil war that forbade her attempting to prevent it. Consequently, in October 1861, these three powers signed the Treaty of London agreeing upon joint intervention for the sole purpose of securing adequate protection for Europeans resident in Mexico, and the proper discharge of financial obligations incurred by that country by previous treaties. The Allies expressly stated that they had no intention of making territorial conquests or of overthrowing the existing Mexican government, which was a republic under Juarez as president. The expedition was sent out, arriving in December 1861 and January 1862. But by April it became clear to Spain and England that France had distinctly other purposes in this affair than those stated in the treaty of alliance. Napoleon's real intentions, shortly apparent, were the overthrow of the republic and the establishment of a monarchy in Mexico under a European prince. The English and Spaniards would give no sanction to such a scheme, and consequently entirely withdrew in April 1862. The expedition now became one purely French. The question of financial honesty on the part of Mexico was lost sight of, and a war began, a war of aggression, entirely uncalled for, but a war which in the end punished its author more than it did the Mexicans, one of the most dishonorable, as it was one of the most costly and disastrous, for the Second Empire.

Napoleon III was a man of ideas, a man of imagination, with a mind ranging boldly and far at times. His ideas were frequently grandiose, yet vague and dim, his imagination lively, yet frequently unsound, superficial, deceptive. While a prisoner in the fortress of Ham he had written and published a pamphlet concerning America. In this he proclaimed the necessity of digging a great canal to connect the Atlantic and Pacific. On it a "new Constantinople" might arise, near the borders of North America and South America, as ancient Byzantium had arisen at the point where Europe and Asia meet. The founder of such a place might work out for the new world what had been worked out in Europe — an equilibrium of the different forces — by strengthening the enfeebled Latin element and hemming in the overflowing Anglo-Saxon element.

The theory of nationalities would thus win another victory. Latins would hold in check the aggressive Anglo-Saxons. The

colonies of Spain and France would be more secure, French commerce would find new outlets, the materials for French industries would be more easily procured. And, said Napoleon, "We shall have established our beneficent influence in the center of America." Another reason may have influenced the Emperor. The Republic of Mexico had in some of its legislation deeply offended the Roman Catholic Church. Might he not win back the favor of Catholics forfeited by his Italian expedition by undertaking this one?

This expedition for the overthrow of the Mexican Republic, pronounced by courtiers "the grandest thought of the reign," was a long drawn out folly. The French troops were checked at Puebla on May 5, 1862 — the first military defeat of the Empire. But, reinforced, they were victorious, and General Forey, the French commander, called together an assembly of Mexican notables of the opposition party, which decreed that Mexico should henceforth be an Empire, and which offered the imperial crown to Archduke Maximilian of Austria, brother of Francis Joseph, since 1848 Emperor of Austria. This assembly represented, perhaps 350,000 people out of about 7,000,000. It offered a fatal gift. This young prince of thirty-one was of attractive and popular manners, and of liberal ideas. Young, handsome, versatile, half poet, half scientist, he was living in a superb palace, Miramar, overlooking the Mediterranean, amid his collections, his objects of art, and with the sea, which was his passion, always before him. From out of this enchanting retreat he now emerged to become the central figure of a short and frightful tragedy. Mexico lured him to his doom. Influenced by his own ambition and that of his spirited wife, Carlotta, daughter of Leopold I, King of Belgium, and receiving definite promises of French military support until 1867, he accepted the imperial crown and arrived in Mexico in May 1864.

This entire project, born in the brain of Napoleon III, was to prove hopeless from the start, disastrous to all who participated in it, to the new Emperor and Empress, and to Napoleon. The difficulties confronting the new monarch were insuperable. A guerilla warfare was carried on successfully by Juarez, using up the French soldiers and putting them on the defensive. Even the communications of the French army with the sea were seriously threatened. Maximilian at last issued a decree that any enemies taken with arms would be summarily shot — a decree that made him hated by all Mexicans, and that gave to the war a character of extreme atrocity. A greater danger threatened

the new empire when General Lee surrendered at Appomattox. The United States had looked from the first with disapprobation upon Napoleon's project. Now that the Civil War was over, she threatened intervention. Napoleon was unwilling to risk a conflict with this country, and consequently promised to withdraw his troops speedily from Mexico. Maximilian could not remain long an Emperor without Napoleon's support. His wife, Carlotta, returning to Europe to persuade Napoleon in frantic personal interviews not to desert them, received no promise of support from the man who had planned the whole adventure, and in the fearful agony of her contemplation of the impending doom of her husband became insane. Maximilian was taken by the Mexicans and shot June 19, 1867. The phantom empire vanished.

A most expensive enterprise for the French Emperor! It had eaten into the financial resources of France, already badly disorganized. It had prevented his playing a part in decisive events occurring in central Europe in 1864-66, in the Danish war, and the Austro-Prussian war, the outcome of which was to alter so seriously the importance of France in Europe by the exaltation of an ambitious, aggressive, and powerful military state, Prussia. It had damaged him morally before Europe by the desertion of his protégés to an appalling fate before the threats of the United States. His army had once been repelled, before Puebla in 1862, the first military defeat in his reign. He had squandered uselessly his military resources and had increased the national debt. It has been asserted that the Mexican war was as disastrous for Napoleon III as the Spanish war had been for Napoleon I.

In 1868, after the great humiliation resulting from the Mexican war and from the futile attempts to play an effective part in European diplomacy in the crowded years of 1864-68, which will be described later, Napoleon III, feeling greatly the need of new sources of strength, could only turn to the Liberals with still larger concessions. Other motives influenced him to go farther in this direction than he had previously gone. He had declared at the beginning of his reign that autocratic power was to be merely provisional, that liberty should crown the edifice. Liberal-minded by nature, he saw that he could not safely postpone the day. Time was passing. Sixteen years had gone by and the system of 1852 was still almost entirely intact. Moreover, he was now becoming prematurely old, and was suffering acutely from disease, a fact that must be borne in mind hence-

forth as helping to explain the vacillation and languor at critical times of this man, who had previously acted with decision and promptness. Self-interest also would be served in another way. As his policy was now sadly compromised in every way, there would be evident advantage in making the assembly, the people, share the responsibility with himself. In 1867 the right of *interpellation* was granted the Chamber, which gave its members the power to question the ministers concerning their acts and policies at any moment. In 1868, upon the Emperor's recommendation, a law was passed freeing the press from a considerable number of restrictions that had previously weighted it; also a law permitting, under certain elaborate conditions, the right of holding public meetings.

The Empire had thus entered upon a frankly liberal path. The result was not to strengthen, but greatly to weaken it. Many new journals were founded, in which it was assailed with amazing bitterness. A remarkable freedom of speech characterizes the last two years of Napoleon's reign. A movement to erect a monument to a Republican deputy, Baudin, who had been shot on the barricades in 1851 at the time of the coup d'état, seemed to the Government to be too insulting. It prosecuted the men who were conducting the subscription. One of these was defended by a brilliant, impassioned young lawyer and orator from the south of France, thirty years of age, who was shortly to be a great figure in politics, a founder of the Third Republic. Gambetta conducted himself not as a lawyer defending his client, but as an avenger of the wrongs of France for the past seventeen years, impeaching bitterly the entire reign of Napoleon III. Particularly did he dwell upon the date of December 2d. The coup d'état, he said, was carried through by a crowd of unknown men "without talent, without honor, and hopelessly involved in debts and crimes." "These men pretend to have saved society. Do you save a country when you lay parricidal hands upon it?" The end of this remarkable discourse remains famous: "Listen, you who for seventeen years have been absolute master of France. The thing that characterizes you best, because it is evidence of your own remorse, is the fact that you have never dared to say: We will place among the solemn festivals of France, we will celebrate as a national anniversary, the Second of December. . . . Well! this anniversary we will take for ourselves; we will observe it always, always without fail; every year it shall be the anniversary of our dead, until the day when the country, having become master

itself once more, shall impose upon you the great national expiation in the name of liberty, equality, and fraternity."

This address had a prodigious effect. Nothing so defiant, so contemptuous of the Government, had been heard in France since 1851. Though Gambetta's client lost his case, it was generally felt that the Empire emerged from that court-room soundly beaten. It was clear that there was a party in existence bent upon revenge, and willing to use all the privileges a now liberal Emperor might grant, not gratefully, but as a means of completely annihilating the very Empire, a Republican party, aggressive, and growing, already master of Paris, and organizing in the departments.

There was also in existence another party which played a commanding and decisive part in the closing years of the reign, the Third Party, so called from the fact that it stood between the thorough-going supporters of the Empire and the Republicans, its active enemies. This party was willing to support the Empire loyally if Napoleon would make it frankly and completely liberal, that is, if he would substitute a completely parliamentary system of government for personal rule. This party was led by Ollivier, formerly a Republican.

Two policies were now urged upon Napoleon, one by those of his immediate circle — a return to the strong measures of 1852, a renouncement of all compromises with the Liberals; the other, the one advocated by the Third Party. The elections of 1869 reinforced the latter by showing that, though 4,438,000 votes had been cast for the official candidates, 3,355,000 had been cast for those opposed. Napoleon adopted the plan of the Third Party, and by a *senatus consultum* of September 8, 1869, supplemented by another of April 20, 1870, the political system of the Empire was completely transformed. The Senate was deprived of its powers as guardian of the Constitution, and became a law-making chamber simply. The Legislative Body became complete master of itself, having the right to choose its own officers, to make its own rules, to initiate legislation, and to demand explanations of the ministers, who were declared responsible. Finally, on January 2, 1870, Ollivier was himself made head of the ministry, and was supported by a majority of the Chamber. Ollivier felt that he could assure the Emperor a "happy old age," and his son a quiet accession to the throne.

The approval of the people was now sought for these changes. As the Constitution of 1852 had been ratified by popular vote, ought not the Constitution of 1870, so profoundly altered in

the course of the last ten years, to be likewise approved? Believing that a vote of France on all these changes would only consolidate them and put behind the Emperor an immense popular support, thus enabling him easily to dominate all the hostile parties which had recently become so aggressive and annoying, Napoleon now invited the people to vote on this proposition: "The French nation approves the liberal reforms made in the Constitution since 1860, and ratifies the *senatus consultum* of April 20, 1870." Then followed the Constitution in forty-five articles, assuring, among other things, the transmission of the imperial dignity in the direct line of Napoleon III. The plébiscite took place May 8, 1870, and resulted overwhelmingly in favor of the Empire; 7,358,786 voted yes; 1,571,939 voted no. Napoleon III could claim that he had as many supporters in 1870 as in 1852. The Republicans, a small minority, opposed this plébiscite, not because they did not believe in the right of the people to rule, but because they considered it in this case a mere trick to gain an apparent absolution for the sins of the Empire. Every one must approve the reforms, but would not such a vote mean that reform need go no further? Now, said Gambetta, only one form of government adequately expresses universal suffrage — the Republic. This party, revolutionary in its aims, appeared now to be utterly discredited by the great success of the Empire in the plébiscite. Yet its victory was very near. The Empire seemed solidly re-established upon the confidence of the people. In less than three months, however, it had declared a war against Prussia, in the midst of which it utterly collapsed and was succeeded by the Republic. To understand the reasons for this sudden and complete downfall, it is necessary to survey the diplomacy of the period just preceding 1870, and to describe the general and immediate causes of that war.

CHAPTER XIV

THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR

CONCERNING that diplomacy much is known but much remains obscure. Not until the archives of France and Germany, the papers of Napoleon III, William I, Bismarck, and their ministers and agents are freely given to the world will it stand forth fully revealed. Yet fragmentary and unsatisfactory as our information is, the broad outlines of the story can be drawn with reasonable certitude.

Up to 1862 Napoleon had been uniformly successful. He had defeated Russia and Austria, supposed to be the two most redoubtable military powers in Europe, in the Crimean and Italian wars. In 1862, however, he entered upon the ill-starred Mexican expedition, the "grandest thought of the reign," as his courtiers mispronounced it. This weakened him in many ways, indicated above, but, particularly did it trammel him in his European diplomacy, at the very time when events were crowding upon each other thick and fast, altering profoundly the face of Europe. Napoleon, distracted by a wasting, distant, and inglorious war, was not able to act with decision in regard to the remodeling of central Europe, the rise of Prussia. Moreover, his intellectual limitations, his lack of clear thought and persistent action, his half-hearted, wavering, shifting nature were now brought out in high relief against the hard, practical, clean-cut, restrained yet ruthless character of the leader of this evolution of Germany, Otto von Bismarck. His doctrine of nationalities, on which he so prided himself, was now to turn against him to his own undoing. He had acted upon that doctrine in Italy with the result that an Italian Kingdom was in existence. He now, with singular fatuity, helped forward the development of another state on the frontiers of France — Prussia. In the Schleswig-Holstein affair of 1864 he secretly advised Prussia to take both duchies. "I shall always be consistent in my conduct," he had said in 1863. "If I have fought for the independence of Italy, if I have lifted up my voice for the Polish nationalities, I cannot have other sentiments in Germany, nor obey other principles."

The strengthening of Prussia was a far more serious matter for France than the strengthening of Piedmont, as Prussia held the left bank of the Rhine, the Rhine provinces, which Frenchmen regarded as rightfully theirs. Frenchmen protested against this dangerous policy of encouraging the growth of the ambitious neighbor.

In 1866 Napoleon had an excellent opportunity to recover from his initial mistake in Germany. In that year Prussia and Austria went to war, nominally over the question of these very duchies, in reality for the leadership of central Europe. Bismarck, long planning such a war, had been particularly anxious about the attitude of France, and had sought to divine the probable conduct of the French Emperor, in the famous interview at Biarritz (1865). We have no official details as to the result of that interview, but it is clear that Bismarck left it with the conviction that Napoleon would be neutral. This would free Prussia from any anxiety about her western boundary, and she could throw her whole force to the south against Austria and her allies. It is evident that Napoleon looked forward to such a war between the two German powers with complacency. He believed there was nothing to fear from Prussia. He even urged Italy to conclude the treaty with Prussia, apparently thinking that the two combined could hold out longer against Austria. Thus, in his opinion, the war would be long, exhausting both combatants. At the proper time he could intervene, and from the distress of the rivals could extract gain for France, possibly the left bank of the Rhine, which Prussia might be willing to relinquish in return for aid. His calculation was based upon his belief in the vast military superiority of Austria. The war came, and, contrary to expectation, it was short and swift. Prussia was victorious, not Austria. The battle of Königgrätz, or Sadowa, July 3, 1866, was decisive. Even then it was not too late for an intervention. Napoleon could have played a commanding part in determining the terms of peace had he threatened to come to the aid of Austria, as Austria desired. His Minister of Foreign Affairs said to him July 5th: "Let the Emperor make a simple military demonstration, and he will be astonished at the facility with which he will become arbiter and master of the situation without striking a blow." King William later said that the war of 1866 was the ruin of France, "because Napoleon should have attacked us in the rear." This was what Bismarck most feared.

But the golden hour slipped by. Napoleon missed one of the

greatest opportunities of his entire career. Had he refused to sanction the annexations of Prussia unless compensated, he could have secured important additions to France. Pacifically inclined, racked by a disease which reduced his powers of concentration and decision, perhaps distrustful of his army, which was depleted by the Mexican campaign and which had no eminent commander, his conduct was vacillating and weak. Accomplishing nothing for France, he yet irritated Prussia by a half measure of insisting that the new confederation should not extend south of the river Main.

The year 1866 is a turning point in the history of Prussia, of Austria, of France, of modern Europe. It profoundly altered the historic balance of power. By the decisiveness of the campaign, and by the momentous character of its consequences, Prussia, hitherto regarded as the least important of the great powers, had astounded Europe by the evidence of her strength. She possessed a remarkable army and a remarkable statesman. That both were the most powerful in Europe was not entirely proved, but the feeling was widespread that such was the case. The center of interest in central Europe shifted from Vienna to Berlin. The reputation of Napoleon III was seriously compromised. The instinct of the French people saw in the battle of Königgrätz, or Sadowa, as they called it, a humiliating defeat for France, though it was a battle exclusively between Prussia and Austria, France being no party to the war. The instinct was largely right. At least the Peace of Prague involved and indicated the diminution of the authority and importance of France. For a reorganization so sweeping in central Europe, as the overthrow of Austria, her expulsion from Germany, and the consolidation and aggrandizement of Prussia, a powerful military state, upset the balance of power. A feeling of alarm spread through France. "Revenge for Sadowa," was a cry often heard henceforth. Its meaning was that if one state like Prussia should be increased in area and power, France also, for consenting to it, had a right to a proportionate increase, that the reciprocal relations might remain the same. The hold of the Emperor upon his own people was greatly weakened, and Napoleon knew it. To recover this, to renew his prestige by securing an increase of territory, he now resorted to diplomacy, seeking to appeal to the generosity or gratitude of Bismarck, having neglected to appeal to his fears. For a year negotiations went on, in 1866 and 1867, between the two powers, looking to some possible enlargement of the boundaries of France. These nego-

tations concerned, now the left bank of the Rhine, now Luxemburg, now Belgium. Bismarck drew them out in order to gain time and also evidence with which to discredit Napoleon still further. Then, at the ripe moment, he blocked every proposal, and no course was left open to the French Emperor but to adapt himself to his unhappy position. But French governmental circles, greatly chagrined and embittered, came more and more to entertain the idea of war. The Emperor tried to persuade France that all these changes in central Europe had really increased the strength of France. The argument was labored, and, moreover, reacted most disastrously, for when in 1868 he urged the reform of the French army, largely along the lines of the Prussian organization, which had proved so successful, the Chamber acceded only in slight part, quoting his own assertion that France stood in Europe stronger than ever as a result of the Seven Weeks' War in Germany. Thus the one method of augmenting the influence of France was rejected, and Parliament must share the responsibility for the lack of preparation of 1870 with the Emperor, and Liberals must share it with Conservatives. A few years earlier Napoleon might have forced such proposals through Parliament. In 1868 he was no longer in a position so to do. The Opposition was too numerous, and he had made too many enemies by his Italian and Mexican policies. Moreover, he had just increased the power of the legislature. And not for a moment admitting that the Empire was in danger, he could not use the greatest of all arguments — the safety of the state.

From 1866 to 1870 the idea that ultimately a war would come between Prussia and France became familiar to the people and governments of both countries. Many Frenchmen desired "revenge for Sadowa." Prussians were proud and elated at their two successful wars, and intensely conscious of their new position in Europe. The newspapers of both countries during the next four years were full of crimination and recrimination, of abuse and taunt, the government in neither case greatly discouraging their unwise conduct, at times even inspiring and directing it. Such an atmosphere was an excellent one for ministers who wanted war to work in, and both France and Prussia had just such ministers. Bismarck believed such a war inevitable, and, in his opinion, it was desirable as the only way of completing the unification of Germany, since Napoleon would never willingly consent to the extension of the Confederation to include the South German states. All that he desired was that it should

come at precisely the right moment, when Prussia was entirely ready, and that it should come by act of France, so that Prussia could pose before Europe as merely defending herself against a wanton aggressor. In his *Reminiscences* he avows that he entertained this belief as early as 1866: "That a war with France would succeed the war with Austria lay in the logic of history"; and again, "I did not doubt that a Franco-German war must take place before the construction of a United Germany could be realized." The unification of Germany being his supreme aim, he was bound by logic and ambition to see that that war occurred.

Unfortunately, there entered in 1870 into the Foreign Office of France a pronounced and bitter opponent of Prussia, the Duke of Gramont, a reckless and unwise politician, whose brief career in office was to be very costly to his country. With two such willing ministers, a cause of war was not long in being found. It was offered in a form which did not directly concern either Germany or France, the filling of the vacant throne of Spain.

In 1868 a revolution had occurred in Spain, which resulted in the overthrow and exile of the Queen, Isabella II. The Provisional Government which then arose proceeded upon the task, always delicate, of finding a new ruler. It chose Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern, a kinsman of the King of Prussia, who at first declined. Three times the offer of the Spanish crown was made to Leopold, twice in 1869, and again in March 1870. In an interview with Bismarck in May 1869, Benedetti, French ambassador at Berlin, made it apparent that the candidacy of the Prince would be resented by France. Bismarck nevertheless secured from Spain a fourth offer, and Leopold this time accepted, largely persuaded thereto by Bismarck, who was sufficiently cognizant of the feeling of the French Emperor. The news that a Prussian Prince had accepted the throne of Spain reached Paris by way of Madrid, July 2, 1870. Instantly great indignation was expressed in the newspapers. The excitement in Paris rapidly increased. Gramont[†] declared in the Chamber that the election of the Prince was inadmissible as "upsetting to our disadvantage the present equilibrium of forces in Europe," and imperiling "the interests and honor of France." To prevent it, "we shall discharge our duty without hesitation and without weakness." Benedetti was ordered by the French Government to proceed at once to Ems, a watering resort near the Rhine, where King William was at the time, and to make a formal

demand that the candidacy be withdrawn. Neither Napoleon III, more and more exhausted by disease, nor the Prime Minister, Ollivier, desired war, though both were anxious for a diplomatic victory. Nor did William I desire it. Moreover, the Governments of England, Austria, Russia, and Belgium labored in the interests of peace. On July 12 the candidacy was announced withdrawn by the father of Prince Leopold.

The tension was immediately relieved: the war scare was over. Two men, however, were not pleased by this outcome, Gramont and Bismarck. This was, says a biographer of Bismarck, "the severest check which Bismarck's policy had yet received; he had persuaded the Prince to accept against his will; he had persuaded the King reluctantly to keep the negotiations secret from Napoleon; however others might disguise the truth, he knew that they had had to retreat from an untenable position, and retreat before the noisy insults of the French press and the open menace of the French Government."¹ Bismarck considered the reverse so great and humiliating that he thought he must in self-respect resign and retire into private life.

He was to be saved from this by the folly of the French ministry, and by his own unscrupulousness. "The ministry has achieved," said Guizot, now a very old man, living in retirement, "the finest diplomatic victory which has been won in my lifetime." This victory was now thrown away. The whole matter was unwisely reopened and rendered far more acute by the French ministry, supported by the Parisian war party, which now made an additional demand, namely, that the King of Prussia should promise that this Hohenzollern candidacy should never be renewed. This demand was presented to William I by Benedetti, July 13, in Ems. The King refused but with entire courtesy. In the meeting of the French ministers, held on the evening of the 13th, it was not felt that this refusal made war necessary.

Meanwhile King William had caused a description of the events of that day (July 13) to be telegraphed to Bismarck, who was in Berlin, leaving with him the decision as to whether the facts of the new French demand and his refusal to entertain it be published. Here was Bismarck's opportunity, and he used it ruthlessly and joyously to provoke the French to declare war. The form in which the Ems despatch was published was intended by him to be "a red flag for the Gallic bull," and certainly fulfilled the intention. The Ems despatch was not falsified, as has been frequently asserted, but it was condensed in

¹ Headlam, *Bismarck*, 334.

such a fashion that the negotiations at Ems appeared to have been sharp and discourteous and abruptly terminated, whereas they had been courteous and respectful on both sides. While the text of the Ems despatch was not changed save by excision, the tone of it was greatly and intentionally altered, so that the Prussians thought that their King, the French that their ambassador, had been insulted. The effect of its publication on the 14th was instantaneous and malign. It aroused the indignation of both countries to fever heat. As if that were not sufficient, the newspapers of both teemed with false, abusive, and inflammatory accounts of the events at Ems. The voice of the advocates of peace was drowned in the general clamor. Napoleon did not wish war, but he was very ill, and was swept from his real convictions by the war party. The Empress, it appears, urged it out of hatred of Prussia as a Protestant nation, and in the belief that it would strengthen the imperial throne. The ministry went with the current. No one in authority dared brave unpopularity in Paris, and consequently war credits were voted amid great excitement on July 15th and France entered into the valley of the shadow. Ollivier, head of the French ministry, declared that he accepted this war "with a light heart." Thiers, demanding that the Chamber be informed of the contents of the despatches which were prompting such perilous action, and declaring that having gained "the essential thing we ought not to break because of a mere detail of form — ought not to effect a rupture on a question of touchiness," was hissed in the Chamber. War was declared by France virtually on July 15th, technically on July 19th. Only ten members in the Chamber, among whom were Thiers and Gambetta, voted against it. Paris resounded with cries, "On to Berlin!" Victory seemed certain. The Minister of War was confident. The Minister of Foreign Affairs believed that within a few hours the triple alliance for which there had been negotiations for some time would be concluded with Austria and Italy. The war grew directly out of mere diplomatic fencing. The French people did not desire it, only the people of Paris, inflamed by an official press. Indeed, until it was declared, the French people hardly knew of the matter of dispute. It came upon them unexpectedly. The war was made by the responsible heads of two Governments. It was in its origin in no sense national in either country. Its immediate occasion was trivial. But it was the cause of a remarkable display of patriotism in both countries.

The war upon which the French ministry entered with so

light a heart, was destined to prove the most disastrous in the history of their country. In every respect it was begun under singularly inauspicious circumstances. France declared war upon Prussia alone, but in a manner that threw the South German states, upon whose support she had counted, directly into the camp of Bismarck. They regarded the French demand, that the King of Prussia should pledge himself for all time to forbid the Prince of Hohenzollern's candidature, as unnecessary and insulting. At once Bavaria and Baden and Württemberg joined the campaign on the side of Prussia.

Not only Prussia, therefore, but united Germany stood confronting France. Moreover, Bismarck's diplomacy was able to isolate France from the rest of Europe. Bismarck published a draft of a treaty drawn up some years before, between Prussia and France, but never signed, which provided for the annexation of Belgium to France. France protested, but in vain, that the treaty had been dictated by Bismarck. This so worked upon English opinion, which has always opposed French extension northwards, that the English Government immediately proclaimed its neutrality. France had counted upon the ultimate aid of Austria, but Bismarck gained the support of Russia to this extent that Russia threatened to invade Austria if Austria supported France. Italy, too, was neutralized by the fact that she could not safely move alone.

Thus at the beginning of the month of August it was clear that France would have no ally. The French military authorities made the serious mistake of grossly underestimating the difficulty of the task before them. The Minister of War declared that France was ready, more than ready, that her preparations were more advanced than those of the enemy. The supreme folly of such an assertion was immediately shown. While the German armies mobilized and advanced toward the frontier with amazing swiftness, order, and ease, in the French army all was confusion. In Prussia everything had been for years prepared and orders only had to be taken out of their pigeonholes and dated. In France everything had to be improvised in the midst of unparalleled disorder. Particularly apparent was this in the case of the reserves. It frequently happened that men living in the east of France must cross to the west and get their arms and uniform, then recross to the east to join their regiments. Not only was time lost, but the railway system was deranged by the crowds of men traveling to and fro

for this purpose. Also the trains, thus crowded with soldiers going hither and yon, were prevented from transporting adequate supplies.

The confusion, the lack of preparation, the defects of the military machine were incredible and were apparent from the very first day. Despatches from corps commanders were all in the same strain. "We need everything," wrote General de Failly on July 19th. "We are in want of everything," telegraphed Bazaine on July 21st. "Everything is completely lacking," announced another a little later. Marshal Lebœuf, who, as Minister of War, had declared that everything was ready even to the last button on the last gaiter, soon lost his optimism, and on July 28th telegraphed that his troops could not advance because they lacked bread. Tents were frequently wanting, or there were tents without tent pins. Pots and kettles, medicines for men and for horses, means of transport, wagons, blankets, were frequently lacking. There were cannon without ammunition, horses without harnesses, machine guns without the men who knew how to fire them. Examples might be endlessly multiplied. More, however, are needless to show the chaos that reigned in the French army. Frequently soldiers and even generals went astray, not able to find their places. "Have arrived at Belfort," telegraphed General Michel on July 21st. "Can't find my brigade; can't find the general of the Division. What shall I do? Don't know where my regiments are." It has been observed that this document is probably unique in military records.

But the French were inferior to the Germans in numbers also. They could put into the field hardly 300,000 men, and they had no reserves worth speaking of upon which to draw. The Germans could put into the field nearly 450,000 men, and had very large reserves which could be gradually made into new armies. Again, on the French side there was confusion in the direction of the forces. The Emperor was very ill, of the disease of which he died three years later, yet, irresolute and feeble, he was at the outset commander-in-chief. During the first two weeks of the war he made three different arrangements concerning the command of the Army of the Rhine.

The French had dreamed of a swift invasion of Germany. Once in central Germany, they thought that the South Germans would rise to their aid, that then Austria and Italy would join, and the march to Berlin would begin. Nothing of the sort occurred. Their officers had maps of Germany, which they never

needed, few of France. The Germans crossed into Alsace and Lorraine, and between August 6th and September 2nd the French suffered reverse after reverse. On the former day MacMahon was defeated in the battle of Wörth and subsidiary engagements. The French fought bravely and the Germans paid heavily for their success. Nevertheless, it was an unmistakable victory. MacMahon retreated rapidly to the great camp at Châlons, east of Paris.

West of Wörth the Germans defeated the French on the same day (August 6th) at Forbach and Spicheren, and drove the army back toward Metz, one of the strongest fortresses in France. The German armies pressed on, endeavoring to prevent Bazaine, now commander of Metz, from retreating and joining MacMahon. This they succeeded in doing in a series of very bloody battles, Borny, to the east of Metz, on August 14th; Mars-la-Tours, to the west, on August 16th; and Gravelotte, also to the west, on August 18th. The result was that Bazaine, with the principal French army, was bottled up in Metz, surrounded by Germans.

The Emperor, now fearing to return to Paris with these defeats undermining his throne, conceived the unwise plan of having MacMahon's army move from Châlons, eastward, to the relief of Metz. This it attempted but did not accomplish. On September 1st the battle of Sedan was fought, with the result that the French were surrounded by the Germans. On the next day, September 2nd, the French army surrendered to the Germans. Napoleon himself was taken prisoner of war. The French lost, on September 1st, about 17,000 in killed and wounded, and 21,000 captured by the enemy. On the 2nd over 81,000 officers and men surrendered and became prisoners of war.

Disasters so appalling resounded throughout the world. France no longer had an army; one had capitulated at Sedan; the other was locked up in Metz. The early defeats of August had been announced in Paris by the Government as victories. The deception could no longer be maintained. On September 3rd this despatch was received from the Emperor: "The army has been defeated and is captive; I myself am a prisoner." As a prisoner he was no longer head of the government of France; there was, as Thiers said, a "vacancy of power." On Sunday, September 4th, the Legislative Body was convened. But it had no time to deliberate. The mob invaded the hall shouting, "Down with the Empire! Long live the Republic!" Gambetta, Jules Favre and Jules Ferry, followed by the crowd, proceeded

to the Hôtel de Ville and there proclaimed the Republic. The Empress fled. A Government of National Defense was organized with General Trochu at its head, which was the actual government of France during the remainder of the war.

The Franco-German war lasted about six months, from the first of August 1870, when fighting began, to about the first of February 1871. It falls naturally into two periods, the imperial and the republican. During the first, which was limited to the month of August, the regular armies were, as we have seen, destroyed or bottled up. Then the Empire collapsed and the Emperor was a prisoner in Germany. The second period lasted five months. France, under the Government of National Defense, made a remarkably courageous and spirited defense under the most discouraging conditions.

The new Government of National Defense, thus improvised, and representing only a spontaneous movement of opinion, never legally sanctioned, was the government of France till the close of the war. It threw all the blame of the war on Napoleon, and declared itself ready for peace; only it would not consent to a peace involving the violation of the territory of France. "Not an inch of our soil will we cede," said Favre, "not a stone of our fortresses." As Germany intended annexations as a result of her victories, this utterance meant that the war must continue.

The Germans, leaving a sufficient army to carry on the siege of Metz, advanced toward Paris. They began the siege of that city on September 19th. The siege, one of the most famous in history, lasted four months, and astonished Europe. Immense stores had been collected in the city, the citizens were armed, and the defense was energetic. The Parisians hoped to hold out long enough to enable new armies to be organized, and diplomacy possibly to intervene. To accomplish the former a delegation from the Government of National Defense, headed by Gambetta, escaped from Paris by balloon, and established a branch seat of government first at Tours, then at Bordeaux. Gambetta, by his immense energy, his eloquence, his patriotism, was able to raise new armies, whose resistance astonished the Germans, but, as they had not time to be thoroughly trained, they were unsuccessful. They could not break the immense circle of iron that surrounded Paris. After the overthrow of the Empire the war was reduced to the siege of Paris, and the attempts of these improvised armies to break that siege. These attempts were rendered all the more hopeless by the fall of Metz (October 27, 1870). Six thousand officers and 173,000 men were forced by

impending starvation to surrender, with hundreds of cannon and immense war supplies, the greatest capitulation "recorded in the history of civilized nations." A month earlier, on September 28, Strasbourg had surrendered, and 19,000 soldiers had become prisoners of war.

The capitulation of Metz was particularly disastrous because it made possible the sending of more German armies to reinforce the siege of Paris, and to attack the forces which Gambetta was, by prodigies of effort, creating in the rest of France. These armies could not get to the relief of Paris, nor could the troops within Paris break through to them. The siege became simply a question of endurance.

The Germans began the bombardment of the city early in January. Certain sections suffered terribly, and were ravaged by fires. Famine stared the Parisians in the face. After November 20th there was no more beef or lamb to be had; after December 15th only thirty grammes of horse meat a day per person, which, moreover, cost about two dollars and a half a pound; after January 15th the amount of bread, a wretched stuff, was reduced to 300 grammes. People ate anything they could get, dogs, cats, rats. The market price for rats was two francs apiece. By the 31st of January, there would be nothing left to eat. Additional suffering arose from the fact that the winter was one of the coldest on record. Coal and fire wood were exhausted. Trees in the Champs Elysées and the Bois de Boulogne were cut down, and fires built in the public squares for the poor. Wine froze in casks. On January 28th, with famine almost upon her, Paris capitulated after an heroic resistance. The armistice of Versailles was concluded which really closed the war.

The armistice was designed to permit elections to be held throughout France for an assembly that should pronounce upon the question of peace. As peace would involve the cession of French territory to the victors, the Government of National Defense felt that the people of France should themselves decide a matter so vital. Elections were accordingly held on February 8, 1871. The peasants voted overwhelmingly for those favoring peace. As Gambetta, leader of the Republicans, favored war to the bitter end, they voted largely against the Republican candidates. Thus the first Assembly, elected under the Third Republic, was composed of a majority of Monarchists, divided into two wings, the Legitimists and the Orleanists, and a minority of Republicans. Only a handful of Bonapartists were chosen, so vast was the disgrace now attached to that name. The

Assembly met at Bordeaux, February 12th, and, believing that if France continued the war she might ultimately be annihilated, believing that the fundamental necessity of self-preservation demanded an immediate cessation, voted overwhelmingly for peace.

The Government of National Defense now laid down its powers, yielding to the National Assembly. This Assembly chose Thiers as "Chief of the Executive Power," and empowered him to negotiate with Bismarck for peace. The question of the permanent government of France was postponed until a more convenient season. Thiers was now the most popular man in France. He had, in July 1870, done his utmost to prevent France from going to war. He had, during the war, journeyed from one capital of Europe to another, London, St. Petersburg, Vienna, Florence, on a futile diplomatic mission, seeking to win foreign support for France. He was over seventy years of age, but he was about to render his most valuable services to France.

The terms of peace granted by Bismarck were extraordinarily severe. They were laid down in the preliminary Peace of Versailles, February 26, 1871. France must pay an indemnity of five thousand million francs (\$1,000,000,000) within three years. She must cede Alsace and a large part of Lorraine, including the important fortress of Metz. She was to support a German army of occupation, which should be gradually withdrawn as the installments of the war indemnity were paid. After much controversy these preliminaries were embodied in the final Treaty of Frankfort, signed May 10, 1871, and ratified by the Assembly of Bordeaux by 433 votes to 98.

Meanwhile other events had occurred as a result of this war. Italy had completed her unification by seizing the city of Rome, thus terminating the temporal rule of the Pope. The Pope had been supported there by a French garrison. This was withdrawn as a result of the battle of Sedan, and the troops of Victor Emmanuel attacked the Pope's own troops, defeated them after a slight resistance, and entered Rome on the 20th of September 1870. The unity of Italy was now consummated and Rome became the capital of the Kingdom.

A more important consequence of the war was the completion of the unification of Germany, and the creation of the German Empire. Bismarck had desired a war with France as necessary to complete the unity of Germany. Whether necessary or not, at least that end was now secured. After the early German victories, and during the siege of Paris, negotiations were carried on between Prussia and the South German states, looking

toward their entrance into the Confederation. In the case of Bavaria and Württemberg, states of considerable size, concessions had to be made, preserving to them certain powers not retained by the other states. Finally treaties were drawn up and the King of Bavaria, prompted and directed by Bismarck, urged the King of Prussia, in behalf of the princes, to assume the headship of united Germany, and to revive the Empire.

Finally on the 18th of January 1871, surrounded by the princes of Germany and by the generals of the army, King William I was proclaimed German Emperor. This memorable ceremony is one of the supreme ironies of history, as it occurred in the Hall of Mirrors, in the palace of Versailles, itself a mighty monument and symbol of the power and pride of Louis XIV, a power which had been secured to some extent by the humiliation of Germany.

The war of 1866 had resulted in the expulsion of Austria from Germany and from Italy. The war of 1870 completed the unification of both countries. Berlin became the capital of a federal Empire, Rome of a unified Kingdom.

CHAPTER XV

THE RISE OF SOCIALISM

ONE of the important forces in the modern world, Socialism, is the direct outgrowth of the Industrial Revolution. Only against the background of the factory system of industry can the various theories grouped under that name be properly examined. The factory system offered certain advantages which were undeniable and obvious, a greatly increased production of the commodities which men need or desire. Wealth increased rapidly through the greater power now exercised by man over the forces of nature. The improvements in manufacturing, in commerce and in communication were multifarious, astounding, far-reaching in the benefits they conferred. But along with these advantages went certain disadvantages, equally perceptible, equally serious, and also far-reaching in their effects. The development of the factory system meant the simultaneous development of the capitalist system, upon which, indeed, it rested. The new machines and factories were owned by one set of men, while those who utilized them and made them work constituted another set. Capitalists on the one hand, laborers on the other, such was the division in the world of industry, a world now split asunder into two elements of unequal strength. That fusion of capital and labor which had partially characterized the domestic system of industry, that essential solidarity of interest of all who participated in the work of production, did not characterize the new system, which emphasized, rather, the differences in status and in opportunity, of the directors of industry and of its manual laborers. The position of the former became more and more powerful and brilliant while that of the latter in many cases, and particularly at first, became harder and more depressing. The capitalists who built the factories and equipped them with machinery were anxious to make as large profits as possible, and in order to do this, they sacrificed the well-being and the health of their employees. The latter were obliged to have employment or they could not live, and they were forced therefore to accept whatever conditions and whatever wages were

offered them. The competition of the two factors in production, capital and labor, was most uneven, and the division of the product, of the wealth created only by the co-operation of the two, was also most unequal. On the one side the rapidly increasing wealth of the few; on the other the grinding toil of the laborer under new and harsh conditions, such was the situation. Life for the masses in the new industrial and mining centers was deadening, the outlook quite drab and hopeless.

Out of this contrast between the profits and opportunities offered by the factory system of large-scale production to the two component elements of that system, the owners and the laborers, arose that stream of thought which we call Socialism, a stream which, beginning feebly a century ago, has grown in volume and in force ever since. Socialism is the reply to capitalism of the disappointed and disillusioned employees of capitalism. As capitalism has gone on developing, so has Socialism, its counterpart and challenge. The steadily progressing Industrial Revolution has enormously stimulated the growth of each. Socialism in its origin was a cry of distress, a protest against conditions felt to be intolerable, a demand for justice in the economic sphere, as the French Revolution had been one in the political and social sphere.

It is not easy to define Socialism, because its representatives have themselves defined it differently at different times, and because, like any other growing thing, it has passed through various stages and has assumed Protean shapes. No hard and fast formulation, no precise and dogmatic definition of Socialism will be attempted here. But as a working definition enabling us to thread our way through the vast body of discussion, we may say that in contrast to the system of the private ownership of capital and of the means of production which prevailed a century ago, and which prevails to-day, Socialism demands their complete control by the community as a whole, by society in its entirety, in the interest of all the workers. Whether the changes which Socialism demands are likely to accomplish the ends aimed at, whether its theories are sound, whether the remedies which it recommends will cure the patient or will kill him, are questions which have been much discussed during the last half-century. Sufficient for the moment will be the study of the origins and the development of this new and significant school of thought and of some of the experiments in the art of social reform attempted by certain of its adherents. The conditions out of which the new theories emerged, the long process of criticism to which

those theories have been subjected by the zealots of the new philosophy themselves, the growing clarification of the issue between advocates and opponents will appear as we take up the careers of the prominent men who have been, at one time or another, identified with the progress of the movement, and as we seek to disengage their thought, to appraise their individual contributions to the cause.

One thing we meet at the outset. Socialism is a part of that passionate aspiration for freedom which has shown itself so unquenchable and so militant all through the modern period of history. Whether Socialists have added anything to the conception of human freedom, whether they have clarified or whether they have obscured that conception, whether Socialism means a larger freedom or the very negation of freedom, we will not now discuss. Certain it is that to the Socialists themselves the very question is preposterous, and can be answered only in one way.

The Industrial Revolution, by the evils which accompanied it, created the desire for their removal and thus started an agitation which has continued to this day, assuming many forms, enlisting the most diverse types of men, provoking a profusion of suggestions and panaceas, many of which have not been brought forward in vain, however inadequate all have been to solve the immense and complex problem. One type of man who has never rested since the first appearance of the abuses described above has been the reformer, generally denounced by his enemies as radical, and often radical in fact, who, sensitive to the iniquities of the existing social order, has aimed to remove them by an appeal to the sentiments of justice. Such men were Jeremy Bentham and James Mill and John Stuart Mill and many others, in England and in other countries, men who had no desire to disturb the system of private property, to see the state owning or controlling the means of production, but who thought that the inequalities and injustices created by existing institutions could be remedied or removed by measures, drastic, if need be, and yet not subversive of the existing organization of society which, with all its defects, contains too many excellences to be lightly sacrificed. This type of reformer has accomplished wonders since the eighteenth century. The imprint of his thought and action is to be seen everywhere and is often very deep. His has been a noble and very fruitful record of varied reform in the institutions and the modes of thought and feeling of the modern age. We shall see him at work everywhere in Europe, with varying success, as we proceed with the histories of

the different countries. He has contributed, without doubt, an important share to the increasing prosperity and power of the working classes.

But the nineteenth century produced another class of social reformers, revolutionary, not radical, in their outlook and their aim, insisting upon widespread and fundamental alteration of existing institutions. These men came early to be known as Socialists. The Industrial Revolution gave rise to Socialism, a doctrine which is hailed as a universal and final panacea for the evils of the economic world and, also, of society in all its departments. The reformers of the class first mentioned were in general highly individualistic in their philosophy and did not at all desire to magnify the rôle of the state in industry. The reformers of the latter class, the Socialists, on the other hand, would bring about the golden age by enormously magnifying the rôle of the state, by placing it at the very center of things, by making it the supreme director and inspirer of all economic activity, the manager-in-chief of society, its pilot or helmsman or guide or driver, as the case might be, in short the regulator of social evolution.

It is said that the man first to use the word socialism was Robert Owen (1771-1858), a Welshman endowed with many of the brilliant qualities of the Celt, a man who combined great practical ability with an ardent desire to improve the conditions of his fellowmen. The son of a saddler and ironmonger, Owen's schooling was poor and brief, being over when he was but nine years old. At the age of nineteen he became manager of a cotton mill in Manchester, which employed about five hundred people. Such was his talent for business that he made money rapidly and became one of the most successful manufacturers in England. But unlike most other manufacturers of the time he was not content with the mere acquisition of riches. A man of intelligence, a careful observer, he saw the evils of the factory system in all their harshness and crudity, though he himself had greatly profited by that system. Removing later to New Lanark, where he continued his business activity, he became increasingly absorbed in the problem of the poor and helpless. He became a social reformer. The condition of the workingmen revolted him, their interminably long hours of labor, the deadly drudgery of their lives, their lack of education, their cramped, wretched, unsanitary habitations, most families occupying but a single room, the prevalence among them of drunkenness and vice. He saw also the dreadful evils of child labor. Believing that men

are what their environment makes them, and hating this particular environment with deep and abiding hatred, he resolved to change it and change it he did, utterly. Such was his driving power, such his wisdom and enthusiasm, that New Lanark was made over and became a model factory town, with clean and healthy workrooms, decent homes, excellent schools for the children, a co-operative store where the laborers could buy the things they needed at nearly cost prices, and with societies designed to provide pensions for sickness and old age. The age at which children might be employed was raised from five to ten and Owen wished to raise the limit still further. During a business crisis he continued to pay the wages of his employees, temporarily thrown out of work. His operatives became self-respecting, intelligent and contented, the relations between employer and employees were always characterized by the best of feeling, and the business continued to prosper and to flourish. New Lanark was a shining evidence of what unselfishness, combined with ability, could accomplish for the betterment of a community. It became a place of pilgrimage for those interested in social reform.

Had all manufacturers shown the inclination or ability to follow in the footsteps of Robert Owen, Socialism might never have been heard of. Its appearance would at any rate have been long postponed. But that was not to be. The bulk of them continued to fix their entire attention on merely making money, paying no attention to the shocking conditions that existed among the laboring class, and Owen, seeing that there was no hope in them, denounced them, and the factory system as well, with burning indignation. If the manufacturers would not reform that system, then the state ought to. Such was his opinion.

Having made a success of New Lanark, Owen's career now widened out. He devoted the rest of his life to social reform, writing books and making experiments to that end. He would have been willing to have the necessary reforms come from above, from the manufacturers themselves, as those which had transformed New Lanark had come autocratically from himself. But when he saw the unbending selfishness of the manufacturers he turned more and more toward the laborers themselves as the element that must accomplish their own salvation. His ideas became, properly speaking, more socialistic. But at a time when he seemed to be gaining the attention of the country he went out of his way, quite unnecessarily, to offend it by declaring

his hostility to all the received forms of religion, thus damaging his cause and discrediting his ideas with large numbers of his fellow-citizens.

Robert Owen lived till 1858. Pessimistic about the chances of a widespreading or speedy reform in England, he came to America in 1825 in order to establish, in a supposedly more favorable atmosphere, a community so organized as to test his matured theories of social organization. His experiment at New Harmony, Indiana, failed after two or three years, and Owen returned to England impoverished. He spent the rest of his life expounding his ideas, through lectures, pamphlets and books. In 1835 he founded a society with a pompous title, "The Association of all Classes of all Nations," and it was in the discussions of this body that the word socialism seems to have been first launched upon its eventful career.

Robert Owen, says one writer, "was essentially a pioneer, whose work and influence it would be unjust to measure by their tangible results. Apart from his socialistic theories, it should, nevertheless, be remembered that he was one of the foremost and most energetic promoters of many movements of acknowledged and enduring usefulness. He was the founder of infant schools in England; he was the first to introduce reasonably short hours into factory labor, and zealously promoted factory legislation — one of the most needed and most beneficial reforms of the century; and he was the real founder of the co-operative movement. In general education, in sanitary reform, in his sound and humanitarian views of common life, he was far in advance of his time."¹

If Owen may be considered the founder of English Socialism, Saint-Simon was the founder of Socialism in France. Owen was a business man who had been aroused by direct contact with the evils of the factory system to attempt their removal. Very successful within his own immediate sphere at New Lanark he failed in his larger aims, owing to certain serious defects of character and thought, and also owing to the fact that social reorganization is not the comparatively simple thing he considered it, but the most complex and difficult thing on earth. Count Henri de Saint-Simon (1760-1825) was a very different type of person. A member of an old and famous family which has given many men of note to France, including that Duke de Saint-Simon whose memoirs of the Court of Louis XIV are among the treasures of French historical literature; claiming also de-

¹ Kirkup, *History of Socialism*, 69-70:

scient from no less a person than Charlemagne, Count Henri was the heir of ancient and aristocratic traditions, traditions which had, however, no hold upon his mind. He was educated under the direction of d'Alembert, the philosopher and Encyclopedist. As a youth of nineteen he came to America to aid the revolutionists in their fight against England. A man of very active mind he devoted his life to study and writing on scientific, political, and social subjects. During his later years he was reduced to the greatest distress, once, in despair, attempting suicide.

Saint-Simon as a thinker was not systematic nor always clear but he was fertile in ideas, ingenious in plans for social reform, and he exercised a considerable influence upon a small body of young and able men, who were attracted by the generous and benevolent character of his teachings. A profound student of science and of history, he wished to reorganize the world in accordance with the lessons to be learned from them. The future, he held, will belong to "the industrial state," that is, the exploitation of the globe by the material, intellectual and moral activity of men associated together. The new society will be dominated and directed, not by hereditary aristocratic or military classes, but by the intellectual élite, by savants, who alone will possess the necessary knowledge for the regular, scientific, fraternal utilization of the opportunities offered by nature. They alone will be capable of abolishing evil, of suppressing that individualism, that competitive spirit which creates social misery and ruin, that antagonism between states which creates wars, they alone capable of bringing all men together in associated labor. Humanity, organized and directed by them, will attain social happiness and prosperity.

Though Saint-Simon's was a Utopian scheme, no doubt, yet its modern character, as distinguished from other Utopian schemes of social reconstruction, is apparent. It advocated an industrial state directed by modern science. "Every human institution ought to aim at the physical and moral improvement of the most numerous and poorest class; society ought to be organized in the way best adapted for attaining this end."

This became the watchword for the entire school of Saint-Simon, for the master left behind him, when he died, a group of ardent disciples who continued to advocate his principles while at the same time expounding and clarifying them for the general public, such men as Bazard and Enfantin and Pierre Leroux. Some of these abandoned the cult as they grew older,

and the moral and intellectual excesses of some of them tended to discredit it. But Saint-Simonism long remained a fructifying influence in the world of thought. The school as a school, however, was soon torn by internal dissensions and disappeared.

The imagination of Saint-Simon saw farther than that of many of the bourgeoisie. In 1825 it correctly appraised the significance of the railroad, just being invented. This invention, wrote Saint-Simon, will bring about a great revolution in society: "With an ease and rapidity of communication so great, the provincial cities of an empire will become so many suburbs of the capital. Commodities, inventions, discoveries, opinions will circulate with a speed hitherto unknown, and, above all, the relations of men, of provinces, of nations with each other will be prodigiously increased." ✓

Another Frenchman who was struck with the evils of the existing economic system and who elaborated a plan for their cure was Charles Fourier (1772-1837). Fourier's scheme took the commune, or what he called a phalanstery, as the industrial and social unit, a unit comprising about fifteen hundred persons who were to live and work together and share together the product of their toil. Fourier declared that the true foundation of society lay in the spirit of harmony. For his new system he therefore appealed to this spirit. Give every individual the opportunity for self-expression which he instinctively craves and social relations will become harmonious, peaceful, happy. The individual should engage in whatever work he likes, should leave it when he likes and should then take up something more to his taste. Ultimately he will find his perfect niche in society, the kind of work which will be most in harmony with his inclinations and qualities. Such, very summarily stated, were some of Fourier's ideas.

Fourier's scheme was fanciful enough and most shaky in its psychological foundations, grossly underestimating the force of human egotism. But so fervently did its author believe in it that for years he made it a point to be at home every day at noon to receive any rich capitalist who might appear to offer him the means for its realization. The rich man never came, but experiments were made, here and there, more or less according to the new principles. All of these experiments were short-lived, including one in America, at Brook Farm, about ten miles out of Boston, an experiment which had originally grown out of the transcendental movement, and which included among its members at various times George Ripley, George William Curtis,

Father Hecker, Nathaniel Hawthorne and others. Transformed into a "phalanx" in 1845, it disappeared in 1847.

All these men, Owen, Saint-Simon, Fourier and their followers, planned for an entirely new social order. But their plans were in part so fantastic, in part such imperfect analyses of both human nature and the nature of human society, that they were for those very reasons predestined to failure. Moreover, their attacks on religion and the family rendered them suspect or odious in the eyes of many who might otherwise have been influenced by their purely humanitarian ideas. Their teachings and their experiments proved that what is essential for the social reformer, who would substitute a new world for an old one, is a sound and accurate knowledge of human nature and of the laws of social evolution as revealed to us by history. Otherwise he builds upon shifting sands, sands which will speedily engulf his temerarious creations. And the science of human nature, as John Ruskin has somewhere pointed out, has to deal with many very subtle elements.

The writings of Owen, Saint-Simon and Fourier were inspired by industrial discontent, by the evils attendant upon the introduction in greater and greater degree of the large-scale system of production. The same conditions also inspired two movements, in England and in France, which aimed at fundamental changes in politics and industry, Chartism in the former country and the Socialism associated particularly with the name of Louis Blanc in the latter. Both these movements are described elsewhere.¹ Both advocated political as well as social reform, necessarily, since in neither state did the working people have any voice in the government, in neither was education assured them, in neither were their interests seriously considered. The workingmen felt that only by attaining political power, by gaining the franchise, could they possibly secure any improvement in their conditions. But, while they advocated certain political measures as the only means to enfranchisement from intolerable burdens, the thing they had most at heart was the removal of those burdens themselves and such a change in social institutions that they could never be restored. The prevalent poverty and social misery of the masses was at the bottom of both movements.

Both movements reached their climax in 1848, when they received such blows that they never recovered. But they left their traces behind them. Particularly in England had one of the greatest literary figures of the nineteenth century, an incompa-

^a See pp. 127-129, 426-428.

nable master of English prose, been aroused to fever heat by the sight of the suffering of the English masses, and had expressed his wrath with every accent of sarcasm, invective, satire, humor and pathos. Like an avenging god, Thomas Carlyle, on fire with a passionate sense of the wickedness of men and their institutions, played about him right and left with every literary weapon in a singularly capacious and well-stored armory. According to the mood of the moment he used the Damascus blade or the bludgeon, the battering ram or the bowie-knife, in his furious attempt to damage and disfigure those whom he held responsible for the flagrant evils all about him. Those who wish to see how this gladiator worked and the character of his assault have only to read his book on *Chartism*, his *Past and Present* and the frenzied *Latter-Day Pamphlets*, the first of which appeared in 1839, the last in 1850, when the battle was over, having apparently been lost, and which he wrote, he said, "after a period of deep gloom and bottomless dubitation." Carlyle was no patient and careful student but a man of terrific moods and Olympian exaggerations and in his *Latter-Day Pamphlets* he seemed to renounce in fury much that he had said in the earlier two volumes. But with all his limitations and idiosyncracies, with all his stormy, tumultuous haste, and his palpable contradictions, he was, as one writer has said, "the strongest influence toward socialism, in the wide sense of the word, among English writers of the nineteenth century, the first great writer to appreciate the supremacy of the social question and to burn it into the public conscience by eloquence and profound conviction."¹ He was a voice crying in the wilderness, not a still, small voice, far from it, but a strident trumpet call, or, to change the figure, a volcano in eruption, fulgurous and incinerating. Having no faith in pretentious panaceas, in schemes of swift regeneration, in sentimental and doctrinaire idealism, he was, however, a rude and rampant disturber of English complacency and cant, of the optimism of those who thought that because England was growing daily richer, all was well with Englishmen. A master of diatribe and tirade Carlyle shook the earth and made the welkin ring.

But another gladiator of a very different build and very differently accoutred had just entered the arena of social and economic discussion. Just as Chartism was being snuffed out in England under the vigilant and lowering eye of the Duke of Wellington, assisted by Louis Napoleon Bonaparte and innumer-

¹ Marvin, F. S., *The Century of Hope*, 109.

able other constables and supporters of the existing order; just as Louis Blanc and all his works, putative and genuine, were being suppressed in France, and just as Carlyle was retiring from the scene of social controversy, soured by the futile sentimentality of light-weight reformers and the bovine stodginess of conservatives and reactionaries, another figure was stepping forth into the light and demanding the attention of the audience while he expounded an idea which had been maturing in his brain, namely that the state of the world was rotten and must be radically altered. The new critic, destined to great fame and influence, was a German, whereas the reformers we have thus far mentioned were Englishmen and Frenchmen. If one is interested in the psychology of peoples one may find in this fact an inviting field for study and reflection.

Karl Marx (1818-1883) was of Jewish origin. He was born in 1818 in the city of Treves. His father was a lawyer. Both parents were cultivated people who renounced Judaism and accepted Christianity, at the same time changing the family name from that of Mordechai to Marx. Young Marx was given a good education. He studied at the universities of Bonn and Berlin and was especially interested in philosophy and history. He fell under the influence of Hegel, then at the height of his celebrity as the leading philosopher of Germany. In 1841 Marx won his doctor's degree with an essay on the philosophy of Epicurus. He had intended to settle at Bonn as a teacher of philosophy but abandoned this idea and entered journalism. For a short time he worked on the *Rhenish Gazette*, a democratic paper published in Cologne, but he shortly removed to Paris, where he gave himself ardently to the study of the subjects that interested him most, economics and history. In Paris he came into contact with socialists of the Saint-Simonian type and with other radical thinkers, like Proudhon. He knew Heinrich Heine, then an exile, and became acquainted with Frederick Engels (1820-95), destined to be his life-long friend and most intimate co-worker. Like himself, Engels was of Jewish origin, and like himself, was absorbed in economic studies. Unlike Marx, Engels possessed a direct and practical knowledge of the condition of laborers under the factory system, having been connected for some time with a cotton mill in Manchester. The two men were henceforth inseparable, collaborating in research and agitation for nearly forty years.

In 1845 Marx was expelled from France and settled in Brussels, where he spent three years. He gave up his Prussian

citizenship and henceforth was a man without a country, since he never sought naturalization elsewhere. In 1845 Engels published a book on *The Condition of the Working Class in England*. Two years later Marx published a severe criticism of the theories of Proudhon, at that time one of the most prominent of European radicals. In 1848 appeared a document destined to be famous, the *Communist Manifesto*, written by Marx and Engels, which expressed for the first time and most effectively a new and revolutionary form of socialism, that form which the world has been discussing ever since.

In 1848 Marx returned to Germany for a short time, revolutions having broken out in that country, and edited a socialist newspaper in Cologne. This activity was soon interrupted, however, and he was expelled from the country. In 1849 he settled in London, which was to be his home henceforth until his death in 1883. He supported himself as best he could, mainly by writing articles for whatever newspapers would accept them, among which was the *New York Tribune*, edited by Horace Greeley, who was interested in the ideas of Fourier. Living very simply, and often in the severest financial straits, he devoted himself, day in and day out, to historical, economic, philosophical research of the most intense kind. The result of his investigations was a *Criticism of Political Economy*, published in 1859, and the first volume of his great work on *Capital* which appeared in 1867. After his death in 1883 the other two volumes of this famous treatise were published by Engels from manuscripts left by Marx. This monumental work became and has remained the Bible of Socialists the word over. Like the Bible, it has had a multitude of commentators and interpreters, "orthodox" and "heterodox." It has been the object of the most unbounded admiration and of severe and damaging criticism. During the past thirty years many of its most important features have been rejected by many able Socialists, as based upon false assumptions or reasoning, or upon inadequate and partial researches. It is in itself a controversial book of the most pronounced kind and has provoked memorable and bitter discussion, which shows few signs of subsiding. Claiming to prove the bankruptcy of the previous science of political economy, it pretends to establish in its place a political economy that is truly "scientific," as scientific, as comprehensive and irrefutable as the physics of Sir Isaac Newton or the biology of Charles Darwin. It has had, however, a far greater success as a work of popular propaganda, in which aspect, indeed, few books in history have surpassed or

equalled it, than it has had as a revelation of pure and final truth in the realm of economics and history.

Let us examine some of the most significant and characteristic of Marx's teachings, as set forth in the *Communist Manifesto* and *Capital*. Marx asserted that his brand of socialism was *scientific*, that is, was a presentation of certain immutable laws. He made short shrift of the socialistic theories of his predecessors which he declared "utopian." He treated with contempt all their schemes for a perfect social organization. The future state is not to be the product of the intellectual ingenuity or imagination of any man, however able; is not, like a great poem or a great work of art, something to be created, if only you have sufficient talent. The socialistic state is not to be the device of some gifted reformer. The future is determined by the past, is the inevitable, ineluctable product of certain forces operating in the world, the product of economic tendencies, and these tendencies are as irresistible as is the law of gravitation. These tendencies determine pitilessly the course of events. Amateurs, framing ideal plans of economic and social reorganization, are no more serious than children blowing soap-bubbles, which are often very beautiful but which are quite hollow and unsubstantial. The problem confronting the serious man is not, by taking thought, to elaborate the future order of the world, but is solely the study of the forces which are at work to-day among men and which will in the fulness of time create that order, whether he likes it or not. It is the business of the investigator to discover laws, not to prescribe panaceas.

Where do you find these laws? In history. Marxian socialism, differing so widely from all preceding so-called socialism, rests, as Engels says, upon one "fundamental proposition," namely the economic interpretation of history. "In every historic epoch," so runs the preface to the *Communist Manifesto*, "the prevailing mode of economic production and exchange, and the social organization necessarily following from it, form the basis upon which is built up, and from which alone can be explained, the political and intellectual history of that epoch." In other words, economic conditions have determined the entire course of history, and history is but the record of economic conditions and the institutions and ideas to which they have given birth. Not only do the methods of production and distribution constitute the economic life, but they are the chief factors in determining every other part of life as well. Our political and social institutions, our religious conceptions and emotions, our stand-

ards of morality, our philosophies and literatures, our sciences, our bodies of law, all are inspired, shaped and fashioned and explained by the prevalent economic process. This is the famous economic or materialistic interpretation of history about which Socialists are so confident. It is to them the only safe key, indeed, the only possible key to history. It is the open sesame to knowledge, and there is no other. It is this which renders Marxian socialism "scientific."

Taking hold of this key and turning it, what do we learn in regard to the past? This, that "the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles. Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master and journeyman, in a word oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted fight, now hidden, now open, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstruction of society at large or in the common ruin of the contesting classes." History is but the progressive record of this desperate and destructive struggle of classes. The more it changes the more it is the same thing. The class struggle of to-day, which is to be the final one, is that between employers and laborers, between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat; in other words between those who own the instruments of production, the capitalists, and those who, in order to live, are compelled to accept whatever conditions the capitalists impose. Such are the modern "exploiters" and "exploited"; such the struggle which is now going on, the result of which is not in doubt, is inevitable and will be revolutionary. As the bourgeoisie defeated the old feudal and aristocratic class and then installed itself in its place, so the proletariat will dethrone the bourgeoisie and rule in its stead. Then will disappear the bourgeois system of law and government, bourgeois morality and religion, all so many "prejudices" — which is merely another word for economic "interests."

But there have been class conflicts in the past which grew and waxed for a time and then waned and faded away. What reason is there for supposing that this particular "class struggle" will become steadily more and more tense and acute and will finally end in revolution? The reason is that "capitalistic production" has two inevitable, unvarying tendencies, greater and greater concentration of wealth in the hands of fewer and fewer people, and greater and greater misery for the wage-earners, the "exploited." Capitalists will become fewer and fewer and richer and richer as the big ones swallow up the little. The laboring class,

that is, the proletariat, will become larger and larger, as many small capitalists, small farmers and merchants, lawyers, doctors, teachers, the professional people in general, in other words, the middle classes, unable to hold their own with "big capital," will be driven down and down until they land in the proletariat. When you get society divided not into several classes but only into two, and those two sharply differentiated by increasing wealth and increasing misery, then there can be only one outcome, a social revolution. The vast majority of men will not be content to remain forever the wretched tools of a small and selfish minority, controlling all the means of production, that is, holding the veritable keys of life and death. They will, when that intolerable moment has been reached, rise in their wrath, overthrow their oppressors, and themselves take control of the instruments of production. On this point the *Manifesto* of 1848 speaks with its accustomed energy and clarity: "All previous historical movements were movements of minorities, in the interest of minorities. The proletarian movement is the self-conscious, independent movement of the immense majority. The proletariat, the lowest stratum of our present society, cannot stir, cannot raise itself without the whole superincumbent stratum of official society being blown into the air." As the capitalistic method of production is responsible for this situation, it may be said that "what the bourgeoisie therefore produces, above all, are its own grave-diggers. Its fall and the victory of the proletariat are inevitable."

Capitalism is therefore finally hoist with its own petard, or to quote another Marxian phrase, "the expropriators are expropriated." "Let the ruling classes tremble at a communistic revolution," says the meaty *Manifesto*. "The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win." If the struggle in which such tremendous things are at stake cannot be otherwise won no quarter is to be given. The year after the appearance of the *Manifesto*, Marx wrote: "We are ruthless and want no consideration from you [the bourgeoisie]; when our turn comes, revolutionary terrorism will not be sugar-coated. . . . There is but one way of simplifying, shortening, concentrating the death agony of the old society, as well as the bloody labor of the new world's birth—revolutionary Terror"—a phrase which Russian Bolsheviks were to recall seventy years later.

Such are the three basic principles of Marxian Socialism, the economic or materialistic interpretation of history, the class

struggle, and the inevitable social revolution. There are also two or three other principles or theories which cannot be examined here in this brief summary, such as the theory of surplus value, and of recurring economic crises declared to be inherent in the present economic system. Another cardinal teaching of Marx is that the economic movement which he is describing is not national, but international. The laborers of a given country have far more in common with the laborers of other countries, than they have with the capitalists of their own. All Socialists are brothers, whereas not all Germans or Frenchmen or Americans are. All are "comrades." Class interests have precedence over national interests. The proletarian has no country, only a birthplace. "Workingmen of All Countries, Unite!", such are the closing words of the *Manifesto* of 1848.

How has this elaborate and imposing body of thought called Marxian Socialism fared at the hands of critics and at the hands of time? It may be said at once that if Socialism depended solely upon the truth of the principles which have been stated it would long ago have lost all force, for those principles have been riddled and disproved by an army of competent critics, including many Socialists themselves. And the lapse of time has not been kind to those so-called tendencies which were to lead to the complete collapse of capitalism. Marx's "truths" have turned out to be only half-truths, or truths for the time being, or no truths at all. His fundamental doctrine of the economic interpretation of history, while useful in inciting much fruitful investigation into the economic aspects of history, is woefully inadequate as an explanation of all history. Economic cause and effect have been important in the past, without question, but they do not suffice to reveal the whole story. The history of mankind is the history of the entire life of man on this earth, and that is a very complicated matter to which there is no single key. Life is much more than meat and much more than raiment, and no materialistic philosophy can explain it or adequately account for its immensely varied phenomena. The economic interpretation of history is a gross exaggeration. You cannot explain the action of the race during all past history, or during a century or two, or even during the present moment, by the magic of any single formula or rule. Marx claimed that his system was rigorously "scientific," to be forever distinguished from the "utopianism" of the systems of his socialistic predecessors. But the scientist does not get very far in postulating his laws, if he ignores or misconceives many of the elements in-

volved. Many other motives or instincts operate upon men besides the economic, and often these others act, in fact, in direct opposition to the economic. There are racial characteristics, religious and patriotic motives, the fighting instinct, the dynamic power of exceptional individuals, attested by all history, the influence of traditions and of customs, the power of eloquence inspiring the most surprising actions, the responsiveness of the masses to this or that suggestion, or "mob psychology," if you prefer a rather disobliging term, — all these and many other factors have gone into the making of history and it is the difficult business of the historian to analyze them and to show their relative contributions to any given period in man's evolution. No historian can for a moment claim to be scientific who ascribes all the phenomena of the past to the operations of one force, of one of the interests of men, of one of the aspects of his nature. He can be propagandist or sectarian, if he proceeds thus, but never scientific. It is highly useful and desirable to study economic history but it is also useful and desirable to preserve one's intellectual balance in so doing. Marx, himself, did not preserve this necessary balance. There is danger in positing the future upon a single category of tendencies, as did Marx, for if time proves that those tendencies were merely temporary, then your forecast of the end toward which they are verging, will prove an embarrassment to yourself. And this is what has happened to Karl Marx.

The theories of Karl Marx are based upon certain tendencies which their author observed and which he assumed would continue to persist until the great revolutionary change should occur. But in social matters it is hazardous to make so colossal an assumption as this. Society is likely to react against tendencies which it finds injurious. In other words tendencies develop counter-tendencies and this is what has happened in this instance with a result very damaging to the idea of the inevitability of social revolution.

"Every tendency," says Professor Simkhovitch, "that Marx and Engels confided in has been checked, retarded, deflected, or reversed. Industry has not concentrated to any such extent as the fathers of scientific socialism expected. Agriculture shows tendencies towards decentralization. The concentration of wealth and proletarianization of the middle class has proved a fable; and moderate incomes are steadily increasing in number. The idea of the growing misery of the proletariat is abandoned in view of facts that prove the opposite; the class struggle, instead

of increasing, is as a whole diminishing. Commercial crises, that were to increase till they destroyed like an earthquake our whole industrial organization, are admittedly abating their fury. . . . What interests us is the fact that it is not our industrial society but the Marxian theory that has broken down.”¹

But despite this fact that most of the theories upon which Marx based his “scientific” Socialism have been discredited by the criticism which they have encountered, despite the fact that they have been rejected by many thoughtful Socialists themselves, such as Bernstein and the so-called Revisionists, nevertheless the Socialist movement has grown greatly and constantly since Marx first sounded his call to arms, Socialist parties exist in all countries, the Socialist vote is everywhere an appreciable factor in politics and in many countries a very weighty factor. How is this phenomenal growth to be explained in view of the fact that the theories of the school have proved so vulnerable?

This explanation lies in the fact that Socialism has been, apart from all theories, the severest critic of existing conditions, that it has pointed out concretely, repeatedly and unsparingly the evils and defects of the present industrial system, that it has studied and dilated upon every aspect of that most formidable and most complex problem of the relations of capital and labor. Society as it is, being the product of the industrial revolution, has persistently demanded reform, to conform to enlightened standards of justice and humanity. The Socialists are not the only ones to see the needs of the situation. All through the nineteenth century social reformers of many kinds have been at work and have, in sum, accomplished extraordinary results. But the Socialists have from the start had a better organization, and a definite and comprehensive plan, confidently advertised as ensuring the best means of escape from existing abuses. Moreover Socialists have directed their appeal directly to the masses and they have had a wide response. A theory does not need to be sound, a plan does not need to be practicable, in order to appeal to those who suffer or are dissatisfied. The history of error has always been a considerable part of the history of mankind. Moreover it should not be supposed that all those who, in different countries, vote the Socialist ticket are Socialists. Many voters plump for Socialist candidates merely as an emphatic way of expressing their discontent with other parties, or merely as a protest against certain abuses which those parties will not tackle. But, however this may be, and however large

¹ Simkhovitch, *Marxism versus Socialism*, 239.

the deductions must be, the rise and development of socialistic parties and of international socialism are subjects of the first importance in recent history.

Another feature of the philosophy of Karl Marx, namely, its international character, ought to be mentioned. This was openly proclaimed in the *Manifesto* of 1848: "Proletarians of all lands, unite!" Such was the watchword. Laborers were the largest element of the population in every country and success was assured them if they should only work together. In union would they find the necessary strength. Sixteen years after the announcement of this necessity, there was founded in London (1864) "The International Association of Working Men," now called the First International. The entrance of Socialism into politics is a fact of the first importance, within both the national and the international field. The International Association was founded for the purpose of co-ordinating and systematizing the operations of Socialistic societies, groups, parties everywhere. The labor problem was declared to be not a local nor a national problem but an international one. Numbers, as Marx told the workingmen, were on their side, but could only be made effective by union, and the union must transcend national boundaries. The International, as organized in London, was to have a General Council on which each nation was to be represented. This Council was to summon annual congresses, and was to stimulate and correlate as far as possible the efforts of the local societies and the national parties, whenever and wherever they should arise, was to serve as a clearing house of information and suggestion. It was to be a generator of energy, an organizer of propaganda, Socialism in action. It adopted the Marxian economic theories and was pledged to their advocacy everywhere. It inspired alarm in the minds of the governing classes in various countries, who saw in it the possibility of a general uprising of the laboring classes. The congress called to meet in Brussels in 1865 was forbidden by the Belgian government. After that a congress was held every year, usually in Switzerland. In its pronouncements the International became more and more revolutionary. Each succeeding congress added something in the line of defining the Socialistic position.

The International had on the whole a considerable success in educating the opinion of workingmen. Its membership was, however, never very large, its financial resources were slight. It was motley in composition, composed of radicals of various strains who harmonized none too well. Indeed its history was

signalized by a series of internal struggles for control, the chief of which was that between Marx and Bakunin, a Russian refugee who believed in anarchy and who wished to commit the International to the support of his theories. Here was a clash of two programmes, the collectivism of Marx and the anarchy of Bakunin, and a clash of two policies, Marx's policy of legal political action, Bakunin's of violence. In the end the anarchists were expelled.

Attacked from without, and torn within by rival factions, the International did not last long. It was really a society for the propagation of doctrine. It gave Marx a pulpit and a trumpet with which to address the world of labor. But the nationalism of the period, a period which was witnessing the unification of Italy and Germany, was unfavorable to the spread of a philosophy of internationalism. Moreover Karl Marx himself gave it a serious blow by his laudation of the Paris Commune of 1871: "The Paris of the workers, with its Commune, will ever be celebrated as the glorious herald of a new society. Its martyrs will be enshrined in the great heart of the working class. History has already nailed its destroyers on the pillory, from which all the prayers of their priests are impotent to deliver them."

The final congress of the International was held in 1873, and three years later the association was formally declared dissolved. While it had accomplished no positive results in legislation it had rendered familiar to large numbers of the working classes the thought that their problems and interests were international in character and could only be solved by the co-operation of the workers of all countries. This thought was destined to live on in such circles, circles ever widening. The International also started the ideas of Marx on their tour of the world. The progress of Socialism, however, was to be achieved, not through it, but, most strikingly, through the development of compact, aggressive Socialist political parties within the different states. The first of these and the most important, in itself and in its outside influence, was the Social Democratic Party of Germany. The preliminary work had been done, the socialistic dogmas had been defined. That had been the work of Marx. Organization and agitation along national lines only remained, and these were in process of formation during the years when the International was trying its futile experiment with an international Socialist party.

While the International was engaged in this attempt to found

a great international Socialist party which should unite the laborers of all countries under a common banner and a central authority, an attempt that proved futile and short-lived, there was being formed in Germany a nationalist Socialist party, which, by reason of its able and resourceful leadership, its supple and effective organization, its trenchant and vigorous programme, was destined to an extraordinary growth, until in the course of time it became the largest party in Germany, having also served, meanwhile, as a model for the Socialists of other countries. This party was founded by Ferdinand Lassalle, a man whose career was as brilliant and sensational as it was brief and energetic.

Like Marx, the founder of International Socialism, Lassalle, the founder of National Socialism, was of Jewish extraction. The son of prosperous parents, he was given the best opportunities for education, which, moreover, he utilized to the full. His father, a rich Breslau merchant, intended him for a business career, but as business was not at all to his taste, the young man gave himself up to the prosecution of his favorite studies, philology and philosophy, at the universities of Breslau and Berlin. Having completed his university work he went to Paris, where he made the acquaintance of his lyrical and witty fellow-countryman, the poet Heine. Heine, in giving him a letter of introduction to certain literary circles in Berlin, paints the young man as a person of the most remarkable gifts, who combines great knowledge with great acuteness, and altogether exceptional powers of expression with practical ability and driving force. Heine added that Lassalle was highly modern, a typical representative of the new age, quite lacking in all modesty and revealing no talent for self-denial.

In Berlin Lassalle was well received and made many acquaintances in the literary and political and university world. He was pronounced a *Wunderkind*, a miraculous child, by no less illustrious person than William von Humboldt. In Berlin he made the acquaintance of the Countess Hatzfeldt, whose husband was wasting his fortune in profligate living and leaving her in penury. Lassalle, like a true knight errant, believing the lady outrageously wronged, offered his services, fell to studying law, fought the case through thirty-six courts during nine years, brought the faithless Count to terms and won an ample fortune for the Countess. This long-drawn-out trial, one of the most extraordinary of the nineteenth century, had its element of scandal but it made the name of Lassalle known throughout Germany.

The spirit of revolt was in this man's blood. Taking part in the revolutionary movement of 1848 he had been sentenced to six months' imprisonment for having incited workingmen to acts of violence. Thus by the time he was twenty-three he was known as a champion of the laboring classes. For many years he was not allowed to reside in Berlin because of his participation in the events of 1848, but in 1859, he dared to enter that city disguised as a cart-driver, and, through the influence of Humboldt with the King, was finally allowed to remain. Plunging into the constitutional struggle, which shortly broke out between Bismarck and the Liberals of the Prussian Chamber, he advocated a cause represented by neither party in that famous quarrel, the cause of the workingmen. Lassalle was now launched upon that brief, agitated, pyrotechnical career as advanced democrat and radical social reformer which was to constitute his claim to a distinct place in history. By his facile pen, by his impassioned eloquence, by his extraordinary argumentative power, by the magnetism of his personality, by his boldness and his feverish activity, he impressed himself upon his age and started an agitation which has not yet stopped.

A curious leader for the poor, the world's disinherited! A man of fashion, sybaritic in his tastes and with plenty of money to satisfy those tastes, a connoisseur of wines, an amazing conversationalist, with the halo of successful authorship about him, this champion of the toiling masses gave the most brilliant dinners in Berlin, dinners which were the talk of the town. As vain as he was ambitious, he bragged unconscionably, saying, among other things, that in every line he wrote he was armed with the whole culture of his century. There was a streak of vulgarity and much that was theatrical in this man, who in 1864 tossed away his life in a wretched duel, born of a frenzied love-affair, and thus ended a most promising career.

But before he died he had left his mark on history. An unrivalled controversialist, an indefatigable worker, an agitator who knew no fear and who never rested on his oars, he conceived his mission to be to arouse the workingmen of Germany to a sense of their commanding future, to organize and instruct the masses. In speeches and in numerous treatises, which bore witness to the power of his altogether exceptional mind, he criticized the existing capitalistic system of production from every angle and advocated the substitution for it of social production, *productive association* with state credit, a plan somewhat like that which had been advocated by Louis Blanc. This idea was to have

no very great future. Indeed it soon disappeared. But another idea, namely, that the workingmen of Germany, who had hitherto had no political power, should form a great national political party, pledged to fight for democracy and for the amelioration of the "normal conditions of the entire working classes," was destined to a vigorous life. Lassalle's fundamental idea was that only through the acquisition of political power could the social revolution be effected. In 1863 he founded the *General Workingmen's Association of Germany*, and was its first president, conducting its affairs with ability, making tours among the industrial cities of Germany which sometimes resembled triumphal processions, agitating, orating, corresponding, and appearing in a dozen state trials started against him by watchful, zealous officials. Lassalle died on August 31, 1864, at the age of thirty-nine, leaving a movement that had only begun. His influence was, however, destined steadily to increase among the working classes. Lassalle had also revived the old name of 1848, "Social Democrat," and it became the title of the party organ, established the year after his death.

Lassalle's field of action lay mainly in Prussia and North Germany. Meanwhile there was growing up in Saxony and in South Germany another workingman's party which derived its inspiration direct from Marx, and was in fact one of the fruits of Marx's international movement. William Liebknecht, the leader of this group, was a friend and disciple of Marx. A revolutionist of 1848, Liebknecht had had the usual fortune of the revolutionists of that period and had been driven from Germany and had taken refuge in Switzerland, where he had come into touch with Mazzini. Expelled from Switzerland he went to London where for thirteen years he was closely associated with Marx. Returning to Germany in 1862, he sought to spread the influence of the newly founded International. Liebknecht, like Lassalle and Marx, was a university man, of wide learning, a powerful debater. But he was not the man to win a large personal following, being rigid and dogmatic and lacking many of the qualities that please. He made a notable convert in August Bebel (1840-1913), a wood-turner, the son of Roman Catholic parents, a young man of twenty-five, fourteen years his junior. Bebel had had no such educational opportunities as had Liebknecht, but had educated himself as best he could and with considerable success. It was Bebel who captured the working classes for the new international Socialism of Marx, and who ultimately became the unquestioned leader of the German prole-

tariat, developing into an antagonist so redoubtable that even Bismarck himself found no pleasure in encountering him.

This international group of Socialists, as distinguished from the nationalist group, followers of Lassalle, founded in 1869, at Eisenach the Social Democratic Workingmen's Party, based upon Marxian principles. Thus there were two Socialist parties in Germany, the Lassalleans and the "Eisenachers." For several years the two parties held separate congresses, nominated separate candidates for the Reichstag, and fought each other generally. As their aims were, however, fundamentally the same it was only a question of time when they would fuse and this they did in 1875, at Gotha, assuming the name of the Socialistic Working Men's Party of Germany. The programme then adopted was, on the theoretical side, a compromise between the doctrines and and formulae of Marx and Lassalle; labor, "the source of all wealth and all culture," the ownership of the instruments of labor by society as a whole, the entire product of industry belonging to society, that product to be distributed justly. "The emancipation of labor must be the work of the laboring class, in contrast to which all other classes are only a reactionary mass." The party demanded "the establishment of Socialistic productive associations with State help under the democratic control of the laboring people."

The party also demanded, as the basis of the state, universal, direct and equal suffrage, secret and obligatory voting, a people's army in place of standing armies, questions of war and peace to be decided directly by the people; freedom of the press, of associations and public meetings; free justice and free and universal education; the unrestricted right of combination; prohibition of all child labor, and of all women's labor that is injurious to health and morality; laws for the protection of the life and health of workmen; inspection of mines, factories, workshops, and home industries by officials chosen by the workmen; a "normal working day corresponding to the needs of society" and the prohibition of Sunday labor. Religion was declared to be a private concern, which meant that church and state ought to be separated.

The work accomplished at Gotha was important. It created for the first time in a great European state a single, working-man's Socialist party, with a complete and permanent organization, and a definite programme of principles and practical aims. This party was to have its annual meetings and its own official organ. It was to compete with the other parties in the political arena offered by the institutions of the newly founded German

Empire. The party was also to exert a great and increasing international influence as it became a model for the Socialists in other countries. Indeed, its international influence was to be far greater than that of the International properly so-called, which after a brief existence of ten years had passed out of existence three years before the meeting at Gotha.

Three years after that meeting, in 1878, Bismarck turned his attention to this party which now seemed menacing. In 1871 the Socialists had elected two members to the Reichstag, three years later their representation increased to nine, and in 1877 to twelve. The Socialist votes polled in the first ordinary returns were: in 1871, 124,655 out of a total of 3,892,160; in 1874, 351,952 out of 5,190,254, and in 1877, 493,288 out of 5,401,021. Among the fourteen parties or factions of Germany it had, in 1877, reached the fifth place in the number of popular votes, and the eighth in the number of members in the Reichstag.

CHAPTER XVI

THE GERMAN EMPIRE UNDER WILLIAM I

THE Franco-German war completed the unification of Germany. That unification was, however, no by-product of a war, no astounding improvisation of a genius in politics and diplomacy. The foundations had been laid before, and the superstructure had been slowly and painfully built up. Many forces had long been co-operating, as we have seen, and had at last converged toward this triumphant issue. Most effective of all was the passion for nationality, which gave to the nineteenth century such elevation of emotion everywhere. But all these factors might have failed of results in the domain of politics had it not been for the rise of a forceful and sagacious statesman to a position of vast power in the Prussian state. How he used that power has been shown.

The Constitution of the new state was adopted immediately after the close of the war with France, and went into force April 16, 1871. In most respects it was simply the Constitution of the North German Confederation of 1867. The name Confederation gave way to that of Empire, and the name of Emperor was substituted for that of President. But the Empire was a confederation, consisting of twenty-five states, and one imperial territory, Alsace-Lorraine. The King of Prussia was *ipso facto* German Emperor. The Bundesrath and the Reichstag continued, enlarged by the admission of new members from the new states, but with practically the same powers. The Emperor declared war with the consent of the Bundesrat; he made treaties which, if they concerned matters that fell within the sphere of imperial legislation, must be ratified by Parliament. He was head of the army and navy. He was assisted by a Chancellor whom he appointed, and whom he removed, who was not responsible to the Parliament but to him alone. Under the Chancellor were various secretaries of state, who simply administered departments, but who did not form a cabinet responsible to Parliament. The Empire was a constitutional monarchy, but not a parliamentary one.

Laws were made by the Bundesrath and the Reichstag. The Bundesrat consisted of delegates appointed by the rulers of the different states. The votes of each state, ranging in number from one to seventeen, were cast only as a unit and that according to the instructions of the state government. The Reichstag was the only popular element in the Empire. It consisted of 397 members, elected for a term of five years by the voters, that is, men twenty-five years of age or older. The powers of the Reichstag were inferior to those of most of the other popular chambers of Europe. It neither made nor unmade ministries. While it, in conjunction with the Bundesrath, voted the appropriations, certain ones, notably those for the army, were voted for a period of years. Its consent was required for new taxes, whereas taxes previously levied continued to be collected without the consent of Parliament being secured again. The matters on which Parliament might legislate were those concerning army, navy, commerce, tariffs, railways, postal systems, telegraphs, civil and criminal law. On matters not within the jurisdiction of the Empire each state legislated as it chose.¹

The German Empire was unique among federal governments in that it was a confederation of monarchical states, which, moreover, were very unequal in size and population, ranging from Prussia with a population of 37,000,000, and covering two-thirds of the territory, down to Schaumburg-Lippe, with a population of 45,000. Three members of the Empire were republics: Lübeck, Bremen, and Hamburg. The rest were monarchies. All possessed constitutions and legislatures, more or less liberal. This confederation differed from other governments of its class in that the states were of unequal voting power in both houses, one state largely preponderating, Prussia, a fact explained by its great size, its population, and the importance of its historic rôle.

Between 1871 and 1918, when the Empire was overthrown, Germany had three Emperors, William I (1871-1888), Frederick III (March 9-June 15, 1888), and William II, from 1888 to 1918.

The reign of William I, as Emperor, falls into two periods; from 1871 to 1878, a period of internal administrative reforms, and of bitter struggles with the Roman Catholic Church — and from 1878 till 1888, the year of his death, a period characterized by the prominence of economic questions, of protection to industries, of social reforms, and of the acquisition of colonies.

¹ The constitution is given in Howard, *The German Empire*, 403-435, and in Dodd, *Modern Constitutions*, I, 325-351.

During all this time Bismarck was the Emperor's chief minister or Chancellor. Having in nine years made the King, whom he found upon the point of abdicating, the most powerful ruler in Europe, and having given Germans unity, he remained the chief figure in the state twenty years longer until his resignation in 1890.

His position now was one of immense prestige and authority. Much legislation rendered desirable by the new situation was passed in the next few years. Imperial offices were organized. An imperial bureau of railroads was established (1873). In 1873 monometallism was adopted in the place of the confusion of groschen, kreutzer, which hindered trade. New coins were issued, bearing on one side the effigy of the Emperor, and on the other the arms of the Empire — "going to preach to the people the good news of unity." The Imperial Bank was erected in 1875, and, in 1877, elaborate laws on civil and criminal procedure, on bankruptcy, on the judicial organization, and still later, a civil code, were passed. A new system of local government was adopted for cantons, circles, or provinces, whereby the judicial and police authority of the nobility was abolished, and more power was given the voters.

THE KULTURKAMPF

No sooner was the new Empire established than it was torn by a fierce religious conflict that lasted many years, the so-called Kulturkampf, or war for civilization, a contest between the State and the Roman Catholic Church. Germany had, since the time of Luther, been divided among the Protestants and Catholics, the Protestants predominating. South German states, Bavaria, Baden, were Catholic. In Prussia, the stronghold of Protestantism, there were two strong Catholic sections, to the east in the Polish provinces, and to the west along the Rhine. Many causes contributed to the fanning of religious passions at this time. By the Prussian Constitution of 1850 almost complete liberty of action and control of organization were granted the Church, which availed itself most energetically of the advantage thus offered. Religious societies, monastic orders, missions, were established widely and conducted an active and uncommonly successful propaganda during the next fifteen years. Prominent among these were the Jesuits. Two classes were alarmed by this progress, the orthodox Protestants, and those devoted to freedom of

thought, who dreaded the rise of religious fanaticism as prejudicial to culture.

The wars with Austria and France increased the religious disturbance. They were victories by a Protestant state over two strongly Catholic powers. Leadership in Germany had passed from Austria, in Europe from Austria and France, to the principal Protestant nation of the continent, Prussia. In the Seven Weeks' War, the Catholic states, Bavaria, Baden, had sided with Austria. It was widely believed that the French war had been largely occasioned by the Jesuits, working through the Empress Eugénie, and animating her ardent desire to humble the growing Protestant power. Bismarck shared this belief. The loss of the Pope's temporal power just at this time, 1870, embittered Catholics. During the war of 1870 the Archbishop of Posen went to Versailles to solicit Bismarck's intervention in behalf of the Papacy. He was coldly received. Apparently with the purpose of bringing political pressure to bear upon the Chancellor, a Catholic party was organized at once, the so-called Center, and in the election to the first Imperial Parliament it won sixty-three seats; in the election to the Prussian legislature or Landtag, forty-seven. This party desired the restoration of the temporal power and the independence of the Church. The immediate cause of the conflict was the proclamation by the Vatican Council in 1870 of the new dogma of papal infallibility, the dogma that the Pope can not err "when he defines *ex cathedra*, and in virtue of his apostolic authority any doctrine of faith, or morals," a dogma that shocked Liberals thoroughly penetrated with the modern scientific spirit, and that seemed to politicians to assert that the Pope was superior to all rulers, and had a claim upon the loyalty of the faithful superior to that of their sovereigns.

On the promulgation of this dogma a conflict broke out between the Church and the State. In the Vatican Council the German bishops had opposed the new dogma, but had been in the minority. It was now required that all bishops and priests should subscribe to it; the large majority did so, but some refused. A leading opponent was Döllinger, a distinguished professor and theologian. Ordered to explain the dogma in his university of Munich, he denied the principles on which it was based. "As a Christian, a theologian, an historian and a citizen, I cannot accept this doctrine," he declared. He was accordingly excommunicated. As an answer to this the university elected him as its Rector. The conflict quickly widened, affecting schools and parishes. The dissidents called themselves Old Catholics, pro-

claiming their adherence to historic Catholicism, but rejecting merely this addition to their creed as false. These men were excommunicated and deprived of their positions as priests or teachers. People were forbidden to attend worship in churches where they officiated, students to attend the lectures of such professors. The Old Catholics thereupon appealed to the imperial and state governments for protection. A religious war was shortly in progress, which grew more bitter each year. First the Imperial Parliament forbade the religious orders to engage in teaching; then, in 1872, it expelled the Jesuits from Germany. Of all legislation enacted during this struggle, the Falk or May Laws of the Prussian legislature were the most important (passed in May of three successive years, 1873, 1874, 1875). Bismarck supported them on the ground that the contest was political, not religious, that there must be no state within the state, no power considering itself superior to the established authorities. The State must be lay. He also believed that the whole movement was conducted by those opposed to German unity. Anything that imperiled that unity must be crushed. These May Laws gave the State large powers over the education and appointment of the clergy. They forbade the Roman Catholic Church to intervene in any way in civil affairs, or to coerce citizens or officials; they required that all clergymen should pass the regular state examination of the gymnasium, and should study theology for three years at a state university; that all Catholic seminaries should be subject to state inspection. They also established control over the appointment and dismissal of priests. A law was passed making civil marriage compulsory. This was to reduce the power that priests could exercise by refusing to marry a Catholic and a Protestant, and now even Old Catholics. Religious orders were suppressed.

Against these laws the Catholics indignantly protested. The Pope declared them null and void; the clergy refused to obey them, and the faithful rallied to the support of the clergy. To enforce them the Government resorted to fines, imprisonment, deprivation of salary, expulsion from the country. The conflict spread everywhere, into little villages, as well as into the cities into the universities and schools. It dominated politics for several years. In more than a thousand parishes in Prussia, all religious services were suspended and churches were closed. There was no priest to baptize or to marry. Eight out of the twelve bishoprics were vacant. One bishop had fled to Austria, another was hiding in a little village in Holland, and in order

to visit his fellow-Catholics at Munich, had disguised himself as a peddler; another, a cardinal, had taken refuge within the Vatican itself. The national life was more and more troubled, and the end was not being accomplished. Indeed, the resistance of the Catholics only stiffened under what they called this "Diocletian persecution." In the elections of 1877 the Center succeeded in returning ninety-two members, and was the largest party in the Reichstag. It was evident that the policy was a failure. Meanwhile other questions were becoming prominent, of an economic and social character, and Bismarck wished to be free to handle them. Particularly requiring attention, in his opinion, and that of William I, was a new and most menacing party, the Socialist. Bismarck therefore prepared to retreat. The death of Pius IX in 1878, and the election of Leo XIII, a more conciliatory and diplomatic Pope, facilitated the change of policy. From 1878 to 1887 the anti-clerical legislation was in one detail after another abandoned. First the May Laws were suspended, in 1879; then rescinded in 1886; religious orders were permitted to return, with the exception of the Jesuits (1887). Of the various laws only those concerning civil marriage and the civil registration of births and deaths, and the state inspection of schools were left. In return for the measures surrendered Bismarck gained the support of the Center for laws which he now had more at heart.

The religious conflict lasted fifteen years, and was acute during five. Its only permanent result was to consolidate and strengthen the Center or Catholic party, which was henceforth for many years the strongest party in this Protestant country.

BISMARCK AND THE POLICY OF PROTECTION

In 1879, Bismarck brought about a profound change in the financial and industrial policy of Germany by inducing Parliament to abandon the policy of a low tariff, and comparative free trade, and to adopt a system of high tariff and pronounced protection. His purposes were twofold. He wished to increase the revenue of the Empire and to encourage native industries. The income of the Empire consisted mainly of customs duties. Further funds, if necessary, were furnished by the several states, their quotas being apportioned according to population. Now the revenue from customs proved insufficient. For some years there had been a deficit, which involved heavier and heavier taxation of the states, to enable them to meet the assessments. If

the revenue of the Empire should be increased so that it could meet its own expenses and have a surplus, its political strength would be greatly augmented. For, instead of appealing to the states for contributions, it could distribute the surplus to the states, thus relieving them of taxation for federal purposes; and could also use it as a fund for the social reforms which Bismarck had in mind and which will shortly be described.

Moreover, Bismarck now desired high tariff duties in order to protect and encourage home industries. In adopting the principle of protection, he was not influenced, he asserted, by the theories of economists, but by his own observation of facts. In his speech of the 2nd of May 1879, in which he introduced his protective policy, he said that he did not propose to discuss protection and free trade in the abstract. He observed that while England was the only nation following the latter policy, France and Austria and Russia and the United States were pronounced adherents of the former, and that it was too much to ask that Germany should permanently remain the dupe of an amiable error. "We have hitherto," he said, "owing to our policy of the open door, been the dumping-ground for the over-production of other countries. It is this, in my opinion, that has depressed prices in Germany, that has prevented the growth of our industries, the development of our economic life. Let us but close the door, let us raise the somewhat higher barrier which I am now proposing, and see to it that at least we preserve for German industry the same market which we are now good-naturedly allowing foreigners to exploit. . . . The fact is that our condition is unsatisfactory and, in my opinion, is worse than that of any of our protectionist neighbors. If the dangers of protection were as great as they are painted by enthusiastic free-traders, France would have been a ruined and impoverished country long ago, because of the theories which she has followed ever since the time of Colbert. . . . For the abstract teachings of science in this connection I care not a straw. I base my opinion on experience, the experience of our own time. I see that protectionist countries are prospering, that free-trade countries are retrograding and that great and powerful England, the mighty athlete, who, having hardened her sinews, stepped out into the open market and said: 'Who will fight me? I am ready for any and all,' even she is gradually returning toward protection, and will in a few years adopt it, in order to keep for herself at least the English market."¹

¹ Kohl, *Die politischen Reden des Fürsten Bismarck*, VIII, 11-32.

On another occasion Bismarck pointed out that England had adopted free trade only after having given such ample protection to her industries that they were able to outstrip all others in the world. Only then did she dare to issue her challenge. He cited the remarkable development of the United States after "the most gigantic and expensive war of all history," as proof of his contention. "Because it is my deliberate opinion that the prosperity of the United States is chiefly due to her system of protection, I urge that Germany has now reached the point where it is necessary that she follow her example."

Bismarck won the day, though not without difficulty. Germany entered upon a period of protection, which, growing higher and applied to more and more industries, has continued ever since. Bismarck believed that Germany must become rich in order to be strong; that she could only become rich by manufactures; and that she could have manufactures only by giving them protection. The system was worked out gradually and piecemeal, as he could not carry his whole plan at once. By means of the tariff Bismarck wished to assure Germans the home market. Not only was that largely accomplished, but by its means the foreign market also was widened. Through offering concessions to foreign nations for concessions from them, Germany gained for her manufactured products an entrance into many other countries, which was denied them before. The prodigious expansion of German industry after 1880 is regarded as a vindication of this policy.

BISMARCK AND SOCIALISM

In 1878 Bismarck turned his attention to the Socialist party whose rise and development have been described in the preceding chapter. The steady growth of this party aroused the alarm of the ruling classes of Germany, and, as its aims were revolutionary and destructive of the entire existing order, it was a more serious enemy than the Center and Ultramontane party. William I regarded Socialism as his personal enemy, and considered himself commissioned by God to combat it. Bismarck had never yet proposed any comprehensive programme against it, but he had long hated the party, as was natural, considering his training and environment, and considering also the declarations of the Socialists themselves. Their leaders, Liebknecht and Bebel, had opposed the North German Confederation, the war with France, the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine. The Socialists

expressed openly and freely their entire opposition to the existing order in Germany. It was only a question of time when they must clash violently with the man who had helped so powerfully to create that order, and whose life-work henceforth was to consolidate it. Again, the Socialist party was radically democratic, and Bismarck hated democracy. A conflict between men representing the very opposite poles of opinion was inevitable. The occasion came in 1878, when two attempts were made upon the life of the aged Emperor, the first on May 11th, and the second on June 2nd, the latter proving very serious. These attempts upon the life of a man who was their hero horrified and angered the people. The would-be assassins had acted of their own motion, but they were Socialists. The Socialists denounced their acts, nevertheless public opinion held them responsible. Bismarck determined to use this opportunity to crush them once for all. He would use two methods, one stern repression of Socialist agitation, the other amelioration of the conditions of the working class, conditions which alone, he believed, caused them to listen to the false and deceptive doctrines of the Socialist leaders.

First came repression. In October 1878 a law of great severity, intended to stamp out completely all Socialist propaganda, was passed by the Imperial Parliament. It forbade all associations, meetings and publications having for their object "the subversion of the social order," or in which "socialistic tendencies" should appear. It gave the police large powers of interference, arrest, and expulsion from the country. Martial law might be proclaimed where desirable, which meant that, as far as Socialists were concerned, the ordinary courts would cease to protect individual liberties. Practically a mere decree of a police official sufficed to expel from Germany any one suspected or accused of being a Socialist. This law was enacted for a period of four years. It was later twice renewed and remained in force until 1890. It was vigorously applied. According to statistics furnished by the Socialists themselves, 1400 publications were suppressed, 1500 persons were imprisoned, 900 banished, during these twelve years. One might not read the works of Lassalle, for instance, even in a public library.

This law, says a biographer of Bismarck, is very disappointing. "We find the Government again having recourse to the same means for checking and guarding opinion which Metternich had used fifty years before."¹ It was, moreover, an egregious

¹ Headlam, *Bismarck*, 409,

failure. For twelve years the Socialists carried on their propaganda in secret. It became evident that their power lay in their ideas and in the economic conditions of the working classes, rather than in formal organizations, which might be broken up. A paper was published for them in Switzerland and every week thousands of copies found their way into the hands of workingmen in Germany, despite the utmost vigilance of the police. Persecution in their case, as in that of the Roman Catholics, only rendered the party more resolute and active. At first it seemed that the law would realize the aims of its sponsors, for in the elections of 1881, the first after its passage, the Socialist vote fell from about 493,000 to about 312,000. But in 1884 it rose to 549,000; in 1887 to 763,000; in 1890 to 1,427,000, resulting in the election of thirty-five members to the Reichstag. In that year the laws were not renewed. The Socialists came out of their contest with Bismarck with a popular and a parliamentary vote increased threefold.

But Bismarck had at no time intended to rest content with merely repressive measures. He had purposed from the beginning to effect such sweeping reforms in the conditions of the working classes that they would see that the State was their true benefactor, and would rally around it, leaving the Socialist party stranded and with no further reason for existence. In the very year 1878 he said in the Reichstag, "I will further every endeavor which positively aims at improving the condition of the working classes," and he promised to consider "any positive proposal" coming from the Socialists "for fashioning the future in a sensible way." In this he and Emperor William I were in entire accord, as they had not been in the Kulturkampf. The Emperor in opening the Reichstag in 1879, said; "A remedy cannot alone be sought in the repression of socialistic agitation; there must be simultaneously the positive advancement of the welfare of the working classes. And here the case of those workpeople who are incapable of earning their own livelihood is of the greatest importance." Two years later (March 8, 1881) he said; "That the State should interest itself to a greater degree than hitherto in those of its members who need assistance, is not only a duty of humanity and Christianity — by which state institutions should be permeated — but a duty of state-preserving policy, whose aim should be to cultivate the conception — and that, too, among the non-propertied classes, which form at once the most numerous and the least instructed part of the population — that the State is not merely a necessary but

a benevolent institution. These classes must, by the evident and direct advantages which are secured to them by legislative measures, be led to regard the State, not as an institution contrived for the protection of the better classes of society, but as one serving their own needs and interests.”¹ Bismarck said in 1884: “The whole matter centers in the question: Is it the duty of the state, or is it not, to provide for its helpless citizens? I maintain that it is its duty, that it is the duty not only of the Christian state . . . but of every state.”²

The method by which Bismarck proposed to improve the condition of the working class was by an elaborate and comprehensive system of insurance against the misfortunes and vicissitudes of life, against sickness, accident, old age and incapacity. It was his desire that any workingman incapacitated in any of these ways should not be exposed to the possibility of becoming a pauper, but should receive a pension from the state. His policy was called State Socialism. “Give the workingman the right to employment as long as he has health,” he told the Reichstag, “assure him care when he is sick, and maintenance when he is old. If you will do that without fearing the sacrifice, or crying out ‘State Socialism’ as soon as the words ‘provision for old age’ are uttered . . . then I believe these gentlemen (the Socialists) will sound their bird call in vain; and as soon as the workingmen see that the Government is deeply interested in their welfare, the flocking to them will cease.”

Bismarck’s proposals met with vehement opposition, both in the Reichstag and among influential classes outside. It was only slowly that he carried them through, the Sickness Insurance Law in 1883, the Accident Insurance Laws in 1884 and 1885, and the Old Age Insurance Law in 1889. These laws are very complicated and cannot be described here at length.

Bismarck wished to have the state bear the entire expense. He did not wish to have it come as an additional burden to the working people. But he was not able to secure the consent of the Reichstag, which gave as reasons for its opposition the enormous amount of money required, the great centralization of power in the hands of the Government which would arise from a system requiring so many officials and handling such large sums, and the weakening of the sense of self-reliance and personal responsibility with the workingmen.

As finally enacted in the case of accident insurance the

¹ Dawson, *Bismarck and State Socialism*, 111.

² *Ibid.*, 118.

employers were to bear the burden alone. The employer was obliged by law to insure his employees, entirely at his own expense. In the case of sickness insurance, as a rule, the employer must pay one-third and the employee two-thirds of the premium, and in the case of the old age and incapacity insurance, the premiums were to be paid by the employers, the employees, and, to some extent, by the state.

Such was Bismarck's contribution to the solution of the social question, which grew to such commanding importance as the nineteenth century wore on. In this legislation Bismarck was a pioneer. His ideas have been studied widely in other countries, and his example followed in some. Dawson calls him "the first social reformer of the century." Bismarck, once charged with changing his opinions to meet the occasion, replied that he had frequently changed his opinions. "But I have been faithful to this: the unification of Germany under the leadership of Prussia. Everything else is accessory." That this system of state insurance, by relieving the mental and physical distress of millions of German laborers would strengthen the Empire, as well as benefit humanity, was, in his opinion, an additional reason for its adoption.

The Socialists did not co-operate with him in the passage of these laws, which they denounced as entirely inadequate to solve the social evils, as only a slight step in the right direction. Nor did Bismarck wish their support. They were Social Democrats. Democracy he hated. Socialism of the state, controlled by a powerful monarch, was one thing; Socialism carried through by the people believing in a democratic government, opposed to the existing order in government and society, a very different thing. At the very moment that Bismarck secured the passage of the Accident Insurance Bill he also demanded the renewal of the law against the Socialists. His prophecy, that if these laws were passed the Socialists would sound their bird call in vain, has not been fulfilled. That party has grown greatly and almost uninterruptedly ever since he began his war upon it.

ACQUISITION OF COLONIES

One of the important features of the closing years of Bismarck's political career was the beginning of a German colonial empire. In his earlier years Bismarck did not believe in Germany's attempting the acquisition of colonies. In 1871 he refused to demand as prize of war any of the French colonial

possessions. He believed that Germany should consolidate, and should not risk incurring the hostility of other nations by entering upon the path of colonial rivalry. But colonies, nevertheless, were being founded under the spirit of private initiative. Energetic merchants from Hamburg and Bremen established trading stations in Africa, and the islands of the Pacific, for the purpose of selling their goods and acquiring tropical products, such as cocoa, coffee, rubber, spices. The aid of the Government was invoked at various times, but Bismarck held aloof. The interest aroused in the exploits of these private companies gave rise towards 1880 to a definite colonial party and the formation of a Colonial Society, which later became important.

The change in the policy of the Government, however, from one of aloofness to one of energetic participation and acquisition of colonies was largely a result of the adoption of the policy of protection and active governmental encouragement of manufactures and commerce. In the debate on the tariff bill of 1879 Bismarck said that it was desirable to protect manufactures, that thus a greater demand for labor would arise, that more people could live in Germany, and that therefore the emigration which had for years drawn tens of thousands from the country, particularly to the United States, would be decreased. But to develop manufactures to the utmost, Germany must have new markets for her products; and here colonies would be useful. In 1884 he adopted a vigorous colonial policy, supporting and expanding the work of the private merchants and travelers. In that year Germany seized a number of points in Africa, in the southwest, the west, and the east. A period of diplomatic activity began, leading in the next few years to treaties with England and other powers, resulting in the fixing of the boundaries of the various claimants to African territory. This is the partition of Africa described elsewhere.¹ Germany thus acquired a scattered African empire of great size, consisting of Kamerun, Togoland, German Southwest Africa, German East Africa; also a part of New Guinea. Later some of the Samoan islands came into her possession, and in 1899 she purchased the Caroline and the Ladrone islands, excepting Guam, from Spain for about four million dollars.

¹ See Chapter XXVI.

THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

While domestic affairs formed the chief concern of Bismarck after the war with France, yet he followed the course of foreign affairs with the same closeness of attention that he had shown before, and manipulated them with the same display of subtlety and audacity that had characterized his previous diplomatic career. His great achievement in diplomacy in these years was the formation of the Triple Alliance, an achievement directed, like all the actions of his career, toward the consolidation and exaltation of his country. The origin of this alliance is really to be found in the Treaty of Frankfort, which sealed the humiliation of France. The wresting from France of Alsace and Lorraine, he felt, would inevitably render that country desirous of a war of revenge, of a war for their recovery. This remained the open sore of Europe after 1871. Firmly resolved to keep what he had won, Bismarck's chief consideration was to render such a war hopeless, therefore, perhaps, impossible. France must be isolated so completely that she would not dare to move. This was accomplished, first by the friendly understanding brought about by Bismarck between the three rulers of eastern Europe, the Emperors of Germany, Russia, and Austria. But this understanding was shattered by events in the Balkan peninsula during the years from 1876 to 1878. In the Balkans, Russia and Austria were rivals, and their rivalry was thrown into high relief at the Congress of Berlin. Russia, unaided, had carried on a war with Turkey, and had imposed the Treaty of San Stefano upon her conquered enemy, only to find that Europe would not recognize that treaty, but insisted upon its revision at an international congress, and at that congress she found Bismarck, to whom she had rendered inestimable services in the years so critical for Prussia, from 1863 to 1870, now acting as the friend of Austria, a power which had taken no part in the conflict, but was now intent upon drawing chestnuts from the fire with the aid of the Iron Chancellor. The Treaty of Berlin was a humiliation for Russia and a striking success for Austria, her rival, which was now empowered to "occupy" Bosnia and Herzegovina. No wonder that the Russian Chancellor, Gortchakoff, pronounced the Congress of Berlin "the darkest episode in his career," and that Alexander II declared that "Bismarck had forgotten his promises of 1870." By favoring one of his allies Bismarck had alienated the other. In this fact lay the germ of the two great international combinations of the future,

the Triple and Dual Alliances, factors of profound significance in the later history of Europe.

Of these the first in order of creation and in importance was the Triple Alliance. Realizing that Russia was mortally offended at his conduct, and that the friendly understanding with her was over, Bismarck turned for compensation to a closer union with Austria, and concluded a treaty with her October 7, 1879. This treaty provided that if either Germany or Austria were attacked by Russia the two should be bound "to lend each other reciprocal aid with the whole of their military power, and, subsequently, to conclude no peace except conjointly and in agreement"; that if either Germany or Austria should be attacked by another power — as, for instance, France — the ally should remain neutral, but that if this enemy should be aided by Russia, then Germany and Austria should act together with their full military force, and should make peace in common. Thus this Austro-German Treaty of 1879 established a defensive alliance aimed particularly against Russia, to a lesser degree against France. The treaty was secret and was not published until 1887. Meanwhile, in 1882, Italy joined the alliance, irritated at France because of her seizure the year before of Tunis, which Italy herself coveted as a seat for colonial expansion. Thus was formed the Triple Alliance. The text of that alliance was kept secret and was first published only after the close of the World War but its purpose and character were fairly well revealed by the diplomatic history of the period. The alliance was made for a period of years, but was constantly renewed and remained in force until 1914. It was a defensive alliance, designed to assure its territory to each of the contracting parties.

Thus was created a combination of powers which dominated central Europe, from the Baltic to the Mediterranean, and which rested on a military force of over two million men.¹ At its head stood Germany. Europe entered upon a period of German leadership in international affairs which was later to be challenged by the rise of a new alliance, that of Russia and France, which for various reasons, however, was slow in forming.

¹ The history of the Triple Alliance has for the first time been set forth authoritatively by the publication of the documents concerning it contained in the Austrian archives. See the invaluable work of A. F. Pribram, *The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary, 1879-1914*, English edition by A. C. Coolidge (1921). An admirable introduction to this whole subject is to be found in A. C. Coolidge, *The Origins of the Triple Alliance* (1917).

CHAPTER XVII

GERMANY UNDER WILLIAM II

THE EDUCATION OF WILLIAM II

ON the 9th of March, 1888, Emperor William I died at the age of ninety-one. He was succeeded by his son, Frederick III, in his fifty-seventh year. The new Emperor was a man of moderation, of liberalism in politics, an admirer of the English constitution. It is supposed that, had he lived, the autocracy of the ruler would have given way to a genuine parliamentary system like that of England, and that an era of greater liberty would have been inaugurated. But he was already a dying man, ill of cancer of the throat. His reign was one of physical agony patiently borne. Unable to use his voice, he could only indicate his wishes by writing or by signs. The reign was soon over, before the era of liberalism had time to dawn. Frederick was King and Emperor only from March 9 to June 15, 1888. .

He was succeeded by his son, William II. The new ruler was twenty-nine years of age, a young man of very active mind, of fertile imagination, versatile, ambitious, self-confident, a man of unusual vigor. His education had been fashioned by events and by the pursuit of a regular programme of studies under competent masters. As a boy he had known all the excitement, all the exhilaration, the patriotic intoxication of the great era of Prussian and Hohenzollern victories, the defeat of Austria and of France, the home-coming of the laurelled soldiers of those stunning campaigns, the coronation of his grandfather William I, the exaltation and glory of the new empire, brought about by Prussia, the world-wide fame of Bismarck. All the intense emotions of that period of unparalleled triumphs played upon the sensitive and imaginative nature of the boy who never forgot the magic impressions of those days. They formed a significant part of his education.

Having completed his secondary studies at Cassel William entered the University of Bonn, which his father had attended in his day and which his son, the Crown Prince, was to attend in his. He joined the *Borussia*, the most famous student fighting corps

which counted many German princes among its members. He wore its ugly cap and gladly attended its meetings in which liberal libations of beer and much singing of chauvinistic songs beguiled the hours away most pleasantly. But William also applied himself to his studies with exemplary assiduity. One of the masters who exercised a great influence upon him at this time was Maurenbrecher, the historian, who caused him to understand Bismarck and to appreciate him. "By the time he left the University," said Maurenbrecher later, "he had, thanks to me, become a fervent admirer of the Prince von Bismarck. I am proud to have achieved this result, and, had I not written a single book, I could still bear witness that I had used my life gloriously." The professor, thus easily satisfied, was destined to know in 1890 that most melancholy experience that comes into the life of a teacher now and then to embitter it, the revelation, namely, that his pupil had quite forgotten his lesson.

The young prince used his university vacation in traveling and one of his trips was to Paris, which, at the age of nineteen, he visited in strict incognito. He saw all the classic sights, among them the Hall of Mirrors in the Château of Versailles, where, seven years before, the German Empire had been proclaimed and where the ruling house of Prussia had attained its apotheosis, and where, forty-eight years thereafter, a very different ceremony was destined to take place.

A Frenchman who saw much of the Prince during the student's days at Bonn has testified that the dominant traits of his character were energy, combativity and a will of iron. These traits were not likely to be diminished by the military education and training which William subsequently received, and all the obligations of which he discharged with application and with zeal.

It was now time to initiate the future occupant of the throne into some of the mysteries and activities of the state in order that he might be adequately prepared, and the old Emperor, William I, and Bismarck arranged, in 1886, that he should do the thing he desired to do, namely, have access to the Foreign Office and its sometimes exciting minutes and transactions, a decision which was emphatically but unavailingly disapproved by William's father, the Crown Prince Frederick, who stated his reasons in a letter to the Chancellor:¹ "But considering the unripeness and inexperience of my eldest son, together with his leaning toward vanity and presumption, and his overweening esti-

¹ In this section I have freely used my introduction and the letters contained in *The Kaiser versus Bismarck* (Harper & Bros., 1921).

mation of himself, I must frankly express my opinion that it is dangerous as yet to bring him into touch with foreign affairs," an interesting and striking pen portrait drawn by the hand that presumably was most qualified to draw, namely, the parental hand.

Interesting, too, and ironic, in view of what was before long to happen, is a letter of William to Bismarck, dated December 21, 1887, in which the Prince said: "The great and affectionate respect and heartfelt attachment which I cherish for Your Highness — and for you I would let my limbs be hewn piecemeal, one after the other, rather than undertake anything that would be disagreeable to you or cause you difficulties — should, I think, be sufficient guaranty that I have engaged in this work in no party spirit." And is not the future Emperor further adumbrated in another letter written at about the same time, November 29, 1887, in which he unfolds to the Iron Chancellor his plan of action toward his fellow sovereigns of Germany when he should be called to power by two deaths which he saw were imminent: "Elderly uncles must not put a spoke in the wheels of their dear young nephew." "It will be easy for me, as the nephew of these gentlemen, to win them over by little acts of complaisance, and to make them tractable by means of eventual visits of ceremony. If I have first of all convinced them as to my type and character and have got them well in hand, they will then obey me all the more readily. For I must be obeyed! But obedience is better obtained by persuasion and confidence than by compulsion."

But these letters, which contained such illuminating analysis by the father and such self-revelation by the son, were not known to the public. The new ruler, however, began, immediately upon his accession to the throne, to show forth the kind of man he was and the ideas which he found congenial. He inaugurated his reign with three proclamations. The first, issued a few hours after his father's death, was addressed to the soldiers. "The absolute and indestructible fidelity of the army to its commander" is the heritage transmitted in the army from father to son from generation to generation. . . . "We are made for each other, I and the army, and we shall remain inseparably united, whether God gives us peace or tempest." The army was, indeed, the new Emperor's first thought. The second was the navy, to which he issued a proclamation on the same day as that to the army, that is on June 15. This was the more striking, as hitherto the navy had played so slight a rôle in German history

that it did not seem to merit the honor of special mention, something which no previous Prussian ruler had accorded it.

It was not until four days later that William the Second addressed his people, promising "to be a just and clement prince, to foster piety and the fear of God, to maintain peace, to succor the poor and the downtrodden, to be a righteous man and a true protector."

The relative emphasis thus put upon the army, the navy and the German people in the Emperor's earliest utterances was destined to be preserved all through the reign, to be repeated in endlessly varied forms to the point of satiety. Another note, sounded early, was his enthusiasm for religious orthodoxy. He also held the doctrine of the divine origin of his royal power with medieval fervor, expressing it with frequency and in dramatic fashion. "My grandfather," the Emperor said to his faithful Brandenburgers in 1890, "considered that the office of king was a task that God had assigned to him, to which up to the last moment he consecrated all his strength. That which he thought I also think, and I see in the people and the country that have been transmitted to me a trust that is confided to me by God, which it is my duty to increase. . . . Those who wish to aid me in that task, whoever they are, I welcome with all my heart; those who oppose me in this work I shall crush." The idea of divine-right monarchy, which is the implicit negation of popular sovereignty, as it admits no intermediary between God and the princes who represent Him, was to find repeated and adequate expression in the speeches of the new Emperor.

It was evident that a man of such a character and of such opinions would wish to govern, and not simply reign. He would not be willing long to efface himself behind the imposing figure of the great Chancellor. Bismarck had prophesied that the Emperor would be his own Chancellor, yet he did not have the wisdom to resign when the old Emperor died, and to depart with dignity. He clung to power, and every evidence of his master's favor filled him with joy. And there were many such during the early months of the new reign. Had not William, as Crown Prince, as recently as April 1, 1888, proposed a resounding toast to him on the occasion of his birthday: "Standard-bearer of the imperial banner, may you long continue to hold it aloft!" And had not Bismarck composed the Kaiser's first speech from the throne and had not the Kaiser, having read it, extended his hand from the throne itself to Bismarck, and had not the resulting vigorous clasp seemed a sign to all the world that the mon-

arch and the minister were in complete accord? The young sovereign was "full of good will," Bismarck confided to his friends. Nothing could be more idyllic. Evidently his early premonitions had been quite baseless. When, in October, 1889, in the midst of an important interview with Alexander III of Russia, the Tsar interrupted Bismarck by saying, "Yes, I believe you, I have confidence in you, but are you sure of remaining in office?" Bismarck replied, "Certainly, Your Majesty, I am absolutely sure to remain a minister all my life." And the Emperor on his side seemed to be of the same opinion, for on December 30, 1889, he wrote to his Chancellor, "May God still for many years grant your true and tried counsel, in my difficult trade of king."

But as the Psalmist discovered long ago and announced to the world, put not your trust in princes. Princes are sometimes fickle, and generally very jealous of their rights. They wish to appear before the world not only as the power on the throne but the power behind the throne as well. Moreover there are always ambitious and ingenious intriguers at court engaged in the practice of the art of feathering their own nests, a practice which is facilitated if all watch dogs are removed. There were many such intriguers at the Court of Berlin, who lost no occasion to suggest to the monarch that he owed it to himself not to be eclipsed, in the present or the future, by any luminary, however effulgent, who pointed out that Frederick the Great had ruled in spirit and in truth, as well as in law, from the age of twenty-eight, and that he had made the greatest of all Hohenzollern reputations by relying upon himself. A courtier who himself aspired to be chancellor casually dropped a remark which is said to have produced a great impression upon the Emperor to the effect "that Frederick the Great would never have been Great if on his accession to power he had found and retained a minister of Bismarck's importance and authority."

But there were more serious reasons than these for that event of great pith and moment, the sudden and forced resignation of Bismarck on March 20, 1890. Behind the fair exterior of their public relations there were differences of opinion between the two men quite early in the reign. The Emperor noticed that things were kept from him and became distrustful. The Chancellor, on his part, confided that "the sudden decisions of His Majesty" were making his position difficult. But the fundamental difficulty lay in the character of the two men, was inherent in the situation. They belonged to different ages, they thought

differently, felt differently. At bottom the question was who should rule in Germany, the monarch or the minister? The struggle was for supremacy, since there was no way in which two persons so self-willed and autocratic could divide power. As Bismarck stayed on when he saw that his presence was no longer desired, the Emperor, not willing to be overshadowed by so commanding and illustrious a minister, finally demanded his resignation early in 1890. Thus in bitterness and humiliation ended the political career of a man who, according to Bismarck himself, had "cut a figure in the history of Germany and Prussia." Bismarck was most unceremoniously hustled out of the palace he had occupied for years, not even having time to superintend the packing of his papers, and his successor was rapidly installed. Bismarck was later obliged to return the proportion of his quarterly salary, which had been paid on January 1, for the eleven days from the date of his dismissal (March 20-31). In many countries a domestic servant is better treated. Republics are not the only governments that show ingratitude, or a mean vulgarity.

Bismarck left Berlin amid frenzied expressions of respect and homage from enormous crowds that sought to do him honor. He withdrew to his estate, Friedrichsruh, where he lived for eight years longer, surrounded by his family and friends. He found country life less attractive than he had thought it from previous experience, and retirement from the world's great stage soon became an intolerable bore. To be compelled, like any other human being, to read in the morning paper the news which he had been in the habit of creating was humiliating, indeed. To relieve the ennui and to indulge his still vigorous combative instincts, he used his time in writing his memoirs and in carrying on a guerilla war in the newspapers with his enemies and successors. Friedrichsruh became during these years a place of pilgrimage for patriotic Germans. Delegations, associations, distinguished individuals visited in almost endless succession the great exile, and formidable and heady was the volume of incense that arose. But all this, though gratifying enough in itself, was tame for one who had tasted abundantly of the real pleasures and pomp of power. The time for those had passed forever, and indeed, the end of all was approaching. Bismarck died on July 30, 1898, at the age of eighty-three, leaving as his epitaph, "A faithful servant of Emperor William I." Thus melted into history one of the few great founders of states.

After 1890 the personality of William II was the decisive

factor in the state. His Chancellors were, in fact as well as in theory, his servants, carrying out the master's wish. Down to the outbreak of the Great War there were four: Caprivi, 1890-1894; Hohenlohe, 1894-1900; Bülow, 1900-1909, and Bethmann-Hollweg, from July, 1909. The war was to add three others to the list, whose terms were to prove exceedingly brief, Michaelis, Hertling, and Prince Maximilian of Baden.

The extreme political tension was at first somewhat relieved by the removal of Bismarck from the scene, by this "dropping of the pilot," after twenty-eight years of continuous service. The early measures under the new régime showed a liberal tendency. The Anti-Socialist laws, expiring in 1890, were not renewed. This had been one of the causes of friction between the Emperor and the Chancellor. Bismarck wished them continued, and their stringency increased. The Emperor wished to try milder methods, hoping to undermine the Socialists completely by further measures of social and economic amelioration, to kill them with kindness. The repressive laws lapsing, the Socialists reorganized openly, and have conducted an aggressive campaign ever since. The Emperor had said that Social Democracy was a "transient phenomenon which would be exhausted by its own violence." But, seeing his error and recognizing the futility of anodynes, he soon became the bitter enemy of the Socialists and began to berate them vehemently. In November, 1891, he told the recruits at Potsdam: "If Socialist agitations continue as they are doing, I may have to order you to shoot down your relatives, your brothers, even your parents—which God forbid!—but even then you must obey my commands without murmuring." Later he denounced the Socialists as "a pack of men unworthy to bear the name of Germans," as "a treasonable horde," as "vermin gnawing at the roots of the Imperial oak." Such passionate utterances only added fuel to the flames. The Emperor, who was so confident in his own judgment, was also evidently impulsive, changeable, swayed by sudden and violent emotions, likes and dislikes, prejudices and predilections. In this first important contact with affairs the superficiality of his judgment and the instability of his purpose were clearly shown.

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INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL EXPANSION

The reign of William II was notable for the remarkable expansion of industry and commerce which rendered Germany the redoubtable rival of England and the United States, an expansion

with which the Emperor was in full sympathy and which he encouraged in every way. This astonishing development, which transformed Germany from an agricultural into an industrial state, began under William I and was greatly furthered by Bismarck's policy of protection, but it was under William II that it attained its most signal triumphs. The successful issue of the war of 1870 and the founding of the Empire in 1871 gave a great impetus to the political and commercial life of the nation. Germany became conscious as never before of her power and of her manifold opportunities. The spirit of enterprise, of adventure, was in the air and sought expression in all departments of the national life. This old, historic people seemed to be born again, seemed endowed with a new youth, and with all the ardor and energy and audacity that go with youth. Particularly was this expansion to be observed in the economic life of the country. An unwonted energy sent its pulsations through every class of the population. The restless spirit of the Germans showed that they were passing into a new phase of their history. The industrial epoch had arrived.

One has only to consider the rapid growth of the cities of Germany to become aware of the tremendous power of the new factors in the situation. In 1870, Germany had only eight towns of over 100,000 inhabitants; in 1880 the number was fourteen; in 1890 twenty-six; in 1900 thirty-three; in 1910 forty-eight, sixteen of which had over 250,000 inhabitants. In Great Britain in 1911 there were forty-four towns with a population of over 100,000, fifteen of which had over 250,000 inhabitants. Berlin in 1870 had a population of over 800,000; in 1910 of over 2,000,000. The population of the German Empire was forty-one million in 1870, sixty-five million in 1910.

These statistics indicate several things, among which are to be particularly noted the expansion of industry and the shifting of population from the country to the urban districts. In 1870 the rural population of Germany was sixty-four per cent.; in 1910 about thirty-three per cent. The nation was rapidly becoming an industrial state, and industrial development tends to concentrate population in certain favored regions. Agriculture was becoming relatively less important. In every branch of industry the progress was astonishing and constituted an increasing menace for competitors. It was probably in the metallurgical and mining industries that the most striking advances were made. Modern industrialism is based upon two things, coal and iron. The nation which has had the richest deposits of these materials,

and which knows best how to exploit them, is the nation marked for industrial primacy. The development of these two basic industries during the last fifty years in Germany has been extraordinary. The principal coal-fields of Germany were those of the Ruhr, in Westphalia, of Upper and Lower Silesia, of Saxony, and of the Saar. In 1872 the coal output of Germany was thirty-three million metric tons, in 1912 a hundred and seventy-five million. The uses of coal are numerous. It serves not only to warm our houses, factories and public buildings, to run our machines, to furnish the power for light and transportation, but, in recent years, it has become the basis of new industries which have greatly flourished in Germany, the manufacture of various pharmaceutical preparations, such as saccharin, phenacetin, aspirin, and, most important of all, the anilin dyes which have become so essential to the textile industries of the world and in the manufacture of which Germany, thanks to the discoveries of her chemists, not only became the leader but practically the monopolist, thus having a thriving source of revenue from abroad, from France and England and the United States, countries which needed these dyes but knew not how to make them.

In other branches of activity we find the same extraordinary expansion. Between 1870 and 1914 Germany's output of iron increased about sixteen times and she became the second iron-producing country of the world, the United States being the first. In the steel industry a similar development occurred. Within twenty years, from 1890 to 1910, Germany's output increased seven times as fast as did that of England and at the outbreak of the war its total product was twice that of Great Britain.

In other industries, too, the same or similar results; in that of shipbuilding, in which rapid progress was made during the reign of William II, endowing Germany with a large and modern navy and with a mercantile marine, second only to that of England; in the industry of machine-making, in which Germany became an important exporter all over the world; in the textile and chemical and electrical industries which grew at a giant's pace; there was hardly a field of economic activity which had not its record of triumph.

There was too a remarkable growth in the foreign trade of Germany during this period, partly as a consequence of the rapid development of her manufactures, partly as a necessary aid to that development, Germany being compelled to import large stocks of raw materials to keep her factories going, com-

pelled to export for the same reason and, also, to pay for that portion of her food which her native agriculture could not furnish her. Between 1870 and 1914 Germany's foreign trade increased five hundred per cent., from a billion to five billion dollars. And this expansion of the foreign trade brought with it as concomitants the building of more and larger ships, an enormous growth in the merchant marine. The tonnage of German shipping engaged in world commerce increased not only steadily but rapidly. That shipping became concentrated more and more into a few great companies, of which the Hamburg American and the North German Lloyd lines were the chief. Hamburg and Bremen became the leading ports of the Continent, admirably equipped with all the facilities that modern commerce demands, docks and quays and warehouses. The expansion of commerce was also in part the cause and in part the effect of the endeavor to equip the whole country with adequate railroads and canals.

Germany thus became under William one of the busiest workshops of the world. Her economic development led to an increase in her population and the increase in her population facilitated her economic development. And her expanding industries were able in increasing measure to take care of the growing numbers. Germany, which had for forty or fifty years been a land of emigration, became one of immigration. Probably between four and five million Germans had gone to the United States alone since 1848, sometimes as many as two hundred thousand a year. But in the last decade of the nineteenth century this outgoing stream practically ceased to flow, Germany losing only about twenty thousand of her subjects annually, which was no more than a normal wastage for any country of her size. Not only was German industry so prosperous that it could offer an attractive field for the energies of a population which was growing at the rate of seven or eight hundred thousand a year, but it was even forced to draw upon neighboring countries for an additional labor supply. Hundreds of thousands of Russians, Italians, Austrians, came to Germany annually, for longer or shorter periods, to help work her mines and harvest her crops. From being a land of emigration, Germany became a land of immigration, temporary immigration. To such a pitch had the national enterprises developed that the national labor resources were no longer adequate.

The reasons for this notable economic development, which we have thus briefly sketched, are numerous. First, as already in-

licated, the great quickening of the national energies, the broadening of the national horizon, the stimulus to national ambition that followed the exciting chapter of national unification, the extraordinary years from 1864 to 1871. But not only did that movement generate unwonted popular exhilaration, not only did it inspire great self-confidence in the German people, but it yielded them some very palpable and mundane advantages as well. War frequently pays, if only you but win it, and the war of 1870 brought Germany an indemnity of practically a billion dollars in gold, something unheard of until then, every penny of which was collected, and also brought Alsace-Lorraine with an industrious population of over a million and a half, with a large wheat area, with a flourishing cotton industry, and with rich stores of iron. Germany's industrial prosperity has been built up, as has that of England, upon coal and iron. Now at the close of the Franco-German war the boundary was so drawn as to give Germany half of the most valuable deposit of iron ore in Europe, and one of the largest deposits in the world, namely, that of Lorraine. The accruing advantage was enormous and ought to be visible even to those who think that war is never advantageous from an economic point of view. In 1913 out of twenty-eight million tons of iron ore extracted from the soil of Germany, twenty-one million came from the mines of annexed Alsace-Lorraine alone, that is to say, three-fourths of the production of the entire empire. The Treaty of Frankfort therefore was a godsend to German metallurgy, which received a conspicuous fillip toward that development which has been one of the features of her later history. Furthermore Germany also received that part of the coal basin of the Saar which had remained French in 1815 and which constituted perhaps a fourth of the field. An excellent birthday gift, these French minerals, for the new German Empire which had just been proclaimed in the mirrored and marble halls of the palace of Versailles. Being basic materials they represented a signal gain to German industry and a corresponding loss to the industry of France. German enterprise was to know how to exploit them to the full. The annexation of Lorraine was, then, something more than the transfer of territory and human beings from one sovereignty to another. It was an economic fact of great significance. It rendered possible the great metallurgical development of Imperial Germany which, in turn, was at the basis of her industrial and commercial expansion.

Such was the material gain of the Franco-German war. That

war also had its intellectual and moral reaction. Germany's brilliant successes, while they had a depressing effect upon the next generation in France, had an electrifying one upon the German people, stimulating all its energies to an exceptional pitch. A characteristic of the succeeding period was the enthusiasm of the German people for industrial and commercial pursuits, the national resolve to achieve in the economic sphere the greatness already achieved in politics and war.

Another reason helping to explain the rapid rise of Germany as an economic power was the profound respect of the Germans for science and their eagerness to apply scientific discoveries and scientific processes to the service of industry, at every point and constantly. The laboratory became, not merely an adjunct, but in many cases, the vital center of the factory, sending new forces pulsing through the industry, as, from time to time, new light emerged from the experiments of the chemists, or the physicists, or the engineers whom German manufacturers had the wisdom to gather about them. More than any other people did the Germans recognize that intelligently directed scientific research is a necessity for modern industry. This faith in science, this belief that science "pays" is illustrated by the story, which is typical and not exceptional, of the manager of a large chemical establishment who, pointing to the seventy highly trained chemists who were engaged in research, said to a visitor to his factory, "These seventy researchers cost us 350,000 francs a year; nine-tenths of them will produce nothing, but the tenth man may discover something which will enable us to earn several millions a year." Another company having purchased the patents for a process of making artificial indigo spent seventeen years in minute research in order to make this discovery commercially valuable. The famous Krupp munition works at Essen included an immense laboratory of physics and chemistry remarkably equipped — an agency of scientific research such as was possessed by no university in the world.

Now this scientific conception of industry is nothing peculiar to the Germans, is no German invention. Without going farther back we find the idea of applied sciences clearly grasped in England at the close of the eighteenth century and in France at the beginning of the nineteenth. But it was the Germans who erected this idea into a system. German universities and technical schools rendered Germany powerful in the markets of the world. By educating this scientific general staff for the factories of the country they were winning victories in the field of industry as

the military staff was preparing to win them on the field of battle.

Other reasons for the economic successes of the Germans are: the high birth rate, assuring Germany, toward the end of the period, seven or eight hundred thousand new pairs of arms every year; the industriousness of the German workman, his steady application, his sense of discipline, his habits of obedience, his satisfaction in being grouped and organized with others of his class, qualities remarkably adapted to the new conditions of industry, with its enormous aggregations of workers under concentrated leadership. Then again the Germans showed the national patience and care in their study of the market, in their study of the customer and their determination to please him at all costs, in their readiness to adapt methods and processes to the peculiarities or tastes of the particular country or people with which they wished to deal. In other words they sought to apply the maximum of intelligence to the great art of salesmanship.

Other nations had no legitimate grounds of complaint if the Germans forged ahead, and even won their markets away from them by the use they made of the national habits of industry and application, thoroughness and intelligence. But there was more to the story than merely a laudable exploitation of national virtues. This grandiose machine, once set up and put in motion, produced far more than was needed at home. A hunt for new markets, new and newer, consequently began. The Germans deliberately, intentionally, adopted the policy of systematic and enormous over-production and, to drain off the surplus, they must inundate the world. "We must export in order to import, and we must import, in order to live and work," they said. Once entered upon this path there was no stopping. An increasing population, an increasing industrial efficiency, an increasing output rendered absolutely necessary larger markets which could only be found abroad. Exportation, being essential to the national life, was organized with the customary German thoroughness. Markets must be procured at all costs, honestly if possible, dishonestly or unfairly, if needs must be. One conspicuous result, in the decade preceding the World War was the increasing resort on the part of the Germans to unfair methods of underselling and undermining rivals in the fierce competition for the markets of the world, methods, elaborately and minutely organized, in which the state, the railroads, the banks and the factories all combined in ingenious and unscrupulous collaboration. One of these methods was that called dumping, that is, the unloading upon

foreign markets at unreasonably low prices of goods which are sold much dearer in the country producing them. The object of dumping is to kill off the foreign competition by prices which are often far below cost, in the expectation that prices may be increased as soon as these rivals are driven into bankruptcy. Thus a commodity made in Germany and selling there for a hundred marks might be sold in France for eighty and in Italy for sixty, the rate being fixed low enough to cut under the French and Italian producer of the same commodity. Dumping, as the name itself shows, was no German invention. The English engaged in dumping long before the Germans, and certain French and American concerns had also sometimes practised it. But what with the latter was generally only a temporary expedient of relieving the home market from a momentary surplus of commodities, was erected by the Germans, according to their national habit, into a permanent system. It became a recognized policy of exploitation, openly encouraged by the state. Economic relations assumed under this system the character of military operations, the purpose of which is no longer exchange, but complete destruction of competitors, the prevention or annihilation of the same industries in other countries than Germany. As a matter of fact the Germans had succeeded by this and other methods of "economic penetration" in reducing Italian industry into practical serfdom to German industry, in bringing Belgium under the German yoke long before the invasion of 1914, and in crushing many competing industries in Switzerland and Spain, even in France, and in then occupying the field for the greater glory and advantage of Germany. The German will to conquer, by fair means or by foul, could only in the end arouse the determination of other peoples to defend themselves. The latter would not be willing permanently to acquiesce without a struggle, and in an attitude of impotence and resignation, in their own strangulation by a power bent on Germanizing the world.

The picture we have been painting of the extraordinary transformation of Germany under the Empire is still far from complete nor can we hope to make it complete within the space at our disposal. That transformation was to be observed in almost every aspect of the national life. The state and its head, the Emperor, by associating themselves closely and fruitfully with all this development, favoring in a multitude of ways the release and multifarious expression of the nation's energies, by personifying the national aspirations, by identifying themselves with the enterprising and adventurous spirit of the people, became

themselves immensely popular, and this, in turn, increased their influence for good or for evil, as the case might be. They stirred the national imagination.

NAVAL EXPANSION

The expansion of industry, of the foreign trade, of the mercantile marine naturally aroused a desire for a navy, for colonies, for a vigorous foreign policy, attentive to the national interests everywhere. To all of these concerns the government of William II was keenly alive. Strong on land for fifty years, William desired that Germany should be strong on the sea, that she might act with decision in any part of the world, that her diplomacy, which must be permeated with the idea that nothing great should be done in world politics anywhere, in Europe, in Asia, in Africa, without her consent, might be supported by a formidable navy. To make that fleet powerful was a constant and a growing pre-occupation of the Emperor. Here again William II was the faithful spokesman of the people, who supported him enthusiastically, convinced, as they were, of the economic necessity of a great navy, as a protection of the position Germany had acquired, as "insurance."

We have seen that the first official utterance of William II on the day of his accession was a proclamation to the army. The second was a proclamation to the navy, a small and neglected affair which no German Emperor before him had ever thought of thus addressing. The emphasis which William thus put upon the navy at the very outset of his career was but a harbinger of what was to come. Many of the most memorable phrases of this monarch, who had a taste and aptitude for swelling oratory, express this great interest which was to become an important factor in the history of the reign. As William I had made the modern and glorious German army, William II aspired to make a powerful navy, and he succeeded. "Our future lies upon the water," "sea power is world power," "Neptune with the trident is a symbol that we have new tasks to perform . . . and that trident must pass into our hands," such are some of the phrases by which William sought to impress his people with the importance of the new interest. He spoke of himself as "The Admiral of the Atlantic," forgetful that England might have some claims to that pretentious title. "The Admiral of the Atlantic salutes the Admiral of the Pacific," was a famous Imperial toast. The Emperor talked much of the "empire of the sea" and of Ger-

many's duty to "impose peace on the sea" as well as on land. On January 1, 1900, he said, "What my grandfather did for the army on land that is what I shall do for the navy; without permitting myself to be troubled, I shall accomplish the work of reorganization, in order that it may hold the same rank as my land forces, and that, thanks to it, the German Empire can take the place in the world that it does not yet occupy. By means of the two armies, land and sea, I hope to be able, with the aid of God, to realize the saying of Frederick William I 'when one wishes to decide anything in this world, the pen is not sufficient, if it is not supported by the sword.'"

Under such aggressive and ambitious leadership as this Germany supplied herself with a powerful and modern fleet, second only to that of England. The first great navy law was passed in 1900 and the words of the preamble revealed its temper and contained a pointed hint for the rest of the world, and particularly for Great Britain, to reflect upon: "Germany must possess a fleet of such strength that a war against the mightiest naval Power would endanger the supremacy of that Power." Under Admiral von Tirpitz, who was appointed Secretary of the Navy in 1897 and who presided for twenty years over the construction and development of the fleet, the training of its officers and men, and the establishing of its discipline and traditions proceeded apace. In 1890 Heligoland was acquired by Germany from Great Britain and was made into an impregnable fortress. Five years later the Kiel Canal, connecting the North Sea and the Baltic, was completed. These were events of vital importance in the history of the German navy as a fighting force.

COLONIAL POLICY

Along with the steadily increasing interest in the navy went naturally enough an interest in colonial development. Here, however, Germany encountered obstacles which foiled and irritated her. In the competition for colonial possessions Germany arrived late upon the scene and did not fare well. We have seen that at first Bismarck and William I were opposed to a policy of colonial expansion, thinking that the pressing problem for Germany was internal consolidation, concentration not dispersion of effort, and not desiring to offend or alarm Great Britain. Bismarck even sought to divert the attention of France from "the gap in the Vosges" and to occupy her elsewhere by encouraging Jules Ferry in his colonial schemes, thereby showing, what he

showed more frequently than is generally supposed, shortsightedness. In the end, however, swept along by a current of opinion and circumstance which he neither created nor controlled, Bismarck had entered upon the path of acquisitions overseas and had acquired very considerable possessions in Africa. These, however, as time went on, proved disappointing, unsatisfactory for settlement, expensive for administration, breeders of costly local wars, which were occasioned by the arrogance and incompetence of German officials and the greed of German merchants and traders. The history of the German colonies in Africa was troubled and discreditable. There were repeated risings on the part of the natives, risings which were suppressed, but not without a heavy cost in men and money. These insurrections occurred in East Africa and in the Cameroons. In the latter no less than seventeen separate campaigns were necessary within a period of three years. In other words the people were in a state of chronic rebellion. But the worst outbreak was the rising of the Hereros in Southwest Africa which began in 1903 and which aimed at the expulsion, root and branch, of the intruders. It was admitted by a German judge located at the capital of the colony that the rebellion was due to the outrageous act of the German traders. The German government stopped at nothing to extinguish this dangerous revolt. When order was finally restored the Hereros had been reduced, by fire and sword and exile, from a tribe of 200,000 to one of 50,000. The war cost Germany two thousand men in killed and wounded and over a hundred million dollars.

The German public was disappointed at the outcome of the country's first effort to build a colonial empire. The enthusiasm of the early days waned rapidly in the face of the poor results. The colonies had cost much more than they had brought in. With the exception of Kiauchau, acquired in 1897 from China, and furnishing an excellent naval base in the Far East, and enabling Germany largely to gain commercial control of the province of Shantung, the German colonies were of no great value. A period of disillusionment of the public mind therefore followed the period of optimism and extravagant hopes. Capitalists saw no value in colonies that cost far more than they yielded. The people were indifferent. This mood, however, was brief and transitory. The Pan-German movement, then so strong, brought powerful support to the colonial cause. The colonial administration, which had hitherto been a department of the Foreign Office, was now made entirely independent and Bernhard Dernburg, an enter-

prising and successful banker, was appointed first Colonial Secretary. His duty was to reform the methods of colonial administration, which he did after a careful study of English methods, to rescue the colonial movement for the disrepute into which it had fallen, to stir up colonial sentiment everywhere. This he was largely instrumental in doing and the interest in colonial development and expansion became a general feature of German imperialism. A more intelligent and humane exploitation of the colonies began. A feature which was somewhat menacing, however, was that Germany began to look with covetous eyes upon the possessions of her neighbors, England and France and Belgium, and that popular writers and politicians began to familiarize the public mind with the idea that colonies might be won by an aggressive foreign policy and also by war. These men talked most indiscreetly and in a way to disturb or alarm those nations which had more attractive colonies than Germany possessed. It was quite natural for Germany to covet her neighbors' plantations, but it was equally natural for the latter to desire to retain them. The Germans did acquire in 1911 a large slice of the Congo rubber region, which had previously been French and which France traded, under slightly veiled compulsion, for recognition of certain Moroccan claims of hers.

German colonies were valuable for the raw materials they furnished for German industry and commerce, but they were not inviting as fields for emigration. As Bernhardt expressed it in his popular book on *Germany and the Next War*: "For centuries the overflow of the strength of the German nation has poured into foreign countries and been lost to our Fatherland and to our nationality; it is absorbed by foreign nations and steeped with foreign sentiments. Even to-day the German Empire possesses no colonial territories where its increasing population may find remunerative work and a German way of living. This is obviously not a condition which can satisfy a powerful nation, or which corresponds to the greatness of the German people and their intellectual importance."

The expanding German industries rendered desirable and even necessary larger markets, that thus the growing population of the Empire might secure essential food supplies and raw materials. If Germany's colonies were not adequate to this end, if new colonies were difficult to acquire, the world being already appropriated, the required outlets must be sought elsewhere, and German foreign policy for many years before the Great War was increasingly attentive to this problem. Commercial penetration

of other countries might prove a passable substitute for actual colonial possession and might in the long run even prepare the way for such possession. Brazil for a while seemed an inviting field, as for a half a century many Germans had emigrated to that country. In 1900 there were supposed to be about 400,000 Germans there, mostly concentrated in a few provinces. But ever to convert commercial relations into any form of political control was quite out of the question, owing to the growing prosperity and national sentiment of the Brazilians themselves, the sure opposition of the other South American states, and the blunt, forbidding fact of the Monroe Doctrine, any threat to which would be certain to arouse the United States.

But there were other lands, Morocco in Africa, and the Turkish Empire in Europe and, particularly, in Asia, which presented fewer obstacles to exploitation, economic and possibly political. The *Drang nach Osten*, the pressure to the East, became a favorite theme with writers on world affairs, with economists and politicians. It exercised a fascination upon the Emperor, William II, whose romantic turn of mind was fired by the mysterious and alluring Orient as the mind of the youthful Napoleon had been, a century earlier. General von Moltke as long ago as the forties of the nineteenth century had seen the chances there were for Germans in that section of the world, and had even thought of a German principality of Palestine. In the twentieth century such men as Dernburg, Germany's first Colonial Minister, Paul Rohrbach, one of her ablest publicists, Friedrich Naumann, a brilliant pamphleteer and later an immensely popular advocate of a wide-sweeping Middle Europe union, professors of repute and learning, like Sprenger and Hasse, all harped upon the self-same theme, and the ambitious and active Pan-German League took up the glad refrain enthusiastically. Eastward the path of Empire might easily take its way if only the Germans were wise enough to seize opportunities that were obvious and that could not fail to be richly rewarding. German influence must dominate in the Near East and shape its destinies. The Ottoman Empire was weak and inefficient. By proper handling it might be brought under German guidance. In an alliance of the two there could be no doubt as to where power would lie. Rohrbach, in a pamphlet on "The German Idea (*Gedanke*)," said that in Turkey there was "a sphere in which the German idea may have a great future, not only by way of material colonization, but also with a view to political domination and moral influence." Large markets for German manufactured goods, abundant raw materials for German

industries, possibly promising settlements for the surplus German population, fields for attractive investment of German capital in the building of railways, in the digging of irrigation canals, in mining, in agriculture, such were some of the prizes in view if only sufficient energy and sufficient wisdom should be applied to this problem of getting a control, of one kind or another, of a spacious, decadent, and neglected empire. And with the systematic and scientific development of that empire would also come other good or useful things. Persia, Arabia, finally India also might be penetrated by German commerce, and the influences that follow upon commercial conquest might then exert their sway. The prospect widened out as attention was fixed upon it, and for the more sanguine temperaments became entrancing, and even intoxicating. A railroad from Berlin to Byzantium, and from Byzantium to Bagdad, swung into view. The Turkish army might be reformed under German masters and might, as Rohrbach calmly pointed out, be used as a "spear-head" against the English in case the latter were unwise enough to oppose German plans elsewhere.

Attractive as the outlook was, it involved many factors and much preliminary work before it could entirely succeed, and the German mind was greatly occupied with such considerations for years before the war. Boundless were the possibilities, economic and political. But they involved risks. To realize these possibilities the ground between Germany and the East must be prepared and securely held. This meant that Austria-Hungary must dominate the Balkans and must herself not cross the German orbit, but proceed parallel with it. Also Russia and England, both threatened by these schemes, must naturally be considered. Here we are in the full current of all that planning and intriguing, of all that dreaming and scheming that led to the Great War, and whose preliminaries we shall treat more particularly later on. The central feature of German *Weltpolitik* was this ambition to dominate the Near East. How to realize this ambition was the subject of much discussion.

FOREIGN POLICY

The mention of *Weltpolitik* or World Policy brings us to another and very conspicuous aspect in the life of modern Germany. At the beginning of the twentieth century the Germans turned with increasing interest to the field of international affairs. All this industrial and commercial expansion which we have been

tracing, this growth of navy and merchant marine, this solicitude for colonial expansion, this desire for new markets everywhere, culminated in a fixed determination to play a greater rôle upon the stage of world affairs and one more commensurate with what the Germans felt to be their real importance among the peoples. World policy, world empire, world power were phrases increasingly in use, phrases which were somewhat vague and difficult to define but which revealed an ambition, a purpose and a temper that might constitute a serious menace for other nations, that would at least constitute a challenge. The new attitude was symbolized in the Kaiser's remark that "nothing must go on anywhere in the world in which Germany does not play a part." The word *prestige* entered into the current political vernacular, a word of no precise signification but which was, at best, of unhappy omen for the peace of the world and which might, at the worst, be made to cover a multitude of sins. Bismarck, who certainly was as active in Continental politics as any man of his day, always sought, in his various interventions, some definite end which would merely consolidate Germany's position in Europe and enable her to develop her resources in peace. He never followed so glimmering and uncertain a light as mere prestige. But as the reign of William I had signalized Germany's leadership in Europe, so William II was evidently resolved that his reign should signalize her leadership everywhere, in Europe, in Asia, in Africa, across the seas as well as at home. This would mean a spirited foreign policy and accordingly we find that, although William II identified himself whole-heartedly with all those activities of his people which have been described, his dominating interest was his international rôle. He was the adequate and loquacious spokesman of the new national mood, an explosive, unstable, exuberant, impetuous spokesman, whose utterances were often calculated to alarm his neighbors and to keep the world in troubled suspense. Such utterances were plentifully interlarded with warm expressions of devotion to the cause of international concord, but no candid biographer of William II can successfully maintain that his ways were ways of pleasantness and that all his paths were peace. Few sovereigns have made as many pacific declarations as did he, few have inspired less confidence by them. For William had a way of talking of peace that was singularly warlike and that might be easily confounded with an appeal to arms. Moreover the second half of the nineteenth century had known a monarch who had constantly protested his love of peace and yet whose reign had been a succession of wars,

the last of which had been fatal for his country and his dynasty. Was William the Second a more sincere pacifist than Napoleon the Third?

Even if he was, and there was little to show that such was the case, there were features of the public mind of Germany that were disquieting. Germany was evidently no longer content with the remarkable successes she had won in the economic sphere. As Prussia's leadership in Germany continued to assert itself more and more emphatically, certain modes of thought, certain sentiments and ambitions characteristic of Prussia as revealed in her history, became more and more general throughout the Empire, an aggressiveness of manner, an enormous pride of race, an ambition for power, a feeling that Germany ought to play a rôle in world affairs proportionate to the size of her population and her wealth and culture, and a belief in force as the means of acquiring whatever the nation might desire, or think its due. This heightened tone and temper, this aggressiveness and touchiness, were increasingly expressed after 1900. Along with all this went the assertion, frequent to the point of weariness, of the superiority of Germans over all other peoples, of the claim that Germany was destined in the modern world to play the rôle that Rome had played in the ancient, that she had a high and holy mission to achieve. "God has called us," exclaimed the Kaiser, "to civilize the world; we are the missionaries of human progress." And again, "The German people will be the block of granite on which our Lord will be able to erect and achieve the civilization of the world." Editors, pamphleteers, politicians, historians, philosophers, the so-called "Intellectuals," as well as high-flying military men, and even Socialists, sounded the same note of national self-esteem and of discontent with the existing situation. The history of national conceit is as vulgar as it is sometimes diverting. Among the oldest of phenomena it gains nothing in attractiveness by repeated exhibition. The theory that this nation or that is a chosen people, a supreme, illuminated leader of mankind, is justified neither by history nor by common sense. From the intellectual point of view nothing could be more tawdry and pretentious than such national self-inflation. If there is anything clear in this world it is that civilization is a highly co-operative undertaking, that it is not the work, largely or chiefly, of one selected people. This would appear the most obvious and tritest of truths yet the world has repeated need of being reminded of it. No doubt similar expressions could be found in other literatures, noisily claiming superiority for

other nations, but they would be found to be infrequent and innocuous in comparison with the overwhelming volume of such utterances in Germany. It was a dangerously swollen stream of national self-exaltation that was coursing through the German mind in the decade or two that immediately preceded the World War. What were isolated and generally insignificant voices in other countries became there a deafening chorus. The prevalent German psychology was preparing a grave international crisis.

PAN-GERMANISM

One of the most strident voices in this chorus of self-adulation, in this advocacy of the nation's special mission, was that which issued from the Pan-German League, an imperialistic and propagandist organization founded in 1894. Covering the whole country with a network of branches, standing outside and above the various political parties, this society developed multiple agencies of action upon public opinion. It was aggressive and chauvinistic. It advocated a policy of widespread territorial aggrandizement, which should realize the dream of the poet Arndt that the German Empire should extend as far as the German language is spoken. As there were Germans in parts of Austria, Switzerland, Holland, Luxemburg, and Belgium, these "brothers" ought to be redeemed as quickly as possible. The Pan-Germanists harped much upon ethnic theories, some of which were monuments of absurdity. None of the non-Germanic elements within the Empire, the Poles, the Danes, the French, were to be expelled from it out of devotion to the principle of ethnic unity, but the German-speaking people outside were to be brought in. The fact that the arguments given were often preposterous, that the propaganda was a threat at the neighbors of Germany who saw their integrity menaced, that the incessant agitation carried on in books and pamphlets, in the press and on the platform was calculated to arouse and did arouse widespread apprehension and resentment, did not deter the Pan-German League from carrying on its campaign with energy from the day of its foundation down to the outbreak of the war. While the Berlin government often denounced the active and compromising League before Europe, nevertheless the League exercised an increasing influence upon the governing authorities. Its insistence upon an aggressive foreign policy, its constant advocacy of world empire as the supreme aim of the nation, its praise of force as the method of solving questions of power, its extravagant lauda-

tion of everything German and its equally extravagant criticism of other peoples, all were so many contributions to national self-exaltation and to international unrest. One of the most sympathetic and intelligent of foreign students of contemporary Germany, Dawson, has given it as his opinion that "perhaps no body of political propaganda has on the whole exerted a more sinister or more immoral influence upon a nation's mind than that of this powerful organization, whose predatory doctrines implied the practical repudiation of international faith and the negation of public right." The same author quotes a recent German writer as saying of the Pan-German League: "Well as it may have acted as a national leaven amongst the Germans at home and abroad, it has greatly injured the reputation of Germany abroad by its fulsome boasting of the power of the Empire and its naïve depreciation of foreign nationalities."

THE PERSONALITY OF THE EMPEROR

But while Pan-Germanism cannot be ignored in any history of the present age, in any study of German psychology, we must not pass by other factors making for uncertainty or trouble. We must render unto Caesar what is due unto Caesar, and in the annals of our day the personality of William II has occupied a conspicuous and important position. Closely and enthusiastically associated with that economic expansion which brought Germany a sudden and hitherto unknown prosperity, William II was as reactionary in some ways as he was progressive in others. His conception of the royal office was, as we have already said, thoroughly medieval. "You Germans have only one will and that is my will; there is only one law, and that is my law," is one of his revealing epigrams. "The will of the king, that is the supreme law," was another. "As I will, so I order," was a third. And still another was: "There is only one master in the land; I am he and I will tolerate no other beside me." And again, "Looking upon myself as the instrument of the Lord, without regard for the opinions and intentions of the day, I go my way, which is devoted solely to the welfare and peaceful development of the Fatherland." Entertaining such serene and exalted views of his powers and of their divine origin it was of course inevitable that William II should resolve to play the central and supreme rôle in the state. With such a conception of his mission he was not likely to efface himself behind either a ministry or a parliament. In fact his reign was one of "personal

rule" and therefore his personality, his qualities and defects, his thought and the limitations of his thought, were factors in the evolution of Germany, factors so direct and palpable, that no historian is at liberty to ignore them.

One quality which the greatest of his predecessors on the throne of Prussia had possessed and which he conspicuously lacked was the ability to choose wisely his collaborators, or, having chosen them, to support them loyally. Between 1888 and 1914 William II had five chancellors and over eighty ministers: Bismarck, whom he summarily dismissed after two years; Caprivi, a general inexperienced in political affairs; Hohenlohe, an aristocrat of conspicuous tact and lack of will; Bülow, a diplomat without principle but with much finesse and elegance of manner; Bethmann-Hollweg, a professional office-holder, of wide practical knowledge of administration but without suppleness and adaptability, rigid, rather doctrinaire. None of the five received that steady, loyal support which had been the making of Bismarck under William I. The center of the stage was occupied by the monarch whose vanity was obvious, who did not enjoy contact with really superior personalities, and did not solicit their aid, and who himself could not supply the qualities of intelligence, firmness, foresight, and technical competence which the state ought to command, if not in the sovereign, at least in the sovereign's chief assistants. Instead of these qualities we see in William II a masterful will, an impulsive character, a spontaneous, capricious, unstable, extremely active personality, an eager but superficial mind with a pronounced penchant for the dramatic, the histrionic, and with a facility of utterance, an oratorical intemperance, that could only be assuaged by innumerable, and frequently indiscreet, harangues on every subject and on every occasion. While steadfast and unvarying in his pursuits of certain objects, such as the creation of a navy and an army that should be always powerful and always ready, there was nevertheless a certain incoherence in the policies of William II, a certain fluctuating tendency, which were indicative of weakness and indecision, and which caused his reign to contrast, behind its generally imposing exterior, unfavorably with that of William I, a less showy figure, less self-assertive, less theatrical, but more solid, and guided with maturer judgment and wider knowledge. A lack of unity in the political direction of the German Empire was one of the outstanding features of this reign. Royal energy is no substitute for perspicacity.

THE PRINCIPLE OF NATIONALITY

There were still other disquieting elements in the situation of Germany besides Pan-Germanism, ministerial instability and mediocrity, a feeble and divided parliament and an impulsive and autocratic emperor. One of the most important forces operative in the nineteenth century was the principle of nationality. Aroused by the French Revolution, intensified by the Napoleonic wars and by the reaction which followed, that force gradually remade considerable parts of the map of Europe. The rise of the Balkan states, the unification of Italy, the creation of the German Empire were among its triumphs. But that principle was a two-edged sword. While it contributed to the liberation of certain states it threatened the dismemberment of others. It cut to pieces most of the Turkish Empire in Europe. It was suspended like the sword of Damocles over the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. If it should ever be directed at the Russian Empire it might effect considerable changes there. The principle of nationality is a dissolving as it is also a unifying principle. Closely connected as it is with the principles of modern liberalism, recognizing as it does the right of peoples to govern themselves, it may prove harmless to those countries, like France, which are essentially homogeneous, but it is a dangerous theory for complex countries, for countries that include peoples really distinct or which consider themselves distinct.

But while this principle, the great thought of the reign of Napoleon III, had greatly served the cause of German unification, nevertheless it had not made it. Bismarck's policy had rested upon no such romantic base, but upon the self-interest, primarily of Prussia, secondarily of Germany. When the operation of this principle was favorable to his plans Bismarck willingly exploited it; when it was unfavorable he ignored it. And the German Empire which he created rested upon a denial of the famous principle, in several respects. On the periphery of Prussia and of Germany were several subject peoples which resented their condition and protested against it. Prussia had incorporated within her kingdom Danish and Polish peoples, and Germany possessed a subject territory in Alsace-Lorraine. These conquered and protesting peoples were subjected to a régime that was in each instance odious and oppressive. They were too feeble successfully to challenge the supremacy of their German masters. Nevertheless, as open sores, as the victims of

injustice, they weakened the German Empire morally and somewhat compromised her. Germany had her problem of nationalities, as had Austria and Turkey, although in a less acute form.

The Poles had been conquered in the eighteenth century, the Danes in 1864, the Alsatians and Lorrainers in 1870. But while the Germans might conquer they knew not how to win, to assimilate.

In 1914 Germany was as far from the goal as ever. On the fringes of the Empire were various conquered and exasperated peoples whose dislike of German rule was kept active and was ever sharpened by the character of that rule. For Poles and Alsatians and Danes there was no equality of treatment with the Germans. They shared to a large extent the economic prosperity of the Empire, and they benefited from some of the legislation of the country with which they were associated, notably that establishing the system of social insurance. But they were subject peoples and they were made to feel in numerous and galling ways the inferiority of their position and the fragility of their rights and liberties. Indeed they were often made to feel that they had no rights whatever which their German masters were bound to respect. Not only were their natural and legitimate demands ignored or treated with contempt, but the ingenuity and harshness of their masters, in attempting to make them something which they were not and which they had no desire to be, revolted their consciences and aroused a grim and vigorous spirit of resistance which in turn was met by renewed oppression. The policy of compulsory Germanization failed in the end, but it created so passionate a feeling of resentment, so deep a sense of wrongs inflicted and endured, that the German Empire was unquestionably weakened both materially and morally.

Such then were some of the shadows upon the brilliant picture of German prosperity and power in the closing years of the reign of William II. Strong on land, strong on sea, growing amazingly in population and in wealth, progressing by leaps and bounds in the markets of the world, rich in the development of the sciences, pure and applied, nevertheless not all was well with Germany. The disaffection of her conquered peoples, while powerless to disrupt, was, however, an annoying and a weakening element in the state. A graver weakness lay in the character and operation of some of her institutions, which, as time went by, aroused an increasingly vigorous and acrimonious criticism among the Germans. Despite the formidable appearance of power offered to the gaze of the world by the German

Empire, there were many phenomena that showed that the national life was not in a healthy condition, and a Swiss publicist of great knowledge and acumen was able to show convincingly, in a book published in 1913,¹ that the Empire was already caught in a serious and dangerous crisis, growing out of the spirit of her institutions, the weakness of her government, the discontent of her democracy, resentful of repression and clamoring for recognition, the impotence and confusion of her parliament, the corroding disaffection of her subject nationalities. Let us examine some of these factors of the situation.

THE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS OF GERMANY

In the political world the rise of the Social Democratic party was the most important phenomenon. It represented not merely a desire for a revolution in the economic sphere, it also represented a protest against the autocratic government of the ruler, a demand for democratic institutions. While Germany had a Constitution and a Parliament, the monarch was invested with vast power. Parliament did not control the Government, as the ministers were not responsible to it. There was freedom of speech in Parliament, but practically during most of this reign it did not exist outside. Hundreds of men were, during the last twenty years of William II, imprisoned for such criticisms of the Government as in other countries are the current coin of discussion. This is the crime of *lèse-majesté*, which, as long as it exists, prevents a free political life. The growth of the Social Democratic party to some extent represented mere liberalism, not adherence to the economic theory of the Socialists. It was the great reform and opposition party of Germany. It had, in 1907, the largest popular vote of any party, 3,260,000.² Yet the Conservatives with less than 1,500,000 votes elected in 1907 eighty-three members to the Reichstag to the forty-three of the Socialists. The reason was this: the electoral districts had not been altered since they were originally laid out in 1869-1871, though population had vastly shifted from country to city. The cities had grown rapidly since then, and it was in industrial centers that the Socialists were strongest. Berlin with a population in 1871 of 600,000 had six members in the Reichstag. It still had only that number

¹ W. Martin, *La Crise Politique de l'Allemagne Contemporaine*, Paris, 1913.

² In 1912 the Socialists cast 4,250,000 votes and elected 110 members to the Reichstag, thus displacing the Center as the largest party in that body.

in 1907, although its population was over 2,000,000, and although it would have been entitled to twenty members had equal electoral districts existed. These the Socialists demanded, but for this very reason the Government refused the demand. The extreme opponents of the Social Democrats even urged that universal suffrage, guaranteed by the Constitution, be abolished, as the only way to crush the party. To this length the Government did not dare to go.

In the closing years of the reign of William II several questions were much discussed; the question of the electoral reform in Prussia; of the redistribution of seats, both in the Prussian Landtag and the Imperial Reichstag; and of ministerial responsibility.

Prussia was the state that in practice ruled the German Empire. This was what was intended by Bismarck when he drew up the Constitution of the Empire, it was precisely the object of his entire policy. The Constitution was based on the two chief articles of Bismarck's creed, the power of the monarch and the ascendancy of Prussia, and such was the accepted idea of the governing classes down to the outbreak of the World War. As was said in 1914 by Prince von Bülow, the most important Chancellor of the Empire since Bismarck, "Prussia attained her greatness as a country of soldiers and officials, and as such she was able to accomplish the work of German union; to this day she is still, in all essentials, a state of soldiers and officials." The governing classes were, in Prussia, which, in turn, governed Germany, the monarchy, the aristocracy, and a bureaucracy of military and civil officials, responsible to the King alone. The determining factor in the state was the personality of the King.

Neither the Empire, nor the Kingdom of Prussia, was governed by democratic institutions. The Kingdom lagged far behind the Empire, and, so great was its power, impeded the development of liberty in the Empire. Prussia in 1914 was a country of 40,000,000 people. It had had a legislature of two chambers since 1850, and the lower house of the legislature was chosen by universal suffrage. Every Prussian man who had attained his twenty-fifth year had the vote. Was Prussia, therefore, a democracy? Not exactly, for this universal suffrage was most marvelously manipulated. The exercise of the right to vote was so arranged that the ballot of the poor man was practically annihilated. Universal suffrage was rendered illusory. The way in which this was done has already been described. The voters were divided in each electoral district into three classes according to

wealth. The amount of taxes, paid by the district, was divided into three equal parts. Those taxpayers who paid the first third were grouped into one class; those, more numerous, who paid the second third, into another class; those who paid the remainder, into still another class. The result was that a very few rich men were set apart by themselves, the less rich by themselves, and the poor by themselves. Each of these groups, voting separately, elected an equal number of delegates to a convention, which convention chose the representatives of that constituency to the lower house of the Prussian Parliament.

Thus in every electoral convention two-thirds of the members belonged to the wealthy or well-to-do class. There was no chance in such a system for the poor, for the masses. This system gave an enormous preponderance of political power to the rich. The first class consisted of very few men, in some districts of only one; the second was sometimes twenty times as numerous, the third sometimes a hundred, or even a thousand times. Thus, though every man had the suffrage the vote of a single rich man might have as great weight as the votes of a thousand workingmen. Universal suffrage was thus manipulated in such a way as to defeat democracy decisively and to consolidate a privileged class in power in the only branch of the government that had even the appearance of being of popular origin. Bismarck, no friend of liberalism, once characterized this electoral system as the worst ever created. Its shrieking injustice was shown by the fact that in 1900 the Social Democrats, who actually cast a majority of the votes, got only seven seats out of nearly 400. It was one of the most undemocratic systems in existence.

In 1908 there were 293,000 voters in the first class, 1,065,240 in the second, 6,324,079 in the third. The first class represented 4 per cent., the second 14 per cent., the third 82 per cent. of the population. In Cologne the first class comprised 370 electors, the second 2,584, while the third had 22,324. The first class chose the same number of electors as the third. Thus 370 rich men had the same voting capacity as 22,324 proletarians. In Saarbrücken the Baron von Stumm formed the first class all by himself and announced complacently that he did not suffer from his isolation. In one of the Berlin districts Herr Heffte, a manufacturer of sausages, formed the first class.

This system would seem to have been outrageous enough by reason of its monstrous plutocratic caste. But this is not all. This reactionary edifice was appropriately crowned by another device — oral voting. Neither in the primary nor the secondary





voting was a secret ballot used. Voting was not even by a written or printed ballot, but by the spoken word. Thus every one exercised his right publicly, in the presence of his superior or his patron or employer or his equals or the official representative of the King. In such a country as Prussia, where the police were notoriously ubiquitous, what a weapon for absolutism! The great landowners, the great manufacturers, the State, could easily bring all the pressure they desired to bear upon the voter, exercising his wretched rudiment of political power. Needless to say, under such a system as this the working classes were almost entirely unrepresented in the Prussian legislature.

Again, with the exception of a thoroughly insignificant measure passed in 1906, no changes were made in the electoral districts of Prussia after 1858. No account was taken of the changes in the population, and there were consequently great disparities between the various districts. Thus, in a recent election in the Province of East Prussia, the actual ratio of inhabitants to each deputy was 63,000, while in Berlin it was 170,000. In one election, 3,000,000 inhabitants of four large Prussian districts returned nine representatives, while three other millions, divided among forty smaller districts, returned 66. Naturally, the demand grew constantly louder that many districts should be partially or wholly disfranchised or merged with others, and that other districts should receive a larger representation. No attempt, however, was made to meet this demand.

In the Empire, also, a similar problem became yearly more acute. In 1871, Germany was divided into 397 constituencies for the Reichstag. The number remained the same from that time down to the war and, indeed, until the Reichstag disappeared in the convulsions of the closing months of 1918. Not a single district gained or lost in representation. Yet from 1871 to 1914 the population of the Empire increased from about forty-one millions to over sixty-five millions, and there was a great shifting in population from the country to the cities. One of the divisions of Berlin, with a population of 697,000, elected one representative, whereas the petty principality of Waldeck, with a population of 59,000, elected one. The 851,000 voters of Greater Berlin returned eight members; the same number of voters in fifty of the smaller constituencies returned forty-eight. A reform of these gross inequalities was widely demanded, but the demand passed unheeded.

Another subject much discussed during the later years of the Empire was that concerning ministerial responsibility. The in-

discretions of Emperor William II made this from time to time a burning question. An interview with him, in which he spoke with great freedom of the strained relations between Germany and Great Britain, was published in the London *Telegraph* on October 28, 1908. At once was seen a phenomenon not witnessed in Germany since the founding of the Empire. There was a violent protest against the irresponsible actions of the Emperor, actions subject to no control, and yet easily capable of bringing about a war. Newspapers of all shades of party affiliation displayed a freedom of utterance and of censure unparalleled in Germany. All parties in the Reichstag expressed their emphatic disapproval. The incident, however, was not sufficient to bring about the introduction of the system of the responsibility of ministers for all the acts of the monarch, and the control of the ministry by the majority of the Reichstag, in short, the parliamentary system in its essential features.

Neither in the Empire, nor in the Kingdom of Prussia, nor in any of the other states that composed the Empire, did the elected chamber control the Government. In every case the Prince had an absolute veto. Where there were second chambers, as in many of the states, they were not elected by the voters, but were either based on heredity or on appointment by the ruler or by certain narrow organizations. In any case the second chambers were a bulwark of a privileged class. And in Prussia, as we have seen, even the so-called popular house was merely another name for a privileged class. Neither in the Empire nor in the individual states were the ministers controlled by the popular assemblies. The assemblies might vote a lack of confidence as often as they felt like it. The ministers would go right on as long as the Emperor, King, Grand Duke, or Prince desired. In none of the German states could the constitution be amended without the consent of the sovereign of that state. The constitution of the Empire could not be amended without the consent of one man, William II, for a constitutional amendment must be passed not only by the Reichstag but by the Bundesrath, and the constitution provided that no amendment could pass the Bundesrath if fourteen votes were cast against it. In that body Prussia had seventeen votes and those votes were cast as the King of Prussia directed. If every individual in Germany except this one, and including the other Kings and Dukes, had desired a change in the constitution they could not have secured it if William II said "No"!

The power of the Prussian crown was virtually absolute—

"absolutism under constitutional forms," as Rudolph Gneist, once considered in Germany a great authority on public law, said years ago. In the economic sphere Germany was enterprising, progressive, successful, highly modern; in the intellectual sphere she was active and productive; but in the political sphere she was in a state of arrested development. And it had been the amazing triumphs of Bismarck, based on force, that had caused the arrest. German legislatures were impotent and ineffective. For all practical purposes the Reichstag was merely a debating club, and a debating club that had no power of seeing that its will was carried out. As late as January, 1914, Dr. Friedrich Naumann, of "Middle Europe" fame, described the humiliating position of the body of which he was a member in the following words:

"We on the Left are altogether in favor of the parliamentary régime, by which we mean that the Reichstag cannot forever remain in a position of subordination. Why does the Reichstag sit at all, why does it pass resolutions, if behind it is a waste paper basket into which these resolutions are thrown? The problem is to change the impotence of the Reichstag into some sort of power. . . . The man who compared this House to a hall of echoes was not far wrong. . . . When one asks the question, 'What part has the Reichstag in German history as a whole?' it will be seen that the part is a very limited one."

The effective seat of political power in Germany was, as it had always been, in the monarchs. Germans might have the right to vote, but of what value was it if the vote led nowhere, if the body elected by the voters was carefully and completely nullified by other bodies, princes and aristocratic hereditary upper chambers, over which the voters had no control?

Prussia was the strongest obstacle the democratic movement of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries encountered. Germany in 1914 was less liberal than in 1848. The most serious blow that the principle of representative government received during that century was the one she received at the hands of Bismarck. We have expert testimony of the highest and most official sort that the effects of that blow were not outlived. Prince von Bülow, writing in 1914, said: "Liberalism, in spite of its change of attitude in national questions, has to this day not recovered from the catastrophic defeat which Prince Bismarck inflicted nearly half a century ago on the party of progress which still clings to the ideals and principles of 1848."

The situation was still further defined by the utterance of

Professor Delbrück, successor to Treitschke in the chair of modern history in the University of Berlin, who wrote in 1914 to the effect that "Anyone who has any familiarity with our officers and generals knows that it would take another Sedan, inflicted on us instead of by us, before they would acquiesce in the control of the Army by the German Parliament." Here was a very clear indication as to where real power lay in Germany. One has only to recall the great chapters in English history which tell of the struggle for liberty to know that it has been obtained solely by the recognition of the supremacy of Parliament over royal prerogative, over military power.

The German state was the most autocratic in Western Europe; it was also the most militaristic. Fundamental individual liberties, regarded as absolutely vital in England, France, America, and many other states, had never been possessed by Germans, nor were they possessed in 1914. Germany was rich, vigorous, powerful, instructed. It was not free. A military monarchy is the very opposite of a democratic state. Prince von Bülow in his book, *Imperial Germany*, published in 1914, says, "Despite the abundance of merits and the great qualities with which the German nation is endowed, political talent has been denied it." Any citizen of a free country knows that that talent grows only where an opportunity has been given it to grow. It need occasion no surprise that Mommsen, the historian of Rome, writing in 1903, should say of his own country, "There are no longer free citizens." Instead there were industrious, energetic, educated, ambitious, and submissive subjects.¹

¹ In the above section liberal use has been made of a study published by the author in 1917 on *The Government of Germany*.

CHAPTER XVIII

FRANCE UNDER THE THIRD REPUBLIC

WE have seen that the Republic was proclaimed by the Parisians September 4, 1870, as a result of the defeats of the Empire in the Franco-German war, culminating at Sedan. Immediately a Provisional Government of National Defense assumed control. In all this there was no appeal to the people of France, no ratification by them. This Government gave way in February 1871 to a National Assembly of 750 members elected by universal suffrage for the purpose of making peace with Germany. It was felt that the Provisional Government, not popularly chosen, but the creation of a Parisian insurrection, was not competent to settle so grave a matter, involving, as it necessarily would, the cession of territory to the Germans. This National Assembly, which first met at Bordeaux, showed a majority of Monarchists. The reason was that, as Gambetta and the leading Republicans wished to continue the war, and as the mass of peasants wished peace, the latter voted for the opponents of Gambetta, who were chiefly Monarchists. There is no evidence to show that in doing this the peasants were expressing an opinion against the Republic as a form of government and in favor of a Monarchy. They wished the war stopped, and took the most obvious means to that end. The Assembly of Bordeaux made the peace, ceding Alsace and Lorraine, and assuming the enormous war indemnity. But peace did not return to France as a result of the Treaty of Frankfort. The "Terrible Year," as the French call it, of 1870-71 had more horrors in store. Civil war followed the war with the foreigners, shorter, but exceeding it in ferocity, a war between the city of Paris and the Government of France, represented by the Assembly of Bordeaux. That Assembly had, as we have seen, chosen Thiers as "chief of the executive power," pending "the nation's decision as to the definitive form of government." Thus the fundamental question was postponed. Thiers was chosen for no definite term; he was the servant of the Assembly to carry out its wishes, and might be dismissed by it at any moment.

THE COMMUNE

Between the Government and the people of Paris serious disagreements immediately arose, which led quickly to the war of the Commune. Paris had proclaimed the Republic. But the Republic was not yet sanctioned by France, and existed only *de facto*. On the other hand, the National Assembly was controlled by Monarchists, and it had postponed the determination of the permanent institutions of the country. Did not this simply mean that it would abolish the Republic and proclaim the Monarchy, when it should judge the moment propitious? This fear, only too well justified, that the Assembly was hostile to the Republic, was the fundamental cause of the Commune. Paris lived in daily dread of this event. Paris was ardently Republican. For ten years under the Empire it had been returning Republicans to the Chamber of Deputies. These men did not propose to let a coup d'état like that of Louis Napoleon in 1851 occur again. Various acts of the Assembly were well adapted to deepen and intensify the feeling of dread uncertainty. The Assembly showed its distrust of Paris by voting in March 1871 that it would henceforth sit in Versailles. In other words, a small and sleepy town, and one associated with the history of Monarchy, was to be the capital of France instead of the great city which had sustained the tremendous siege and by her self-sacrifice and suffering had done her best to hold high the honor of the land. Not only was Paris wounded in her pride by this act, which showed such unmistakable suspicion of her, but she suffered also in her material interests at a time of great financial distress. Property-owners, merchants, workmen were affected by this decision which really removed the capital from Paris. The prosperity of Paris, sadly undermined by the war with the Germans, now received an additional blow from the Government of France.

Other highly imprudent acts of the Assembly tended in the same direction. The payment of rents, debts, notes falling due, had been suspended during the siege. The Parisians wished this suspension prolonged until business should revive. The Assembly refused to grant this, but ordered the payment of all such debts to be made within forty-eight hours. The result was that within four days 150,000 Parisians found themselves exposed to legal prosecution because of inability to pay their debts. This meant immense hardship to the business world.

Again, the majority of workingmen still without employment

had as their only means of support their pay as members of the National Guard. This was now suppressed by the Assembly, except for those supplied with certificates of poverty. The economic misery of large numbers was thus increased at the very time they needed relief, after the harrowing siege. The National Guard included most of the able-bodied male population of the city. It had defended the city during the siege, and its arms were left in its hands after the peace. As soon as the siege was raised the rich and well-to-do members of the Guard left Paris in large numbers, perhaps 150,000 of them, to rejoin their families in the provinces and abroad. The poor remained, perforce, without work, and now in most instances deprived of their franc and a half a day — an immense mass of discontented men, wretched, suspicious, armed, and inflamed by every rumor that the Republic was in danger.

There was also in Paris a considerable population having diverse revolutionary tendencies — Anarchists, Jacobins, Socialists. The last party had grown under the reign of Napoleon III, and had a large following among the working classes. Among the restless, discontented, poverty-stricken masses of the great city, their leaders worked with success. There arose out of the confusion of the time the idea of the commune, or the individual unit of the nation, the city, or the village. It was held that in the future government of France emphasis should be given to the commune, that it should be vested with large powers to exercise as it saw fit, that the rôle of the state as a whole should be circumscribed. Looked at in one light this was the old idea that France was too highly centralized, local government too limited, too much controlled by the state. Let France be decentralized, was the cry. Each commune should be largely independent, uncontrolled in most matters by the central government. Such a scheme had this connection with the situation of the hour: it would free the cities, most of which were republican, in great measure from the control of the central government, which in the Assembly was monarchical. It would also be of advantage to the Socialists, who aspired to invest the commune with extensive powers in order that they might be used to bring about in each unit an economic and social revolution. Thus the radical Republicans, suspicious of the Assembly and prone to believe that the Republic was in danger, and a revolutionary party influenced by Socialists and inciting the people of the crowded workingmen's quarters to revolt, both emphasized the importance of the commune.

It was through the National Guard that this confused discontent gained expression. The Guard chose in February 1871 a committee of sixty to direct it, and to prevent any action against Paris and against the Republic on the part of the National Assembly. It removed some cannon to one of the strongest points in the city. The Government, believing an insurrection likely, and not willing to strengthen it by leaving the cannon in the hands of the disaffected, endeavored to seize them on March 18, 1871, but failed. The National Guard protected them; popular defiance of the Government had begun. The insurrectionary spirit spread with great rapidity throughout Paris until it developed into a war between Paris and the Versailles Government. Two of the generals of the latter were seized and shot by the insurgents. The Government forces were withdrawn from Paris by Thiers, and the city was left entirely in the hands of the insurgents.

This action of the national government left a free field for the insurgents in the city. The more radical element now secured complete control. An election was held in Paris on March 26th of a General Council of 90 members to serve as the government of the commune. This government, commonly called the Commune, organized itself by appointing ministers or heads of various departments. It adopted the republican calendar of the Revolution, and the red flag of the Socialists. This government consisted of revolutionists, but the revolutionists differed widely and bitterly from each other, and in these divisions lay their weakness and the cause of their ultimate overthrow. The ideal of the new government, as announced to the people, was the decentralization of France. The central government should simply consist of delegates from the communes. France was to be a kind of federation of these local units. The Communists vehemently denounced as a slander that they were seeking to destroy the unity of France, as worked out by the French Revolution: they were simply trying to abolish the kind of unity "imposed on us up to this day by the Empire, the Monarchy, and Parliamentarism," which had been but "despotic, unintelligent, arbitrary, and onerous centralization." They wished by the new and free and spontaneous unity of the communes, co-operating voluntarily, to abolish the old system of "militarism, officialism, exploitation, stock jobbing, monopolies, and privileges to which the proletariat owes its servitude, and the fatherland its misfortunes and its disasters." They appealed to France to join them. "Let her be our ally in this conflict,

which can only end by the triumph of the communal idea or the ruin of Paris!"¹

This government and this ideal did not succeed, as success depended on defeating the Versailles Government. Troops were sent out from Paris to break up the National Assembly in Versailles, but they failed, their leaders were seized and shot on the spot. The Commune in revenge ordered the arrest of many prominent men in Paris, who were to be kept as "hostages."

To Thiers and the National Assembly the whole affair was infamous. It imperiled the very existence of France. It was a bold and unscrupulous attempt of a single city to defy all France, the more infamous as foreign troops were still in control of the country. For Frenchmen to defy the Government of France, to begin civil war in the presence of the victorious Germans, was bitterly humiliating to the nation before all the world. Some attempts at bringing about a reconciliation were made, but failed. Thiers, to disarm the cry that the Republic was in danger, denied that the Government was preparing to destroy the Republic, flatly contradicted the Communist leaders — "they are lying to France" — and announced that if any such conspiracy existed anywhere he would not lend himself to its execution, and a law was passed, April 14th, enlarging the powers of local governing bodies. But he was emphatic that the unity of France must be preserved, and it was clear that the only way to do this was to put down the insurgents of Paris. This was for some time impossible, as the Assembly had few troops, and those were demoralized. But with the return of soldiers from Switzerland and from Germany, an army of 150,000 men was gotten together. With this army a regular siege of Paris was begun, this time by Frenchmen, Germans who controlled the forts to the north of Paris looking on, the second siege of the unhappy city within a year. Thus civil war succeeded foreign war, surpassing it in bitterness and ferocity. It lasted nearly two months, from April 2d to May 21st, when the Versailles troops forced their entrance into the city. Then followed seven days' ferocious fighting in the streets of Paris, the Communists more and more desperate and frenzied, the Versailles army more and more revengeful and sanguinary. This was the "bloody week," during which Paris suffered much more than she had from the bombardment of the Germans — a week of fearful destruction of life and property. The horrors of incendiarism were added to those of slaughter. "Everything,"

¹ Anderson, *Constitutions and Documents*, No. 126.

says Hanotaux, of May 23d, "was burning; there were explosions everywhere. A night of terror. The Porte Saint-Martin, the church of Saint-Eustache, the Rue Royale, the Rue de Rivoli, the Tuileries, the Palais-Royal, the Hôtel de Ville, the left bank from the Légion d'Honneur to the Palais de Justice, and the Police Office were immense red braziers, and above all rose lofty blazing columns. From outside, all the forts were firing upon Paris. . . . The gunners were cannonading one another across the town, and above the town. Shells fell in every direction. All the central quarters were a battle-field. It was a horrible chaos: bodies and souls in collision over a crumbling world."¹ The Communists shot their hostages. Finally the agony was brought to a close. On May 28th the last insurgents were shot down in the cemetery of Père-Lachaise.

The revenge taken by the Government possessed no quality of mercy. Racked by the horror of the week, infuriated by the belief that the Communists, seeing their defeat approaching, had made a deliberate attempt to destroy the city, horror-stricken at the murder of the hostages, of whom one was the Archbishop of Paris, it punished right and left summarily. Many were shot on the spot. "The number of men," says Hanotaux, "who perished in this horrible fray, without any other form of law, is estimated at 17,000. The cemeteries, the squares, private or public gardens, saw trenches opened in which nameless corpses were deposited without register and without list, by thousands."² Arrests and trials went on for years. Up to 1875 over 43,000 had been arrested, over 350,000 denounced. The prisoners were judged by courts-martial. Nearly ten thousand were condemned summarily to various punishments, thousands being deported to New Caledonia. It was not until 1879 that an amnesty was passed for the remaining prisoners, and then only owing to the impassioned plea of Gambetta for pity. The result of all this was the deep embitterment of classes against each other. The revolutionary party, crushed and silenced, nourished its hatred of the bourgeoisie, who returned its hatred.

THE GOVERNMENT OF THIERS

Having put down the insurrection of Paris and signed the hard treaty with Germany, France was at peace. She had between July 1870 and June 1871 received such staggering blows

¹ Hanotaux, *Contemporary France*, I, 215.

² Hanotaux, *Ibid.*, 225.

that she had sunk rapidly from the position of the first power on the Continent to the rank of fourth or fifth. Immense destruction of national wealth and national prestige had characterized the Terrible Year. Time was needed for reorganization. France, overwhelmingly crushed, must be built up anew. This work of reconstruction was immediately undertaken by the Government of Thiers. That Government lasted over two years, and its achievements were notable. Thiers had been chosen by the Assembly of Bordeaux "chief of the executive." The Assembly was the only authority in France for several years. It had been elected February 8, 1871, but no definite powers had been vested in it, nor had the length of its term been fixed. Would this Assembly, which had been elected to decide the question of peace and war, consider itself competent to sit longer, to determine the future government of France, and if so, to decide that the government should be a Monarchy, and not the Republic proclaimed by the crowd of Paris on September 4th? These were vital questions, which were, however, but slowly answered. The Assembly remained in power for nearly five years, from February 1871 to December 31, 1875, refusing to dissolve.

On August 31, 1871, it passed the important Rivet law, by which it accepted provisionally the existing government, declared that the chief of the executive should take the title of *President of the French Republic*, and that he should be responsible to the Assembly. The law also proclaimed that the Assembly possessed constituent powers, and was under the obligation to exercise them at the proper time. No definite term was established for the presidency. It was to last, so the Rivet law itself stated, as long as the Assembly lasted. The government, therefore, was one strictly by parliament. All sovereignty was declared vested in the Assembly. Thiers was really simply leader of the majority. As soon as he lost his majority he stepped down and out (1873).

But before that time came he accomplished an extraordinary work. Urging the parties to drop their merely partisan interests for the time being, he appealed to their patriotism, which was not lacking. France must be reorganized, the wounds of the past year healed. After that, let the question of the final form of government be brought forward.

The financial burdens created by the war, the Commune, and the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, were found, on examination, to amount to over fifteen billion francs, or about three billion dollars. The loss in life was great. It is estimated that about

140,000 men were killed, and more than that number wounded; that about 340,000 entered hospitals for various diseases. France lost about 1,600,000 inhabitants by the cession of Alsace-Lorraine, and apart from that, her population suffered a loss of about a half a million.

The most imperative task confronting the Government was to get the Germans out of the country. By the Treaty of Frankfurt France was to pay within three years a war indemnity of five billion francs. Until this was accomplished there was to be a German army of occupation in France, supported by France, and occupying a certain number of departments. This army was to be withdrawn gradually, as the instalments of the indemnity were paid. The army at first numbered about 500,000 men and 150,000 horses. The cost of their support was heavy.

Thiers wished to bring about evacuation with the utmost possible speed, in order to remove the humiliation of a victorious foreign soldiery in France, the possibility that their presence might at any moment provoke some incident which would lead to a new war, and also to save millions. Under his leadership the task of paying the Germans was undertaken with energy and carried out with celerity. The first five hundred million francs were paid in July 1871, and the German troops were withdrawn from Normandy. By the end of September 1871 1,500,000,000 had been paid, and troops had been withdrawn from all but twelve departments. By the end of 1871 the army of occupation numbered 150,000 men and 18,000 horses. Payments proceeded rapidly. In September 1873 the final instalment was met, and the last German soldiers left France. Thus French soil was freed nearly six months earlier than was provided by the treaty. This rapid liquidation of the indemnity had been effected by two successful loans contracted by the Government, one in 1871 for over 2,000,000,000 francs, the other in 1872 for nearly 3,500,000,000 francs. The former was oversubscribed two and a half times; the latter over fourteen times. This amazing success bore striking evidence to the wealth of the country. For his great services in this initial work of the reconstruction of France the National Assembly voted that Thiers had "deserved well of the country." That the country shared the sentiment was shown by its spontaneous bestowal of the grateful name, "The Liberator of the Territory."

The two years of Thiers' presidency were notable for the energy and success of the work of rebuilding France. Two measures in particular merit description, the local government

bill, and the bill whereby the army was reconstructed and put on a far larger and sounder basis than ever before.

Local government was partially reorganized in the direction of decentralization. Some of the powers hitherto belonging to the central government were now vested in the departmental and communal councils. Hitherto the prefect, head of the department, and appointed by the central government, had had almost unlimited powers throughout his department. Ever since the Revolution various attempts had been made to reduce this excessive concentration of power in the hands of the officials in Paris. The outbreak of the Commune had made this question acute. A law was passed in 1871 permitting all adult men of a year's residence in the commune to elect the communal council, and in the smaller communes permitting the council to choose the mayor. In all towns of over 20,000 inhabitants, and in the chief towns of departments or *arrondissements*, the mayors were still to be appointed by the central government. The measure was a compromise between Napoleonic centralization and the complete self-government demanded by radical reformers. In only 460 communes would the mayors henceforth be appointed from Paris.

The reconstruction of the army was also urgent. A law was passed in July 1872 which, in its essential features, still remains the basis of the military system of France. The example of Prussia, so successful, was followed. Henceforth there was to be universal compulsory military service. The National Guard was abolished. The new army, based on universal obligatory service, was to be divided into four parts, with various terms: five years in the active army, and different periods in the various reserves. Certain special classes were to be required to give only one year's service, as for instance, young men who showed certain certificates of advanced education. These must, however, pay to the state the amount of 1500 francs. Other classes were exempted entirely from service — ecclesiastics, teachers, and sons of widows, supposed to be supporters of families. The enactment of this law, with the principle of compulsory service for five years in the active army, was one of the most important acts of the early years of the Third Republic. In the face of the threats from Germany, alarmed at this revival of French military power, France went steadily ahead with her projects of reorganization. Not only was a new and large army provided, but fortresses were built, equipment created, all burdensome, yet willingly borne.

In regard to the subjects which grew out of the war, the

terms of peace, and the necessary measures of reconstruction, the Assembly was able to work on the whole harmoniously. But now a question, which could no longer be postponed, and which was highly divisive in its nature, entered upon its acute phase — the question of the permanent form of government. The Republic existed *de facto*, but not in law. It had been merely proclaimed by an insurrectionary body in Paris in September 1870. The Assembly, which was elected in the following February, and which represented all France, proved to be composed, as we have seen, in the majority, of Monarchists. Would these Monarchists consider that they were elected to make a constitution, not simply to determine the question of peace and war? If so, would they not simply declare the restoration of the Monarchy? They did not at first attempt this, probably because they preferred that the odium of a peace relinquishing French territory should attach to the Republic, not to the restored Monarchy. But now that the peace was made, the territory freed, the necessary laws passed, the Monarchists became active. They found they had in Thiers a man who would not abet them in their project. Thiers was originally a believer in constitutional monarchy, but he was not afraid of a republican government, and during the years after 1870 he came to believe that a Republic was, for France, at the close of a turbulent century, the only possible form of government. "There is," he said, "only one throne, and there are three claimants for a seat on it." He discovered a happy formula in favor of the Republic, "It is the form of government which divides us least." And again, "Those parties who want a monarchy do not want the same monarchy." By which phrases he accurately described a curious situation. The Monarchists, while they constituted a majority of the Assembly, were divided into three parties, no one of which was in the majority. There were Legitimists, Orleanists, and Bonapartists. The Legitimists upheld the right of the grandson of Charles X, the Count of Chambord; the Orleanists, the right of the grandson of Louis Philippe, the Count of Paris; the Bonapartists, of Napoleon III, or his son. The Monarchist parties could unite to prevent a definite, explicit establishment of the Republic; they could not unite to establish the monarchy, as each wing wished a different monarch. Out of this division arose the only chance the Third Republic had to live. As the months went by, the Monarchists felt that Thiers was becoming constantly more of a Republican, which was true; not a Republican of affection, but one of reason. He was, therefore, too dangerous a man to

leave in power, as he might, so great was the authority of his name and argument, persuade the former Monarchists to become Republicans. Indeed, it has been estimated that probably about a hundred members of the Assembly were influenced by him in that direction. If a monarchical restoration was to be attempted, therefore, Thiers must be gotten out of the way. But he had thus far been indispensable. Now, however, that peace was made, the finances regulated, the army reorganized, he was considered no longer necessary, and in 1873 was outvoted in the Assembly, and resigned, and Marshal MacMahon was chosen president to prepare the way for the coming monarch.

THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION

Earnest attempts were made forthwith to bring about a restoration of the monarchy. This could be done by a fusion of the Legitimists and the Orleanists. Circumstances were particularly favorable for the accomplishment of such a union. The Count of Chambord had no direct descendants. The inheritance would, therefore, upon his death, pass to the House of Orleans, represented by the Count of Paris. The elder branch would in the course of nature be succeeded by the younger. This fusion seemed accomplished when the Count of Paris visited the Count of Chambord, recognizing him as head of the family. A committee of nine members of the Assembly, representing the Monarchist parties, the Imperialists holding aloof, negotiated during the summer of 1873 with the "King" concerning the terms of restoration. The negotiations were successful on most points, and it seemed as if by the close of the year the existence of the Republic would be terminated and Henry V would be reigning in France. The Republic was saved by the devotion of the Count of Chambord to a symbol. He stated that he would never renounce the ancient Bourbon banner. "Henry V could never abandon the white flag of Henry IV," he had already declared, and from that resolution he never swerved. The tricolor represented the Revolution. If he was to be King of France it must be with his principles and his flag; King of the Revolution he would never consent to be. The Orleanists, on the other hand, adhered to the tricolor, knowing its popularity with the people, knowing that no régime that repudiated the glorious symbol could long endure. Against this barrier the attempted fusion of the two branches of the Bourbon family was shattered. The immediate danger to the Republic was over.

But the Monarchists did not renounce their hope of restoring the monarchy. The Count of Chambord might, perhaps, change his mind: if not, as he had no son, the Count of Paris would succeed him after his death as the lawful claimant to the throne; and the Count of Paris, defender of the tricolor, could then be proclaimed. The Monarchists, therefore, planned merely to gain time. Marshal MacMahon had been chosen executive, as had Thiers, for no definite term. He was to serve during the pleasure of the Assembly itself. Believing that MacMahon would resign as soon as the King really appeared, they voted that his term should be for seven years, expecting that a period of that length would see a clearing up of the situation, either the change of mind or the death of the Count of Chambord. Thus was established the Septennate, or seven-year term, of the president, which still exists. The presidency was thus given a fixed term by the Monarchists, as they supposed, in their own interests. If they could not restore the monarchy in 1873, they could at least control the presidency for a considerable period, and thus prepare an easy transition to the new system at the opportune moment.

But France showed unmistakably that she desired the establishment of a definitive system, that she wished to be through with these provisional arrangements, which only kept party feeling feverish and handicapped France in her foreign relations. France had as yet no constitution, and yet this Assembly, chosen to make peace, had asserted that it was also chosen to frame a constitution, and it was by this assertion that it justified its continuance in power long after peace was made. Yet month after month, and year after year went by and the constitution was not made, nor even seriously discussed. If the Assembly could not, or would not, make a constitution, it should relinquish its power and let the people elect a body that would. But this it steadily refused to do.

There was a dispute even as to what the form of government was at that moment. Was it a Republic or not? It is true that the Assembly had elected a *President of the Republic*. It had thus inferentially ratified the proclamation of the Parisians of September 4, 1870. But was this merely provisional? The Republic needed to be founded on fundamental laws before it could really be considered established.

But not only would the Assembly not frankly proclaim the Republic, even after the attempt to restore "Henry V" had failed, but, on the other hand, it endeavored to stamp out the

Republican propaganda, which was steadily gaining ground among the people under the inspiring leadership of Gambetta. In order to increase its power in this contest with the Republicans, the Assembly altered the local government laws described above. By the law of 1873 the mayors of all the communes in France were to be appointed directly or indirectly by the ministry, and not elected by the local council, as by the law of 1871. This gave the ministry control of a number of office-holders in each town, who must do its bidding. Busts representing the Republic were removed from all public buildings; the name Republic was ostentatiously omitted from public documents. Republican newspapers were prosecuted and harassed in many ways. In a year more than 200 of them were arbitrarily suppressed. Such conduct rendered the Republicans more united and resolute. Gambetta journeyed from town to town, winning over to the Republic by his remarkable eloquence and powers of argumentation "new social classes," now influential by reason of universal suffrage, the lower ranks of the bourgeoisie, and the working class. The party grew steadily. Every day, therefore, the Assembly could less safely appeal to the people by a dissolution, yet with the rising tide of disaffection it must appeal to it or must set about giving the country permanent institutions, as a method of restoring quiet. Just at this time, when feeling ran so high, the Bonapartist party became aggressive, and won a number of successes at elections. The danger of a Bonapartist revival was one of the causes which prompted the Assembly finally to take up seriously the consideration of the constitution. Would not the people rush to the support of the Bonapartists when they saw that the Assembly could not establish the Monarchy and would not establish the Republic? A number of Orleanist members preferred even a republic to another Napoleonic empire, and it was through their secession that the majority shifted in the Assembly to the Republicans. Only, they insisted on making the Republic as *conservative* as possible, with as many of the attributes of monarchy as could be thrown about it. As the Republicans needed the votes of these Orleanists in order to carry through their plans at all, they were forced to make liberal concessions in this direction.

Out of this confused and abnormal situation arose the laws known as the Constitution of 1875; a law on the Organization of the Senate (February 24); on the Organization of the Public Powers (February 25); and on the Relations of the Public Powers (July 16); and other organic laws passed later. At

the beginning of the discussion it was found that the word "republic" was avoided in the texts. Proposed in the form of an amendment, it was voted down. Only later, and by indirection, was it adopted in speaking of the mode of election of "the President of the Republic." Even this phrase, the famous Wallon amendment, was adopted by a majority of only one vote, 353 to 352. Throughout the constitution it is only in connection with the presidential title that the word occurs. There is no formal but only this implicit statement that France is a republic. The difficult word was officially uttered by an Assembly that would have established monarchy if it could have.¹

By the laws of 1875 a legislature consisting of two houses was established, a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies. The Senate was to consist of 300 members, at least forty years of age. The Monarchists wished to have the members appointed by the President. It was finally determined, however, that one-fourth, or 75, should be elected for life by the Assembly itself, the remainder for a term of nine years. The Republicans wished to have these senators chosen by direct universal suffrage, but the Assembly wished to limit the sphere of universal suffrage as much as possible. It was finally decided that the senators of each department should be chosen by an electoral college. This electoral college should consist of various classes, the deputies from that department, members of the general department council, members of the arrondissement or district councils, and, more important than all the others because more numerous, of one delegate from each commune of the department, chosen by the communal council. The Monarchists insisted on this arrangement as likely to give them control of the Senate. No distinction was made between communes. A large city and a small country village were each to send one delegate to the college which should choose the senator. As the representatives from the country communes or villages were the more numerous class, and as the Monarchists, being large landed proprietors, had great influence in the rural districts, it was likely that the Senate could thus be controlled by them. One-third of the elective senators was to be renewed every three years.

There was also to be a Chamber of Deputies, elected by universal suffrage for a four-year term. The Senate and Chamber of Deputies, meeting together, should constitute a National

¹ A constitutional amendment adopted in 1884 renders the matter explicit: "The republican form of government shall not be made the subject of a proposed revision."

Assembly. Organized in this form they should have the power to elect the President and to revise the Constitution. The President is chosen for seven years, and may be re-elected. There is no vice-president, no succession provided by law. In case of a vacancy in the presidency the National Assembly meets and elects a new President, generally within forty-eight hours. The President has the right to initiate legislation, as have the members of the two chambers, the duty to promulgate laws after their passage, to superintend their execution, the pardoning power, the direction of the army and navy, and the appointment to all civil and military positions. He may, with the consent of the Senate, dissolve the Chamber of Deputies before the expiration of its legal term and order a new election. But these powers are merely nominal, for the reason that every act of the President must be countersigned by a minister, who thereby becomes responsible for the act, the President being irresponsible, except in the case of high treason.¹

The most fundamental feature of the French Republic, as established by the laws of 1875, is the parliamentary system, as worked out in England. "The ministers are jointly and severally responsible to the Chambers for the general policy of the government, and individually for their personal acts," says the law. The ministry, therefore, is the real executive, and it is practically a committee of the Chambers, chosen to exercise the executive power under the nominal direction of the President. The ministry must resign as soon as it loses support of the Chambers. The Chambers, therefore, possess control of the executive, as of the legislative power. These powers, instead of being carefully separated, as in our constitution, are really fused, as in the English system. Parliament is the center and head of power. The President's position resembles that of the constitutional monarch; one of ceremonial representation of the state, without real power, other than that which may flow from his personality, his powers of suggestion or advice, which the ministers may listen to or not. The ministers are responsible to parliament, that is, practically to the Chamber of Deputies, as the popular chamber. It is the Chamber that really makes and unmakes ministries by its votes, that is, controls the executive branch of the government. The Chamber has proved able even to force the President to resign before the expiration of his

¹ These laws are given in Anderson, *Constitutions and Documents*, No. 133; also in Dodd, *Modern Constitutions*, I, 286-294; in French in Lowell, *Governments and Parties*, II, 337-344.

seven-year term by refusing to support any ministry, thus bringing all state action to a standstill. In 1875 France had a constitution more democratic than that of England or the United States, in both of which countries the popularly elected chamber encountered serious checks.

Not that this was apparent to the Assembly that created this system. Not for some years was it clear that the democratic element of this constitution was to be the vital part. The monarchical assembly that established the parliamentary republic in 1875 thought that it had introduced sufficient monarchical elements into it to curb the aggressiveness of democracy and to facilitate a restoration of the Monarchy at some convenient season. By reducing the presidency to a nominal position it aimed to prevent one-man power, the emergence of a Bonaparte, as in 1848 and 1851. The Senate, it thought, would be a monarchical stronghold. And the President and Senate could probably keep the Chamber of Deputies in check by their power of dissolving it. The Republicans accepted this system as better than monarchy or the existing provisional scheme. It bore the name Republic, and they hoped to make it a Republic in more than name. Some Radical Republicans, however, denounced the Constitution as a mockery.

The Constitution of 1875 was plainly a compromise between opposing forces, neither of which could win an unalloyed victory. It was as Hanotaux says, "a dose prepared for a convalescent country."

Having completed the Constitutional Laws, the National Assembly which had been in session since February 1871, which had ratified the Treaty of Frankfort, had liberated the territory, and had reorganized the army and local government, dissolved itself December 31, 1875. The elections to the Senate and Chamber of Deputies were held at the beginning of 1876. The Monarchists secured a slight majority in the former, the Republicans a large majority in the latter. MacMahon at first appointed a ministry of Republicans, insisting, however, that three departments were outside politics, therefore not controllable by Parliament — the departments of War, Navy, and Foreign Affairs.

The Monarchists now began a vigorous agitation against the Republicans. They were powerfully supported by the clerical party, which, ever since 1871, had been extremely active. The Republicans resented this intrusion of the Catholic party into politics, and their opinion was vividly expressed by Gambetta,

who in the Chamber threw out a phrase which became famous — "Clericalism — that is our enemy," — meaning that the Roman Catholic Church was the most dangerous opponent of the Republic. These Anti-Republican groups persuaded President MacMahon that he was not bound to accept a ministry at the bidding of the Chambers, that he had the right to a personal policy, a programme of his own. As certain elections of the bodies which participated in the choice of senators were to be held toward the close of 1877, and as they would probably result in the Republicans capturing the Senate, if conducted by a Republican ministry, and as he believed that the triumph of the Republicans would be harmful to France, to the army, to foreign prestige, MacMahon virtually dismissed, May 16, 1877, the Simon ministry, which had the support of the Chamber, and appointed a ministry, composed largely of Monarchists, under the Duke de Broglie. Thereupon, the Senate, representing the same views, consented to the dissolution of the Chamber, and new elections were prepared.

Thus a constitutional question was created — the relation of the Presidency to the Chamber of Deputies. If the President was to resemble the British sovereign, he had no right to a personal policy of his own, no right to dismiss ministers acceptable to Parliament. MacMahon's opinion was that he had that right, and that "if the Chamber did not approve, it remained for the people to decide between him and it" by a dissolution and new elections.

This was a contest for political power between the President and the Senate on the one hand, the Chamber on the other. As the Constitution gave the President and Senate the right to dissolve the Chamber, they had the upper hand, at least until the people voted. A crisis had arisen which involved an interpretation of the Constitution. The President did not consider himself a mere figurehead, did not propose to consider the Chamber of Deputies as supreme.

This question was now fought out before the people. A new Chamber of Deputies was to be chosen. The Broglie ministry used every effort to influence the voters against Gambetta and the Republicans. Republican office-holders were removed and reactionaries put in their place. The political machinery was used to hamper the Republicans, to silence or curb the Republican newspapers. Gambetta coined another famous phrase, when he declared that after the people should have spoken, MacMahon must "either submit or resign." For this he was prosecuted, and

condemned to three months of prison and a fine of 2,000 francs. Official candidates were put forth for the Chamber, supported by the ministry and office-holders. The clergy took an active part in the campaign, supporting the official candidates, and preaching against the Republicans, conduct which in the end was to cost them dear. The struggle was embittered. It was a contest between the monarchical and republican principles, with the clergy, then very influential, in favor of the former. The bishops ordered a supplication for a favorable vote. The supplication was apparently not heard. The Republicans were overwhelmingly victorious. In the new Chamber they had a majority of over a hundred. MacMahon "submitted," and took a Republican ministry.

In the next year, 1878, an election of one-third of the Senate occurred. The Republicans now gained control of that body. With both Chambers Republican, Marshal MacMahon's position became very difficult. The Chambers demanded the retirement from the army of certain generals, who were opposed to the Republicans. MacMahon refused to remove them on the ground that this would be prejudicial to the army, which should be kept out of politics. Rather than acquiesce he resigned the Presidency, January 30, 1879. The National Assembly immediately met and elected Jules Grévy president, a man whose devotion to Republican principles had been known to France for thirty years. For the first time since 1871 the Republicans controlled the Chamber of Deputies, the Senate, and the Presidency. Since that time the Republic has been entirely in the hands of the Republicans.

REPUBLICAN LEGISLATION

Jules Grévy had in 1848 advocated the suppression of the Presidency on the ground that one-man power was dangerous. He now administered the office in a manner sharply contrasting with that of MacMahon. He had no personal policy, he never personally intervened in the conduct of affairs; that was the province of the ministry. His example has been followed by succeeding presidents. Thus the Presidency has lost any suggestion of monarchy it may ever have had. In the war of politics the President is a neutral figure, affiliating with no party.

The Republicans, now completely victorious, and no longer merely on the defensive, shortly broke up into numerous groups. Ministries changed with great frequency, and it is not in the permutations and combinations of politicians that the main sig-

nificance of the next period lies, but in the constructive work which aimed to consolidate the Republic. Two personalities stand out with particular prominence: Gambetta, as president of the Chamber of Deputies, and Jules Ferry, as member of several ministries and as twice prime minister. The legislation enacted during this period aimed to clinch the victory over the Monarchists and Clericals by making the institutions of France thoroughly republican and secular. The seat of government was transferred from Versailles, where it had been since 1871, to Paris (1880), and July 14th, the day of the storming of the Bastille, symbol of the triumph of the people over the monarchy, was declared the national holiday, and was celebrated for the first time in 1880 amid great enthusiasm. The right of citizens freely to hold public meetings as they might wish, and without any preliminary permission of the Government, was secured, as was also a practically unlimited freedom of the press (1881). Municipal councils were once more given the right to elect mayors (1882), and their administrative power was greatly augmented (1884). This was an enlargement of the sphere of local self-government, a great school of political training for the people. Workingmen were permitted, for the first time, freely to form trade unions (1884). Divorce, which Napoleon had introduced into the Code, but which was abolished in 1814, was restored in 1884.

The Republicans were particularly solicitous about education. As universal suffrage was the basis of the state, it was considered fundamental that the voters should be intelligent. Education was regarded as the strongest bulwark of the Republic. Several laws were passed, concerning all grades of education, but the most important were those concerning primary schools. A law of 1881 made primary education gratuitous; one of 1882 made it compulsory between the ages of six and thirteen, and later laws made it entirely secular. No religious instruction is given in these schools. All teachers are appointed from the laity. This system of popular education is one of the great creative achievements of the Republic, and one of the most fruitful. Before the close of the century it had increased the number of those in primary schools by 850,000. Illiteracy dropped from 25 per cent. to 4 per cent. for the men, and from 38 per cent. to 7 per cent. for the women. Large expenditures were necessary, to erect schoolhouses and to employ more teachers. Twenty-five thousand schoolhouses were built, or rebuilt, at an expense of over 140 million dollars, and the appropriations

for the maintenance, which fell upon the state,— for primary education is an affair of the nation, not of the locality,— trebled. This legislation was enacted under the vigorous direction and inspiration of the Minister of Public Instruction, Jules Ferry, and is one of his most enduring titles to fame. Laws were also passed concerning secondary, university, and technical education. The Government undertook in this legislation to free the schools from all clerical control, on the ground that the clergy were enemies of the Republic. Further evidences of this anti-clerical feeling are found in the expulsion of the Jesuits from France in 1880, and in the refusal to all unauthorized religious orders of the right to maintain schools. Schools might, however, be maintained by the secular clergy and by those orders which should receive the sanction of the Government.

The Republic also entered upon a policy of large expenditures for public works, such as the building of railways, canals, the dredging of harbors and rivers, the erection and equipment of fortresses along the Belgian and German frontiers.

In 1884 the Constitution was revised in that the principle of life membership in the Senate was abolished. There were 75 such seats. It was provided that, as these seats became vacant, they should be filled by the election of ordinary senators, for the regular term of nine years.

Under the masterful influence of Jules Ferry, prime minister in 1881, and again from 1883 to 1885, the Republic embarked upon an aggressive colonial policy. She established a protectorate over Tunis; sent an expedition to Tonkin, to Madagascar; founded the French Congo. This policy aroused bitter opposition from the beginning, and entailed large expenditures, but Ferry, regardless of growing opposition, forced it through, in the end to his own undoing. His motives in throwing France into these ventures were various. One reason was economic. France was feeling the rivalry of Germany and Italy, and Ferry believed that she must gain new markets as compensation for those she was gradually losing. Again, France would gain in prestige abroad, and in her own feeling of contentment, if she turned her attention to empire-building and ceased to think morbidly of her losses in the German war. Her outlook would be broader. Moreover, she could not afford to be passive when other nations about her were reaching out for Africa and Asia. The era of imperialism had begun. France must participate in the movement or be left hopelessly behind in the rivalry of nations. Under Ferry's resolute leadership the policy of expansion was carried out, and

the colonial possessions of France were greatly increased, but at the expense of political peace at home.

THE RISE OF BOULANGISM

Policies so decided, so far-reaching, so ambitious had many enemies — Clericals, Monarchists. Such sweeping undertakings as educational reform and empire-building were very expensive. The Government gave up all idea of economy, and was forced to negotiate new loans, thereby greatly increasing the national debt, and to levy new taxes. Moreover, there was a vigorous group of Republicans, the Radicals, whose leader was Clemenceau, who denounced these colonial enterprises as involving war, which they hated, as being an attack upon other peoples who had a right to be free, as expensive and therefore an unjustifiable luxury for a country that had been through the experience of France, and as tending to divert attention from domestic problems, whose solution they felt to be urgent. These Radical Republicans demanded the separation of Church and State, the reduction of the powers of the Senate, an income tax that wealth might bear its proper proportion of the burdens of the state. The rivalry of the Republican factions now lost all bounds, and when a false rumor reached Paris of a failure of the war in Tonkin, these Radicals joined with the Monarchists and Clericals in May 1885 to overthrow Ferry, one of the strong figures of the Republic's history. Though he had vastly augmented the empire, public opinion had been so vehemently aroused by the campaign of attack and slander against him that he had become extremely unpopular.

During the next three years, from 1886 to 1889, the political situation was troubled, uncertain, factious, nervous. There was no commanding personality in politics to give elevation and sweep to men's ideas. Gambetta had died in 1882 at the age of forty-four, and Ferry was most unjustly the victim of obloquy, from which he never recovered. Ministries succeeded each other with meaningless rapidity. Politics appeared to be merely a petty game of getting offices, not of pursuing matured policies of state. There was a great deal of discontent with the Republic. Many had been embittered by the policy of secularizing education; many by the colonial ventures. The Republic was a parliamentary republic, and parliamentary institutions were in the opinion of many utterly discredited. The incessant changes of ministries, the petty and bitter personalities of political life, the absence of conspicuous leaders with large ideas, rendered

France disillusioned and bored. The Republic was spending more than its income on the various undertakings described above, and deficits were the result, alarming the public mind. Just at this time, too, a scandal was unearthed in President Grévy's own household. His son-in-law, Wilson, was found to be using his influence for purposes of trafficking in the bestowal of places in the Legion of Honor, and as a result, the President, in no sense involved, yet defending his son-in-law, was forced to resign, and was succeeded by Carnot, a moderate Republican (December 3, 1887). Moreover, many believed that as no régime in France for a century had outlasted eighteen years, the Republic would form no exception, and the eighteen years were nearly up.

Such a state of discontent and despondency, justified in part, in part fictitious, created a real crisis for the Republic, in which its very life was at stake. If the Parliamentary Republic was unable to give a strong and intelligent government, might not France welcome a dictator, as she had done in the case of two previous republics? A person was at hand anxious to serve in this capacity, General Boulanger. A dashing figure on horseback, an attractive speaker, General Boulanger sought to use the popular discontent for his own advancement. Made Minister of War in 1886, he showed much activity, seeking the favor of the soldiers by improving the conditions of life in the barracks, and by advocating the reduction of the required term of service. He controlled several newspapers, which began to insinuate that under his leadership France could take her revenge upon Germany by a successful war upon that country. The scandal of the Legion of Honor decorations occurring opportunely, and involving the resignation of the President, encouraged his campaign. He posed as the rescuer of the Republic, demanding a total revision of the Constitution. His programme, as announced, was vague, but probably aimed at the diminution of the importance of Parliament, and the conferring of great powers upon the President, and his election directly by the people, which he hoped would be favorable to himself. For three years his personality was a storm center. Discontented people of the most varied shades flocked to his support — Monarchists, Imperialists, Clericals, hoping to use him to overturn the Republic. These parties contributed money to the support of his campaign, which was brilliantly managed, with the view to focusing popular attention upon him. To show the popular enthusiasm Boulanger now became a candidate for Parliament in many districts where vacancies occurred. In five months (1888) he was elected deputy six

times. A seventh election in Paris itself, in January 1889, resulted in a brilliant triumph. He was elected by over 80,000 majority. Would he dare to take the final step and attempt to seize power, as two Bonapartes had done before him? He did not have the requisite audacity to try. In the face of this imminent danger the Republicans ceased their dissensions and stood together. They assumed the offensive. The ministry summoned Boulanger to appear before the Senate, sitting as a High Court of Justice, to meet the charge of conspiring against the safety of the state. His boldness vanished. He fled from the country to Belgium. He was condemned by the Court in his absence. His party fell to pieces, its leader proving so little valourous. Two years later he committed suicide. The Republic had weathered a serious crisis. In the elections to the Chamber of Deputies of 1889 the Republicans badly defeated all opponents — Monarchists, Imperialists, Boulangists — gaining a majority of nearly a hundred and fifty. It was clear that the Republic was becoming year by year more solidly established in the devotion of the voters. This was shown again still more strongly four years later, in the elections of 1893.

The utter collapse of Boulanger had several important consequences. It strengthened the Republic, proved its vitality, and discredited its opponents. It also discredited the idea of a revision of the Constitution. From now on conditions began to improve. The Exposition of 1889 in Paris was a great success, proved to all the world the remarkable recuperation of France, and was a reminder of the Revolution of 1789, from which the country had gained so much. Convinced that the Republic was to be permanent and not a transitory phenomenon, Pope Leo XIII ordered the bishops to cease their attacks upon it, and in Parliament a certain number of Catholic politicians rallied to it. In 1891 an alliance was made with Russia, which ended the long period of diplomatic isolation, served as a counterweight to the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria, and Italy, and satisfied the French people, as well as increased their sense of safety and their confidence in the future. In 1892 France entered upon a policy of high tariffs for purposes of protection.

The Republicans were henceforth in an overwhelming majority, but divided into various groups. The Radicals were more numerous than before, and a new party appeared, the Socialists, with some sixty members. As the Republic was becoming more solidly established, it was also becoming more radical. The history of the next fifteen years was to be the proof of this.

In 1894 President Carnot was assassinated. Casimir-Périer was chosen to succeed him, but resigned after six months. Félix Faure, a moderate Republican, was chosen to succeed him. Under Faure the alliance with Russia was still further strengthened and proclaimed. This was the most important fact in the current diplomatic history of France, tending to raise her international position, and to make her more contented by gratifying her self-esteem, and by increasing her sense of security.

Faure died in office in 1899. Under his presidency (1895-1899) the most burning question of internal politics was the Dreyfus case, for many years a dominant issue, creating another serious crisis for the Republic. An examination of that case is essential to an understanding of contemporary French history.

THE DREYFUS CASE

In October 1894, Alfred Dreyfus, an Alsatian Jew, and a captain in the artillery, attached to the General Staff, was arrested amid circumstances of unusual secrecy, was treated with great harshness, and was brought before a court-martial, where he was accused of treason, of transmitting important military documents to a foreign power, presumably Germany. The accusation rested on a document that had come into the possession of the War Office, and was soon to be famous as the "bordereau," a memorandum merely containing a list of several documents said to be inclosed. The bordereau bore no address, no date, nor signature, but it was declared to be in the known handwriting of Dreyfus. The court-martial, acting behind closed doors, found him guilty, and condemned him to expulsion from the army and to imprisonment for life. In January 1895 he was publicly degraded in a most dramatic manner in the courtyard of the Military School, before a large detachment of the army. His stripes were torn from his uniform, his sword was broken. Throughout this agonizing scene he was defiant, asserted his innocence, and shouted "*Vive la France!*" He was then deported to a small, barren, and unhealthy island off French Guiana, in South America, appropriately called Devil's Island, and was there kept in solitary confinement. A life imprisonment under such conditions would probably not be long, though it would certainly be horrible.

No one questioned the justice of the verdict. The opinion was practically unanimous that he had received a traitor's deserts. Only the immediate family and circle of Dreyfus maintained that a monstrous wrong had been done, and demanded further investi-

gation. Their protests passed unheeded. The case was considered closed.

It was reopened in 1896 by Colonel Picquart, one of the youngest and most promising officers in the army, attached since June 1895 to the detective bureau, or Intelligence Department of the General Staff. In the course of his duties he had become convinced that the "bordereau" was not the work of Dreyfus, but of a certain Major Esterhazy, who was shortly shown to be one of the most abandoned characters in the army. Picquart informed his superior, the Minister of War, of this discovery. The military authorities, instead of investigating the matter, not wishing to have the case reopened, sent Picquart to Tunis and Algeria, the purpose apparently being to get him out of the way. Colonel Henry was appointed to his place.

By this time the public was becoming interested. Some of the documents in the famous case had found their way into print; the mysterious elements in the proceedings aroused curiosity and some uneasiness.

Toward the end of 1897, Scheurer-Kestner, a vice-president of the Senate, who had become convinced of the innocence of Dreyfus, tried to have the case reopened. His efforts met with the blunt statement of the prime minister, Méline, that the Dreyfus case no longer existed, was a *chose jugée*. But the fact that a man of such importance, and such known integrity of character and mind, as Scheurer-Kestner, was convinced that a cruel wrong had been committed, was of unmistakable consequence. The wrath of the anti-Dreyfus party was increased; criminations and recriminations flew back and forth. Race hatred of the Jews, zealously fanned for several years by a group of journalists, fed the flames.

Esterhazy was now brought before a court-martial, given a very travesty of a trial, and triumphantly acquitted, congratulated, *avec émotion*, by the members of the court itself (January 11, 1898). On the next day Colonel Picquart was arrested and imprisoned on charges made by Esterhazy. On the day following that, January 13th, Émile Zola, the well-known novelist, published a letter of great boldness and brilliancy, in which he made most scathing charges against the judges of both the Dreyfus and Esterhazy courts-martial, and practically dared the Government to prosecute him. His desire was thus to reopen the whole Dreyfus question. The Government prosecuted him in a trial which was a parody of justice, secured his condemnation to imprisonment and fine, and evaded the question of Dreyfus. The

Zola condemnation was later quashed by a higher court on a mere technicality. He was later tried again, and again condemned (July 1898) by default, having fled to London. The Dreyfus case had not been reopened.

Meanwhile, the Méline ministry had been overthrown, and the Brisson ministry had come into power, with Cavaignac as Minister of War. On July 7, 1898, Cavaignac, intending to settle this troublesome matter once for all, made a speech before the Chamber of Deputies, in which, omitting all mention of the *bordereau*, he brought forward three documents as new proofs of the guilt of Dreyfus. His speech was so convincing that the Chamber, by a vote of five hundred and seventy-two to two, ordered that it should be posted in every one of the thirty-six thousand communes of France. The victory was overwhelming.

Immediately, however, Colonel Picquart wrote to Cavaignac that he could prove that the first two documents cited had nothing to do with Dreyfus, and that the third was an outright forgery. He was rearrested. It was immediately after this that Zola was condemned for the second time, as stated above.

Events now took a most sensational turn. At the end of August the newspapers of Paris contained the announcement that Colonel Henry had confessed that he had forged the document which Picquart had declared was a forgery and that then he had committed suicide. Cavaignac resigned, maintaining, however, that the crime of Henry did not prove the innocence of Dreyfus.

The public was vastly disturbed by these events. Why was there any need of new proof to establish Dreyfus's guilt, and if the new proof was the work of crime, what about the original proof, the famous *bordereau*? At this juncture the case was referred to the Court of Cassation, the highest court in France. While it was deliberating, the President, Faure, known as an anti-Dreyfusite, died suddenly under somewhat mysterious circumstances, and on February 18, 1899, Émile Loubet, known to be favorable to a reopening of the question, was chosen as his successor.

Sensations showed no signs of abating. On June 2nd, Esterhazy, who had fled to England, announced that he had himself written the *bordereau*. The enemies of Dreyfus now asserted that he had simply been bribed by the Dreyfus party to make this declaration. On the next day the Court of Cassation annulled the decision of the court-martial of 1894, and ordered that Dreyfus be tried again before a court-martial at Rennes. Dreyfus

was brought from Devil's Island, and his second trial began in August 1899.

This new trial was conducted in the midst of the most excited state of the public mind in France, and of intense interest abroad. Party passions were inflamed as they had not been in France since the Commune. The supporters of Dreyfus were denounced frantically as slanderers of the honor of the army, the very bulwark of the safety of the country, as traitors to France.

At the Rennes tribunal, Dreyfus encountered the violent hostility of the high army officers, who had been his accusers five years before. These men were desperately resolved that he should again be found guilty. The trial was of an extraordinary character. It was the evident purpose of the judges not to allow the matter to be thoroughly probed. Testimony, which in England or America would have been considered absolutely vital, was barred out. The universal opinion outside France was, as was stated in the *London Times*, "that the whole case against Captain Dreyfus, as set forth by the heads of the French army, in plain combination against him, was foul with forgeries, lies, contradictions and puerilities, and that nothing to justify his condemnation had been shown."

Nevertheless, the court, by a vote of five to two, declared him guilty, "with extenuating circumstances," an amazing verdict. It is not generally held that treason to one's country can plead extenuating circumstances. The court condemned him to ten years' imprisonment, from which the years spent at Devil's Island might be deducted. Thus the "honor" of the army had been maintained.

President Loubet immediately pardoned Dreyfus, and he was released, broken in health. This solution was satisfactory to neither side. The anti-Dreyfusites vented their rage on Loubet. On the other hand, Dreyfus demanded exoneration, a recognition of his innocence, not pardon.

But the Government was resolved that this discussion, which had so frightfully torn French society, should cease. Against the opposition of the Dreyfusites, it passed, in 1900, an amnesty for all those implicated in the notorious case, which meant that no legal actions could be brought against any of the participants on either side. The friends of Dreyfus, Zola, and Picquart protested vigorously against the erection of a barrier against their vindication. The bill, nevertheless, passed.

Six years later, however, the Dreyfus party attained its vindication. The revision of the whole case was submitted to the

Court of Cassation. On July 12, 1906, that body quashed the verdict of the Rennes court-martial. It declared that the charges which had been brought against Dreyfus had no foundation, that the bordereau was the work of Esterhazy, that another document of importance was a forgery, that the Rennes court-martial had been guilty of gross injustice in refusing to hear testimony that would have established the innocence of the accused. The case was not to be submitted to another military tribunal but was closed.

The Government now restored Captain Dreyfus to his rank in the army, or rather, gave him the rank of major, allowing him to count to that end the whole time in which he had been unjustly deprived of his standing. On July 21, 1906, he was invested with a decoration of the Legion of Honor in the very courtyard of the Military School, where eleven years before he had been so dramatically degraded. Colonel Picquart was promoted brigadier-general, and shortly became Minister of War. Zola had died in 1903, but in 1908 his body was transferred to the Pantheon, as symbolizing a kind of civic canonization. Thus ended the "Affair."

The Dreyfus case, originally simply involving the fate of an alleged traitor, had soon acquired a far greater significance. Party and personal ambitions and interests sought to use it for purposes of their own, and thus the question of legal right and wrong was woefully distorted and obscured. The Anti-Semites used it to inflame the people against the Jews. They won the support of the Clericals, ingeniously suggesting that the so-called anti-religious legislation of the Third Republic, particularly that establishing secular education, was really the work of the Jews, influencing politicians by their money, and that the Jews were now getting control of the army, and that Dreyfus himself showed how they would use it for traitorous purposes. Further, reactionaries of all kinds joined the anti-Dreyfus party: Monarchists, anxious to discredit the Republic, that thus they might profit; so-called Nationalists, anxious to change the government along the lines of Boulangism and to adopt a vigorous foreign policy. On the other hand, there rallied to the defense of Dreyfus those who believed in his innocence, those who denounced the hatred of a race as a relic of barbarism, those who believed that the military should be subordinate to the civil authority and should not regard itself above the law, as these army officers were doing; all who believed that the whole opposition was merely conducting an insidious, covert, dangerous attack

upon the Republic, and all who believed that clerical influence should be kept out of politics.

THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE

One result of the Dreyfus agitation was the creation in the Chamber of Deputies of a strong coalition, called the "Bloc," which consisted of the Radical Republican and Socialist parties. This coalition was destined to control the government for many years. Its first conspicuous head was Waldeck-Rousseau, a leader of the Parisian bar, a former follower of Gambetta. In October 1900, Waldeck-Rousseau, then prime minister, made a speech at Toulouse which resounded throughout France and which foreshadowed a policy of great significance. The real peril confronting France, he said, arose from the growing power of religious orders — orders of monks and nuns. "In this country, whose moral unity has for centuries constituted its strength and greatness, two classes of young people are growing up ignorant of each other until the day when they meet, so unlike as to risk not comprehending one another. Such a fact is explained only by the existence of a power which is no longer even occult, and by the constitution in the state of a rival power." By which was meant that the youth of France were growing up, divided into two classes, whose outlook upon life, whose mental processes, whose opinions concerning politics and morals were so widely at variance that the moral unity of the nation was destroyed. And the cause of this was the astonishing and dangerous growth in recent years of religious orders or Congregations, whose influence upon a considerable and increasing section of the young was highly harmful. Here was a power that was a rival of the State. Waldeck-Rousseau pointed out that these orders, not authorized under the laws of France, were growing rapidly in wealth and numbers; that between 1877 and 1900 the number of nuns had increased from 14,000 to 75,000 in orders not authorized; that the monks numbered about 190,000; that their property, held in mainmorte, estimated at about 50,000,000 francs in the middle of the century, had risen to 700,000,000 in 1880, and was more than a billion francs in 1900. This vast absorption of wealth, thus withdrawn from circulation, was an economic danger of the first importance. But the most serious feature was the activity of these orders in teaching and preaching. Waldeck-Rousseau believed that the education they gave was permeated with a spirit of hostility to the Republic; that the traditional

hostility of the Roman Catholic Church to liberty was inculcated; that this Roman spirit was a menace in a country that believed in liberty; that it constituted a political danger to the State which Parliament must face; that to preserve the Republic defensive measures must be taken. Holding this opinion, the Waldeck-Rousseau ministry secured the passage, July 1, 1901, of the Law of Associations, which provided, among other things, that no religious orders should exist in France without definite authorization in each case from Parliament. It was the belief of the authors of this bill that the Roman Catholic Church was the enemy of the Republic, that it was using its every agency against the Republic, that it had latterly supported the anti-Dreyfus party in its attempt to discredit the institutions of France, as it had done formerly under MacMahon. Gambetta had, at that time, declared that *the* enemy was the clerical party. "Clericalism," said Combes, who succeeded Waldeck-Rousseau in 1902, "is, in fact, to be found at the bottom of every agitation and every intrigue from which Republican France has suffered during the last thirty-five years."

Animated with this feeling the Associations Law was enforced with rigor in 1902 and 1903. Many orders refused to ask for authorization from Parliament; many which asked were refused. Tens of thousands of monks and nuns were forced to leave their institutions, which were closed. By a law of 1904 it was provided that all teaching by religious orders, even by those authorized, should cease within ten years. The State was to have a monopoly of the education of the young, in the interest of the ideals of liberalism it represented. Combes, upon whom fell the execution of this law, suppressed about five hundred teaching, preaching, and commercial orders. This policy was vehemently denounced by Catholics as persecution, as an infringement upon liberty, the liberty to teach, the liberty of parents to have their children educated in denominational schools if they preferred.

This, as events were to prove, was only preliminary to a far greater religious struggle which ended in the complete separation of Church and State, the disestablishment of the former, the laicization of the latter.

The relations of the Roman Catholic Church and the State down to 1905 were determined by the Concordat, concluded between Napoleon I and Pius VII in 1801, and put into force in 1802. The Concordat provided that the archbishops and bishops should be appointed by the State with the consent of the Pope; that the bishops should appoint the priests, but only with the

consent of the Government; that the State should pay the salaries of the clergy, both priests and bishops, who thus became a part of the administrative system of the country. Ecclesiastical property, cathedrals, parish churches, residences of bishops and priests, and seminary buildings had all been declared the property of the nation in 1789, and still remained such, but these buildings were to be placed at the disposal of the clergy. Thus the Church was harnessed to the State, which had extensive power over it.

This system remained undisturbed throughout the nineteenth century, under the various régimes, but with the advent of the Third Republic serious friction began to develop. The Republicans believed in the thorough secularization of the State, and they were resolved that the clergy should not use their power over men's minds and consciences in opposition to the acts or principles of the Republic. In their determination to abolish ecclesiastical influence in the State, many measures were passed, between 1881 and 1903; schools were made undenominational, no clergyman might teach in them, no religious exercises might be conducted in them; prayers at the sessions of Parliament were abolished; hospitals were made secular; divorce, which had been abolished in 1814, was restored, and, as just described, the religious orders were brought into subjection to the State, and, indeed, largely dispersed. These acts were partly the reply of the Republicans to the anti-republican activity of the ecclesiastics which ran through the whole thirty years, partly the cause of that activity. The clergy were not friendly to the Republic, from which they drew their salaries. This is unquestionable. The Pope himself recognized it when, in 1893, he urged the clergy to accept the Republic as their lawful government. Many Republicans were not only intent upon maintaining the Republic, but were anxious to undermine religion, considering it an obstacle in the way of progress, of civilization. But many who were not opposed to religion believed that religion did not concern the State, but was a private matter. They held that the State had no right to tax people for the support of a Church in which many had no belief or interest; that the State had no right to favor one denomination over another or over all others; that it must, in justice to all its citizens, be purely secular, entirely neutral toward all creeds and churches.

There was ceaseless friction, then, for thirty years between Church and State. The opposition of the Republicans was augmented by the activity of the clergy in the Dreyfus affair. Diplomatic incidents, in themselves of comparatively slight importance,

brought matters to a head. In April 1904 the President of France, Loubet, went to Rome to render a visit to Victor Emmanuel III, a "usurper" in the eyes of the Pope. The latter protested to the Catholic powers of Europe against what he called "a grave offense to the Sovereign Pontiff." The French in turn resented what they regarded as an impertinent interference with their conduct of their foreign relations. Other disturbing incidents followed. These incidents did not cause the rupture; they merely furnished the occasion.

Ever since June 1903, a parliamentary committee had been studying the problem and trying to draft a measure of separation of Church and State. A law was finally passed, December 9, 1905, which abrogated the Concordat of 1801. The State was henceforth not to pay the salaries of the clergy; on the other hand, it relinquished all rights over their appointment. It undertook to pay pensions to clergymen who had served many years, and were already well advanced in age; also to pay certain amounts to those who had been in the priesthood for a few years only. In regard to the property, which, since 1789, had been vested in the nation, the cathedrals, churches, chapels, it was provided that these should still be at the free disposal of the Roman Catholic Church, but that they should be held and managed by so-called "Associations of Worship" (*associations cultuelles*), which were to vary in size according to the population of the community.

The law contained many provisions designed to prevent these associations from amassing more than a given small amount of wealth by legacies, gifts, or otherwise; and to prevent the clergy, now cut off from all official connection with the State, from using their influence against the Republic. The Church must not become too powerful. It was stated that the property thus to be left in the hands of the associations amounted to over a hundred million dollars. The disestablished Church would not have to make this enormous expenditure for the construction of new places of worship. A year was given for the making of the necessary arrangements.¹

This law was not universally condemned by the Catholics of France. Many believed that the Church should adapt itself to it, at least provisionally. Seventy-four bishops decided to give it

¹ The Separation Law applied also to Protestant and Jewish churches, separating them from all connection with the State, discontinuing payment by the State of the salaries of their clergymen. These sects were in favor of the law.

a trial if a certain alteration could be made in the character of the Associations of Worship.

It is probable that this change would have been conceded by the Government, but this was not to be tested, for Pope Pius X condemned the law of 1905 unreservedly. He declared that the fundamental principle of separation of Church and State is "an absolutely false thesis, a very pernicious error." He denounced the Associations of Worship as giving the administrative control, not "to the divinely instituted hierarchy, but to an association of laymen," and declared that this was a violation of the principle on which rested the Church which "was founded by Jesus Christ."

The Pope's decision was final and decisive for all Catholics. It was based on fundamentals. No change in details could alter it. The bishops who had been willing to try the new law acquiesced in its condemnation. What would Parliament do about it? The year was running out. Would the churches be closed? If so, would not France be drawn into a lamentable religious war, the outcome of which no one could foretell? The Government was determined to avoid that contingency. The Minister of Public Worship, Briand, decided to apply to the situation a law passed in 1881 regulating the holding of public meetings. Designed for secular meetings, there was nothing to prevent its being applied to religious. It was therefore announced that priests might make use of the churches after merely filing the usual application, which should cover a whole year. This compromise also was rejected by the Pope.

Parliament therefore passed a new law, promulgated January 2, 1907. By it most of the privileges guaranteed the Roman Catholic Church by the Law of 1905 were abrogated. The critical point was the keeping of the churches open for public worship. It was provided that their use should be gratuitous, and should be regulated by contracts between the priests and the prefects or mayors. These contracts would safeguard the civil ownership of the buildings, but worship would go on in them as before. This system gradually gained lodgment in the life of France.

The result of this series of events and measures was this: Church and State were definitively separated. The people apparently approved in subsequent elections the policy followed by their Government. Bishops and priests no longer receive salaries from the State. On the other hand they have liberties which they did not enjoy under the Concordat, such as rights of

assembly and freedom from governmental participation in appointments. The faithful must henceforth support their priests, and bear the expenses of the Church. The churches have been left them by this practical but irrational device. Other ecclesiastical buildings, such as the palaces of bishops, the rectories of priests, and the edifices of theological seminaries, have been taken from ecclesiastical control, and are now used for educational or charitable purposes, or as government offices. The former palace of the Archbishop of Paris was forthwith occupied by the Minister of Labor. The famous seminary of St. Sulpice was for some time used in connection with the Luxembourg Museum.¹

"By this separation of church and state," says Seignobos, "France broke with the European tradition of concordats, by which the state officially recognizes religion; she adopted the American system which leaves the churches to be organized by private initiative. This was a revolution in the ecclesiastical régime of France."

ACQUISITION OF COLONIES IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

France, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, had possessed an extensive colonial empire. This she had lost to England as a result of the wars of the reign of Louis XV, the Revolution, and the Napoleonic period, and in 1815 her possessions had shrunk to a few small points, Guadaloupe and Martinique in the West Indies, St. Pierre and Miquelon, off Newfoundland, five towns on the coast of India, of which Pondicherry was the best known, Bourbon, now called Réunion, an island in the Indian Ocean, Guiana in South America, which had few inhabitants, and Senegal in Africa. These were simply melancholy souvenirs of her once proud past, rags and tatters of a once imposing empire.

In the nineteenth century she was destined to begin again, and to create an empire of vast geographical extent, only second in importance to that of Great Britain, though vastly inferior to that. The interest in conquests revived but slowly after 1815. France had conquered so much in Europe from 1792 to 1812,

¹ See the admirable and detailed article by Professor Othon Guerlac in *Political Science Quarterly*, June 1908, entitled, "Church and State in France." The best and fullest account of this subject is to be found in Debidour, *L'église catholique et l'état sous la troisième république*, Vol. II, 231-498. Most of the important documents are appended.

only to lose it as she had lost her colonies, that conquest in any form seemed but a futile and costly display of misdirected enterprise. Nevertheless, in time the process began anew, and each of the various régimes which have succeeded one another since 1815 has contributed to the building of the new empire.

The beginning was made in Algeria, on the northern coast of Africa, directly opposite France, and reached now in less than twenty-four hours from Marseilles. Algeria was nominally a part of the Turkish Empire, but the power of the Sultan was insignificant. A native Dey was the real ruler. The population consisted of Arabs, a nomadic and pastoral people, descendants of the Arabian conquerors of the seventh century, and of Berbers, an agricultural people, descendants of the natives who, more than twenty centuries before, had fought the Carthaginians. All the people were Mohammedans. The capital was an important town, Algiers.

Down to the opening of the nineteenth century Algeria, Tunis, and Tripoli, nominally parts of the Ottoman Empire, were in reality independent, and constituted the Barbary States, whose main business was piracy. But Europe was no longer disposed to see her wealth seized and her citizens enslaved until she paid their ransom. In 1816 an English fleet bombarded Algiers, released about 3,000 Christian captives, and destroyed piracy.

The French conquest of Algeria grew out of a dispute concerning a loan made by the Dey to the Directory in 1797. This dispute ended in insults by the Dey to France, with the result that in 1830 the latter power sent a fleet of a hundred ships, and five hundred transports across the Mediterranean, and seized the capital. France had not intended the conquest of the whole country, only the punishment of an insolent Dey, but attacks being made upon her from time to time, which she felt she must crush, she was led on, step by step, until she had everywhere established her power. All through the reign of Louis Philippe this process was going on. Its chief feature was an intermittent struggle of fourteen years with a native leader, Abd-el-Kader, who proclaimed and fought a Holy War against the intruder. In the end (1847) he was forced to surrender, and France had added what is still her most important colony. This is also another episode in the dismemberment of the Turkish Empire, whose disintegration in Europe, in the Balkan peninsula, is elsewhere described.

Under Napoleon III, the beginning of conquest in another part of Africa was made. France had possessed, since the time

of Louis XIII and Richelieu, one or two miserable ports on the western coast, St. Louis the most important. Under Napoleon III, the annexation of the Senegal valley was largely carried through by the efforts of the governor, Faidherbe, who later distinguished himself in the Franco-German war. Under Napoleon III, also, a beginning was made in another part of the world, in Asia. The persecution of Christian natives, and the murder of certain French missionaries gave Napoleon the pretext to attack the king of Annam, whose kingdom was in the peninsula that juts out from southeastern Asia. After eight years of intermittent fighting France acquired from the king the whole of Cochin-China (1858-67), and also established a protectorate over the kingdom of Cambodia, directly north.

Thus, by 1870, France had staked out an empire of about 700,000 square kilometers, containing a population of about six million.

Under the present Republic the work of expansion and consolidation has been carried much further than under all of the preceding régimes. There have been extensive annexations in northern Africa, western Africa, the Indian Ocean, and in Indo-China.

In northern Africa, Tunis has passed under the control of France. This was one of the Barbary states, and was nominally a part of the Turkish Empire, with a Bey as sovereign. After establishing herself in Algeria, France desired to extend her influence eastward, over this neighboring state. But Italy, now united, began about 1870 to entertain a similar ambition. France, therefore, under the ministry of Jules Ferry, an ardent believer in colonial expansion, sent troops into Tunis in 1881, which forced the Bey to accept a French protectorate over his state. The French have not annexed Tunis formally, but they control it absolutely through a Resident at the court of the Bey, whose advice the latter is practically obliged to follow.

In western Africa, France has made extensive annexations in the Senegal, Guinea, Dahomey, the Ivory Coast, and the region of the Niger, and north of the Congo. By occupying the oases in the Sahara she has established her claims to that vast but hitherto unproductive area. This process has covered many years of the present Republic. The result is the existence of French authority over most of northwest Africa, from Algeria on the Mediterranean, to the Congo river. This region south of Algeria is called the French Soudan, and comprises an area seven or eight times as large as France, with a population of

some fourteen millions, mainly blacks. There is some discussion of a Trans-Saharan railroad to bind these African possessions more closely together.

In Asia, the Republic has imposed her protectorate over the kingdom of Annam (1883) and has annexed Tonkin, taken from China after considerable fighting (1885). In the Indian Ocean, she has conquered Madagascar, an island larger than France herself, with a population of two and a half million. A protectorate was imposed upon that country in 1895, after ten years of disturbance, but after quelling a rebellion that broke out the following year, the protectorate was abolished, and the island was made a French colony.

Thus, at the opening of the twentieth century, the empire of France was eleven times larger than France itself, had an area of six million square kilometers, and a population of about fifty millions, and a rapidly growing commerce. Most of this empire is located in the tropics, and is ill adapted to the settlement of Europeans. Algeria and Tunis, however, offer conditions favorable for such settlements. They constitute the most valuable French possessions. Algeria is not considered a colony, but an integral part of France. It is divided into three departments, each of which sends one senator and two deputies to the chambers of the French Parliament.

On March 30, 1912, France established a protectorate over Morocco. For several years the status of that country had been one of the contentious problems of international politics. France had desired to gain control of it in order to round out her empire in northwestern Africa. In 1904 she had made an agreement with England whereby a far-reaching diplomatic revolution in Europe was inaugurated. This was largely the work of Théophile Delcassé, Minister of Foreign Affairs for seven years, from 1898 to 1905, one of the ablest statesmen the Third Republic has produced. Delcassé believed that France would be able to follow a more independent and self-respecting foreign policy, one freer from German domination and intimidation, if her relations with Italy and England, severely strained for many years, largely owing to colonial rivalries and jealousies, could be made cordial and friendly. This he was able to accomplish by arranging a treaty of commerce favorable to Italy and by promising Italy a free hand in Tripoli and receiving from her the assurance that she would do nothing to hamper French policy in Morocco, a country of special significance to France because of her possession of Algeria.

More important was the reconciliation with England. The relations of these two neighbors had long been difficult and, at times, full of danger. Indeed, in 1898 they had stood upon the very brink of war when a French expedition under Marchand had crossed Africa and had seized Fashoda on the Upper Nile in the sphere of influence which Great Britain considered emphatically hers. The Fashoda incident ended in the withdrawal of the French before the resolute attitude of England. The lesson of this incident was not lost upon either power, and six years later, on April 8, 1904, they signed an agreement which not only removed the sources of friction between them once for all, but which established what came to be known as the *Entente Cordiale*, destined to great significance in the future. By this agreement France recognized England's special interests in Egypt and abandoned her long-standing demand that England should set a date for the cessation of her "occupation" of that country. On the other hand, England recognized the special interests of France in Morocco and promised not to impede their development.

One power emphatically objected to the determination of the fate of an independent country by these two powers alone. Germany challenged this agreement and asserted that she must herself be consulted in such matters; that her rivals had no right by themselves to preëempt those regions of the world which might still be considered fields for European colonization or control. German interests must be considered quite as much as French or English.

Germany's peremptory attitude precipitated an international crisis and led to the international Conference of Algeciras in 1906, which was, however, on the whole a victory for France, acknowledging the primacy of her interests in Morocco. As France proceeded to strengthen her position there in the succeeding years, Germany issued another challenge in 1911 by sending a gunboat to Agadir, thus creating another crisis, which for a time threatened a European war. In the end, however, Germany recognized the position of France, but only after the latter had ceded to her extensive territories in Kamerun and the French Congo. For several years, therefore, Morocco was a danger spot in international politics, exerting a disturbing influence upon the relations of European powers to each other, particularly those of France and Germany. Finally, however, the independence of Morocco disappeared and the country was practically incorporated in the colonial empire of France.

CHAPTER XIX

THE KINGDOM OF ITALY

THE Kingdom of Italy, as we have seen, was established in 1859 and 1860. Venetia was acquired in 1866, and Rome in 1870. In these cases, as in the preceding, the people were allowed to express their wishes by a vote, which, in both instances, was nearly unanimous in favor of the annexation; in the former case by about 647,000 votes to 60; in the latter by about 130,000 to 1,500.

The new kingdom had to face problems of the gravest and most varied character, problems which the struggle for unity, so absorbing, had obscured, but which now appeared in all their saliency. Political unity had been gained, but not moral unity. "We have united Italy," said D'Azeglio in 1861, "now let us unite Italians," by which was meant that peoples differing in their historical evolution, in their institutions, in their economic life, in their temperaments, which had for centuries regarded each other with indifference or animosity, must be made to feel that they were one. These peoples had never been united since the fall of Rome, and Venetians, Sicilians, Tuscans, Romans, Piedmontese, differed profoundly. The contrast was sharpest between the north and the south. They were like two different countries. "To harmonize north and south," said Cavour, "is harder than fighting with Austria or struggling with Rome." A fusion of such dissimilar elements could only be slowly achieved, and must be the result of many forces. But it must imperatively be the first object of Italian statesmen to create a common patriotism, and mutual interests.

Since 1815 there had been several states, each with its own government, its own diplomatic corps, its own courts, system of taxation, its own tariff, and coinage. This variety could not be preserved in the new kingdom, which was not a federal state, like Germany, but a single government, unitary. Only one section had had training in parliamentary government, Piedmont, and that only since 1848. The others had been under despotisms, severe as in Naples, enlightened as in Tuscany. Piedmont had

accomplished the great work of unification, yet it was not, like Prussia, larger than all the other states combined, but was a mere fraction of four or five millions out of twenty-two or more. It could not, therefore, impose its will upon the others as Prussia could upon Germany. Could elements so dissimilar, men so little likely to understand each other's point of view, so little dominated by the same ideals, work together effectively? Might they not tear down the whole edifice, the mere shell of which had been so painfully erected? Now that Italy was united, it must be thoroughly transformed that it might continue. "Unify to improve," said Cavour, "improve to consolidate." A work of organization, so vast and varied, would need, not years, but generations. In 1870, after the fall of Rome, Victor Emmanuel showed that he understood the situation. "Italy is united and free; it remains for us henceforth to make her great and happy." This was the programme of the Government.

This work, begun in 1861, has continued ever since, marked by notable achievements, by distressing failures, but, on the whole, by distinct and great progress. Only certain features of the later story can be indicated here.

The work of construction was undertaken earnestly. In 1861 the Constitution of Piedmont was adopted, with slight variations, as the Constitution of Italy. There was to be a parliament of two chambers, a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies. The suffrage for the latter was to be the same as it had been for the Lower House in Piedmont. The full parliamentary system was introduced, ministers representing the will of the Lower Chamber and controlled by it, legislation enacted by the two Houses. The first capital was Turin, then Florence in 1865, and finally Rome, since 1871. The kingdom was divided for administrative purposes into fifty-nine districts, resembling the French departments, which were increased to sixty-nine after the annexation of Venetia and Rome. This broke up the old provincial lines, centralized the state, by giving the appointment of all prefects and mayors of cities to the national government, tended to destroy the spirit of local individuality, and to exalt Italy and Italian patriotism.

The most perplexing question confronting the new kingdom concerned its relations to the Papacy. The Italian Kingdom had seized, by violence, the city of Rome, over which the Popes had ruled in uncontested right for a thousand years. Rome had this peculiarity over all other cities, that it was the capital of Catholics the world over. Any attempt to expel the Pope from

the city or to subject him to the House of Savoy would everywhere arouse the faithful, already clamorous, and might cause an intervention in behalf of the restoration of the temporal power. There were henceforth to be two sovereigns, one temporal, one spiritual, within the same city. The situation was absolutely unique and extremely delicate. It was considered necessary to determine their relations before the government was transferred to Rome. It was impossible to reach any agreement with the Pope, as he refused to recognize the Kingdom of Italy, but spoke of Victor Emmanuel simply as the King of Sardinia, and would make no concessions in regard to his own rights in Rome. Parliament, therefore, passed in Florence, May 13, 1871, the Law of Papal Guarantees, a remarkable act defining the relations of Church and State in Italy.

The object of this law was to carry out Cavour's principle of a "free Church in a free State," to reassure Catholics that the new kingdom had no intention of controlling in any way the spiritual activities of the Pope, though taking from him his temporal powers. Catholics must feel that the Pope was no creature of the Italian government, but had entire liberty of action in governing the Church. Consequently his person is declared sacred and inviolable. Any attacks upon him are, by this law, to be punished exactly as are similar attacks upon the King. He has his own diplomatic corps, and receives diplomatic representatives from other countries. He has his court, the Curia Romana, as the King has his. That he may communicate with the outside world directly, and not through agencies controlled by the Kingdom, he has his own independent postal and telegraph service. Certain places are set apart as entirely under his sovereignty: the Vatican, the Lateran, Castel Gandolfo, and their gardens. Here no Italian official may enter, in his official capacity, for Italian law and administration stop outside these limits. A similar exemption holds wherever a conclave or a church council is held. In return for the income lost with the temporal power, the Pope is granted 3,225,000 francs a year by the Italian Kingdom. This law has been faithfully observed by the Italian government. But neither Pius IX, nor any of his successors has been willing to accept it. The Pope considers himself the "prisoner of the Vatican," and since 1870 has not left it to go into the streets of Rome, as he would thereby be tacitly recognizing the existence of another ruler there, the "usurper." The Pope has never accepted the annuity. For many years Catholics were forbidden to vote in national elections,

or to accept national offices, as that would be a recognition that an Italian nation existed. They might vote in municipal elections. Municipalities existed long before the Kingdom.

The Pope has never recognized the existence of the kingdom, and the solution of the question of the relations of the Church and the State seems as remote as ever. The statement of Victor Emmanuel on entering the city as sovereign, July 2, 1871, still describes the situation. "Yes, we are in Rome, and we shall remain." The Italian Government has never feared the Pope, but it did for several years fear an intervention of Catholic powers, a danger which, with the lapse of time, has practically disappeared.

Another difficult problem for the Kingdom was its financial status. The debts of the different states were assumed by it and were large. The nation was also obliged to make large expenditures on the army and the navy, on fortifications, and on public works, particularly on the building of railways, which were essential to the economic prosperity of the country as well as conducive to the strengthening of the sense of common nationality. There were, for several years, large annual deficits, necessitating new loans, which, of course, augmented the public debt. Heroically did successive ministers seek to make both ends meet, not shrinking from new and unpopular taxes, or from the seizure and sale of monastic lands. Success was finally achieved, and in 1879 the receipts exceeded the expenditures.

In 1878 Victor Emmanuel II died and was buried in the Pantheon, one of the few ancient buildings of Rome. Over his tomb is the inscription, "To the Father of his Country." He was succeeded by his son, Humbert I, then thirty-four years of age. A month later Pius IX died, and was succeeded by Leo XIII, at the time of his election sixty-eight years of age. But nothing was changed by this change of personalities. Each maintained the system of his predecessor. Leo XIII, Pope from 1878 to 1903, following the precedent set by Pius IX, never recognized the Kingdom of Italy, nor did he ever leave the Vatican. He, too, considered himself a prisoner of the "robber king."

Another urgent problem confronting the new kingdom was that of the education of its citizens. This was most imperative if the masses of the people were to be fitted for the freer and more responsible life opened by the political revolution. The preceding governments had grossly neglected this duty. In 1861 over seventy-five per cent. of the population of the Kingdom were

illiterate. In Naples and Sicily, the most backward in development of all the sections of Italy, the number of illiterates exceeded ninety per cent. of the population; and in Piedmont and Lombardy, the most advanced sections, one-third of the men and more than half of the women could neither read nor write. "Without national education there exists morally no nation," Mazzini had said. "The national conscience cannot be awakened except by its aid. Without national education, common to all citizens, the equality of civic duties and rights is an empty formula."

In 1877 a compulsory education law was passed. This was extended by a new law passed in 1904. But as the support of primary schools rests with the communes, and as, in many cases, they have evaded their responsibility, the system of universal education has not been established in practice. Italy has done much for education, but much remains to be done. Illiteracy, though diminishing, is still widely prevalent. Recent statistics show that a large percentage of the recruits in the army are illiterate. Satisfactory results will probably not be obtained until the Government itself assumes the support and direction of the schools instead of leaving them in the hands of the local authorities.

In 1882 an electoral reform, which had long been discussed, was passed. Hitherto the suffrage had been limited to property-holders twenty-five years of age and older, paying an annual tax of at least forty lire. Under this system less than two and a half per cent. of the population possessed the right to vote. So widespread was illiteracy that it was not considered wise to proclaim universal suffrage. The property qualification was now reduced from forty lire to nineteen lire eighty centesimi, and the age qualification was lowered to twenty-one, and an additional method of securing the franchise was also established, namely an educational qualification. All men of twenty-one who have had a primary school education were given the franchise. This reform more than tripled the number of voters at once, from 627,838 to 2,049,461. Of these about two-thirds secured the right through meeting the educational qualification.

In 1912 Italy took a long step toward democracy by making the suffrage almost universal for men, only denying the franchise to those younger than thirty who had neither performed their military service nor learned to read and write. Thus all men over twenty-one, even if illiterate, were given the vote if they had served in the army. The number of voters was thus increased

from somewhat over three million to more than eight and a half million.

This period of internal reforms was interrupted by foreign politics. In 1882 Italy entered the alliance with Germany and Austria, thus forming the famous Triple Alliance which dominated Europe most of the time from its foundation down to the outbreak of the Great War. The reasons prompting Italy's action were various: pique at France, dread of intervention in behalf of the Pope, and a desire to appear as one of the great powers of Europe. The result was that she was forced to spend larger sums upon her army, remodeled along Prussian lines, and her navy, thus disturbing her finances once more.

Italy now embarked upon another expensive and hazardous enterprise, the acquisition of colonies, influenced in this direction by the prevalent fashion, and by a desire to rank among the world powers. Shut out of Tunis, her natural field, by France, she, in 1885, seized positions on the Red Sea, particularly the port of Massawa. Two years later she consequently found herself at war with Abyssinia. The minister who had inaugurated this movement, Depretis, died in 1887. He was succeeded by Crispi, one of the few striking personalities Italian politics have produced since the time of Cavour. Crispi threw himself heartily into the colonial scheme, extended the claims of Italy in East Africa, and tried to play off one native leader against another. To the new colony he gave the name of Eritrea. At the same time an Italian protectorate was established over a region in eastern Africa called Somaliland. But all this involved long and expensive campaigns against the natives. Italy was trying to play the rôle of a great power when her resources did not warrant it. The consequence of this aggressive and ambitious military, naval, and colonial policy was the creation again of a deficit in the state's finances, which increased alarmingly. The deficits of four years, ending January 1, 1891, amounted to the enormous sum of over seventy-five million dollars. To meet the situation new taxes had to be imposed upon a people already heavily over-burdened. The reaction of this upon internal politics was disastrous. The resultant economic distress expressed itself in deep dissatisfaction with the monarchy, and in the growth of republican and socialistic parties. Riots broke out in 1889 in Turin, Milan, Rome, and in the southern province of Apulia. Crispi adopted a policy of stern repression, which restored quiet on the surface, but left a widespread feeling of rancor behind. He fell from office in 1891, but, his successor

being unable to improve the financial situation and the internal conditions of the country, he came back into power in 1893 and ruled practically as a dictator until 1896. His policy was the same as before, vigorous repression of all opposition to the existing system. He made no attempt to remove the causes of discontent.

But Crispi only gave fuller range to his excessive ambitions in the colonial field. Extending the field of occupation in East Africa he aroused the bitter opposition of Menelek, ruler of Abyssinia. The result was disastrous. The Italian army of 14,000 under Baratieri, was overwhelmed in 1896 by Menelek with 80,000, no less than 6,000 of the Italian troops perishing. This crushing defeat sealed the doom of Crispi, who immediately resigned. The Marquis di Rudini became prime minister and attempted a policy of pacification. Italy renounced her extreme claims, restricted her colonial area, and secured the release of the soldiers who were prisoners of war in the hands of Menelek. The repressive policy at home was abandoned, and an attempt was made to investigate the causes of discontent. But this policy was suddenly cut short by formidable and sanguinary riots that broke out in various parts of Italy in May 1898. The movement was general, though most bloody in Milan. Its cause was the wretchedness of the people, which in turn was largely occasioned by the heavy taxation resulting from these unwise attempts to play an international rôle hopelessly out of proportion to the country's resources. In the south and center the movement took the form of "bread riots," but in the north it was distinctly revolutionary. "Down with the dynasty," was a cry heard there. All these movements were suppressed by the Government, but only after much bloodshed. They indicated widespread distress and dissatisfaction with existing conditions.

In July 1900, King Humbert was assassinated by an Italian anarchist who went to Italy for that purpose from Paterson, New Jersey. Humbert was succeeded by his son Victor Emmanuel III, then in his thirty-first year.

The new King had been carefully educated and soon showed that he was a man of intelligence, of energy, and of firmness of will. He won the favor of his subjects by the simplicity of his mode of life, by his evident sense of duty, and by his sincere interest in the welfare of the people, shown in many spontaneous and unconventional ways. He became forthwith a more decisive factor in the government than his father had been. He was a

democratic monarch, indifferent to display, laborious, vigorous. The opening decade of the twentieth century was characterized by a new spirit which, in a way, reflected the buoyancy, and hopefulness, and courage of the young King. But the causes of the new optimism were deeper than the mere change of rulers and lay in the growing prosperity of the nation, a prosperity which, despite appearances, had been for some years preparing and which was now witnessed on all sides. The worst was evidently over. The national finances were being conservatively managed. After 1897 the receipts were larger than the expenses. Between 1901 and 1907 the surpluses were successively thirty-two, sixty-nine, thirty-three, forty-seven, sixty-three, and one hundred and one million lire. This situation, so highly creditable, was brought about by strict economy and by heavy taxation. The market price of the five per cent. bonds, which had fallen as low as seventy-two in 1894, rose to par and above par. A beginning was also made in the imperative work of reducing taxes and of shifting somewhat their incidence, which was grossly unjust to the poorer classes.

These facts were full of encouragement, but they represented an effect as well as a cause. Behind a flourishing budget stood an expanding economic activity. Italy was becoming an industrial nation. Metallurgy made such progress that in the two lines of naval and railway construction Italy was no longer dependent upon foreign countries. The development of these two industries gave a powerful impulse to activity in other directions. The silk and cotton and chemical manufactures rapidly advanced. The merchant marine greatly increased.

More remarkable than the progress made in the last twenty years before the World War, and more engaging public attention, was the progress that seemed destined in the future, and for a special reason. Industry depended, up to the close of the nineteenth century, upon steam and steam depends upon coal. Italy is at a great disadvantage compared with other countries because she lacks the two indispensable elements — coal and iron — which she is therefore obliged to import. This is a tremendous handicap. But the last two decades of the nineteenth century revealed to the world the possibility of the use of electricity as a source of energy for industrial pursuits. From electricity, "white coal," as it is sometimes called, Italy expects her transformation into a great industrial power, for, while nature has refused her coal, she has given her immense water power in the streams which flow rapidly from the Alps and Apennines. It

has been estimated that the amount of energy she can draw from this source will be from three to five million horsepower. The motive power used in the manufacturing establishments of the United States in 1900 was, according to the census report, eleven million, three hundred thousand horse-power. It is appropriate that the land of Volta and Galvani should see her future in the new agency which is already profoundly altering the conditions of modern industry and which her mountain streams will furnish her so abundantly.

This transformation into a great industrial state was considered not only possible but necessary, owing to her rapidly increasing population, which grew, between 1870 and 1914, from about 25,000,000 to more than 35,000,000. The birth rate was higher than that of any other country of Europe. But during the same period the emigration from Italy was large and steadily increased. Official statistics show that, between 1876 and 1905, over eight million persons emigrated, of whom over four million went to various South American countries, especially Argentina, and to the United States. Perhaps half of the total number have returned to their native land, for much of the emigration is of a temporary character. Emigration has increased greatly under the present reign, while the economic conditions of the country tended, down to 1914, to improve. This is explained by the fact that the industrial revival described above has not yet affected southern Italy and Sicily, whence the large proportion of the emigrants come. From those parts which have experienced that revival the emigration is not large. Only by an extensive growth of industries can this emigration be stopped or at least rendered normal. Italy finds herself in the position in which Germany was for many years, losing hundreds of thousands of her citizens each year. With the expansion of German industries the outgoing stream grew less until, in 1908, it practically ceased, owing to the fact that her mines and factories had so far developed as to give employment to all.

This increasing population and this constant loss by emigration have served in recent years to concentrate Italian thought more and more upon the necessity of new and more advantageous colonies, that her surplus population may not be drained away to other countries. The desire for expansion has increased and with it the determination to use whatever opportunities are offered by the politics of Europe for that purpose. The result was the acquisition in 1912 of the extensive territory of Tripoli and of a dozen Ægean islands, spoils of a war with Turkey

which will be more fully treated later. With this desire for expansion went also a tendency to scrutinize more carefully the nature of her relations with her allies, Germany and Austria. The advantages of the Triple Alliance became, in the minds of many, more and more doubtful. One obvious and positive disadvantage in an alliance with Austria was the necessary abandonment of a policy of annexation of those territories north and northeast of Italy, which are inhabited by Italians but which were not included within the boundaries of the kingdom at the time of its creation. These were the so-called Trentino, the region around the town of Trent; Trieste, and Istria. These territories were subject to Austria, and as long as Italy was allied with Austria she was kept from any attempt to gain this *Italia Irredenta* or Unredeemed Italy, and thus so round out her boundaries as to include within them people who are Italian in race, in language, and in sympathy.

On May 4, 1915, Italy denounced her treaty of alliance with Austria. The famous Triple Alliance, which had been the dominant factor in European diplomacy since 1882, thus came to an end. On May 23, Italy declared war against Austria-Hungary and entered the European conflict on the side of the Entente Allies in the hope of realizing her "national aspirations."

CHAPTER XX

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AFTER 1849

AUSTRIA TO THE COMPROMISE OF 1867

AUSTRIA, perilously near dissolution in 1848, torn by revolutions in Bohemia, Hungary, the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom, and its influence in Germany temporarily paralyzed, had emerged triumphant from the storm, and by 1850 was in a position to impose her will once more upon her motley group of states. She learned no lesson from the fearful crisis just traversed, but at once entered upon a course of reaction of the old familiar kind. Absolutism was everywhere restored. Italy was ruled with an iron hand, Prussia was humiliated in a most emphatic manner at Olmütz, the German Confederation was restored, and Austrian primacy in it conspicuously reaffirmed. Hungary felt the full weight of Austrian displeasure. She was considered to have forfeited by her rebellion the old historic rights she had possessed for centuries. Her Diet was abolished, her local self-government, in her county assemblies, was suppressed, Croatia, Transylvania, and the Serbian districts were severed from her, and the Kingdom itself was cut up into five sections, each ruled separately. Hungary was henceforth governed from Vienna and largely by Germans. She was for the next few years simply a vassal of Austria, whose policy was to crush and extinguish all traces of her separate nationality. Francis Joseph, however, found it in the end impossible to break the spirit of the Magyars, who bent beneath the autocrat but did not abate their claims. During the revolution, Francis Joseph had granted a constitution to the whole Empire (March 4, 1849). This was revoked December 31, 1851, "in the name of the unity of the empire and monarchical principles." For ten years absolutism and centralization prevailed throughout the dominions of the youthful ruler. One achievement of the revolution remained untouched, the abolition of feudalism, the liberation of the peasantry, a great economic and social change benefiting millions of people.

To perpetuate a system of this character the Government must sedulously avoid any disaster that would weaken its power, any crisis in which it would need the support of all its subjects. This it did not do. The crisis of 1859, the failure of that year

in Italy, sealed the doom of a system universally odious, which was now seen to be unable to maintain the integrity of the Empire. As a result of the war Austria was forced to cede Lombardy to Piedmont, and afterwards to remain inactive while the Italians made waste paper of the Treaty of Zurich, which she had concluded with France. She was compelled to continue this passive attitude because of the utter demoralization of her finances, and particularly because of the threatening situation in Hungary. Austria's distress was Hungary's opportunity. Thousands of Hungarians had joined the armies opposed to her, and rebellion was likely to break forth at any moment in Hungary itself. Peace had to be secured at any price.

This time the Austrian government profited by experience. In order to increase the strength of the state by actively interesting his various peoples in it so that they would be willing to make sacrifices for it, Francis Joseph resolved to break with the previous policy of his reign, to sweep away abuses, redress grievances, and introduce liberal reforms. But the problem was exceedingly complicated, and was only slowly worked out after several experiments had been tried which had resulted in failure. The chief difficulty lay in the adjustment of the claims of the different races over which he ruled. How could these be granted, and yet the power of the monarchy remain strong, Austria remain a great European power, able to speak decisively in European councils? Opinion was divided as to the method to pursue. There were at least two parties — those who wished to emphasize the principle of federalism in the government, and those who wished to emphasize the principle of unity. The federalists demanded that the equality of all the countries within the Empire should be recognized, that each should make its own internal laws, and should administer them. Austria would then be a federal state with home rule as the recognized basis of the government of the several parts, and with a central parliament for purely imperial affairs. The other party, emphasizing the idea of unity, believed that the central government should possess large powers in order to play a commanding rôle among the European states. That the unity of the Empire might be preserved and emphasized home rule should be limited in scope, the central government must be endowed with great authority.

The Emperor at first tried the federal system in 1860. This experiment not working to his satisfaction, he inaugurated a new system in 1861. Under this there was to be a parliament for the whole Empire, divided into two chambers, meeting annually. Its

functions were important. The two chambers were to be a House of Lords, appointed by the Emperor, and a House of Representatives of 343 members to be chosen by the local diets (Hungary 85, Transylvania 20, Croatia 9, Bohemia 54, Moravia 22, Galicia 38). The local diets were to continue for local affairs but with reduced powers. By this constitution, granted by the Emperor, Austria became a constitutional monarchy. Absolutism as a form of government was abandoned.

But this constitution was a failure, and chiefly because of the attitude of the Hungarians. To the first parliament Hungary declined to send representatives, an attitude she maintained steadily for several years until a new arrangement was made, satisfactory to her. Why did she refuse to recognize a constitution that represented a great advance in liberalism over anything the Empire had known before? Why did she refuse to send representatives to a parliament in which she would have weight in proportion to the number of her inhabitants? Why did she steadily refuse to accept an arrangement that seemed both liberal and fair?

It must be constantly remembered that Hungary consisted of several races, and that of these races the Magyars had always been the dominant one, though in a numerical minority. This dominant race was divided into two parties, one of irreconcilables, men who bitterly hated Austria, who would listen to no compromise with her, whose ideal was absolute independence. These men, however, were not now in control. They were discredited by the failures of 1849. The leaders of Hungary were now the moderate liberals, at whose head stood Francis Deák, the wisest and most influential Hungarian statesman of the nineteenth century. These men were willing to compromise with Austria on the question of giving the requisite strength to the government of the whole Empire to enable it to play its rôle as a great European power, but they were absolutely firm in their opposition to the constitution just granted by Francis Joseph, and immovable in their determination to secure the legal rights of Hungary. Their reasons for opposing the new constitution, which promised so vast an improvement upon the old unprogressive absolutism that had reigned for centuries, for thwarting the Emperor, who was frankly disposed to enter the path of liberalism, are most important.

They asserted that Hungary had always been a separate nation, united with Austria simply in the person of the monarch, who was King of Hungary as he was emperor in his own heredi-

tary states; that he was King in Hungary only after he had taken an oath to support the fundamental laws of Hungary, and had been crowned in Hungary with the iron crown of St. Stephen; that these fundamental laws and institutions were in part centuries old, had in a sense been redefined in the laws of 1848, which Ferdinand I had formally accepted in their new statement; that no change could be made without the consent of both contracting parties; that the Emperor-King as merely one party to the contract had no right to alter them in jot or tittle by any exercise of his own power; that they were therefore still the law of the land; that Hungary was an historic state, with definite boundaries, including Transylvania and Croatia; "that a people which has had a past is never able to forget its history"; that the new constitution was one "granted" by Francis Joseph, and if granted, might be withdrawn; that whatever its abstract merits were, it was unacceptable by reason of its origin; that, moreover, it was designed for the whole Empire, and that its effect was to make Hungary a mere province of Austria; that what was wanted was not *a* constitution, but *the* constitution of Hungary, which had, since 1848, been illegally suspended.

This party differed from the revolutionary party of 1848 and 1849 in that it recognized that the times did not permit a merely "personal" union of Austria and Hungary, but that the interests of each demanded a certain "real" union, a certain strength for the central government that should enable it to act with decision and authority in foreign affairs, and the party was prepared to make concessions enough to render this possible. Only, the concessions must come later, after the Emperor had formally recognized the historic rights of Hungary, and must come then only after fair discussion. The unity represented by the new parliament it would never consent to. In that assembly it would be a minority outnumbered by "foreigners," for all the other peoples of the Empire were, in its eyes, foreigners; it would not fuse its individuality in the general mass of all the inhabitants; it was determined to preserve the historic personality of Hungary. Francis Joseph must first consider himself personally bound to accede to the laws of 1848, which his predecessor, Ferdinand, had ratified.

The new experiment of an imperial parliament finally broke down beneath the impact of this persistent Hungarian refusal to accept it. For four years, from 1861 to 1865, there was a deadlock, neither side giving way. The condition of the country grew worse, the deficit continued to increase. The Emperor.

recognizing the failure of his plans, recognizing that Hungary was really a separate nation, — strongly conscious of her own distinct history and personality and utterly unwilling to enter a unified monarchy however liberal, — finally determined to adapt himself to the situation. Negotiations were begun with the Hungarians, the object of which was to harmonize their claims with the unity and power of the Empire. These negotiations began in 1865, were interrupted in 1866 by the Austro-Prussian war, and were completed in 1867. Indeed, the war facilitated the great work, as showing once more how heavy was the cost to the Empire of Hungarian disaffection, how imperative it was for the power of the monarchy that Hungary should be contented. Moreover, as by that war Austria was expelled from Germany, it was imperative for the monarchy to gain additional strength elsewhere. The negotiations resulted accordingly, in 1867, in the Compromise, or *Ausgleich*, which remained the basis of the Hapsburg Empire as long as that Empire continued to exist. It was accepted by the Emperor and the Parliaments of both countries. Francis Joseph was in the same year crowned King of Hungary.

Thus was created a curious kind of state defying classification. Neither federalism nor unity was the outcome of the long constitutional struggle, but dualism. The Empire was henceforth to be called Austria-Hungary, and was to be a dual monarchy. Austria-Hungary was to consist of two distinct, independent states, which were to stand in law upon a plane of complete equality. They were to have the same flag. They were to have the same ruler, who in Austria was to bear the title of Emperor, in Hungary that of King. Each was to have its own parliament, its own ministry, its own administration. Each was to govern itself in all internal affairs absolutely without interference from the other.

But the two were to be united, not simply in the person of the monarch. They were to be united for certain affairs regarded as common to both. There was to be a joint ministry composed of three departments: Foreign Affairs, War, and Finance. Each state was to have its own parliament, but there was to be no parliament in common. In order then to have a body that should supervise the work of the three joint ministries there was established the system of "delegations." Each parliament was to choose a delegation of sixty of its members. These delegations were to meet alternately in Vienna and Budapest. They were really to be committees of the two parliaments, sitting and debating separately, each using its own language, and com-

municating with each other in writing. If after three communications no decision had been reached a joint session was to be held in which the question was to be settled without debate by a mere majority vote.

Other affairs, which in most countries are considered common to all parts, such as tariff and currency systems, were not to fall within the competence of the joint ministry or the delegations. They were to be regulated by agreements concluded between the two parliaments for periods of ten years, an awkward arrangement creating an intense strain every decade, for the securing of these agreements was to prove most difficult.

This Compromise was satisfactory only to the Germans and the Magyars, each the dominant party in its section, but each also in a numerical minority.

One of the important results therefore of the expulsion of Austria from Germany after the Austro-Prussian war of 1866 was the internal transformation of the Austrian Empire itself. The German element in that state was weakened, the Hungarians had to be appeased, and as a consequence the *Ausgleich* or Compromise of 1867 was worked out. By this the former Austrian Empire was divided into two states, the Empire of Austria and the Kingdom of Hungary, the two together known henceforth as Austria-Hungary. The small river Leitha formed in part the boundary between the two, Hungary being known as Transleithania, Austria as Cisleithania. The capital of Austria was Vienna; of Hungary, Budapest. The Constitution of the collective state was the Compromise of 1867, already described. Each state also possessed a constitution of its own. In Austria the Constitution of 1861 was liberally revised by five laws passed in 1867, by which full parliamentary government was established, the Emperor choosing his ministry from the majority party or group in Parliament. The Parliament or *Reichsrat* was to consist of two chambers, a House of Lords and a House of Representatives, which numbered at that time 203 members. These were chosen, not directly by the voters, but by the diets or local legislatures of each of the seventeen provinces into which Austria was divided, for each province had its local legislature for local purposes.

In Hungary the Constitution of 1848 was restored, with some alterations. Thus Hungary had a parliament of two chambers, the Table of Magnates, composed chiefly of nobles, and the Table of Deputies, elected directly by the voters, all males twenty years of age and paying a certain amount in taxes.

Though this amount was small it resulted in the exclusion of about three-fourths of the adult males. Thus in neither state did universal suffrage exist. A demand for this was later repeatedly made in both countries with results that will appear.

Neither of the two states had a homogeneous population. In each there was a dominant race, the Germans in Austria, the Magyars in Hungary. The Compromise of 1867 was satisfactory to these alone. In each country there were subordinate and rival races, jealous of the supremacy of these two, anxious for recognition and for power, and rendered more insistent by the sight of the remarkable success of the Magyars in asserting their individuality. In Hungary there were Croatia, Slavonia, and Transylvania; in Austria there were seventeen provinces, each with its own diet, representing almost always a variety of races. Some of these, notably Bohemia, had in former centuries possessed a separate statehood, which they wished to recover; others were gaining an increasing self-consciousness, and desired a future controlled by themselves and in their own interests.

The struggles of these races were destined to form the most important feature of Austrian history during the next half-century. It should be noted that the principle of nationality, so effective in bringing about the unification of Italy and Germany, tended in Austria in precisely the opposite direction, the splitting up of a single state into many. Dualism was established in 1867, but these subordinate races refused to acquiesce in that as a final form. They wished to change the dual into a federal state, which should give free play to the several nationalities. The fundamental struggle all through this period was between these two principles—dualism and federalism. These racial and nationalistic struggles were most confusing, crossing each other in various ways, and rendered more complex by their connection with other forces, such as Liberalism, Clericalism, Socialism. In the interest of clearness, only a few of the more important can be treated here.

The Empire of Austria and the Kingdom of Hungary, having had different histories since 1867, may best be treated separately.

THE EMPIRE OF AUSTRIA AFTER 1867

The first years in Austria under her new constitution were years of liberal reform. The constitution guaranteed complete religious liberty. To give effect to this guarantee laws were passed greatly restricting the powers of the Roman Catholic

Church. Henceforth all forms of religion were on a basis of legal equality; each person might freely choose his church and that of his children, or might decline connection with any. The public schools were to be open to all citizens without regard to creed. Churches might maintain schools of their own if they wished to. A form of marriage by civil authorities was established for those cases in which the priest refused to officiate. By these laws religious liberty and secular education were established. The Pope denounced them as "abominable," and declared them null and void "for the present and the future." Despite these fulminations they went into force.

At this time also other useful laws were passed, regulating the finances, altering the judicial system, and introducing trial by jury, and reorganizing the military system along the successful Prussian lines of universal military service for three years, with service in the reserve for several years longer.

At the same time the Austrian Government was confronted by questions far more baffling. Various nationalities, or would-be nationalities, demanded that they should now receive as liberal treatment as Hungary had received in the Compromise of 1867. The leaders in this movement were the Czechs of Bohemia, who, in 1868, definitely stated their position, which was precisely that of the Hungarians before 1867. They claimed that Bohemia was an historic and independent nation, united with the other states under the House of Hapsburg only in the person of the monarch. They demanded that the kingdom of Bohemia should be restored, that Francis Joseph should be crowned in Prague with the crown of Wenceslaus.

The Galicians in the north, the Slovenes and Serbs in the south, brought forward similar, though not so sweeping, demands. These groups, imitating the successful methods of the Magyars, refused to sit in the Austrian Parliament in Vienna, declining to recognize the authority of institutions in the creation of which they had had no share. The moral authority of the new Parliament was therefore greatly reduced. The agitation became so great that the Emperor decided to yield to the Bohemians. On September 14, 1871, he formally recognized the historic rights of the Kingdom of Bohemia, and agreed to be crowned King in Prague, as he had been crowned King in Budapest. Arrangements were to be made whereby Bohemia should gain the same rights as Hungary, independence in domestic affairs and union with Austria and Hungary for certain general purposes. The dual monarchy was about to become a triple monarchy.

But these promises were not destined to be carried out. The Emperor's plans were bitterly opposed by the Germans of Austria, who, as the dominant class and as also a minority of the whole population, feared the loss of their supremacy, feared the rise of the Slavs, whom they hated. They were bitterly opposed, also, by the Magyars of Hungary, who declared that this was undoing the Compromise of 1867, and who feared particularly that the rise of the Slavic state of Bohemia would rouse the Slavic peoples of Hungary to demand the same rights, and the Magyars were determined not to share with them their privileged position. The opposition to the Emperor's plans was consequently most emphatic and formidable. It was also pointed out that the management of foreign affairs would be much more difficult with three nations directing rather than two. The Emperor yielded to the opposition. The decree that was to place Bohemia upon an equality with Austria and Hungary never came. Dualism triumphed over federalism, to the immense indignation of those who saw the prize snatched from them. Where the Bohemians had failed, obviously the weaker groups — Galicians, Serbs — could not succeed. The Compromise of 1867 remained unchanged. The House of Hapsburg continued to rule over a dual, not over a federal state.

A radical change in the constitution was thus definitely rejected. Gradually the extreme demands of the various races subsided. The Czechs lost much of their power by splitting into two groups. The constitutional régime slowly struck root. For some years it was the Germans who controlled the Austrian Parliament and the ministry. In 1873 a change was made in the electoral system. Hitherto the members of the Reichsrat, or Imperial Parliament, had been elected by the diets of the different provinces. This was objected to as giving the Reichsrat the appearance of a congress of delegates, rather than of a real parliament. Moreover, any diet, by refusing to elect delegates (as Bohemia had frequently done), could so reduce the national representation as to destroy its moral authority. The new law of 1873 withdrew this power from the provincial diets and gave it directly to those who had the right to elect the diets. Now the right to choose the members of these diets was not vested in a general mass of electors, but was vested in certain groups or classes, four in number — the landowners, the cities, the chambers of commerce, and the rural districts. Each class elected a certain number of members of the diets. It was now provided that each should henceforth elect a certain number of members of the

Reichsrat. All that the change of 1873 accomplished was to substitute direct election by the four classes for indirect election by the diets. The number of members of the Reichsrat was increased from 203 to 353. The number of voters in each class and the relative weight of the individual voter varied enormously. Thus in 1890, in the class of landowners, there was one deputy to every 63 voters, one to 27 in the class of chambers of commerce, one to 2,918 in that of cities, one to 11,600 in that of rural districts. With such a system further demands for reform were inevitable, and were, as we shall see, to figure prominently in later history.

The German element maintained control of the Austrian Parliament as long as it remained united, but breaking up finally into three groups, and incurring the animosity of the Emperor by constantly blocking his measures, its ministry fell in 1879, and was succeeded by one of a very different character under Taaffe. This ministry lasted fourteen years, from 1879 to 1893. While Taaffe steadily refused to alter the Constitution of 1867 in the direction of federalism, his policy nevertheless greatly stimulated the growth of the federalist spirit. Relying for parliamentary support upon the Czechs and Poles against the Germans, he was forced to make concessions to them. In Bohemia the Czechs were favored in various ways. They secured an electoral law which assured them a majority in the Bohemian Diet and in the Bohemian delegation to the Reichsrat; they obtained a university, by the division into two institutions of that of Prague, the oldest German university, founded in 1356. Thus there was a German University of Prague and a Czech University (1882). By various ordinances German was dethroned from its position as sole official language. After 1886 office-holders were required to answer the demands of the public in the language in which they were presented, either German or Czech. This rule operated unfavorably for German officials, who were usually unable to speak Czech, whereas the Czechs, as a rule, spoke both languages.

In Galicia the Poles, though a minority, obtained control of the Diet, supported by the Taaffe ministry, and proceeded to oppress the Ruthenians; in Carniola the Slovenes proceeded to Slaviceize the province. Thus the Slavs were favored during the long ministry of Taaffe, and the evolution of the Slavic nationalities and peoples progressed at the expense of the Germans.

Under this long administration the financial condition of Austria improved. The chronic deficit disappeared and receipts

exceeded expenditures for the first time in many years. In social legislation the policies of Bismarck were imitated by the compulsory insurance of workingmen and the repression of Socialists, for it was also at this time that the Socialist party became prominent. This was, here as elsewhere, a radical democratic party, demanding universal suffrage, obligatory and free education, the complete laicization of the state. This party was not local, like the racial and nationalistic groups, but was interprovincial, thus cutting across the parties already existing and increasing the confusion.

In Bohemia there was a movement in favor of democracy, which was independent of the Socialists. The Czechs had long been divided into Old and Young Czechs. They had worked together as against the Germans, but now that they were in the main victorious in this, they flew apart. The Young Czechs were a democratic party, demanding universal suffrage, secular schools, liberty of the press and of public meetings. After 1887 this party, profiting by the concession of the Taafe ministry, began to agitate fiercely in favor of a reconstruction of Bohemian nationality, whereas the Old Czechs were willing to abide by the Compromise of 1867. By 1891 the Young Czechs had swept the Old Czechs completely from the field. An attempt by the Government to stop this movement had resulted in total failure. The Germans of Bohemia, on the other hand, opposed with vehemence the nationalist aspirations of the Czechs. So fierce did race struggles become that in 1893 the Government was forced to proclaim the state of siege in Prague. The situation became so difficult for the Taafe ministry that it resigned in 1893.

Thus racial movements and democratic movements were in full swing at the close of this long ministry. To satisfy the latter, Taafe, just before his fall, brought forward a radical electoral reform, which would have increased the number of voters from about 1,500,000 to 4,500,000. The proposal failed, but, the agitation continuing, the succeeding ministry in 1896 carried through a more limited measure. The existing four electoral classes were left as they were; but a fifth class was created, which was to elect 72 additional members to Parliament. This class was to include all men of twenty-four years of age or older. It included, therefore, all those of the four other classes, members of which, consequently, possessed under the new system a double vote. The result was to make the system of representation more complex than ever, without giving numbers anything like their due weight. Thus five million and a half voters would choose 72

members, whereas the 1,700,000 voters of the four other classes would choose 353; the class of great landed proprietors, numbering only about 5,000, would choose 85 members. Obviously, such a system would not satisfy the growing demand for a democratic suffrage. It was a mere temporary expedient.

The agitation for universal suffrage continued to increase during the next decade, and was finally successful. By the law of January 26, 1907, all men in Austria over twenty-four were given the right to vote, and the class system was abolished. The most striking result of the first elections on this popular basis (May 1907) was the return of 87 Socialists, who polled 1,041,948 votes, nearly a third of those cast. This party had previously had only about a dozen representatives. The race parties, such as the Young Czechs, lost heavily. Whether this meant that the period of extreme racial rivalry was over and the struggle of social classes was to be the feature of the future, was not clear.

THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AFTER 1867

Hungary, a country larger than Austria, larger than Great Britain, found her historic individuality definitely recognized and guaranteed by the Compromise of 1867. She had successfully resisted all attempts to merge her with the other countries subject to the House of Hapsburg. She was an independent kingdom under the crown of St. Stephen. The sole official language was Magyar, which was neither Slavic nor Teutonic, but Turanian in origin.

The political history of Hungary after the Compromise was much more simple than that of Austria. Race and language questions were fundamental, but they were decided in a summary manner. The ruling race in 1867 was the Magyar, and it remained the ruling race. Though numerically in the minority in 1867, comprising only about six millions out of fifteen millions, they were a strong race, accustomed to rule and determined to rule. This minority was steadily, after 1867, attempting the impossible — the assimilation of the majority. There were four leading races in Hungary — the Magyar, the Slav, the Roumanian, the German. The Roumanians were the oldest, calling themselves Latins and claiming descent from Roman colonists of ancient times. They lived particularly in the eastern part of the kingdom, which was called Transylvania. They did not constitute a solid block of peoples, for there were among them many German or Saxon settlements, and between them and the independent Kingdom of Roumania, inhabited by people of the same race, were

many Magyars. The Slavs of Hungary fell into separate groups. In the northern part of Hungary were the Slovaks, practically of the same race and language as the Czechs of Bohemia. In the southern and particularly the southwestern part, were Serbs and Croats, related to the Serbs of the Kingdom of Serbia. Of these the Croats were the only ones who had a separate and distinct personality. They had never been entirely absorbed in Hungary, they had had their own history, and their own institutions. In 1868 the Magyars made a compromise with Croatia, similar to the compromise they had themselves concluded with Austria in the year preceding. In regard to all the other races, however, the Magyars resolved to Magyarize them early and thoroughly. This policy they steadily persisted in. They insisted upon the use of the Magyar language in public offices, courts, schools, and in the railway service — wherever, in fact, it was possible. It is stated that there was not a single inscription in any post-office or railway station in all Hungary except in the Magyar language. The Magyars, in fact, refused to make any concessions to the various peoples who lived with them within the boundaries of Hungary. They, indeed, tried in every way to stamp out all peculiarities. For nearly fifty years this policy was carried out, and it did not succeed. Hungary was not Magyarized because the power of resistance of Slovaks, Croats, Slavonians, Roumanians proved too strong. But in the attempt, which grew sharper and shriller than ever in the last decade before the Great War, the Magyar minority stopped at nothing. It committed innumerable tricks, acts of arbitrary power, breaches of the law, in order to crush out all opposition. Political institutions were distorted into engines of ruthless oppression, political life steadily deteriorated in character and purpose, under the influence of this overmastering purpose which recognized no bounds. Hungary, which boasted itself a land of freedom, insured freedom only to the dominant race, the Magyars. But for the other races Hungary was a land of unbridled despotism. Every imaginable instrument was used to crush the Slavs or convert them into Magyars — corruption and gross illegalities in the administrative service, in the control of elections, persecution of all independent newspapers, suppression of schools, the firm determination to prevent these subject peoples, for that they virtually were though theoretically fellow-citizens, from developing their own languages, literatures, arts, economic life, ideals. The situation was galling to the Slavs and other peoples. Magyar misrule steadily increased in intensity, seriously vitiated and

corrupted the national life and made Hungary a tinder box, where disaffection was bound to blaze up at the first opportune moment. It was an odious history of oppression. Had the Magyars recognized that the other races living within Hungary had the same rights as they, had they adopted a policy of fair play and justice, instead of amalgamation by force, Hungary might have been in a healthy condition. Hungary was not Magyarized. But racial animosities were raised to the highest pitch and the time of reckoning came with the Great War. Any detailed study of the relations of the dominant Magyars with the Croats, the Serbs, the Slovaks, the Roumanians would amply prove the statements made.

The reply to these assertions, constantly given by the apologists of the Magyars, is that Hungarian law expressly and carefully recognized the absolute equality of all the various elements, and they point to the Law of 1868, which guaranteed the "Equal Rights of Nationalities." This law was admirable and enlightened and was composed in the finely liberal spirit of Francis Deák, who indeed was its chief author. But this law was a dead letter, and it had been a dead letter almost from the time of its passage. It was not repealed, as the advantage of having so liberal an enactment to point to for the purpose of silencing critics and throwing dust in foreign eyes was apparent to the Magyar tyrants. But the spirit of Francis Deák long ago passed out of the governing circles of Hungary.

That many Roumanians in Transylvania desired separation from Hungary and incorporation in the Kingdom of Roumania, that many of the Serbs or Slavs of southern Hungary desired annexation to the Kingdom of Serbia, need occasion no surprise. Had the Slavs of Hungary received justice, which they never did receive, they would not have become an element of danger to the state. There is no evidence even yet to show that the Magyars have learned this lesson.

Toward the close of the nineteenth century there grew up among the Magyars themselves a new party, which still further complicated an already complex situation. It was called the Independence Party and was under the leadership of Francis Kossuth, son of Louis Kossuth of 1848. This party was opposed to the Compromise of 1867, and wished to have Hungary more independent than she was. It demanded that Hungary should have her own diplomatic corps, control her relations with foreign countries independently of Austria, and possess the right to have her own tariff. Particularly did it demand the use of Magyar

in the Hungarian part of the army of the dual monarchy — a demand pressed passionately, but always resisted with unshaken firmness by the Emperor, Francis Joseph, who considered that the safety of the state was dependent upon having one language in use in the army, that there might not be confusion and disaster on the battlefield. Scenes of great violence arose over this question, both in Parliament and outside of it, but the Emperor would not yield. Government was brought to a deadlock, and, indeed, for several years the Ausgleich could not be renewed, save by the arbitrary act of the Emperor, for a year at a time. Francis Joseph finally threatened, if forced to concede the recognition of the Hungarian language, to couple with it the introduction of universal suffrage into Hungary, for which there was a growing popular demand. This the Magyars did not wish, fearing that it would rob them of their dominant position by giving a powerful weapon to the politically inferior but more numerous races, and that they would, therefore, ultimately be submerged by the Slavs about them. In 1914 less than twenty-five per cent. of the adult male population of Hungary possessed the vote. The normal operation of political institutions had for some time been seriously interrupted by the violent character of the discussions arising out of these extreme demands for racial monopoly and national independence. Parliamentary freedom had practically disappeared and at the outbreak of the War Hungary was being ruled quite despotically.

The House of Hapsburg lost during the nineteenth century the rich Lombardo-Venetian kingdom (1859–1866). It gained, however, Bosnia and Herzegovina. As a result of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877 these Turkish provinces were handed over by the Congress of Berlin of 1878 to Austria-Hungary to “occupy” and “administer.” The Magyars at the time opposed the assumption of these provinces, wishing no more Slavs within the monarchy, but despite their opposition they were taken over, so strongly was the Emperor in favor of it. This acquisition rendered Austria-Hungary a more important and aggressive factor in all Balkan politics, in all discussions of the Eastern Question. In October, 1908, Austria-Hungary declared these provinces formally annexed. The great significance of this act will be discussed later in connection with the very recent history of southeastern Europe and the causes of the European War.

On November 21, 1916, Francis Joseph died after a reign of nearly sixty-eight years. He was succeeded by his grand-nephew, who assumed the title of Charles I.

CHAPTER XXI

ENGLAND TO THE REFORM BILL OF 1832

GREAT BRITAIN appeared in 1815, to the superficial observer, in a brilliant light. She had persisted, when others had faltered, in her bitter hostility to Napoleon. She had been the soul of the coalitions, and the crowning victory of Waterloo seemed to place her at the very head of the nations of Europe. Her energy and her wealth seemed to be unbounded. Her population had been only 14,000,000 at the beginning of the great war; at the end it was 19,000,000. Her debt, it is true, had increased with appalling rapidity. Over a billion dollars in 1792, it was over four billion in 1815.¹ The annual interest charge amounted to 150,000,000 dollars. Her expenditures during those years exceeded seven billion dollars. But while her debt and the yearly expenditures grew at an unprecedented rate, the wealth of the country grew more rapidly, and the burden of the state was more easily borne than ever. For the period had been one of extraordinary material development. The growth of her industry at home and her commerce abroad had made her easily the first industrial and the first commercial power in the world. This industrial and commercial supremacy, fully revealed during the Napoleonic wars and the period just succeeding, rested upon a series of remarkable inventions and discoveries made by Englishmen in the latter part of the eighteenth century, inventions so momentous, so far-reaching in their results, that they effected what has been called the Industrial Revolution, which has already been described.

These inventions and processes were for a while monopolized by Great Britain, for it was not until after the downfall of Napoleon that they came into general use on the Continent. Manufacturing on a large scale, she was able to outstrip all possible rivals. She first developed the so-called factory system, and first utilized its advantages. These inventors, says an historian of modern England, "did more for the cause of mankind than even Wellington. Their lives had more influence on their coun-

¹ Debt in 1792, £239,650,000; in 1815, £861,000,000.

try's future than the career of the great general. His victories secured his country peace for rather more than a generation. Their inventions gave Great Britain a commercial supremacy which neither war nor foreign competition has yet destroyed."¹ "It is our improved steam engine," wrote Francis Jeffrey in the *Edinburgh Review* in 1819, "that has fought the battles of Europe, and exalted and sustained, through the late tremendous contest, the political greatness of our land. It is the same great power which enables us now to pay the interest of our debt, and to maintain the arduous struggle in which we are still engaged with the skill and capital of countries less oppressed with taxation."²

But England profited not only from the genius of her inventors. The long war itself had greatly contributed to her commercial expansion. England had not been invaded; her industries had not been injured, their activity interrupted or rendered precarious, as had been the case in all the countries of the Continent. She prospered both because she was unmolested and because they were molested, so that they were forced to rely upon her for many things which in normal times they would have manufactured for themselves. The war, too, had given her the command of the seas. The carrying trade of the world was almost entirely hers. The material development of England filled other nations with envy. Her empire was also commanding in its range and universality. As one after another of the countries of Europe became the enemy of Britain, she attacked its colonies. Thus at the close of the long war she had enriched herself with valuable possessions, hitherto belonging to France and Holland.³

The proud position that England held was ascribed, in the general opinion of Europe, to the excellence of her government. This government enjoyed a great reputation on the Continent. It had remained erect throughout a period when other governments, one after another, had collapsed. It had followed a uniform, persistent policy from the beginning to the end, with a single interruption, while the policy of other nations had veered and changed, and changed and veered again. It seemed that there must be some peculiar merit in a system that remained immutable in a world of change. Europeans heard of England as

¹ Walpole's *History of England since 1815*, I, 66; on the whole subject of this series of inventions and the expansion of industry see Walpole, I, 44-67.

² Quoted by Cheyney, *Readings in English History*, 614-615.

³ On general material condition of Great Britain in 1815, Walpole, I, 22-113.

a land of freedom, of representative government, of local self-government. The renown of her Parliament had filled the world. It was known that her Parliament was her real ruler, that though the king reigned he did not govern, that the real executive was the ministry of the hour, that ministries rose and fell according to the will of Parliament. The fact that England was so successful under this parliamentary and cabinet system of government, which was supposed to be the mouthpiece of the English people, gave great impetus to the demand for similar institutions on the Continent. England was the model for Liberals everywhere.

Yet on examination it was seen that this structure was far from fair, that it was honeycombed with abuses, marked by glaring discriminations between social classes, that England was a land of privilege, a land of the old régime, that her institutions required radical change to bring them into proper adjustment with the new age and its ideas. While the French across the Channel had, by supreme and violent exertions, asserted that the modern state must rest upon the principle of equality, and had, in order to give that principle definite lodgment in the facts of the national life, reduced the aristocracy and humbled the church, in England the ruling class maintained its position unshaken. England remained a land of the old régime until 1832, forty years after the great transformation in France.

Power rested with the aristocracy, composed of the nobility and the gentry. This class largely controlled local government and local taxation. The "local self-government" of England, so much praised and idealized abroad, as if it were government of the people by the people, did not exist. In the counties the nobility filled the most important offices in the local governing boards and in the militia. Smaller offices were occupied by its dependents. In the boroughs, too, its influence was generally decisive with the close corporations which controlled most of them. Its power was glaringly apparent at the top, in Parliament. The House of Lords was composed almost exclusively of large landed proprietors. This was the inexpugnable bulwark of the prevailing social class. But the House of Commons was also another stronghold hardly less secure. This body, supposed, as its name shows, to be representative of the commoners of England, conspicuously belied its name. Its composition was so extraordinary that it merits full description, particularly as the great reform movement of the next generation concerned it primarily, its thorough alteration being correctly

felt to be the condition absolutely precedent to all other reform.

The House of Commons in 1815 consisted of 658 members; 489 of these were returned by England, 100 by Ireland, 45 by Scotland, 24 by Wales. There were three kinds of constituencies — the counties, the boroughs, and the universities. In England each county had two members, and nearly all of the boroughs had two each, though a few had but one. Representation had no relation to the size of the population in either case. A large county and a small county, a large borough and a small borough, had the same number of members. In times past the king had possessed the right to summon this town and that to send up two burgesses to London. Once given that right it usually retained it. If a new town should grow up, the monarch might give it the right, but he was not obliged to. Since 1625 only two new boroughs had been created. Thus the constitution of the House of Commons had become stereotyped at a time when population was increasing and was also shifting greatly from old centers to new. An increasing inequality in the representation was a feature of the political system. Thus the county and borough representation of the ten southern counties of England was 237, and of the thirty others only 252; yet the latter had a population nearly three times as large as the former. All Scotland returned only 45 members, while the single English county of Cornwall (including its boroughs, of course), returned 44. Yet the population of Scotland was eight times as large as that of Cornwall.¹

The suffrage in the counties was uniform, and was enjoyed by those who possessed land yielding them an income of forty shillings a year. But as this worked out it gave a very restricted suffrage, for England was the land of large estates, and the tendency toward the absorption of small estates in large ones was steadily increasing. The small farmer, holding his land in his own right, who was so common in France, had become almost universally in England a mere tenant of a large landholder. Accurate statistics are lacking, but Gneist estimates that at least four-fifths of the cultivable land of the United Kingdom belonged to not more than 7,000 of the nobility and gentry. The county voters, then, were chiefly the men who had large country estates, and not the farmers and peasantry who tilled them. The county representation was consequently a stronghold of the aristocracy. Counties in which there were so few voters could often be easily controlled by the wealthy landowners. Indeed,

¹ These numbers include not only the county representatives proper but also the representatives of the boroughs located in the respective counties.

in many counties the election of the landowners' nominee was accepted as so much a matter of course that there were no opposing candidates. In at least three counties there had been no contest for over a hundred years.

In Scotch counties the condition was even worse. There the suffrage was not determined by ownership of land, but by the possession of a so-called "superiority," or direct grant from the crown, producing at least 400 pounds a year. The result was that there were not three thousand county voters in all Scotland; yet the population of Scotland was nearly two million. Fife had 240 voters, Cromarty 9. In the county of Roxburgh in 1831 the result of the election was a "great majority" of 40 to 19. Yet that county had a population of more than 40,000. The climax was reached in Bute, where there were 21 voters out of a population of 14,000, only one of whom lived in the county. On a certain occasion only one voter attended the election meeting of that county. He constituted himself chairman, nominated himself, called the list of voters, and declared himself returned to Parliament.

Such was the situation in the counties of Great Britain, which returned 186 members to the House of Commons. But more important were the boroughs, which returned 467 members.¹ In the counties the suffrage was uniform; in the boroughs, on the other hand, there was a bewildering variety in the methods whereby the right to vote was secured. In the boroughs, too, the influence of the landowning and wealthy class was even greater and more decisive than in the counties. The boroughs were of several kinds or types — nomination boroughs, rotten or close boroughs, boroughs in which there was a considerable body of voters, boroughs in which the suffrage was almost democratic. It was the existence of the first two classes that contributed the most to the popular demand for the reform of the House. In the nomination boroughs, the right to choose the two burgesses was completely in the hands of the patron. Such places might have lost all their inhabitants, yet representation, being an attribute of geographical areas rather than of population, these places were still entitled to their two members. Thus Corfe Castle was a ruin, Old Sarum a green mound, Gatton was part of a park, while Dunwich had long been submerged beneath the sea, yet these places, entirely without inhabitants, still had two members each in the House, because it had been so decided centuries before, when they did have a population, and because the English Parlia-

¹ The universities returned 5 members.

ment took no account of changes. Thus the owner of the ruined wall, or the green mound, or this particular portion of the bottom of the sea, had the right of nomination.

In the rotten or close boroughs the members were elected by the corporation, that is, by the mayor and aldermen, or the suffrage was in the hands of voters, who, however, were so few, from a dozen to fifty in many cases,¹ and generally so poor that the patron could easily influence them by bribery or intimidation to choose his candidates. Elections in such cases were a mere matter of form. Walpole states that, in 1793, 245 members were notoriously returned by the influence of 128 peers. Thus peers, themselves sitting in the House of Lords, had representatives sitting in the other House. Lord Lonsdale thus returned nine members, and was known as "premier's cat-o'-nine-tails." Others returned six, five, four apiece. Some would sell their appointments to the highest bidder, and a common price was 10,000 pounds for two seats for a single parliament. Borough-mongering was common.² It was stated in 1817 that seats were bought and sold like tickets to the opera. Thus at the period at which this history opens a considerable majority of the members of the House of Commons was returned through the influence of a small body of patrons. These were noblemen, or wealthy landowners, who aspired to become noblemen and chose this method of acquiring political power, that thus they might in the end be raised to the peerage.

In the third class of boroughs, those with a fairly large electorate, there was much bribery, while the fourth class of practically democratic boroughs was very small. On the other hand, there were large industrial cities with no representation at all, such as Manchester, with a population of 140,000, Birmingham with 100,000, Leeds with 75,000, Sheffield with about 70,000.³

Bribery, as has been said, was customary. The polls were

¹ Ninety members represented places of less than 50 voters each.

² Some of the most honorable and useful members bought their seats as the only way of getting into Parliament on an independent basis, though they utterly detested the system. See the case of Romilly. Cheyney, *Readings in English History*, pp. 644-646.

³ The salient fact about the suffrage in boroughs before 1832 is that it varied greatly from place to place. Molesworth considers the following a tolerably complete list of these qualifications: "House-holders, resident house-holders, house-holders paying scot and lot: inhabitants, resident inhabitants, inhabitants paying scot and lot: burgesses, capital burgesses, burghage-holders; freeholders, freemen, resident freemen; corporations, pot-wallopers, payers of poor rates." Molesworth, *History of England*, I, 66, note.

kept open for fifteen days. Where there were contests the expenses were borne by the candidates. These were sometimes enormous. A case is on record in which the two candidates spent 200,000 pounds in a single election. Rich men were willing to make these vast expenditures. For, once in Parliament, they were on the road to political power and social eminence. They or their sons might enter the peerage, and numerous sinecures might fall in the direction of the family. For this reason men who were making their fortunes in industry sought to enter the class of landed proprietors by purchasing large estates. Thus the established order gained additional support in the ambition of the newly arising moneyed class. Well might the younger Pitt exclaim: "This House is not the representation of the people of Great Britain; it is the representation of nominal boroughs, of ruined and exterminated towns, of noble families, of wealthy individuals, of foreign potentates." The government of England was not representative, but was oligarchical.

Closely identified with the State, and, like the State, thoroughly permeated with the principle of special privileges, was another body, the Church of England. Though there was absolute religious liberty in Great Britain, though men might worship as they saw fit, the position of the Anglican Church was one greatly favored. Only members of that church possessed any real political power. No Catholic could be a member of Parliament, or hold any office in the state or municipality. In theory Protestants who dissented from the Anglican Church were likewise excluded from holding office. In practice, however, they were enabled to, by the device of the so-called Act of Indemnity, an act passed each year by Parliament, pardoning them for having held the positions illegally during the year just past. The position of the Dissenter was both burdensome and humiliating. He had to pay taxes for the support of the Church of England, though he did not belong to it. He had to register his place of worship with authorities of the Church of England. He could only be married by a clergyman of that church, unless he were a Quaker or a Jew. There was no such thing as civil marriage, or marriage by dissenting clergymen. A Roman Catholic or a Dissenter could not graduate from Cambridge, could not even enter Oxford, owing to the religious tests exacted, which only Anglicans could meet. The natural result of the supremacy of this religion was that those embraced it who were influenced by self-interest, who were ambitious for political preferment, for social advancement, or for an Oxford

or Cambridge education for their sons. It was "ungentleman-like" to be a Dissenter.

Not only was the Church of England privileged with reference to other churches, but within the Church itself there were great inequalities. Bishops and archbishops received large salaries, ranging from ten to one hundred and fifty thousand dollars a year. These prizes went to the younger sons or protégés of the great families. The assumption was, as Sir Leslie Stephen says, that "a man of rank who takes orders should be rewarded for his condescension." On the other hand, there were thousands of parish clergymen with wretchedly low salaries. The latter had little chance of promotion. There were pluralities and absenteeism in this Church, exactly as in the Roman Catholic Church in pre-revolutionary France. The clergy were eminently respectable, but eminently worldly, a social, if not a spiritual, force in the life of England, an interested bulwark of the established order.

The great institutions of England, therefore, were controlled by the rich, and in the interest of the rich. Legislation favored the powerful, the landed nobility, and the rich class of manufacturers that was growing up, whose interests were similar. The immense mass of the people received scant consideration. Their education was woefully neglected. Probably three-fourths of the children of England did not receive the slightest instruction. Laborers were forbidden to combine to improve their conditions, which the state itself never dreamed of improving. Even their food was made artificially dear by tariffs on breadstuffs passed in the interests of the landlords. The reverse side of the picture of English greatness and power and prosperity was gloomy in the extreme. England was in need of sweeping and numerous reforms to meet the demands of modern liberalism, whether in politics, in economics, or in social institutions.

The conditions just described had not escaped challenge. In the last quarter of the eighteenth century, two writers in particular, of great vigor and originality, Adam Smith and Jeremy Bentham, had subjected English institutions and policies to trenchant and damaging criticism. Adam Smith had published in 1776 his "Wealth of Nations," a comprehensive condemnation of the prevalent economic theories and practices of Great Britain. He denounced protection and defended free trade, and urged liberty in the economic life in place of constant and minute governmental regulation. Bentham criticized government and jurisprudence and morals. Aroused by Blackstone's panegyric

of the British Constitution as the perfection of human wisdom, he published in 1776 a "Fragment on Government," in which he showed unsparingly its defects. He laid down in this, and in other books in later years, the principle that "the greatest happiness of the greatest number is the foundation of morals and legislation"; that "the end of all government is utility, or the good of the governed." Obviously, English government was not based on any such principle. Bentham applied his principle of utility to all the institutions of England in succession—the monarchy, the church, the courts, parliament—showing how harmful rather than useful each was. He was constructive also, showing how the grievous defects could be remedied.

The views of Smith and Bentham made no impression upon Parliament, but they gradually influenced the rising generation. They contributed greatly to the reforms effected from about 1825 to 1850. They would probably have been effective much earlier had it not been for the French Revolution, which, working much good for France, worked nothing but evil for England. English conservatism became stiff and implacable. Liberal demands must be resisted, because, as any one could see, they led to anarchy and violence and a Reign of Terror. From 1793 to 1815 the liberal reformers of England were silenced by the odium attached to the deeds of their French neighbors. Salutory changes were delayed for a whole generation. The Tory party, opposed to all change, was assured of a long lease of power, one that lasted, indeed, until 1830.

The demand for reform was resumed, however, after the final victory over Napoleon at Waterloo, and became more and more emphatic. It drew its main strength from the deep and widespread wretchedness of the people. Contrary to all expectations, the peace did not bring with it happiness and prosperity, but rather intense suffering and the hatred of class and class. The reasons for this are not far to seek. As long as war continued England was the manufacturer and the common carrier of the world. Now that the war was over this practical monopoly was destroyed, the foreign market was restricted by the renewed activity of European manufacturers and merchants, who could now conduct their business in security. The export trade fell off rapidly. Then the English Government reduced its expenditures suddenly by one-half, greatly injuring all those industries which had furnished it the materials of war. Thus manufacturers, losing customers at home and abroad, were forced, some into bankruptcy, others to curtail their activity, in other words, to

dismiss thousands of workmen. And at this very moment, when laborers were being thrown out of employment or were finding their wages reduced, their number was being increased by the disbandment of the militia and the reduction in the army and navy. The navy alone was reduced from 100,000 men in 1815 to 33,000 in 1816. At the time when the number of laborers was greater than the demand, 200,000 or more men were added to the labor market. Furthermore, the next few years saw a series of bad harvests. By these, and by the Corn Law of 1815, bread was made dearer. Add also the fact that the modern industrial or factory system was painfully supplanting the old system of household industries and temporarily throwing multitudes out of employment, or employing them under hard, even inhuman conditions, and it is not difficult to understand the widespread, desperate discontent of the mass of the population. A Parliament, organ of the rich minority, refused to help them; it even forbade them to help themselves, for it was a misdemeanor for workmen to combine. If they did, they would be sent to jail. Labor was unorganized.

The prevalence of such conditions naturally furthered the demand for reforms, long held in check by the war. Now that the war was over, the time seemed to have come for legislation remedial of the many abuses in English institutions, and of the existing economic distress. But the ministry and Parliament saw only danger in change, and set themselves grimly against all concessions. The years from 1815 to 1820 are years of repression and alarm, as pronounced in England as in most of the countries of Europe.

The demand for reforms came primarily from the poor and disheartened masses, who possessed a remarkable leader in the person of William Cobbett, the son of an agricultural laborer. For some years Cobbett had published a liberal periodical called "The Weekly Political Register," in which he had opposed the Government. In 1816 he reduced the price of his paper from a shilling to twopence, made his appeal directly to the laboring class, and became their guide and spokesman. The effect was instantaneous. For the first time the lower class had an organ, cheap, moreover brilliantly written, for Cobbett's literary ability was such that a London paper, the *Standard*, declared that for clearness, force, and power of copious illustration he was unrivaled since the time of Swift. Cobbett was the first great popular editor, who for nearly thirty years, with but little interruption, expressed in his weekly paper the wishes and the

emotions of the laboring classes. He was a great democratic leader, a powerful popular editor, a pugnacious and venomous opponent of the existing régime, a champion of the cause of parliamentary reform.

For Cobbett persuaded the working people that they must first get the right to vote before they could get social and economic reforms. Parliamentary reform must have precedence. Let the people get political power, let them change Parliament from the organ of a narrow class into a truly national assembly, and then they could abolish the evils from which they suffered, and put useful statutes into force. He demanded, therefore, universal suffrage. Other leaders appeared also, and a considerable fermentation of ideas among the unpropertied and working classes characterized these years.

Certain radicals took more active measures which aroused disproportionate alarm in the minds of the ministry, who scented a new French Revolution in every popular commotion, and were ready to go to almost any length to stamp out the troublesome spirit. The distress of the masses led to disturbances. Riots broke out in 1816. Farm buildings, barns, stacks, business premises were set on fire. Machines were broken by workmen who thought them the cause of their woes. Obnoxious tradesmen were attacked. The ministry, thinking it necessary in the interests of property to make an example, arrested seventy-three of the wretched rioters of Ely, secured the condemnation to death of thirty-four of them, and the actual execution of five. Such was the reply of the British Government to the prevalent discontent. Similar disturbances occurred elsewhere, and were similarly suppressed. A political demonstration of a radical character was held in Spa Fields in London in the same year (1816). The Government prosecuted the leaders for treason, but the jury declined to convict. Somewhat later when the Prince Regent was returning from Parliament, where he had declared that the English electoral system was the most perfect the world had ever seen, the people threw stones at his carriage, breaking one of its windows.

The legislation occasioned by these occurrences was harshly repressive. No less grave a measure was passed than one suspending the Habeas Corpus Act, an act which no Parliament in Great Britain, since that of 1817, has felt it necessary to suspend. An act for the suppression of seditious meetings was hardly more defensible. It was the object of this bill to prevent political discussion by the public. Only with the special permis-

sion of a magistrate could a debating club meet or a lecture be given or a reading room be opened. The ministry even declined to make any exception of lectures on medicine, surgery, and chemistry. Such legislation only the gravest necessity could justify, and such necessity did not exist. That it could be used to damage political opponents of the existing ministry was soon made evident. The suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act drove Cobbett, the most aggressive opponent of the ministry, into temporary exile.

Two years later a more important event occurred in Manchester. A public meeting was held in St. Peters Field, August 16, 1819, for the purpose of petitioning for parliamentary reform and the redress of grievances. This meeting had been declared illegal by the authorities, yet the organizers had determined to hold it nevertheless. Fifty thousand men, women, and children came together accordingly to listen to Hunt, a popular orator. The police attempted to arrest Hunt and the other leaders. The crowd closed in around them, jeering. The magistrates apparently lost their heads. They ordered a body of cavalry and yeomanry to rescue the police. The result, however, was that the troops charged the crowd which was unarmed. There was a scene of fearful confusion; several defenseless people were killed at once; many more were injured. This so-called Massacre of Peterloo angered the people, and in the end furthered the agitation for reform, but the Government warmly approved the action of the magistrates and induced Parliament to pass the famous Six Acts or Gag Laws which represent the climax of this sorry reaction in England, and which stringently restricted the freedom of speech, of the press, and of public meeting, which had long been the boast of England.

Such was the answer of the Tory aristocracy under Lord Liverpool to the demands of the discontented and distressed. No attempt on the part of the privileged classes to examine the grievances of the people, to seek to remove the causes of the universal discontent, but only harsh and repressive legislation that encroached gravely upon the traditional liberties of the British people. The conquerors of Napoleon were easily frightened. Their policy of coercion was successful. The radical party was silenced. It reappeared ten years later, however, and contributed immensely to the cause of parliamentary reform which then became irresistible.

In 1820 George III died at the age of eighty-one. He had for many years been insane, and the regency had been exercised by

his son, who now became George IV, and who reigned from 1820 to 1830.

After 1820 a change gradually came over the political life of England. The Tory party still retained its great majority in Parliament, but it showed a tendency toward liberalism. With returning prosperity after the resumption of specie payments in 1819, the disturbances of the last few years ceased, and the panic, into which the governing classes had been thrown by the French Revolution, passed away. Several of the more reactionary members of the ministry died or resigned, and their places were taken by men of a younger and more liberal generation. Canning, Peel, and Huskisson made the Tory party an engine of partial reform. Under Canning, as Foreign Secretary from 1822, England assumed the position that each nation is free to determine its own form of government, a doctrine opposed to that of the Holy Alliance of the right of intervention in the affairs of other states whose acts might be thought to imperil the principle of monarchy. Canning freed England from all connection with the Holy Alliance. He recognized the independence of the Spanish colonies in America. If Spain could reconquer them she might. But no foreign country, declared Canning, should subdue them for her. "I called the New World in," he said, "to redress the balance of the Old." The main significance of Canning's administration of the Foreign Office is that at least one of the great powers with boldness and success defied the smug and timorous reactionary policy of the absolute monarchies of the Continent. Similar interventions in Portuguese and Greek affairs served the cause of liberalism in those countries.

While Canning was making England's foreign policy more liberal, Huskisson was introducing greater liberty into commerce by carrying bills in 1823 altering the Navigation Laws, which threw restrictions about the carrying trade, and by reducing the duties on many articles of import. This was not free trade, but it was a step in that direction. The more strongly protected interests maintained their ground for a generation longer. When Huskisson began his reforms about 1,500 Acts of Parliament regulated the administration of the tariff system; the number was now reduced to eleven, thus greatly simplifying that department.

Another important reform of these years was that of the Penal Code. The code then prevailing was a disgrace to England, and placed her far behind France and other countries. There was a crying need for reform. The punishment of death could be legally

inflicted for about two hundred offenses — for picking a man's pocket, for stealing five shillings from a store, or forty shillings from a dwelling house, for stealing a fish, for injuring Westminster Bridge, for sending threatening letters, for making a false entry in a marriage register.¹

This code, as a matter of fact, was not enforced. It was shown, for instance, that in the twelve years, from 1805 to 1817, 655 persons had been indicted for stealing five shillings from a shop. Of these 113 had been sentenced to death, but the sentence had not been carried into effect in a single instance. While this was an evidence that the humane feeling of the age condemned the law and would not enforce it, still the code, by its very harshness, tended to encourage indifference to law. Two great reformers, Romilly and Mackintosh, had labored for fifteen years to persuade Parliament to alter this barbarous code, but with only disheartening results. But now Sir Robert Peel took up the reform, and proposed and carried, in 1823, the abolition of the death penalty in about a hundred cases. The Tory party now accepted proposals it had previously fiercely combated. It is a curious fact that even before this more humane policy was adopted with reference to the misdeeds and weaknesses of men, a law for the prevention of cruelty to animals, the first of its kind, had been passed (1822).

Another reform of these years no less significant lay in the direction of greater religious liberty. In 1815 there was in England religious freedom but not religious equality. People might worship as they saw fit. Nevertheless, as we have seen, men paid a penalty for belonging to any other than the established Church of England. Political privileges were conditioned upon creed. It has been only by a series of acts passed in the nineteenth century that England has thrown open her political life to all, irrespective of church connections or religious beliefs or professions. The first step taken was the removal of the disabilities from which Protestant Dissenters suffered. These were imposed by the so-called Test and Corporation Acts. These acts, put upon the statute book at a time when there was grave fear of a violent assault upon Protestantism, had been intended to destroy the political power of the Catholics. As a qualification for holding most offices, municipal and national, the sacrament must be received according to the rites of the Anglican Church, and the oaths of supremacy and allegiance taken. The Test Act required a declaration against transubstantiation.

¹ Walpole, II, 140-1, footnote, gives a partial list of these offenses.

Though these acts were designed to exclude Catholics, they went further and excluded as well Dissenters generally. Yet with singular inconsistency Dissenters were permitted to be members of Parliament, and thus to participate in the making of the laws of England. For a long time, however, they did not vigorously object to the injustice and inconvenience which they suffered, inasmuch as they hated and feared Catholics more than they coveted political power, and believed that the repeal of the Test Act would inevitably lead to the emancipation of the Catholics, which they did not wish to see. Moreover, as has been already stated, a convenient device was made to fit their case. They were, as a matter of practice, permitted to hold office, though in so doing they were lawbreakers. Then Parliament would pass an act of indemnity pardoning them for what they had done. This had for a long while been the established custom; consequently the Test Act no longer operated to the exclusion of Dissenters from office, but was only a badge of religious inferiority. In 1828 the Test and Corporation Acts were repealed as being no longer in harmony with the age or with the wishes of Dissenters. Henceforth every person on entering upon office must make a declaration "on the true faith of a Christian" that he would not use his authority in any way against the Established Church. These words had the effect of excluding Jews from office, thereby occasioning in the years to come a new agitation and a new reform.

Thus the monopoly of the Church had in one particular been broken. The repeal of the Corporation and Test Acts was an act of complete justice to Protestant Nonconformists, but of only partial justice to Roman Catholics. Though the latter could now hold most offices they were still excluded from Parliament, for their exclusion from Parliament depended not on the Test Act but upon an act passed in 1679, and which was still in force, requiring all members of Parliament to take the oath of supremacy and to make a declaration against transubstantiation and the adoration of the Virgin Mary. Thus, while after the repeal of the Test Act in 1828, Catholics might be appointed to municipal and national offices, they might not sit in either House of Parliament. They were not upon an equality with Protestants in political matters, and had no share in the legislation of the empire. Moreover, their position was anomalous and contradictory. In Ireland all forty shilling freeholders possessed the suffrage. Thus a large number of Catholics could vote for members of the House of Commons, but practically they could only

vote for Protestants, as Protestants alone would subscribe to the oath and declaration required of all members. Nevertheless it was not illegal for Catholics to vote for one of their own faith and elect him. They would, of course, be throwing away their suffrage, as such a person would certainly, for the reason given, not be permitted to take his seat.

Catholic Emancipation, as the removal of these disabilities was called, had for forty years been a prominent question in English politics. Some of the great statesmen of England had tried to solve it favorably to Catholic claims, notably Pitt and Canning, but without success, owing to the prevalent bigotry. George III and George IV were violently opposed, George III declaring that he should reckon any man his personal enemy who should propose any measure of relief, and they were supported by the more conservative Tories. The question entered upon the acute stage in 1828. The Duke of Wellington was prime minister and Sir Robert Peel was the most important member of the cabinet. Both were opposed on principle to Catholic emancipation. The ministry wished to postpone all discussion of the question. But events were just then occurring in Ireland which would have rendered further postponement of the settlement an act of sheer madness. An agitation, widesweeping and portentous, convulsed this long-suffering people. A man of remarkable powers of leadership had arisen and had forced the crisis. Daniel O'Connell is one of the most extraordinary men in Irish history. A thrilling orator and a shrewd and energetic lawyer he could inflame vast multitudes of men, yet could lead them safely past snares and pitfalls. Believing that Ireland could only obtain justice by an overwhelming display of force he founded the Catholic Association to advocate Catholic claims. This soon became so powerful a political body as to alarm the Government. A law was accordingly passed in 1825 ordering its dissolution. The law was from the start a dead letter. The Association, dissolved, immediately reappeared in another form. Monster meetings were held, where the witchery of O'Connell's oratory was displayed and his marvelous power of control of an excitable and injured people conspicuously manifested. These monster demonstrations were marked by no excesses. They constituted an indignant and resolute protest against unfair legislation. O'Connell now decided upon an act so bold that he believed it would mean the end of the agitation. A vacancy occurred in the parliamentary representation from the county of Clare. O'Connell decided to be a candidate. He was triumphantly elected. He

was a Catholic, therefore debarred by the laws from membership. The electors voted for him despite the fact that they were throwing their votes away. They aimed to produce a moral effect and they succeeded. It was evident that O'Connell could be similarly returned in almost every other county in Ireland should the occasion occur, that the people were in earnest, and united. It was the fear that this was the attitude of a united people on the very brink of a revolt, rather than any sense of the justice of the cause, that prompted Wellington and Peel to bring in the famous Emancipation Bill, to force it through an unwilling Parliament, and to impose it upon an unwilling King. Wellington candidly admitted that he was driven to this step by fear of civil war. George IV felt, as he afterward said, like a person with a pistol at his breast. Like most persons in such a predicament he yielded (1829). Catholics were henceforth admitted to both Houses of Parliament, and with a few exceptions they might now fill any municipal and state office. The act established real political equality between Catholics and Protestants.

But at the very time that Catholics were given the right to sit in Parliament, they were in large majority deprived of the suffrage, for the property qualification for voters in Ireland was raised from forty shillings to two hundred. Thus in removing one grievance a new one was created, certainly an ineffective method of pacifying Ireland. One hundred and ninety thousand forty-shilling freeholders were disfranchised offhand. It is to be said, however, that this Tory Parliament would not have consented to Catholic Emancipation had it not known beforehand that this blow would be dealt to democracy.

The reforms that have just been described were carried through by the Tory party. There was one reform, however, more fundamental and important, which it was clear that that party would never concede, the reform of Parliament itself. The significant features of the parliamentary system have already been described. That they required profound alteration had been held by many of the Whigs for more than fifty years. But the Whigs had been powerless to effect anything, having long been in the minority. A combination of circumstances, however, now brought about the downfall of the party so long dominant, and rendered possible the great reform. George IV died on June 26, 1830, and was succeeded by his brother, William IV (1830-1837). The death of the monarch necessitated a new election of Parliament. Many of the influential Tory politicians, indignant that Wellington and Peel had consented to the emancipation of the Catholics, wished

to punish their leaders by sending up members to the Commons who would be opposed to them. Wellington's foreign policy increased the unpopularity of the ministry. Moreover, just at this time the distress of the working classes was great, and they were demanding parliamentary reform with renewed vigor. Suddenly the French Revolution of 1830 occurred. It exerted a great influence in England. To the distressed and discontented it was an encouragement to further activity. But its influence upon the well-to-do middle class was more important, as it proved that great changes could be effected without bringing social anarchy in their train. Thus the specter of revolution that had haunted the imagination of the solid, conservative class of Englishmen was finally laid by a revolution both reasonably orderly and most salutary. This class was no longer unwilling to co-operate with the working people. It now took up with energy the demand for reform.

The elections of 1830, held under such circumstances, resulted in a Tory loss of fifty members in the Commons. Though that party still had a majority it was not likely to last long, as many Tories were opposed to Wellington. Parliament met in November 1830, and the question of reform was immediately introduced. The Duke of Wellington showed his position by a remarkable eulogy of the English Parliament as one which "answered all the good purposes of legislation, and this to a greater degree than any legislature had ever answered, in any country whatever," that it possessed and deservedly possessed "the full and entire confidence of the country." He would go still further and say "that if at the present moment he had imposed upon him the duty of forming a legislature for any country — and particularly for a country like this, in possession of great property of various descriptions — he did not mean to assert that he could form such a legislature as they possessed now, for the nature of man was incapable of reaching such excellence at once, but his great endeavor would be to form some description of legislature which would produce the same results." Under these circumstances he would himself never bring forward any measure changing that system, but he "should always feel it his duty to resist such measures when proposed by others."¹

The result of this speech, which was entirely sincere but seemed the very abdication of the intellect, was to arouse such widespread indignation that the Wellington ministry was shortly

¹ Quoted in May, *Const. Hist. of Eng.*, I, 331-332. Kendall, *Source Book of English History*, No. 129.

swept from office, and the Whigs came in. Thus was broken the control the Tory party had exercised with one slight interruption for forty-six years.

Earl Grey, who for forty years had demanded parliamentary reform, now became prime minister. A ministry was formed with ease, and included many able men, Durham, Russell, Brougham, Palmerston, Stanley, Melbourne, and on March 1, 1831, a Reform Bill was introduced in the House of Commons by Lord John Russell. It aimed to effect a redistribution of seats on a more equitable plan, and the establishment of a uniform franchise for boroughs in place of the great and absurd variety of franchises then existing. The redistribution of seats was based on two principles, the withdrawal of the right of representation from small, decayed boroughs, and its bestowal upon large and wealthy towns hitherto without it.

Accordingly the bill proposed to deprive all boroughs having a population of less than 2,000 of their separate representation in Parliament; to deprive all boroughs of less than 4,000 inhabitants of one of their two members. It was estimated that 110 boroughs would be affected, and that 168 seats would be abolished.¹ The ministry proposed that these should be given to the counties and the great unrepresented boroughs. The bill amazed the House by its thoroughgoing character and encouraged the reformers. Neither side had expected so sweeping a change. The introduction of the bill precipitated a remarkable parliamentary discussion, which continued with some intervals for over fifteen months, from March 1, 1831, to June 5, 1832.

Lord John Russell in his introduction of the measure, after stating that the theory of the British Constitution was no taxation without representation, and after showing that in former times Parliament had been truly representative, said that it was no longer so. "A stranger who was told that this country is unparalleled in wealth and industry, and more civilized and more enlightened than any country was before it — that it is a country that prides itself on its freedom, and that once in every seven years it elects representatives from its population to act as the guardians and preservers of that freedom — would be anxious and curious to see how that representation is formed, and how the

¹ The list read by Lord John Russell of the boroughs which it was proposed wholly or partially to disfranchise, with the number of voters and "the prevailing influence" of each, that is the landowner, who had practical control, may be found in Molesworth, *Hist. of Eng.*, 1, 70-73; also, in part, in Cheyney, *Readings in English History*, 686-688.

people choose their representatives, to whose faith and guardianship they entrust their free and liberal institutions. Such a person would be very much astonished if he were taken to a ruined mound and told that that mound sent two representatives to Parliament; if he were taken to a stone wall and told that three niches in it sent two representatives to Parliament; if he were taken to a park where no houses were to be seen, and told that that park sent two representatives to Parliament. But if he were told all this, and were astonished at hearing it, he would be still more astonished if he were to see large and opulent towns, full of enterprise and industry and intelligence, containing vast magazines of every species of manufactures, and were then told that these towns sent no representatives to Parliament."

Lord John Russell estimated that the electorate would be enlarged by about a half a million additional voters by this measure, for it proposed the extension of the suffrage as well as the redistribution of seats.

The first man who arose to oppose the bill was the representative of the University of Oxford, Sir Robert Inglis, who represented the opinions and prejudices of the country gentlemen so vitally affected by the measure. He denied flatly that the population of a town had ever had anything to do with its representation or that representation and taxation were in any way connected in the British Constitution. "Can the noble lord show that any town or borough has been called into parliamentary existence because it was large or populous, or excluded from it because it was small? The noble lord has tried to make much of the instance of Old Sarum. In one and the same year, the 23rd Edward I, a writ was issued to both Old and New Sarum, and in neither case was it conferred on account of population or taxation. On the contrary, I believe it was given, in the first instance, to oblige some Earl of Salisbury by putting his friends into the House. And in an account of the borough it was stated that it had lately been purchased by Mr. Pitt, the possessor of the celebrated diamond of that name, who has attained an hereditary seat in the House of Commons as much as the Earl of Arundel possessed one in the House of Peers by being the owner of Arundel Castle. How then can it be said, that, according to the constitution of the country, noblemen are not to be represented and their interests regarded in this House. . . . It is in vain after this to talk of the purity of representation in former times. I defy the noble lord to point out at any time when the representation was better than it is at present. I say, therefore, that

what is proposed is not restorative. The House and the country may judge what it is, but I will state in one word that it is *Revolution*, a revolution that will overturn all the natural influence of rank and property." Sir Robert proceeded to show that some of the greatest men in parliamentary annals had entered the House as representatives of these nomination and close boroughs, the elder Pitt, who sat indeed for this very Old Sarum, which was to be embalmed as a classic in these debates, the younger Pitt, Burke, Canning, Fox, that thus they had had a chance to show their talents and were later chosen the representatives of large towns. But no such towns would ever have chosen them had they not previously had this opportunity to prove their ability. "It is only by this means that young men who are unconnected by birth or residence with large towns can ever hope to enter this House unless they are cursed — I will call it cursed — with that talent of mob oratory which is used for the purpose of influencing the lowest and most debasing passions of the people."

Hunt, one of the radical leaders, former hero of the field of Peterloo, and now a member of the House, took part in the debate. "How is this House constituted?" he asked, "How are many honorable members elected? Look at the borough of Ilchester and the boroughs of Lancashire and Cornwall, and see what classes of men return members to this House. I will tell the House a fact which has come to my knowledge, and which bears on that particular point. In the borough of Ilchester . . . many of the voters are of the most degraded and lowest class, who can neither read nor write, and who always take care to contract debts to the amount of £35 previous to an election, because they know that those debts will be liquidated for them. Is that, then, the class of men which the House is told represents the property of the country? I am one who thinks that this House ought to be what it professes to be — the Commons House of Parliament, representing the feelings and interest of all the common people of England."

Another member, Sir C. Wetherell, denounced the proposed loss of their positions by 168 members as "corporation robbery," as a new Pride's Purge, as an imitation of the illegalities of the Cromwellian period, as republican in principle, "destructive of all property, of all right, of all privilege."

Sir Robert Peel pointed out that the close boroughs not only brought out young talent that otherwise could get no opportunity to show itself, but that they furnished refuges for distinguished

members, who by some caprice of fortune had lost their hold upon their constituencies — and that thus these men could continue in the service of the nation. “During 150 years the constitution in its present form has been in force; and I would ask any man who hears me to declare whether the experience of history has produced any form of government so calculated to promote the happiness and secure the rights and liberties of a free and enlightened people.” Stanley, later Lord Derby, replying to the contention that the nomination boroughs opened an opportunity to very able men to enter Parliament who might not find any other way, said, “Whatever advantage might be derived from this mode of admission would be more than balanced by this disadvantage — that the class of persons thus introduced would, whatever may be their talents and acquirements, not be looked upon by the people as representatives.”

Macaulay delivered a speech on the second day of the debate that made his reputation as one of the foremost orators of the House. Replying to Sir Robert Inglis he said, “My honorable friend . . . challenges us to show that the constitution was ever better than it is. Sir, we are legislators, not antiquaries. The question for us is, not whether the constitution was better formerly, but whether we can make it better now?” Shall “a hundred drunken potwallopers in one place, or the owner of a ruined hovel in another,” be invested with powers “which are withheld from cities renowned to the furthest ends of the earth for the marvels of their wealth and of their industry?” “But these great cities, says my honorable friend . . . are virtually, though not directly, represented. Are not the wishes of Manchester, he asks, as much consulted as those of any town which sends members to Parliament? Now, Sir, I do not understand how a power which is salutary when exercised virtually can be noxious when exercised directly. If the wishes of Manchester have as much weight with us as they would have under a system which should give representatives to Manchester, how can there be any danger in giving representatives to Manchester?” Referring to the utility of the close boroughs as affording careers to men of talent he said that “we must judge of the form of government by its general tendency, not by happy accidents,” and that if “there were a law that the hundred tallest men in England should be members of Parliament, there would probably be some able men among those who would come into the House by virtue of this law.”

Thus the debate went on, an unusual number of members partic-

ipating. But the bill did not have long to live. The Opposition was persistent, and on April 19th the ministry was defeated on an amendment. It resolved to appeal to the people. Parliament was dissolved and a new election ordered. This election took place in the summer of 1831 amid the greatest excitement and was one of the most momentous of the century. From one end of the land to the other the cry was, "The bill, the whole bill, and nothing but the bill." There was some violence and intimidation of voters, and bribery on a large scale was practised on both sides. The question put the candidates was, "Will you support the bill or will you oppose it?" The result of the election was an overwhelming victory for the reformers.

On June 24, 1831, Lord John Russell introduced the second Reform Bill, which was practically the same as the first. The Opposition did not yield, but fought it inch by inch. They tried to wear out the ministry by making dilatory motions and innumerable speeches which necessarily consisted of mere repetition. In the course of two weeks Sir Robert Peel spoke forty-eight times, Crocker fifty-seven times, Wetherell fifty-eight times. However, the bill was finally passed, September 22nd, by a majority of 106. It was then sent up to the House of Lords where it was quickly killed (October 8, 1831).

It was the Lords who chiefly profited by the existing system of nomination and rotten boroughs, and they were enraged at the proposal to end it. They were determined not to lose the power it gave them.

The defeat of the bill by the Upper House caused great indignation throughout the country. Apparently the Lords were simply greedy of their privileges. Again riots broke out in London and other towns, expressive of the popular feeling. Newspapers appeared in mourning. Bells were tolled. Threats of personal violence to the Lords were made, and in certain instances carried out. Troops were called out in some places. England, it was widely felt, was verging toward a civil war.

Parliament was now prorogued. It reassembled December 6th, and on the 12th, Lord John Russell rose again and introduced his third Reform Bill. Again the same tiresome tactics of the Opposition. But the bill finally passed the House of Commons, March 23, 1832, by a majority of 116.

Again the bill was before the Lords, who showed the same disposition to defeat it as before. The situation seemed hopeless. Twice the Commons had passed the bill with the manifest and express approval of the people. Were they to be foiled by a

chamber based on hereditary privilege? Riots, monster demonstrations, acrimonious and bitter denunciation, showed once more the temper of the people. There was only one way in which the measure could be carried. The King might create enough peers to give its supporters a majority in the House of Lords. This, however, William IV at first refused to do. The Grey ministry consequently resigned. The King appealed to the Duke of Wellington to form a ministry. The Duke tried but failed. The King then gave way, recalled Earl Grey to power and signed a paper stating: "The King grants permission to Earl Grey and to his Chancellor, Lord Brougham, to create such a number of peers as will be sufficient to insure the passing of the Reform Bill." The peers were never created. The threat sufficed. The bill passed the Lords, June 4, 1832, about 100 of its opponents absenting themselves from the House. It was signed and became a law.

The bill had undergone some changes during its passage. In its final form it provided that fifty-six nominations or close boroughs, with a population of less than 2,000, should lose their representation entirely; that thirty-two others, with a population of less than 4,000 should lose one seat each. The seats thus obtained were redistributed as follows: twenty-two large towns were given two members each; twenty others were given one each, and the larger counties were given additional members, sixty-five in all. Scotland and Ireland were by companion bills given increased representation. One hundred and forty-three seats were thus redistributed. There was no attempt to make equal electoral districts, but only to remove more flagrant abuses. Constituencies still varied greatly in population. The total membership of the House was not altered but remained 658.

The Reform Bill also altered and widened the suffrage. Previously the county franchise had depended entirely upon the ownership of land; that is, was limited to those who owned outright land of an annual value of forty shillings, the forty-shilling freeholders. The county suffrage was now extended to include also copyholders and leaseholders, i.e., farmers and tenants of land whose tenure was for sixty years, and of the annual value of ten pounds, and to tenants-at-will holding land worth fifty pounds a year. Thus in the counties the suffrage was dependent still upon the tenure of land, but not upon outright ownership. There were, it is seen, several methods of acquiring the county franchise.

In the boroughs a far greater change was made. The previous

local franchises were all abolished, the personal rights of living voters being guaranteed, and a new uniform suffrage was adopted. The right to vote was given to all ten pound householders, which meant all who owned or rented a house or shop or other building of an annual rental value, with the land, of ten pounds. Thus the suffrage was practically given in boroughs to the great middle class. There was henceforth a uniform suffrage in boroughs, and a varied suffrage in counties.

The law applied only to England. In the same session similar reform bills were passed for Scotland and Ireland. In order to reduce bribery, voting in each constituency was limited henceforth to two days.

The Reform Bill of 1832 was not a democratic measure, but it made the House of Commons a truly representative body. It admitted to the suffrage the wealthier middle class. The number of voters, particularly in the boroughs, was considerably increased; but the laborers of England had no votes, nor had the poorer middle class. The average ratio of voters to the whole population of Great Britain was about one to thirty. The measure, therefore, though regarded as final by the Whig ministry, was not so regarded by the vast majority, who were still disfranchised. No further alteration was made until 1867, but during the whole period there was a demand for extension. In 1831 and 1832 the people, by their monster meetings, riots, acts of violence, had helped greatly to pass the bill only to find when the struggle was over that others and not themselves had profited by their efforts.

The passage of the Reform Bill showed clearly the predominance in the state of the House of Commons over both King and Lords in case the House had the evident and emphatic support of the people.

CHAPTER XXII

ENGLAND BETWEEN TWO GREAT REFORMS (1832-1867)

ENGLAND had entered upon a period of Whig government that was destined to be almost as prolonged as the preceding period of Tory rule. The Tories had been in power from 1784 to 1830, with but one short interval. From 1830 to 1874 the Whigs controlled the government, with the exception of short periods which amounted in all to eight years. In the elections of 1832, held under the new conditions, the Whigs were overwhelmingly victorious. The Tories returned only about 150 members. The terms Tory and Whig now gradually gave way to the terms Conservative and Liberal, which are still in use.

The reforming activity of the Whigs, which had achieved the notable triumph of the great change in the House of Commons, continued unabated for several years. Several measures of great importance were passed by the reformed Parliament during the next few years.

One of the first of these was the abolition of slavery in 1833. It had been long held by the British courts that slavery could not exist in the British Isles, that the instant a slave touched the soil of England he became free. Moreover, after a long agitation, England had abolished the slave trade in 1807. Henceforth it was a crime to kidnap negroes in Africa and sell them into slavery. But slavery itself existed in the West Indies, in Mauritius and in South Africa. There were about 750,000 slaves in these colonies. To free them was a far more difficult matter than to stop the African slave trade, for it was considered an interference with the rights of property, and it might ruin the prosperity of the colonies. Two causes were now working for the abolition of slavery, a growing sensitiveness to the moral iniquity of the institution, and the decreasing influence of its leading supporters, the West Indian planters, owing to the fact that their trade with Great Britain had fallen off greatly since 1815. For many years an anti-slavery agitation had been in progress, ably led by Wilberforce, Buxton, and Zachary

Macaulay, father of the historian, who had created the public opinion indispensably necessary to any reform.

Various acts of legislation had been passed looking toward the improvement of the position of slaves in the crown colonies, but not providing for the abolition of the institution itself. These measures were indignantly and hotly resented by the planters, who denounced the action of the English government in vituperative terms, unwise conduct, as it still further alienated public opinion in the mother country. A bill was passed in August 1833 decreeing that slavery should cease August 1, 1834. It provided for the immediate emancipation of all children of six years and under; for a period of apprenticeship for all others for seven years, during which three-fourths of their time was to belong to their former masters, one-fourth to themselves. This, it was argued, would give them the preparation necessary for a wise and intelligent use of freedom, but the provision did not work well in practice and was ultimately allowed to lapse. A gift of twenty million pounds was made to the slave owners as compensation for the loss of their property.

Conscience was aroused at the same time by a cruel evil right at home, the employment, under barbarous conditions, of children in the factories of England.

The employment of child labor in British industries was one of the results of the rise of the modern factory system. It was early seen that much of the work done by machinery could be carried on by children, and as their labor was cheaper than that of adults they were swept into the factories in larger and larger numbers, and a monstrous evil grew up. They were, of course, the children of the poorest people. Many began this life of misery at the age of five or six, more at the age of eight or nine. Incredible as it may seem, they were often compelled to work twelve or fourteen hours a day. Half hour intervals were allowed for meals, but by a refinement of cruelty they were expected to clean the machinery at such times. Falling asleep at their work they were beaten by overseers or injured by falling against the machinery. In this inhuman régime there was no time or strength left for education or recreation or healthy development of any kind. The moral atmosphere in which the children worked was harmful in the extreme. Physically, intellectually, morally, the result could only be stunted human beings.

This shocking abuse had been attacked spasmodically and unsuccessfully for thirty years. In 1802 a law was passed

limiting the number of hours to twelve a day, and providing that work should not begin before six in the morning, nor continue after nine at night. It applied, however, to but few mills. In 1816[?] a bill was introduced providing that no child should be employed for more than ten hours a day in any factory. The House of Lords limited this to cotton mills and extended the hours to twelve. Later it was voted that each child should have a quarter of a holiday on each Saturday. Such was the pitifully small protection guaranteed children workers by the laws of England.

1819?

This monstrous system was defended by political economists, manufacturers, and statesmen in the name of individual liberty, — in whose name, moreover, crimes have often been committed, — the liberty of the manufacturer to conduct his business without interference from outside, the liberty of the laborer to sell his labor under whatever conditions he may be disposed or, as might more properly be said, compelled to accept. A Parliament, however, which had been so sensitive to the wrongs of negro slaves in Jamaica, could not be indifferent to the fate of English children. Thus the long efforts of many English humanitarians, Robert Owen, Thomas Sadler, Fielden, Lord Ashley, resulted in the passage of the Factory Act of 1833, which prohibited the employment in spinning and weaving factories of children under nine, made a maximum eight-hour day for those from nine to thirteen, and of twelve for those from thirteen to eighteen. The bill also provided for the sanitary conditions of the factories, for a certain amount of recreation and education, and, most important, it created a system of factory inspectors whose duty it was to see that this law was enforced. This was a very modest beginning, yet it represented a great advance on the preceding policy of England. It was the first of a series of acts regulating the conditions of laborers in the interest of society as a whole, acts which have become more numerous, more minute, and more drastic from 1833 to the present day. The idea that an employer may conduct his business entirely as he likes has no standing in modern English law.

The reform spirit, which rendered the decade from 1830 to 1840 so notable, achieved another vast improvement in the radical transformation of municipal government. The local self-government of England enjoyed great fame abroad but was actually in a very sorry condition at home. Not only was the Parliament of 1830 the organ of an oligarchy, but so was the system of local government. Usurpations of power by a single

class had gone on flourishingly under the Tudor and Stuart and even Hanoverian kings. The whole political structure, local as well as general, was honeycombed with notorious abuses. The municipal and the parliamentary systems were closely bound together. The unreformed boroughs were natural supports of an unreformed House of Commons. Now that Parliament had been reformed it was natural that the same party should attempt to bring about the abolition of the evils of local government. In earlier centuries all the freemen of the borough had enjoyed full rights of citizenship, and local government had been popular in character. But with the lapse of time the term "freemen" had become technical and applied only to a few in each borough, and frequently to non-residents. Thus Cambridge, with a population of about 20,000, had only 118 "freemen," Portsmouth, with 46,000, only 102. Many of these were poor, paid small taxes, and were in no sense representative citizens, yet they alone possessed the right to vote in municipal elections. Thus, in Cambridge, the freemen paid only about two thousand pounds of the twenty-five thousand of the city taxes. But in many cases even the "freemen" had no political power, but only privileges of a pecuniary nature, such as a right to share in certain charitable funds and of exemption from tolls. In very numerous cases the local government was entirely in the hands of the corporation, that is, the mayor and the common council. The mayor was chosen by the council and the councilors sat for life and had the right to fill all vacancies in their body. The government in such cases was literally a close corporation. Thus, throughout all England, a very small minority had an absolute monopoly of political power in towns and cities.

These municipal governments were notoriously corrupt. Elected for life and self-elected they had no sense of responsibility to the community at large. Their proceedings were generally secret. They levied taxes but rendered no account of how they expended them. Neglecting the needs of the community for proper policing, paving, lighting, sanitation, they used the funds largely for self-gratification or personal advantage or the advantage of the party which they favored. In many of the smaller boroughs the mayor alone was practically the entire government. Generally speaking, those Englishmen who lived in boroughs were not only not self-governed, but were wretchedly misgoverned.

This system received its death-blow from the reform of Parliament. The two systems hung together, were mutually

interdependent. The reform of one had, as an inevitable consequence, the reform of the other. The power of the privileged class in the House of Commons had rested largely upon the ease with which they had been able to secure control of these little local oligarchies, which had had the right to elect the members of the boroughs to the House. In 1833 a commission was appointed to investigate the whole subject, which it did with convincing thoroughness.

In 1835 a law was passed, the Municipal Corporations Act, second in importance only to the Reform Bill. This act provided for the election of town councilors by all the inhabitants who had paid taxes during the preceding three years. This established a property and residence qualification. The town council was to elect the mayor. The town council and the constituency together formed the corporation. The proceedings of the council were to be public; the accounts were to be published and audited. Not only were property owners but property renters included in the new electorate. Those who rented property that was on the tax lists as worth ten pounds a year had the right to vote as well as those who paid taxes themselves; in other words, a man who paid a rent of about a dollar a week for his house or his store was now enfranchised. This bill did not apply to London, reserved for special treatment, nor to sixty-seven boroughs, which were very small, but concerned 178 boroughs, the large majority. It is estimated that about two million people were affected by it. The bill was not a democratic measure, but it gave borough government, as the bill of 1832 had given parliamentary, to the wealthy and the middle classes. It effectually restored self-government. The basis of representation has been widened since 1835. A similar act for Scotland, sweeping away abuses even more glaring, had been passed in 1833.

In the midst of this period of reform occurred a change in the occupancy of the throne. King William IV died June 20, 1837, and was succeeded by his niece, Victoria. The young Queen was the daughter of the Duke of Kent, fourth son of George III. She was, at the time of her accession, eighteen years of age. She had been carefully educated, but owing to the fact that William IV disliked her mother, she had seen very little of court life, and was very little known. Carlyle, oppressed with all the weary weight of this unintelligible world, pitied her, quite unnecessarily. "Poor little Queen!" said he, "she is at an age at which a girl can hardly be trusted to choose a bonnet for her-

self; yet a task is laid upon her from which an archangel might shrink." Not such was the mood of the Queen. She was buoyant and joyous, and entered with zest upon a reign which was to prove the longest in the annals of England. She impressed all who saw her with her dignity and poise. Her political education was conducted under the guidance, first of Leopold, King of Belgium, her uncle, and after her accession, of Lord Melbourne, both of whom instilled in her mind the principles of constitutional monarchy. The question of her marriage was important and was decided by herself. Summoning her cousin, Prince Albert of Saxe-Coburg, into her presence, she offered him her hand — "a nervous thing to do," as she afterward said, yet the only thing, as "he would never have presumed to take such a liberty" himself as to ask for the hand of the Queen of England. The marriage, celebrated in 1840, was a marriage of affection. "She is as full of love as Juliet," said Sir Robert Peel. Her married life was exceptionally happy, and when the Prince Consort died, twenty-one years later, she was inconsolable. During these years he was her constant adviser, and so complete was the harmony of their views that he was practically quite as much the ruler of the country as was she.

The early years of the new reign were years of trouble and unrest. The accession of Victoria brought to an end the connection between England and Hanover, which had existed since the Elector of Hanover had become King of Great Britain in 1714, under the name of George I. As the Salic law obtained in Hanover, that kingdom now passed to the uncle of the Queen, the Duke of Cumberland, Ernest Augustus. This was, on the whole, more a gain for England than a loss, as it freed her from vexatious entanglements on the Continent. Far more serious was the disruption of the colonial empire, threatened by the Canadian Rebellion of 1837. This will be described elsewhere. More serious still was the widespread unrest and discontent in England itself, an unrest that found expression in the Chartist Movement.

The Reform Bill of 1832 had been carried by a combination of Liberals and Radicals, the latter furnishing in those exciting days the appearance and the reality of physical force, the monster meetings, the riots, which had made the Tories feel that a civil war would result if they did not yield to what was manifestly the people's will. A breach between these two elements now ensued. The Radicals looked upon the measure, to the passing of which they had so greatly contributed, as merely a step in the right direction, from which they themselves had

gained nothing. They were a genuinely democratic party, aiming at the introduction into England of truly democratic government, popular control of the House of Commons and legislation in the interest of the people, that is, the great mass of the workers of Great Britain. But when, after 1832, they attempted to bring forward measures for a wider suffrage as a necessary preliminary to all this, they met with uncompromising opposition on the part of their former allies. Lord John Russell took occasion to say publicly in 1837 that the Reform Act of 1832 had been made as extensive as possible in the hope that it might be final; and that the question of the franchise ought not to be reopened. The leader of the Liberals had spoken. It was clear that the Conservatives would be of the same mind on this matter. There had been a reform in 1832 in the interest of the middle classes. Clearly there was to be no reform in the interest of the lower classes. The middle classes had said so. The Radicals felt that a middle class Parliament would consider simply the interests of the middle class, and they desired a democratic Parliament to legislate for the masses of the laborers of England, whether in town or country, for the laborers were the *nation*. The breach between the former allies became complete. The Radicals dubbed Lord John "Finality Jack." They began a vehement agitation for further reform. Workingmen's associations, socialist societies, the discontented generally, worked together.

In a pamphlet entitled *The Rotten House of Commons* (December 1836), Lovett, one of their leaders, proved from official returns that, out of 6,023,752 adult males living in the United Kingdom, only 839,519 were voters. He also showed that despite the reform of 1832 there were great inequalities among the constituencies, that twenty members were chosen by 2,411 votes, twenty more by 86,072. The immediate demands of the Radicals were expressed in "The People's Charter," or programme, a petition to Parliament drawn up in 1838. They demanded that the right to vote be given to every adult man, declaring, "we perform the duties of freemen, we must have the privileges of freemen"; that voting be secret, by ballot rather than orally as was then the custom, so that every voter could be free from intimidation, and less exposed to bribery; that property qualifications for membership in the House be abolished; and that the members receive salaries so that poor men, laborers themselves and understanding the needs of laborers, might be elected to Parliament if the voters wished. They also demanded

Manhood
Suffrage
Vote
Ballot
Abolition
Property
Qualification
Pay
of

that the House of Commons should be elected, not for seven years, as was then the law, but simply for one year. The object of this was to prevent their representatives misrepresenting them by proving faithless to their pledges or indifferent or hostile to the wishes of the voters. Annual elections would give the voters the chance to punish such representatives speedily by electing others in their place. "The connection between the representatives and the people, to be beneficial, must be intimate," said the petition. Such were the five points of the famous Charter designed to make Parliament representative of the *people*, not of a class. Once adopted, it was felt that the masses would get control of the legislature and then improve their conditions.

The Chartists had almost no influence in Parliament, and their agitation had consequently to be carried on outside in workingmen's associations, in the cheap press, in popular songs and poems, in monster meetings addressed by impassioned orators, in numerous and unprecedentedly large petitions. One of these was presented in 1839. It was in the form of a large cylinder of parchment about four feet in diameter, and was said to have been signed by 1,286,000 persons. The petition was summarily rejected. Notwithstanding this failure another was presented in 1842, signed, it was asserted, by over three million persons. Borne through the streets of London in a great procession it was found too large to be carried through the door of the House of Commons. It was therefore cut up into several parts and deposited on the floor. This, too, was rejected, as unworthy of serious consideration.

The Chartist movement lasted about ten years, from 1838 to 1848. It had periods of quiet, followed by periods of great activity. The latter were generally contemporary with hard times. The whole movement was born of the great distress and misery of the English working class. Unfortunately it lacked able leadership. Many of its supporters were men of ability, devotion, and disinterestedness, but during most of the time the real leader was Feargus O'Connor, an able orator, but a weak, vain, unstable man, who knew better how to alienate those who naturally wished to co-operate than to consolidate and magnify a party. The Chartists themselves divided into two groups: those who wished to use only peaceful methods in their agitation, and those who wished to make an ultimate appeal to physical force, believing the other method entirely ineffective. Whenever the physical-force Chartists attempted to act according to their principle they were severely punished.

The Chartist could look to neither great party for aid. The movement smoldered on for ten years, blazing up threateningly in times of unusual distress. Indeed, it was a kind of barometer measuring the misery of the people and their sense of injustice. After 1848 the movement subsided. Encouraged by the French Revolution of that year the Chartists held a great national convention or people's parliament in London, and planned a vast demonstration on behalf of the Charter. Half a million men were to accompany a new petition to Parliament, which it was expected would be overawed and would then yield to so imposing a demand of an insistent people. The Government was so alarmed that it entrusted the safety of London to the Duke of Wellington, then seventy-nine years of age. His arrangements were made with his accustomed thoroughness. One hundred and seventy thousand special constables were enrolled, one of whom was Louis Napoleon, who before the year was out was to be President of the French Republic. The result was that the street demonstration was a failure, and the petition, examined by a committee of the House, was found to contain, not 5,706,000 signatures, as asserted, but less than two million. It was summarily rejected. The movement died out owing to ridicule, internal quarrels, but particularly because of the growing prosperity of the country, which resulted from the abolition of the Corn Laws and the adoption of Free Trade.

It is difficult to appraise the value and significance of this movement. Judged superficially and by immediate results the Chartists failed completely. Yet most of the changes they advocated have since been brought about. There are now no property qualifications for members of the House of Commons, 1858.
and the secret ballot has been secured; the suffrage is enjoyed by 1842.
the immense majority of men, though not by all, and by several 1864.
million women; the payment of members has been adopted for 1916
the House of Commons though not for the House of Lords. 1911
Parliaments are now elected for five years. It seems that some of the tremendous impetus of England toward democracy, which grew so marked toward the close of the nineteenth century, was derived from this movement of which Carlyle wrote in 1839: "The matter of Chartism is weighty, deep-rooted, far-extending; did not begin yesterday; will by no means end this day or tomorrow."

Simultaneously with the Chartist Movement another was going on which had a happier issue. The adoption of the principle of Free Trade must always remain a great event in

English history, and was the culmination of a remarkable movement that extended over forty years, though its most decisive phase was concentrated into a few years of intense activity. The change was complete from a policy which England in common with the rest of the world had followed for centuries.

In 1815 England believed thoroughly in protection. Hundreds of articles were subject to duties as they entered the country, manufactured articles, raw materials. English shipping was also protected by the Navigation Laws. The most important single interest among all those protected was agriculture. Parliament in 1815 was a parliament of landlords, and their legislation was naturally favorable to their interest. Corn is a word used in England to describe wheat and breadstuffs generally. The laws imposing duties on corn were the keystone of the whole system of protection, because they affected the most influential class in the nation and the one, moreover, which made the laws. The advocates of free trade necessarily therefore delivered their fiercest assaults upon the Corn Laws. If these could be overthrown it was believed that the whole system would fall. Not until they were abolished would England be a free trade country. The Corn Law of 1815 forbade the importation of foreign corn until the price should have reached ten shillings a bushel. Later, in 1828, in place of the fixed duty, was put the so-called sliding scale, the duty on foreign grain going up as the price of domestic grain fell, and decreasing as the home price rose. But the object was the same, high protection of British grain growers. This was the particular feature which the reformers attacked. But for a long while the landlord class was so entrenched in political power that the law remained impregnable. Small and piecemeal attacks were therefore made upon other parts of the system. Huskisson in 1823-5 succeeded in carrying through a modification of the Navigation Laws of 1651. Previously all commerce between England and her colonies had to be carried on in English ships; and all commerce between England and any other country had to be carried on by English ships or by those of the country concerned. An act was passed in 1823 empowering the Government to conclude reciprocity treaties with foreign countries, admitting their ships to British ports on the same conditions as British ships, if they would put British shipping on the same footing of equality with their own in their ports. This opened the way for the ultimate abolition of all restraints upon navigation. Huskisson also succeeded in securing legislation reducing duties on almost all foreign manufactures and on many raw

materials. These changes were a beginning in the direction of freer trade, but they did not touch the strongest interest, the landowners, protected by the Corn Laws.

For the next few years public interest was absorbed in the various reforms already described. In 1841 the Whig party, then under the leadership of Lord Melbourne, the successor to Earl Grey, was overthrown, and Sir Robert Peel, leader of the Conservatives, became prime minister. His ministry lasted from 1841 to 1846. The financial condition of the state was bad, and the distress of the laboring classes general and acute. To provide a surplus in place of a deficit, and to relieve trade Peel carried through an extensive tariff reform. In 1842 there were about 1,200 articles subject to tariff duties. Peel succeeded in abolishing or reducing the rates on about 750 of them. But the most important interest still remained essentially unaffected. The great struggle for free trade came over the Corn Laws.

In 1839 there was founded, in Manchester, a great manufacturing center, the Anti-Corn-Law League. Its leader was Richard Cobden, a young business man, successful, traveled, thoughtful. Cobden was convinced that the Corn Laws interfered with the growth of British manufactures. He was soon joined by John Bright, like himself a manufacturer, unlike him, one of the great popular orators of the nineteenth century. The League, under these two leaders, and Villiers, a member of Parliament, began an earnest agitation. It attempted to convince Englishmen that they should completely reverse their commercial policy in the interest of their own prosperity. The methods of the League were business-like and thorough. Its campaign was one of persuasion. It distributed a vast number of pamphlets, setting forth the leading arguments. Lecturers were sent to the large cities and to small country towns. In a single year four hundred lectures were delivered to 800,000 persons. A purely voluntary movement, gifts poured in until in 1845 the League was spending a million and a quarter dollars. Year after year this process of argumentation went on.

This free trade party consisted of manufacturers and merchants. The manufacturers felt that they did not need protection against foreigners, as they believed that their own processes were so far superior that the latter could not compete with them. The home market would remain theirs even if French and German manufacturers were at entire liberty to send their commodities into England duty free. They also believed that it was absolutely essential for them to gain foreign markets, and that this could not

be done under the existing system. Increase your foreign markets, they said, and you increase the employment of Englishmen in English factories, a thing of utmost importance as the population is growing rapidly. You will only be permitted to export freely to other countries if you consent to take freely in payment the commodities of those countries, their grain, their timber. If you will take these, they will purchase your woolens, your cottons, your hardware, and will not attempt to manufacture these themselves. If you do not, you will foster the growth of foreign competitors in manufacturing and will make them rivals in the markets of Europe, a suicidal policy. "In France," said one orator, "there are millions willing to clothe themselves in English garments, and you have millions of hungry mouths to take their corn. In Hungary, not being able to sell their corn to England, the people are turning their capital to manufacturing their own cloth." Replying to the argument that the removal of the Corn Laws would mean the ruin of English agriculture, which it was necessary to encourage in order that the country might produce an adequate food supply for its own needs, and not become dependent on other countries for the very necessities of life, they pointed to Holland, declaring that it was "dependent upon every country, that there were no corn laws, yet no scarcity of food, that wages were high and trade brisk." One of the most effective arguments was that the time had come when the increasing population needed cheap food.

This agitation extended over seven years. It was conducted quite independently of political parties. It does not seem, however, that the repeal of the Corn Laws could have been carried had it not been for a great natural calamity, the Irish famine of 1845. "Famine itself, against which we had warred, joined us," said John Bright. The food of the vast majority of the Irish people was the potato. More than half of the eight million inhabitants of Ireland depended on it alone for sustenance, and with a large part of the rest it was the chief article of diet. A failure in the potato crop could mean nothing less than famine. In the fall of 1845 this was precisely what impended, for a potato disease had set in and it was evident that the crop would be hopelessly ruined. Potatoes could not be obtained from foreign countries, which, fearing for themselves, were forbidding their exportation. At the same time the English grain crops were very poor, and foreign grain could not be bought by these Irish peasants, so high was the duty. The alternatives seemed unavoidable, either starvation for multitudes or cheap grain, which

could be obtained only by the repeal of the Corn Laws. The famine came, and tens of thousands perished of starvation. Great charitable gifts from England and America aimed to relieve the distress but proved inadequate. Finally, in 1846, Sir Robert Peel carried against bitter opposition the repeal of the Corn Laws by a combination of Conservative and Liberal votes.¹ But in so doing he split his party. The bill was passed by 223 Liberals and 104 Conservatives, against 229 Conservatives. Peel had come into office in 1841 the head of a party pledged to the support of the Corn Laws; in 1846 he repealed them against the passionate opposition of two-thirds of his own party. The vengeance of the protectionists was not long in coming. Peel was shortly overthrown by their votes, after having revolutionized the commercial policy of Great Britain. Peel had been converted to the theory of free trade some time before the Irish crisis. That crisis simply gave an irresistible practical reason for putting the theory into immediate effect. ✓

There still remained after this many duties for protective purposes in the English tariff, but the keystone of the whole system was removed. In 1849 the Navigation Laws were finally abolished, and the ships of all the world might compete with English ships for the carrying trade to England and her colonies, might enter British harbors as freely as British ships might. In 1853 Mr. Gladstone succeeded in having the duties removed from 123 articles, and reduced on 133 others. In 1860 the number of commodities subject to the tariff was reduced to 48. In 1866 the duty on lumber was abolished. England still had a tariff, but it was for revenue only, not for the protection of English industries. Nearly all of the revenue from the tariff, which in 1910 amounted to over a hundred and sixty million dollars, came from the duties on tobacco, tea, spirits, wine, and sugar. England is absolutely dependent upon other countries for her food supplies. It was evident as early as 1845 that English agriculture could not support England's population.

The twenty years succeeding the repeal of the Corn Laws were years of quiescence and transition. Comparatively few changes of importance were made in legislation. Those of greatest significance concerned the regulation of employment in factories and mines. Such legislation, merciful in its immediate effects and momentous in the reach of the principles on which it rested,

¹ Until 1849 there was still to be a duty, but a slight one, on corn. Then a nominal one of a shilling a quarter. This was abolished in 1869.

was enacted particularly during the decade from 1840 to 1850. The initial step in such legislation had been taken in the Factory Act of 1833, already described, a law that regulated somewhat the conditions under which children and women could be employed in the textile industries. But labor was unprotected in many other industries, in which gross abuses prevailed. One of the most famous parliamentary reports of the nineteenth century was that of a commission appointed to investigate the conditions in mines. Published in 1842, its amazing revelations revolted public opinion and led to quick action. It showed that children of five, six, seven years of age were employed underground in coal mines, girls as well as boys; that women as well as men labored under conditions fatal to health and morals; that the hours were long, twelve or fourteen a day, and the dangers great. They were veritable beasts of burden, dragging and pushing carts on hands and knees along narrow and low passageways, in which it was impossible to stand erect. Girls of eight or ten carried heavy buckets of coal on their backs up steep ladders many times a day. The abuses were so astounding and sickening that a law was passed in 1842 which forbade the employment of women and girls in mines; and which permitted the employment of boys of ten for only three days a week.

Once embarked on this policy of protecting the economically dependent classes, Parliament was forced to go further and further in the governmental regulation of private industry. In 1844 a law was passed which restricted the labor of children in factories to half of each day, or six and a half hours, or the whole of every other day, the labor of women to twelve hours, and also restricting night work still further. The Factory Act of 1847, altered somewhat by an act of 1850, practically established a ten-hour day for labor, a demand long urged by the laboring class and bitterly opposed by manufacturers as ruinous to industry, as certain to lower wages, and to drive capital to foreign countries, by economists as in violation of the "laws" of political economy, by both as a violation of the right of free contract.

Since then a long series of similar statutes has been enacted by the English Parliament, which it is here impossible to describe, so extensive and minute, that Morley, writing over forty years ago, and speaking of the Factory and Workshop Consolidation Act of 1878, an act of more than fifty printed pages, virtually a labor code could say: "We have to-day a complete, minute,

and voluminous code for the protection of labor; buildings must be kept pure of effluvia; dangerous machinery must be fenced; children and young persons must not clean it while in motion; their hours are not only limited, but fixed; continuous employment must not exceed a given number of hours, varying with the trade, but prescribed by the law in given cases; a statutable number of holidays is imposed; the children must go to school, and the employer must every week have a certificate to that effect; if an accident happens, notice must be sent to the proper authorities; special provisions are made for bake-houses, for lace-making, for collieries, and for a whole schedule of other special callings; for the due enforcement and vigilant supervision of this immense host of minute prescriptions, there is an immense host of inspectors, certifying surgeons, and other authorities, whose business it is 'to speed and post o'er land and ocean' in restless guardianship of every kind of labor, from that of the woman who plaits straw at her cottage door, to the miner who descends into the bowels of the earth, and the seaman who conveys the fruits and materials of universal industry to and fro between the remotest parts of the globe."¹

Since 1878 the principle of governmental regulation has been much more extensively applied. The labor code of to-day is contained in the Factory and Workshop Act of 1901, called by Dicey "the most notable achievement of English socialism."²

This mid-century period of English history, so sterile in political interest, is thus seen to be highly significant in the economic sphere. It was the period in which trade-unionism grew rapidly, solidified itself, perfected its machinery, and discussed and clarified the demands of the laboring class. The effect of this preliminary work was apparent later. Workingmen were receiving in their unions a kind of education in politics and management that was a valuable training for the use of the suffrage, when they should get it, as they did in 1867. Meanwhile they came to attach less importance to purely political privileges, such as those demanded by the Charter, and to study far more carefully social questions, arising from the relations of

¹ Morley, *Life of Cobden*, Ch. XIII.

² The Combination Act of 1800, which, in connection with the law of conspiracy then in force, made a trade union an unlawful association, was repealed in 1824. Since then such organizations have not been illegal. They have grown greatly and now enjoy strong legal protection. See Dicey, *Law and Opinion in England*, 95-102; 190-200; 266-272.

capital and labor. During these years a remarkable change of opinion was going on. The beauties of individualism were seen to be less attractive; the advantages of collectivism or socialism were more and more emphasized. The economic and social beliefs of large classes of the population were undergoing a profound transformation. The revolution of thought was one tending distinctly toward socialism.¹ This transformation was proceeding quietly, and its significance did not become apparent until after the passage of the Reform Bill of 1867.

This period of comparative inaction in England was a time of great and stirring events and changes abroad, the period of the revolutions of 1848, of the Crimean War, in which England played a leading part, of the making of Italy, the rise of Prussia, the dismemberment of Denmark, the humiliation of Austria, the Civil War in the United States. The foreign policy of the ministry was active, the domestic very subordinate.

Yet during these years certain internal reforms were carried through, which are worthy of mention. In 1858 under the Derby-Disraeli ministry Jews were permitted to sit in the House of Commons; the oath required of members containing the words "on the true faith of a Christian," was altered, and thus another piece of religious intolerance was removed, another step in the secularization of the state taken, and a controversy of twenty-five years terminated. Another reform of the same session was the abolition of the property qualification for members of Parliament. Thus one point of the Charter was registered quietly. The government of India also was greatly altered.

During many of these years Gladstone was Chancellor of the Exchequer (1852-1855; 1859-1866), and in this capacity was winning the name of the greatest finance minister since Peel, and was laying deep the foundations of his later power. His policy was economy, and the completion of the free trade policy, which he believed would augment the prosperity of England.

By the year 1860 the tariff list had been reduced to 48 articles. Largely through Gladstone's efforts the excise duty on paper was abolished, thus furthering the publication of books and papers at a price within the reach of the masses. Gladstone also carried through a great scheme of using the post offices of England as savings banks. Thus each locality could have its savings

¹ On this subject see the remarkable Chapter VII, in Dicey, *Law and Opinion in England*, entitled, "The Growth of Collectivism." On Trade Unionism see Bright, *History of England*, IV, 401-406.

banks without the creation of an entirely new and elaborate machinery. The system went into force in 1861, and has proved very successful in encouraging thrift among the working classes. Before the end of 1862, 180,000 accounts had been opened. Since then the deposits have increased each year. In 1907 these postal savings banks had deposits of £157,500,000, and the number of depositors was nearly 10,700,000. Deposits may be made from a shilling upward. The interest is small, but the security, that of the State, is perfect. Every little hamlet thus has its institution for savings, the local post office. Walpole calls this use of the post office "the most efficient machinery for the encouragement of thrift that the world had ever seen, or the imagination of man had ever conjectured." Two years later, in 1864, Mr. Gladstone was able to follow up this success by another, using the same machinery of the post office for the selling of small life insurance policies, to the maximum amount of a hundred pounds. Thus workingmen with small incomes were enabled to insure their lives cheaply, and with a sense of absolute safety.

While from the point of view of politics, of internal reforms effected by legislation, this period, from 1846 to 1866, is unusually barren and insignificant, changes of great importance were occurring in the domain of industry and science. The printing press was being perfected, which cheapened vastly the cost of production of newspapers and books, rendering the large circulation possible, which is so characteristic and vital a feature of the modern world, and which has contributed immensely to the democratic evolution of England. Railway construction advanced rapidly, the drawing power of locomotives was greatly augmented, iron ships were supplanting wooden, machinery was applied to agriculture, the sewing machine, which astonishingly lightened the work of the home, and which inaugurated a revolution in the clothing trade, was being very widely adopted, implements of war were being increased in power and deadliness. During this period the Atlantic Cable was finally laid, after great and distressing failures, by an American, Cyrus Field, supported by British capitalists. As a consequence, cables were later laid in every direction, which were to bind the whole world together by their rapid transmission of news, profoundly altering the conditions of commerce and international relations.¹

During the period of transition just described, England was outgrowing old forms of thought and organization, was evidently tending towards democracy. Yet this general trend was not mir-

¹ On this remarkable chapter of history see Walpole, *History of Twenty-five Years*, I, Ch. 7.

rored in her political life and institutions. Parliament remained what the Reform Bill of 1832 had made it. From 1832 to 1867 there was no alteration either in the franchise or in the distribution of seats in the House of Commons. This was the era of middle class rule, as its predecessor had been one of aristocratic rule.

But during this period the demand was frequently made that the suffrage be extended. Not more than one man in six then had the right to vote. The demand was pressed by the Chartists from 1838 to 1848. After that, from time to time, proposals were made in Parliament to enlarge the electorate. Bills to this effect were introduced in 1852, 1854, 1859, and 1860, but none of them progressed far. Both parties treated them gingerly and with trepidation. Furthermore, the exceptional position held by one man in English public life during these years, Lord Palmerston, was a deterrent, for Palmerston was strongly opposed to change in the institutions of England. So commanding was his personality that it came in a way to be tacitly understood that no change should be attempted as long as he remained in politics. But in 1865 Lord Palmerston died, and shortly afterward Lord Derby and Earl Russell passed from the scene of politics. In place of the old-time statesmen, two younger men, neither of whom feared innovation, occupied the center of the stage, Gladstone and Disraeli. Their rivalry was to constitute the central thread of parliamentary history for many years.

Then, too, the success of the United States in the Civil War greatly encouraged the democratic party in England, for it was considered a triumph of democracy over aristocracy. Moreover, in that war the sympathy of the working classes in England had been steadfastly with the North, though they suffered greatly from the war, while the upper classes had largely favored the South. The people, in other words, had been right, when the favored class had not, and when the ministry had so handled its relations with the United States as to leave an ugly feeling and a grave diplomatic difficulty behind to harass the coming years. Were not people who had shown such moral and intellectual qualities worthy of any share in the government of England? Thus the question of the further extension of the suffrage came once more prominently before the English people and Parliament.

In 1866 Mr. Gladstone, leader of the House of Commons, under Earl Russell as prime minister, brought forward a bill to enlarge the electorate. Earl Russell had himself of recent years been favorable to reform. By the bill of 1832 the suffrage was

given in the boroughs to those owning or "occupying" houses or buildings yielding ten pounds a year. From 1832 to 1867 England was consequently ruled by the "ten pound householders." But five out of every six men could not meet this qualification, and were, therefore, without political power. The masses of workingmen could not afford to pay ten pounds a year for the houses in which they lived.

The measure now introduced proposed but a slight change. In boroughs the suffrage was to be extended to seven pound householders. This would add only about 150,000 to the number of voters. The county franchise was not to be treated even as liberally as the borough. The timidity of this measure, and the half-hearted way in which it was urged, encouraged all the opponents of change, and failed to arouse any counteracting interest among the unenfranchised outside of Parliament. The Conservatives were united against it, and a body of the Liberals joined them. There was no sign that the people wanted the measure, therefore this coalition did not hesitate to defeat it. The ministry resigned and Derby became prime minister, with Disraeli as leader of the House of Commons. The Conservatives were now in power, and the opponents of reform thought that they had effectually stemmed the advance toward democracy. Never were politicians more completely deceived. The people instantly became alert and indignant at the rejection of even so modest a measure. Gladstone, in his final speech on the bill, had exclaimed defiantly to his opponents, "You cannot fight against the future; time is on our side," a phrase that now became a battle cry. Gladstone, aroused, lost all his timidity and became a fiery apostle of an extensive reform. A determined effort was made to influence the people, and it succeeded.

Mr. Bright, with ill-concealed menace, incited the people to renew the scenes of 1832. "You know what your fathers did thirty-four years ago, and you know the result. The men who, in every speech they utter, insult the workingmen, describing them as a multitude given up to ignorance and vice, will be the first to yield when the popular will is loudly and resolutely expressed. If Parliament Street, from Charing Cross to the venerable Abbey, were filled with men seeking a Reform Bill these slanderers of their countrymen would learn to be civil, if they did not learn to love freedom." Under the influence of such incitement the people speedily lost their indifference, and great popular demonstrations of the familiar kind occurred in favor of the bill.

Seeing this, and feeling that reform was inevitable, and that,

such being the case, the Conservative party might as well reap the advantages of granting it as to allow those advantages to accrue to others, Disraeli in the following year, 1867, introduced a reform bill. This was remodeled almost entirely by the Liberals, who, led by Gladstone, defeated the proposals of the ministry time after time, and succeeded in having their own principles incorporated in the measure. The bill as finally passed was largely the work of Gladstone, practically everything he asked being in the end conceded, but it was the audacity and subtlety and resourcefulness of Disraeli that succeeded in getting a very radical bill adopted by the very same legislators who the year before had rejected a moderate one.

The bill as finally passed in August, 1867, closed the rule of the middle class in England, and made England a democracy. The franchise in boroughs was given to all householders. Thus, instead of ten pound or seven pound householders, all householders, whatever the value of their houses, were admitted; also, all lodgers who had occupied for a year lodgings of the value, unfurnished, of ten pounds, or about a dollar a week. In the counties the suffrage was given to all those who owned property yielding five pounds clear income a year, rather than ten pounds, as previously; and to all occupiers who paid at least twelve pounds, rather than fifty pounds, as hitherto. Thus the better class of laborers in the boroughs, and practically all tenant farmers in the counties, received the vote. By this bill the number of voters was nearly doubled.¹

So sweeping was the measure that the prime minister himself, Lord Derby, called it a "leap in the dark." Carlyle, forecasting a dismal future, called it "shooting Niagara." Robert Lowe, whose memorable attacks had been largely instrumental in defeating the meager measure of the year before, now said, "we must educate our masters." It should be noted that during the debates on this bill, John Stuart Mill made a strongly reasoned speech in favor of granting the suffrage to women. The House considered the proposition highly humorous. Nevertheless, this movement, then in its very beginning, was destined to persist and grow.

Acts, similar in principle though differing in detail, were passed in 1868 for Scotland and Ireland.

¹ Just before 1867 the county voters numbered 768,705; the borough voters 602,088. By 1871 the former had increased to 1,055,467; the latter to 1,470,956.

CHAPTER XXIII

ENGLAND UNDER GLADSTONE AND DISRAELI

MR. GLADSTONE possessed a more commanding majority than any prime minister had had since 1832. As the enlargement of the franchise in 1832 had been succeeded by a period of bold and sweeping reforms, so was that of 1867 to be. Mr. Gladstone was a perfect representative of the prevailing national mood. The recent campaign had shown that the people were ready for a period of reform, of important constructive legislation. Supported by such a majority, and by a public opinion so vigorous and enthusiastic, Gladstone stood forth master of the situation. No statesman could hope to have more favorable conditions attend his entrance into power. He was the head of a strong, united, and resolute party. The ministry contained a remarkable array of able men. Mr. Bright was there, one of the most eloquent orators who have spoken the English tongue; Mr. Forster, Mr. Goschen, Mr. Lowe, and Lord Clarendon were also members.

The man who thus became prime minister at the age of fifty-nine was one of the notable figures of modern English history. His parents were Scotch. His father had hewed out his own career, and from small beginnings had, by energy and talent, made himself one of the wealthiest and most influential men in Liverpool, and had been elected a member of Parliament. Young William Ewart Gladstone received "the best education then going" at Eton College and Oxford University, in both of which institutions he stood out among his fellows. At Eton his most intimate friend was Arthur Hallam, the man whose splendid eulogy is Tennyson's *In Memoriam*. His career at Oxford was crowned by brilliant scholarly successes, and here he also distinguished himself as a speaker in the Union, the university debating club. In one of the discussions he denounced the Reform Bill of 1832, then pending in Parliament, as destined to change the form of government and subvert the social order. Before leaving the university his thought and inclination were to take orders in the church, but his father was opposed to this and the son yielded. In 1833 he took his seat in the House of Commons

as representative for one of the rotten boroughs which the Reform Bill of the previous year had not abolished. He was to be a member of that body for over sixty years, and for more than half that time its leading member. Before attaining the premiership, therefore, in 1868, he had had a long political career and a varied training, had held many offices, culminating in the Chancellorship of the Exchequer and the leadership of the House of Commons. Beginning as a Conservative (Macaulay called him in 1838 the "rising hope of the stern and unbending Tories"), he came under the influence of Sir Robert Peel, a man who, conservative by instinct, was gifted with unusual prescience and adaptability, and who possessed the courage required to be inconsistent, the wisdom to change as the world changed. Gladstone had, after a long period of transition, landed in the opposite camp, and was now the leader of the Liberal Party. By reason of his business ability, shown in the management of the nation's finances, his knowledge of parliamentary history and procedure, his moral fervor, his elevation of tone, his intrepidity and courage, his reforming spirit, and his remarkable eloquence, he was eminently qualified for leadership. When almost sixty he became prime minister, a position he was destined to fill four times, displaying marvelous intellectual and physical energy. His administration, lasting from 1868-1874, is called the Great Ministry. The key to his policy is found in his remark to a friend when the summons came from the Queen for him to form a ministry: "My mission is to pacify Ireland." The Irish question, in fact, was to be the most absorbing interest of Mr. Gladstone's later political career, dominating all four of his ministries.

To understand the question, a brief survey of Irish history in the nineteenth century is necessary. Ireland was all through the century the most discontented and wretched part of the British Empire. While England constantly grew in numbers and wealth, Ireland decreased in population, and her misery increased. In 1815 Ireland was inhabited by two peoples, the native Irish, who were Catholics, and settlers from England and Scotland, who were for the most part Anglicans or Presbyterians. The latter were a small but powerful minority.

The fundamental cause of the Irish question lay in the fact that Ireland was a conquered country, that the Irish were a subject race. As early as the twelfth century the English began to invade the island. Attempts made by the Irish at various times during six hundred years to repel and drive out the invaders only resulted in rendering their subjection more complete and more

galling. Irish insurrections have been pitilessly punished, and race hatred has been the consuming emotion in Ireland for centuries. The contest was unequal, owing to the far greater resources of England during all this time. The result of this turbulent history was that in 1815 the Irish were a subject people in their own land, as they had been for centuries, and that there were several evidences of this so conspicuous and so burdensome that most Irishmen could not pass a day without feeling the bitterness of their situation. It was a hate-laden atmosphere which they breathed.

The marks of subjection were various. The Irish did not own the land of Ireland, which had once belonged to their ancestors. The various conquests by English rulers had been followed by extensive confiscations of the land. Particularly extensive was that of Cromwell. These lands were given in large estates to Englishmen. The Irish were mere tenants, and most of them tenants-at-will, on lands that now belonged to others. The Irish have always regarded themselves as the rightful owners of the soil of Ireland, have regarded the English landlords as usurpers, and have desired to recover possession for themselves. Hence there arose the agrarian question, a part of the general Irish problem.

Again, in 1815 the Irish were the victims of religious intolerance. At the time of the Reformation they remained Catholic, while the English separated from Rome. Attempts to force the Anglican Church upon them only stiffened their opposition. Nevertheless, in 1815 they were paying tithes to the Anglican Church in Ireland, though they were themselves ardent Catholics, never entered a Protestant church, and were supporting their own churches by voluntary gifts. Thus they contributed to two churches, one alien, which they hated, and one to which they were devoted. Thus a part of the Irish problem was the religious question.

Again, in 1815 the Irish did not make the laws which governed them. In 1800 their separate Parliament in Dublin was abolished, and from 1801 there was only one Parliament in Great Britain, that in London. While Ireland henceforth had its quota of representatives in the House of Commons, it was always a hopeless minority. Moreover, the Irish members did not really represent the large majority of the Irish, as no Catholic could sit in the House of Commons. There was this strange anomaly that, while the majority of the Irish could vote for members of Parliament, they must vote for Protestants — a bitter mockery.

The Irish demanded the right to govern themselves. Thus another aspect of the problem was purely political.

The abuse just mentioned was removed in 1829,¹ when Catholic Emancipation was carried, which henceforth permitted Catholics to sit in the House of Commons. The English statesmen granted this concession only when forced to do so by the imminent danger of civil war. The Irish consequently felt no gratitude. Moreover, at the moment when Catholics were being admitted to Parliament, most of them lost their vote by the much higher franchise qualification enacted at the same time, for the qualification was raised in Ireland from forty shillings to ten pounds, though for England it remained at forty shillings. Shortly after Catholic Emancipation had been achieved, the Irish, under the matchless leadership of O'Connell, endeavored by much the same methods to obtain the repeal of the Union between England and Ireland, effected in 1801, and to win back a separate legislature and a large measure of independence. This movement, for some time very formidable, failed completely, owing to the iron determination of the English that the union should not be broken, and to the fact that the leader, O'Connell, was not willing in last resort to risk civil war to accomplish the result, recognizing the hopelessness of such a contest. This movement came to an end in 1843. However, a number of the younger followers of O'Connell, chagrined at his peaceful methods, formed a society called "Young Ireland," the aim of which was Irish independence and a republic. They rose in revolt in the troubled year, 1848. The revolt, however, was easily put down.

As if Ireland did not suffer enough from political and social evils, an appalling catastrophe of nature was added. The Irish famine of 1845-7, to which reference has already been made, was a tragic calamity, far-reaching in its effects. The repeal of the Corn Laws did not check it. The distress continued for several years, though gradually growing less. The potato crop of 1846 was inferior to that of 1845, and the harvests of 1848 and 1849 were far from normal. Charity sought to aid, but was insufficient. The government gave money, and later gave rations. In March 1847 over 700,000 people were receiving government support. In March and April of that year the deaths in the workhouses alone were more than ten thousand a month. Peasants ate roots and lichens, or flocked to the cities in the agony of despair, hoping for relief. Multitudes fled to England

¹ Catholics were permitted to hold offices after 1828 by the abolition of the Test Acts.

or crowded the emigrant ships to America, dying by the thousands of fever or exhaustion. It was a long drawn out horror, and when it was over it was found that the population had decreased from about 8,300,000 in 1845 to less than 6,600,000 in 1851. Since then the decrease occasioned by emigration has continued. By 1881 the population had fallen to 5,100,000, by 1891 to 4,700,000, by 1901 to about 4,450,000. Since 1851 perhaps 4,000,000 Irish have emigrated. Ireland, indeed, is probably the only country whose population decreased in the nineteenth century.

For many years after the famine, and the failure of "Young Ireland" in 1848, Irish politics were quiescent. Year after year the ceaseless emigration to the United States continued. Finally, there was organized among the Irish in America a secret society, called the Fenians, whose purpose was to achieve the independence of the republic of Ireland. The Irish in the two countries co-operated, and in 1865 and 1866 were active. James Stephens, the leader in Ireland, announced that the flag of the Irish republic would be raised in 1865. The Government, alarmed, took stringent measures, arresting many of the leaders, and even securing from Parliament the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act in Ireland. In May 1866 the Fenians in the United States attempted an invasion of Canada. About 1,200 of them crossed the Niagara River, but were soon driven back, though only after blood had been shed. Several, taken prisoners, were tried by courts-martial and shot. In 1867 various Fenian outrages occurred in Ireland and in England. There were many arrests, trials, and some executions. The chief significance of the Fenian movement was the alarm it aroused in England, and the vivid evidence it gave of the unrest and deep-rooted discontent of Ireland. The Irish question thus became again an exciting topic for discussion, a problem pressing upon Parliament for solution.

When Gladstone came into power in 1868 he was resolved to pacify the Irish by removing some of their more pronounced grievances, the three branches of the Irish Upas tree, as he called them — the Irish Church, the Irish land laws, and Irish education.

The question of the Irish Church was the first one attacked. This was the Anglican Church established and endowed in Ireland at the time of the Reformation. It was a branch of the Church of England. Its position was anomalous. It was a state church, yet it was the church not of the people, but of a small minority. Established to win over the Catholics to Protestantism, it had

signally failed of its purpose. Its members numbered less than an eighth of the population. There were many parishes, about 150, in which there was not a single member. There were nearly 900 in which there were less than fifty members. Yet these places were provided with an Anglican clergyman and a place of worship, generally the former Catholic church building. The Church was maintained by its endowment and by the tithes which the Catholics, as well as the Protestants, paid. Sidney Smith said of this institution: "On an Irish Sabbath the bell of the neat parish church often summons to service only the parson and an occasional conforming clerk; while two hundred yards off, a thousand Catholics are huddled together in a miserable hovel, and pelted by all the storms of heaven," and he added, "There is no abuse like it in all Europe, in all Asia, in all the discovered parts of Africa, and in all that we have heard of Timbuctoo." This favored corporation did not even discharge its religious functions with zeal. Many a clergyman used his position simply for the salary attached, employed a curate to perform his duties, and himself lived in England. The Irish resisted the payment of tithes, and the result was the so-called tithe war, in which the peasant's property, his cow or goat, his chickens or kettles, were seized and sold for payment. Even such methods were not successful. In 1833 out of £104,000 due only £12,000 could be collected. At length, in 1838, the system was abandoned. The tithes were made a tax upon the land, which simply meant that the peasants no longer paid them directly, but paid them indirectly in the form of the increased rent demanded by the landlord. The Catholics were still supporters of a wealthy and alien corporation. Meanwhile, their own priests were exceedingly poor, and their own services had to be held in the open air or in wretched buildings. The existence of this alien church was regarded as humiliating and oppressive.

Gladstone in 1869 procured the passage of a law abolishing tithes, even in this roundabout form, and disestablishing and partly disendowing the Church. The Church henceforth ceased to be connected with the State. Its bishops lost their seats in the House of Lords. It became a voluntary organization and was permitted to retain a large part of its property as an endowment. The rest was to be appropriated as Parliament should direct. It was to have all the church buildings which it had formerly possessed. It was still very rich, but the connection with the Church of England was to cease January 1, 1871. The bill, though very favorable to the Church, was

denounced as sheer robbery, as "highly offensive to Almighty God," as the "greatest national sin ever committed." Nevertheless, it passed and became law. One branch of the famous Upas tree had been lopped off.

Gladstone now approached a far more serious and perplexing problem—the system of land tenure. Ireland was almost exclusively an agricultural country, yet the land was chiefly owned, not by those who lived on it and tilled it, but by a comparatively small number of landlords, who held large estates. Many of these were Englishmen, absentees, who rarely or never came to Ireland, and who regarded their estates simply as so many sources of revenue. The business relations with their tenants were carried on by agents or bailiffs, whose treatment of the tenants was frequently harsh and exasperating. In the minds of the Irish their landlords were foreigners, who had acquired by robbery land which they regarded as rightly belonging to themselves. This initial injustice they never forgot. There had been from the beginning a wide gulf between the two. As, however, there were almost no industries in Ireland, the inhabitants were obliged to have land. They were, therefore, in an economic sense, at the mercy of the landlord. There was, properly speaking, no competition among landowners to rent their land, forcing them, therefore, to treat their tenants with some liberality and consideration. There was competition only among the applicants for land, applicants so numerous that they would offer to pay much more for a little plot on which to raise their potatoes, which furnished the chief food, than the value of the land justified. The result was that in many cases they could not pay the stipulated rent and were evicted. Their position only became still more deplorable, for land they must have or starve; consequently, they would promise a higher rent to some other landlord, with, in the end, another eviction as a result. Now, eviction was easy, because these petty farmers were tenants-at-will, that is, tenants who must leave their holdings at the will and pleasure of the landlord, or on short notice, generally six months, obviously a most insecure form of tenure. Lands were not rented for a year or five years or ten, but only as long as the owner should see fit. Occupation could be terminated abruptly by the landlord, starvation faced the peasant. Moreover, Irish landlords rented, as was correctly stated at the time, not farms, that is, land and the necessary buildings and improvements, but simply land. The tenant put up at his own expense such buildings and made

such improvements in the way of fences, draining, clearing, fertilizing, as he could, or wished; in very many cases the land would have had no value whatever, but for these improvements. Yet, as the law then stood, when a landlord evicted his tenant he was not obliged to pay for any buildings or improvements made during the tenant's occupation. He simply appropriated so much property created by the tenant.

It would be hard to conceive a more unwise or unjust system. It encouraged indolence and slothfulness. The land was wretchedly cultivated, because good cultivation of it was penalized. Why should a tenant work hard to improve the quality of his holding, to erect desirable farm buildings, when he knew that this would merely mean a higher rent or his eviction in favor of some one who would offer a higher rent, in which case all his improvements would benefit others and not himself? In other words, it was a positive disadvantage to a tenant to be prosperous. If prosperous, he made efforts to conceal the fact, as did the peasants in pre-revolutionary France. Now, the social effects of this system were disastrous in the extreme. Chronic and shocking misery was the lot of the Irish peasantry. "The Irish peasant," says an official English document of the time, "is the most poorly nourished, most poorly housed, most poorly clothed of any in Europe; he has no reserve, no capital. He lives from day to day." His house was generally a rude stone hut, with a dirt floor. The census of 1841 established the fact that in the case of forty-six per cent. of the population, the entire family lived in a house, or, more properly, hut of a single room. Frequently the room served also as a barn for the live stock.

Stung by the misery of their position, and by the injustice of the laws that protected the landlord, and that gave them only two hard alternatives, surrender to the landlord, or starvation, and believing that when evicted they were also robbed, and goaded by the hopeless outlook for the future, the Irish, in wild rage, committed many atrocious agrarian crimes, murders, arson, the killing or maiming of cattle. This in turn brought a new coercion law from the English Parliament, which only aggravated the evil.

Such was the situation. Mr. Gladstone, desiring to govern Ireland, not according to English, but according to Irish ideas, faced it resolutely. He had an important argument at hand. While the system just described was the one prevailing throughout most of Ireland, a different one had grown up in a single

province, Ulster, the so-called system of "tenant right." The tenant's right was undisturbed possession of his holding as long as he paid his rent, and fair payment for all permanent improvements, in case he should relinquish his holding, whether voluntarily or because of inability to pay the rent. This was mere custom, not law. But the result was that the peasants of Ulster were hard-working and prosperous, whereas in the rest of Ireland the contrary was the case. The outgoing peasant received, as a matter of fact, for his improvements from five to twenty times the amount of his annual rent. It paid him, therefore, to make them. Mr. Gladstone took this local custom and made it a law for all Ireland. In the Land Act of 1870 it was provided that if evicted for any other reason than for the non-payment of rent, the tenant could claim compensation for disturbance from the landlord, and also that he was to receive compensation for all improvements of a permanent character on giving up his holding. It was hoped that thus the peasants would have a sense of security in their occupation, and that with security would come prosperity and peace.

There were certain other clauses in the bill, not greatly approved by Gladstone, but strongly urged by Mr. Bright, whose influence with the people Gladstone did not wish to alienate. Bright desired that the Irish peasants should gradually cease to be tenants of other people's land, and should become land-owners themselves. This could only be done by purchasing the estates of the landlords, and this obviously the peasants were unable to do. The Bright clauses, therefore, provided that the State should help the peasant up to a certain amount, he in turn repaying the State for the money loaned by easy installments, covering a long period of years. Accordingly, carefully guarded land purchase clauses were put into this bill.

The bill thus proposed went through Parliament with comparative ease. On one point it was vigorously attacked, the clause giving a tenant compensation from the landlord if the landlord evicted him for any other reason than for the non-payment of rent. This, said Disraeli, is revolutionary. It alters, by act of Parliament, the nature of property, the thing least to be tampered with safely by legislation. The landlord may no longer do what he will with his own. In place of absolute and uncontrolled ownership, you make the tenant part owner, for he can not be evicted as long as he pays his rent. You create a hybrid and dangerous form of land tenure, dual ownership. If you violate the sacredness of property in land, you

may do it in other kinds, and thus the people will come to see that they can acquire property not alone by labor, but by taking another's by act of Parliament. To which the reply was that one's absolute right to property is conditioned upon its conducing to the public welfare, that restrictions may be imposed when in the interest of society as a whole, and that the principle of the factory acts, and of the laws regulating banking, corporations, trade unions, was the same. It was simply now being applied for the first time to land.

The Land Act of 1870 did not achieve what was hoped from it; did not bring peace to Ireland. Landlords found ways of evading it, and evictions became more numerous than ever. The act did not forbid landlords to raise their rents, and did not guarantee the tenant compensation for disturbance if he were evicted for non-payment of rent, only if evicted arbitrarily. Practically, then, it was easy for a landlord to get rid of any tenant he might wish to, by simply raising his rent to a point the tenant could not meet. Nor did the land purchase clauses prove effective. Only seven sales were made up to 1877.

Nevertheless, the bill was very important, because of the principles upon which it was based. One principle was that the landlord's ownership of the soil was not absolute and unrestricted, that the tenant was in some sense a partner in the land he tilled, in the soil of Ireland. Another was the desirability of enabling the tenant to become complete owner. The land-purchase section of the act proved ineffective, largely because very timidly applied, but it contained an idea that was to grow more and more attractive and to be applied in a long series of laws destined in the end to be highly successful. In the principles on which it was based, the Land Act of 1870 was path-breaking.

Another measure of this active ministry was designed to provide a national system of elementary education. The educational system of England was deplorably inadequate and inefficient, inferior to that of many other countries. England possessed the famous endowed schools of Eton, Rugby, Harrow, but these and others were for the aristocratic and prosperous middle classes. But she possessed no national system of public schools for the mass of the population. It was long the accepted opinion in England that education was no part of the duty of the State.

The work that the State neglected was discharged in a measure, by the various religious denominations. Whatever education the children of the working class received, they received in schools

maintained by voluntary gifts, generally in connection with a church. Most of the schools were Anglican, some were Wesleyan, some Catholic, some Jewish. In 1833 Parliament appropriated the sum of £20,000 in aid of schools established by voluntary effort. The sum was ludicrously small. Prussia at that time was spending many times as much for its popular education, and Prussia was a far poorer country and a smaller one. Nevertheless, Parliament tacitly recognized by this vote that the State had a duty to perform in educating its citizens. The sum was enlarged to £30,000 in 1839. Once embarked upon this course, there could be no turning back. The parliamentary grant grew greatly, and, between 1860 and 1865, it averaged annually not far from £700,000. With this encouragement the number of voluntary schools increased, but was, nevertheless, totally inadequate to the needs of the nation. It came to be generally admitted that this system would not suffice for the education of the people. In 1869 it was estimated that of 4,300,000 children in need of education, 2,000,000 were not in school at all, 1,000,000 were in schools that received no grant from the government, were uninspected, and were generally of a very inferior character, and only 1,300,000 were in schools aided by the State and inspected by the State. Moreover, whatever facilities existed were unevenly distributed; many districts being entirely without schools.

Many forces combined now to make the question of popular education urgent. When the working classes in the boroughs were given the suffrage in 1867, the cause of education received a great stimulus. "We must educate our masters," was the watchword. Foreign countries were cited as examples. The northern states, which had conquered the southern in the American Civil War, were the home of the common school, and on the Continent men spoke of the victory of Prussia over Austria at Sadowa as the triumph of the Prussian schoolmaster, meaning that the Prussian army was the more intelligent. Moreover, the trades-unions, representing workingmen, favored popular education.

The Gladstone ministry carried, in 1870, a bill designed to provide England for the first time in her history with a really national system of elementary education. The system then established remained without essential change until 1902. It marked a great progress in the educational facilities of England. The bill did not establish an entirely new educational machinery to be paid for by the State and managed by the State. It divided

the country into school districts. It did not propose to establish new schools in each district to be administered by the State. Its aim was not to provide England with new secular schools, but to provide her with a sufficient number of schools of good quality. It incorporated in its scheme the already existing church schools. "Our object," said Mr. Forster, who was in charge of the bill, "is to complete the voluntary system, and to fill up the gaps." Each district was to be considered by itself. If, at the end of a year, it was found to possess already a sufficient number of schools, it was to be left alone. Such schools must submit to State inspection, and would then receive parliamentary aid. If the district were found to be inadequately supplied with schools of this character, then a new agency was to be created. Local school boards were to be elected with power to establish new schools, and to levy local taxes for the purpose.

Thus there would be two sets of schools, church schools supported by voluntary contributions, by grants of Parliament, and by children's tuition fees, and "board schools," supported by grants of Parliament, tuition fees and local taxes.

The main difficulty encountered by educational reformers in 1870, as had been the case before, and was long to be the case, was the question of religious instruction. There was a party among the Liberals who wished to have education entirely secular, but this party was in the minority. The supporters of the voluntary schools wished to have those schools permitted to teach the tenets of the denomination as they had done in the past. There was inserted in this bill a so-called conscience clause, providing that where voluntary schools included as a part of their teaching instruction in the religious beliefs of the denomination conducting them, parents might have their children excused from such instruction. To facilitate the operation of this provision all religious instruction must be given at the beginning or at the close of the school session. Thus the children of Methodists and Baptists could attend an Anglican school without being obliged to be instructed in the Anglican beliefs.

But should there be any religious instruction in the new board schools, schools to be supported in part by local taxes? A strong party demanded that these schools at least be entirely secular, but Parliament did not so decide. The bill as passed provided that the board in each district should decide whether there should be religious instruction or not, but that if it permitted such instruction, "no catechism or religious formulary which is dis-

tinctive of any particular denomination," should be taught.¹ In other words there might be reading of the Bible and comment on it, but no instruction in any creed or dogma. Moreover, in board schools, as in voluntary, there should be a conscience clause, and a time schedule enabling parents to have their children excused from such exercises.

The law of 1870 did not establish either free, or compulsory, or secular education. It adopted, under the restrictions indicated, denominational or voluntary schools, and allowed them to give denominational teaching, with, however, a conscience clause which rendered it possible, as has been said, for the son of a Methodist to attend an Episcopalian school. It permitted undenominational religious teaching in the board schools, but here, too, the conscience clause was attached. The schools were not free, but pupils were to pay tuition. It was held undesirable to relieve parents of all feeling of responsibility for the education of their children. School boards might, however, establish free public schools in districts where exceptional poverty prevailed or might pay the fees of poor children.

The Education Act of 1870 was a compromise between conflicting views. It did not create a national system of education throughout the land. It kept the denominational system and added another system to it. The bill was more acceptable to the opponents of the Liberal ministry, mainly Churchmen, than to its supporters and Non-Conformists. John Bright thought it the "worst act passed by any Liberal Parliament since 1832." Under it, however, popular education made great advances. In twenty years the number of schools more than doubled, and were capable of accommodating all those of school age. In 1880 attendance was made compulsory, and in 1891 made free.

The system just described remained in force till 1902, when a new education bill was passed.

Another reform carried through by this ministry, was that of the army, by the introduction of a short service with the colors, and a longer term in the reserve. Here we see, as we do everywhere in Europe, the tremendous influence of the Prussian military system, which had proved so victorious in the campaign culminating at Königgrätz. It had long been supposed that an army of veterans was the best. But Prussia had proved the contrary. There military service was compulsory but limited to a few years in the active army. Then the young men passed

¹ The Cowper-Temple amendment, which also provided that voluntary schools should receive no assistance from local taxes.

into the reserve, and might be called out if necessary. Military service was their profession for only a brief period. The Prussian army was consequently an army of young men in the prime of physical condition. Prussia's example was subsequently followed in all the great European armies. Universal obligatory service had never been adopted in England, but the period of active service of those enlisting was reduced by Gladstone so that the army became one of young men.

But no real reform in the army could be accomplished without an additional change in its structure. Men obtained promotion in the British army by purchasing positions of higher rank. There was a definite schedule of prices fixed by royal ordinance. To be an ensign in the infantry cost £450, to be a lieutenant-colonel £4,500. But the regulation price was by no means the actual price. So eager were men to secure these positions that they offered much more. Having paid for his position an officer considered it his property, to be sold for what he could get for it. He had a vested interest. Manifestly this system was unfair to poor men, who might be meritorious and able soldiers, as practically the desirable positions in the army were open only to the wealthy class. Naturally the growing democratic feeling of England, expressed in many ways by this ministry, was impatient of a system which rendered the army an appendage of the aristocracy. Gladstone brought in a bill to abolish purchase, paying present owners at the market price. "The nation," said he, "must buy back its own army from its own officers." Bitterly opposed by the officers and by their influential friends inside and outside Parliament, the ministry succeeded, however, in getting its bill through the Commons only to have it practically defeated in the House of Lords. Mr. Gladstone then took a step for which he was severely criticised. He advised the Queen to abolish purchase by royal ordinance, which could be done, as the whole system rested on royal ordinance, not upon an act of Parliament. In this way the system was abolished (1871), and promotion by merit substituted for promotion by purchase.

In the same session in which the military career was thrown open to merit, regardless of wealth or rank, civil and academic careers were also made free to all classes. In 1870, by an Order in Council, the system of appointment to most positions in the Civil Service was put on the basis of standing in open competitive examinations. This system had earlier been applied to the Indian service. The step now taken was strongly opposed, and

one argument was that it would result in eliminating the aristocratic class from the service and would fill all positions with a lower social class. Mr. Gladstone never shared this opinion, believing, indeed, that the better educated class would have all the stronger hold upon the higher positions, as has proved to be the case, the greater part of the successful candidates for those positions being Oxford and Cambridge men.

In 1871 the universities of England were made thoroughly national. The last remaining religious tests, which operated only to the advantage of the members of the Church of England, were abolished. Henceforth men of any religious faith or no religious faith could have all the advantages of university training and university degrees. This was another step in religious and intellectual liberty. It abolished another monopoly of the Established Church. The universities belonged henceforth to all Englishmen.

Another reform carried through by this ministry was the Ballot Act of 1872. Voting up to this time had been *viva voce*. Each voter declared his candidate in public at the polling place. For over forty years the question of making the ballot secret had been discussed. Indeed, it was considered at the time of the Reform Bill of 1832. For years Grote, the historian of Greece, had brought the matter up annually for discussion in the House of Commons. The secret ballot was one of the demands of the Chartists. But the movement made no progress as the years went by. The argument for open voting was that, as voting is a trust, it must be discharged in a manner known of all men, that thus it makes for courage and a due sense of responsibility. If you render a man's vote secret you undermine the citizen's courage, you foster evasion. This was Lord Palmerston's view. It was at one time also Gladstone's, who made the ingenious discovery that the secret ballot had led to the fall of the Roman Republic. But the facts were apparent to all the world that public voting led to extensive bribery and scandalous corruption. Intimidation, also, could flourish under such a system, and now that the poorer people were enfranchised by the act of 1867 they plainly needed further protection in the exercise of their right. As Morley says: "Experience showed that without secrecy in its exercise, the suffrage was not free. The farmer was afraid of the landlord, and the laborer was afraid of the farmer; the employer could tighten the screw on the workman, the shopkeeper feared the power of his best customers, the debtor quailed before his creditor, the priest wielded thunder-

bolts over the faithful. Not only was the open vote not free, it exposed its possessor to so much bullying, molestation, and persecution that his possession came to be less of a boon than a nuisance.”¹

It was evident that whatever the abstract arguments might be, the concrete ones were all in favor of the secret ballot. A bill was finally passed in 1872 providing for the Australian system in voting, so called because of its use first in the colony of Victoria.

Though Mr. Gladstone was losing popularity with every new reform, alienating in each case those affected disadvantageously by the measure in question, he still went on. He now approached the question of the third branch of the Upas tree, the system of Irish education. In February 1873 he introduced the Irish University Bill, designed to give adequate facilities to Ireland for higher education. That the facilities were not adequate was clear. There were in Ireland two universities, that of Dublin, which consisted of a single college, Trinity, a Protestant institution, though admitting Catholics to its courses and degrees, and Queen's University, established in 1845, and consisting of three colleges, at Belfast, Cork, and Galway. These were entirely secular; the Catholics called them “godless.” The Catholics, constituting the mass of the population, desired a university of their own, endowed and authorized to grant degrees. There had been established some years before a so-called Catholic University of Dublin, but it was not empowered to grant degrees. Mr. Gladstone proposed in 1873 that there should be established a new university for the whole of Ireland, with which these various institutions and others should be affiliated. The new university was to be amply endowed. The bill made shipwreck, however, on the religious difficulty. It was provided that each college might be denominational and teach dogma if it chose, but the university was to be undenominational. Owing to the religious passions involved it was held that the university course should not include teaching in theology, moral philosophy, or modern history. The colleges might teach these subjects but not the university. There was added the remarkable provision that any professor might be suspended or removed from his position if he wilfully offended, in speaking or writing, the religious convictions of any student.

This bill satisfied no one. Catholics pronounced against it, saying that they wanted a Catholic university, not an undenominational one. Protestants, on the other hand, felt that at the

¹ Morley, *Gladstone*, II, 366.

very time they were liberalizing Oxford and Cambridge by opening them to all, regardless of religious affiliations, they ought not to encourage bigotry and sectarianism in an Irish university. Moreover, the "gagging" clauses were bitterly denounced. A university which should teach neither modern history nor philosophy, and whose professors should not have freedom of speech would be in the eyes of reasonable men ridiculous and not worth establishing.

The opposition was very general and violent. Disraeli, feeling that the moment had come when it would be possible to overthrow the ministry, reviewed the whole record in a caustic speech, denouncing all its reforming measures as simply "harassing legislation," endangering all the institutions of England. To which John Bright retorted that if the Conservatives had been in the wilderness they would have condemned the Ten Commandments as "harassing legislation." The bill was defeated, and Gladstone resigned, but as the Conservatives would not take office at that moment he came back into power for a few months.

Not only did Gladstone's domestic legislation give offense to many interested sections of the population, and thus raise up enemies, but his foreign policy was characterized by many as weak, humiliating for England, lowering her prestige, particularly his adoption of arbitration in the controversy with the United States over the *Alabama* matter.

The grievances of the United States against England because of her conduct during our Civil War were a dangerous source of friction between the two countries for many years. Mr. Gladstone agreed to submit them to arbitration, but as the decision of the Geneva Commission was against England (1872), his ministry suffered in popularity. Nevertheless, Mr. Gladstone had established a valuable precedent. This was the greatest victory yet attained for the principle of settling international difficulties by arbitration rather than by war. In this sphere also this ministry advanced the interests of humanity, though it drew only disadvantage for itself from its service.

Disraeli, seeing that the popularity of the ministers was on the wane, took occasion to indulge in mockery, saying that as he looked at them across the aisle of the House of Commons he was reminded of those marine landscapes not unusual on the coasts of South America: "You behold a range of exhausted volcanoes. Not a flame flickers on a single pallid crest. But the situation is still dangerous. There are occasional earthquakes, and ever and anon the dark rumbling of the sea."

All the accumulated disaffection of six years found vent in the elections of 1874. The Liberals were defeated by a majority of fifty. The Conservatives entered office with Disraeli as prime minister and remained in power till 1880. Thus fell Gladstone's first and most successful administration, with a record of remarkable achievement in legislation and in administrative reform.

Mr. Disraeli now found himself prime minister, chief of a party controlling by safe majorities both Houses of Parliament. His administration lasted from 1874 to 1880. It differed as strikingly from Gladstone's as his character differed from that of his predecessor. This was owing to several facts. The criticisms which his party had leveled at its opponents, of disturbing everything by harassing legislation, imposed upon him the obligation of leaving things alone, of inactivity in domestic legislation where possible, of effecting only mild reforms where reforms were necessary at all. Colonial and foreign affairs were the chief occupation of this ministry. Disraeli found the situation favorable and the moment opportune for impressing upon England the political ideal, long germinating in his mind, succinctly called imperialism, that is, the transcendent importance of breadth of view and vigor of assertion of England's position as a world power, as an empire, not as an insular state. In 1872 he had said: "In my judgment no minister in this country will do his duty who neglects any opportunity of reconstructing as much as possible our colonial empire, and of responding to those distant sympathies which may become the source of incalculable strength and happiness to this land." This principle Disraeli emphasized in act and speech during his six years of power. It was imperfectly realized under him; it was partially reconsidered and revised by Gladstone upon his return to power in 1880. But it had definitely received lodgment in the mind of England before he left power. It gave a new note to English politics. This is Disraeli's historic significance in the annals of British politics. He greatly stimulated interest in the British colonies. He invoked "the sublime instinct of an ancient people," and he invoked it not in vain.

The first two years of his administration were singularly uneventful. The work of the preceding six years was accepted and left in the main untouched. Laws were passed in the direction of economic improvement, to enable certain large towns to provide laborers with better dwellings, if they should wish to, to improve certain Friendly Societies so that the savings of the

poor would be more secure, to provide a system of land registration, so that land titles might be more certain, less exposed to litigation.

Disraeli had said that if Gladstone had been less eager to reform everything in England and more insistent upon maintaining her prestige abroad, it would have been better. He criticised the Liberal party as secretly undermining the Empire, as believing the Empire a burden, as looking upon the colonies simply in a financial light as a great and dubious expense. In opposition he spoke of the "cause of the Tory party" as the "cause of the British Empire," and he declared the "issue is not a mean one."

Now in power himself he set about reversing what he considered to have been the unimaginative, unpatriotic policy of his predecessors. His first conspicuous achievement in foreign affairs was the purchase of the Suez canal shares. The Suez canal had been built by the French against ill-concealed English opposition. Disraeli had himself declared that the undertaking would inevitably be a failure. Now that the canal was built its success was speedily apparent. It radically changed the conditions of commerce with the East. It shortened greatly the distance to the Orient by water. Hitherto a considerable part of the commerce with India, China, and Australia had been carried on by the long voyage around the Cape of Good Hope. Some went by the Red Sea route, and that involved transshipment at Alexandria. Now it could all pass through the canal. About three-fourths of the tonnage passing through the canal was English. It was the direct road to India. There were some 400,000 shares in the Canal Company. The Khedive of Egypt held a large block of these, and the Khedive was nearly bankrupt. Disraeli bought, in 1875, his 177,000 shares by telegraph for four million pounds, and the fact was announced to a people who had never dreamed of it, but who applauded what seemed a brilliant stroke, somehow checkmating the French. It was said that the high road to India was now secure. Financially it was an advantageous bargain. The shares are now worth several times what was paid for them.¹ The political significance of this act was that it determined at least in principle the future of the relations of England to Egypt, and that it seemed to strike the note of imperial self-assertion

¹ The exact number of shares acquired was 176,602; amount paid 3,976,582 pounds. England, therefore, paid about \$112 per share (par value \$100). The stock was quoted in 1909 at \$790.

which was Disraeli's chief ambition, and which was the most notable characteristic of his administration.

At the same time Disraeli resolved to emphasize the importance of India, England's leading colony, in another way. He proposed a new and sounding title for the British sovereign. She was to be Empress of India. The Opposition denounced this as "cheap" and "tawdry," a vulgar piece of pretension. Was not the title of King or Queen borne by the sovereigns of England for a thousand years glorious enough? But Disraeli urged it as showing "the unanimous determination of the people of the country to retain our connection with the Indian Empire. And it will be an answer to those mere economists and those diplomatists who announce that India is to us only a burden or a danger. By passing this bill then, the House will show, in a manner that is unmistakable, that they look upon India as one of the most precious possessions of the Crown, and their pride that it is a part of her empire and governed by her imperial throne."

The reasoning was weak, but the proposal gave immense satisfaction to the Queen, and it was enacted into law. On January 1, 1877, the Queen's assumption of the new title was officially announced in India before an assembly of the ruling princes.

In Europe Disraeli insisted upon carrying out a spirited foreign policy. His opportunity came with the reopening of the Eastern Question, or the question of the integrity of Turkey, in 1876. For two years this problem absorbed the interest and attention of rulers and diplomatists, and England had much to do with the outcome. This subject may, however, be better studied in connection with the general history of the Eastern problem in the nineteenth century.¹

Disraeli, who in 1876 became Lord Beaconsfield, continued in power until 1880. The emphasis he put upon imperial and colonial problems was to exert a considerable influence upon the rising generation, and upon the later history of England. But it involved him in several undertakings, particularly wars in Afghanistan and South Africa, which did not prove successful, and which contributed to his overthrow and the temporary eclipse of his party. In the elections of 1880 the Liberals attacked the whole policy of the last six years with vehemence. The result of the elections was the return of a Liberal majority of over a hundred. In April 1880, Mr. Gladstone became prime minister for the second time.

¹ See Chapter XXI.

Mr. Gladstone's greatest ability lay in internal reform, as his previous ministry had shown. This was the field of his inclination, and, as he thought, of the national welfare. Peace, retrenchment, and reform, the watchwords of his party, now represented the programme he wished to follow. But this was not to be. While certain great measures of internal improvement were passed during the next five years, those years on the whole were characterized by the dominance of imperial and colonial questions, with attendant wars. Mr. Gladstone was forced to busy himself with foreign policy far more than in his preceding administration. Serious questions confronted him in Asia and Africa. These may best be studied, however, in the chapter on the British Empire.¹

Two pieces of internal legislation of great importance enacted during this ministry merit description, the Irish Land Act of 1881, and the Reform Bills of 1884-5.

The legislation of his preceding ministry had not pacified Ireland. Indeed, the Land Act of 1870 had proved no final settlement, but a great disappointment. It had established the principle that the landlord's ownership in Ireland was not absolute and unrestricted but was a kind of limited partnership. The tenant was to be compensated if deprived of his farm except for non-payment of rent, and was to be compensated, in any case, for all the permanent improvements which he had made upon the land. But this was not sufficient to give the tenant any security in his holding. It did not prevent the raising of the rent at the will of the landlord. The bill was not far-reaching enough adequately to safeguard the interests of the tenant; moreover, it contained too many exceptions and restrictions. The bill, in fact, proved no solution, but only the first of a long line of measures enacted since, aiming at the removal of the agrarian difficulties under which the island suffered.

In his new measure Gladstone sought to give the peasant, in addition to the compensation for improvement previously secured, a fair rent, a fixed rent, one that is not constantly subject to change at the will of the landlord, and freedom of sale, that is, the liberty of the peasant to sell his holding to some other peasant. These were the "three F's," which had once represented the demands of advanced Irishmen, though they no longer did. Henceforth, the rent of an Irish farm was not to be fixed by the ordinary law of supply and demand, by an agreement between landlord and tenant, but was to be determined by a court, estab-

lished for the purpose. It was hardly proper to call this "fair" rent. It might not necessarily be fair, as the Land Court might lean too much in favor of the landlord, or in favor of the peasant. It was, however, a *judicial* rent. Rents, once judicially determined, were to be unchangeable for fifteen years, during which time the tenant might not be evicted except for breaches of covenant, such as non-payment of rent. There was also attached to the bill a provision similar to the one in the preceding measure of 1870, looking toward the creation of a peasant proprietorship. The Government was to loan money to the peasants under certain conditions and on easy terms, to enable them to buy out the landlords, thus becoming complete owners themselves.

The bill was attacked with unusual bitterness. Landowners, believing that it meant a reduction of rents, determined not by themselves but by a court, called it confiscation of property. "It is a bill," said the Duke of Argyll, "by which three persons are authorized to settle the value of the whole country." It was attacked because it established the principle that rents were not to be determined, like the price of other things, by the law of supply and demand. Rents were not to be what the landlord might demand and the peasant agree to pay, but were to be reasonable, and their reasonableness was to be decided by outsiders, judges, having no direct interest at all, that is, in last resort, by the State. The bill was criticized, as altering ruthlessly the nature of property in land, as establishing dual ownership. The only alternative, however, was the single ownership of the landlord, that is, his right to do as he liked with the land, the very thing which had, it was asserted, occasioned the many sufferings of Ireland, and the endless series of coercion acts by which it had been so long ruled arbitrarily. The bill passed. It did not pacify Ireland, which was now putting forth new demands of a political nature and was in the full swing of the Home Rule movement. It did not bring immediate but only ultimate improvement. Meanwhile disturbances, and even atrocious crimes, continued, evidences of the profound unrest of the unhappy island.

It was Mr. Gladstone who carried through the third great reform act of the nineteenth century, by which England has been transformed from an oligarchy into a democracy. The Reform Bill of 1832 had given the suffrage to the wealthier members of the middle class. The Reform Bill of 1867 had taken a long step in the direction of democracy by giving the vote practically

to all householders in boroughs. But those who lived, not in boroughs, but in the country, were not greatly profited by this measure. In England there are three classes of people who have to do with the land. First, the landlords, the owners of large estates. These men belonged to the nobility and gentry, and had controlled the House of Commons before 1832, when that house was called the landlords' Parliament. Second are the farmers, men who rent their farms from the landlords, and who conduct the agriculture of the country, but do not, as a rule, do the actual work of tilling the soil. These men were largely enfranchised by the Reform Bill of 1832. Third, there are the laborers, employed by the farmer to do his work, day laborers. Now the Act of 1867 did not give them the suffrage, though it did give it largely to the day laborers in the boroughs by establishing the household and lodger franchise, a franchise so low that many workingmen could meet it. The franchise in boroughs was much wider than the franchise in counties. There was apparently no valid reason for giving a vote to workingmen living in boroughs and not to those living in country villages or on farms. Mr. Gladstone's bill of 1884 aimed at the abolition of this inequality between the two classes of constituencies, by extending the borough franchise to the counties so that the mass of workingmen would have the right to vote whether they lived in town or country. The county franchise, previously higher, was to be exactly assimilated to the borough franchise. The bill passed, and in connection with bills enacted for Scotland and Ireland, doubled the number of county voters, and increased the total number of the electorate from over three to over five millions. Mr. Gladstone's chief argument was that the bill would lay the foundations of the government broad and deep in the people's will, and "array the people in one solid compacted mass around the ancient throne which it has loved so well, and around a constitution now to be more than ever powerful, and more than ever free."

The franchise bill of 1884 was accompanied, as had been those of 1832 and 1867, by a redistribution of seats in the House of Commons. By the Redistribution Act of 1885 inequalities of representation of the same type as those rendered familiar in connection with the Reform Bill of 1832, inequalities which had grown up in the last generation, were redressed, and certain new principles were adopted. Towns containing fewer than 15,000 inhabitants were to lose their separate representation and be merged in the counties in which they were situated. Towns

whose population ranged between 15,000 and 50,000 were to return one member only. Such were the two disfranchising clauses. There were some exceptions, but the result of the whole was the extinction of 160 seats. These were distributed among the more populous boroughs and counties.

The Act of 1885 provided that henceforth boroughs with more than 15,000, and less than 50,000 inhabitants, should have one member; those with more than 50,000 and less than 165,000, two members; those with more than 165,000, three, with an additional member for every 50,000 inhabitants above that number. Thus London, in place of the previous 22 members, was to have 62, to which it was entitled if population was to be the basis. Liverpool was to have nine, Glasgow seven, and so on. The same was to hold with the counties. Yorkshire was to have 26 members, Lancashire 23. The result was that the great industrial centers, towns and counties, received representation approximate to their importance.

The Redistribution Act of 1885 further applied in most cases the principle of single member divisions. Previously, if a borough had had two members it yet formed one constituency. All the voters had the right to vote for two members. Such boroughs were now divided into as many constituencies as they were allowed members. While previously some counties had been divided as being inconveniently large, no boroughs had been. The Act of 1885 applied the new principle to towns and counties alike, each constituency returning, with few exceptions, only one member. For instance, Liverpool, which had previously sent three members to Parliament, and which now was to send nine, was divided into nine distinct constituencies, each returning one member; Lancashire was now split into twenty-three divisions, with a single member from each.

The membership of the House of Commons was increased at this time to 670, where it remained until the Representation Act of 1918, which increased the number to 707. The number in 1815 was 658. This was not changed in 1832, nor in 1867, but after 1867 it had been reduced to 652 by the disfranchisement of several boroughs for corrupt practices.

Between 1885 and 1918 there was no new redistribution of seats, and no extension of the suffrage. The evolution of the parliamentary franchise, which we have traced through the three great measures of 1832, 1867, and 1884, stopped for a generation. During this period there was no single, uniform, universal qualification for voting. A man secured the right to vote by

being able to meet one of several qualifications, and he might have several votes, if he satisfied the qualifications in different constituencies (plural voting). He might vote if he owned land of forty shillings annual value, if he held land of the value of five pounds by a lease of sixty years, of fifty pounds by a lease of twenty years, if he was a householder, no matter what the value of the house was, if he was an "occupier" of a house or building or store, of the annual value of ten pounds, if he was a lodger of lodgings of the annual value, unfurnished, of ten pounds. Some enjoyed the right under the provisions of the Act of 1884, some under those of the Act of 1867, some even under those of the Act of 1832. "The present condition of the franchise is indeed," wrote President Lowell, in 1908, "historical rather than rational. It is complicated, uncertain, expensive in the machinery required, and excludes a certain number of people whom there is no reason for excluding, while it admits many people who ought not to be admitted, if any one is to be debarred."¹

¹ Lowell, *The Government of England*, I, 213-14.

CHAPTER XXIV

ENGLAND FROM 1886 TO 1914

THE Gladstone ministry fell from power in 1885 chiefly because of the unpopularity of its Egyptian policy, which will be described elsewhere. Lord Salisbury, since Lord Beaconsfield's death in 1881 leader of the Conservative party, formed a ministry. This lasted but a few months, for the general elections at the close of the year showed that the Liberals would have in the new Parliament 335 votes, the Conservatives 249, and the Irish Home Rulers 86. Thus the Liberals exactly equalled the other two parties combined. The Irish held the balance of power. It is necessary at this point to trace the history of this new party, which was destined to exert a profound influence upon the course of British politics.

During Gladstone's first ministry there was formed in Dublin the Home Government Association of Ireland, three years later reconstituted as the Home Rule League, and demanding an Irish Parliament for the management of the internal affairs of Ireland. The Irish had constantly smarted under the injury which they felt had been done them by the abolition of their former Parliament, which sat in Dublin, and which was abolished by the Act of Union of 1800. The feeling for nationality, one of the dominant forces of the nineteenth century everywhere, acted upon them with unusual force. They disliked, for historical and sentimental reasons, the rule of an English Parliament, and the sense as well as reality of subjection to an alien people. They felt that England must give them rights of self-government or else must rule them by coercion. The party grew into importance under Disraeli's administration, having 51 members in Parliament, who supported the principle of Home Rule. Their leader at first was Mr. Butt, who brought their demands before the House of Commons. The party did not wish the separation of Ireland from England, but a separate parliament for Irish affairs, on the ground that the Parliament at Westminster had neither the time nor the understanding necessary for the proper consideration of measures affecting the Irish. It became much more aggressive when Charles Stuart Parnell

became its leader in 1879. Parnell was a Protestant, of English education, a landowner. Unlike the other great leaders of Irish history — Grattan, O'Connell — he was no orator, and was of a cold and haughty nature, but of an inflexible will. For twelve years he played a great part in the politics of England and Ireland.

Discontented with the slow, easy, ineffective methods of urging Home Rule hitherto followed, Parnell persuaded the party to adopt a more vigorous and defiant attitude. His policy was to keep the Home Rule party entirely separate from the other parties, and to use the modes of procedure of the House of Commons in order to block the work of the House; in other words, to resort to endless dilatory motions and roll-calls and speeches, in short, obstruction. The rules of the House rendered this possible, as every member could propose as many amendments as he chose to any bill, and could speak on those proposals as long as he chose. This policy was carried out by the Irish members relieving each other systematically. In 1879 it was estimated that Parnell had spoken five hundred times, and that two others had spoken over three hundred times each. The purpose of this recourse to such methods was to paralyze the action of Parliament until it gave heed to Irish demands, to prevent or delay all legislation on even the most necessary subjects until their grievances were redressed, and to show conclusively that one Parliament was insufficient for the business of both countries. The House was obliged to change its rules in order to prevent this blocking of public business by a small fraction of its members.

In the Parliament of 1880 the Home Rulers numbered 63. Mr. Gladstone, still believing that land legislation would solve the Irish question, showed the intention of carrying further the policy begun in his first administration. He caused the Land Act of 1881 to be passed. But the Home Rulers all through his term pursued him even more vehemently than they had his predecessors. They accepted the bill as a mere instalment. But the first three years of Gladstone's second administration were years of unexampled bitterness. The Irish resorted to every means to get their object, intimidation, violence, mutilation of cattle, burning of houses, even the murder of landlords and some of the Government officials in Ireland, notably Lord Frederick Cavendish and Thomas Burke, shockingly assassinated in broad daylight in Phoenix Park, Dublin, in 1882. Gladstone replied by a policy of coercion. Conciliatory legislation and stern

repression of violence were his principles of action. After 1883 the condition of Ireland became somewhat calmer, but only after a confused and bitter struggle, which had aroused all the hostile feelings of both the Irish and the English. The Irish, it was clear, were prepared to fight to the knife, were biding the time when they might force Home Rule from Parliament by holding the balance of power in the House of Commons. In the next Parliament, which met in 1886, they were in this position. They had 86 members, all but one of whom represented Irish constituencies.

Mr. Gladstone entered upon his third ministry February 1, 1886. It lasted less than six months, and was wholly devoted to the question of Ireland.

It was evident that the Irish question would dominate Mr. Gladstone's third ministry, as it had dominated his first and largely his second. This would have been so even if the Home Rulers had not held the balance of power in the House of Commons. It would have dominated the Conservatives had not the Liberals won in the general election. Mr. Gladstone had expressed during the campaign his desire that either one or the other of the two great English parties should have so large a majority that the vexatious question could be handled without the aid of Irish votes. There is, indeed, evidence to show that he was quite willing that the Conservatives should solve this question if they would only honestly face it. He wished to raise it out of the realm of party conflict. That was not to be, however, and the election had resulted in creating just the situation he had dreaded and deplored. The Irish held the balance of power, and any proposals he might make would now be represented as simply a bribe for political position. Such a consideration, however, he proudly ignored, and it had no hold upon serious politicians of either party, for his noble record for fifty years gave it emphatic denial. This was the situation as it presented itself to his mind. The Irish people had expressed their almost unanimous wish by returning a solid body of 85 Home Rulers out of the 103 members to whom they were entitled. Mr. Gladstone had tried in previous legislation to rule the Irish according to Irish rather than English ideas, where he considered those ideas just. He believed the great blot upon the annals of England to be the Irish chapter, written, as it had been, by English arrogance, hatred, and unintelligence. Reconciliation had been his keynote hitherto. Moreover, to him there seemed but two alternatives — either further reform along the lines

desired by the Irish, or the old, sad story of hard yet unsuccessful coercion. Mr. Gladstone would have nothing more to do with the latter method. He, therefore, resolved to endeavor to give to Ireland the Home Rule she plainly desired. On the 8th of April, 1886, he introduced the Irish Government Bill, announcing that it would be followed by a Land Bill, the two parts of a single scheme which could not be separated.

The bill, thus introduced, provided for an Irish Parliament to sit in Dublin, controlling a ministry of its own, and legislating on Irish, as distinguished from imperial affairs. A difficulty arose right here. If the Irish were to have a legislature of their own for their own affairs, ought they still to sit in the Parliament in London, with power there to mix in English and Scotch affairs? On the other hand, if they ceased to have members in London, they would have no share in legislating for the Empire as a whole. "This," says Morley, "was from the first, and has ever since remained, the Gordian knot." The bill provided that they should be excluded from the Parliament at Westminster. On certain topics it was further provided that the Irish Parliament should never legislate, questions affecting the Crown, the army and navy, foreign and colonial affairs; nor could it establish or endow any religion. After two years it was to have control of the Irish police. Ireland must contribute a certain proportion to the imperial expenses, one-fourteenth, instead of two-seventeenths, as had been the case since 1801.

Mr. Gladstone did not believe that the Irish difficulty would be solved simply by new political machinery. There was a serious social question not reached by this, the land question. He introduced immediately a land bill, which was to effect a vast transfer of land by purchase from landlords to peasants, and which might perhaps involve an expenditure to the State of about £120,000,000.

The introduction of these bills, whose passage would mean a radical transformation of Ireland, precipitated one of the fiercest struggles in English parliamentary annals. They were urged as necessary to settle the question once for all on a solid basis, as adapted to bring peace and contentment to Ireland, and thus strengthen the Union. Otherwise, said those who supported them, England had no alternative but coercion, a dreary and dismal failure. On the other hand, the strongest opposition arose out of the belief that these bills imperiled the very existence of the Union. The exclusion of the Irish members from Parliament seemed to many to be the snapping of the cords that held

the countries together. Did not this bill really dismember the British Empire? Needless to say, no British statesman could urge any measure of that character. Gladstone thought that his bills meant the reconciliation of two peoples estranged for centuries, and that reconciliation meant the strengthening rather than the weakening of the Empire, that the historic policy of England towards Ireland had only resulted in alienation, hatred, the destruction of the spiritual harmony which is essential to real unity. But, said his opponents, to give the Irish a parliament of their own, and to exclude them from the Parliament in London, to give them control of their own legislature, their own executive, their own judiciary, their own police, must lead inevitably to separation. You exclude them from all participation in imperial affairs, thus rendering their patriotism the more intensely local. You provide, it is true, that they shall bear a part of the burdens of the Empire. Is this proviso worth the paper it is written on? Will they not next regard this as a grievance, this taxation without representation, and will not the old animosity break out anew? You abandon the Protestants of Ireland to the revenge of the Catholic majority of the new Parliament. To be sure, you provide for toleration in Ireland, but again is this toleration worth the paper it is written on?

Probably the strongest force in opposition to the bill was the opinion widely held in England of Irishmen, that they were thoroughly disloyal to the Empire, that they would delight to use their new autonomy to pay off old scores by aiding the enemies of England, that they were traitors in disguise, or undisguised, that they had no regard for property or contract, that an era of religious oppression and of confiscation of property would be inaugurated by this new agency of a parliament of their own. These feelings were expressed in characteristic ways by the leader of the Opposition, Lord Salisbury, and by Mr. Gladstone's close friend and previous political ally, John Bright. Lord Salisbury expressed all the contempt of an aristocrat belonging to a superior race. "Ireland," he declared, "is not one nation, but two nations. There were races like the Hottentots, and even the Hindoos, incapable of self-government. He would not place confidence in people who had acquired the habit of using knives and slugs. His policy was that Parliament should enable the government of England to govern Ireland. 'Apply the recipe honestly, consistently, and resolutely for twenty years, and at the end of that time you will find that Ireland will be fit to accept any gifts in the way of local govern-

ment or repeal of coercion laws that you may wish to give her.' ”¹ He added that rather than spend the money in buying out the Irish landlords, it would be far better to spend it in assisting the emigration of a million Irishmen. Mr. Bright's opposition differed in temper, and was far more damaging in its effects. He had long been known as the friend of Ireland, as a disbeliever in the policy of coercion, as an advocate of measures adapted to relieve the discontent of the people. But he disliked intensely the idea of a second parliament in the United Kingdom, which he did not think would be successful or work harmoniously with the Parliament in London; he believed a new parliament would prove most oppressive to Irish Protestants; he spoke with extreme bitterness of the Irish party in Parliament, and its policy for the last six years; he did not believe these men either loyal or honorable or truthful, and he did believe that, if they obtained a Parliament of their own, they would use it against England.

Bitter personalities abounded in the debate. One member characterized the plan as the offspring of “verbosity and senility,” as the “foolish work” of “an old man in a hurry.” It was evident that the Home Rule Bill had aroused an amount of bitterness unknown in recent English history. The Conservative party opposed it to a man. And the Liberal party was in full process of disruption because of it. Even before the measure was brought in, many men who had hitherto worked side by side with Mr. Gladstone in his previous ministries, withdrew and went over to the Conservatives. These men called themselves Liberal-Unionists, Liberals, but not men who were prepared to jeopardize the Union, as they held that this measure would do — Lord Hartington (later the Duke of Devonshire), Mr. Bright, Joseph Chamberlain, Mr. Goschen, and many others. All the journals of London, with the exception of one morning and one evening paper, were vigorously opposed. The crucial question was, how large the secession from the Liberal party would be? Would it be large enough to offset the Irish vote which would be cast for the measure? Finally a vote was taken on the 8th of June, on the second reading of the bill. It was found that 93 Liberals had joined the Opposition, and that the Home Rule Bill was beaten by 343 votes to 313. The total poll was thus enormous, 656 out of the 670 members of the House. Between

¹ Morley, *Life of Gladstone*, III, 317, 318.

one-third and one-fourth of the Liberal party had withdrawn from it on account of this fateful measure.

Mr. Gladstone dissolved Parliament and appealed to the people. The question was vehemently discussed before the voters. The result was disastrous to the Gladstonian Home Rulers. 191 Gladstonians and 85 Irish Home Rulers were returned, and 316 Conservatives and 78 Liberal-Unionists. Thus a majority of over a hundred was rolled up against Gladstone's policy. Taking England alone, the result was even more striking. There he had only 125 seats out of 455; in London only 11 out of 62. On the other hand, Scotland approved in the ratio of 3 to 2, Wales of 5 to 1. Mr. Gladstone did not consider that such a result settled the issue irrevocably.

Lord Salisbury had said that if Parliament would rule Ireland resolutely for twenty years, at the end of that time she would be fit to accept any gifts in the line of local government or repeal of coercion acts that Parliament might see fit to give her. He was now prime minister, and in a position to put his opinion into force. Coercion more severe than that of previous years was the policy adopted by this ministry, largely under the direction of Arthur James Balfour, Chief Secretary for Ireland. That the measures followed were stringent was shown by a statement of Sir George Trevelyan that of the eighty-five Irish Nationalist members, one out of every seven was in prison, on his way to prison, or on his way out of prison. Needless to say, no reconciliation was to be effected by such methods. The exasperation of the Irish was only intensified. Nevertheless, the system steadily applied was successful at least in restoring quiet. In 1890 it was found possible to relax it somewhat.

But the policy of this ministry was not simply negative. The idea that buying out the landlords and enabling the peasants to become full owners of their farms would solve the agrarian question, and that the agrarian question was at the root of Irish discontent, was no discovery of a Conservative ministry. Clauses with this in view had been inserted in Gladstone's Land Acts of 1870 and 1881, and the Land Bill of 1886 was a gigantic measure designed to effect this on a grand scale. That measure, however, frightened the taxpayers by the amount of the expenditure involved, and, moreover, it necessarily fell with the Home Rule Bill of which it was intended to be the companion piece. Gladstone's earlier acts had not had great effect, as the State had offered to advance only two-thirds of the purchase price.

The present plan provided that the State should advance the whole of it, to be repaid by instalments until at the end of forty-nine years the peasant would have his land as an unencumbered freehold. Thirty-three million pounds were set aside for the purpose. The landlords were not required to sell, but the issue has proved them willing to do so in a large number of cases. The Government buys the land, sells it to the peasant, who that instant becomes its legal owner, and who pays for it gradually. He actually pays less in this way each year than he formerly paid for rent, and in the end he has his holding unencumbered. This bill was passed in 1891, and in five years some 35,000 tenants were thus enabled to purchase their holdings under its provisions. The system was extended much further in later years, particularly by the Land Act of 1903. From 1903 to 1908 there were about 160,000 purchasers.

A most important piece of legislation carried by this ministry was the County Councils Act of 1888. This act rendered the county governments of England and Wales democratic. Those governments had previously been entirely unrepresentative in character. They had been mainly in the hands of the landlord class, members of which were appointed by the Queen as magistrates or justices of the peace. As such they met four times a year in quarter sessions, and there regulated county affairs, levying taxes, discharging certain judicial functions, regulating the liquor trade, and the building and repair of highways, and supervising the actions of the officials of smaller areas. County government was in the hands of an oligarchy. The new act placed it in the hands of all ratepayers, who were to elect county councils for a term of three years, which were to conduct the local administration, with the exception of granting liquor licenses, a function which was to remain in the hands of the justices of the peace. Thus county government was made democratic. As local self-government had been established in the boroughs in 1835, it was now established in the counties. This was one of the most important achievements of this ministry. In 1889 a similar bill was passed for Scotland. Ireland lay outside this legislation.

This ministry passed other bills of a distinctly liberal character; among them an act absolutely prohibiting the employment of children under ten, an act designed to reduce the oppression of the sweat-shop by limiting the labor of women to twelve hours a day, with an hour and a half for meals, an act making education

free, and a small allotment act intended to create a class of peasant proprietors in England. These measures were supported by all parties. They were important as indicating that social legislation was likely to be in the coming years more important than political legislation, which has proved to be the case. They also show that the Conservative party was changing in character, and was willing to assume a leading part in social reform.

In respect to another item of internal policy, the Salisbury ministry took a stand which was to have important consequences. In 1889 it secured an immense increase of the navy. Seventy ships were to be added at an expense of £21,500,000 during the next seven years. Lord Salisbury laid it down as a principle that the British navy ought to be equal to any other two navies of the world combined.

In foreign affairs the most important work of this ministry lay in its share in the partition of Africa, which will be described elsewhere.

The general elections of 1892 resulted in the return to power of the Liberals, supported by the Irish Home Rulers, and Mr. Gladstone, at the age of eighty-two, became for the fourth time prime minister, a record unparalleled in English history. As he himself said, the one single tie that still bound him to public life was his interest in securing Home Rule for Ireland before his end. It followed necessarily from the nature of the case that public attention was immediately concentrated anew on that question. Early in 1893 Mr. Gladstone introduced his second Home Rule Bill. Again the crucial difficulty was found to be that of the retention or non-retention of Irish representatives in the Parliament in London. There were three possible methods — total exclusion, inclusion for all purposes, or inclusion for certain specified purposes. The bill of 1886 was based on the first (with slight exceptions), and immediately the cry had been raised, and had been most effective, that the unity of the kingdom was threatened. In the new bill the third method was adopted. It was provided that Ireland should send eighty members to Westminster, but that they were not to vote on questions expressly confined to England and Scotland, on taxes which were not to be levied in Ireland, or on appropriations for other than imperial concerns.¹

¹ The bill of 1893 provided for two chambers in the Irish parliament; the bill of 1886 had provided for one chamber.

On this point the debate raged for a whole week. Mr. Gladstone was forced to change ground completely, and to propose the unconditional admission of the Irish members to the Parliament in London, with right to vote on all matters. Exclusion, as in 1886; partial inclusion as proposed in 1893; total inclusion as finally accepted by the ministry, these were the three possible ways of treating this crucial question. On this fundamental matter Lord Morley has written as follows: "Each of the three courses was open to at least one single, but very direct objection. Exclusion, along with the exaction of revenue from Ireland by the Parliament at Westminster, was taxation without representation. Inclusion for all purposes was to allow the Irish to meddle in our affairs, while we were no longer to meddle in theirs. Inclusion for limited purposes still left them invested with the power of turning out a British government by a vote against it on an imperial question. Each plan, therefore, ended in a paradox. There was a fourth paradox, namely, that whenever the British supporters of a government did not suffice to build up a decisive majority, then the Irish vote, descending into one or other scale of parliamentary balance, might decide who should be our rulers. This paradox — the most glaring of them all — habit and custom have made familiar."¹

The opposition to the bill was exceedingly bitter and prolonged. Very few new arguments were brought forward on either side. Party spirit ran riot. Mr. Chamberlain was called Judas, and he in turn called Gladstone Herod. Lord Salisbury called the proposal "an intolerable, an imbecile, an accursed bill." Lord Randolph Churchill declared that the Irish leaders were "political brigands and nihilists," and that the ministry was "as capricious as a woman, and as impulsive and as passionate as a horde of barbarians."

Mr. Gladstone, who, incidentally, kept his temper, expressed with all his eloquence his faith in the Irish people, his belief that the only alternative to his policy was coercion, and that coercion would be forever unsuccessful, his conviction that it was the duty of England to atone for six centuries of misrule.

After eighty-two days of discussion, marked by scenes of great disorder, members on one occasion coming to blows to the great damage of decorous parliamentary traditions, the bill was carried by a majority of 34 (301 to 267). A week later it was defeated in the House of Lords by 419 to 41, or a majority of more than ten to one. The bill was dead.

¹ Morley, *Gladstone*, III, 498.

Gladstone attempted to carry through various English measures, but here again he was foiled by the hereditary chamber. A single legislative reform was enacted, the Parish Councils Bill of 1894. This established in every parish of more than 300 inhabitants a council elected by the taxpayers, and gave them certain powers of self-government. This was the natural supplement to the County Councils Act of 1888, completing the process of constitutional reform which began in 1832. Agricultural laborers were henceforth to have a political training in participating in the management of local affairs.

Mr. Gladstone's fourth ministry was balked successfully at every turn by the House of Lords, which, under the able leadership of Lord Salisbury, recovered an actual power it had not possessed since 1832. In 1894 Mr. Gladstone resigned his office, thus bringing to a close one of the most remarkable political careers known to English history. His last speech in Parliament was a vigorous attack upon the House of Lords. In his opinion, that House had become the great obstacle to progress. "The issue which is raised between a deliberative assembly, elected by the votes of more than 6,000,000 people," and an hereditary body, "is a controversy which, when once raised, must go forward to an issue." This speech was his last in an assembly where his first had been delivered sixty-one years before. Gladstone died four years later, and was buried in Westminster Abbey (1898).

He was succeeded in the premiership by Lord Rosebery, whose ministry lasted only sixteen months. The withdrawal of Gladstone showed the many rifts in the Liberal party, which a leader of less prestige and less commanding personality could not close. The party was discouraged by its failure to achieve Home Rule, was balked by the House of Lords, was divided into groups desiring various things, and was feebly supported by the people. Such a ministry could not long endure. Rosebery alienated the Irish by declaring that he agreed with Lord Salisbury, that before Home Rule should be granted Ireland, "England, as the predominant member of the partnership of the three kingdoms, will have to be convinced of its justice."

The Rosebery ministry accomplished very little. Its campaign against the House of Lords was half-hearted and ineffective. In one sphere, where the Lords were by custom forbidden to interfere in financial matters, it made an important change. England was now involved in the widespread militaristic movement, which was one of the striking features of the closing nineteenth century.

In England it took the form of very largely increasing the navy, and the principle was now being accepted which later became an axiom in British policy, of making the British fleet the equal of any two foreign fleets combined. This involved much larger taxation. In the budget of 1894, the work of Sir William Vernon Harcourt, the principle of graduation was introduced into the inheritance taxes. The tax imposed by the state was to vary from one per cent. on estates of five hundred pounds to eight per cent. on estates of over a million pounds. This change was bitterly resented by the wealthy.

In June 1895 the Roseberry ministry was defeated on a minor matter and seized the occasion to resign. Lord Salisbury became prime minister. A general election was at once held, which proved to be a crushing defeat for the Liberals. The Conservatives and the Liberal-Unionists, or the Unionist party, as it was generally called, so thorough had become the amalgamation of the two, had a majority in the new Parliament of about a hundred and fifty, a larger majority than any party had had in any Parliament since the one chosen immediately after the Reform Bill of 1832. This party was to remain uninterruptedly in power until December 1905. ~~reconstructed~~ 1902.

Lord Salisbury was now prime minister for the third time. He remained such until 1902, when he withdrew from public life, being succeeded by his nephew, Mr. Arthur James Balfour. There was, however, no change of party. Lord Salisbury had an immense majority in the House of Commons. His ministry contained several very able men. He himself assumed the Foreign Office, Mr. Chamberlain the Colonial Office, Mr. Balfour the leadership of the House of Commons. The withdrawal of Mr. Gladstone and the divisions in the Liberal party reduced that party to a position of ineffective opposition. The Irish question sank into the background. Much social and labor legislation was enacted. The commanding question of this period was to be that of imperialism, and the central figure was Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, a man remarkable for vigor and audacity, and the most popular member of the cabinet. Chamberlain, who had made his reputation as an advanced Liberal, an advocate of radical social and economic reforms, now stood forth as the spokesman of imperialism. His office, that of Colonial Secretary, gave him excellent opportunities to emphasize the importance of the colonies to the mother country, the desirability of drawing them closer together, of promoting imperial federation.

A period of great activity in foreign and colonial affairs began almost immediately after the inauguration of the new ministry. The most important chapter in this activity concerned the conditions in South Africa, which led, in 1899, to the Boer War, and which had important consequences. This will better be described elsewhere.¹

The Conservatives, resolutely opposed to the policy of an independent parliament in Ireland, and conscious that in this they had the support of the people, declined absolutely to consider Home Rule. But they proposed to "kill Home Rule by kindness," as the phrase ran. Rigorous coercion for the suppression of disorder was united with a Land Purchase Bill, of the now familiar type, aiming to facilitate, more than previous bills had done, the buying out of the landlords and the creation of a peasant proprietorship of the soil of Ireland (1896). More important was the Irish Local Government Act of 1898, which aimed to give some measure of local self-government to the Irish by establishing there, as had been done in England, county councils and district councils, but not parish councils. These bodies, which were to possess considerable powers in the management of local affairs, were to be elected on a franchise identical with the parliamentary franchise, except that Peers and women might vote. This was, of course, no substitute for Home Rule, nor was it intended to be.

The South African war, from 1899 to 1902, absorbed the attention of England until its successful termination. Internal legislation was of slight importance. In the course of the war Queen Victoria died, January 22, 1901, after a reign of over sixty-three years, the longest known in British history, and only exceeded elsewhere by the seventy-one years' reign of Louis XIV of France. She had proved during her entire reign, which began in 1837, a model constitutional monarch, subordinating her will to that of the people, as expressed by the ministry and Parliament. "She passed away," said Mr. Balfour in the House of Commons, "without an enemy in the world, for even those who loved not England loved her." The reign of Edward VII, then in his sixty-second year, began.

A very important measure passed by this Conservative ministry was the Education Act of 1902. The Forster Act of 1870, which had remained the basis of the elementary educational system of England since its passage, had adopted the voluntary or denominational schools, and had added, where these were not

¹ Pages 507-509.

adequate, board schools. Both were to receive generally fees from their pupils and grants from Parliament. In addition, the voluntary schools were to receive voluntary gifts as hitherto, and the board schools local taxes levied for the purpose by the boards. As the years went by, the voluntary schools found that they were being handicapped by the fact that the board schools had larger financial resources than they. The parliamentary grants were conditioned in amount by the sums raised in the other ways by the two kinds of schools. Now the board schools could, by raising more from taxation, earn larger grants from Parliament, while the voluntary schools, relying upon private subscriptions, could not gain increased appropriations unless they could get larger subscriptions. While they were able to do this for a while, they were not able to in the long run. In 1900 the average amount per pupil was somewhat less than thirty years before. They were thus at a disadvantage compared with the board schools. The voluntary schools, which were for the most part connected with the Church of England, began to demand further help from Parliament. In 1897 they were given an additional subsidy, which, in their opinion, was not large enough. Their agitation continued and resulted finally in the passage of the Act of 1902.

By this the school boards, established in 1870, were abolished, and their powers were vested in the county and borough councils, that is, in the regular local government bodies. These were to support both sets of schools, the former board and the voluntary, out of local taxes, parliamentary grants continuing. In other words, local taxes were to be raised for denominational schools, as well as for undenominational, parliamentary grants, as hitherto, also going to both. The actual management of the former board schools was to be in the hands of a committee of the county or borough council. That of the church schools was to be in the hands of a committee of six, two of whom were to represent the county or borough council, while four were to represent the denomination. In other words, people were to be taxed for both sets of schools, but were to control only one. The bill gave great offense to Dissenters and believers in secular education. It authorized taxation for the advantage of a denomination of which multitudes of tax-payers were not members. It was held to be a measure for increasing the power of the Church of England. The conscience clause was applied to all schools, as hitherto.

The opposition to this law was intense. Thousands refused

to pay their taxes, and their property was, therefore, sold by public authority to meet the taxes. Many were imprisoned. There were over 70,000 summonses to court. The agitation thus aroused was one of the great causes for the crushing defeat of the Conservative party in 1905. Yet the law of 1902 was put into force and remained the law of England until 1918, the Liberals having failed in 1906 in an attempt to pass an education bill of their own to supersede it. The educational system continued to be one of the contentious problems of English politics.

The popularity of the Unionist ministry began to wane after the close of the South African war. Much of its legislation was denounced as class legislation designed to bolster up the Conservative party, not to serve the interest of all England. Moreover a new issue was now injected into British politics which divided the Unionists, as Home Rule had divided the Liberals. Chamberlain came forward with a proposition for tariff reform as a means of binding the Empire more closely together. He urged that England impose certain tariff duties against the outside world, at the same time exempting her colonies from their operation. He called this policy "colonial preference." It would be that but it would also be the abandonment of the free trade policy of Great Britain and the adoption of the protective system.

As the discussion of this proposal developed it became apparent that Englishmen had not yet lost their faith in free trade as still greatly to their advantage, if not absolutely essential to their welfare. The new controversy disrupted the Unionist party and reunited the Liberals.

The result of this increasing disaffection was shown in the crushing defeat of the Unionists and the inauguration of a very different policy under the Liberals. After December, 1905, the Liberal party was long in power, first under the premiership of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, and then, after his death early in 1908, under that of Herbert Asquith, who gave way, in December, 1916, to Lloyd George, a Liberal, but whose ministry was a coalition ministry, composed of members of both parties. The Liberals won in the General Elections of 1906 the largest majority ever obtained since 1832.

An important achievement of this administration was the passage in 1908 of the Old Age Pensions Act, which marked a long step forward in the extension of state activity. It granted, under certain slight restrictions, pensions to all persons of a

certain age and of a small income. Denounced as paternalistic, as socialistic, as sure to undermine the thrift and the sense of responsibility of the laborers of Great Britain, it was urged as a reasonable and proper recognition of the value of the services to the country of the working classes, services as truly to be rewarded as those of army and navy and administration. The act provided that persons seventy years of age whose income did not exceed twenty-five guineas a year should receive a weekly pension of five shillings, that those with larger incomes should receive proportionately smaller amounts, down to the minimum of one shilling a week. Those whose income exceeded thirty guineas and ten shillings a year were to receive no pensions. It was estimated by the prime minister that the initial burden to the state would be about seven and a half million pounds, an amount that would necessarily increase in later years. The post office was used as the distributing agent. This law went into force on January 1, 1909. On that day over half a million men and women went to the nearest post office and drew their first pensions of from one to five shillings, and on every Friday henceforth as long as they lived they might do the same. It was noticed that these men and women accepted their pensions not as a form of charity or poor relief, but as an honorable reward. The statistics of those claiming under this law are instructive and sobering. In the county of London one person in every one hundred and seventeen was a claimant; in England and Wales one in eighty-six; in Scotland one in sixty-seven; in Ireland one in twenty-one.

The Unionist party had been in control from 1895 to 1905. Its chief emphasis had been put upon problems of imperialism. Social legislation had slipped into the background. But the conduct and course of the Boer War, the great adventure in imperialism, had not increased the reputation for statesmanship or the popularity of the Conservatives, and their domestic legislation aiming, as was held, at the strengthening of the Established Church and the liquor trade, two stout and constant defenders of the party, exposed them to severe attack as aristocratic, as believers in privileged and vested interests, as hostile to the development of the democratic forces in the national life.

Now that the Liberals were in power they turned energetically to undo the class legislation of the previous ministry, to remove the obstacles to the development of truly popular government. The new Liberal party was more radical than the old Liberal party of the time of the first Home Rule Bill as the more conservative Liberals had left it then and had gone over to the oppo-

sition. Moreover there now appeared in Parliament a party more radical still, the Labor party, with some fifty members. Radical social and labor legislation was now attempted. That the existing social system weighed with unjust severity upon the masses was recognized by the ministry. "Property," said Asquith, "must be associated in the mind of the masses of the people, with the ideas of reason and justice." In the attempt to realize this aim the Liberal party was forced into new and momentous enterprises.

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THE LIBERAL PARTY AND THE HOUSE OF LORDS

But when the Liberals attempted to carry out their fresh and progressive programme they immediately confronted a most formidable obstacle. They passed through the House of Commons an Education Bill, to remedy the evils of the Education Act of 1902, enacted in the interests chiefly of the Established Church; also a Licensing Bill designed to penalize the liquor trade which Conservative legislation had greatly favored; a bill abolishing plural voting, which gave such undue weight to the propertied classes, enabling rich men to cast several votes at a time when many poor men did not have even a single vote. The obstacle encountered at every step was the House of Lords, which threw out these bills and stood right athwart the path of the Liberal party, firmly resolved not to let any ultra-democratic measures pass, firmly resolved also to maintain all the ground the Conservatives had won in the previous administrations. A serious political and constitutional problem thus arose which had to be settled before the Liberals could use their immense popular majority, as shown in the House of Commons, for the enactment of Liberal policies. The House of Lords, which was always ruled by the Conservatives, and which was not, being an hereditary body, subject to direct popular control, now asserted its power frequently and, in the opinion of the Liberals, flagrantly, by rejecting peremptorily the more distinctive Liberal measures. The Lords, encouraged by their easy successes in blocking the Commons, blithely took another step forward, a step which, as events were to prove, was to precede a resounding fall. The Lords in 1909 rejected the budget, a far more serious act of defiance of the popular chamber than any of these others had been, and a most conspicuous revelation of the spirit of confidence which the Lords had in their power, now being so variously and systematically asserted.

In 1909 Lloyd George, Chancellor of the Exchequer, introduced the budget. He announced correctly that two new lines of heavy expenditure, the payment of old-age pensions and the rapid enlargement of the navy, necessitated new and additional taxation. The new taxes which he proposed would bear mainly on the wealthy classes. The income tax was to be increased. In addition there was to be a special or super-tax on incomes of over £5,000. A distinction was to be made between earned and unearned incomes — the former being the result of the labor of the individual, the latter being the income from investments, representing no direct personal activity on the part of the individual receiving them. Unearned incomes were to be taxed higher than earned. Inheritance taxes were to be graded more sharply and to vary decidedly according to the amount involved. New taxes on land of various kinds were also to be levied.

This budget aroused the most vehement opposition of the class of landowners, capitalists, bankers, persons of large property interests, persons who lived on the money they had inherited, on their investments. They denounced the bill as socialistic, as revolutionary, as, in short, odious class legislation directed against the rich, as confiscatory, as destructive of all just property rights.

The budget passed the House of Commons by a large majority. It then went to the House of Lords. For a long time it had not been supposed that the Lords had any right to reject money bills, as they were an hereditary and not a representative body. They, however, now asserted that they had that right, although they had not exercised it within the memory of men. After a few days of debate they rejected the budget by a vote of 350 to 75 (November 30, 1909).

At once was precipitated an exciting and momentous political and constitutional struggle. The Liberals, blocked again by the hereditary chamber, consisting solely of the aristocracy of the land, and blocked this time in a field which had long been considered very particularly to be reserved for the House of Commons, indignantly picked up the gauntlet which the Lords had thrown down. The House of Commons voted overwhelmingly, 349 to 134, that the action of the Lords was "a breach of the Constitution and a usurpation of the rights of the House of Commons." Asquith declared in a crowded House that "the House would be unworthy of its past and those traditions of which it is the custodian and the trustee," if it allowed any time to pass without showing that it would not brook this usurpation.

He declared that the "power of the purse" belonged to the Commons alone. The very principle of representative government was at stake. For if the Lords possessed the right they had assumed the situation was exactly this: that when the voters elected a majority of Conservatives to the Commons then the Conservatives would control the legislation; that, when they elected a majority of Liberals, the Conservatives would still control by being able to block all legislation they disliked by the veto of the House of Lords, always and permanently a body adhering to the Conservative party. An hereditary body, not subject to the people, could veto the people's wishes as expressed by the body that was representative, the House of Commons. In other words, the aristocratic element in the state was really more powerful than the democratic, the house representing a class was more powerful than the house representing the people.

The question of the budget and the question of the proper position and the future of the Upper Chamber were thus linked together. As these questions were of exceptional gravity the ministry resolved to seek the opinion of the voters. Parliament was dissolved and a new election was ordered. The campaign was one of extreme bitterness, expressing itself in numerous acts of violence. The election, held in January, 1910, resulted in giving the Unionists a hundred more votes than they had had in the previous Parliament. Yet despite this gain the Liberals would have a majority of over a hundred in the new House of Commons if the Labor party and the Irish Home Rulers supported them, which they did.

In the new Parliament the budget which had been thrown out the previous year was introduced again, without serious change. Again it passed the House of Commons and went to the Lords. That House yielded this time and passed the budget with all its so-called revolutionary and socialistic provisions.

THE "LORDS' VETO"

The Liberals now turned their attention to this question of the "Lords' Veto," or of the position proper for an hereditary, aristocratic chamber in a nation that pretended to be democratic, as did England. The issue stated nearly twenty years earlier by Gladstone in his last speech in Parliament had now arrived at the crucial stage. What should be the relations between a deliberative assembly elected by the votes of more than six million voters

and an hereditary body? The question was vehemently discussed inside Parliament and outside. Various suggestions for reform of the House of Lords were made by the members of that House itself, justly apprehensive for their future. The death of the popular King Edward VII (May 6, 1910), and the accession of George V, occurring in the midst of this passionate campaign, somewhat sobered the combatants, though only temporarily. Attempts were made to see if some compromise regarding the future of the House of Lords might not be worked out by the two parties. But the attempts were futile, the issue being too deep and too far-reaching.

The ministry, wishing the opinion of the people on this new question, dissolved the House of Commons again and ordered new elections, the second within a single year (December, 1910). The result was that the parties came back each with practically the same number of members as before. The Government's majority was undiminished.

The Asquith ministry now passed through the House of Commons a Parliament Bill restricting the power of the House of Lords in several important particulars and providing that the House of Commons should in last resort have its way in any controversy with the other chamber. This bill passed the House of Commons by a large majority. How could it be got through the House of Lords? Would the Lords be likely to vote in favor of the recognition of their inferiority to the other House, would they consent to this withdrawal from them of powers they had hitherto exercised, would they acquiesce in this altered and reduced situation at the hands of a chamber whose measures they had been freely blocking for several years? Of course they would not if they could help it. But there was one way in which the opposition of the House of Lords could be overcome, no matter how overwhelming. The King could create new peers — as many as he liked — enough to overcome the majority against the measure in question. This supreme weapon the King, which of course meant the Asquith ministry, was now prepared to use. Asquith announced that he had the consent of George V to create enough peers to secure the passage of the bill in case it were necessary. The threat was sufficient. The Lords on August 18, 1911, passed the Parliament Act which so profoundly altered their own status, power and prestige. This measure establishes new processes of law-making. If the Lords withhold their assent from a money bill, that is, any bill raising taxes or making appropriations, for more than one month after it has

passed the House of Commons, the bill may be presented for the King's signature and on receiving it becomes law without the consent of the Lords. If a bill other than a money bill is passed by the Commons in three successive sessions, whether of the same Parliament or not, and is rejected by the Lords, it may on a third rejection by them, be presented for the King's assent and on receiving that assent will become a law, notwithstanding the fact that the House of Lords has not consented to the bill — provided that two years have elapsed between the second reading of the bill in the first of those sessions and the date on which it passes the Commons for the third time.

This Parliament or Veto Bill contained another important provision, substituting five years for seven as the maximum duration of a Parliament; that is, members of the Commons are henceforth chosen for five, not seven years. Their term was thus reduced.

Thus the veto power of the House of Lords is gone entirely for all financial legislation, and for all other legislation its veto is merely suspensive. The Commons can have their way in the end. They may be delayed two years.

The way was now cleared for the enactment of certain legislation desired by the Liberal party which could not secure the approval of the House of Lords. It was possible finally to pass a Home Rule Bill, to the principle of which the Liberal party had been committed for a quarter of a century. On April 11, 1912, Asquith introduced the third Home Rule Bill, granting Ireland a Parliament of her own, consisting of a Senate of 40 members and a House of Commons of 164. If the two houses should disagree, then they were to sit and vote together. On certain subjects the Irish Parliament should not have the right to legislate: on peace or war, naval or military affairs, treaties, currency, foreign commerce. It could not establish or endow any religion or impose any religious disabilities. The Irish were to be represented in the Parliament in London by 42 members instead of the previous number, 103.

This measure was passionately opposed by the Conservative party and particularly by the Ulster party, Ulster being that province of Ireland in which the Protestants were strong. They went so far in their opposition as to threaten civil war, in case Ulster were not exempted from the operation of this law. During the next two years the battle raged around this point, in conferences between political leaders, in discussions in Parliament and the press. Attempts at compromise failed as the Home Rule

party would not consent to the exemption of a quarter of Ireland from the jurisdiction of the proposed Irish Parliament.

The bill was, however, passed and was immediately vetoed by the House of Lords. At the next session it was passed again and again vetoed by the Lords. Finally on May 25, 1914, it was passed a third time by the House of Commons by a vote of 351 to 274, a majority of 77. The bill was later rejected by the Lords. It might now become a law without their consent, in conformity with the Parliament Act of 1911. Only the formal assent of the King was necessary.

But the ministry was so impressed by the vehemence and the determination of the "Ulster party," which went so far as to organize an army and establish a sort of provisional government, that it decided to continue discussions in order to see whether some compromise might not be arranged. These discussions were interrupted by the outbreak of the European War.

Meanwhile a bill disestablishing the Anglican Church in Wales had gone through the same process; had thrice been passed by the Commons and rejected by the Lords. Like the Home Rule Bill, it only awaited the signature of the sovereign.

Finally that signature was given to both bills on September 18, 1914, but Parliament passed on that same day a bill suspending these laws from operation until the close of the war.

England now had far more serious things to consider and she swept the deck clean of contentious domestic matters until a more convenient season. Whether the Home Rule Act when finally put into force would be accompanied with amendments which would pacify the Protestants of Ulster, remained, of course, to be seen, or whether, indeed, it would ever be put into force.

CHAPTER XXV

THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

WE have thus far concerned ourselves with the history of the European continent. But one of the most remarkable features of the nineteenth century was the reaching out of Europe for the conquest of the world, and the opening of the present century sees the process far advanced. What is known as European civilization is in its characteristic features becoming the civilization of all countries and continents. The age of world politics, of world commerce, has come; the age of a common world culture appears likely ultimately to prevail. This extraordinary transformation is being effected by a number of agencies, by the building up of great colonial empires, by conscious and resolute imitation of Europe on the part of countries like Japan, and, very recently, by China, India, and Persia; by the elaboration of a marvelous economic life, each decade making enormous strides, of which every nation and country are necessary parts, bound securely together in the mesh of reciprocal needs and advantages. Peoples may no longer live in splendid or inglorious isolation, even if they wish to. European nations dominate directly immense regions of the world outside of Europe, civilization is acting as a powerful dissolvent of other inferior or less complex civilizations. The nineteenth century was not only a century of nation building, as we have seen, but of empire building on a colossal scale. A movement so vast in its sweep, so varied in its manifestations, so momentous in its inevitable consequences, merits careful study. Of the forces furthering this evolution undoubtedly the most important is the British Empire.

At the close of the eighteenth century England possessed in the New World, Upper and Lower Canada, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, and a large vague region known as the Hudson Bay territory; Jamaica, and other West Indian islands; in Australia, a strip of the eastern coast; in India, the Bengal or lower Ganges region, Bombay, and strips along the eastern and western

coasts. The most important feature of her colonial policy had been her elimination of France as a rival, from whom she had taken in the Seven Years' War almost all of her North American and East Indian possessions. This Empire she increased during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, largely at the expense of France and Holland, the ally of France. Thus she acquired the Cape of Good Hope, Guiana in South America, Tobago, Trinidad, and St. Lucia, in the Pacific Mauritius and Ceylon. In the Mediterranean she acquired Malta. She also obtained Heligoland, and the protectorate of the Ionian Islands.

Since 1815 her Empire has been vastly augmented by a long series of wars, and by the natural advance of her colonists over countries contiguous to the early settlements, as in Canada and Australia. Her Empire lies in every quarter of the globe.

INDIA

The acquisition of India, a world in itself, for the British crown was the work of a private commercial organization, the East India Company, which was founded in the sixteenth century and given a monopoly of the trade with India. This company established trading stations in various parts of that peninsula. Coming into conflict with the French, and mixing in the quarrels of the native princes, it succeeded in winning direct control of large sections, and indirect control of others by assuming protectorates over certain of the princes, who allied themselves with the English and were left on their thrones. This commercial company became invested with the government of these acquisitions, under the provisions of the laws passed by the English Parliament at various times. In the nineteenth century the area of British control steadily widened, until it became complete. Its progress was immensely furthered by the overthrow, after a long and intermittent war, of the Mahratta confederacy, a loose union of Indian princes dominating central and western India. This confederacy was finally conquered in a war which lasted from 1816 to 1818, when a large part of its territories were added directly to the English possessions, and other parts were left under their native rulers, who, however, were brought effectively under English control by being obliged to conform to English policy, to accept English *Residents* at their courts, whose advice they were practically compelled to follow, and by putting their native armies under British direction. Such is the condition of many of them at the present day.

The English also advanced to the north and the northwest, from Bengal. One of their most important annexations was that of the Punjab, an immense territory on the Indus, taken as a result of two difficult wars (1845 to 1849), and the Oudh province, one of the richest sections of India, lying between the Punjab and Bengal, annexed in 1856.

The steady march of English conquest aroused a bitter feeling of hostility to the English, which came to a head in the famous Sepoy Mutiny of 1857, which for a time threatened the complete overthrow of the British in northern India. There were various causes of this insurrection: the bitter discontent of the deposed princes and their adherents, who sent out emissaries to stir up hatred against the intruders; the fear of other princes that their turn might come; the introduction of railways and telegraphs, represented by the priests as an attack upon their religion; rumors that the English intended to force Christianity upon the people and destroy their religion and civilization; the attempts to stamp out the custom of female infanticide; a prophecy of the soothsayers that English domination was destined to end on the hundredth anniversary of its beginning at the battle of Plassey (1757).

English domination rested on military force, and in the main upon the native Indian soldiers. There were in India in 1857 about 45,000 English troops, and over 250,000 native soldiers, the Sepoys. In that year a mutiny broke out among the Sepoys of the Ganges provinces in northern India. The immediate occasion was the introduction of a new rifle, or rather of the paper-covered cartridges for it, which were lubricated, it was alleged, with the fat of cows and pigs. One end of the cartridges had to be bitten by the teeth before being put into the barrel. This outraged the religious feeling of the Hindus, who regarded the cow as a sacred animal, and of the Mohammedans, who regarded the pig as unclean, the lard as contaminating. The English tried to dispel the rumor by publishing a formula of the grease used, and ordering officers to assure the soldiers that these ingredients were not employed, but their efforts were unavailing. A cavalry regiment refused to receive the new munitions, some of its members were sentenced to ten years' imprisonment, their comrades began an insurrection to save them, and the insurrection spread swiftly. The native soldiery seized Delhi, the ancient capital of the Moguls, Lucknow, Cawnpore, and other places, massacring with barbarous cruelty large numbers of men, women, and children. Shortly all northern India seemed lost.

The English took a fearful and decisive revenge. Many of the Sepoys remained loyal, European troops were rushed to the scene of the disturbance, and the insurrection was crushed. Beside themselves with rage and terrified by the narrowness of the escape, the English meted out ferocious punishment. Hundreds were shot in cold blood, without trial, and thousands were hanged after trials that were a travesty of justice. Many were fastened to the mouths of cannon and blown to pieces.

Since the mutiny of 1857 no serious attempts have been made to overthrow English control. One important consequence was that in 1858 the government of India was transferred to the Crown from the private company which had conducted it for a century. It passed under the direct authority of England. In 1876, as we have seen, India was declared an empire, and Queen Victoria assumed the title Empress of India, January 1, 1877. This fact was officially announced in India by Lord Lytton, the Viceroy, to an imposing assembly of the princes.

An empire it surely is, with its three hundred and twenty million inhabitants. A Viceroy stands at the head of the government. There is a Secretary for India in the British Ministry. The government is largely carried on by the highly organized Civil Service of India, and is in the hands of about eleven hundred Englishmen. About 250 millions of people are under the direct control of Great Britain; about 70 millions live in native states under native rulers, the "Protected Princes of India," of whom there were, a few years ago, nearly seven hundred. For all practical purposes, however, these princes must follow the advice of English officials, or Residents, stationed in their capitals.

"The people of India," says President Lowell, "are not a nation, but a conglomerate of many different races and religions, often side by side in the same place, yet unmixed and sharply separate. It is this, as Seeley pointed out in his 'Expansion of England,' that has enabled the British to conquer and hold the country. If the inhabitants could act together, and were agreed in wanting independence, they could get it. In short, if they were capable of national self-government, the English would live on a volcano, and their occupation would be brief. The Mutiny was suppressed because it was not universal. The Sikhs helped to put down the Sepoys; and so long as large sections of the people distrust one another more than they do the English, disaffection has little chance of achieving any notable result."¹

¹ Lowell, *The Government of England*, II, 424-425.

Not only did England complete her control of India in the nineteenth century, but she added countries round about India, Burma toward the east, and, toward the west, Baluchistan, a part of which was annexed outright, and the remainder brought under a protectorate. She also imposed a kind of protectorate upon Afghanistan, as a result of two Afghan wars (1839-42 and 1878-80).

BRITISH NORTH AMERICA

In 1815, as already stated, Great Britain possessed, on the continent of North America, six colonies: Upper Canada, Lower Canada, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and Newfoundland; and the Hudson Bay Company's territories stretched to the north and northwest with undefined boundaries. The total population of these colonies was about 460,000. The colonies were entirely separate from each other. Each had its own government, and its relations were not with the others, but with England. The oldest and most populous was Lower Canada, which included Montreal and Quebec and the St. Lawrence valley. It was the French colony conquered in 1763. Its population was French-speaking, and Roman Catholic in religion.

The two most important of these colonies were Lower Canada, largely French, and Upper Canada, entirely English. Each had received a constitution in 1791, modeled along lines familiar to Englishmen at home. There was a Governor appointed by the monarch, an Executive Council, appointed by the same authority and corresponding to the cabinet, a Legislative Council, likewise appointed by the Crown and for life, intended as the nearest approach to the House of Lords possible in a frontier country, and a House of Assembly, the members of which were elected by the people.

Neither in Upper nor in Lower Canada did the constitution work well. In Upper Canada there were perpetual conflicts between the two Houses on the one hand, and the Governor on the other. The Governor could virtually veto the actions of the legislature, and considered himself responsible primarily to the English Government, not to the people of the province. He consulted the Executive Council only infrequently, and followed its opinion only when he chose to. What the two Houses were constantly struggling for was the creation of an executive, responsible, not to the monarch in England, but to themselves, and to this end they wished to make the Executive Council resemble the ministry

COLONIAL POSSESSIONS
of the
EUROPEAN POWERS
IN 1815.

West Longitude from Greenwich

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CARIBBEAN SEA

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☐ *British*
☐ *Spanish*
☐ *Danish*



in England. This struggle between executive and legislature was the fundamental problem in this province, which had, however, other grievances, such as the practical monopoly in office-holding which a few families had succeeded in acquiring.

In Lower or French Canada there was also a constitutional struggle, embittered by race animosity. The French, overwhelmingly predominant in population, controlled only the House of Assembly, while the three other branches of the Government, the Governor, Executive Council, and Legislative Council, all appointive and not elective, were controlled by the English element. The chief struggle in this colony was between the Assembly, controlled by the French, and the Legislative Council, controlled by the English. The French demanded that the Legislative Council be made elective, expecting, if that were done, to have the majority in it. They demanded also that the executive, with the exception of the Governor, be made responsible to the legislature. The French, unable to get control of any branch of the government except the Assembly, resolved to use this to force the concessions they desired. They refused to make the appropriations necessary for the running of the government. Year after year, from 1832 on, no moneys were voted for the payment of judges and civil officials. The struggle was similar to that witnessed in the eighteenth century in many of the thirteen colonies to the south.

The conflict was between the representative and the non-representative parts of the government. It was fundamentally a constitutional question. The colonies did not possess complete legislative power, as the upper chamber, non-elective, could block the lower chamber, representing the people. Nor had the legislature, as a whole, what it had in England — control over the executive. "The colonies have the mockeries, the shadows of English institutions, not the realities; the names, not the substances," said Lord Durham later. The principle which makes the English system of government workable, responsibility of the executive to the legislature, was lacking. The people had no efficient control of their rulers. England had not yet solved the problem of colonial government.

In 1837 disaffection had reached such a point that revolutionary movements broke out in both colonies. These were easily suppressed by the Canadian authorities without help from England, but the grievances of the colonists still remained.

The English Government, thoroughly alarmed at the danger of the loss of another empire, adopted the part of

discretion and sent out to Canada a commissioner to study the grievances of the colonists. The man chosen was Lord Durham, whose part in the reform of 1832 had been brilliant. Durham was in Canada five months. His acts were vehemently criticized in Parliament, the ministry, which had appealed to him to undertake the mission, did not loyally support him, and he shortly returned to England, humiliated and in official disgrace, the victim of the party and personal politics of England. He had "marred a career, but made a nation." The Durham Report, submitted to Parliament on his return, entitles him to the rank of the greatest colonial statesman in British history. It contained a full description of the situation in Canada, and proposed sweeping changes in colonial policy.

Examining the history of the six provinces, Lord Durham declared "that the natural state of government in all these colonies is that of collision between the executive and the representative body." He pointed out that the executive was irresponsible, and asked how long Englishmen at home would tolerate a ministry not in sympathy with the majority of the House of Commons. Such ministries were the common occurrence in Canada. "It is difficult," he declared, "to understand how any English statesman could have imagined that representative and irresponsible government could be successfully combined." He also declared that the situation in Canada "was the unavoidable result of a system which stunted the unpopular branch of the legislature of the necessary privileges of a representative body." The Assembly in Lower Canada had been conducting "a constant warfare with the executive, for the purpose of obtaining the powers inherent in a representative body by the very nature of representative government."

Fox had said that "the only method of retaining distant colonies, with advantage, is to enable them to govern themselves." This was what Lord Durham now proposed, namely, the introduction of complete ministerial responsibility to the popular chamber. "The Crown must consent to carry on the government by means of those in whom the representative members have confidence." "That sounds like a truism now," says Lord Durham's biographer, "but it was the first recognition by a responsible statesman of the principle of self-government in the colonies."¹

No wonder then that this Report has been called "the Magna

¹ Reid, *Life and Letters of Lord Durham*, II, 314.

Charta of the Colonies," the "most valuable document in the English language on the subject of colonial policy," the "text-book of every advocate of colonial freedom in all parts of the globe," that it is asserted to have "broadened once for all the lines of constructive statesmanship in all that relates to the colonial policy of England."

Lord Durham believed also in a federal union of all the British colonies of North America, but, recognizing that the idea was premature, he recommended the union of Upper and Lower Canada into a single colony with a single government. This he also thought would have the advantage of putting the English, the more progressive element, in a majority in the united colony.

Durham's recommendations were not immediately followed, as they seemed to many Englishmen to render the colonies independent. In 1840, however, a bill was passed carrying out the latter suggestion of a fusion of Ontario and Quebec, Upper and Lower Canada, under a single government, the Assembly to have larger powers than previously. But the essential feature of Durham's report, ministerial responsibility, was not provided for in the law, and, as a matter of fact, during the next seven years the Governors did not act upon the principle that the Executive Council was to do as the majority of the Assembly wished. This vital and, as far as the colonies were concerned, revolutionary principle was adopted in 1847 by Lord Elgin, the Governor of Canada and the son-in-law of Lord Durham, who chose as members of the Executive Council members of the French party then in majority in the Assembly, an act very unpopular with the English, and leading to a riot in which the mob attacked the Governor's carriage and set fire to the Parliament building. Elgin adhered to his resolution, however, and the principle of ministerial responsibility was thus introduced, and has since been constantly maintained. It was custom, however, not law. It spread rapidly to the other colonies of Great Britain, which were chiefly of English stock and were therefore considered capable of self-government. Responsible government was granted to Nova Scotia and New Brunswick in 1848, to Prince Edward Island in 1851, to New Zealand in 1854, and within the next two years to New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania, South Australia, and Newfoundland; to Queensland in 1859; to British Columbia in 1871; to Cape Colony in 1872; to Western Australia in 1890, and Natal in 1893; to Transvaal Colony in 1906, and Orange River Colony in 1907.

DOMINION OF CANADA

The Act of 1840, based largely upon Durham's Report, had united Upper and Lower Canada, or Ontario and Quebec, into one colony, had swept away the two legislatures and established a single one for the united colony. This union of two colonies so very dissimilar, the one English, the other largely French, did not work smoothly, and there was a strong feeling that each part should have a legislature of its own for purely local purposes.

Lord Durham had also suggested federation of all the North American colonies as a final settlement. Various reasons prevented this for many years, among others the very defective means of communication, but the desire for federation gradually increased.

The growth of population, the improvement of ways of communication by the building of railroads, the example of the successful federation across the border to the south, and the possible danger of attack from that side, as suggested by the Fenian movement and the *Alabama* contentions, all caused Canadian public opinion to express itself in favor of union. The English Parliament was therefore merely voicing Canadian sentiment when in 1867 it passed the British North American Act. Indeed, that act had been drawn up in Canada and was ratified by the English Parliament without change. By it Upper and Lower Canada, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick were joined into a confederation called the Dominion of Canada. There was to be a central or federal parliament sitting at Ottawa. There were also to be local or provincial legislatures in each province to legislate for local affairs. Questions affecting the whole Dominion were reserved for the Dominion Parliament.

The central or Dominion Parliament was to consist of a Senate and a House of Commons. The Senate was to be composed of seventy members nominated for life by the Governor-General, himself appointed by the monarch, and representing the Crown. The House of Commons was to be elected by the people. In some respects the example of the English Government was followed in the constitution, in others that of the United States. This federation differs from ours in one very important particular. By our constitution certain definite powers are granted the federal government. All others are vested either in the states or the people of the states. In the Dominion certain powers are granted to the provinces. All others are vested in the federal government.

Though the Dominion began with only four provinces provision was made for the possible admission of others. Manitoba was admitted in 1870, British Columbia in 1871, Prince Edward Island in 1873.

In 1846, by the settlement of the Oregon dispute, the line dividing the English possessions from the United States was extended to the Pacific Ocean, and in 1869 the Dominion acquired by purchase (£300,000) the vast territories belonging to the Hudson Bay Company, out of which the great provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan have been carved and admitted into the union (1905). The Dominion now includes all of British North America except the island of Newfoundland, which has steadily refused to join. It thus extends from ocean to ocean. Except for the fact that she receives a Governor-General from England and that she possesses no treaty powers, Canada is practically independent. She manages her own affairs, and even imposes tariffs which are disadvantageous to the mother country. That she has imperial as well as local patriotism, however, was shown strikingly in her support of England in the South African war. She sent Canadian regiments thither at her own expense to co-operate in an enterprise not closely connected with her own fortunes.

The founding of the Canadian union in 1867 rendered possible the construction of a great transcontinental railway, the Canadian Pacific, built between 1881 and 1885. This has in turn reacted upon the Dominion, binding the different provinces together, and contributing to the remarkable development of the west. Another transcontinental railway has since been built farther to the north. Canada is connected by steamship lines with Europe and with Japan and Australia. Her population has increased from less than five hundred thousand in 1815 to more than nine million. Her prosperity has grown immensely, and her economic life is becoming more varied. Largely an agricultural and timber-producing country, manufactures are now developing under the stimulus of protective tariffs, and her vast mineral resources are in process of rapid development.

AUSTRALIA

An eminent English historian, Sir Spencer Walpole, has written that "the greatest fact in the history of England is that she is the mother of the United States. It may be similarly added, that the greatest fact in the history of the

nineteenth century is the foundation of a new Britain — which may eventually prove a greater Britain — in the Southern Hemisphere.”¹

Whether Australia will prove a greater Britain or not, only the future can show, but the opening of the twentieth century sees a new “colonial nation” in existence, prosperous, energetic, ambitious. The creation of that new empire was the work of the nineteenth century, an empire nearly as extensive territorially as the United States or Canada, about three-fourths as large as Europe, and inhabited almost entirely by a population of English descent.

No systematic exploration of this southern continent, *Terra Australis*, was undertaken until toward the close of the eighteenth century, but certain parts had been sighted or traced much earlier by Spanish, Portuguese, and particularly by Dutch navigators. Among the last, Tasman is to be mentioned, who in 1642 explored the southeastern portion, though he did not discover that the land which was later to bear his name was an island, a fact not known, indeed, for a century and a half. He discovered the islands to the east of Australia, and gave to them a Dutch name, New Zealand. The Dutch called the *Terra Australis* New Holland, claiming it by right of discovery. But they made no attempt to occupy it. The attention of the English was first directed thither by the famous Captain Cook, who made three voyages to this region between 1768 and 1779. Cook sailed around New Zealand, and then along the eastern coast of this New Holland. He put into a certain harbor, which was forthwith named Botany Bay, so varied was the vegetation on the shores. Sailing up the eastern coast, he claimed it all for George III, and called it New South Wales, because it reminded him of the Welsh coast. Seventeen years, however, went by before any settlement was made.

As Australia was remote, it was considered by English statesmen a good place to which to send criminals, and it was as a convict colony that the new empire began. The first expedition for the colonization of the country sailed from England in May 1787 with 750 convicts on board, and reached Botany Bay in January 1788. Here the first settlement was made, and to it was given the name of the colonial secretary of the day, Sydney. For many years fresh cargoes of convicts were sent out who, on the expiration of their sentences, received lands. Free settlers came

¹ *History of England*, VI, 336.

too, led to emigrate by various periods of economic depression at home, by promises of land and food, and by an increasing knowledge of the adaptability of the new continent to agriculture, and particularly to sheep raising. By 1820 the population was not far from 40,000. During the first thirty years the government was military in character.

The free settlers were strongly opposed to having Australia regarded as a prison for English convicts. They were not a desirable class of immigrants, and their presence tended to prevent men from coming whose immigration would have been desirable. As Englishmen came to see that this was an expensive and ineffective way of punishing criminals, and as the free men in Australia vehemently denounced the custom as a stigma upon their adopted land, it was finally abolished in New South Wales in 1840. The custom lingered on, however, in other colonies, and did not entirely disappear until 1853. This question of the transportation of criminals, was one of the important questions in Australia during the first part of its history.

Australia had thus far been mainly a pastoral country, producing wool and hides. But, in 1851 and 1852, rich deposits of gold were found, rivaled only by those discovered a little earlier in California. A tremendous immigration ensued. The population of the colony of Victoria (cut off from New South Wales) increased from 70,000 to more than 300,000 in five years. Australia has ever since remained one of the great gold-producing countries of the world.

Thus there gradually grew up six colonies, New South Wales, Queensland, Victoria, South Australia, Western Australia, and the neighboring island of Tasmania. These were gradually invested with self-government, parliaments and responsible ministries in the fashion worked out in Canada. The population increased steadily, and by the end of the century numbered about four million. In 1923 it was over five million.

The great political event in the history of these colonies was their union into a confederation at the close of the century. Up to that time the colonies had been legally unconnected with each other, and their only form of union was the loose one under the British Crown. For a long time there was discussion as to the advisability of binding them more closely together. Various reasons contributed to convince the Australians of the advantages of federation. They have been summarized by Lord Bryce as follows: "The gain to trade and the general convenience to be expected from abolishing the tariffs established on the frontiers of

each colony, the need for a common system of military defense, the advantages of a common legislation for the regulation of railways and the fixing of railway rates, the advantages of a common control of the larger rivers for the purposes both of navigation and of irrigation, the need for uniform legislation on a number of commercial and industrial topics, the importance of finding an authority competent to provide for old age pensions and for the settlement of labor disputes all over the country, the need for uniform provisions against the entrance of colored races (especially Chinese, Malays, and Indian coolies), the stimulus to be given to industry and trade by substituting one great community for six smaller ones.”¹

Moreover, the desire for nationality, which accomplished such remarkable changes in Europe in the nineteenth century, was also active here. An Australian patriotism had grown up. Australians desired to make their country the dominant authority in the Southern Hemisphere. They longed for a larger outlook than that given by the life of the separate colonies, and thus both reason and sentiment combined toward the same end, a close union, the creation of another “colonial nation.”

Union was finally achieved after ten years of earnest discussion (1890-1900). The various experiments in federation were carefully studied, particularly the constitutions of the United States and Canada. The draft of the constitution was worked over by several conventions, by the ministers and the governments of the various colonies, and was finally submitted to the people for ratification. Ratification being secured, the constitution was then passed through the British Parliament under the title of “The Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act” (1900). The constitution was the work of the Australians. The part taken by England was simply one of acceptance. Though Parliament made certain suggestions of detail, it did not insist upon them in the case of Australian opposition.

The constitution established a federation consisting of the six colonies which were henceforth to be called states, not provinces, as in the case of Canada. It created a federal Parliament of two houses, a Senate consisting of six senators from each state, and a House of Representatives apportioned among the several states according to population. The powers

¹ Bryce, *Studies in History and Jurisprudence*, I, 478-479.

given to the Federal Government were carefully defined. The new system was inaugurated January 1, 1901.¹

NEW ZEALAND

Not included in the new commonwealth is an important group of islands of Australasia called New Zealand, situated 1,200 miles east of Australia. England began to have some connection with these islands shortly after 1815, but it was not until 1839 that they were formally annexed to the British Empire. In 1854 New Zealand was given responsible government, and in 1865 was entirely separated from New South Wales and made a separate colony. Emigration was methodically encouraged. New Zealand was never a convict colony. Population increased and it gradually became the most democratic colony of the Empire. In 1907 the designation of the colony was changed to the Dominion of New Zealand.

New Zealand consists of two main islands with many smaller ones. It is about a fourth larger than Great Britain and has a population of about 1,200,000, of whom about 52,000 are aborigines, the Maoris. Its capital is Wellington, with a population of over 100,000. Auckland is another important city. New Zealand is an agricultural and grazing country, and also possesses rich mineral deposits, including gold.

New Zealand is of great interest to the world of to-day because of its experiments in advanced social reform, legislation concerning labor and capital, landowning and commerce. State control has been extended over more branches of industry than has been the case in any other country.

The Government owns and operates the railways.² The roads are run, not for profit, but for service to the people. As rapidly as profits exceed three per cent., passenger and freight rates are reduced. Comprehensive and successful attempts are made by very low rates to induce the people in congested districts to live in the country. Workmen going in and out travel about three miles for a cent. Children in the primary grades in schools are carried free, and those in higher grades at very low rates.

¹ A valuable description of this constitution is to be found in Bryce, *Studies in History and Jurisprudence*, "The Australian Commonwealth." Abstract of this in Beard, *Intro. to Eng. Hist.*, pp. 645-662. See also Bright, *Hist. of Eng.*, V. 197-199. The constitution itself may be found in Dodd, *Modern Constitutions*. On inauguration of the new government see *Annual Register* 1901, 444-445.

² In 1921 the Government owned 3,009 miles. There was 138 miles of private lines.

The Government also owns and operates the telegraphs and telephones and conducts postal savings banks. Life insurance is largely in its hands. It has a fire and accident insurance department. In 1903 it began the operation of some state coal mines. Its land legislation is remarkable. Its main purpose is to prevent the land from being monopolized by a few, and to enable the people to become landholders. In 1892 progressive taxation on the larger estates was adopted, and in 1896 the sale of such estates to the Government was made compulsory, and thus extensive areas have come under government ownership. The State transfers them under various forms of tenure to the landless and working classes. The system of taxation, based on the principle of graduation, higher rates for larger incomes, properties, and inheritances, is designed to break up or prevent monopoly and to favor the small proprietor or producer.

In industrial and labor legislation New Zealand has also made radical experiments. Arbitration in labor disputes is compulsory if either side invokes it, and the decision is binding. Factory laws are stringent, aiming particularly at the protection of women, the elimination of "sweating." In stores the Saturday half holiday is universal. The Government has a Labor Department whose head is a member of the Cabinet. Its first duty is to find work for the unemployed, and its great effort is to get the people out of the cities into the country. There is an Old Age Pension Law, enacted in 1898 and amended in 1905, providing pensions of about a hundred and twenty-five dollars for all men and women after the age of sixty-five whose income is less than five dollars a week.

All this governmental activity rests on a democratic basis. There are no property qualifications for voting, and women have the suffrage as well as men. The referendum has been adopted.

The more advanced parties demand a further extension in the line of social reform; the nationalization of lands and mines, of marine and coastal and intercolonial services; state clothing and boot factories, flour and woolen mills, bakeries, iron-works, and ship-building yards. The Australian colony of Victoria has enacted much legislation resembling that described in the case of New Zealand.

BRITISH SOUTH AFRICA

As an incident in the wars against France and her ally and dependent, Holland, England seized the Dutch possession in South Africa, Cape Colony. This colony she retained in 1814,

together with certain Dutch possessions in South America, paying six million pounds as compensation. This was the beginning of English expansion into Africa, which was to attain remarkable proportions before the close of the century. This Dutch colony had been founded as early as 1652 as a port of call for Dutch ships trading with the Orient. Immigrants came from Holland, and after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes under Louis XIV, many Huguenots joined them. These Frenchmen were gradually completely absorbed in the Dutch population, losing all distinguishing characteristics. England kept the colony in 1814 for the same purpose that the Dutch had founded it, as a port of call, for English commerce with India went by this route, there being then no Suez canal. The population at the time she took possession consisted of about 27,000 people of European descent, mostly Dutch, and of about 30,000 African and Malay slaves owned by the Dutch, and about 17,000 Hottentots. Immigration of Englishmen began forthwith.

Friction between the Dutch (called Boers, i.e., peasants) and the English was not slow in developing. The forms of local government to which the Boers were accustomed were abolished and new ones established. English was made the sole language used in the courts. The Boers, irritated by these measures, were rendered indignant by the abolition of slavery in 1834. They did not consider slavery wrong. Moreover, they felt defrauded of their property as the compensation given was inadequate — about three million pounds — little more than a third of what they considered their slaves were worth. Even that was made payable in London, a device which enabled London bankers to get a good share. For all the abolition of slavery meant a loss of property, for many a total loss.

The Boers resolved to leave the colony and to settle in the interior, where they could live unmolested by the intruders. This migration or Great Trek began in 1836, and continued for several years. About 10,000 Boers thus withdrew from Cape Colony. Rude carts drawn by several pairs of oxen transported their families and their possessions into the wilderness. Some went northeastward and settled in Natal only to find that they were not, for their pains, to be free from English control. In 1842 the English sent troops into Natal, and in the following year proclaimed it a colony. Many of the Boers trekked again to join their fellow Boers who, while they were going into Natal, had gone into the Orange River country. Such were the beginnings of the Orange Free State, whose capital was Bloemfontein. But

again they were followed. The English, in 1848, declared this region a part of the British Empire, under the name of the Orange River Sovereignty. Many of the Orange River Boers, refusing to live under the British flag, trekked again, joining those who, in the earlier migration, had gone farther north across the Vaal, founding a state destined to become famous as the Transvaal or South African Republic, and where it seemed for many years they would be permitted to enjoy the independence which they had made such efforts to secure.

For, in 1852, Great Britain, apparently considering the Transvaal not worth annexing, formally recognized its independence, its entire right to manage its own affairs, by a treaty, the Sand River Convention, and two years later it abandoned the Orange River Sovereignty, by the Convention of Bloemfontein. From this time date the two Boer republics of South Africa, the Orange Free State and the Transvaal or South African Republic.

From 1854 to 1899 the Orange Free State pursued its peaceful career unmolested, its independence not infringed upon. The Transvaal, too, was left in the splendid isolation it so much enjoyed, but not for so long a time, for in 1877 England, under Lord Beaconsfield's administration, abruptly declared it annexed to the British Empire, on the ground that its independence was a menace to the peace of England's other South African possessions, as the Boers were frequently involved in wars with the natives, who, once aroused, constituted a general menace. A delegation of Boers was sent to England to protest and demand the restoration of their independence. One of the delegates was Paul Kruger, who, as a boy of ten, had followed his father's cattle as they were driven across the prairie in the Great Trek of 1836. The delegation was told in London by the British ministry that the annexation was irrevocable. The Boers' hatred of the English naturally grew more intense, and they fell to meditating plans for the future.

But in 1880 Lord Beaconsfield was overthrown and Mr. Gladstone came into power. Mr. Gladstone had denounced the annexation, and was convinced that a mistake had been made which must be rectified. He was negotiating with the Boer leaders, hoping to reach, by peaceful means, a solution that would be satisfactory to both sides, when his problem was made immensely more difficult by the Boers themselves, who, in December 1880, rose in revolt and defeated a small detachment of British troops at Majuba Hill, February 27, 1881. In a military sense this so-called battle of Majuba Hill was an insignificant affair, but

its effects upon Englishmen and Boers were tremendous and far-reaching. Gladstone, who had already been negotiating with a view to restoring the independence of the Transvaal, which he considered had been unjustly overthrown, did not think it right to reverse his policy because of a mere skirmish, however humiliating.

He therefore restored to the Boers their independence, but with the express reservation of the "suzerainty" of the British Crown, a word carrying no precise meaning, but resented in the Transvaal as a limitation upon its perfect independence, and so understood in England. The Boers were allowed complete self-government with this restriction. Gladstone's action was severely criticised by Englishmen who did not believe in retiring, leaving a defeat unavenged. They denounced the action of the ministry as inimical to the welfare of the South African colonies and damaging to the prestige of the Empire. Gladstone did not believe that he should be deflected from an act of justice and conciliation merely because of a military misfortune of no importance in itself, and he considered that giving up negotiations previously begun, promises previously made, would be an act of bad faith. He therefore concluded the Pretoria Convention of 1881 with its mysterious word "suzerainty."

The Boers, on the other hand, considered that they had won their independence by arms, by the humiliation of the traditional enemy, and were accordingly elated. In holding this opinion they were injuring themselves by self-deception and by the idea that what they once had done they could do again, and they were angering the British by keeping alive the memory of Majuba Hill. That name came to be spoken with passion on both sides.

The Pretoria Convention did not work smoothly, and consequently a new agreement was drawn up in 1884. This, the London Convention, restored to the Transvaal the old name of South African Republic, omitted the preamble of the Pretoria Convention, in which the word suzerainty occurred, and inserted a provision, which was destined to gain tremendous importance later, to the effect that "white men were to have full liberty to reside in any part of the republic, to trade in it, and to be liable to the same taxes only as those exacted from citizens of the republic."¹

Mr. Gladstone's biographer in summing up the history of the relations of England and the Transvaal says that the Sand River Convention of 1852 conferred independence, that the Proclama-

¹ Morley, *Gladstone* III, 45.

tion of 1877 took independence away, that the Pretoria Convention of 1881 "in a qualified way gave it back," and that the London Convention of 1884 "qualified the qualification over again till independence, subject to two or three specified conditions, was restored."¹

The London Convention was naturally regarded as a victory by the Boers, and encouraged them to believe that in time the restrictions it contained could be removed. The word "sovereignty" being omitted and "republic" being given them, they felt they were once more masters in their own house. On the other hand, they were not entirely independent, as England expressly had the control over their foreign relations. Moreover, the phrase concerning immigration contained the germ of future trouble, which in the end was to result in the violent overthrow of the republic, for a momentous change in the character of the population was impending.

The South African Republic was entirely peopled by Boers, a people exclusively interested in agriculture and grazing, solid, sturdy, religious, freedom-loving, but, in the modern sense, unprogressive, ill-educated, suspicious of foreigners, and particularly of Englishmen. The peace and contentment of this rural people were distributed by the discovery, in 1884, that gold in immense quantities lay hidden in its mountains, the Rand. Immediately a great influx of miners and speculators began. These were chiefly Englishmen. In the heart of the mining district the city of Johannesburg grew rapidly, numbering in a few years over 100,000 inhabitants, a city of foreigners. Troubles quickly arose between the native Boers and the aggressive, energetic Uitlanders or foreigners.

The Uitlanders gave wide publicity to their grievances. Great obstacles were put in the way of their naturalization; they were given no share in the government, not even the right to vote. Yet in parts of the Transvaal they were more numerous than the natives, and bore the larger share of taxation. In addition they were forced to render military service, which, in their opinion, implied citizenship. They looked to the British Government to push their demand for reforms. The Boer Government was undoubtedly an oligarchy, but the Boers felt that it was only by refusing the suffrage to the unwelcome intruders that they could keep control of their own state, which at the cost of much hardship they had created in the wilderness. In 1895 occurred an event which deeply embittered them, the Jameson Raid — an in-

¹ Morley, *Gladstone*, III, 45.

vasion of the Transvaal by a few hundred troopers under Dr. Jameson, the administrator of Rhodesia, with the evident purpose of supporting the Uitlanders, and probably of overturning the Boer Government. The raiders were easily captured by the Boers, who with great magnanimity handed them over to England. This indefensible attack and the fact that the guilty were only lightly punished in England, and that the man whom all Boers held responsible, Mr. Cecil Rhodes, was shielded by the British Government, entered like iron into the souls of the Boers and only hardened their resistance to the demands of the Uitlanders. These demands were refused, and the grievances of the Uitlanders, who now outnumbered the natives perhaps two to one, continued.

A special commissioner, sent out from England in 1897, Sir Alfred Milner, informed his Government early in 1899 that "the spectacle of thousands of British subjects kept permanently in the position of helots, constantly chafing under undoubted grievances, and calling vainly to her Majesty's Government for redress, does steadily undermine the influence and reputation of Great Britain, and the respect for the British Government." Milner was of the opinion that the Boers were aiming ultimately at nothing less than the union of all the Boers, including those of Cape Colony, the ultimate expulsion of the English from South Africa, and the establishment of a great Boer state. "I can see nothing which will put a stop to this mischievous propaganda but some striking proof of the intention of her Majesty's Government not to be ousted from its position in South Africa." This claim that the real point at issue was the maintenance of England's position as the paramount power in South Africa exerted a great influence at home. To stop this "mischievous propaganda," which was undermining British influence, the policy of the Transvaal Government must be changed, and it could only be changed by giving the Uitlanders political power. Therefore the right of the suffrage was insisted upon by the English Government, "no selfish demand," said Milner, as it is "asking for nothing from others which we do not give ourselves." Conferences were held in 1899 at Bloemfontein. But this demand the Boers would not grant, believing that it was a matter of self-preservation, that its bestowal would simply mean the handing over of the country to the foreigner.

War broke out in October 1899. The Orange Free State, no party to the quarrel, threw in its lot with its sister Boer republic.

This war was lightly entered upon by both sides. Each grossly underestimated both the resources and the spirit of the other. The English Government had made no preparation at all adequate, apparently not believing that in the end this petty state would dare oppose the mighty British Empire. The Boers, on the other hand, had been long preparing for a conflict, and knew that the number of British troops in South Africa was small, totally insufficient to put down their resistance. Moreover, for years they had deceived themselves with a gross exaggeration of the significance of Majuba Hill as a victory over the British. Each side believed that the war would be short, and would result in its favor.

The war, which they supposed would be over in a few months, lasted for nearly three years. England suffered at the outset many humiliating reverses. The war was not characterized by great battles, but by many sieges at first, and then by guerilla fighting and elaborate, systematic, and difficult conquest of the country. It was fought with great bravery and brilliancy on both sides. For the English, Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener were the leaders, and of the Boers several greatly distinguished themselves, obtaining world-wide reputations, Christian de Wet, Louis Botha, Delarey.

The English won in the end by sheer force of numbers. Awakening from the costly misapprehension of the first days concerning the nature of their problem, they proceeded to make war on a scale absolutely unprecedented in their annals. No general in English history had ever commanded so many troops as did Lord Roberts. During the war England sent about 450,000 men to South Africa. Three hundred and forty thousand came from Great Britain; the others from the colonies, Canada, Australia, India, and Cape Colony. In the closing months Lord Kitchener had more than 250,000 men against perhaps ten or twelve thousand opponents.

Peace was finally concluded on June 1, 1902. The Transvaal and the Orange Free State lost their independence, and became colonies of the British Empire. Otherwise the terms offered by the conquerors were liberal. Generous money grants and loans were to be made by England to enable the Boers to begin again in their sadly devastated land. Their language was to be respected wherever possible.

The work of reconciliation proceeded with remarkable rapidity after the close of the war. Responsible government, that is, self-government, was granted to the Transvaal Colony in

1906 and to the Orange River Colony in 1907. This liberal conduct of the English Government had the most happy consequences, as was shown very convincingly by the spontaneity and the strength of the movement for closer union, which culminated in 1909 in the creation of a new "colonial nation" within the British Empire. In 1908 a convention was held in which the four colonies were represented. The outcome of its deliberations, which lasted several months, was the draft of a constitution for the South African Union. This was then submitted to the colonies for approval and, by June 1909, had been ratified by them all. The constitution was in the form of a statute to be enacted by the British Parliament. It became law September 20, 1909.

The South African Union is substantially a unified, rather than a federal state. While the provinces are preserved, their powers are very limited. The central government consists of a Governor-General appointed by the Crown; an Executive Council; a Senate of forty members, eight from each province, and eight appointed by the Governor in Council, and serving for ten years; and a House of Assembly, consisting of 134 members, of whom 51 represent Cape of Good Hope Province, 49 Transvaal Province, 17 Orange Free State Province, and 17 Natal Province. Both Dutch and English are official languages and enjoy equal privileges. Difficulty was experienced in selecting the capital, so intense was the rivalry of different cities. The result was a compromise. Pretoria was chosen as the seat of the executive branch of the government, Cape Town as the seat of the legislative branch.

The creation of the South African Union was another triumph of the spirit of nationality which has so greatly transformed the world since 1815. The new commonwealth has a population of about 1,500,000 whites and five and a half million people of non-European descent. Provision has been made for the ultimate admission of Rhodesia into the Union.

IMPERIAL FEDERATION

At the opening of the twentieth century Great Britain possessed an empire far more extensive and far more populous than any the world had ever seen, covering about thirteen millions of square miles, if Egypt and the Soudan be included, with a total population of over four hundred and twenty millions. This Empire was scattered everywhere, in Asia, Africa, Australia, the two

Americas, and the islands of the seven seas. The population included a motley host of peoples. Only fifty-four million were English-speaking, and of these about forty-two million lived in Great Britain. Most of the colonies were self-supporting. They presented every form of government, military, autocratic, representative, democratic. The sea alone bound the Empire. England's throne was on the mountain wave in a literal as well as in a metaphorical sense. Dominance of the oceans was essential that she might keep open her communications with her far flung colonies. It is no adventitious circumstance that England is the greatest sea-power of the world, and intends to remain such. She regards this as the very vital principle of her imperial existence.

A noteworthy feature of the British Empire, as already sufficiently indicated, is the practically unlimited self-government enjoyed by several of the colonies, those where the English stock predominates, Canada, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand. This policy is in contrast to that pursued by the French and German governments, which have ruled their colonies directly from Paris and Berlin. But this system does not apply to the greatest of them all, India, nor to a multitude of smaller possessions.

CHAPTER XXVI

THE PARTITION OF AFRICA

LYING almost within sight of Europe and forming the southern boundary of her great inland sea is the immense continent, three times the size of Europe, whose real nature was revealed only in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. In some respects the seat of very ancient history, in most its history is just beginning. In Egypt a rich and advanced civilization appeared in very early times along the lower valley of the Nile. Yet only after thousands of years and only in our own day have the sources and the upper course of that famous river been discovered. Along the northern coasts arose the civilization and state of Carthage, rich, mysterious, and redoubtable, for a while the powerful rival of Rome, succumbing to the latter only after severe and memorable struggles. The ancient world knew therefore the northern shores of Africa. The rest was practically unknown. In the fifteenth century came the great series of geographical discoveries, which immensely widened the known boundaries of the world. It might seem that Africa, rather than America and Asia, would have been the important conquest of that marvelous period of human curiosity and courage. But this was not the case. Europe was seeking primarily riches, and riches were to be found, as events proved, in Peru, and Mexico, and India, rather than in the great continental mass on its very threshold. The age of exploration did, it is true, reveal the hitherto unknown outline and magnitude of the continent. Portuguese explorers pushed farther and farther south until they finally rounded the southern cape, and then sailed away toward India, so alluring with its gems and spices. Diaz, Vasco da Gama, are shining names in this romantic history. But the result was not the conquest of Africa and its introduction into European civilization. America, and even Australia, then unknown, were destined to receive the civilization of Europe long before that continent. A melancholy beginning was, however, made. No ancient civilization offered its riches to the spoliation of Europeans, as in Mexico, Peru, and India. But property in human beings was to be had in abundance for little effort. The African slave trade began,

"black ivory," and stations were established by the Portuguese, and later by other nations for this business, which was both lucrative and inhuman. These posts were simply along the shores. The great inner mass of the continent remained as before, unknown, mainly because of the difficulty of penetrating it, owing to its lack of rivers navigable from the sea. For centuries Europe, absorbed in multifarious struggles, whence emerged its modern civilization, paid slight attention to the mystery which lay near at hand. Moreover, it had not the means, mechanical and scientific, for the exploration of this enigmatic and dangerous land. And such remained the case down to the nineteenth century, and, indeed, well into it. Africa was the great field of discovery of that century as America was of the fifteenth and sixteenth.

In 1815 the situation was as follows: the Turkish Empire extended along the whole northern coast to Morocco, that is, the Sultan was nominally sovereign of Egypt, Tripoli, Tunis, and Algeria. Morocco was independent under its own sultan. Along the western coasts were scattered settlements, or rather stations, of England, France, Denmark, Holland, Spain, and Portugal. Portugal had certain claims on the eastern coast, opposite Madagascar. England had just acquired the Dutch Cape Colony, whence, as we have seen, her expansion into a great South African power has proceeded. The interior of the continent was unknown, and was of interest only to geographers.

For sixty years after 1815, progress in the appropriation of Africa by Europe was slow. The most important annexation was that of Algeria by France between 1830 and 1847. In the south, England was spreading out, and the Boers were founding their two republics.

European annexation waited upon exploration. Africa was the "dark continent," and until the darkness was lifted it was not coveted. About the middle of the century the darkness began to disappear. Explorers penetrated farther and farther into the interior, traversing the continent in various directions, opening a chapter of geographical discovery of absorbing interest. It is impossible within our limits to do more than allude to the wonderful work participated in by many intrepid explorers, Englishmen, Frenchmen, Portuguese, Dutch, Germans and Belgians. A few incidents only can be mentioned.

It was natural that Europeans should be curious about the sources of the Nile, a river famous since the dawn of history, but whose source remained enveloped in obscurity. In 1858 one

AFRICA

European Possessions in 1884.

Scale: 0 100 200 Miles (0 100 200 Kilometers)

English Possessions: English French

Portuguese Possessions: Portuguese Spanish

Abbreviations:
 Y. - Y. Land
 F. - F. Land
 P. - P. Land
 S. - S. Land
 T. - T. Land
 G. - G. Land
 L. - L. Land
 M. - M. Land
 N. - N. Land
 O. - O. Land
 R. - R. Land
 S. - S. Land
 T. - T. Land
 U. - U. Land
 V. - V. Land
 W. - W. Land
 X. - X. Land
 Y. - Y. Land
 Z. - Z. Land





source was found by Speke, an English explorer, to consist of a great lake south of the equator, to which the name Victoria Nyanza was given. Six years later another Englishman, Sir Samuel Baker, discovered another lake, also a source, and named it Albert Nyanza.

Two names particularly stand out in this record of African exploration, Livingstone and Stanley. David Livingstone, a Scotch missionary and traveler, began his African career in 1840, and continued it until his death in 1873 at Chitambo, not far from the shores of Lake Bangweolo, which he had previously discovered. He traced the course of the Zambesi River, of the upper Congo, and the region round about Lakes Tanganyika and Nyassa. He crossed Africa from sea to sea in higher latitudes than had hitherto been traversed. He opened up a new country to the world. His explorations caught the attention of Europe, and when, on one of his journeys, Europe thought that he was lost or dead, and an expedition was sent out to find him, that expedition riveted the attention of Europe as no other in African history had done. It was under the direction of Henry M. Stanley, sent out by the *New York Herald*. Stanley's story of how he found Livingstone was read with the greatest interest in Europe, and heightened the desire, already widespread, for more knowledge about the great continent. Livingstone, whose name is the most important in the history of African exploration, died in 1873. His body was borne with all honor to England and given the burial of a national hero in Westminster Abbey.

Another African explorer was Cameron, sent out from England by the Royal Geographical Society to rescue Livingstone. He failed in this, as Livingstone died before his arrival, but Cameron made a remarkable journey across Africa from east to west. He was the first, indeed, to cross the continent in that direction.

By this time not only was the scientific curiosity of Europe thoroughly aroused, but missionary zeal saw a new field for activity. Thus Stanley's journey across Africa, from 1874 to 1878, was followed in Europe with an attention unparalleled in the history of modern explorations. Stanley explored the equatorial lake region, making important additions to knowledge. His great work, was, however, his exploration of the Congo River system. Little had been known of this river save its lower course as it approached the sea. Stanley proved that it was one of the largest rivers in the world, that its length was more than three thousand miles, that it was fed by an enormous number of tribu-

taries, that it drained an area of over 1,300,000 square miles, that in the volume of its waters it was exceeded only by the Amazon.

Thus, by 1880, the scientific enthusiasm and curiosity, the missionary and philanthropic zeal of Europeans, the hatred of slave hunters who plied their trade in the interior, had solved the great mystery of Africa. The map showed rivers and lakes where previously all had been blank.

Upon discovery quickly followed appropriation. France entered upon her protectorate of Tunis in 1881, England upon her "occupation" of Egypt in 1882. This was a signal for a general scramble. A feverish period of partition succeeded the long, slow one of discovery. European powers swept down upon this continent lying at their very door, hitherto neglected and despised, and carved it up among themselves. This they did without recourse to war by a series of treaties among themselves defining the boundaries of their claims. Africa became an annex of Europe. Out of this rush for territories the great powers, England, France, and Germany, naturally emerged with the largest acquisitions, but Portugal and Italy each secured a share. The situation and relative extent of these may best be appreciated by an examination of the map. Most of the treaties by which this division was effected were made between 1884 and 1890.

One feature of this appropriation of Africa by Europe was the foundation of the Congo Free State. This was the work of the second king of Belgium, Leopold II, a man who was greatly interested in the exploration of that continent. After the discoveries of Livingstone, and the early ones of Stanley, he called a conference of the powers in 1876 "to discuss the question of the exploration, and the civilization of Africa, and the means of opening up the interior of the continent to the commerce, industry, and scientific enterprise of the civilized world," and to consider measures for extinguishing "the terrible scourge of slavery known to prevail over wide and populous tracts in the interior of the continent." This conference was participated in by Great Britain, Belgium, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Russia. As a result of its deliberations an International African Association was established, which was to have its seat in Brussels, and whose aim was to be the exploration and civilization of central Africa. Each nation wishing to co-operate was to collect funds for the common object.

But the international character of the movement thus started was not long maintained. Most of the contributions came from Belgium. Stanley reached Europe in 1878 with the remarkable

additions of knowledge which his trip across Darkest Africa had given him. He was sent back the following year nominally under the auspices of the International Association of the Congo, an organization formed in 1879, and the practical successor of the former African Association, just alluded to. Stanley, hitherto an explorer, now became, in addition, an organizer and state builder. During the next four or five years, 1879-84, he made hundreds of treaties with native chiefs and founded many stations in the Congo basin. Nominally an emissary of an international association, his expenses were largely borne by King Leopold II.

Portugal now put forth extensive claims to much of this Congo region on the ground of previous discovery. To adjust these claims and other matters a general conference was held in Berlin, in 1884-5, attended by all the states of Europe, with the exception of Switzerland, and also by the United States. The conference recognized the existence as an independent power of the Congo Free State, with an extensive area, most of the Congo basin. It was evidently its understanding that this was to be a neutral and international state. Trade in it was to be open to all nations on equal terms, the rivers were to be free to all, and only such dues were to be levied as should be required to provide for the necessities of commerce. No trade monopolies were to be granted. The conference, however, provided no machinery for the enforcement of its decrees. Those decrees remained unfulfilled. The state quickly ceased to be international, monopolies were granted, trade in the Congo was not really free to all.

The new state became practically Belgian. In 1885, Leopold II assumed the position of sovereign, declaring that the connection of the Congo Free State and Belgium should be merely personal, he being ruler of both, and that the former, like the latter, should be entirely neutral. The Belgian parliament gave its consent, and the powers gave their approval. Leopold granted to the new state a constitution of an autocratic character, and in the succeeding years acted as if it were entirely his private possession. His position was that of sovereign and proprietor combined. In 1889 he announced that by his will all his sovereign rights in the Congo should go to Belgium after his death. This, of course, was an infraction of the Berlin Act of 1885 as he had no right to will an international state without the consent of the powers. The powers, however, recorded no protest, probably because the new state was nearly bankrupt

and they were not disposed to contribute to its maintenance and development. In reality the Congo Free State was not a free state at all, but the personal property of King Leopold. He possessed there practically unlimited power in the making and execution of laws. An international state became a personal appanage of the King of Belgium, largely because the powers did nothing for the Congo while Leopold gave it liberal and constant support.

In later years Leopold's policy was vehemently denounced. State monopolies were established, and monopolies were granted to private companies. In the exploitation of the natural resources, particularly the immensely valuable rubber trees, and in the building of railroads, it has been asserted that the natives were reduced to practical slavery. Fearful stories of inhuman treatment meted out to women as well as to men, of endless and crushing toil imposed upon them, of outrage, murders, whippings freely inflicted, and greatly reducing the population, gained wide, and it would appear, making some allowance for exaggeration, justified credence. The existence of the gravest abuses was affirmed by a commission of investigation appointed by the King himself. After a study of their report, published in October 1905, a professor in the University of Brussels wrote as follows: "An examination of the Congo Free State administration reveals the clear and indisputable fact that the Congo Free State is not a colony in the proper sense of the term: it is a financial speculation. The real aims of those in authority are pecuniary—to increase the amount yielded by taxation, to exploit the natural wealth of the country, to effect all that can stimulate the powers of production. Everything else is subordinated to this end. The colony is administered neither in the interest of the natives nor even of the economic interest of Belgium; the moving desire is to assure the sovereign king the maximum of pecuniary benefit."¹

As the years went by the revelations of the atrocious conditions prevailing in the Congo became steadily more numerous and more shocking. Other powers, notably England and the United States, finally aroused, demanded reforms. The result was that the Belgium ministry and Parliament were forced by the public opinion of the world to take up this question, and in 1908 the Congo Free State was converted outright into a Belgian colony, subject, not to the personal rule of the King, but to Parliament.

¹ Quoted in Bliss, *Encyclopedia of Social Reform*, 270.

EGYPT

Egypt, a seat of ancient civilization, was conquered by the Mohammedans soon after the rise of their religion. Some centuries later it was conquered by the Turks, and became a part of the Turkish Empire (1517). It remained nominally such down to 1914, its supreme ruler being the Sultan, who resided in Constantinople. But a series of remarkable events in the nineteenth century resulted in giving it a most singular and complicated position. To put down certain opponents of the Sultan an Albanian warrior, Mehemet Ali, was sent out early in the nineteenth century. Appointed Governor of Egypt in 1806, by 1811 he had made himself absolute master of the country. He had succeeded only too well. Originally merely the representative of the Sultan, he had become the real ruler of the land. His ambitions grew with his successes. In time he aspired to add Syria to his states, but was checked in this by a European intervention in 1840. He was compelled to acknowledge the suzerainty of the Porte once more, and to limit his rule to Egypt, but he gained in turn the important concession that the right to rule as viceroy should be hereditary in his family. The title was later changed to that of Khedive (1866).

The fifth ruler of this family was Ismail (1863-79). It was under him that the Suez Canal was completed, a great undertaking carried through by a French engineer, Ferdinand de Lesseps, the money coming largely from European investors. This Khedive plunged into the most reckless extravagance. As a result the Egyptian debt rose with extraordinary rapidity from three million pounds in 1863 to eighty-nine million in 1876. This, as well as the increased taxation which characterized the same years, was a crushing burden for a poor and ignorant population. Sir Alfred Milner after studying the situation declared: "There is nothing in the financial history of any country, from the remotest ages to the present time, to equal this carnival of extravagance and oppression."

The Khedive, needing money, sold, in 1875, his shares in the Suez Canal Company to Great Britain for about four million pounds, to the great irritation of the French. They are now worth many times as much. This was a mere temporary relief to the Khedive's finances, but was an important advantage to England, as the canal was destined inevitably to be the favorite route to India.

The extraordinary increase of the Egyptian debt is the key to

the whole later history of that country. The money had been borrowed abroad, mainly in England and France. Fearing the bankruptcy of Egypt, the governments of the two countries intervened in the interest of their investors, and succeeded in imposing their control over a large part of the financial administration. This was the famous Dual Control, which lasted from 1879 to 1883. The Khedive, Ismail, resented this tutelage, was consequently forced to abdicate, and was succeeded by his son Tewfik, who ruled from 1879 to 1892. The new Khedive did not struggle against the Dual Control, but certain elements of the population did. The bitter hatred inspired by this intervention of the foreigners flared up in a native movement that had as its war cry, "Egypt for the Egyptians," and as its leader, Arabi Pasha, an officer in the army. Before this movement of his subjects the Khedive was powerless. It was evident that the foreign control, established in the interests of foreign bond-holders, could only be perpetuated by the suppression of Arabi and his fellow-malcontents, and that that suppression could be accomplished only by the foreigners themselves. Thus financial intervention led directly to military intervention. England sought the co-operation of France, but France declined. She then proceeded alone. A British fleet bombarded Alexandria, and forced its abandonment by Arabi (July 11, 1882). Arabi and his troops withdrew. England then sent an army under General Wolseley, who, with great swiftness and precision, marched from the Suez Canal westward across the desert to Cairo. Wolseley defeated Arabi at Tel-el-Kebir, September 13, 1882, and immediately seized Cairo. The rebellion collapsed. Arabi himself was captured and sent to Ceylon.

The English had intervened nominally in the interest of the Khedive's authority against his rebel, Arabi, though they had not been asked so to intervene either by the Khedive himself or by the Sultan of Turkey, legal sovereign of Egypt, or by the powers of Europe. Having suppressed the insurrection, what would they do? Would they withdraw their army? The question was a difficult one. To withdraw was, in the opinion of the British ministry, of which Gladstone was the head, and Lord Granville the foreign secretary, to leave Egypt a prey to anarchy; to remain was certainly to offend the European powers, which would look upon this as simply another piece of British aggression. Particularly would such action be resented by France, and by the Sultan. The ministry decided neither to annex the country to the British Empire nor to proclaim a British protectorate

over it, but to assume the position of "adviser" to the Khedive, whose power would nominally remain what it had been. Under British "advice" the Khedive would himself carry out the reforms considered necessary for the prosperity and welfare of his country. This policy was expressed by Lord Granville in a diplomatic note sent to the various powers of Europe. "Although," so runs the note, "for the present a British force remains in Egypt for the preservation of public tranquillity, her Majesty's Government are desirous of withdrawing it as soon as the state of the country and the organization of proper means for the maintenance of the Khedive's authority will admit of it. In the meantime the position in which her Majesty's Government are placed towards His Highness imposes upon them the duty of giving advice with the object of securing that the order of things to be established shall be of a satisfactory character, and possess the elements of stability and progress." A gloss on the meaning of the word "advice" was furnished a year later by Lord Granville in a communication to the British representative in Egypt, Sir Evelyn Baring, later Lord Cromer. "It should," wrote Lord Granville, "be made clear to the Egyptian ministers and governors of provinces that the responsibility, which for a time rests on England, obliges her Majesty's Government to insist on the adoption of the policy which they recommend, and that it will be necessary that those ministers and governors who do not follow this course should cease to hold their office."

These two utterances described the anomalous position of England in Egypt in 1883, and they described it down to the outbreak of the Great War. A British force remained in Egypt, the "occupation" continued, advice was compulsory. England was often asked when she intended to keep her promise. No answer was forthcoming. She was ruler in fact, not in law. The Dual Control ended in 1883, and England began in earnest a work of reconstruction and reform which was carried forward under the guidance of Lord Cromer, who was British Consul-General in Egypt until 1907.

In intervening in Egypt in 1882, England became immediately involved in a further enterprise which ended in disaster and humiliation. Egypt possessed a dependency to the south, the Soudan, a vast region comprising chiefly the basin of the Upper Nile, a poorly organized territory with a varied, semi-civilized, nomadic population, and a capital at Khartoum. This province, long oppressed by Egypt, was in full process of revolt. It found a chief in a man called the Mahdi, or leader, who succeeded in

arousing the fierce religious fanaticism of the Soudanese by claiming to be a kind of Prophet or Messiah. Winning successes over the Egyptian troops, he proclaimed a religious war, the people of the whole Soudan rallied about him, and the result was that the troops were driven into their fortresses and there besieged. Would England recognize any obligation to preserve the Soudan for Egypt? Gladstone, then prime minister, determined to abandon the Soudan. But even this was a matter of difficulty. It involved at least the rescue of the imprisoned garrisons. The ministry was unwilling to send a military expedition. It finally decided to send out General Gordon, a man who had shown a remarkable power in influencing half-civilized races. It was understood that there was to be no expedition. It was apparently supposed that somehow Gordon, without military aid, could accomplish the safe withdrawal of the garrisons. He reached Khartoum, but found the danger far more serious than had been supposed, the rebellion far more menacing. He found himself shortly shut up in Khartoum, surrounded by frenzied and confident Mahdists. At once there arose in England a cry for the relief of Gordon, a man whose personality, marked by heroic, eccentric, magnetic qualities, bafflingly contradictory, had seized in a remarkable degree the interest, enthusiasm, and imagination of the English people. But the Government was dilatory. Weeks, and even months, went by. Finally, an expedition was sent out in September 1884. Pushing forward rapidly, against great difficulties, it reached Khartoum January 28, 1885, only to find the flag of the Mahdi floating over it. Only two days before the place had been stormed and Gordon and eleven thousand of his men massacred. Public opinion held Gladstone responsible, and as a result his ministry was quickly overthrown.

For the next decade the Soudan was left in the hands of the dervishes, completely abandoned. But it was certain that the reconquest of the provinces would some day be attempted. Various forces contributed to this end—the national honor, the feeling that Gordon must be avenged, the sense of humiliation that the Egyptian empire had grown smaller under English rule, the conviction that the power that controls the lower reaches of the Nile must, for its own safety, control the upper reaches and the sources, also. And another cause was the pronounced growth during these years, in England as elsewhere, of the spirit of imperialism, eager for an onward march. In 1896 an Anglo-Egyptian army was sent into the Soudan under General Kitchener. Building a railway as he advanced, in order properly to supply

his army, he progressed "very slowly, but very surely." At the battle of Omdurman, September 2, 1898, the power of the dervishes was completely annihilated. Thus the Soudan was recovered, but it was recovered, not for Egypt, but for England and Egypt. The British and the Egyptian flags were both raised over the conquered field. Thus the power of England in the Soudan rested technically upon a different basis than did its power in Egypt.

Egypt and the Soudan were practically declared annexed to the British Empire in 1914 as an incident of the European War. The Khedive was deposed and a new Khedive was put in his place, and Great Britain prepared to rule Egypt as she rules many of the states of India, preserving the formality of a native prince as sovereign. Egypt was declared a "Protected State." This protectorate was destined, however, to end in 1922.

CHAPTER XXVII

SPAIN AND PORTUGAL


SPAIN AFTER 1823

WE have traced the history of Spain from the downfall of Napoleon to the year 1823, and have seen the restored King Ferdinand VII reign in a manner so cruel, so unintelligent, and tyrannical that the people rose in insurrection and insisted upon being accorded a liberal constitution.¹ And we have seen that as a result the powers, commonly called the Holy Alliance, intervened in 1823 to put down this reform movement, sent a French army into the peninsula, and restored to Ferdinand his former absolute power. This recovery of his former position through foreign aid was followed by a period of disgraceful and ruthless revenge on the part of Ferdinand upon those who had stood out as Liberals, or had merely been lukewarm toward the King. Forced finally by the energetic remonstrances of the French, who had put him back upon his absolute throne, to moderate the frenzy of his wrath, he was obliged to grant an amnesty, which proved, however, to be most deceptive, as it excepted from its operation fifteen different classes. The royal rage was slow in subsiding. Hundreds were executed at the order of courts-martial for the most trivial acts in which there was the slightest tinge of liberalism, such as uttering so-called "subversive" cries, or possessing a portrait of Riego, or defacing an inscription "Long live the Absolute King." Various classes were carefully watched as "suspects," military men, lawyers, doctors, professors, and even veterinary surgeons. Universities and clubs, political and social, were closed as dangerous, yet most of them were entirely innocuous, and little disposed to criticise or disturb the existing order. The University of Cervera, for instance, had begun an address to the monarch with the reassuring words, "Far from us the dangerous novelty of thinking." After closing the universities as inimical to society, Ferdinand endowed a school of bull-fighting at Seville.

Ferdinand VII ruled for ten years after his second restoration,

¹ See Chapter III.

AFRICA
1910



European Possessions

☐	German	☐	British
☐	French	☒	Portuguese
☒	Spanish	☐	Italian
☐	under Turkish Suzerainty	☒	Belgian

Abbreviations:

K. - British Kaffraria
W. Gt. West (Fingua Land)
E. Gt. East (Fingua Land)
T. - Tembu Land





and in the spirit of unprogressive, unenlightened absolutism. His reign is not signalized by any attempt to improve the conditions of a country that sorely needed reform. It is notable mainly for the loss of the immense Spanish empire in the new world, and the rise of the independent states of Central and South America. Practically nothing remained under the scepter of the King save Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines.

Ferdinand's chief interest in the last years of his reign was the determination of the succession. He had no heir. But, assured, in March 1830, that one was about to be born to him, he wished that the child, whether son or daughter, should succeed him. In the case of a daughter, however, the Salic law would stand in the way. This law was not a native product of the evolution of the Spanish monarchy. For centuries the laws of Castille and Leon had permitted women to rule, and one of the great figures in Spanish history was Isabella, Queen of Castille, the patroness of Columbus, who, moreover, upon her death was succeeded by her daughter. But with the accession of the Bourbon line of monarchs the Salic law was introduced. It was a French importation, resting on the decree of Philip V, issued in 1713. As the king was absolute, his decree made it law.

In 1789 Charles IV prepared to rescind this law. A decree was drawn up, called the Pragmatic Sanction, making the change. But this decree was not published, and was known only to a few. Forty years later, in March 1830, Ferdinand VII drew it forth and promulgated it, whereupon Don Carlos, his brother, and the next in the line of succession, if the Salic law were not repealed, issued a public protest and announced his intention to assert his rights to the crown if the contingency should arise. In October 1830 a daughter, Isabella, was born.

The matter now became the subject of court bickering and intrigue, one faction struggling for the withdrawal of the new decree, the other for its maintenance. In 1832 the King fell ill, and, believing his end to be near, and dominated at the time by the supporters of Don Carlos, he signed a paper revoking the Pragmatic Sanction, September 18, 1832. The King, contrary to all expectations, began to recover, whereupon his sister-in-law, aunt of the little Isabella, forced her way to his bedside, berated him for his weakness, had the decree revoking the Pragmatic Sanction brought her, and tore it up.

The King did not change his mind again, and when he died, September 29, 1833, his daughter Isabella, three years of age, was proclaimed Queen, with her mother, Christina, as Regent.

Christina was in power seven years, from 1833 to 1840, when she was driven into exile. During that time the Carlist war and the political evolution of the kingdom constituted the two chief series of events.

Don Carlos, true to his word, refusing to recognize the revocation of the Salic law, proclaimed himself king immediately after the death of Ferdinand, and a war of seven years was necessary to determine whether he or his niece, Isabella, should henceforth be the ruler of Spain. The supporters of Isabella, called *Christinos*, after the Regent Christina, had the advantage of being in actual possession of Madrid and the machinery of government. They also controlled a part of the army. Don Carlos, on the other hand, was supported by the clergy and nobility, and all who believed in thorough-going absolutism, many of whom considered even the régime of the late Ferdinand too mild. The war between these factions was very irregular and incoherent, and is of little interest. As neither side had numerous troops or large resources, the fighting was carried on in guerilla fashion by small detachments. Local issues entered in to make confusion worse confounded.

Christina had no desire to use her position for the purpose of reforming Spain. "I will maintain scrupulously," she said at the outset, "the form and fundamental laws of the monarchy, admitting none of the dangerous innovations of which we already know too well the cost. The best form of government for a country is that to which it is accustomed." Christina was an absolutist by training and conviction. Yet under her the Spanish monarchy was changed from an absolute to a constitutional one. She saw the Carlists victorious in the north, and even gaining a part of old Castille. She was forced to appeal to the Liberals for support, and to gain them was obliged to grant the Royal Statute of 1834. This established a parliament divided into two bodies, the Chamber of Peers and the Chamber of Deputies. The latter was to be elected by the property owners for a term of three years. The Chambers were to have the power to vote taxes and laws. But the Government was to have sole right to propose laws. Ministers, moreover, were not to be responsible to the Chambers, to rise and fall according to their will, but were to be responsible to the monarch alone. The Crown could summon and dissolve the Chamber of Deputies, but a year must not pass without a meeting of Parliament. This statute resembled the French Charter of 1814. It granted a certain amount of individual liberty. It created a parliament which represented

the propertied class, but whose powers were not large. It marks some progress, as by it, by action of the Crown itself, instead of by action of revolutionists, as hitherto, Spain became a constitutional state. The gain, though largely nominal, was something. It did not satisfy the Liberals, but it contributed somewhat to the political education of the country.

The parliamentary history of Spain, opening in 1834, was much disturbed, bewildering and unprofitable to follow. Ministries changed with amazing frequency, parties were more nominal than real, not representing bodies of divergent political principles, but serving as masks for men who were eager to get into office as an easy method of gaining a livelihood. The ministries were short; in twenty-five years, from 1833 to 1858, there were 47 presidents of council, 61 ministers of the interior, 78 of finance, and 96 of war.

The Liberals were divided into two groups, the Moderates and the Progressists. The Moderates accepted the Statute of 1834, which so carefully guarded the rights of the monarch, and gave him such power over the chambers. But the Progressists demanded the far more liberal Constitution of 1812, which clearly proclaimed the sovereignty of the people and made Parliament more powerful than the monarch. As the Carlist war continued unfavorable, Christina was driven to make further concessions. The Constitution of 1837 was accordingly promulgated, more liberal than the Statute of 1834, less liberal than the Constitution of 1812. The Parliament or Cortes was henceforth to consist of a Senate and a Congress, the former to be appointed for life and, under certain restrictions, by the Crown, the latter to be elected by the voters for three years. This Constitution had been framed by a constituent Cortes, whereas the Statute of 1834 was merely a royal decree.

The Carlist war was finally brought to a close, with the help of England and France, in 1840, but at the same time the Queen Regent was driven from the country. Actual direction of the government now fell for many years into the hands of rival military leaders. The war had left the army the strongest force in the state. Isabella II was declared of age in 1843, and the government was carried on henceforth in her name. Her reign, which lasted until 1868, was one, on the whole, of reaction. Adhering tenaciously to the forms of religion, and to the principle of monarchical authority, the Queen was influenced throughout by her favorites, by a camarilla, and did not observe the spirit, and frequently not the letter, of the constitution. Her reign

was marked by absolutism nearly as unqualified as that of her predecessors. Constitutional forms were used to cover arbitrary actions. It was a period of short and weak ministries, court intrigue, petty politics, a period little instructive. Whatever disturbances occurred were vigorously repressed.

In 1861 Spain joined England and France in sending an expedition to Mexico to enforce certain claims upon the Mexican government. Spain and England quickly withdrew from this undertaking, leaving France to embark upon one of the most ill-starred enterprises of Napoleon III. In 1861 also Spain took possession again of her former colony of San Domingo, only to relinquish it a little later as the result of a revolt.

Dissatisfaction with the existing régime, marked, as it was, by arbitrariness, by religious and intellectual intolerance, by abuses and corruption, and by the scandalous immorality of the Queen, increased as the reign progressed. The more liberal politicians and officers in the army and navy, persecuted under this régime, became revolutionary. In 1865 an insurrection broke out, led by General Prim. It was suppressed and Prim sought refuge in exile. In 1866 and 1867 similar movements occurred, likewise abortive. But in 1868 the issue was different. More widespread than the others, and more carefully organized, this revolt resulted in the flight of the Queen to France, and in the establishment of a provisional government, in which Marshal Serrano and General Prim were the leading figures. The reign of the Spanish Bourbons was declared at an end, and universal suffrage, religious liberty, and freedom of the press were proclaimed as the fundamental principles of the future constitution. The Society of Jesus was suppressed.

The Cortes were elected a little later by universal suffrage, and the future government of Spain was left to their determination. They drew up a constitution based upon popular sovereignty, and promulgated it in June 1869. They pronounced in favor of a monarchy and against a republic, by a vote of 214 to 71. They established a regency under Marshal Serrano, to conduct the government until a king should be chosen. This proved to be no easy task. The queen, Isabella II, abdicated in favor of her son Alfonso, but those in power were opposed to any representative of the House of Bourbon. It was considered necessary that the king should be a Roman Catholic; that, moreover, he should be of royal blood. Some advocated a son of Louis Philippe, others a Portuguese prince. Finally, after long negotiations, Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern was chosen. His

candidacy is important in history as having been the immediate occasion of the Franco-Prussian war of 1870. In the end Leopold declined the offer.

At length, November 1870, the crown was offered by a vote of 191 out of 311, to Amadeo, second son of Victor Emmanuel II.¹ The smallness of the majority was ominous. The new king's reign was destined to be short and troubled. Landing in Spain at the close of 1870, he was coldly received. Opposition to him came from several sources — from the Republicans, who were opposed to any monarch; from the Carlists, who claimed that the heir of Don Carlos, brother of Ferdinand VII, was the lawful king; from the supporters of Alfonso, son of Isabella, who held that he was the legitimate ruler. Amadeo was disliked also for the simple reason that he was a foreigner. The clergy attacked him for his adherence to constitutional principles of government. No strong body of politicians supported him. Ministries rose and fell with great rapidity, eight in two years, one of them lasting only seventeen days. Each change left the government more disorganized and more unpopular. Believing that the problem of giving peace to Spain was insoluble, and wearying of an uneasy crown, Amadeo, in February 1873, resigned his powers into the hands of the Cortes. In a letter to that body he said: "I realize that my good intentions have been in vain. For two long years have I worn the crown of Spain, and Spain still lives in continual strife, departing day by day more widely from that era of peace and prosperity for which I have so ardently yearned. I am to-day firmly convinced of the barrenness of my efforts and the impossibility of attaining my aims. These, deputies, are the reasons that move me to give back to the nation, and in its name to you, the crown offered me by the national suffrage, renouncing it for myself, my children, and my successors."

The abdication of Amadeo left the nation without an executive. The ministry necessarily disappeared with the monarch, whose servant it was. The Cortes alone remained as a depository of power. In the Cortes there were many Republicans. Feeling that monarchy by divine right had failed in the person of Isabella II, and ought not to be restored by calling either her or her son to the throne, feeling also that elective monarchy had failed in the person of Amadeo, they held that the only alternative was the republic, that, moreover, it was the only form

¹ Sixty-three voted for a republic; the other votes were scattering or blank.

of government consistent with the principle of the sovereignty of the people. The Monarchists, taken by surprise, had no definite plan. The Cortes, therefore, proclaimed the Republic, February 12, 1873, by a vote of 258 to 32, and declared that the constitution should be framed by a convention to be chosen especially for that purpose. Castelar, a prominent Republican, speaking of the fall of the monarchy, declared that it had not been brought about by violence. "No one destroyed it. It died of natural causes. The monarchy died of internal decomposition. It died by the providence of God. The Republic is the creation of circumstances. It comes from a conjuncture of society and nature and history."

But the advent of the Republic did not bring peace. Indeed, its history was short and agitated. European powers, with the exception of Switzerland, withdrew their diplomatic representatives. The United States alone recognized the new government. The Republic lasted from February 1873 to the end of December 1874. It established a wide suffrage, proclaimed religious liberty "in all its purity," proposed the complete separation of the church and state, and voted unanimously for the immediate emancipation of slaves in Porto Rico.

The causes of its fall were numerous. The fundamental one was that the Spaniards had had no long political training, essential for efficient self-government, no true experience in party management. The leaders did not work together harmoniously. Moreover, the Republicans, once in power, immediately fell apart into various groups, of which the principal were those who believed in a centralized republic and those who believed in a federal republic. The Federalists differed even among themselves as to the size of the various units that should form the federation. The avowed enemies of the Republic were numerous, the Monarchists, the clergy, offended by the proclamation of religious liberty, all those who profited by the old régime, and who resented the reforms which were threatened. Also, the problems that faced the new government increased the confusion. Three wars were in progress during the brief life of the Republic — a war in Cuba, a Carlist war, and a war with the Federalists in southern Spain.

Presidents succeeded each other rapidly. Figueras was in office four months, Pi y Margall six weeks, Salmeron and Castelar for short periods. Finally, Serrano became practically dictator. The fate of the Republic was determined by the generals of the army, the most powerful body in the country, who declared in

December 1874 in favor of Alfonso, son of Isabella II. The Republic fell without a struggle. Alfonso, landing in Spain early in 1875, and being received in Madrid with great enthusiasm, assumed the government, promising a constitutional monarchy. The Carlist war was brought to an end in the following year. Thus, six years after the dethronement of Isabella, her son was welcomed back as king. Those six years had been characterized by instability and governmental confusion. The new King had followed his mother into exile in 1868, and had spent the intervening years in study in France, Austria, Switzerland, and England. He was now seventeen years of age. His reign lasted ten years, until his death in November 1885. In 1876 a new Constitution was voted, the last in the long line of ephemeral documents issuing during the century from either monarch or Cortes or revolutionary junta. Still in force, the Constitution of 1876 declared the person of the king inviolable, created a responsible ministry, a parliament of two chambers, a Congress of Deputies, elected by voters meeting a property qualification, and a Senate, consisting of three classes, those sitting in their own right, such as sons of the king, *grandees* of a certain wealth, admirals of the navy, archbishops, life members appointed by the king, and elective members, chosen for five years by certain corporations, such as provincial legislatures and universities, and by the wealthier citizens. The executive power was vested in the king, the legislative in the king and the parliament. No project should become law unless passed by both houses. Spain possesses the machinery of parliamentary government, ministries rising and falling according to the votes of parliament. Practically, however, the political warfare is largely mimic. The two chief parties in 1876 were the Conservatives, led by Canovas, and the Liberals, led by Sagasta. But they were divided, not so much by principle, as by a desire for office. Parliamentary institutions have been used for purposes of personal advantage rather than for the increase of the national well-being through courageous and intelligent legislation. They constitute a parody on the parliamentary system.

Alfonso XII died in 1885. His wife, an Austrian princess, Maria Christina, was proclaimed regent for a child born a few months later, the present King Alfonso XIII. Maria Christina, during the sixteen years of her regency, confronted many difficulties. Of these the most serious was the condition of Cuba, Spain's chief colony. An insurrection had broken out in that island in 1868, occasioned by the gross misgovernment of the

mother country. This Cuban war dragged on for ten years, cost Spain nearly 100,000 men and \$200,000,000, and was only ended in 1878 by means of lavish bribes and liberal promises of reform in the direction of self-government. As these promises were not fulfilled, and as the condition of the Cubans became more unendurable, another rebellion broke out in 1895. This new war, prosecuted with great and savage severity by Weyler, ultimately aroused the United States to intervene in the interests of humanity and civilization. A war resulted between the United States and Spain in 1898, which proved most disastrous to the latter. Her naval power was annihilated in the battles of Santiago and Cavite; her army in Santiago was forced to surrender, and she was compelled to sign the Treaty of Paris of 1898, by which she renounced Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippine Islands. The Spanish Empire, which at the opening of the nineteenth century bulked large on the map of the world, comprising immense possessions in America, and the islands of both hemispheres, has disappeared. Revolts in Central and South America, beginning when Joseph Napoleon became King in 1808, and ending with Cuban independence ninety years later, have left Spain with the mere shreds of her former possessions, Rio de Oro, Rio Muni in western Africa, a strip of northern Morocco, and a few small islands off the African coast. The Canary Islands are not colonies but form one of the provinces of the kingdom. The disappearance of the Spanish colonial empire is one of the most significant features of the nineteenth century. Once one of the great world powers, Spain is to-day a state of inferior rank, a negligible quantity in this era of world politics.

In 1902 the present King, Alfonso XIII, formally assumed the reins of government. He married in May 1906 Princess Ena of Battenberg. Profound and numerous reforms are necessary to range the country in the line of progress. Though universal suffrage was established in 1890, political conditions and methods have not changed. Illiteracy is widespread. Out of a population of 18,000,000 perhaps 12,000,000 are illiterate. In recent years attempts have been made to improve this situation; also to reduce the influence of the Roman Catholic Church in the state. Nothing important has yet been accomplished in this direction. Liberty of public worship has only recently been secured for Protestants and other religious bodies.

PORTUGAL, 1815-1909

Portugal, like other countries, felt the full shock of Napoleonic aggression. French armies were sent into the peninsula in 1807 for the purpose of forcing that country into the Continental System, of closing all Europe to English commerce. The royal family fled from Lisbon just as the French were approaching, and went to the capital of Portugal's leading colony, Brazil. The actual authority in Portugal for several years was the English army and Lord Beresford. Portugal suffered during this period the immense loss of a million in population. After the fall of Napoleon the Portuguese hoped for the return of the royal family, but this did not occur. The King, John VI, was contented in Rio de Janeiro; moreover, he felt that his departure from Brazil would be the signal for a rebellion in that colony, which would result in its independence. The situation gave great dissatisfaction to the Portuguese, whose pride was hurt by the fact that they no longer had a court in Lisbon, and that the mother country seemed to be in the position of a colony, inferior in importance to Brazil. Moreover, Beresford remained in Portugal after 1814, and was the real ruler of the country. The relations between the Portuguese and the English were strained from the beginning. The army was disaffected because it was not promptly paid, and because many of the positions in it were held by Englishmen. An occasion for the explosion of the growing discontent was furnished by the Spanish revolution of 1820. Encouraged by the movement in the sister state, the Portuguese army revolted, and the Cortes were summoned to frame a constitution. This body adopted, in 1822, what was practically the famous Spanish Constitution of 1812, which, as has been shown, was largely the French Constitution of 1791, the ideal of radicals in various countries; which, moreover, possessed the advantage of being ready made. The King accepted it, and Portugal, hitherto an absolute monarchy, became a constitutional one. The King meanwhile had returned from Brazil, leaving his eldest son, Dom Pedro, as regent of that country. In 1822 Brazil declared itself an independent empire, under Dom Pedro I. Three years later its independence was recognized by Portugal.

Meanwhile, the Portuguese Constitution proved short-lived. As the absolutists regained control in Spain in 1823, the absolutists in Portugal also were encouraged to attempt to recover their power, and succeeded. The first experiment in constitutional government had been very brief, but it resulted in leaving a constitutional party confronting an absolutist party.

The death of King John VI in 1826 created a new crisis, which distracted the country for many years. His eldest son, Dom Pedro, was Emperor of Brazil. His younger son was Dom Miguel. Dom Pedro was lawfully King of Portugal. He opened his reign as Pedro IV by granting a liberal constitutional charter introducing parliamentary government of the English type. Then, not wishing to return from Brazil, he abdicated in favor of his daughter, Donna Maria da Gloria. Hoping to disarm his brother Dom Miguel, who himself wished to be king, he betrothed his daughter, aged seven, to Dom Miguel, decreeing that the marriage should be consummated when Donna Maria became of age. He then appointed Dom Miguel regent for the little princess. But Miguel, landing in Portugal in 1828, was proclaimed king by the absolutists. He accepted the crown. His reign was odious in the extreme, characterized by cruelty and arbitrariness, by a complete defiance of the law, of all personal liberty, by imprisonments and deportations and executions. Dom Pedro abdicated his position as Emperor of Brazil, and returned to Europe to take charge of the cause of his daughter. This civil war between Maria da Gloria and Dom Miguel resulted in the favor of the former. Dom Miguel formally renounced all claims to the throne and left Portugal never to return (1834).

Maria reigned until her death in 1853, a reign rendered turbulent and unstable by the violence of political struggles and by frequent insurrections. In 1852 the Charter of 1826, restored by Maria's government, was liberalized by important alterations, with the result that various parties were satisfied, and political life under her successor, Pedro V, was mild and orderly. His reign was uneventful. He was followed in 1861 by Louis I, and he in 1889 by Carlos I.

Of recent years radical parties, Republican, Socialist, have grown up. Discontent during this period expressed itself by deeds of violence. The Government replied by becoming more and more arbitrary. The King, Carlos I, even assumed to alter the Charter of 1826, still the basis of Portuguese political life, by mere decree. The controversy between Liberals, Radicals, and Conservatives developed astounding bitterness. Parliamentary institutions ceased to work normally, necessary legislation could not be secured. On February 1, 1908, the King and the Crown Prince were assassinated in the streets of Lisbon. The King's second son, Manuel, succeeded him. Manuel's reign was brief, for, in October, 1910, a revolution broke out in Lisbon. After several days of severe street fighting the monarchy was

overthrown and a Republic was proclaimed. The King escaped to England. Dr. Theophile Braga, a native of the Azores, and for over forty years a distinguished man of letters, was chosen President. The constitution was remodeled and liberalized. The Church was separated from the State in 1911, and State payments for the maintenance and expenses of worship ceased.

Since 1910, therefore, Portugal has been a Republic. The problems confronting her are numerous and serious. She is burdened with an immense debt, disproportionate to her resources, and entailing oppressive taxation. Although primary education has been compulsory since 1911, a very large percentage of the population over six years of age still remain illiterate. Portugal's population is about six millions. She has small colonial possessions in Asia and extensive ones in Africa, which have thus far proved of little value. The Azores and Madeira are not colonies, but are integral parts of the republic.

Portugal was destined to play a minor but honorable rôle in the European War, side by side with the Entente Allies.

CHAPTER XXVIII

HOLLAND AND BELGIUM AFTER 1830

HOLLAND

WE have described the dismemberment of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1830, and the years succeeding. That kingdom, which included what we know as Holland and Belgium, was the work of the Congress of Vienna, created as a bulwark against France. The Belgians had revolted, and, supported in the end by some of the great powers, had won their independence. Since then there have been two kingdoms.

The old Dutch provinces preserved the name henceforth of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. This kingdom, more frequently called Holland in English-speaking countries, has had a history of comparatively quiet internal development, and has played no important rôle in international politics. It has passed through several reigns, that of William I, from 1814 to 1840; of William II, from 1840 to 1849; of William III, from 1849 to 1890, and of Queen Wilhelmina since 1890. The questions of greatest prominence in her separate history have been those concerning constitutional liberties, educational policy, and colonial administration.

The political system rested upon the Fundamental Law granted by William I in 1815. By this the kingdom became a constitutional monarchy, but a monarchy in which the king was more powerful than the parliament, or States-General. By that law, the States-General were composed of two chambers, one of which consisted of members appointed for life by the king, the other of members chosen by the estates of the provinces, which themselves were chosen by voters meeting a certain property qualification. The legislative power of the States-General was restricted to the acceptance and rejection of bills submitted by the Government. They had no powers of origination or of amendment. The budget was voted for a period of years; the civil service was beyond their control. The ministry was not responsible to them, but to the king alone.

Such a system was an advance upon absolutism, but it left the king extensive powers, not easily or adequately controlled,

and rendered possible the personal government of William I, which ended in the revolt of the Belgians in 1830. The Liberals of Holland demanded that this system should be radically changed, and that thenceforth the emphasis should be laid upon parliament, and that parliament should be brought into closer connection with the people. After an agitation of several years they were rewarded with a considerable measure of success. A revision of the constitution was made by a commission appointed by the King, and was adopted by an extraordinary States-General in 1848, the general revolutionary tendency of that time no doubt facilitating the change. By the revised Constitution of 1848 the power of the king was diminished, that of parliament greatly increased. The Upper House was no longer to be appointed by the monarch, but elected by the provincial estates. The Lower House was to be chosen directly by the voters, that is, those who paid a certain property tax, varying according to locality. The ministers were made responsible to the States-General, which also acquired the right to initiate legislation, to amend projects submitted, and to vote the budget annually. Their sessions became public. Later reforms reorganized the provincial estates. Holland is divided into eleven provinces, each with its estates. The principle at the basis of these, of division into orders, or estates, was abolished. They were henceforth to be elected directly by those who were entitled to vote for the popular chamber of the States-General. Properly speaking, they ceased to be estates, and became legislatures in the modern sense, though the old name was preserved. Since 1848 the constitution has been subjected to slight amendments, one of the more important being the enlargement in 1887 of the electorate and the extension of the suffrage practically to householders and lodgers, as in England. This increased the number of voters from about 140,000 to about 300,000. By a later reform, voted in 1896, increasing the variety of property qualifications, the number was augmented to about 700,000, or one for every seven inhabitants. Universal suffrage and proportional representation were introduced in 1917. The Second Chamber is elected directly by citizens of both sexes who are twenty-five years of age or older. The electoral body now numbers over three million voters.

The Kingdom of the Netherlands possesses extensive colonies in the East Indies and the West Indies. Of these the most important is Java. Sumatra, Borneo, Celebes in Asia, Curaçao and Surinam or Dutch Guiana in America, are valuable possessions.

The Dutch colonial empire has a population of about 47,000,000, compared with a population of about 7,000,000 in the Netherlands themselves. The colonies are of great importance commercially, furnishing tropical commodities in large quantities, sugar, coffee, pepper, tea, tobacco, and indigo.

BELGIUM

The constitution adopted by the Belgians in 1831, at the time of their separation from Holland, is still the basis of the state. It established an hereditary monarchy, a parliament of two chambers, and a ministry responsible to it. The King, Leopold I, scrupulously observed the methods of parliamentary government from the outset, choosing his ministers from the party having the majority in the chambers. Leopold's reign lasted from 1831 to his death in 1865. It was one of peaceful development. Institutions essential to the welfare of the people were founded. Though the neutrality of Belgium was guaranteed by the powers, it was nevertheless essential that she should herself have force enough to maintain her neutrality. The army was, consequently, organized and put upon a war basis of 100,000 men. State universities were founded, and primary and secondary schools were opened in large numbers. Legislation favorable to industry and commerce was adopted. Railroads were built. Liberty of religion, of the press, of association, of education, was guaranteed by the Constitution. Foreign relations were prudently conducted by Leopold I, whose influence with other rulers of Europe was great, owing to his extensive acquaintance with European statesmen, his knowledge of politics, his sureness of judgment. Under Leopold I Belgium's material and intellectual development was rapid.

He was succeeded in 1865 by his son, Leopold II, who ruled for forty-four years. The two most important political questions during most of this period concerned the suffrage and the schools. The suffrage was limited by a comparatively high property qualification, with the result that in 1890 there were only about 135,000 voters out of a population of six millions. As the cities had grown rapidly, and as the working classes were practically disfranchised, the demand for universal suffrage became increasingly clamorous until it could no longer be ignored. In 1893 the Constitution was revised, and the suffrage greatly enlarged. Every man of twenty-five years of age, not disqualified for some special reason, received the franchise. But supple-

mentary votes were given to those who, in addition to the age qualification, could meet certain property qualifications. This is the principle of plural voting, and was designed to give the propertied classes more weight than they would have from numbers alone. It was provided that no voter should have more than three votes. This form of suffrage was strongly opposed by the Socialists, a growing party which attempted to secure the recognition of the principle of "one man, one vote," but which was not destined to succeed until after the close of the Great War.

The political parties of most importance have been the Liberal and the Catholic, and latterly the Socialist. The Catholics have struggled to gain sectarian religious instruction in the schools, and have in great measure succeeded. Their opponents desire unsectarian schools.

Belgium is the most densely populated country in Europe. Its population of more than seven millions is overwhelmingly Roman Catholic. It possesses one colony, the former Congo Free State, transformed into a colony in 1908.

Leopold II died December 17, 1909, and was succeeded by his nephew, Albert I. Less than five years after the accession of King Albert the Great War broke out and Belgium was its first victim, a very conspicuous and very influential victim, for many reasons, one of which should be mentioned here.

There were in Europe in 1914 about twenty different states. It is difficult to give the precise number, since the exact status of one or two of them was somewhat doubtful. Some of these states were extremely small. There were two petty republics. One was Andorra, located in the Pyrenees, and consisting chiefly of a valley surrounded by high mountain peaks and having a population of about five thousand. Its maximum length is seventeen miles, its width eighteen. Andorra is under the suzerainty of France and of the Spanish Bishop of Urgel, paying 960 francs a year to the former, 460 pesetas to the latter. The other of these republics is San Marino, which claims to be the oldest state in Europe, is located on a spur of the Apennines, entirely surrounded by Italy, and possesses a population of about twelve thousand. San Marino is the sole survivor of those numerous city-republics which abounded in Italy during the Middle Ages. Then there was also the little principality of Liechtenstein, lying between Switzerland and Austria, and having a population of about eleven thousand. There was also in 1914 the principality of Albania, a state which was created by international action in

1912 and 1913, and which collapsed in the following year at the outbreak of the war. But whatever the exact status of these petty states may be, they may be ignored in our survey as, with the exception of Albania, they have not counted in the general politics of Europe.

There were in 1914 three other states which occupied a peculiar position. They were the so-called neutralized states, Belgium, Luxemburg, and Switzerland. A neutralized state is one whose independence and integrity are solemnly guaranteed by international agreement. Such states may generally maintain armies, but only for defense. They may never make aggressive war; nor may they make treaties or alliances with other states that may lead them into war. The reason why a state may desire to become neutralized is that it is weak, that its independence is guaranteed, that it has no desire or ability to participate in international affairs, in the usual struggles or competitions of states. The reasons why the great powers have consented to the neutralization of such states have differed in different cases. But the chief reason has been connected with the theory of the balance of power, the desire to keep them as buffers between two or more neighboring large states. Switzerland was neutralized in 1815 at the close of the Napoleonic wars, and its neutrality has never been infringed. Belgium was neutralized in 1831 when it separated from Holland and became an independent state, and its neutralization was confirmed in the treaties of 1839, and was recognized generally by the states of Europe. Luxemburg was neutralized in 1867 when it was freed from its previously existing connections with Germany as an incident to the reorganization of Germany and the establishment of the North German Confederation, after the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 and the famous battle of Königgrätz or Sadowa.

A neutralized state may, as has been said, have an army and a navy and may build fortresses, as long as this is done for purposes of self-defense only, for a neutralized state is obliged to defend its neutrality, if attacked, to the full extent of its powers. Thus, in 1914, Belgium and Switzerland had armies and universal military service. Luxemburg, however, was an anomaly, as the treaty of 1867, neutralizing her, provided explicitly that she should not be allowed to keep any armed force, with the exception of a police for the maintenance of public security and order. Under the circumstances, Luxemburg could do nothing for the defense of her neutrality when invaded in August, 1914. Belgium, however, could and did make a

spirited, though ineffectual, resistance to the invader. Switzerland was not attacked, but nevertheless she mobilized her army at the outbreak of the war and stood ready to defend herself, if necessary. Whether Belgium and Luxemburg, whose guaranteed rights were so poor a protection in 1914, would be neutralized again remained, of course, to be seen.

It was doubtful whether neutralization as an international device could stand the test of history, or not. Belgium's neutrality was observed by its guarantors for eighty-three years and then ruthlessly broken by one of them; Luxemburg's for forty-seven, then broken by the same power, Germany. Switzerland, was destined to be the only one of these specially "protected" states which was to pass unscathed through the Great War, its neutrality respected by its protectors for a full century and more.

From the point of view of recent European politics, the significance of Belgium and of her northern neighbor, Holland, from whom she revolted in 1830, has lain in the fact that they have been coveted by those Germans who have wished to increase the boundaries of the German Empire, and who have, to that end, advocated the absorption of certain territories lying beyond the boundaries of Germany. Belgium and Holland have been desired by the Pan-Germans because of their riches, industrial and agricultural, because of their coastline, abounding in excellent harbors on the Atlantic, fronting England, and also because of their colonies, Belgium possessing a vast African domain, now called the Congo Colony, rich in tropical products, and Holland possessing invaluable tropical islands in the East Indies, Java, Sumatra, Borneo, and Celebes. The Belgian colony had, in 1914, an area of some 900,000 square miles, an area about a fourth as large as that of the United States, including Alaska, with a population of perhaps ten million. The colonies of Holland or the Netherlands, as that state is officially called, had an area of about 800,000 square miles and a population of approximately thirty-eight millions. The Pan-Germans looked with greedy eyes upon these spacious and inviting territories, belonging to countries which, in a military sense, were conveniently weak. These colonies, and even the countries to which they belonged, were included in the Pan-Germanic dream of conquest.

The history of Belgium during and after the Great War will be narrated in a later chapter.

CHAPTER XXIX

SWITZERLAND

SWITZERLAND in 1815 was a loose confederation of twenty-two states or cantons.¹ These varied greatly in their forms of government. A few were real democracies, the people meeting *en masse* at stated periods, generally in some meadow or open place, to enact laws and to elect officials to execute them. But these were the smaller and poorer cantons. In others, the government was not direct but was representative. In some of these political power was practically monopolized by a group of important families, the patricians; in others by the propertied class. Most of the cantons, therefore, were not democratic, but were governed by privileged classes. The central government consisted of a Diet, which really was a congress of ambassadors, who voted according to the instructions given them by the cantons that sent them. In the language of political science, Switzerland was not a federal state, but was only a federation of states. Its constitution was the Pact of 1815, which was the work of a convention which met in Zurich and whose deliberations continued from April 1814 to August 1815. Switzerland did not have a capital. The Diet sat alternately in three leading cities, Bern, Zurich, and Lucerne.

In Swiss institutions, therefore, the emphasis was put upon the cantons, not upon the confederation. This had been the case during the five hundred years of Swiss history, save during a short period of French domination under the Directory, and under Napoleon. The cantons retained all powers that were not expressly granted to the Diet. They had their own postal systems, their own coinage. A person was a citizen of a canton, not of Switzerland. Leaving his canton, he was a man without a country. Cantons might make commercial treaties with foreign powers. The Pact of 1815 said nothing about the usual liberties of the press, of public meeting, of religion. These

¹ Three of these were divided into "half-cantons," thus making in all twenty-five cantonal governments. A "half-canton" has the same powers in local government as has a whole canton. In federal affairs, however, it has only half the weight. Vincent, *Government in Switzerland*, 40.

matters were, therefore, left in the hands of the cantons, which legislated as they chose, in some cases very illiberally. Several possessed established churches, and did not allow any others. Valais did not permit Protestant worship, Vaud did not permit Catholic. Education was entirely a cantonal affair. Most of the cantons were neither democratic nor liberal, and it remained for the future to accomplish the unification of these petty states.

For about fifteen years after 1815 most of the cantons followed generally reactionary policies. Then began the period which the Swiss call the era of regeneration, in which the constitutions of many of the cantons were liberalized by the recognition of the classes hitherto excluded from power, and now becoming clamorous. The cantonal governments were wise enough to make the concessions demanded, such as universal suffrage, freedom of the press, equality before the law, before discontent appealed to force. Between 1830 and 1847 there were nearly thirty revisions of cantonal constitutions.

The same party which demanded liberal cantonal constitutions demanded a stronger central government. This, however, was not effected so easily, but only after a short civil war, the war of the *Sonderbund*.

As each canton possessed control of religion and education, it had come about that in the seven Catholic cantons the Jesuits had gained great influence, which they were striving to increase. The Radical party stood for liberty of religion, secular education, a lay state. It wished to increase the power of the central government, so that it might impose its views upon the whole confederation. For this reason the Catholic cantons were opposed to any increase of the federal power, and wished to maintain the authority of the cantons untouched, for only thus could they maintain their views. Religious and political passions finally rose so high that in 1847 the seven Catholic cantons formed a special league (*Sonderbund*), for the purpose of protecting the interests which they considered threatened. They regarded their action as merely defensive against possible attack. The Radicals were, however, able to get a vote through the Diet ordering the disbandment of this league. As the members of the league refused to disband, a war resulted (1847). It was of brief duration and was over in three weeks. The victory, which did not cost many lives, was easily won by the forces of the federal government, which were much more numerous and better equipped than those of the league. The *Sonderbund* was dissolved, the Jesuits were expelled, and the triumphant Radicals

proceeded to carry out their cherished plan of strengthening the federal government. This they accomplished by the Constitution of 1848, which superseded the Pact of 1815. This constitution, with some changes, is still in force. It transformed Switzerland into a true federal union, resembling, in many respects, the United States. The Diet of ambassadors gave way to a representative body with extensive powers of legislation.

The federal legislature was henceforth to consist of two houses: the National Council, elected directly by the people, one member for every 20,000 inhabitants; and the Council of States, composed of two members for each canton. In the former, population counts; in the latter, the equality of the cantons is preserved. The two bodies sitting together choose the Federal Tribunal, and also a committee of seven, the Federal Council, to serve as the executive. From this committee of seven they elect each year one who acts as its chairman and whose title is "President of the Swiss Confederation," but whose power is no greater than that of any of the other members. It was recognized that there should be a single capital, and Bern was chosen as such, on account of its position on the border of the German- and French-speaking districts.

Larger powers were now given to the confederation: the control of foreign affairs, the army, tariffs, the postal system, and the coinage. The cantons retain great powers, such as the right to legislate concerning civil and criminal matters, religion, and education.

The new constitution was ratified by three-fourths of the cantons and two-thirds of the voters, and was put immediately into force. It converted an ancient league of states into a strong federal union. It created for the first time in history a real Swiss nation. This is one of the triumphs of the nationalistic spirit, of which Europe has seen so many in the nineteenth century. It is also a triumph of another of the motive forces of the century, the democratic spirit. The reform of the federal constitution in a manner satisfactory to the democratic demands of the time was only possible after a reform in the cantons in the direction of democracy. The cantonal reform movement of the decade preceding 1848 was the condition precedent to the Constitution of 1848.

Since 1848 Switzerland has pursued a course of peaceful development, but one of extraordinary interest to the outside world. This interest consists not in great events, not in foreign policy, for Switzerland has constantly preserved a strict neu-

trality, but in the steady and thoroughgoing evolution of certain political forms which may be of great value to all self-governing countries. There have been developed in Switzerland certain processes of law-making the most democratic in character known to the world. The achievement has been so remarkable, the process so uninterrupted, that it merits description.

In all countries calling themselves democratic, the political machinery is representative, not direct, i.e., the voters do not make the laws themselves, but merely at certain periods choose people, their representatives, who make them. These laws are not ratified or rejected by the voters; they never come before the voters directly. But the Swiss have sought, and with great success, to render the voters law-makers themselves, and not the mere choosers of law-makers, to apply the power of the democracy to the national life at every point, and constantly. They have done this in various ways. Their methods have been first worked out in the cantons, and later in the confederation.

Some of the smaller cantons have from time immemorial been pure democracies. The voters have met together at stated times, usually in the open air, and have elected their officials, and by a show of hands have voted the laws. There are six such cantons to-day. Such direct government is possible, because these cantons are small both in area and population. They are so small that no voter has more than fifteen miles to go to the voting place, and most have a much shorter distance. These mass meetings or *Landesgemeinden* are not unwieldy, varying from 2,000 to 10,000.

But in the other cantons this method does not prevail. In them the people elect representative assemblies, as in England and the United States, but they exercise a control over them not exercised in these countries, and which renders self-government almost as complete as in the six cantons described above. They do this by the so-called referendum and initiative. In the cantons where these processes are in vogue the people do not, as in the *Landesgemeinde* cantons, come together in mass meeting and enact their own laws. They elect, as in other countries, their own legislature, which enacts the laws. The government is representative, not democratic. But the action of the legislature is not final, only to be altered, if altered at all, by a succeeding legislature. Laws passed by the cantonal legislature may or must be referred to the people (referendum), who then have the right to reject or accept them, who, in other words, become the law-makers, their legislature being simply a kind of

committee to help them by suggesting measures and by drafting them. The referendum is of two kinds, optional and obligatory. The optional referendum requires that a law must be submitted to popular vote if a certain number of the voters petition for it. The proportion varies in the different cantons, ranging from a twelfth to a fifth of all the voters. The obligatory referendum requires, as the name implies, that all laws, or certain kinds of laws, shall be submitted without the need of petition. The obligatory form is the more democratic, requiring, as it does, a direct popular vote on every law.

The initiative, on the other hand, enables a certain number of voters to propose a law or a principle of legislation and to require that the legislature submit the proposal to the people, even though it is itself opposed to it.¹ If ratified the proposal becomes law. The initiative thus reverses the order of the process. The impulse to the making of a new law comes from the people, not from the legislature. The referendum is negative and preventative. It is the veto power given to the people. The initiative is positive, originative, constructive. By these two processes a democracy makes whatever laws it pleases. The one is the complement of the other. They do not abolish legislatures, but they give the people control whenever a sufficient number wish to exercise it. The constitution of the canton of Zurich expresses the relation as follows: "The people exercise the law-making power with the assistance of the state legislature." The legislature is not the final law-making body. The voters are the supreme legislators. These two devices, the referendum and the initiative, are intended to establish, and do establish, government of the people, and by the people. They are of immense interest to all who wish to make the practice of democracy correspond to the theory. By them Switzerland has more nearly approached democracy than has any other country.

This system has been mainly developed since 1848, though its beginnings may be found earlier. Its growth constitutes the most important feature of Swiss political history in the last half century. It has been adopted wholly or in part in all of the representative cantons, with the exception of Freiburg. It has also been introduced into the federal government. In 1874 the federal constitution was revised, and at that time the federal referendum was established, and since 1891 a kind of federal initiative exists, that is, the people have the right to initiate

¹ The number is about the same, in proportion to the whole number of voters, as is required in the case of the optional referendum.

constitutional amendments, not ordinary laws, but, as no sharp line separates the two, the power is practically unrestricted.

The Swiss have not only sought by these devices to subordinate the representative system to the higher will of the people, but they have at the same time sought to perfect that system itself by making it a more exact expression of that will. The method advocated to accomplish this is proportional representation, by which minorities are given weight in legislatures in proportion to their numbers. This system has been adopted in several cantons, and its advocates urge its adoption in the others, and in the confederation.¹

From being decentralized and undemocratic in 1815 Switzerland has achieved during the century a considerable degree of centralization, and has become the most democratic country in the world. It has made great progress in education and in industry. The population has increased over a million since 1850, and now numbers approximately four millions. This population is not homogeneous in race or language. About 71 per cent. speak German, 21 per cent. French, 5 per cent. Italian, and a small fraction speak a peculiar Romance language, called Roumansch. But language is not a divisive force, as it has been elsewhere, as for example, in former Austria-Hungary and in the Balkan peninsula, probably because no political advantages or disadvantages are connected with it.

The neutrality of Switzerland is guaranteed by the powers. From this fact, as well as from its central position, Switzerland has come to play a unique and important part in international affairs. It has become the seat of a number of useful international institutions — the Red Cross Society, whose flag is the Swiss flag with colors reversed; the International Postal Union, the International Telegraph Union. It has also played an important rôle in the international peace movement. It was in Geneva, in 1872, that the most important work of international arbitration of the nineteenth century was accomplished, that which settled the controversy between the United States and Great Britain which grew out of the *Alabama* claims. Since the World War Switzerland has become the seat of the League of Nations.

¹ Vincent, *Government in Switzerland*, 75-83.

CHAPTER XXX

THE SCANDINAVIAN STATES

DENMARK

DURING the later wars of Napoleon Denmark had been his ally, remaining loyal to the end, while other allies had taken favorable occasion to abandon him. For this conduct the conquerors of Napoleon punished her severely by forcing her by the Treaty of Kiel, January 1814, to cede Norway to Sweden, which had thrown in its lot with the Great Coalition. The condition of the Danish kingdom at the period of the opening of this history was deplorable, indeed. By the loss of Norway her population was reduced a third. Her trade was ruined, and her finances were in the greatest disorder.

The government was an absolute monarchy. Frederick VI was king from 1808 to 1839. Down to 1830 there was practically no political activity. The people were struggling to recover some measure of prosperity, the government was forced to pursue a quiet economical policy of routine to provide for the urgent needs of the state. The great war debt weighed heavily upon the nation. Not for a generation was it found possible to begin to reduce it.

But after 1830 a liberal movement developed of sufficient strength to necessitate some action on the part of the King. Thinking to quiet it by mild concessions, he established in 1834 four consultative estates — one for each of the provinces into which Denmark was divided — the Islands, Jutland, Schleswig, and Holstein. These assemblies were to be chosen for six years by the landed proprietors, and were to meet biennially. They were to have the power to discuss laws and taxes, to present petitions, to criticise the government. But they had no real authority, as they were merely consultative. The king might follow their advice, or accede to their petitions, or not, as he chose. Their meetings were behind closed doors, and their debates were not published.

Obviously, such assemblies did not at all satisfy the demands of the Liberals, who desired a real constitution and a real parlia-

ment. This party had high hopes that the succeeding king, Christian VIII, who ruled from 1839 to 1848, and who came to the throne with a reputation for enlightened and progressive ideas, would launch Denmark upon a career of liberalism, but their hopes were entirely disappointed. The agitation, therefore, continued, and grew so strong that Christian finally decided to grant a constitution, but he died before promulgating it.

His successor, Frederick VII, issued a constitution in June 1849, which was limited to the Islands and Jutland, and did not include the duchies, Schleswig and Holstein. In 1854 Frederick promulgated another constitution, and in 1855 still another. The difficulty was that the question of a constitution was bound up with that vastly complicated problem of the relation of the duchies, Schleswig and Holstein, to Denmark. This problem of the duchies dominated Danish politics during the entire reign of Frederick VII, from 1848 to 1863, never solved, and always highly disturbing. Under his successor, Christian IX, who reigned from 1863 to 1906, the problem entered upon its final phase, leading, as we have seen elsewhere, to the war of 1864 between Denmark on the one hand and Prussia and Austria on the other. The result of that war was the loss of the duchies to the two powers by the Treaty of Vienna, October 30, 1864. The question of the duchies was thus settled as far as Denmark was concerned. For the second time in the nineteenth century Denmark suffered a dismemberment at the hands of the great military powers. This reduced her territorial extent by a third, her population by about a million.

Since that war Denmark has pursued a policy of internal development, undisturbed by foreign politics. A constitution was issued in 1866, a revision of that of 1849, and it remained in force down to the outbreak of the World War. By it a parliament of two houses was established, the Upper House or Landsting, consisting of 66 members, twelve of whom were appointed by the king for life, the others being chosen by the large taxpayers for a term of eight years; and the Lower House, or Folkething, elected for three years by a wide suffrage.

For many years Christian IX ruled, relying on the Upper House in defiance of the wishes of the Lower. The dispute was over army reform and the budget, and the example followed was that of Bismarck in Prussia between 1862 and 1866. In the end the King was victorious. Constitutional government during these years (1873-1894) really existed only in name. Later the Radical party and, later still, the Socialist, increased greatly in

size and importance. Legislation along radical lines was enacted. In 1891 an old age pension system was established, extended by later laws. All over sixty years, of good character, are entitled to a pension, half of which is paid by the state, half by the local authority. There is no requirement of previous payments on the part of the recipients, as there is in Germany. Education is compulsory between the ages of seven and fourteen. The population of Denmark is over three million and a quarter. The area is about that of Switzerland.

Denmark had, throughout the nineteenth century and down to the Great War, extensive possessions — Greenland, Iceland, the Faroe Islands, and the three small West Indian islands of St. Croix, St. Thomas, and St. John. Of these the most important was Iceland, 600 miles west of Norway, with an area of over 40,000 square miles and a population of about 80,000. Iceland was granted home rule in 1874, and had her own parliament of thirty-six members. In 1874 she celebrated the thousandth anniversary of her settlement. Since December 1, 1918, Iceland has been recognized as a sovereign, independent state united with Denmark only by a personal bond. Both have the same King, Christian X. The Danish West Indies, the so-called Virgin Islands, were purchased by the United States for twenty-five million dollars by a treaty ratified by Denmark December 22, 1916, and by the government of the United States early in the following year. The Faroes are not colonies, but parts of the kingdom. Denmark's only colony at the present moment is therefore the island of Greenland.

As a result of the Great War Denmark was destined to recover Northern Schleswig, lost in 1864.

The present king is Christian X, who has been on the throne since 1912, having succeeded his father, Frederick VIII, who reigned from 1906 to 1912.

A new constitution was adopted in 1915, and put into force in 1918, introducing equal suffrage in the elections for both Houses, men and women being entitled to vote under identical conditions, the voting age being thirty-five for the Upper House and twenty-five for the Lower. The former now has a membership of 75 and the latter of 149. The system of proportional representation has been adopted.

SWEDEN AND NORWAY

Both Sweden and Norway were affected by the course of the

Napoleonic wars. After the Treaty of Tilsit of 1807, by which Russia and France became allies, Russia proceeded to gratify a long cherished ambition by seizing Finland from Sweden, thus gaining a large territory and a long coast line on the Baltic Sea. Later, Sweden, uniting with the Allies against Napoleon, was rewarded in 1814 by the acquisition of Norway, torn from Denmark, which had adhered to Napoleon to the end, and which was accordingly considered a proper subject for punishment.

The Norwegians had not been consulted in this transaction. They were regarded as a negligible quantity, a passive pawn in the international game, a conception that proved erroneous, for no sooner did they hear that they were being handed by outsiders from Denmark to Sweden than they protested, and proceeded to organize resistance. Claiming that the Danish King's renunciation of the crown of Norway restored that crown to themselves, they proceeded to elect a king of their own, May 17, 1814, and they adopted a liberal constitution, the Constitution of Eidsvold, establishing a parliament, or Storting.

But the King of Sweden, to whom this country had been assigned by the consent of the powers, did not propose to be deprived of it by act of the Norwegians themselves. He sent the Crown Prince, Bernadotte, into Norway to take possession. A war resulted between the Swedes and the Norwegians, the latter being victorious. Then the great powers intervened so peremptorily that the newly elected Norwegian king, Christian, resigned his crown into the hands of the Storting. The Storting then acquiesced in the union with Sweden, but only after having formally elected the King of Sweden as the King of Norway, thus asserting its sovereignty, and also after the King had promised to recognize the Constitution of 1814, which the Norwegians had given themselves.

Thus there was no fusion of Norway and Sweden. There were two kingdoms and one king. The same person was King of Sweden and King of Norway, but he governed each according to its own laws, and by means of separate ministries. No Swede could hold office in Norway, no Norwegian in Sweden. Each country had its separate constitution, its separate parliament. In Sweden the parliament, or Diet, consisted of four houses, representing respectively the nobility, the clergy, the cities and the peasantry. In Norway the parliament, or Storting, consisted of two chambers. Sweden had a strong aristocracy, Norway only a small and feeble one. Swedish government and society were aristocratic and feudal, Norwegian very democratic.

Norway, indeed, was a land of peasants, who owned their farms, and fisherfolk, sturdy, simple, independent. Each country had its own language, each its own capital, that of Sweden at Stockholm, that of Norway at Christiania.

The two kingdoms, therefore, were very dissimilar, with their different languages, different institutions, and different conditions. They had in common a king, and ministers of war and foreign affairs. The connection between the two countries, limited as it was, led during the century to frequent and bitter disagreements, ending finally in their separation.

Charles XIII, the ruler in 1815, having no son, had adopted the French marshal, Bernadotte, as Crown Prince. Bernadotte became king in 1818, and ruled as Charles XIV until his death in 1844. Under him only slight changes were made in the institutions of Sweden. He was opposed to reforms, and earnest in his resistance to the liberal parties. In an economic sense the prosperity of Sweden advanced considerably. Religious freedom was established. The debt was reduced. But the King would not consent to the chief demand of reformers for a radical change in the antiquated form of the Diet. Its division into four chambers played directly into his hands, as he could generally oppose one or two chambers to the others, thus himself exercising an authority practically free from control. The situation remained unchanged under his successor, Oscar I (1844-1859). Under Charles XV, however (1859-1872), this fundamental change was accomplished by the constitutional laws of 1866. The Diet was transformed into a modern parliament, consisting of two chambers. Representation by orders was abolished. Henceforth, there was to be an Upper Chamber, elected by communal councils for a term of nine years. As a high property qualification was required for membership, and as members of this house received no salaries, it really represented the noble and rich classes. The Lower Chamber was elected for three years, but, as a fairly high property qualification was required for voters, it also represented property. Indeed, only about eight per cent. of the people possessed the suffrage under this constitution. Members of this Chamber received salaries. This system went into force in 1866, and remained in force until 1909.

Under the next king, Oscar II, who ruled from 1872 to 1907, the relations with Norway became acute, ending finally in complete rupture. Friction between Norway and Sweden had existed ever since 1814, and had provoked frequent crises. The funda-

mental cause lay in the different conceptions prevalent among the two peoples, as to the real nature of the union effected in that year. The Swedes maintained that Norway was unqualifiedly ceded to them by the Treaty of Kiel in 1814; that they later were willing to recognize that the Norwegians should have a certain amount of independence; that they, nevertheless, possessed certain rights in Norway and preponderance in the Union. The Norwegians, on the other hand, maintained that the Union rested, not upon the Treaty of Kiel, a treaty between Denmark and Sweden, but upon their own act; that they had been independent, and had drawn up a constitution for themselves, the Constitution of Eidsvold; that they had voluntarily united themselves with Sweden by freely electing the King of Sweden as King of Norway; that there was no fusion of the two states; that Sweden had no power in Norway; that Sweden had no preponderance in the Union, but that the two states were on a plane of entire equality. With two such dissimilar views friction could not fail to develop, and it began immediately after 1814 on a question of trivial importance. The Norwegians insisted upon celebrating as their national holiday May 17th, the date of their adoption of the Constitution of Eidsvold. The Swedes wished it to be November 4th, the day on which the King, Charles XIII, accepted and promulgated that constitution. The Norwegians then, in 1815, intended to manage their own internal affairs as they saw fit, without any intermixture of Swedish influence. But their King was also King of Sweden, and, as a matter of fact, lived in Sweden most of the time, and was rarely seen in Norway. Moreover, Sweden was in population much the larger partner in this uncomfortable union.

By the Constitution of Eidsvold the King had only a suspensive veto over the laws of the Storting, the Norwegian parliament. Any law could be enacted over that veto if passed by three successive Storthings, with intervals of three years between the votes. The process was slow, but sufficient to insure victory in any cause in which the Norwegians were in earnest. It was thus, that, despite the King's veto, they carried through the abolition of the Norwegian nobility. Contests between the Storting and the King of Norway, occurring from time to time, over the question of the national flag, of annual sessions, and other matters, kept alive the antipathy of the Norwegians to the Union. Meanwhile, their prosperity increased. Particularly did they develop an important commerce. One-fourth of the merchant marine of the continent of Europe passed gradually

into their hands. This gave rise to a question more serious than any that had hitherto arisen — that of the consular service.

About 1892 began a fateful discussion over the question of the consular service. The Norwegian Parliament demanded a separate consular service for Norway, to be conducted by itself, to care for Norway's commercial interests, so much more important than those of Sweden. This the King would not grant, on the ground that it would break up the Union, that Sweden and Norway could not have two foreign policies. The conflict thus begun dragged on for years, embittering the relations of the Norwegians and the Swedes, and inflaming passions until in 1905 (June 7th) the Norwegian Parliament declared unanimously "that the Union with Sweden under one king has ceased." The war feeling in Sweden was strong, but the Government finally decided, in order to avoid the evils of a conflict, to recognize the dissolution of the Union, on condition that the question of separation should be submitted to the people of Norway. Sweden held that there was no proof that the Norwegian people desired this, but was evidently of the opinion that the whole crisis was simply the work of the Storting. That such an opinion was erroneous was established by the vote on August 13, 1905, which showed over 368,000 in favor of separation and only 184 votes in opposition. A conference was then held at Carlstad to draw up a treaty or agreement of dissolution. This agreement provided that any disputes arising in the future between the two countries, which could not be settled by direct diplomatic negotiations, should be referred to the Hague International Arbitration Tribunal. It further provided for the establishment of a neutral zone along the frontiers of the two countries, on which no military fortifications should ever be erected.

Later in the year the Norwegians chose Prince Charles of Denmark, grandson of the then King of Denmark, as King of Norway. There was a strong feeling in favor of a republic, but it seemed clear that the election of a king would be more acceptable to the monarchies of Europe, and would avoid all possibilities of foreign intervention. The new king assumed the name of Haakon VII, thus indicating the historical continuity of the independent kingdom of Norway, which had grown up in the Middle Ages. He took up his residence in Christiania.

On December 8, 1907, Oscar II, since 1905 King of Sweden only, died, and was succeeded by his son as Gustavus V.

In 1909 Sweden took a long step toward democracy. A franchise reform bill, which had long been before parliament, was

finally passed. Manhood suffrage was established for the Lower House, and the qualifications for election to the Upper House were reduced to the point that those enjoying an income of about \$1,800 a year were eligible. By resolutions of Parliament adopted in 1918, 1919 and 1921 the constitution was further developed in a very democratic sense. Women now have the same voting rights as men. The voting age for the Lower House is twenty-three.

In Norway, every citizen of twenty-three years of age and who has been a resident of the country for five years, has the right to vote. Since 1913 women have been entitled to vote under the same conditions as men, and since 1915 they have been eligible to the cabinet.

Sweden has a population of about six million; Norway of more than two and a half million.

CHAPTER XXXI

THE DISRUPTION OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE RISE OF THE BALKAN STATES

THE Ottoman Empire, although it had been for a long time diminishing in size and in importance, was still very extensive in 1815. In Asia it included Asia Minor, Syria, the region of the Euphrates up to Persia, and the suzerainty of Arabia; in Africa, it comprised Egypt and the northern coast of the continent as far as Morocco. In Europe it possessed the whole of the Balkan peninsula, and north of the Danube the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia. It stretched, therefore, like a huge crescent round the eastern and southern shores of the Mediterranean from the Adriatic nearly to Spain. This vast empire had been for some time in danger of being conquered by foreign powers. Russia had, since the time of Catharine II, been pushing her way southward, by seizing Turkish soil. At one time it seemed as if Russia and Austria, her two nearest neighbors, would divide the spoils between them, at another that Napoleon would direct his restless activity thither with damaging results. But the interests of European politics had kept these powers otherwise occupied, and had frustrated whatever designs they had had upon the Sultan's possessions. But there was another menace. The immediate danger was not from without but from within. The government of the Sultan was inefficient, its mechanism of control of its agents deplorably defective. The result was that in various parts of the empire those agents were using their power to found for themselves virtually independent states, with themselves and their children as the royal lines. A process of dismemberment was going on in Turkey such as had gone on in Germany in the Middle Ages under the feudal system. A large but loosely organized state was being broken up by the personal cupidity and ambition of its agents into small, compact, and energetic states. Thus Algiers and Tunis were only nominally parts of the empire, and the bond of vassalage attaching them to the empire was not in 1815 recognized by Europe. The Beys were real sovereigns. Thus, in Egypt, Mehemet Ali was really founding an independent monarchy, and his son, Ibrahim, was

already chosen as his successor. The process had even reached European Turkey, and, in Albania, Ali of Janina was endeavoring to accomplish the same thing. The military system of the empire, once the terror of Europe, was now in decay, both in discipline, in leadership, and in equipment. The main object for a century had been defense, and not offense, and even that was beyond the competence of the government.

This empire rested on a fundamental principle which, in the nineteenth century, was to prove a source of great weakness. Difference of religious belief was made the basis of the state. The population was divided into two classes, the Mohammedans and those who were not Mohammedans. The government had never attempted to fuse the two elements, but rather had always sharply differentiated them. The Mohammedans were the ruling class, and they were contemptuous of the others, to whom they applied the name *rayahs*, that is, unprotected herds destined only to serve.

That part of the Ottoman Empire which lay in Europe was the smallest part by far, yet it has had the most eventful history and has furnished one of the most intricate and contentious problems European statesmen have ever had to consider, the so-called Eastern Question. The Turks in their conquest of southeastern Europe in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries had subdued many different races; the Greeks, claiming descent from the Greeks of antiquity; the Roumanians, claiming descent from the Roman colonists of the empire; the Albanians, and various branches of the great Slavic race, the Serbs, Bulgarians,¹ Bosnians, and Montenegrins. Full of contempt for those whom they had conquered, the Turks made no attempt to assimilate them nor to fuse them into one body politic. They were satisfied with reducing them to subjection, and with exploiting them. They left them in a kind of semi-independence as far as administration was concerned, allowing them to retain their civil laws and their local magistrates. These subject peoples were permitted the free exercise of their religion which, for most of them, was the Greek form of Christianity, but they were despised.

¹ The Bulgars, whose name is perpetuated in that of the present Kingdom of Bulgaria, were not a Slavic people but a Turanian or Tatar, akin to the Magyars and Turks. Crossing to the south of the Danube in the second half of the seventh century, they conquered a Slavic people previously settled there. But the same thing happened to them that happened to other barbarian invaders. They were assimilated by their subjects, whose language, moreover, they adopted. In language, in religion, in sympathies and aspirations they are Slavs.

While they enjoyed certain privileges they possessed no rights. Their property might be confiscated, their lives taken in some moment of anger or suspicion or cupidity on the part of their rulers. They were flocks to be sheared, rayahs, victims of a government that was arbitrary, rapacious, capricious, and unrestrained. These Christian peoples were effaced for several centuries beneath Mussulman oppression. They bore their ills with resignation as long as they thought it impossible to resist the oppression, yet they never acquiesced in their position. The Turks neither crushed nor conciliated. The subject peoples kept their own organizations which sometime might be used as weapons. There were two causes always present which might at any moment bring about a conflagration, race hatred and religious animosity. There were other forces, also, active from time to time, but these were always present and were alone sufficient to render the Turkish government insecure. The decay of the Ottoman Empire, the rise of Russia, and the vast fame of the French Revolution seemed to indicate that the time had come for revolt. The Serbs were the first to rise,—in 1804 under Kara-George, a swineherd. The Turks were driven from Serbia for a time, but they regained it in 1813. The Serbs again arose, and in 1820, Milosch Obrenovitch, who had instigated the murder of Kara-George in 1817, and who thus became leader himself, secured from the Sultan the title of “Prince of the Serbs of the Pashalik of Belgrade.” His policy henceforth was directed to the acquisition of complete autonomy for Serbia. This, after long negotiations and strongly supported by Russia, he achieved in 1830, when a decree of the Sultan bestowed upon him the title of “Hereditary Prince of the Serbs.” Thus, after many years of war and negotiations, Serbia had ceased to be a mere Turkish province, and had become a principality tributary to the Sultan, but autonomous, and with a princely house ruling by right of heredity—the house of Obrenovitch which had succeeded in crushing the earlier house of Kara-George. This was the first state to arise in the nineteenth century out of the dismemberment of European Turkey. Its capital was Belgrade.

THE GREEK WAR OF INDEPENDENCE

The next of these subject peoples to rise against the hated oppressor was the Greeks. The Greeks had been submerged by the Turkish flood but not destroyed. In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries they had experienced a great rein-

vigoration of their racial and national consciousness. Their condition in 1820 was better than it had been for centuries, their spirit was higher and less disposed to bend before Turkish arrogance, their prosperity was greater. There had occurred in the eighteenth century a remarkable intellectual revival, connected with the restoration and purification of the Greek language. The ancient language had become almost extinct for all practical purposes. It was used, indeed, by the clergy and by the learned, but the masses spoke it in a corrupted form, a dialect sadly mixed with all sorts of extraneous elements. Koraes, a Greek scholar, sought to purify the language of the people so that it would be possible for modern Greeks to read and understand the ancient classics, that thus all might be bound together intellectually by a sense of the common inheritance of a splendid intellectual past. He was remarkably successful so that it has been said that what Luther's Bible did for Germany, Koraes's editions of the classics, with their prefaces in modern Greek, have done for Greece. By this work the national consciousness of the people was greatly stirred and vivified. This was shown graphically in the single fact that the Greeks ceased to call themselves Romans (*Romaioi*), as they had done for centuries, and began to call themselves Hellenes once more.

As in Italy and Spain and Germany, disaffection with the existing state of things was fostered by secret societies. It was such a society, the *Hetairia Philike*, or association of friends, that began the Greek war of independence. This society was founded in 1814 after it had become clear that the Congress of Vienna would do nothing in behalf of the Christian subjects of the Sultan. Its object was the expulsion of the Turk from Europe, and the re-establishment of the old Greek Eastern Empire, which had centuries before been overthrown by the invading Ottomans. The society relied upon gaining the support of Russia because of Russia's evident interest in the downfall of the Turkish power as likely to contribute to her own aggrandizement; also because of religious sympathy. The Russians and the Greeks belonged to the same branch of Christians, and Russia looked upon herself, and was looked upon by others, as the natural defender of Greek Christians wherever they might be. The *Hetairia* increased with great rapidity from 1814-1820 until it included most of the prominent Greeks whether they lived in the Morea, in the Danubian provinces, in Constantinople, in Russia or elsewhere. By 1820 it was supposed to have about 80,000 members. Many of the members of this association were

in the employ of the Tsar, a fact which gave great plausibility to its assertion that in the contest it was preparing it would receive the military aid of Russia. The association collected considerable sums of money, bought weapons, and only waited the favorable moment for beginning an insurrection against the Turks.

Thus there was extensive preparation for the war which began in 1821, and lasted until the Greeks had achieved their independence in 1829. During the first six years, from 1821-1827, the Greeks fought alone against the Turks. This period was followed by a period of foreign intervention. The war was one of utter atrocity on both sides, a war of extermination, a war not limited to the armies. Each side, when victorious, murdered large numbers of non-combatants, men, women, and children. The Greek war song, "The Turk shall live no longer, neither in Morea nor in the whole earth," shows the temper in which this people began its war of liberation. During the first few weeks they proved that this was intended to be no mere lyric but grim reality. The Turks who did not take refuge in the garrison towns were murdered with their families. The Turks immediately took their revenge. The Greeks in Constantinople were hunted down by the enraged Mohammedans, and on Easter Sunday, 1821, the Patriarch or head of the Greek Church, a great and revered dignitary of eighty years, was hanged in his ecclesiastical robes in front of the Cathedral, and various bishops were also hanged. Nothing could have more horrified the members of the Greek Church, who looked upon the Patriarch as Catholics look upon the Pope. Nothing could have so surely deepened the ferocity of the conflict. When the Greeks later took Tripolitza, hitherto the seat of Turkish government in the Morea, they rioted in fearful carnage for three days until few inhabitants were left alive, and a Greek leader could say "that as he rode from the gateway to the citadel his horse's hoofs never touched the ground." The Turks replied by the blood-curdling massacre of Chios, whose inhabitants had long been favorably known for their culture, prosperity, and happiness. The statistics are but rough, but it is said that out of 90,000 inhabitants, 23,000 were massacred, and 43,000 sold as slaves.

The war continued, ineffectually prosecuted by Turkey, which seemed at certain moments likely to crush the rebels completely, only to fail to do so by its own incompetence. This period was made still more wretched by the inability of the Greeks to

work together harmoniously. Torn by violent factional quarrels, they were unable to gain any pronounced advantage. On the other hand, Turkey, unable to conquer by her own force, called upon the Pasha of Egypt, Mehemet Ali, for aid. This ruler had built up a strong, disciplined army, well-equipped and trained in European methods, a force far superior to any which the Sultan or the Greeks possessed. Under Ibrahim, the Pasha's son, an Egyptian army of 11,000 landed in the Morea early in 1825, and began a war of extermination. The Morea was rapidly conquered. The fall of Missolonghi, after a remarkable siege lasting about a year (April 1825–April 1826), with the loss of almost all the inhabitants, and the capture the following year of Athens and the Acropolis, seemed to have completed the subjugation of Greece. Few places remained to be seized.

From the extremity of their misfortune the Greeks were rescued by the decision of foreign powers finally to intervene. The sympathy of cultivated people had, from the first, been aroused for the country which had given intellectual freedom and distinction to the world, this Mother of the Arts, which was now making an heroic and romantic struggle for an independent and worthy life of her own. Everywhere Philhellenic Societies were formed under this inspiration of the memories of Ancient Greece. These societies, founded in France, Germany, Switzerland, England and the United States, sought to aid the insurgents by sending money, arms, and volunteers, and by bringing pressure to bear upon the governments to intervene. Many men from western Europe joined the Greek armies. The most illustrious of these was Lord Byron, who gave his life for the idea of a free Greece, dying of fever at Missolonghi in 1824. As Greek fortunes waned this movement became more vigorous. The new king of Bavaria, Louis I, sent money and numerous officers. In France, Lafayette, Chateaubriand and others worked passionately for the Greek cause. Money, soldiers, arms, clothing, were sent in abundance by these volunteer societies of the west. Yet all this would have been insufficient to rescue Greece had not the monarchs of Europe brought the immense authority and power of their governments to bear upon the problem. Year after year the governments had refused to move. Metternich was no more a friend of revolution against the infidel Sultan than of revolution against the Holy Alliance. He wished to leave the Christians of Turkey to their fate, to let this revolt burn itself out "beyond the pale of civilization." "Three or four hundred thousand individuals hanged, butchered, impaled down there,

hardly count," he is reported to have said, and for several years he was able to prevent the Greeks from receiving the aid of any foreign government. But the Greeks, by holding out against all odds, gave time for changes to occur in the attitude of other countries.

England's foreign policy finally came under the direction of Canning, a firm friend of liberty abroad. Canning was opposed to the principles of the Holy Alliance. He also believed in the ultimate achievement of Greek independence, and he preferred to have the Greeks friendly to England rather than hostile. He also wished the preservation of the Turkish Empire as a bulwark against Russia in Eastern affairs. He did not wish Russia to intervene alone, and help the Greeks to independence, thus thereafter having the support of the new state. He was also influenced by the fact that English bankers had made heavy loans to the Greeks. It would be wise for England to interfere and bring this tangled question to a close favorable to her interests rather than to leave it to further hazard.

In Russia there was a change of monarchs. Alexander I died in 1825, and was succeeded by Nicholas I. The new monarch did not consider himself bound to the policy of the Holy Alliance. As soon as he saw England likely to take a hand in the Eastern Question his interest was not to let her do it alone. Ought England to be permitted to preëempt the favor of the Greeks which they had been only too willing all along to give to Russia? Nicholas was indignant at the prospect. Furthermore, the public opinion of Russia was overwhelmingly in favor of intervention to save the Greeks. The motive was not the same as in the western countries, — the desire to extend human liberty, — the memory of Ancient Greece. The motive with the Russian masses was religious, a desire to prevent the Infidel of Constantinople from longer oppressing the members of the Orthodox Church to which they themselves belonged.

In France all parties, liberal and conservative, were united in favor of the Greeks, — the liberals because of the prospect of creating a new free state in Europe, and thus helping undermine the Holy Alliance, the royalists because they remembered the part the monarchy had played centuries before under Saint Louis in the Crusades against the infidels. Politicians also believed that here was a chance to raise the prestige of France in international affairs by the humiliation of Austria which would be one of the results.

Out of all these motives arose the Treaty of London of 1827.

By this treaty the three powers, England, Russia and France, on the ground that the conflict was of general concern owing to the injuries inflicted upon commerce, agreed to demand an armistice of Mahmud II and his consent to the erection of Greece as an autonomous state under Turkish sovereignty, to be therefore practically in the same situation as Serbia. The Sultan indignantly refused the armistice. The three admirals of the allied fleet presented an ultimatum to Ibrahim, which was rejected. The consequence was a naval battle at Navarino, October 20, 1827, a battle which arose accidentally, but which ended in the destruction of the Turko-Egyptian fleet. The issue of Navarino was not the independence of Greece. The Allies had not intended to fight a battle with Turkey, but only to force an armistice upon the combatants, and then to compel recognition of the autonomy of Greece under the suzerainty of the Sultan. The effect of the battle was greatly to encourage the Greeks, to delight the liberals throughout Europe, but to exasperate the Turks to a point where they lost all prudence. The Sultan demanded that the allied powers make ample reparation for the indignity and the damage which they had inflicted upon him while they pretended to be at peace. This was refused, though the new English ministry, Canning having recently died, shortly pronounced the battle of Navarino an "untoward event." The recriminations became so heated that the ambassadors of the Allies left Constantinople. The Allies could agree upon no definite policy immediately after Navarino. England refused reparation yet regretted the incident because it seemed to her that by weakening the power of the Sultan she was playing directly into the hands of Russia. England's policy was hesitating, cloudy, and unwise. She made no attempt to impose the Treaty of London, and let matters drift.

Meanwhile, the Sultan, losing his self-control, called upon the faithful in a violent manifesto to take part in a holy war. This manifesto named Russia as the cause of the whole insurrection, and was full of venom. Russia desired nothing better than a war with Turkey, which she forthwith declared April 26, 1828.

This Russo-Turkish war lasted over a year. In the first campaign the Russians were unsuccessful, but, redoubling their efforts, and under better leadership, they crossed the Balkans, and marched rapidly toward Constantinople. The French meanwhile had sent an army into the Morea, and had forced the Egyptian troops to leave the country and sail for Egypt. The Sultan was obliged to yield and the Treaty of Adrianople was signed with Russia September 14, 1829.

As the outcome of this series of events Greece became a kingdom, entirely independent of Turkey, its independence guaranteed by the three powers, Russia, England, and France. Russia gained a slight increase of territory in Asia, none in Europe. The Danubian principalities, Moldavia and Wallachia, were made practically, though not nominally, independent. The Sultan's power in Europe was therefore considerably reduced. In 1833, Otto, a lad of seventeen, second son of King Louis I of Bavaria, became the first King of Greece. A new Christian state had been created in southeastern Europe.

THE CRIMEAN WAR

Russia emerged from the Turkish war with increased prestige and power. It had been her campaign of 1829 that had brought the Sultan to terms. Greece had become independent, and was more grateful to her than to the other powers. Moldavia and Wallachia, still nominally a part of Turkey, were practically free of Turkish control, and Russian influence in them was henceforth paramount. Several years later Russia was emboldened to attempt to extend her influence still further, and this attempt precipitated a reopening of the Eastern Question, and the first great European war since the fall of Napoleon I.

Early in 1853 Nicholas I, of Russia, judging the moment opportune, suggested to the English Government that the Turkish Empire was about to fall, and that it would be well for England and Russia to agree on the disposal of the property. "When we are agreed," he said, "I am quite without anxiety as to the rest of Europe; it is immaterial what others may think or do." He referred to the Turkish Empire as a sick man, a very sick man. The collapse of the Empire he felt to be imminent. It would be wise for the two powers most interested to arrange the division of the estate at once. He suggested that the European territories might be made into independent states, over which presumably Russia would have control; that England might have Egypt and the island of Crete, thus safeguarding her route to India; he himself disclaimed any idea of adding Constantinople to his dominions. The English Government declined to enter into a consideration of the plan, and nothing came of this suggestion of the division of Turkey.

For some time a quarrel had been going on between France, Russia, and Turkey, concerning the control of the "holy places" in Palestine, places connected with the birth and life of Christ,

and therefore of interest to Christians, particularly Roman Catholic and Greek, who were in the habit of making pilgrimages thither. This matter was finally arranged by negotiation, but the very day after the settlement of this dispute Russia peremptorily put forth a new demand upon the Sultan, namely the right of protection over all Greek Christians living in the Turkish Empire, of whom there were several millions. The demand was loosely expressed and might possibly, if granted, grow into a constant right of intervention by Russia in the internal affairs of Turkey, that country consequently being reduced to a kind of vassalage to the former. This, at any rate, was the assertion of Turkey. The Sultan submitted this demand to the French and English Governments, which advised him to decline it. At once Russia sent troops into the Danubian Principalities, Moldavia and Wallachia, Turkish provinces, in order to enforce the compliance of the Sultan (June 1853). The Sultan demanded that the Russians withdraw from the Principalities. The demand was rejected, and war therefore existed between the two powers, Russia and Turkey. Nicholas expected that the war would be limited to these two. In this he was shortly undeceived, for England and France, and later Piedmont, came to the support of the Turks, and the first general European war since Napoleon's fall began. Russia found herself at war ultimately with four powers instead of with one.

The motives that brought about this coalition against Russia are important. Englishmen looked upon Russia as a strong power trying to maltreat a weak one. They remembered that Russia had been the bulwark of conservatism in 1848 and 1849, that she had intervened to put down the Hungarians, no subjects of hers, who had almost won their independence. Many Englishmen were tired of the long peace and ready for a fight. War feeling was strong among both Conservatives and Liberals. Lord Palmerston, a prominent member of the Cabinet, desired war. A long-standing dread of Russian expansion into regions too near the route to India also influenced the opinion of Englishmen. The French Emperor, Napoleon III, was inclined to war for several reasons. He had a personal grudge against Nicholas I, who, forced to recognize him as Emperor in 1852, had sulkily addressed him at that time, not in the form usual among rulers, of "My Brother," but in the absurd phrase, in this case really insulting, of "My dear Friend." Moreover, the treaties of 1815 were in the main still intact and were a striking memorial of the downfall of the Great Emperor. To destroy these treaties, and, if possible, to requite the humiliation of Moscow, would be

a sweet revenge, and to throw military glory over his newly and trickily won throne would be a manifest advantage and a real pleasure. Piedmont joined the coalition in 1855 for reasons indicated above, hoping to win an influential friend for the nationalistic ambitions of Cavour.

France and England joined Turkey in demanding the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Principalities. The demand was refused by the Tsar. The two powers then concluded a treaty with Turkey, promising military support, and engaging not to make a separate treaty. On March 27, 1854, they declared war upon Russia.

The Turks meanwhile had been fighting the Russians in the region of the Danube. The French and English now joined them. After a confused campaign the Russians were defeated and forced back over the Danube, and, in June and July 1854, they withdrew entirely from the Principalities. The cause of the war was thus removed. England and France had demanded the evacuation of the Principalities. They were now evacuated. But England and France had ulterior purposes, and consequently the war continued. They desired to humiliate Russia, to weaken her decisively, to prevent her definitely from increasing her power in southeastern Europe. Thinking to do this most completely, they invaded the Crimea, a peninsula in southern Russia, jutting out into the Black Sea (September 1854). The importance of the Crimea lay in the fact that Russia had constructed there, at Sebastopol, a great naval arsenal, and that the Russian navy was there. To seize Sebastopol, to sink the fleet, would destroy Russia's naval power for many years, and thus remove the weapon with which she could seriously menace Turkey.

The siege of Sebastopol was the chief feature of the Crimean war. That siege lasted eleven months. Defended in a masterly fashion by Todleben, the Russian engineer, and the only military hero of the first order that the war developed, Sebastopol finally fell after a murderous bombardment on September 8, 1855. Parts of this campaign, subsidiary to the siege, were the battles of the Alma, of Balaklava, rendered forever memorable by the splendid charges of the heavy and light brigades, and of Inkermann, full of stirring and heroic incident. The Allies suffered fearfully from the weather, the bitter cold, the breakdown of the commissary department, and the shocking inefficiency of the medical and hospital service. These deficiencies were remedied in time, but only after a terrible loss of life. The Russians suffered from the absence of roads and from the corruption of

officials, as well as from the weather. It took a month for soldiers to come the hundred and twenty miles from the northern point of the Crimean peninsula to Sebastopol. Tens of thousands of soldiers perished on the march from the various Russian cities southward.

Early in 1855 (March 2), Nicholas I died, bitterly disappointed at the failure of his plans. Throughout the summer of 1855 the state of Sebastopol grew steadily worse. The number of the killed was appalling, over a thousand a day. It was said by one of the victims of this siege "that statesmen who make wars lightly should be taken to see the hospital for incurable cases at Sebastopol." During the last twenty-eight days of the siege over a million and a half of projectiles were thrown into the place. The French excavations were over fifty miles in length. The long agony drew to a close, and on September 8, 1855, Sebastopol fell after a siege of 336 days, a siege which cost Russia probably 250,000 lives, and an expenditure far out of proportion to her resources.

The war dragged on for some weeks longer, but as most of the powers were anxious for peace, they agreed to enter the Congress of Paris, which met February 25, 1856, and which, after a month's deliberation, signed the Treaty of Paris, March 30, 1856. The treaty provided that the Black Sea should henceforth be neutralized, that it should not be open to vessels of war, even of those countries bordering on it, Russia and Turkey, and that no arsenals should be established or maintained on its shores. Its waters were to be open to the merchant ships of every nation. The navigation of the Danube was declared free. The Russian protectorate over Moldavia and Wallachia was abolished, and they were declared independent under the suzerainty of the Porte. Russia was pushed back from all contact with the Danube by the cession of a small part of Bessarabia to Moldavia. The most important clause was that by which the powers admitted Turkey to the European Concert, from which she had been previously excluded, by which they also recognized and guaranteed the independence and territorial integrity of that country, and renounced all claim on their part, separately or collectively, to intervene in her internal affairs. This action was taken, it was said, because the Sultan had, "in his constant solicitude for the welfare of his subjects, issued a firman recording his generous intentions towards the Christian population of his Empire." This treaty was signed by the representatives of Turkey, England, France, Austria, Russia, Prussia, and Piedmont.

Thus closed a war which cost several hundred thousand lives. There was an uneasy feeling in governing circles after the war that little had been accomplished by this large and horrible expenditure, and that that little was not likely to endure. Future events justified this premonition. Just fourteen years later, during the Franco-German war, when Europe was powerless to prevent, Russia announced that she would no longer observe the provision concerning the neutrality of the Black Sea, and in 1878 she recovered the strip of Bessarabia that gave her access to the lower courses of the Danube. The promise of the Sultan that the lot of his Christian subjects should be improved was ignored. Their condition became worse. And the guaranty of the integrity of his empire, and the promise of the powers not to interfere in his domestic administration were to ring hollow twenty years later. The Sultan gained in importance from this war; the French Emperor gained military glory and diplomatic prestige; the King of Piedmont was shortly to be amply repaid for his efforts by the aid of Napoleon III in his Italian policy. The Crimean war had this further result that, showing the inefficiency of the Russian government, it was a main cause of the wave of reform which swept over that country in the early years of the reign of Alexander II. As a solution of the Eastern Question the war was a flat failure. ✓

FROM THE TREATY OF PARIS TO THE TREATY OF BERLIN

The Eastern Question was primarily that of the fate of European Turkey. Should that country be preserved intact or should it be dismembered; if the latter, what should be the status of the part or parts taken from the Sultan? By the middle of the nineteenth century the solution of the question had not progressed far. The only part that had become independent was Greece, the founding of which kingdom has been traced. The Greeks, however, were not satisfied with their boundaries and cherished the fervent ambition that they might annex other parts of Turkey in which members of their race were living, and even entertained the hope of Constantinople, the possession of which priceless position formed the very crux of the whole Eastern Question. Two other sections of European Turkey had almost attained statehood, though they were still nominally provinces of Turkey: Serbia and Moldavia-Wallachia. Both aspired to convert a semi-independence into complete independence. In Moldavia-

Wallachia a national spirit had been slowly growing up. The inhabitants, feeling that they were of the same stock, and ought to be thoroughly united, were growing accustomed to apply to themselves the single term, Roumanians. They were proud of their ancient origin, of their language, largely of Latin origin, and of their history. They felt that they were destined to be masters in their own house, not pawns to be used by Turkey or Russia. The impulse toward nationality, so striking and fruitful a characteristic of the century, moved them, as it was moving Italians and Germans. The Crimean war facilitated the realization of their ambitions. Though the Roumanians took no part in the war, they profited by it. By the Treaty of Paris all Russian rights of protection over the provinces were abolished, and though the Sultan still remained their sovereign he promised to grant an "independent and national administration." England and France wished to go a step further, and to recognize the two provinces as an entirely independent state of Roumania. There would be a manifest advantage in that such a state would constitute a buffer between Russia and Turkey, standing right athwart the way to Constantinople, which they believed Russia coveted. But Austria and Turkey blocked this suggestion for the time being. The powers decided, in 1858, in a conference held in Paris that, despite the wishes of the people for union, they should remain separate. There should be two princes or hospodars elected by representatives of the people, but invested with their powers by the Sultan. There should also be an assembly in each, but a kind of central committee should prepare legislation common to the "United Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia," as they were officially called. This, of course, did not satisfy the inhabitants of the two Principalities, who felt that they were one in race and language and tradition, and ought to be one in fact. The Moldavians and Wallachians now proceeded to solve the matters to their taste, encouraged in this by Napoleon III, true to his favorite theory of nationalities. Each elected, early in 1859, the same man, Colonel Alexander Couza, as its prince. This double election accomplished the desired result. Thus the Principalities were united *de facto*. Austria was in no position to forbid this consummation as she was then involved in war in Italy. Later the two assemblies were merged into one, and in 1862 the Sultan recognized these changes. Thus the Moldavians and Wallachians had achieved their union, had assumed the name Roumania, and had chosen Bucharest as their capital. But it remained for them to attain complete

independence. They still paid tribute to the Sultan, from whom their prince received his investiture. The new ruler, "Prince of Roumania," a native of Moldavia, styled himself Alexander John I, but he was always known by his family name of Couza. He ruled seven years. They were years of great turbulence. The Prince was in constant conflict with the assembly, and ruled most of the time in defiance of the constitution. He alienated the influential classes of the clergy and nobility or great land-owners, the former by confiscating the property of the monasteries, an act later vetoed by the powers unless the clergy should be indemnified, and the latter by freeing the peasants from their feudal dues, and transferring most of the land to them on the condition that they pay for it in fifteen annual installments. This was a beneficial social reform, somewhat resembling the liberation of the serfs in Russia. It created a class of about 400,000 small proprietors. But, of course, it made the nobles his enemies. The masses, on the other hand, thus benefited, were offended by the tobacco monopoly which Couza introduced. A conspiracy was formed which, in 1866, succeeded in forcing him to abdicate. Convinced by this experience that it was unwise to raise one of their own citizens to the position of ruler, the Roumanians decided to call in a foreign prince. They chose a member of the Roman Catholic branch of the Hohenzollern family who became Charles I of Roumania. This German prince, who was destined to rule until his death in 1914, was then twenty-seven years of age. He at once set to work to study the conditions of his newly adopted country, ably seconded in this by his wife, a German princess, whose literary gift was to win her a great reputation, and was to be used in the interest of Roumania. As "Carmen Sylva" she was the author of poems and stories, published a collection of Roumanian folklore, and encouraged the national idea by showing her preference for the native Roumanian dress and for old Roumanian customs.

Charles I was primarily a soldier, and the great work of the early years of his reign was to build up the army, as he believed it essential if Roumania was to be really independent in her attitude toward Russia and Turkey. He increased the size of the army, equipped it with Prussian guns, and had it drilled by Prussian officers. The wisdom of this was apparent when the Eastern Question was reopened in 1875. The fact that she possessed an army of the modern type enabled Roumania to play an important part in the affairs of the Balkan peninsula.

In 1875 the Eastern Question entered once more upon an

acute phase. Movements began which were to have a profound effect upon the various sections of the peninsula. An insurrection broke out in the summer of 1875 in Herzegovina, a province west of Serbia. For years the peasantry had suffered under the gross misrule of the Turks. Turkey, almost bankrupt, resorted to heavier taxation, especially of her Christian subjects. The oppression became so grinding and was accompanied by acts so barbarous and inhuman that the peasants finally rebelled. These peasants were Slavs, and as such were aided by Slavs from neighboring regions, Bosnia, Serbia, and Bulgaria. They were made all the more bitter because they saw Slavs in Serbia comparatively contented, as they were largely self-governed. Why should not they themselves enjoy as good conditions as others? Religious and racial hatred of Christian and Slav against the infidel Turk flamed up throughout the peninsula. The Balkan peoples also were stirred, as were so many others, by the sight of Italy achieving her independence on the basis of nationality. The Turks did not succeed in stamping out this dangerous movement at its commencement, encouraged as it was by the Slavs of Serbia, Montenegro, and even Austria. Attempts were made by diplomacy to induce the Porte to make concessions sufficient to pacify the discontented Christians. The attempts failed, as the Christians placed no faith in Turkish promises and as the powers were not united in their demands, England rejecting the arrangement that seemed most likely to ensure peace by guaranteeing on the part of the powers the effective execution of the Sultan's promise of reform. (Berlin Memorandum, 1876.)

Meanwhile events occurred in Constantinople which greatly complicated the situation. In March 1876, the Sultan, Abdul-Aziz, was deposed by a palace revolution, and his nephew put upon the throne as Murad V. The new Sultan was shortly found to be, or at least was declared to be, imbecile, and was deposed after a reign of three months. Thereupon his brother, Abdul Hamid II, ascended the throne, a very resolute, subtle, and resourceful man. These rapid changes in Constantinople were due to a recrudescence of national and religious fanaticism in Turkey, to a feeling that Turkey should be for the Turks, that she should no longer be the sport of foreign powers, that she should control her own destinies without intervention. But the intervention of the Christian powers was becoming more and more inevitable because of this very revival of racial and religious fanaticism. They could not rest easy witnessing the

outrages committed upon their co-religionists. And just at this time those outrages attained a ferocity that shocked all Europe.

Early in 1876 the Christians in Bulgaria, a large province of European Turkey, rose against the Turkish officials, killing some of them. The revenge taken by the Turks was of incredible atrocity. Pouring regular troops and the ferocious irregulars called Bashi-Bazouks into the province, they butchered thousands with every refinement or coarseness of brutality. In the valley of the Maritza all but fifteen of eighty villages were practically destroyed. An official report to the English government of what occurred at Batak, a town of about 7,000 inhabitants, indicates graphically the style adopted and pursued. A Turk named Achmet Agha was ordered to attack it. "The inhabitants had a parley with Achmet who solemnly swore that if they gave up their arms not a hair of their heads should be touched. The villagers believed Achmet's oath and surrendered their arms, but this demand was followed by another for all the money in the village, which, of course, had also to be acceded to. No sooner was the money given up than the Bashi-Bazouks set upon the people and slaughtered them like sheep. A large number of people, probably about one thousand or twelve hundred, took refuge in the church and churchyard, the latter being surrounded by a wall. The church itself is a solid building and resisted all the attempts of the Bashi-Bazouks to burn it from the outside. They consequently fired in through the windows, and getting upon the roof tore off the tiles, and threw burning pieces of wood and rags dipped in petroleum among the mass of unhappy human beings inside. At last the door was forced in, the massacre completed, and the inside of the church burned. The spectacle which the church and churchyard present must be seen to be described; hardly a corpse has been buried. . . . I visited this valley of the shadow of death on the 31st of July, more than two months and a half after the massacre, but still the stench was so overpowering that one could hardly force one's way into the church. In the streets at every step lay remains rotting and sweltering in the summer sun. Just outside the village I counted more than sixty skulls in a little hollow. From the remains of female wearing apparel scattered about it is plain that many of the persons here massacred were women."¹ This official estimated that in Batak alone the number of killed was about 5,000.

The Bulgarian atrocities thrilled all Europe with horror.

¹ Baring's report.

Mr. Gladstone, emerging from retirement, denounced "the unspeakable Turk" in a flaming pamphlet called "Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East." He demanded that England cease to support a government that was an affront to the laws of God, and urged that the Turks be expelled from Europe "bag and baggage." The Disraeli ministry dared not lend its support in behalf of Turkey, as it would have liked to do, so vehement was public opinion. It did not, however, intervene in behalf of the oppressed Christians.

Serbia and Montenegro, in July, 1876, declared war against Turkey, and the insurrection of the Bulgarians became general. The Russian people became intensely excited in their sympathy with their co-religionists and their fellow-Slavs. Thousands of Russian volunteers enrolled under the Serb flag. But the Turks were able to overcome their enemies by force of superior numbers. Alexander II did not wish war, but on November 2, 1876, he said to the British ambassador that the present state of affairs in Turkey "was intolerable, and unless Europe was prepared to act with firmness and energy, he should be obliged to act alone." He would act, not for self-interest, but solely in the name of humanity. He had not "the smallest wish or intention to be possessed of Constantinople." Renewed attempts were made to settle the whole trouble by diplomacy. These attempts proved unsuccessful owing to the opposition of the Sultan, who was dominated by reactionary forces, and who felt certain that support would come from the west, particularly from England. He remembered the Crimean war.

Russia, tired of long drawn out and insincere negotiations, declared war upon Turkey, April 24, 1877. She had as allies Roumania, which took occasion to proclaim its entire independence of Turkey (May 21, 1877), Serbia, and Montenegro. The war lasted until the close of January 1878. Crossing the Danube and pushing southward, the Russians gained some successes, and seized one of the passes through the Balkans. But the key to the campaign was the control of Plevna. This place, situated between the Danube and the Balkans, was the center of an extensive system of roads through Bulgaria. The Russians could not safely pass south of the Balkans without controlling this strategic position. They had made the mistake of allowing the Turkish commander, Osman Pasha, to occupy and to fortify it. The Russians made three vigorous attempts to carry it by storm, but were repulsed with heavy losses (July-September 1877). It was evident that Plevna could not be taken by assault

but only by regular siege. Todleben, who had distinguished himself greatly as the defender of Sebastopol in the Crimean war, was now placed in supreme command. By October 24th the investment was completed by an army numbering fully 120,000 men. The siege was slow but was finally successful. On December 10th, Osman surrendered an army of 43,000 soldiers and seventy-seven guns. His defense had been very brilliant. He had detained for five months an army three times as large as his own.

The backbone of Turkish resistance was thus broken. Though it was mid-winter the Russians now poured through the passes of the Balkans, and marched rapidly toward Constantinople. On January 20, 1878, they entered Adrianople. The Sultan sought peace, and on March 3rd the Treaty of San Stefano was concluded between Russia and Turkey. By this treaty the Porte recognized the complete independence of Serbia, Montenegro, and Roumania, and made certain cessions of territory to the two former states. The main feature of the treaty concerned Bulgaria, which was made a self-governing state, tributary to the Sultan. Its frontiers were very liberally drawn. Its territory was to include nearly all of European Turkey, between Roumania and Serbia to the north, and Greece to the south. Only a broken strip across the peninsula, from Constantinople west to the Adriatic, was to be left to Turkey. The new state therefore was to include not only Bulgaria proper, but Roumelia to the south and most of Macedonia. Mr. Gladstone's desire for the expulsion of the Turks from Europe "bag and baggage" was nearly realized.

But this treaty was not destined to be carried out. It satisfied no one except the Russians and the Bulgarians. There was much opposition to it in the Balkan peninsula itself. The Greeks opposed it because it cut short the expansion they desired northward, particularly into Macedonia. The Serbs were opposed for a similar reason, as they wished a part of this territory now adjudged to Bulgaria. Many Serbs lived in Macedonia. The Roumanians protested vehemently when they learned that, in reward for their services to Russia at Plevna, they were to cede to Russia a part of their territory, Bessarabia, receiving an inferior compensation in the Dobrudscha, a region about the mouths of the Danube. But more important was the opposition of the powers of western Europe. They did not wish to have the Eastern Question solved without their consent. England particularly, fearing Russian expansion southward toward the

Mediterranean, and believing that Bulgaria and the other states would be merely tools of Russia, declared that the arrangements concerning the peninsula must be determined by the great European powers, that the Treaty of San Stefano must be submitted to a general congress on the ground that, according to the international law of Europe, the Eastern Question could not be settled by one nation but only by the concert of powers, as it affected them all. Austria joined the protest, wishing a part of the spoils of Turkey for herself. Russia naturally objected to allowing those who had not fought to determine the outcome of her victory. But as the powers were insistent, particularly England, then under the Beaconsfield administration, and as she was in no position for further hostilities, she yielded. The Congress of Berlin was held under the presidency of Bismarck, Beaconsfield himself representing England. It drew up the Treaty of Berlin, which was signed July 13, 1878. By this treaty Montenegro, Serbia, and Roumania were rendered completely independent of Turkey. The Greater Bulgaria of the Treaty of San Stefano was divided into three main parts, Macedonia, left as a part of Turkey under the direct authority of the Sultan, Eastern Roumelia, as a part of Turkey, but to be autonomous and to have a Christian governor appointed by the Sultan, and Bulgaria, to be still nominally a part of Turkey, but to be autonomous, with a prince to be elected freely by the Bulgarians, the election, however, to be confirmed by the Sultan with the assent of the powers. The various powers were not thinking of Turkey in all this, nor of the happiness of the people who had long been oppressed by Turkey. They found the occasion convenient for taking various Turkish possessions for themselves. Austria was invited to "occupy" and administer Bosnia and Herzegovina in the interest of the peace of Europe. Russia retained a part of Turkish Armenia, which she had conquered, and which included Ardahan, Kars, and Batoum. The Congress also forced Roumania to cede Bessarabia to Russia and to take the Dobrudscha as compensation. This made Roumania the enemy of Russia, as the district ceded was peopled by Roumanians, not by Russians. The powers recommended that the Sultan cede Thessaly and a part of Epirus to Grèce, a recommendation only grudgingly complied with three years later. Before the meeting of the Congress, England had induced Turkey to permit her to occupy the island of Cyprus, and in return for this she undertook to guarantee the integrity of the Sultan's remaining dominions in Asia.

As a result of this war, therefore, three Balkan states, long in the process of formation, Montenegro, Serbia, and Roumania, had become entirely independent of their former suzerain Turkey, and a new state, Bulgaria, had been called into existence, though still slightly subject to the Porte, and a new district, Eastern Roumelia, was assured a freer life, though denied union with Bulgaria. All this had been accomplished as a result of the intervention of Russia.

The Treaty of Berlin was not a final solution of the Eastern Question. In one of its most important provisions it did not endure ten years. The device of separating the Bulgarians north of the Balkans from the Bulgarians south of the Balkans, in spite of the entire racial and spiritual unity of the two, and the wishes of the two, of attempting also to make the latter forget that they were Bulgarians by the childish device of calling their province Eastern Roumelia, endured precisely seven years. In 1885 the Bulgarians took matters into their own hands, declared themselves united, and tore up this arrangement of the Congress of Berlin, and the powers were forced to look on in acquiescence. The other arrangement of leaving Macedonia in the hands of Turkey simply raised another question, the Macedonian, which from that day on was to be a source of constant uneasiness to Europe, a recurrent cause of alarm, frequently threatening a general conflagration. As far as humanitarian considerations were concerned this disposition of Macedonia was a colossal blunder. The Turks did not carry out the promised reforms, and the condition of the people would certainly have been greatly improved had Macedonia been a part of Bulgaria as provided by the Treaty of San Stefano. This determination of the fate of Macedonia, which was the essential difference between the two treaties, was one wholly deplorable. Owing to the rival ambitions of the western powers Macedonian Christians were destined long to suffer an odious oppression from which more fortunate Balkan Christians were free.

On the other hand, the benefits assured by the Treaty of Berlin were great and unmistakable. Before the Russo-Turkish war the population of European Turkey was about seventeen or eighteen million. As a result of the Treaty of Berlin, European Turkey was greatly reduced, and its population was only about six million. In other words eleven million people or more had been emancipated from Turkish control. This constituted an important partition of Turkey. Yet the powers had, in 1856, guaranteed the territorial integrity and the independence in

internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire, a guarantee as farcical as many others made in the course of the history of this Eastern Question.

BULGARIA AFTER 1878

The Treaty of Berlin, while it brought substantial advantages, did not bring peace to the Balkan peninsula. The history of the various states after 1878, both in internal affairs and in their foreign relations, was agitated, yet, despite disturbances, considerable progress was made.

Bulgaria, of which Europe knew hardly anything in 1876, was, in 1878, made an autonomous state, but it did not attain complete independence, as it was nominally a part of the Turkish Empire, to which it was to pay tribute. The new principality owed its existence to Russia, and for several years Russian influence predominated in it. It was started on its career by Russian officials. A constitution was drawn up establishing an assembly called the Sobranje. This assembly chose, as Prince of Bulgaria, Alexander of Battenberg, a young German of twenty-two, a relative of the Russian Imperial House, supposedly acceptable to the Tsar (April 1879).

The Bulgarians were grateful to the Russians for their aid. They recognized those who remained after the war was over as having all the rights of Bulgarian citizens, among others the right to hold office. Russians held important positions in the Bulgarian ministry. Russians organized the military forces and became officers. Before long, however, friction developed, and gratitude gave way to indignation at the high-handed conduct of the Russians, who plainly regarded Bulgaria as a sort of province or outpost of Russia, to be administered according to Russian ideas and interests. The Russian ministers were arrogant, and made it evident that they regarded the Tsar, not Prince Alexander, as their superior, whose wishes they were bound to execute. The Prince, the native army officers, and the people found their position increasingly humiliating. Finally, in 1883, the Russian ministers were virtually forced to resign, and the Prince now relied upon Bulgarian leaders. This caused an open breach with Russia, which was further widened by the discovery of an unsuccessful Russian plot to kidnap Alexander.

Meanwhile, the resentment of the Bulgarians of Eastern Roumelia at their separation from Bulgaria by the Treaty of Berlin steadily increased, and in 1885 a bloodless revolution was carried

through which destroyed this artificial arrangement. The people of that province expelled the representative of Turkish authority, and expressed their enthusiastic desire for union with Bulgaria. Prince Alexander was forced to choose between the Russians, whom he knew to be opposed to this aggrandizement of Bulgaria, and his own people and those of Eastern Roumelia, who were eager for the union. He chose the latter and became the "Prince of the Two Bulgarias." It was expected that international complications would result, that Europe would insist upon the observance of the Treaty of Berlin. But the moment for collective intervention was not propitious, owing mainly to the extraordinarily tangled internal political conditions in various countries. The wrath of Russia was great, and was shown in her recall of all Russian officers from the Bulgarian army, leaving the army demoralized in its leadership. Just at this moment, Serbia, claiming that the union of Eastern Roumelia and Bulgaria would overthrow the equilibrium of the Balkan states, jealous of the aggrandizement of her neighbor, and believing that her army was disorganized, and that the European nations would chastise her for her action in regard to Eastern Roumelia, suddenly attacked her. Bulgaria took up the gauntlet, enthusiasm fired her army, and, crippled as she was, to the astonishment of Europe, she expelled the Serbs, severely defeated them, and invaded their own country only to be stopped by Austria, which insisted upon a treaty between the combatants on the basis of the situation before the war (Treaty of Bucharest, March 3, 1886). Bulgaria gained no territory by this war, but she gained prestige. She stood before Europe in a new light, and the war really founded her unity. In the face of the unanimous desire of the people, it was seen to be futile to insist on the separateness of Roumelia, now swallowed up in Bulgaria. The powers protested against this unification, and would not recognize the change, but they refrained from doing anything further.

Russia, however, incensed at the growing independence of the new state, which she looked upon as a mere satellite, resolved to read her a lesson in humility by organizing a conspiracy. The conspirators seized Prince Alexander in his bedroom in the dead of night, forced him to sign his abdication, and then carried him off to Russian soil. Alexander was detained in Russia a short time, until it was supposed that the Russian party was thoroughly established in power in Bulgaria, when he was permitted to go to Austria. He was immediately recalled to Bul-

garia, returned to receive an immense ovation, and then, at the height of his popularity, in a moment of weakness, abdicated, apparently overwhelmed by the continued opposition of Russia (September 7, 1886). The situation was most critical. Two parties advocating opposite policies confronted each other; one pro-Russian, believing that Bulgaria should accept in place of Alexander any prince whom the Tsar should choose for her; the other national and independent, rallying to the cry of "Bulgaria for the Bulgarians." The latter speedily secured control, fortunate in that it had a remarkable leader in the person of Stambuloff, a native, a son of an innkeeper, a man of extraordinary firmness, suppleness, and courage, vigorous and intelligent. Through him Russian efforts to regain control of the principality were foiled and a new ruler was secured, Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg, twenty-six years of age, who was elected unanimously by the Sobranje, July 7, 1887. Russia protested against this action, and none of the great powers recognized Ferdinand.

Stambuloff was the most forceful statesman developed in the history of the Balkan states. He succeeded in keeping Bulgaria self-dependent. During the earlier years of his rule Ferdinand relied upon him, and, indeed, owed to him his continuance on the throne. He won the pretentious title of "the Bulgarian Bismarck." His methods resembled those of his Teutonic prototype in more than one respect. For seven years he was practically dictator of Bulgaria. Russian plots continued. He repressed them pitilessly. His one fundamental principle was Bulgaria for the Bulgarians. His rule was one of terror, of suppression of liberties, of unscrupulousness, directed to patriotic ends. His object was to rid Bulgaria of Russian, as of Turkish control. Bulgaria under him increased in wealth and population. The army received a modern equipment, universal military service was instituted, commerce was encouraged, railroads were built, popular education begun, and the capital, Sofia, a dirty, wretched Turkish village, made over into one of the attractive capitals of Europe. But Stambuloff made a multitude of enemies, and as a result he fell from power in 1894. In the following year he was foully murdered in the streets of Sofia. But he had done his work thoroughly, and it remains the basis of the life of Bulgaria to-day. The Turkish sovereignty was merely nominal, and even that was not destined to endure long. In March 1896 the election of Ferdinand as Prince was finally recognized by the great powers. The preceding years had been immensely significant. They had thoroughly consoli-

dated the unity of Bulgaria, had permitted her institutions to strike root, had accustomed her to independence of action, to self-reliance. Those years, too, had been used for the enrichment of the national life with the agencies of the modern world, schools, railways, an army. Bulgaria had a population of about four million, a capital in Sofia, an area of about 38,000 square miles. She aspired to annex Macedonia, where, however, she was to encounter many rivals. She only awaited a favorable opportunity to renounce her nominal connection with Turkey. The opportunity came in 1908. On October 5 of that year Bulgaria declared her independence, and her Prince assumed the title of Tsar.

ROUMANIA AND SERBIA AFTER 1878

At the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish war in 1877, Roumania declared herself entirely independent of Turkey. This independence was recognized by the Sultan and the powers at the Congress of Berlin on condition that all citizens should enjoy legal equality, whatever their religion, a condition designed to protect the Jews, who were numerous, but who had previously been without political rights.

In 1881 Roumania proclaimed herself a kingdom, and her prince henceforth styled himself King Charles I. The royal crown was made of steel from a Turkish gun captured at Plevna, a perpetual reminder of what was her war of independence. Roumania proceeded to create an army on Prussian models of about 175,000 men, built railroads and highways, and, by agrarian legislation, improved the condition of the peasantry. The population steadily increased, and in 1914 numbered about seven million and a half. The area of Roumania was about 53,000 square miles. While mainly an agricultural country, her industrial development had begun, and her commerce was more important than that of any other Balkan state. Her government was a constitutional monarchy, with legislative chambers. The most important political questions in the years before the war was a demand for the reform of the electoral system, which resembled the Prussian three-class system, and which gave the direct vote to only a small fraction of the population. In 1907 the peasantry rose in insurrection, demanding agrarian reforms. As more than four-fifths of the population lived upon the land, and as the population had steadily increased, the holding of each peasant had correspondingly decreased. A military force of

140,000 men was needed to quell the revolt. After having restored order, the ministry introduced and carried various measures intended to bring relief to the peasants from their severest burdens.

Serbia, also, was recognized as independent by the Berlin Treaty in 1878. She proclaimed herself a kingdom in 1882. For many years she had a turbulent history. In 1885 she declared war against Bulgaria, as has been stated, only to be unexpectedly and badly defeated. The financial policy was deplorable. In seven years the debt increased from seven million to three hundred and twelve million francs. The scandals of the private life of King Milan utterly discredited the monarchy. He was forced to abdicate in 1889, and was succeeded by his twelve-year-old son, Alexander I, who was brutally murdered in 1903 with his wife, Queen Draga, in a midnight palace revolution, and the new occupant of the throne, Peter I, found his position for several years most unstable. Peter I was of the house of Kara-George, which had ended its century-long feud with the house of Obrenovitch by exterminating the latter in the murders of 1903. While some progress was made along economic and educational lines, the condition of the country was far from satisfactory. A new and important chapter in the history of Serbia began with the Balkan War of 1912.

GREECE AFTER 1833

In January 1833, Otto, second son of Louis I, the King of Bavaria, became King of Greece, a country of great poverty, with a population of about 750,000, unaccustomed to the reign of law and order usual in western Europe. The kingdom was small, with unsatisfactory boundaries, lacking Thessaly, which was peopled entirely by Greeks. The country had been devastated by a long and unusually sanguinary war. Internal conditions were anarchic. Brigandage was rife; the debt was large. The problem was, how to make out of such unpromising materials a prosperous and progressive state.

King Otto reigned from 1833 to 1862. He was aided in his government by many Bavarians, who filled important positions in the army and the civil service. This German influence was a primary cause of the unpopularity of the new régime. The beginnings were made, however, in the construction of a healthy national life. Athens was made the capital, and a university was established there. A police system was organized; a na-

tional bank created. In 1844 Otto was forced to consent to the conversion of his absolute monarchy into a constitutional one. A parliament with two chambers, the Deputies being chosen by universal suffrage, was instituted. The political education of the Greeks then began.

From the reopening of the Eastern Question by the Crimean war Greece hoped to profit by the enlargement of her boundaries. The great powers, however, thought otherwise, and forced her to remain quiet. Because the Government did not defy Europe and insist upon her rights, which would have been an insane proceeding, it became very unpopular. For this reason, as well as for despotic tendencies, Otto was driven from power in 1862 by an insurrection, and left Greece, never to return.

A new king was secured in the person of a Danish prince, who became George I, in 1863, and who ruled until his death in 1913. That his popularity might be strengthened at the very outset, England in 1864 ceded to the kingdom the Ionian Islands, which she had held since 1815. This was the first enlargement of the kingdom since its foundation. A new constitution was established (1864) which abolished the Senate and left all parliamentary power in the hands of a single assembly, the Boulé, elected by universal suffrage, and consisting of 192 members, with a four-year term. Political parties have been little more than personal or local coteries, struggling for office as a means of livelihood. In 1881, mainly through the exertions of England, the Sultan was induced to cede Thessaly to Greece, and thus a second enlargement of territory occurred. This was in accordance with the promise of the Congress of Berlin that the Greek frontier should be "rectified."


In 1897 Greece declared war against Turkey, aiming at the annexation of Crete, which had risen in insurrection against Turkey. Greece was easily defeated, and was forced to cede certain parts of Thessaly to Turkey and give up the project of the annexation of Crete. After long negotiations among the powers, the latter island was made autonomous under the suzerainty of the Sultan, and under the direct administration of Prince George, a son of the King of Greece, who remained in power until 1906. A new problem, the Cretan, was thus pushed into the foreground of Greek politics, for the Cretans desired incorporation in the kingdom of Greece and would not rest content with anything less. This, however, the powers would not at the time permit.

Greece was not in sound financial condition. Her debt was

MAP ILLUSTRATING

The Rise of the Balkan States

0 50 100
English Miles





very large, having grown owing to armaments, the building of railroads, and the digging of canals. The country, however, advanced in population and much was accomplished in the direction of popular education. Her parliamentary history has been troubled by incessant factional disputes. During the reign of George I there were over fifty ministries. More Greeks lived outside the Greek kingdom than lived within it. They constituted *Grecia Irredenta*, which all Greek patriots aspired to redeem.

None of these Balkan states was satisfied with its existing boundaries. Roumania wished to include in the kingdom the Roumanians of Russian Bessarabia, and of eastern Hungary. The Serbs dreamed of a Greater Serbia, to include those of their race in Bosnia and Herzegovina and southern Hungary. Bulgarians desired the annexation of parts of Macedonia, or all of it. The Greeks desired Macedonia and Crete. They dreamed of a Greater Greece, dominating the *Ægean*.

Serb, Bulgarian, and Greek rivalries met in the plains of Macedonia, which each country coveted, and which was inhabited by representatives of all these peoples hopelessly intermixed. The problem of Macedonia was further complicated by the rivalry of the great powers, and by the revolution which broke out in Turkey itself in 1908.

REVOLUTION IN TURKEY

The Eastern Question entered upon a new and startling phase in the summer of 1908. In July a swift, sweeping, and pacific revolution occurred in Turkey. The Young Turks, a liberal, revolutionary, constitutional party, imbued, it was supposed, with the political principles of western Europe, seized control of the government, to the complete surprise of the diplomatists and public of Europe. This party consisted of those who had been driven from Turkey by the despotism of the Sultan, Abdul Hamid II, and were resident abroad, chiefly in Paris, and of those who, still living in Turkey, dissembled their opinions and were able to escape expulsion. Its members desired the overthrow of the despotic, corrupt, and inefficient government, and the creation in its place of a modern liberal system, capable, by varied and thoroughgoing reforms, of ranging Turkey among progressive nations. Weaving their conspiracy in silence and with remarkable adroitness, they succeeded in drawing into it the Turkish army, hitherto the solid bulwark of the Sultan's

power. Then, at the ripe moment, the army refused to obey the Sultan's orders, and the conspirators demanded peremptorily by telegraph that the Sultan restore the Constitution of 1876, a constitution granted by the Sultan in that year merely to enable him to weather a crisis, and which, having quickly served the purpose, had been immediately suspended and had remained suspended ever since. The Sultan, seeing the ominous defection of the army, complied at once with the demands of the Young Turks, "restored" on July 24th the Constitution of 1876, and ordered elections for a parliament, which should meet in November. Thus an odious tyranny was instantly swept away. It was a veritable coup d'état, this time effected, not by some would-be autocrat, but by the army, usually the chief support of despotism or of the authority of the monarch, now, apparently, the chief instrument for the achievement of freedom for the democracy. This military revolution, completely successful and almost bloodless, was received with incredible enthusiasm throughout the entire breadth of the Sultan's dominions. Insurgents and soldiers, Mohammedans and Christians, Greeks, Serbs, Bulgarians, Albanians, Armenians, Turks, all joined in jubilant celebrations of the release from intolerable conditions. The most astonishing feature was the complete subsidence of the racial and religious hatreds which had hitherto torn and ravaged the Empire from end to end. The revolution proved to be the most fraternal movement in modern history. Picturesque and memorable were the scenes of universal reconciliation. The ease and suddenness with which this astounding change was effected proved the universality of the detestation of the reign and methods of Abdul Hamid II throughout all his provinces and among all his peoples.

Was this the beginning of a new era or was it the beginning of the end of the Turkish Empire? It will be more convenient to examine this question a little later.

CHAPTER XXXII
RUSSIA TO THE WAR WITH JAPAN
THE REIGN OF ALEXANDER I

RUSSIA in 1815 was the largest state in Europe, and was a still larger Asiatic empire. It extended in unbroken stretch from the German Confederation to the Pacific Ocean. Its population was about 45,000,000. Its European territory covered about 2,000,000 square miles. It was inhabited by a variety of races, but the principal one was the Slavic. Though there were many religions, the religion of the court and of more than two-thirds of the population was the so-called Greek Orthodox form of Christianity. Though various languages were spoken, Russian was the chief one. The Russians had conquered many peoples in various directions. A considerable part of the former Kingdom of Poland had been acquired in the three partitions at the close of the eighteenth century, and more in 1815. Here the people spoke a different language, the Polish, and adhered to a different religion, the Roman Catholic. In the Baltic provinces, Esthonia, Livonia, and Courland, the upper class was of German origin and spoke the German language, while the mass of peasants were Finns and Lithuanians, speaking different tongues. All the inhabitants were Lutherans. Finland had recently been conquered from Sweden. The languages spoken there were Swedish and Finnish, and the religion was Lutheran. To the east and south were peoples of Asiatic origin, many of them Mohammedans in religion. There were in certain sections considerable bodies of Jews.

All these dissimilar elements were bound together by their allegiance to the sovereign, the Tsar, a monarch of absolute, unlimited power. There were two classes of society in Russia — the nobility and the peasantry. The large majority of the latter were serfs of the Tsar and the nobility. The nobility numbered about 140,000 families. Some of the nobles were very wealthy. It is estimated that 1,500 of them possessed more than a thousand serfs each, that 2,000 others possessed over five hundred each, while 17,000 possessed more than two hundred

each. But more than four-fifths of them, that is, about 120,000, were quite poor, with only a few serfs each. The nobles secured offices in the army and the civil service. They were exempt from many taxes, and enjoyed certain monopolies. Their power over their serfs was extensive and despotic. They enforced obedience to their orders by the knout and by banishment to Siberia. The middle class of well-to-do and educated bourgeois, increasingly important in the other countries of Europe, practically did not exist in Russia. Russia was an agricultural country, whose agriculture, moreover, was very primitive and inefficient. It was a nation of serfs and of peasants little better off than the serfs. This class was wretched, uneducated, indolent, prone to drink excessively. In the "mir," or village community, however, it possessed a rudimentary form of communism and limited self-government.

Over this vast and ill-equipped nation ruled the Autocrat of All the Russias, or Tsar, an absolute monarch, whose decisions, expressed in the form of ukases or decrees, were the law of the land. The ruler in 1815 was Alexander I, a man thirty-eight years of age. Ascending the throne in 1801, he played a commanding rôle in the later Napoleonic era. Under him Russia took a leading part in the politics and wars of Europe. Allied with Napoleon in 1807, he broke away from him in 1811, and from that time was his constant and powerful foe. In early life he had had as tutor Colonel Laharpe, a Swiss, who inspired principles of liberalism and humanitarianism in the mind of his quick and receptive pupil. For several years after his accession he followed a progressive and reforming policy. The times, however, were not propitious for any sweeping changes. From 1805 to 1815 Russia was almost incessantly at war, and it is estimated that she lost in these wars nearly a million and a quarter of men, most of whom died from sickness or the privations of war, rather than in battle. The national debt and the burden of taxation had necessarily been immensely augmented. Moreover, blocking the way of reform was an administrative service thoroughly honeycombed with corruption, so that even the official historian of the period after 1815 could only say, "Everything was corrupt, everything unjust, everything dishonest." Such conditions constituted a serious restraint upon the initiative and work of the ruler.

In 1815 Alexander I stood forth as the most liberal sovereign on any of the great thrones of Europe. In the reorganization of Europe in 1814 and 1815 he was, on the whole, a liberal force.

He it was who insisted upon reasonably generous terms to France, on the part of the victorious allies; who insisted that Louis XVIII should grant constitutional liberties to the French people; who, at the Congress of Vienna, favored, though ineffectually, the aspirations of the German people for a larger political life.

He showed his liberal tendencies even more unmistakably in his Polish policy. He succeeded at the Congress of Vienna in securing most of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, which he now transformed into the Kingdom of Poland. This was a state of 3,000,000 inhabitants, with an area less than one-sixth the size of the former Polish kingdom, but containing the Polish capital, Warsaw. This was henceforth to be an independent kingdom, not a part of Russia. The only connection between the two was in the person of the ruler. The Tsar of Russia was to be King of Poland. Alexander intended to make this revived, though incomplete, Poland, a constitutional state. He granted a constitution in 1815, which created a Diet of two chambers, to meet every two years, and to have the power to make laws and to examine the budget. He granted liberty of the press and of religion. The Polish language was to be the official language in the administration and in the army. Poland enjoyed freer institutions at this moment than did either Prussia or Austria. The franchise was wider than that of England or France. Apparently, also, Alexander considered his Polish experiment as preliminary to an introduction of similar reforms in Russia also.

Returning to Russia from Warsaw, Alexander showed in many ways his desire to be a progressive and beneficent ruler. He thought much on what was long the fundamental problem of Russia, the emancipation of the serfs. There were 16,000,000 peasants on the vast domains that belonged to the Crown alone. The condition of these he sought to improve. But the general problem was so vast, his own will so unsteady, that it was solved neither by him nor by his successor. It was, however, a fact of importance that a Tsar had conspicuously indicated that this was the great national evil, which must be removed before Russia could become either free or progressive. The Emperor's opinion could not fail to have a formative influence. Alexander devoted his attention also to healing the wounds and repairing the waste of the long wars. His activity was incessant and varied. He endeavored to make the administration efficient, and to hunt out and punish corruption, which had flourished abundantly during

his long absences and his preoccupation with foreign affairs and war, but his success was slight. Prison reform was undertaken. Hospitals and asylums received generous support. That famine might be avoided, in a country where transportation was very difficult owing to poor roads, he gave orders for the establishment in every district of magazines of corn. He encouraged foreign commerce.

In foreign policy, also, Alexander threw his influence on the side of liberalism, in France, in Germany, in Italy, even in Spain; supporting through his agents in those countries those who wished constitutional forms of government. Consequently, for some time, he was the main obstacle in the path of Metternich, the apostle of reaction. As Metternich, however, possessed the stronger character, and as Alexander was easily discouraged, the result of their rivalry was ultimately the triumph of the former. Metternich had exercised little influence over Alexander at the Congress of Vienna in 1814–1815, but three years later, at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, he ceaselessly played upon the Emperor's essentially timid nature, pointing out the significance of liberalism, how it ended in anarchy, the loss of respect of all human authority, how in the interest of civilization it must be stamped out. Illustrations were forthcoming to point the argument; the election of Radicals to the French Chamber of Deputies; the actions of the German students; the murder of Kotzebue, one of the Tsar's own agents; the mutiny of one of the St. Petersburg regiments; the spread of secret societies. The Tsar was won to a policy of repression, and his support was after 1818 the main bulwark of Metternich's policy of intervention, which expressed itself in the various congresses and which made the name of the Holy Alliance a by-word among liberals. Events at home further altered the Tsar's domestic policy. He became disappointed over the failure of his attempts to give Poland constitutional liberty. Those attempts were always unpopular in Russia. Why should Poland, the old and dangerous enemy, be favored by generous concessions not awarded to Russia herself? Would not such liberty be used simply to build up the former nation to the detriment of Russia? Russian absolutists and reactionaries were opposed on principle to all constitutions, and feared that the Tsar's experiment might be a step toward the introduction of a constitutional régime in Russia itself. The actions of the Poles served this party well, for they took their liberties seriously, and the Diet criticised freely the proposals of the Government. The Tsar, feeling that those whom he had

avored were ungrateful, and swinging to the conservative side in general, began to cool. The Diet rejected in 1820 a measure submitted by the Government. Alexander then modified the constitution, and restricted the freedom he had granted by excluding the public from the sessions of the Diet and forbidding the publication of its debates. The liberal period of a brief five years was soon over.

The Poles replied by conspiring. Profoundly depressed by what he regarded as the ingratitude of the world, and skilfully terrified by Metternich's analysis of the unrest of the times, Alexander became more and more reactionary, and when he died, on December 1, 1825, he left an administration dominated by a totally different spirit from that which had prevailed in the earlier years. The period from 1820 to 1825 was one of reaction and repression throughout his dominions.

THE REIGN OF NICHOLAS I

Alexander left no son to succeed him. His nearest heir was his brother Constantine, who, however, had secretly renounced the crown. Alexander had designated his younger brother, Nicholas, as his successor. The documents, however, making this disposition had never been published. The result was confusion and uncertainty for some weeks. Nicholas refused to mount the throne, and took the oath of allegiance to Constantine. Some days elapsed before Constantine renounced his rights publicly. The opportunity was seized by many malcontents and by the secret societies which had grown up under Alexander. They attempted to effect a revolution, whose precise aim was not clear. This was finally put down by bloodshed in the streets of St. Petersburg. Punishment was meted out to the ringleaders with great severity. Several were hanged, others were banished to the Ural mines or to Siberia. This revolt of December (1825) only strengthened the hold of absolutism upon Russia by deepening the hostility of the new ruler to all liberalism, associated in his mind with disloyalty and anarchy.

Nicholas I was in his thirtieth year at the time of his accession. His reign covered a generation, 1825-1855, and was eventful. His training had not been in politics or administration, but in the army. His mind was practical, narrow, rigid, and exceedingly conservative. He sought to eradicate abuses wherever he discovered them, but in so vast and centralized yet ill-compacted an empire it was impossible for the Emperor to

control effectively the details of the government. His policy was uncompromisingly absolutistic, both at home and abroad. He was the great bulwark of monarchical authority in Europe for thirty years. He carried out systematically and persistently that scheme of reaction into which Alexander had drifted during the closing years of his reign. He sought to give an entirely Russian tone to every aspect of Russian life. His predecessors since Peter the Great had sought Russia's advancement in imitation of western Europe, in the introduction of western customs and ideals and institutions. Nicholas planted himself right athwart this traditional tendency. Russia must be self-sufficient; must find within herself the fundamental, active principles of her life.

For thirty years a system of remorseless, undeviating repression was steadily carried out. The two principal instruments employed were the secret police and the censorship. The former, under the name of the Third Section, possessed practically unlimited powers of life and death, could arrest, imprison, exile, or execute without let or hindrance. The censorship was elaborately and minutely organized, and was most effective in stamping out freedom of the press and of speech, though making itself ridiculous by the senseless zeal with which it pursued its work. Musical notes were investigated on the ground that conspirators might be using them as ciphers for malevolent purposes. It was decreed that books on anatomy and physiology should contain nothing that could offend the sense of decency. Punishments were of great severity. The most harmless word might mean exile to Siberia, without any kind of preliminary trial. The rigor of this régime increased as the reign wore on. To rivet it still tighter, that vigilance should never sleep, a committee was appointed in 1848 to watch over the censors, and later another committee to watch over the first. It has been estimated that in the twenty years between 1832 and 1852 probably 150,000 persons were exiled to Siberia, suffering fearful hardships on the way and after arrival, condemned, as they generally were, to work in the mines. In addition, tens of thousands languished in the prisons of Russia.

Needless to say, under such a system no such thing as a free press or a free reading public could possibly exist. In 1843 all the Russian journals combined did not have more than 12,000 subscribers. That Russians might not be contaminated by the pernicious liberal ideas of the west, their travel abroad was greatly restricted by a system of passports. These pass-

ports were expensive, and were only granted on the consent of the sovereign, and then only for a maximum period of five years. Any one outstaying the time permitted might have his property in Russia confiscated. On the other hand, the travel in Russia of foreigners was elaborately discouraged. Such travelers must obtain passports from the Russian government, must explain why they were visiting that country, and during their entire sojourn were under police surveillance.

Foreign literature of a liberal nature was rigorously excluded. While Nicholas I encouraged Russian literature in the forms that seemed harmless, while his reign was called the "Augustan age of Russia," rendered notable by the poetry of Pushkin, the novels of Dostoievski, Turgenieff, and Gogol, while he encouraged research in lines which he considered legitimate, and showed his humanitarianism by abolishing capital punishment, except for high treason, at a time when the English penal code was barbarous in its severity, and while he encouraged the building of railways, so that at the time of his death there were 632 miles in operation, his reign was, on the whole, one of repression and national stagnation. As we have seen, Russia was as completely as possible shut off from the outside world. No attempt was made even to connect the railways with the systems of western Europe. In later years, regarding educational institutions as "hotbeds of revolution," the Emperor limited the number of students at any Russian university, with the exception of those pursuing courses in medicine, to three hundred. The result was that in 1853, in a country whose population was about 70,000,000, there were only about 2,900 students. Religious persecution accompanied political and intellectual. Any one renouncing the Orthodox religion was punished with loss of property and with eight to ten years of hard labor. Any one attempting to convert an Orthodox believer was imprisoned from eight to sixteen months, and, for the third offense, was exiled to Siberia. Nicholas, like his predecessor, was alive to the evils of serfdom, and during his reign six committees were appointed to study the problem, but almost nothing was accomplished. "I do not understand," he once said, speaking as "the first nobleman in Russia," "how man came to be a thing, and I can explain the fact only by deception on one side and ignorance on the other. We must make an end to this. It is better we should give up, of our own account, that which might otherwise be wrested from us."

Nicholas's foreign policy was marked by the same char-

acteristics, and made him hated throughout Europe as the most brutal autocrat of Europe. Nicholas suppressed the Polish insurrection of 1830-31, abolished the constitution granted by Alexander I, and incorporated Poland in Russia, thus ending the history of that kingdom, a history of only fifteen years. He waged two wars against Turkey, previously described, one in 1828-9, and one in 1853-5. He interfered decisively to suppress the Hungarian revolutionists in 1849, and in German affairs he was a factor of importance. His prestige was great after 1849. Russia, alone of the great powers, had passed through the turbulent years of 1848 and 1849 without commotion. She had aided in the restoration of the established order elsewhere. Her army, on which nearly forty per cent. of her income was annually expended, was supposed by Nicholas and by many outside of Russia to be the best in Europe. The Crimean war, in which Nicholas became involved in 1854, proved the hollowness of this claim. That war was an overwhelming and disillusioning defeat for Russia. Sebastopol finally fell after a famous siege. Russia had lost more than 250,000 lives, and had incurred an enormous expenditure. Another campaign and the Empire might dissolve into the elements from which it had been created. The prestige of Russia, so overwhelming since Napoleon's flight from Moscow, was completely shattered. The people had acquiesced in the narrow, iron régime of Nicholas, consoling themselves with the belief that their country was the greatest in Europe, that their army was invincible, that their sovereign was the most powerful monarch on the Continent. The falsity of all this was now apparent. The Government was shown to be as incompetent and impotent as it was reactionary. The military organization was clearly as honeycombed with abuses as the civil. Though the soldiers were brave, the generals were incapable, the officials corrupt, the commissary department a field of endless robbery.

But in this great national humiliation lay the best hope of the future. As Prussia arose and reformed her institutions after Jena, so did Russia after the Crimean War. That war is a landmark in her history, as it inaugurated a period of extensive reorganization and improvement.

THE REIGN OF ALEXANDER II

Nicholas died in 1855, and was succeeded by his son, Alexander II, who ruled from 1855 to 1881. The new Emperor was in his thirty-seventh year at the time of his accession. He had received

a varied training, designed to equip him for rule. Of an open mind, and desirous of ameliorating the conditions of Russian life, he for some years followed a policy of reform. He relaxed the censorship of the press, and removed most of the restrictions which had been imposed upon the universities and upon travel. Particularly did he address himself to the question of serfdom.

To understand the significance of the Edict of Emancipation, which was to constitute Alexander II's most legitimate title to fame, one must first understand the previous system of land tenure. Nearly all, practically nine-tenths, of the arable land was owned by the crown and the royal princes, and by the one hundred and forty thousand families of the nobility. The land was, therefore, generally held in large estates. It was owned by a small minority; it was tilled by the millions of Russia, who were serfs.

The method of cultivation was as follows: each estate was, as a rule, divided into two parts; one part reserved by the owner for his own use, and cultivated directly under his supervision; the other assigned to his serfs. These serfs generally lived in small villages, going out into the fields to till them, returning to their villages at night. The village communities, or *mirs*, regulated for their members the cultivation of those lands especially allotted to them. The serfs did not own the land, but enjoyed the usufruct of it, were entitled to whatever they raised. In return the *mir* paid the landlord a fixed sum annually. About one-half of the *mirs* were on crown lands, one-half on lands belonging to the nobility.

Serfdom, previously abolished in all other European countries, still flourished in Russia, and was the basis of the economic and social life. The serfs numbered about 50,000,000, about 23,000,000 on the crown domains, about 23,000,000 on the estates of the nobility, and over 3,000,000 on the appanages of the imperial family and in private service as house domestics and attendants. The serfs cultivated, then, the lands allotted to the *mir*, and from what they raised they got their sustenance. But they also cultivated the portion set apart for the landlord's own use. They must labor for him three days a week. They were not slaves in the strict sense of the word. They could not be sold separately. But they were attached to the soil, could not leave it without the consent of the owner, and passed, if he sold his estate, to the new owner. The landlord had the right to inflict corporal punishment, which right, though legally restricted, was practically uncontrolled. If he considered any

of his serfs unduly troublesome he could usually get the government to force them into the army, or send them to Siberia. In practice, the authority of the proprietor was unlimited. The peasant had the use, but not the ownership, of enough land to support himself and family; but otherwise he was not his own master.

Serfdom was condemned on various grounds. It was morally harmful in that it offended the conscience of the age. Economically it had not proved successful. Two-thirds of the estates of private owners were mortgaged up to their full value, and while serfdom was not alone the cause of this, it was one of the causes. Yet the institution had influential support. The nobles looked upon their serfs as the chief source of their income. It was customary in speaking of a nobleman's wealth not to say that he possessed so many acres, or had an income of so many rubles a year, but that he possessed so many hundreds of "souls." It is no occasion for surprise, therefore, that although the Emperor, Alexander II, attacked the question immediately after the close of the Crimean War, several years elapsed before it was solved.

The crown serfs were in a better position than the serfs on private estates. Practically, their only obligation was to pay certain dues each year to the State or the imperial family, which were considerably smaller than those paid by the others to their lords. They were, in a sense, tenants, owing the equivalent of rent. To free them, all that was necessary was to abolish these dues, and to recognize the serfs as owners of the holdings, which they had been cultivating, and to grant them personal freedom. No one could question the right of the State to do what it would with its own. The liberation of these serfs was begun in 1859, though the process was not completed until 1866. Another class, those in domestic service, could easily be freed, but the class belonging to private landlords and attached to the soil presented greater difficulties, for it was not simply a question of giving them civil freedom, but it was a question of giving them land as well. The Edict of Emancipation concerned the serfs of private landowners, the nobles. Issued March 3, 1861, it abolished serfdom throughout the Empire, freeing about 23,000,000 serfs, thus winning for Alexander the title of "the Tsar Liberator." This manifesto did not merely declare the serfs free men. It undertook to solve the far more difficult problem of the ownership of the soil. The Tsar felt that merely to give the serfs freedom, and to leave all the land in the possession of

the nobles, would mean the creation of a great proletariat possessing no property, therefore likely to fall at once into a position of economic dependence upon the nobles, which would make the gift of freedom a mere mockery. Moreover, the peasants were firmly convinced that they were the rightful owners of the lands which they and their ancestors for centuries had lived upon and cultivated, and the fact that the landlords were legally the owners did not alter their opinion. To give them freedom without land, leaving that with the nobles, who desired to retain it, would be bitterly resented as making their condition worse than ever. On the other hand, to give them the land with their freedom would mean the ruin of the nobility as a class, considered essential to the state. The consequence of this conflict of interests was a compromise, satisfactory to neither party, but more favorable to the nobility than to the peasants.

The lands were divided into two parts. The landlords were to keep one; the other was to go to the peasants in the following manner: the house and lot of each peasant was to become his personal property; the lands surrounding the village were to become the property of the village, or *mir*, to be owned by the community collectively, but to be divided periodically among its members, according to the Russian fashion.¹ Such divisions were made by lot, and were merely temporary, for a period, varying in different districts, from three to twelve years, and varying also with the size of the family. Collective ownership of general farming land, private ownership of house and lot, were thus the modes of land tenure adopted at the Emancipation. But the lands, those going to the peasants individually, and those going to the *mir* collectively, were not given to them outright. The peasant and the *mir* must pay the landlord for their respective acquisitions. As they could not do this themselves, the State was to advance the money, which was to be paid back in instalments during a period of forty-nine years. The principle was the same as that applied later in the land purchase laws for Ireland. Thus in time the peasants would become individually and collectively the owners of a part of the soil, yet the former landowner would be paid for what was taken from him.²

¹ This arrangement applied only to those regions where communal ownership was customary, namely the north, east, and south of Russia. Where individual ownership was the rule, as in Little Russia and Poland, the land was apportioned directly to individuals.

² Domestic serfs were given freedom, but not land.

This arrangement was a great disappointment to the peasantry. Their newly acquired freedom seemed a doubtful boon in the light of this method of dividing the land. Indeed, the peasant could not see that he was profiting from the change. Personal liberty could not mean much, when the conditions of earning a livelihood became harder rather than lighter. The peasant ceased to be bound to the landlord, but he was bound to the mir all the more closely, because the mir was bound to the State for at least forty-nine years by its obligation to pay the State for the communal lands. This meant, concretely, a heavy land tax on each peasant. Was anything gained in becoming a kind of serf to the State at the moment of ceasing to be the serf of a nobleman? The peasants regarded the land as their own. But the State guaranteed forever a part to the landlords, and announced that the peasants must pay for the part assigned to themselves. To the peasants this seemed sheer robbery. Moreover, as the division worked out, they found that they had less land for their own use than in the pre-emancipation days, and that they had to pay the landlords, through the State, more than the lands which they did receive were worth. Moreover, as they were not permitted to leave the mir and seek their fortunes elsewhere, even the personal liberty guaranteed by emancipation seemed hollow. Evidently this could be no final solution of the land question for a country almost entirely agricultural. The agrarian question, indeed, became steadily more and more acute during the next fifty years, and was to constitute one of the most difficult problems in the revolution that later broke out. The peasant population in that time vastly increased, and the pressure upon the land consequently grew greater. In the early years of the twentieth century the peasant possessed on an average only half as much land as he had in 1861. He lived necessarily upon the verge of starvation.

The emancipation of the serfs is seen, therefore, not to have been an unalloyed boon. Yet Russia gained morally in the esteem of other nations by abolishing an indefensible wrong. Theoretically, at least, every man was free. Moreover, the peasants, though faring ill, yet fared better than had the peasants of Prussia and Austria at the time of their liberation.¹

The abolition of serfdom was the greatest act of Alexander

¹ On the attitude of the nobility and peasantry toward the Emancipation see Wallace, *Russia* (Revised Edition 1905), 442-451. On general discussion of effects see Wallace, 452-490.

II's reign, but it was only one of several liberal measures enacted at this time of general enthusiasm. In 1864 the Emperor issued a decree establishing a certain measure of self-government. This decree was based upon investigations made by a commission appointed in 1859. Russia is divided into provinces and the provinces are subdivided into districts. In each district a popular assembly was now established, called the zemstvo, to be chosen by the landowners, the bourgeois, and the peasants in the villages. The district zemstvos were to choose representatives, who were to form provincial zemstvos. The zemstvos were to meet regularly once a year, and were to aid the Government in administration. They were not to be political bodies. It was not the intention of the Emperor to divide or reduce in any degree his autocratic power. They were to serve as a part of the local administration, discharging certain functions which the smaller areas, the *mirs*, could not adequately perform, such as the control of the public highways, primary schools and hospitals, and the taking of precautions against famine; in short, to contribute within strict limits to the material and moral well-being of the people. These zemstvos were introduced gradually during the next twelve years, from 1864 to 1876. "The zemstvo," says a leading authority, "has done a great deal to provide medical aid and primary education for the common people, and it has improved wonderfully the condition of the hospitals, lunatic asylums, and other benevolent institutions committed to its charge. In its efforts to aid the peasantry it has helped to improve the native breeds of horses and cattle, and it has created a system of obligatory fire insurance, together with means for preventing and extinguishing fires in the villages, a most important matter in a country where the peasants live in wooden houses, and big fires are fearfully frequent."¹

Though not intended as political or legislative bodies, but simply as aids to the State in business matters, the zemstvos became, nevertheless, training schools in political co-operation. Though their activity was often interrupted, restricted, nullified, more or less, by the central government, yet they persisted, struck root in the life of the nation, and contributed to the political education of the people.

This reform in administration was followed by one in the judicial system (November 1864), based upon a study of the systems of Europe and the United States. The judicial organization was both corrupt and inefficient. Judges were poorly

¹ Wallace, *Russia*, 500-501.

paid, and might be removed at any moment; trials were conducted behind closed doors and in writing, a method which greatly facilitated bribery, a system favorable to the rich, oppressive to the poor. Henceforth, it was provided, that judges should serve during good behavior, that court proceedings should be public and oral, and that trial by jury should be instituted for criminal cases. Whatever its shortcomings, the new system was a great improvement on the old.

Other lesser reforms were also carried through at this time. The censorship of the press was somewhat relaxed, the universities were released from certain restrictions imposed during the reign of Nicholas I, and secondary education was improved. Schools emphasizing scientific education were founded. In 1858 the first high school for girls was opened, and in the course of six years nearly a hundred others were established.

This hopeful era of reform was, however, soon over, and a period of reaction began, which characterized the latter half of Alexander's reign and ended in his assassination in 1881. There were several causes for this change: the vacillating character of the monarch himself, taking fright at his own work; the disappointment felt by many who had expected a millennium, but who found it not; the intense dislike of the privileged and conservative classes for the measures just described, a dislike which could express itself in acts, inasmuch as the Tsar confided the execution of his measures mainly to them. As a matter of fact these measures were, in application, distorted and even partially nullified. The reformers, hitherto a solid body, now split up into groups. Public opinion, the motive force behind all these changes, divided and became less certain. The landlords, smarting under the loss of their serfs, the serfs disappointed at the loss of some of the land which they had been accustomed to cultivate, and indignant at having to pay for the land which they had acquired, were elements of disaffection.

Just at this time, when the attitude of the Emperor was changing, when public opinion was in this fluid, uncertain state, occurred an event which immensely strengthened the reactionary forces, a new insurrection of Poland. After the failure of their attempt to achieve independence in 1831 the Poles had remained quiet, the quiet of despair. As long as Nicholas I lived they were ruled with the greatest severity, and they could not but see the impracticability of any attempt to throw off their chains. But the accession of Alexander II aroused hopes of better conditions. The spirit of nationalism revived, greatly encouraged by the

success of the same spirit elsewhere. The Italians had just realized their aspiration, the creation of an Italian nation — not solely by their own efforts, but by the aid of foreign nations. Might not the Poles hope for as much? Alexander would not for a moment entertain the favorite idea of the Poles, that they should be independent. He emphatically told them that such a notion was an idle dream, that they “must abandon all thoughts of independence, now and forever impossible.” He would continue his father’s policy, as all that he had done had been “rightly done.” In practice for several years, Alexander’s policy was one calculated to agitate and arouse, without satisfying, the Poles. Concessions of a liberal nature were made them, only to be followed by acts regarded as oppressive or hostile. The result was that the irritation of the Poles increased, that misunderstandings multiplied, and that finally, in 1863, an insurrection broke out. It was in no sense as formidable as that of 1831. The Poles had now no army, no native government, no treasury. They had been since 1832 completely incorporated in Russia. At no time during this insurrection did they control even their capital, Warsaw, which remained in the power of the regular Russian officials and army. The fighting was entirely guerrilla in character. The aim of the Poles was to make Poland independent. This involved not only making the Poland of that day a nation, but adding to it the Lithuanian provinces to the east, formerly a part of Poland, but for ninety years, since the first partition in 1772, incorporated in Russia proper. At once the intense national feeling of the Russians was aroused by what seemed to threaten dismemberment of the Empire. Religious fanaticism was also aroused. The Poles were Roman Catholics, whereas the Russians belonged to the Orthodox Greek Church. Thus the Poles stood for schism in religion, as in politics. The Tsar, consequently, in his determination to crush this separatist spirit, had the support of tremendous national passions, and his campaign was conducted with vigor and without mercy. The only hope for the Poles lay in foreign intervention. In this they were bitterly disappointed. England, France, and Austria intervened three times in their behalf, but only by diplomatic notes, making no attempt to give emphasis to their notes by a show of force. Russia, seeing this, and supported by Prussia, treated their intervention as an impertinence, and proceeded to wreak her vengeance. It was a fearful punishment she meted out.

The deep-seated historic evil of Polish nationality was the

division of the people into two classes, completely alienated from each other — the nobles and the peasants. Indeed, the Poles were practically two peoples. The fusion of the two had never been consummated. The nobles were the dominant class, and were regarded by the peasants as despots and oppressors. As a consequence, the Polish people did not act together as a whole. The insurrection of 1863, like its predecessors, was the work of the nobles. The peasants remained inactive, unmoved by the appeals of those who turned to them only in adversity, but who treated them contemptuously and harshly in ordinary times. The Tsar determined to use this, the fundamental fact of Polish life, as a means of crushing the Polish nobility, the turbulent insurrectionary class, by making the Polish peasants friendly to Russia. This he accomplished by a decree of March 1864, which effected a sweeping agrarian change. Practically half of the nobles' lands were given to the peasants as freeholds. The peasants were released from all obligation to cultivate the estates which remained the property of the nobles. At the same time no change was made in the peasants' former right to use the nobles' forest and pasture lands, a right very indefinite and yet real. This right was now preserved to them as tending to win their good will still more, and also as likely to keep friction alive between the nobles and the peasants, which in turn would cause the latter to look constantly to the Tsar for support and protection. The lands taken from the nobles were to be paid for, not by the peasants alone to whom they were transferred, but by a general land tax, which fell upon all lands, that is, upon the lands left to the nobles as well as those now given to the peasants. The result was that the nobles would have to pay a large part of their own compensation, an ingenious method of punishment. The process amounted to a confiscation of a part of their property.

The clergy had supported the nobles in the insurrection. The Russian government punished them by suppressing most of the monasteries and confiscating their lands and by subjecting the priests to political supervision.

A process of Russification was now vigorously pursued. The Russian language was prescribed for the correspondence of the officials and the lectures of the university professors, and the use of Polish was forbidden in churches, schools, theaters, newspapers, on business signs, in fact, everywhere.

The consequences of the Polish insurrection of 1863 were felt in Russia as well. Those who desired a reversal of the Emperor's

previous liberal policies and a return to the old methods and conditions were greatly encouraged and strengthened. Not that the Emperor at once abandoned his liberal policy. The great measures concerning the administrative and judicial systems, already described, were promulgated even after this. But Alexander II, always vacillating, was troubled by these events. Reaction was hastened by two attempts to assassinate him, one in 1866, and the other in 1867. The Tsar, hitherto liberal, became reactionary. The execution of the reform measures described above was entrusted, as has been said, to those who were anxious to limit them, or completely to destroy them, and thus it came about that they were only partially applied, were robbed of some of their essential features. Universities again felt the weight of bureaucratic hostility. The achievements of the reform era were rapidly being undone, and Russia was slipping back into the old familiar ways. This reaction aroused intense discontent and engendered a movement which threatened the very existence of the monarchy itself, namely, Nihilism.

The more liberal-minded Russians had followed the reforming policy of the early years of Alexander's reign with great enthusiasm, and after the issuance of the decree establishing the zemstvos they hoped that the Tsar would advance further along the same path and would crown his work with a constitution, and with real parliamentary institutions for the whole Empire. Their optimism was doomed to speedy extinction. When the members of the zemstvos begged the Tsar to grant a representative constitution he rebuked them summarily for mixing in affairs not theirs. Shortly, the zemstvos were told that they were not political bodies, but merely business organizations, designed to attend to the economic interests of their districts. They were forbidden to express political views. They were to be merely administrative organs, subject to the officials of the central government.

The retrogressive policy of the later years of Alexander II created a widespread and bitter sense of disappointment and deception, and resulted in the rise of an opposition to the existing form of government. This feeling was to pass through several phases, but was constantly to become stronger. The first phase was the most pessimistic. The Russians were thrown in upon themselves once more, there being no room in the Russian state for liberal action. Reading the works of the more radical philosophers and scientists of western Europe, and reflecting upon the foundations of their own national institutions and conditions,

the "intellectuals," as these men were called, became most destructive critics, and were called Nihilists.

"The fundamental principle of Nihilism," says Stepniak, "was absolute individualism. It was the negation, in the name of individual liberty, of all the obligations imposed upon the individual by society, by family life, and by religion." Turgenieff defined a Nihilist as a "man who submits to no authority, who accepts not a single principle upon faith merely, however high such a principle may stand in the eyes of men." The Nihilists were extreme individualists who tested every human institution and custom by reason. As few Russian institutions could meet such a test, the Nihilists condemned them all. Theirs was an attitude, first of intellectual challenge, then of revolt against the whole established order. They did not properly form a party of action, but their reckless criticism of government, religion, marriage, ethics brought down upon them the wrath of the authorities. Alarmed, they fled to other countries. The term Nihilist, as a term of opprobrium, came to be applied by the conservatives to all shades and kinds of reformers, most inaccurately.

Forced to live abroad, mainly in France and Switzerland, the refugees came in contact with other advanced schools of thought. One of these was represented by Bakounine, a Siberian exile, who had escaped and was living in London. Bakounine was an anarchist who advocated the immediate destruction of all existing institutions, governments, churches, the family, private property, codes of law, in the interests of human freedom, "in order that," as he said later, "all these millions of poor human beings who are cheated, enslaved, overworked, and exploited . . . may henceforth and forever breathe in absolute freedom." Shortly, Socialism was grafted upon this hatred of all established institutions, this anarchy of Bakounine. In the place of the existing society, which must be swept away, a new society was to be erected, based on socialistic principles. Thus the movement entered upon a new phase. It ceased to be merely critical and destructive. It became constructive as well, in short, a political party with a positive programme, a party very small but resolute and reckless, willing to resort to any means to achieve its aims.

This party now determined to institute an educational campaign in Russia, realizing that nothing could be done unless the millions of peasants were shaken out of their stolid acquiescence in the prevalent order which weighed so heavily upon them.

This extraordinary movement, called "going in among the people," became very active after 1870. Young men and women, all belonging to the educated class, and frequently to noble families, became day laborers and peasants in order to mingle with the people, to arouse them to action, "to found," as one of their documents said, "on the ruins of the present social organization the empire of the working classes." They showed the self-sacrifice, the heroism of the missionary laboring under the most discouraging conditions. A typical case was that of Sophie Bardine, arrested for discussing a socialist pamphlet before a group of workmen. She had for several months been employed in a spinning factory, working fifteen hours a day, and sharing all the hardships of the other women—all this that she might get the chance to preach to them the new ideas. Our aim, she explained later in court, "was to arouse in the conscience of the people the ideal of a better organization, one more conformable to justice; to point out the vices of the present organization in order to prevent the return of the same errors." It is estimated that, between 1872 and 1878, between two and three thousand such missionaries were active in this propaganda. Their efforts, however, were not rewarded with success. The peasantry remained stolid, if not contented. Moreover, this campaign of education and persuasion was broken up wherever possible by the ubiquitous and lawless police. Many were imprisoned or exiled to Siberia.

A pacific propaganda being impossible, one of violence seemed to the more energetic spirits the only alternative. As the Government held the people in a subjection unworthy of human beings, as it employed all its engines of power against every one who demanded reform of any kind, as, in short, it ruled by terror, these reformers resolved to fight it with terror as the only method possible. The "Terrorists" were not bloodthirsty or cruel by nature. They simply believed that no progress whatever could be made in raising Russia from her misery except by getting rid of the more unscrupulous officials. They perfected their organization and entered upon a period of violence. Numerous attempts, often successful, were made to assassinate the high officials, chiefs of police and others who had rendered themselves particularly odious. In turn many of the revolutionists were executed.

All this redoubled the activity of the authorities, particularly of the dreaded Third Section of the police. In the course of a single winter, 1878-9, it is said that nearly 2,000 arrests were

made in St. Petersburg alone. Suspected persons were not allowed witnesses, and were often summarily executed. Thousands were arrested and sent to Siberia without trial, by simple administrative decrees. Finally the terrorists determined to kill the Tsar as the only way of overthrowing the whole hated arbitrary and oppressive system. Several attempts were made. In April 1879 a schoolmaster, Solovief, fired five shots at the Emperor, none of which took effect. In December of the same year a train on which he was supposed to be returning from the Crimea was wrecked, just as it reached Moscow, by a mine placed between the rails. Alexander escaped only because he had reached the capital secretly on an earlier train. The next attempt (February 1880) was to kill him while at dinner in the Winter Palace in St. Petersburg. Dynamite was exploded, ten soldiers were killed and fifty-three wounded in the guardroom directly overhead, and the floor of the dining room was torn up. The Tsar narrowly escaped because he did not go to dinner at the usual hour.

St. Petersburg was by this time thoroughly terrorized. Alexander now appointed Loris Melikoff practically dictator. Melikoff sought to inaugurate a milder régime. He released hundreds of prisoners, and in many cases commuted the death sentence. He urged the Tsar to grant the people some share in the government, believing that this would kill the Nihilist movement, which was a violent expression of the discontent of the nation with the abuses of an arbitrary and lawless system of government. He urged that this could be done without weakening the principle of autocracy, and that thus Alexander would win back the popularity he had enjoyed during his early reforming years. After much hesitation and mental perturbation the Tsar ordered, March 13, 1881, Melikoff's scheme to be published in the official journal. But on that same afternoon, as he was returning from a drive, escorted by Cossacks, a bomb was thrown at his carriage. The carriage was wrecked, and many of his escorts were injured. Alexander escaped as by a miracle, but a second bomb exploded near him as he was going to aid the injured. He was horribly mangled, and died within an hour. Thus perished the Tsar Liberator. At the same time the hopes of the liberals perished also. This act of supreme violence did not intimidate the successor to the throne, Alexander III, whose entire reign was one of stern repression.

THE REIGN OF ALEXANDER III

The man who now ascended the throne of Russia was in the full flush of magnificent manhood. Alexander III, son of Alexander II, was thirty-six years of age, and of powerful physique. His education had been chiefly military. He was a man of firm and resolute rather than large or active mind. He was profoundly religious, and had a deep sense of his responsibility.

It shortly became clear that he possessed a strong, inflexible character, that he was a thorough believer in absolutism, and was determined to maintain it undiminished. His most influential adviser was his former tutor, Pobyedonostseff, later for many years Procurator of the Holy Synod, a man who abhorred the liberal ideas of western Europe, and who insisted that Russia must preserve her own native institutions untainted, must follow without deviation her own historic tendency, which he conceived in a strictly nationalistic sense. The orthodoxy of the Greek Church, the absolutism of the monarch, were the fundamental tenets of his belief, — no coquetting with western ideas of representative government and religious and intellectual freedom. The opinions of this man are historically important because he was the power behind the throne during all of Alexander III's reign, and during the first ten years of his successor's, that of Nicholas II. Of those opinions two, significant and characteristic, may be quoted, the one concerning parliamentary institutions, the other concerning the press, supposed, in western Europe, to be two of the most powerful agencies of progress. "Parliament is an institution serving for the satisfaction of the personal ambition, vanity, and self-interest of the members. The institution of Parliament is, indeed, one of the greatest illustrations of human delusion. . . . On the pediment of this edifice is inscribed, 'All for the public good.' This is no more than a lying formula; Parliamentarism is the triumph of egoism — its highest expression." "From the day that man first fell, falsehood has ruled the world, ruled it in human speech, in the practical business of life, in all its relations and institutions. But never did the Father of Lies spin such webs of falsehood of every kind as in this restless age. . . . The press is one of the falsest institutions of our time."¹

Under the influence of such an adviser, and under the sway of his own instincts and his indignation at the insolent demand of

¹ Pobyedonostseff, *Reflections of a Russian Statesman*, 35, 62.

the Nihilists that the murderers of his father be not punished, as they were merely "executors of a hard civic duty"; influenced, too, no doubt, by the general horror which that event inspired, and the warm evidences of loyalty which it called forth, Alexander assumed an attitude of defiant hostility to innovators and liberals. His reign, which lasted from 1881 to 1894, was one of reversion to the older ideals of government and of unqualified absolutism.

The terrorists were hunted down, and their attempts practically ceased. The press was thoroughly gagged, university professors and students were watched, suspended, exiled, as the case might be. The reforms of Alexander II were in part undone, the zemstvos particularly being more and more restricted, and the secret police, the terrible Third Section, being greatly augmented. Liberals gave up all hope of any improvement during this reign, and waited for better days.

Many of the subjects of the Emperor felt the hand of the oppressor with excessive severity. Under him began the persecutions of the Jews, which became so dark a feature of later Russian history. The chief home of the Jews in the modern world is Russia. Out of about eight and a half million Jews in Europe, over five million lived in that country. The Russian Jews had long been restricted to Poland and to the contiguous provinces of Lithuania, called the Jewish Territory, formerly a part of Poland. The Tsar, bigoted, and believing in a policy of Russification of all the varied elements and races of the Empire, looked with disfavor upon a people which held fast its own religion and spoke its own language and maintained its own customs. Under Alexander II the restrictions upon Jewish residence had not been rigorously enforced, and many were living outside the Jewish Territory. These were now ordered back, although suffering and hardship were the inevitable result. Anti-Jewish riots broke out in many places, costing many lives. The Government gave but slight protection; indeed, in many cases the officials appeared to encourage the outbreaks, so popular was Jew-baiting. To keep them out of the liberal professions decrees were issued limiting the number of Jews who might attend the secondary schools and universities — to from three to ten per cent. of the total enrollment according to the region, even though in some of these districts they formed a third or a half of the population. Utterly miserable and insecure, tens of thousands left the country. The great Jewish emigration to the United States dates from this time.

Elsewhere, too, in the Baltic provinces, where the dominant

element was of German origin, and in Finland, and particularly in Poland, the policy of Russification was vigorously applied. Alexander was offended by the sight within his Empire of religions, races, and languages not his own, and he steadily endeavored to suppress the variations. Thus by the close of his reign the attempt to force alien peoples to become thoroughly Russian was in process of execution. It was both political and religious. Apparently meeting with a large measure of success, its permanence or profundity was not clear. Widespread, intense, though silent, disaffection was aroused, which would surely express itself if the Government should ever find itself in difficulties. This policy sowed abundant seeds of trouble for the future.

While the policy of Alexander III was thus opposed to the intellectual and moral forces of liberalism, and while it was harshly oppressive to the religious dissenters and subject nationalities of alien race, in other directions it was progressive. The Tsar was sincerely interested in the material advancement of his people, and won the title of the Peasants' Emperor. He abolished the poll tax, which has been called "the last relic of serfdom" (January 1884). He partially canceled the dues still owed by the peasants in compensation for lands acquired at the time of the emancipation. He sought to encourage the peasants to emigrate from congested districts to more sparsely populated regions, for the question of subsistence was then, as it still is, a serious problem in Russia. The lands allotted the peasants at the time of their liberation were inadequate then, and became more inadequate later, owing to the rapid growth of the population. In 1815 the population was about forty-five million, in 1867 over eighty-two, in 1885 over one hundred and eight millions. This growth has been remarkable. In a land with endless agricultural stretches, widespread and terrible famines have frequently occurred.

The most important feature of Alexander's reign was the industrial revolution which began then, and was carried much farther under his successor. Russia had been for centuries an agricultural country whose agriculture, moreover, was of the primitive type. Whatever industries existed were mainly of the household kind. Russia was one of the poorest countries in the world, her immense resources being undeveloped. Under the system of protection adopted by Alexander II, and continued and increased by Alexander III, industries of a modern kind began to grow up. A tremendous impetus was given to this development by

the appointment in 1892 as Minister of Finance and Commerce of Sergius de Witte, one of the most salient personalities in later Russian history. Witte believed that Russia, the largest and most populous country in Europe, a world in itself, ought to be self-sufficient, that as long as it remained chiefly agricultural it would be tributary to the industrial nations for manufactured articles, that it had abundant resources, in raw material and in labor, to enable it to supply its own needs if they were but developed, that a diversified industrial life would have the further advantage that it would draw laborers from the soil already overtaxed, and would thus render the agrarian problem less acute. To effect this economic transformation, believing thoroughly in a protective tariff, he advised that duties be raised and applied on a wider scale. But that the process of building up the nation's industries might be rapid, it was essential that a large amount of capital should be invested at once in the various industries, and this capital Russia did not possess. One of the cardinal features of Witte's policy was to induce foreign capitalists to invest in Russian factories and mines. He was eminently successful in bringing this about by showing them that they would have the Russian market by reason of the protective system, and by promising, in many cases, large orders from the Government for their products. Immense amounts of foreign capital poured in, and Russia advanced industrially in the closing decade of the nineteenth century with great swiftness. But that these industries might flourish, the markets must be rendered more accessible so that customers could be reached. Russia's greatest lack was good means of communication. She now undertook to supply this want by extensive railway building. For some years before M. de Witte assumed office, Russia was building less than 400 miles of railway a year; from that time on for the rest of the decade, she built nearly 1,400 miles a year. The most stupendous of these undertakings was that of a trunk line connecting Europe with the Pacific Ocean, the great Trans-Siberian railroad. For this Russia borrowed vast sums of money in western Europe, principally in France. Begun in 1891, the road was formally opened in 1902. It reduced the time and cost of transportation to the East about one-half. In 1909 Russia possessed over 41,000 miles of railway, over 28,000 of which were owned and operated by the Government.

This tremendous change in the economic life of the Empire was destined to have momentous consequences, some of which were quickly apparent. With the introduction of modern

industry on a large scale came the rise of a large laboring class and of labor problems of the kind with which western Europe had long been familiar. An industrial proletariat sprang up in Russia as elsewhere, a new source of discontent. Cities grew rapidly, owing to the large number of workmen pouring into them. Two of these, Moscow and St. Petersburg, had over a million each. In the large factory towns the revolutionists had a new field of activity which could be more easily worked than the country districts. Here socialistic theories spread rapidly, as among the working people of the other countries of Europe.

All this, too, created a considerable body of rich "industrials" of the middle class, of capitalists, in short, a bourgeoisie which would not permanently be content with entire exclusion from political power or with obsolete, narrow, illiberal forms of government. Thus the political condition of Russia was rendered more complex by the addition of two new elements to the army of discontent. Looked at in this light, the reign of Alexander III is seen to be, not stagnant, but highly formative. Alexander was undermining his most cherished political principle by the new forces which he was liberating, and which in time were bound to spring the old iron framework of Russian life asunder. This fact partly explains the great unpopularity of Witte among the traditional ruling classes of Russia. A system resting on privilege and tradition cannot safely innovate even in the direction of extracting oil and iron from the soil, and spinning cotton and weaving wool. That the old system was being undermined was not, however, apparent, and might not have been for many years had not Russia, ten years after Alexander's death, become involved in a disastrous and humiliating war with Japan.

THE REIGN OF NICHOLAS II

Alexander III died in 1894, and was succeeded by his son, Nicholas II, then twenty-six years of age. The hope was general that a milder régime might now be introduced. This, however, was not to be. No change of importance was made in the Emperor's councilors. Poblyedonostseff, the very incarnation of narrow-minded, stiff-necked despotism, remained the power behind the throne. For ten years the young Tsar pursued the policy of his father with scarcely a variation save in the direction of greater severity. Nicholas early announced his intention to "protect the principle of autocracy as firmly and unswervingly

as did my late and never-to-be-forgotten father." A suggestion of one of the zemstvos that representative institutions might be granted was declared "a senseless dream," and the zemstvo was severely reprimanded. The government of Russia grew more oppressive, rather than less, as the century wore to its close. It was not a government of law but one of arbitrary power. Its main instruments were a numerous and corrupt bureaucracy or body of state officials, and a ruthless, active police. This being the system, an eminent Russian scholar, Professor Vinogradoff, could say in England in 1902, "Nobody is secure against search, arrest, imprisonment and relegation to the remote parts of the Empire. From political supervision the solicitude of the authorities has spread to interferences with all kinds of private affairs. . . . Such is the legal protection we are now enjoying in Russia." And again, "Such a government is not a fitting patron of law and justice. What it enforces is obedience to order, not to law, and its contempt of law is exemplified in every way."¹ Under such a system, men could be terrorized into silence, they could not be made contented. Disaffection, driven into subterranean channels, only increased, biding its time for explosion. The immense additions to the public debt and expenditure, occasioned by the extensive railroad building and the support of army and navy, involved heavier taxation which fell mainly on the poor, the peasantry, reducing them to destitution and despair. Of this the same Russian authority said, speaking of the appalling conditions, "In most cases the number of cattle and horses owned by the peasantry is decreasing. In some districts of the province of Samara, which counts among the granaries of Russia, there have been years when one-third, and even one-half of the population have been turned into mendicants. When the tax gatherer turns away in despair from such wretched people he fastens the more on those who still have something left. It may be said without exaggeration that for the majority of the Russian peasantry the primary object in life is to earn enough to pay the taxes, everything else is accident. The wonder is not at the lack of enterprise and thrift, but at the endurance which enables men to toil along in the face of such conditions."² The same witness quotes a Russian magistrate as saying that "there is no indignity which, in the beginning of the twentieth century, may not be inflicted on a Russian peasant."

¹ *Lectures on the History of the Nineteenth Century*, edited by F. A. Kirkpatrick, 266-267.

² *Ibid.*, 259.

The professional and educated man was in a condition almost as intolerable. If a professor in a university, he was watched by the police, and was likely to be removed at any moment as was Professor Miliukov, an historian of distinguished attainments, for no other reason than "generally noxious tendencies." If an editor, his position was even more precarious, unless he was utterly servile to the authorities. It was a suffocating atmosphere for any man of the slightest intellectual independence, living in the ideas of the present age. The censorship grew more and more rigorous, and included such books as Green's *History of England*, and Bryce's *American Commonwealth*. Arbitrary arrests of all kinds increased from year to year as the difficulty of thoroughly bottling up Russia increased. Students were the object of special police care, as it was the young and ardent and educated who were most indignant at this senseless despotism. Many of them disappeared, in one year as many as a fifth of those in the University of Moscow, probably sent to Siberia or to prisons in Europe.

A government of this kind was not likely to err from excess of sympathy with the subject nationalities, such as the Poles and the Finns. In Finland, indeed, its arbitrary course attained its climax. Finland had been acquired by Russia in 1809, but on liberal terms. It was not incorporated in Russia, but continued a Grand Duchy, with the Emperor of Russia as simply Grand Duke. It had its own Parliament, its Fundamental Laws or constitution, to which the Grand Duke swore fidelity. These Fundamental Laws could not be altered or explained or repealed except with the consent of the Diet and the Grand Duke. Finland was a constitutional state, governing itself, connected with Russia in the person of its sovereign. It had its own army, its own currency and postal system. Under this liberal régime it prospered greatly, its population increasing from less than a million to nearly three million by the close of the century, and was, according to an historian of Russia, at least thirty years in advance of that country in all the appliances of material civilization.¹ The sight of this country enjoying a constitution of its own and a separate organization was an offense to the men controlling Russia. They wished to sweep away all distinctions between the various parts of the Emperor's dominions, to unify, to Russify. The attack upon the liberties of the Finns began under Alexander III. It was carried much further by Nicholas II, who, on February 15, 1899, issued an imperial manifesto

¹ Skrine, *Expansion of Russia, 1815-1900*, p. 322.

which really abrogated the constitution of the country. The Finnish Diet was henceforth to legislate only concerning matters relating solely to Finland. All legislation of a general nature affecting the Empire as a whole was to be enacted in the ordinary way, that is, by the Tsar, who also said, "We have found it necessary to reserve to Ourselves the ultimate decision as to which laws come within the scope of the general legislation of the Empire." This practically meant that Finland was henceforth to be ruled like Russia. The Finns so understood it. The following Sunday was observed as a day of mourning. An immense petition was drawn up, signed within five days by over half a million people. The Tsar refused to receive it.

The process of enforced Russification was continued. The Finnish army was virtually incorporated in the Russian. Finnish soldiers, who had hitherto been required to serve only in the Grand Duchy, might now be sent to serve anywhere. Russian officials were appointed to positions in Finland previously filled only by Finns. Newspapers were suppressed or suspended. Finnish nationality was being intentionally crushed out. Intense was the indignation of the Finns, but three million people were powerless against the autocrat of one hundred and forty million. For the moment there were no signs of any possible relief. Grim despair seized the people. Temporary relief was to come as a result of the disastrous defeat of Russia in the war with Japan in 1904-5, a landmark in contemporary history.

To understand recent events in Russia it is necessary to trace the course of that war whose consequences have been profound and far-reaching, and to show the significance of that conflict we must interrupt this narrative of Russian history in order to give an account of the recent evolution of Asia, the rise of the so-called Far Eastern Question, and the interaction of Occident and Orient upon each other.

CHAPTER XXXIII

THE FAR EAST

ENGLAND, FRANCE, AND RUSSIA IN ASIA

EUROPE has not only taken possession of Africa, but she has taken possession of large parts of Asia, and presses with great force upon the remainder. England and France dominate southern Asia by their control, the former of India and Burma, the latter of a large part of Indo-China. Russia, on the other hand, dominates the north, from the Ural Mountains to the Pacific Ocean. As far as geographical extent is concerned, she is far more an Asiatic power than a European, which, indeed, is also true of England and of France, and she has been an Asiatic power much longer than they, for as early as 1581 Cossacks from the Don had crossed the Urals and seized a town called Sibir. Pushing onward farther and farther east, and meeting no serious obstacles, the population being small, they conquered most of northern Asia before the Pilgrims came to America, and in 1633 they reached the Pacific. To this country, now Russian, they gave the name Siberia, applying the name of the first region conquered to the whole. In 1648 the town of Okhotsk was founded. Thus for nearly three centuries Russia has been a great Asiatic state, while England has been a power in India for only half that time.

It was not until the nineteenth century, however, that Russia began to devote serious attention to Asia as a field for colonial and commercial expansion. Siberia was regarded merely as a convenient prison to which to send her disaffected or criminal citizens. Events in Europe caused her to concentrate her attention more and more upon her Asiatic development. She sought there what she had long been seeking in Europe, but without avail, because of the opposition she encountered, namely, contact with the ocean, free outlets to the world. Russia's coast line, either in Europe or Asia, had no harbors free from ice the year around. She had attempted to gain this contact at the expense of Turkey, hoping to reach the Mediterranean, but she had not succeeded. She made no progress in this direction in

the nineteenth century. Blocked decisively by the Crimean War, and seeing no chance in Europe, she turned to seek advantage in the East. Her coast line in eastern Siberia was very far north, with the result that its harbors were icebound more than half of the year. She sought to extend that line southward. In 1858 she acquired from China, then involved in a war with Great Britain and France, the whole northern bank of the Amur, and two years later she acquired from China more territory farther south, which became the Maritime Province, and at the southern point of this she founded as a naval base Vladivostok, which means the Dominator of the East. Here her development in eastern Asia stopped.

In another direction, Russian advance was notable. She conquered Turkestan, a vast region east of the Caspian Sea, and this conquest brought her close to India, and gave great importance to Afghanistan as a buffer between them. Turkestan had a population of about 10,000,000, partly nomadic, partly settled in famous cities such as Samarkand, Bokhara, Tashkend. The nomads frequently made incursions into Siberia, and cut off the communications of Russia with her eastern possessions. To secure the safety of Siberia it was necessary to subdue them. The process was a long one (1845-1885), and at times exceedingly difficult, but was in the end entirely successful, and Russia annexed Turkestan, proceeding shortly to connect it with Europe by the Trans-Caspian railroad.

CHINA

Between Russian Asia on the north, and British and French Asia on the south, lies the oldest empire of the world, China, and one more extensive than Europe and probably more populous, with more than 400,000,000 inhabitants.¹ It is a land of great navigable rivers, of vast agricultural areas, of mines rich in coal and metals, as yet largely undeveloped. The Chinese were a highly civilized people long before the Europeans were. They preceded the latter by centuries in the use of the compass, powder, porcelain, paper. As early as the sixth century of our era they knew the art of printing from movable wooden blocks. They have long been famous for their work in bronze,

¹ Mr. W. W. Rockhill, late minister of the United States at Peking, came to the conclusion in 1904, after careful inquiries, that the official Chinese estimates had for a hundred and fifty years been greatly exaggerated and that the number of inhabitants did not much exceed 270,000,000.

in wood, in lacquer, for the marvels of their silk manufacture. As a people laborious and intelligent, they have always been devoted to the peaceful pursuits of industry, and have despised the arts of war. Their greatest national hero is not a soldier but a philosopher and moralist, Confucius. Their really vital religion is ancestor worship, and they worship, not simply the souls of their ancestors, but their ideas and customs as well. Hence the most salient feature of their civilization, its immobility. For that civilization, so ancient, and in some respects so brilliant, lacked the very element that gives to European civilization its extraordinary interest, namely, its restlessness, its eagerness, its buoyancy, its daring, its constant struggle for improvement, its adaptability to the new, its forwardness of view, in short, its belief in progress. The one emphasized the past, the other the present and the future. The history of the former was one of endless repetition from generation to generation, and from century to century; the history of the latter was one of evolution. The reverence for ancestral ideas, for immemorial customs as the perfection of wisdom, rendered the Chinese hostile to all innovations in the realm of thought or in the realm of action. Foreigners they regarded as barbarians.

Their kingdom they called the Middle Kingdom, i.e., the center of the world. They called themselves Celestials. Their Emperor was the "Son of Heaven." He was, in theory, an absolute monarch. He was represented in the eighteen provinces into which China was divided by Viceroys. The office-holding class, called by foreigners the *mandarins*, was chosen from the educated by an elaborate and severe series of examinations in the literature and learning of China. The programme of studies in vogue until recently was the same that had been in vogue for a thousand years. The reigning dynasty, the Manchu, had been on the throne since 1644, when it succeeded in overthrowing the former or Ming dynasty.

China, then, had always lived a life of isolation, despising the outside world. Something was known of it in Europe, yet remarkably little. Marco Polo in the thirteenth century brought home marvelous accounts which were one of the great inspirations of the age of geographical discovery. Explorers and, later, missionaries and merchants sought out the fabulous land. At times they even received some favors from the more enlightened Emperors. But, speaking broadly, the connection between Europe and China was of the slightest down to the nineteenth century. Foreigners were permitted in the eighteenth century

to trade in one Chinese port, Canton, but even there only under vexatious and humiliating conditions. China had no diplomatic representatives in any foreign country, nor were any foreign ambassadors resident in Peking. China did not recognize any equality on the part of England, France, Spain, or any other country. "There is only one sun in the heavens, and there is only one Emperor on earth," was a Chinese saying. Inhabiting a country larger than Europe, with every variety of soil and climate, and with an old and elaborate civilization, it is not surprising that the Chinese were self-sufficient and indifferent to the outside world. They even forbade foreigners learning the Chinese language.

Obviously a policy of such isolation could not be permanently maintained in the modern age, and as the nineteenth century progressed it was gradually shattered. This isolation began to be broken down by the outside world as a result of the so-called Opium War between China and Great Britain. Opium, a very harmful and dangerous drug, is made from a certain kind of poppy that is grown in India. The Chinese government, anxious to preserve its people from the effects of the usage of this drug, forbade its importation in 1796. Yet the trade, though declared illegal, was carried on by smugglers with whom corrupt Chinese officials connived for the sake of gain. This illicit traffic flourished greatly. Four thousand chests were imported into China in 1796, thirty thousand in 1837. Each chest was supposed to be worth from six to twelve hundred dollars. The profits were enormous. The trade was a source of great income to British India, which did not wish to do without it.

In 1837 the Chinese government proposed to stop this smuggling, and sent a Viceroy of great energy, Lin, to see that it was done. In this it was entirely within its rights. Lin seized about 20,000 chests of opium and destroyed them. Unfortunately, by his later arbitrary and arrogant proceedings, he put himself in the wrong. Out of this situation arose the Opium War, which began in 1840, and lasted about two years, ending in the victory of Great Britain. This was the first war between China and a European power. The consequences, in forcing the doors of China wider open to European influence, were important. By the Treaty of Nanking, 1842, she was forced to pay a large war indemnity, in part as compensation for the destroyed opium; to open to British trade four ports in addition to Canton, namely, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo, and Shanghai, on the same conditions as those established for Canton; and to cede the island of Hong

Kong, near Canton, to England outright. Hong Kong has since become one of the most important naval and commercial stations of the British Empire. A step was taken also toward the recognition of the equality of Great Britain with China. It was provided that henceforth British officials should be treated as the equals of Chinese officials of similar rank. The question of the opium trade was left undecided. The Chinese refused to legalize it, declining, as they said, "to put a value upon riches and to slight men's lives." They were, however, afraid after their defeat to enforce their prohibition of it, and the smuggling began again and flourished more than ever. Owing to the fact that, practically, the Chinese were not permitted by a Christian nation to abolish an infamous traffic because it was a very lucrative one, and owing to the humiliation of their defeat, the relations with Great Britain continued unstable, and even led to another war.

Other powers now proceeded to take advantage of the British success. The United States sent Calcb Cushing to make a commercial treaty with China in 1844, and before long France, Belgium, Holland, Prussia, and Portugal established trade centers at the five treaty ports. Some years later trouble arose in Canton between the English and the Chinese which led to a second war with China. England was joined by France this time, the reason for French intervention being the murder of a French missionary, an act for which no reparation could be secured. The allies resolved to carry the war to the very neighborhood of Peking, the capital. The Chinese Emperor, therefore, in 1858, assented to the double Treaties of Tientsin. By the one with England, China agreed henceforth to receive a British ambassador, also to open more ports to commerce and to receive British consuls at the treaty ports. The treaty with France was of much the same nature, though differing in details. These treaties represented a great step forward in the recognition of the equality of European powers with China, and in furthering commercial intercourse. But, the Chinese not carrying them out, hostilities were renewed. The allies again marched upon Peking, burned the Emperor's beautiful summer palace just outside, and prepared to bombard the city. The result was that China confirmed the Treaties of Tientsin and agreed to pay additional war indemnities (1860). Thus she was brought into more direct connection with the outside world.

Russia, which had taken no part in these proceedings, knew how to profit by them. It was at this time that she induced

China to cede to her the Maritime Province, which extended her Pacific coast line seven hundred miles farther south, enabling her to found at its southern port Vladivostok, as has already been mentioned (1860).

The period of greatest importance in China's relations with Europe came in the last decade of the nineteenth century as a result of a war with Japan in 1894-5. To appreciate this war it is first necessary to give some account of the previous evolution of Japan. ✓

JAPAN

The rise of Japan as the most forceful state in the Orient is a chapter of very recent history, of absorbing interest, and of great significance to the present age. Accomplished in the last third of the nineteenth century, it has already profoundly altered the conditions of international politics, and seems likely to be a factor of increasing moment in the future evolution of the world.

Japan is an archipelago consisting of several large islands and about four thousand smaller ones. It covers an area of 147,000 square miles,¹ which is smaller than that of California. The main islands form a crescent, the northern point being opposite Siberia, the southern turning in toward Korea. Between it and Asia is the Sea of Japan. The country is very mountainous, its most famous peak, Fujiyama, rising to a height of 12,000 feet. Of volcanic origin, numerous craters are still active. Earthquakes are not uncommon, and have determined the character of domestic architecture. The coast line is much indented, and there are many good harbors. The Japanese call their country Nippon, or the Land of the Rising Sun. Only about one-sixth of the land is under cultivation, owing to its mountainous character, and owing to the prevalent mode of farming. Yet into this small area is crowded a population of about fifty million, which is larger than that of Great Britain or France. It is no occasion for surprise that the Japanese have desired territorial expansion.

The people of Japan derived the beginnings of their civilization from China, but in many respects they differed greatly from the Chinese. The virtues of the soldier were held in high esteem. Patriotism was a passion, and with it went the spirit of unquestioning self-sacrifice. "Thou shalt honor the gods

¹ Exclusive of territories acquired since 1894.

and love thy country," was a command of the Shinto religion, and was universally obeyed. An art-loving and pleasure-loving people, they possessed active minds and a surprising power of assimilation which they were to show on a national and momentous scale.

In the middle of the nineteenth century their state and society were thoroughly feudal, and presented many interesting points of similarity with forms long outlived in Europe. The Mikado or Emperor, reputed to be the descendant of the gods, was the head of the nation. But while he had formerly been a powerful personage he had for two centuries and more sunk into a purely passive state. He lived in complete seclusion in his palace in Kioto, took no part in the actual government, had become, in fact, a figurehead, invested with a kind of religious authority or halo, so that many foreigners thought that he was not the Emperor but a sacred ecclesiastical personage. The real authority was the Shogun. The comparison is often made between the Shogun and the Frankish mayor of the palace in Merovingian times. Reigning as a mere servant of the Mikado, he had known how to acquire from the latter more and more power in the actual direction of affairs until he was practically the ruler. He had his own palace at Yedo, which was the real seat of government, and his power became hereditary, passing from the Shogun to his heir without disturbance. The Mikado was the nominal, the Shogun the real ruler. There were thus practically two dynasties. Beneath the Shogun was the military aristocracy, the Daimios, owners of great estates, governors of provinces, and beneath them their retainers, the Samurai, or class of warriors, completely armed in coats of mail, helmets, and cuirasses, not greatly dissimilar from those with which Europe had been familiar centuries before. These were the directing classes of the state. Beneath them were the masses of the people, of no importance politically, merchants, peasants, artisans. Such was the system that remained intact until the remarkable revolution which began in 1868. That revolution was a direct result of the insistence of foreign nations that Japan should enter with them into the ordinary relations that exist among nations.

For about two hundred years Japan had been almost hermetically sealed against the outside world. In the period of geographical discoveries of the fifteenth century, Zipangu had been one of the mysteries and allurements of the venturesome navigators. Europe had a vague knowledge of the existence of this island, which was placed on pre-Columbian maps somewhat east

of the present United States. To clear up this obscurity, and to find a convenient route to the riches which were associated in men's minds with the East generally, was one of the objects of the Spanish and Portuguese discoverers. One of the latter, Pinto, was the first to reach the famous land, in 1542. He was well received, as were for a time other visitors. In a few years missionaries came, among whom was Francis Xavier, the Jesuit. Later other missionaries appear to have had very considerable success. It is said that in 1581 there were two hundred churches and 50,000 converts, and for some years before 1590 it is estimated that there were 10,000 converts a year. But bitter persecutions of the Christians finally broke out, apparently occasioned by the pretensions and tactlessness of the bishops, and possibly by their political intriguing. A reaction naturally resulted. More than 20,000 converts were put to death in 1591, amid fearful tortures. The spirit of persecution flamed up from time to time in the years following, costing thousands of victims. The anti-foreign feeling grew so strong that in 1638 Japan adopted a policy of isolation, more rigorous than that of China. Foreigners were forbidden to enter the country under pain of death, and the Japanese were forbidden to leave it. They were also forbidden to buy foreign goods, and they might sell only those articles which the Government permitted, and then only to the Dutch, who were allowed a trading station on the small peninsula of Deshima. This was Japan's sole point of contact with the outside world for over two centuries.

This unnatural seclusion was rudely disturbed by the arrival in Japanese waters of an American fleet under Commodore Perry in 1853, sent out by the government of the United States. American sailors, engaged in the whale fisheries in the Pacific, were now and then wrecked on the coasts of Japan, where they generally received cruel treatment. Perry was instructed to demand of the ruler of Japan protection for American sailors and property thus wrecked, and permission for American ships to put into one or more Japanese ports, in order to obtain necessary supplies and to dispose of their cargoes. He presented these demands to the Shogun, supposing him to be the sovereign. He announced further that if his requests were refused, he would open hostilities. The Shogun granted certain immediate demands, but insisted that the general question of opening relations with a foreign state required careful consideration. Perry consented to allow this discussion and sailed away, stating that he would return the following year for the final answer. The dis-

cussion of the general question on the part of the Shogun and the Daimios, or ruling military class, was very earnest. Some of the latter believed in maintaining the old policy of complete exclusion of foreigners. Others, however, including the Shogun, believed this impossible, owing to the manifest military superiority of the foreigners. They thought it well to enter into relations with them in order to learn the secret of that superiority, and then to appropriate it for Japan. They believed this the only way to ensure, in the long run, the independence and power of their country. This opinion finally prevailed, and when Perry reappeared the Shogun made a treaty with him (1854) by which two ports were opened to American ships. This was a mere beginning, but the important fact was that Japan had, after two centuries of seclusion, entered into relations with a foreign state. Later other and more liberal treaties were concluded with the United States and with other countries.

The reaction of these events upon the internal evolution of Japan was remarkable. They produced a very critical situation, and precipitated a civil war. The epoch-making treaty had been made by the Shogun, and one of its results was the speedy overthrow of the Shogunate and of the entire feudal system. The Mikado and his supporters resented the high-handed action of the Shogun, nominally a mere subordinate, who, in a matter of supreme importance, had not consulted the sovereign. All those members of the feudal nobility who opposed the admission of the foreigners sided with the Mikado in opposition to the Shogun. The Shogun and his supporters stood for the policy of entering into relations with the outside powers for the simple reason that the latter had the military force to enable them to impose their demands. The supporters of the Mikado were themselves now convinced of that superiority in a decisive manner. The popular hatred of foreigners resulted in outrages, several of them by the Mikado's partisans. One of these was upon an Englishman, Richardson, murdered in 1862. The English forthwith bombarded Kagoshima, the stronghold of the anti-foreign Daimios (1863). This had the result of convincing these Daimios of the superiority of other nations to Japan, of the uselessness of combating them or trying to keep them out of Japan, of the desirability of adopting their civilization in order to make Japan equally powerful. Thus they completely reversed their position, and became friends of the new foreign policy, instead of its bitter opponents. Other Daimios hostile to the foreigners were taught a similar lesson at Shimon-

oseki (1864). The situation remained, however, confused and troubled.

In 1866 the Shogun died, and in 1867 the Mikado. The successor to the latter was Mutsuhito, then fifteen years of age, and destined to rule until 1912. A civil war shortly broke out between the representatives of the Mikado and the supporters of the Shogun. The latter were repeatedly defeated. The Shogunate was abolished. Henceforth the Mikado was the real as well as the nominal head of the state. He abandoned the retirement in which his predecessors had lived so long, left Kioto in order to emphasize this fact, and established himself in Yedo, previously the Shogun's capital, to which was now given the name Tokio, the Capital of the East (1868).

The collapse of the Shogunate, and the restoration of the Mikado to absolute power constituted the initial step of a remarkable and sweeping transformation of Japan, the beginning of a new era, which the Mikado himself called the era of "enlightened rule." Japan revolutionized her political and social institutions in a few years, adopted with ardor the material and scientific civilization of the West, made herself in these respects a European state, and entered as a result upon an international career, which has already profoundly modified the world, and is likely to be a constant and an increasing factor in the future development of the East. So complete, so rapid, so hearty an appropriation of an alien civilization, a civilization against which every precaution of exclusion had for centuries been taken, is a change unique in the history of the world, and notable for the audacity and the intelligence displayed. The entrance upon this course was a direct result of Perry's expedition. The Japanese revolution will always remain an astounding story. Once begun with the abolition of the Shogunate, it proceeded with great rapidity. In 1871 the Daimios or nobles, most of whom had sided with the Mikado, voluntarily relinquished their feudal rights, and the feudal system, which had lasted for over eight hundred years, was entirely abolished. The old warrior class of Samurai, numbering about four hundred thousand, gave up their class privileges, and became ordinary citizens. All this cleared the way for a general adoption of European institutions. In place of the former military class arose an army based on European models. Military service was declared universal and obligatory in 1872. The German system, which has revolutionized Europe, began to revolutionize Asia. Soldiers entered upon military service at the age of twenty, served

three years in the active army, and four in the reserve, and were liable to be called out in any time of crisis until the age of forty. The army was thus made national. European officers were imported to train it. A navy was started, and dockyards and arsenals were constructed.

The first railroad was begun in 1870 between Tokio and Yokohama. Thirty years later there were over 3,600 miles in operation. To-day there are 5,000. Steam navigation was begun, a telegraph system commenced in 1868, a postal system instituted, and in 1878 a Stock Exchange and a Chamber of Commerce were opened at Tokio. The educational methods of the West were also introduced. A university was established at Tokio, and later another at Kioto. Professors from abroad were induced to accept important positions in them. Students showed great enthusiasm in pursuing the new learning. Public schools were created rapidly, and by 1883 about 3,300,000 pupils were receiving education. In 1884 the study of English was introduced into them. Compulsory military service and the system of education tended to fuse the people into a homogeneous whole, permeated with the same spirit of progress, optimism, and patriotism. Newspapers, first permitted in 1869, multiplied rapidly, until in 1882 there were over a hundred. Translations of foreign books were published unceasingly. Vaccination was introduced, and in 1873 the European calendar was adopted. The codes of law, civil and criminal, and the code of judicial procedure were thoroughly remodeled after an exhaustive study of European systems. The equality of all citizens before the law was proclaimed, and to crown this work of peaceful revolution a constitution was granted by the Mikado. The Mikado had promised this in 1881, and had declared that in 1890 Japan should have a parliament. He was true to his word. In 1881 a commission, at whose head was Count Ito, went to Europe to study the political systems in operation there. After its return the information gathered was carefully studied by a special body appointed for the purpose. This body drafted a constitution in which the influence of England, the United States, Germany, and other countries can easily be traced. Eight years were spent upon the elaboration of this document, which was proclaimed in 1889. It established a parliament of two chambers, a House of Peers, and a House of Representatives. The vote for the latter body was given to men of twenty-five years of age who paid direct taxes to the state of about seven dollars and a half. This was reduced in 1900 to those paying about five dollars. The members

of the popular house receive salaries. The constitution reserves very large powers for the monarch. Parliament met for the first time in 1890.

Thus Japan, as soon as she recognized the superiority of foreign nations, reversed her long-established policy of seclusion, and, instead of lying helpless before them, studied them carefully, adopted all of the machinery of their civilization, political, military, industrial, intellectual, that seemed to promise advantage, and in a few years emerged completely revolutionized and immensely strengthened. Not that such far-reaching reforms occasioned no dissatisfaction, for they did — and even a rebellion — which was easily put down. The test of rejuvenated Japan came in the last decade of the nineteenth century and the first of the twentieth, and proved the solidity of this amazing achievement. During those years she fought and defeated two powers apparently much stronger than herself, China and Russia, and took her place as an equal in the family of nations.

CHINO-JAPANESE WAR AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

A war in which the efficiency of the transformed Japan was clearly established broke out with China in 1894. The immediate cause was the relations of the two powers to Korea, a peninsula lying between China and Japan, about six hundred miles long, with an area one-fifth less than that of Great Britain, and a population of ten or twelve million. This territory was a kingdom, but both China and Japan claimed suzerainty over it. Japan had an interest in extending her claims, as she desired larger markets for her products. Friction was frequent between the two countries concerning their rights in Korea, as a consequence of which Japan began a war in which, with her modern army, she was easily victorious over her giant neighbor, whose armies fought in the old Asiatic style with a traditional Asiatic equipment. The Japanese drove the Chinese out of Korea, defeated their navy in the battle of the Yalu, invaded Manchuria, where they seized the fortress of Port Arthur, the strongest position in eastern Asia, occupied the Liao-tung peninsula on which that fortress is located, and prepared to advance toward Peking. The Chinese, alarmed for their capital, agreed to make peace, and signed the treaty of Shimonoseki (April 17, 1895), by which they ceded Port Arthur, the Liao-tung peninsula, the island of Formosa, and the Pescadores Islands to Japan, also agreeing to pay a large war indemnity of two hundred million





taels (about \$175,000,000). China recognized the complete independence of Korea.

But in the hour of her triumph Japan was thwarted by a European intervention, and deprived of the fruits of her victory. Russia now entered in decisive fashion upon a scene where she was to play a prominent part for the next ten years. The advance of Russia in eastern Asia had early aroused the apprehension of the Japanese. The building of the Trans-Siberian railroad, begun in 1891, seemed to them to indicate that Russia was cherishing ulterior ambitions. The Japanese felt that a further increase of Russian power in Asia would be a menace to themselves. Their anxiety proved well founded. Russia showed that she entertained plans directly opposed to those of the Japanese. She induced France and Germany to join her in forcing them to give up the most important rewards of their victory, to which the conquered Chinese had consented in the treaty. These powers were determined that Japan should not have Port Arthur, should not have any foothold on the continent of Asia. They therefore demanded, "in the cause of peace and amity," that the treaty be revised. The reason given by the Russian Government to the Japanese Government was that "the possession of the peninsula of Liao-tung, claimed by Japan, would be a constant menace to the capital of China, would, at the same time, render illusory the independence of Korea, and would henceforth be a perpetual obstacle to the permanent peace of the Far East," and the Tsar advised the Mikado "to renounce the definite possession of the peninsula of Liao-tung." This was a bitter blow to the Japanese. Recognizing, however, that it would be folly to oppose the three great military powers of Europe, they yielded to the "advice," restored Port Arthur and the peninsula to China, and withdrew from the mainland, highly indignant at the action of the powers, and resolved to increase their army and navy and develop their resources as rapidly and as fully as possible, believing that their enemy in Asia was Russia, with whom a day of reckoning must come sooner or later, and confirmed in this belief by events that crowded thick and fast in the next few years.

The insincerity of the powers in talking about the integrity of China and the peace of the East was not long in manifesting itself. The intervening powers immediately set about reaping their reward. Russia secured the right to run the eastern end of the Trans-Siberian railroad across Manchuria, a province of China, to Vladivostok, and to construct a branch line south from

Harbin into the Liao-tung peninsula, with a terminus at Talienwan. At the end of a certain time, and under certain conditions this railroad was to pass into the possession of China, but meanwhile Russia was given the right to send her own soldiers into Manchuria to guard it. This was the beginning of Russian control of Manchuria. She poured tens of thousands of troops into that Chinese province, and gradually acted as if it were Russian. She also acquired extensive mineral and timber rights in the province.

In 1897 two German missionaries were murdered in the province of Shantung. The German Emperor immediately sent a fleet to demand redress. As a result Germany secured (March 5, 1898) from China a ninety-nine-year lease of the fine harbor of Kiauchau, with a considerable area round about, and extensive commercial and financial privileges in the whole province of Shantung. Indeed, that province became a German "sphere of influence."

This action encouraged Russia to make further demands. She acquired from China (March 27, 1898) a lease for twenty-five years of Port Arthur, the strongest position in eastern Asia, which, as she had stated to Japan in 1895, enabled the possessor to threaten Peking and to disturb the peace of the Orient. France and England also each acquired a port on similar terms of lease. The powers also forced China to open a dozen new ports to the trade of the world, and extensive rights to establish factories and build railways and develop mines.

It seemed, in the summer of 1898, that China was about to undergo the fate of Africa, that it was to be carved up among the various powers. This movement was checked by the rise of a bitterly anti-foreign party, occasioned by these acts of aggression, and culminating in the Boxer insurrections of 1900. The "Boxers" were one of the numerous secret societies which abound in China. They were vehemently opposed to foreigners and to the foreign ideas which their own Emperor, after the defeat at the hands of the Japanese, wished to adopt. They enjoyed the support of the Empress-Dowager, aunt of the Emperor, a woman of remarkable force, who had been for many years the real ruler of China during the minority of the latter. She now emerged from her retirement, and by a coup d'état pushed the Emperor aside, stopping abruptly the liberal reforms which he was inaugurating. The Government, for she was henceforth the leading power in the state, was in sympathy and probably in direct connivance with the Boxers. This movement grew rapidly, and spread over northern China. Its aim was to drive the

“foreign devils into the sea.” Scores of missionaries and their families were killed, and hundreds of Chinese converts murdered in cold blood. Finally, the Legations of the various powers in Peking were besieged, and for weeks Europe and America feared that all the foreigners there would be massacred. In the presence of this common danger the powers were obliged to drop their jealousies and rivalries, and send a relief expedition, consisting of troops from Japan, Russia, Germany, France, Great Britain, and the United States. The Legations were rescued, just as their resources were exhausted by the siege of two months (June 13–August 14, 1900). The international army suppressed the Boxer movement after a short campaign, forced the Chinese to pay a large indemnity, and to punish the ringleaders. In forming this international army, the powers had agreed not to acquire territory, and at the close of the war they guaranteed the integrity of China. Whether this would mean anything remained to be seen.

The integrity of China had been invoked in 1895 and ignored in the years following. Russia, France, and Germany had appealed to it as a reason for demanding the evacuation of Port Arthur by the Japanese in 1895. Soon afterward Germany had virtually annexed a port and a province of China, and France had also acquired a port in the south. Then came the most decisive act, the securing of Port Arthur by Russia. This caused a wave of indignation to sweep over Japan, and the people of that country were with difficulty kept in check by the prudence of their statesmen. The acquisition of Port Arthur by Russia meant that now she had a harbor ice-free the year round. That Russia did not look upon her possession as merely a short lease, but as a permanent one, was unmistakably shown by her conduct. She constructed a railroad south from Harbin, connecting with the Trans-Siberian. She threw thousands of troops into Manchuria; she set about immensely strengthening Port Arthur as a fortress, and a considerable fleet was stationed there. To the Japanese all this seemed to prove that she purposed ultimately to annex the immense province of Manchuria, and later probably Korea, which would give her a large number of ice-free harbors and place her in a dominant position on the Pacific, menacing, the Japanese felt, the very existence of Japan. Moreover, this would absolutely cut off all chance of possible Japanese expansion in these directions, and of the acquisition of their markets for Japanese industries. The ambitions of the two powers to dominate the East clashed, and, in addition, to

Japan the matter seemed to involve her permanent safety, even in her island empire.

Meanwhile, the other powers, observing the increasing Russian control of Manchuria, repeatedly asked that power her intentions. Russian annexation of Manchuria would probably mean the closing of that province to the commerce of the rest of the world. The powers were, therefore, insistent, particularly the United States and England, in urging the policy of the "open door." Russia gave the powers the formal promise to withdraw from Manchuria "as soon as lasting order shall have been established" there, but she steadily refused to specify the date, and this became, therefore, one of the subjects of diplomatic negotiation.

Japan's prestige at this time was greatly increased by a treaty concluded with England in 1902, establishing a defensive alliance according to which the two powers "actuated solely by a desire to maintain the status quo and general peace in the extreme East, being, moreover, especially interested in maintaining the territorial integrity of the Empire of China and the Empire of Korea, and in securing equal opportunities in those countries for the commerce and industry of all nations," agreed, among other things, to remain strictly neutral in case either power became involved in a war concerning these matters, but also agreed that if a third power should join the enemy against the ally, then the second power would drop its neutrality and come to the assistance of its ally, making war and peace in common with it. This meant that if France or Germany should aid Russia in a war with Japan, then England would aid Japan. In a war between Russia and Japan alone England would be neutral. This treaty was, therefore, of great practical importance to Japan, and it also increased her prestige. For the first time in history, an Asiatic power had entered into an alliance with a European power on a plane of entire equality. Japan had entered the family of nations, and it was remarkable evidence of her importance that Great Britain saw advantage in an alliance with her.

Russia, with the other powers, had recognized the integrity of China. Her position differed from theirs in that she had a large army in Manchuria, a Chinese province, and a leasehold of the strong fortress and naval base of Port Arthur. She had definitely promised to withdraw from Manchuria when order should be restored, but she declined to make the statement more explicit. Her military preparations increasing all the while, the Japanese demanded of her the date at which she intended to

withdraw her troops from Manchuria, order having apparently been restored. Negotiations between the two powers dragged on from August 1903 to February 1904. Japan, believing that Russia was merely trying to gain time to tighten her grip on Manchuria by elaborate and intentional delay and evasion, and to prolong the discussion until she had sufficient troops in the province to be able to throw aside the mask, suddenly broke off diplomatic relations and commenced hostilities. On the night of the 8th-9th of February, 1904, the Japanese torpedoed a part of the Russian fleet before Port Arthur and threw their armies into Korea.

The Russo-Japanese war, thus begun, lasted from February 1904 to September 1905. It was fought on both land and sea. Russia had two fleets in Asiatic waters, one at Port Arthur and one at Vladivostok. Her land connection with eastern Asia was by the long single track of the Trans-Siberian railway. Japan succeeded in bottling the Port Arthur fleet at the very outset of the war. Controlling the Asiatic waters she was able to transport armies and munitions to the scene of the land warfare with only slight losses at the hands of the Vladivostok fleet. One army drove the Russians out of Korea, back from the Yalu. Another under General Oku landed on the Liao-tung peninsula and cut off the connections of Port Arthur with Russia. It attempted to take Port Arthur by assault, but was unable to carry it, and finally began a siege. This siege was conducted by General Nogi, General Oku being engaged in driving the Russians back upon Mukden. The Russian General Kuropatkin marched south from Mukden to relieve Port Arthur. South of Mukden great battles occurred. That of Liao-yang, engaging probably half a million men and lasting several days, resulted in a victory of the Japanese, who entered Liao-yang September 4, 1904. Their objective now was Mukden. Meanwhile, in August, the Japanese had defeated disastrously both the Port Arthur and Vladivostok fleets, eliminating them from the war. The terrific bombardment of Port Arthur continued until that fortress surrendered after a siege of ten months, costing the Japanese 60,000 in killed and wounded (January 1, 1905). The army which had conducted this siege was now able to march northward to co-operate with General Oku around Mukden. There several battles were fought, the greatest since the Franco-German war of 1870, lasting in each case several days. The last, at Mukden (March 6-10, 1905), cost both armies 120,000 men killed and wounded in four days' fighting. The Russians

were defeated and evacuated Mukden, leaving 40,000 prisoners in the hands of the Japanese.

Another incident of the war was the sending out from Russia of a new fleet under Admiral Rodjestvensky, which, after a long voyage, was attacked at its close by Admiral Togo as it entered the Sea of Japan and annihilated in the great naval battle of the Straits of Tsushima, May 27, 1905.

The two powers finally consented, at the suggestion of President Roosevelt, to send delegates to Portsmouth, New Hampshire, to see if the war could be brought to a close. The result was the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth, September 5, 1905. The war between Japan and Russia had been fought in lands belonging to neither power, in Korea, and principally in Manchuria, a province of China, yet Korea and China took no part in the war, were passive spectators, powerless to preserve the neutrality of their soil or their independent sovereignty.

By the Treaty of Portsmouth Russia recognized Japan's paramount interests in Korea, which country, however, was to remain independent. Both the Russians and the Japanese were to evacuate Manchuria. Russia transferred to Japan her lease of Port Arthur and the Liao-tung peninsula, and ceded the southern half of the island of Saghalin.

Japan thus stood forth the dominant power of the Orient. She had expanded in ten years by the annexation of Formosa and Saghalin. She did not long regard Korea as independent, but a few years after the war annexed her (1910). She possessed Port Arthur, and her position in Manchuria was one which gave rise to much diplomatic discussion. She had an army of 600,000 men, equipped with all the most modern appliances of destruction, a navy about the size of that of France, flourishing industries, and flourishing commerce. The drain upon her resources during the period just passed had been tremendous, and, appreciating the need of many years of quiet recuperation and up-building, she was willing to make the Peace of Portsmouth. Her financial difficulties were great, imposing an abnormally heavy taxation. No people had accomplished so vast a transformation in so short a time.

The lesson of these tremendous events was not lost upon the Chinese. The victories of Japan, an Oriental state, over a great Occidental power, as well as over China, convinced many influential Chinese of the advantage to be derived from an adoption of European methods, an appropriation of European knowledge. Moreover, they saw that the only way to repel the aggressions

of outside powers was to be equipped with the weapons used by the aggressor.

The leaven of reform began to work fruitfully in the Middle Kingdom. A military spirit arose in this state, which formerly despised the martial virtues. Under the direction of Japanese instructors a beginning was made in the construction of a Chinese army after European models and equipped in European fashion. The acquisition of western knowledge was encouraged. Students went in large numbers to the schools and universities of Europe and America. Twenty thousand of them went to Japan. The state encouraged the process by throwing open the civil service, that is, official careers, to those who obtained honors in examinations in western subjects. Schools were opened throughout the country. Even public schools for girls were established in some places, a remarkable fact for any Oriental country. In 1906 an edict was issued aiming at the prohibition of the use of opium within ten years. This edict was later put into execution and the opium trade was declared suppressed. If it still continued to a certain extent, it was as an outlawed and illicit traffic.

Political reorganization was also undertaken. An imperial commission was sent to Europe in 1905 to study the representative systems of various countries, and on its return a committee, consisting of many high dignitaries, was appointed to study its report. In August, 1908, an official edict was issued promising, in the name of the Emperor, a constitution in 1917.

But the process of transformation was destined to proceed more rapidly than was contemplated. Radical and revolutionary parties appeared upon the scene, demanding a constitution immediately. As the Imperial Government could not resist, it granted one in 1911 establishing a parliament with extensive powers. To cap all, in central and southern China a republican movement arose and spread rapidly. Finally a republic was proclaimed at Nanking and Dr. Sun Yat Sen, who had been educated in part in the United States, was elected president. A clash between this republican movement and the imperial party in the north resulted in the forced abdication of the boy Emperor (February, 1912). This was the end of the Manchu dynasty. Thereupon Yuan Shih K'ai was chosen President of the Republic of China. The situation confronting the new Republic was extremely grave. Would it prove possible to establish the new régime upon solid and enduring bases, or would the Republic fall a prey to the internal dissensions of the Chinese, or to foreign

aggression at the hands of European powers, or, more likely, at the hands of an ambitious and militaristic neighbor, Japan? These were the secrets of the future.

Yuan Shih K'ai was elected for a term of five years. His administration was marked by a growing tension between his increasingly autocratic tendencies and the liberal and radical tendencies of Parliament. In the midst of his term, the President died, June 6, 1916. He was succeeded by Li Yuan-Lung, the Vice-President, generally considered more loyal to republican principles.

CHAPTER XXXIV

RUSSIA AFTER THE WAR WITH JAPAN

WE are now in a position to continue with some understanding our study of the recent history of Russia, a history at once crowded, intricate, turbulent. The next chapter of that history is the record of the reaction of the Japanese War upon Russia herself, the record of what is now commonly called the first Russian Revolution.

That war was from the beginning unpopular with the Russians. Consisting of a series of defeats, its unpopularity only increased, and the indignation and wrath of the people were shown during its course in many ways. The Government was justly held responsible, and was discredited by its failure. As this added greatly to the already existing discontent, the Government found itself powerless to repress the expression of that discontent in the usual summary fashion. There was for many months extraordinary freedom of discussion, of the press, of speech, cut short now and then by the officials, only to break out later. The war with Japan had for the Government most unexpected and unwelcome consequences. The very winds were let loose.

The Minister of the Interior, in whose hands lay the maintenance of public order, was at this time Von Plehve, one of the most bitterly hated men in recent Russian history. Von Plehve had been in power since 1902 and had revealed a character of unusual harshness. He had incessantly and pitilessly prosecuted liberals everywhere, had filled the prisons with his victims, had been the center of the movement against the Finns previously described, and seems to have secretly favored the horrible massacres of Jews which occurred at this time. He was detested as few men have been. He attempted to suppress in the usual manner the rising volume of criticism occasioned by the war by applying the same ruthless methods of breaking up meetings, exiling to Siberia students, professional men, workmen. He was killed July 1904 by a bomb thrown under his carriage by a former student. Russia breathed more easily.

The Emperor Nicholas II now showed a disposition to depart somewhat from the rigorous policy of Von Plehve. He appointed

as Minister of Home Affairs in September, Prince Sviatopolk Mirski, a man of liberal tendencies. The new minister announced "that though the Russian people are as yet unfit for constitutional government, the local representative institutions of the Empire (the zemstvos) might be given greater freedom of action and larger opportunities without risk to the established system," and he spoke of "sincere confidence in the people" as essential to good government. This aroused the hopes of the liberals. The press was allowed great freedom, which it used to express the people's demands, and in November 1904 representatives from the zemstvos were permitted to meet in St. Petersburg to state and discuss what they considered the needs of the country. Many other bodies did the same. Lawyers, academic and professional faculties, learned societies, city councils, all criticised existing abuses and demanded remedies. Never had the Russian people uttered their desires so freely. A few months before under Plehve such meetings would have been broken up and their participants treated with customary severity.

It appeared from all these expressions of opinion that though the liberals differed from each other on many matters, they were agreed on certain points. They demanded that the reign of law be established in Russia, that the era of bureaucratic and police control, recognizing no limits of inquisition and of cruelty, should cease. They demanded the individual rights usual in western Europe, freedom of conscience, of speech, of publication, of public meetings and associations, of justice administered by independent judges, of legal trials for alleged lawbreakers. They also demanded greater participation of the people in local government, some sort of a national parliament which should share in making the laws of the Empire, and which should control the officials, and a national constituent assembly, to be summoned immediately, with power to frame a constitution embodying these privileges in fundamental law. The last two demands were considered by far the most important—a convention to give a constitution to Russia, and a parliament henceforth to make the laws. But, however passionate and universal the demands, the Tsar showed no inclination to grant them, and the discontent continued, fanned by the disclosures of the war, which grew ever more unpopular and disastrous as it progressed. Thousands of soldiers of the reserve, called out, escaped to Germany and Austria. Others were forced, only at the point of the bayonet, into the trains that were to carry them to Manchuria. Hundreds of thousands of workmen were thrown out of employment by the failure

of business enterprises, caused by the war; the harvest was bad, and it was found that the officials were enriching themselves at the expense of the nation's honor, selling for private gain supplies intended for the army, even seizing the funds of the Red Cross Society. The war continued to be a series of humiliating and sanguinary defeats, and on January 1, 1905, came the surrender of Port Arthur after a fearful siege.

The revolutionary agitation continued. The people desired concessions from the Tsar, but none came from him. University students in Moscow and St. Petersburg marched through the streets shouting, "Down with autocracy." "Stop the war!" Finally, the Tsar spoke. Toward the end of December 1904 he issued a decree in reply to the public demands. In it he stated the reforms which he considered were most needed, and ordered the ministers to prepare the laws necessary to effect them. Some of these were identical with the wishes expressed by the zemstvos and other assemblies, but the reformers noticed one critical omission. There was no mention of a national assembly. It was clear that, while the Emperor might grant some reforms, he had no intention of reducing his own autocratic powers, of restricting the bureaucracy, or of allowing the people any share in the government.

The agitation, therefore, continued unabated, more and more embittered as the war progressed. January was signalized by an event that aroused the horror of the civilized world—the slaughter of "Bloody Sunday" (January 22, 1905). Workmen in immense numbers under the leadership of a radical priest, Father Gapon, tried to approach the Imperial Palace in St. Petersburg, hoping to be able to lay their grievances directly before the Emperor, as they had no faith in any of the officials. Instead of that, they were attacked by the Cossacks and the regular troops and the result was a fearful loss of life, how large cannot be accurately stated.

All through the year 1905 tumults and disturbances occurred. Prince Sviatopolk Mirski, ill, foiled at every step, and undermined by reactionaries, was replaced by Buliguin (February 1905). The Government resumed its customary methods. Deeds of violence and repression on its part were met in turn by assassinations and bomb-throwing on the part of the revolutionists. Immense strikes were organized. Peasants burned the houses of the nobles. Mutinies in the army and navy were frequent. The uncle of the Tsar, the Grand Duke Sergius, one of the most pronounced reactionaries in the Empire, who had said "the

people wants the stick," was assassinated. Russia was in a state bordering on anarchy. Finally the Tsar sought to reduce the ever-mounting spirit of opposition by issuing a manifesto, concerning the representative assembly which was so vehemently demanded (August 19, 1905).

In this he announced that "while preserving the fundamental law regarding the autocratic power," he had resolved to call, not later than January 1906, a state council, or Duma, consisting of elected representatives from the whole of Russia. But this manifesto was only another disappointment to the reformers, as the Duma was to be merely a consultative body, not a real legislature, as the elections to it were to be conducted by the very class most hated and distrusted, the bureaucracy, as the working and professional classes were not given the suffrage, and as the sessions of the Duma were not to be public. How small the electorate was to be was shown from the fact that St. Petersburg, with a population of over a million and a half, would have only nine thousand five hundred voters.

Feeling, therefore, that the Emperor's concessions were inadequate and illusory, that Russia must be assured far greater liberties, the revolutionary parties continued their agitation. An agency of great effect when completely applied was now resorted to, the general strike. Under certain conditions, when governments dispose of large, well-equipped armies against which the people are powerless to fight, this is a weapon of great value. It is, however, difficult to set in operation, involving, as it does, the co-operation of vast numbers in a strike, which can be maintained only if the strikers have reserve funds large enough to prevent starvation. In Russia in October 1905 the attempt was made. It began with a railway strike, which included the whole Empire, and which cut off all communication both within Russia and with the outside world. Any one wishing to travel was forced to use the ordinary highways or the water, if that were possible. Commerce was tied up. Merchants could neither ship nor receive goods. Similar strikes occurred in most of the great factories. Practically all shops, except provision stores, were closed. In the large towns the gas and electric light companies ceased to operate. Druggists refused to sell medicines until reforms should be granted. The students of the universities struck, lawyers also; the law courts were closed. No newspapers appeared. Stocks fell rapidly.

This sharp, sweeping suspension of the ordinary and necessary activities of life created an insupportable situation, and exerted

a terrific pressure on the Government. Forced to yield, at least somewhat, the Tsar issued a manifesto October 30, 1905, granting "the immutable foundations of civic liberty," freedom of speech, of conscience, of association, extending the suffrage to those then lacking it, leaving the matter of the permanent franchise to be determined by the Duma, and, most important of all, establishing "as an immutable rule that no law can come into force without the approval of the Duma, and that it shall be possible for the representatives of the people to participate effectively in the supervision of the legality of the acts of the public officials." Count Witte was at the same time appointed prime minister, and Pobyedonosteff, hated by all liberals as the very soul of the cruel government of the last twenty years, was removed from his position.

But it was evident that the police and bureaucrats intended to continue their usual practice of breaking up meetings, shooting, and arresting at will. Moreover, the revolutionists were not satisfied with the Tsar's concessions, but demanded the convocation of an assembly elected by universal suffrage which should draw up a constitution for Russia, as a preliminary step absolutely essential to reassure the people. This the Tsar would not grant. The strike went on through November, new classes joining it, such as the letter carriers and telegraph operators. Dangerous mutinies in the army and navy were frequent, and brutal and bloody attacks upon the Jews, inspired in many cases by government officials, shocked the western world. There was much street fighting in Moscow and other places. The Government refused the constituent assembly, but it ordered the elections for the Duma to be held. Moreover, it made concessions to Finland which brought peace to that distracted country, by restoring the rights enjoyed by the duchy before the late usurpations. Russia continued in a highly troubled state, in fact, an irregular kind of civil war between reactionaries seeking to recover lost ground and revolutionists bent upon preventing a return to the old conditions. That the old odious methods were still extremely vigorous was shown by the fact that, in January 1906 alone, 78 newspapers were suspended, 58 editors arrested, and thousands of people thrown into prison or exiled to Siberia, and most of Russia placed under martial law; all this after the Tsar in October had recognized the civil rights of the individual.

The Tsar had promised the Duma, which was to be a law-making body and was to have a supervision over the actions of officials. But before it met he proceeded to clip its wings. He

issued a decree constituting a Council of the Empire, that is, a body consisting largely of official appointees from the bureaucracy, or of persons associated with the older order of things, as a kind of Upper Chamber of the legislature, of which the Duma should be the Lower. An elective element was to be introduced into the Council of the Empire. Laws must have the consent of both Council and Duma before being submitted to the Tsar for approval.

The elections to the Duma were held in March and April 1906, and resulted in a large majority for the Constitutional Democrats, popularly called the "Cadets," a name derived from the initial letters of the name of the party. Count Witte now resigned and was succeeded by Goremykin, whose first act was to issue in the name of the Tsar certain "organic laws," laws that could not be touched by the Duma. Thus the powers of that body were again restricted, before it had even met.

The Duma was opened by Nicholas II in person with elaborate ceremony, May 10, 1906. It was destined to have a short and stormy life. It showed from the beginning that it desired a thoroughgoing reform of Russia along the well-known lines of western liberalism. It was combated by the court and bureaucratic parties, which had not been able to prevent its meeting, but which were bent upon rendering it powerless, and were only waiting for a favorable time to secure its abolition. It demanded an amnesty for all political offenders. "The first thought at the first assembly of the representatives of the Russian nation should be for those who have sacrificed their freedom for their country," said one orator. It was only able, however, to secure a partial amnesty. It demanded that the Council of the Empire, the second chamber, should be reformed, as it was under the complete control of the Emperor, and was thus able to nullify the work of the people's chamber. It demanded that the ministers be made responsible to the Duma as the only way of giving the people control over the officials. It demanded the abolition of martial law throughout the Empire, under cover of which all kinds of crimes were being perpetrated by the governing classes. It passed a bill abolishing capital punishment. As the needs of the peasants were most pressing, it demanded that the lands belonging to the state, the crown, and the monasteries be given to them on long leases.

The Duma lasted a little over two months. Its debates were marked by a high degree of intelligence and by frequent displays of eloquence, in which several peasants distinguished themselves.

It criticised the abuses of the Government freely and scathingly. Its sessions were often stormy, the attitude of the ministers frequently contemptuous. It was foiled in all its attempts at reform by the Council of the Empire, and by the Tsar.

The crucial contest was over the responsibility of ministers. The Duma demanded this as the only way of giving the people an effective participation in the government. The Tsar steadily refused. A deadlock ensued. The public was inflamed and disorders were rife among the people. A radical party among the peasants demanded that all the land of the country be given to them outright, without payment. The Tsar cut the whole matter short by dissolving the Duma, on July 22, 1906, stating that he was "cruelly disappointed" that "the representatives of the nation, instead of applying themselves to productive legislation, had strayed into spheres beyond their competence, had inquired into the acts of local authorities established by himself, and had commented upon the imperfections of the fundamental laws, which could only be modified by his Imperial will." March 5, 1907, was fixed as the date for the meeting of a new Duma. Stolypin was appointed prime minister in the place of Goremykin. Many of the members of the Duma went to Viborg in Finland, where they issued a manifesto, signed by 230 of them, protesting against the dissolution of the Duma, and calling upon the people "to stand up for the downtrodden rights of popular representation," and to give the Government neither soldiers nor money, as it had no right to either without the consent of the people's representatives. They declared invalid all new loans that might be contracted without the approval of the Duma. As the people remained inactive, either because of indifference or because terrorized, the manifesto proved a mere flash in the pan. Most of those who signed it were prosecuted later, and were provisionally disfranchised and prevented from being elected to the second Duma.

The second Duma was opened by the Tsar March 5, 1907. It did not work to the satisfaction of the Government. Friction between it and the ministry developed early and increased steadily. Finally the Government arrested sixteen of the members and indicted many others for carrying on an alleged revolutionary propaganda. This was, of course, a vital assault upon the integrity of the assembly, a gross infringement upon even the most moderate constitutional liberties. Preparing to contest this high-handed action, the Duma was dissolved on June 16, 1907, and a new one ordered to be elected in September, and to meet in November. An imperial manifesto was issued at the same time

altering the electoral law in most sweeping fashion, and practically bestowing the right of choosing the large majority of the members upon about 130,000 landowners. This also was a grave infringement upon the constitutional liberties hitherto granted, which had, among other things, promised that the electoral law should not be changed without the consent of the Duma. The Tsar asserted now that "the right of abrogating the law and replacing it by a new law belongs only to the power which gave the first electoral law—the historic power of the Tsar of Russia."

The Government declared by word and by act that the autocracy of the ruler was undiminished. Illegalities of the old, familiar kind were committed freely by officials. Reaction ruled unchecked. The third Duma, elected on a very limited and plutocratic suffrage, was opened on November 14, 1907. It was composed in large measure of reactionaries, of large landowners. It proved a docile assembly.

The Government did not dare to abolish the Duma outright, as urged by the reactionaries. The Duma continued to exist, but was rather a consultative than a legislative body. With the mere passage of time it took on more and more the character of a permanent institution, exerting a feeble influence on the national life. However, the government of Russia became again in practice what it had been before the war with Japan, what it had been all through the nineteenth century. The tremendous struggle for liberty had failed. There had been no "revolution." The former governing classes recovered control of the state, after the stormy years from 1904 to 1907, and applied once more their former principles. Among these were renewed attacks upon the Finns, increasingly severe measures against the Poles, and harsh treatment of the Jews. Russia was still wedded to her idols, or at least her idols had not been overthrown. Whether the war of 1914 would result in accomplishing what the war with Japan began but did not achieve, a sweeping reformation of the institutions and policies, ambitions and mental outlook of the nation, was, of course, the secret of the future.

CHAPTER XXXV
THE BALKAN WARS OF 1912 AND 1913
THE PEACE MOVEMENT

THE contemporary world, to a degree unprecedented in history, has been dominated by the thought of war, by extraordinary preparations for war, and by zealous and concerted efforts to prevent war. Finally a conflict came which staggered the imagination and which soon clamped the entire world in its iron grip. This was a ghastly outcome of a century of development, rich beyond compare in many lines. It is, however, not inexplicable and it is important for us to see how so melancholy, so sinister a turn was given to the destinies of the race.

The rise and development of the militaristic spirit have been shown in the preceding pages. The Prussian military system, marked by scientific thoroughness and efficiency, was imitated by most of the countries of the Continent. Europe became in the last quarter of the nineteenth century what she had never been before, literally an armed continent. The rivalry of the nations to have the most perfect instruments of destruction, the strongest army, and the strongest navy, became one of the most conspicuous features of the times. Ships of war were made so strong that they could resist attack. New projectiles of terrific force were consequently required and the torpedo was invented. A new agency would be useful to discharge this missile and thus the torpedo boat was developed. To neutralize it was therefore the immediate necessity and the torpedo-boat destroyer was the result. Boats that could navigate beneath the waters would have an obvious advantage over those that could be seen, and the submarine was provided for this need. And finally men took possession of the air with dirigible balloons and *aéroplanes*, as *aërial* auxiliaries of war. Thus man's immemorial occupation, war, gained from the advance of science and contributed to that advance. The wars of the past had been fought on the surface of the globe. Those of the future were to be fought in the heavens above, and in the earth beneath, and in the waters under the earth.

But all this was tremendously expensive. It cost a hundred thousand dollars to construct the largest coast defense gun, which carried over twenty miles, and its single discharge cost a thousand dollars. Fifteen millions were necessary to build a dreadnought, and then came super-dreadnoughts, more costly still and more destructive. The debts of European countries were nearly doubled during the thirty years preceding 1914 largely because of military expenditures. The military budgets of European states in a time of "armed peace" amounted to not far from a billion and a half dollars a year, half as much again as the indemnity exacted by Germany from France in 1871. The burden became so heavy, the rivalry so keen that it gave rise to a movement which aimed to end it.

In the summer of 1898 the civil and military authorities of Russia were considering how they might escape the necessity of replacing an antiquated kind of artillery with a more modern but very expensive one. Out of this discussion emerged the idea that it would be desirable, if possible, to check the increase of armaments. This could not be achieved by one nation alone but must be done by all, if done at all. The outcome of these discussions was the issuance by the Tsar, Nicholas II, on August 24, 1898, of a communication to the powers, suggesting that an international conference be held to consider the general problem.

The conference, thus suggested by the Tsar, was held at the Hague in 1899. Twenty-six of the fifty-nine sovereign governments of the world were represented by one hundred members. Twenty of these states were European, four were Asiatic—China, Japan, Persia, and Siam,—and two were American—the United States and Mexico. The Conference was opened on May 18 and closed on July 29.

The official utterances of most of the delegates emphasized the frightful burden and waste of this vast expenditure upon the equipment for war, when all nations, big and little, needed all their resources for the works of peace, for education, for social improvement in many directions. Most of the delegates emphasized also the loss entailed by compulsory military service, removing millions of young men from their careers, from productive activity, for several precious years. A German delegate, on the other hand, denied all this, denied that the necessary weight of charges and taxes portended approaching ruin and exhaustion, declared that the general welfare was increasing all the while, and that compulsory military service was not regarded in his country as a heavy burden, but as a sacred and patriotic

duty to which his country owed its existence, its prosperity, and its future.

With such differences of opinion the Conference was unable to reach any agreement upon the fundamental question which had given rise to its convocation. It could only adopt a resolution expressing the belief that "a limitation of the military expenses which now burden the world is greatly to be desired in the interests of the material and moral well-being of mankind," and the desire that the governments "shall take up the study of the possibility of an agreement concerning the limitation of armed forces on land and sea, and of military budgets."

With regard to arbitration the Conference was more successful. It established a Permanent Court of Arbitration for the purpose of facilitating arbitration in the case of international disputes which it is found impossible to settle by the ordinary means of diplomacy. The Court does not consist of a group of judges holding sessions at stated times to try such cases as may be brought before it. But it is provided that each power "shall select not more than four persons of recognized competence in questions of international law, enjoying the highest moral reputation and disposed to accept the duties of arbitrators," and that their appointment shall run for six years and may be renewed. Out of this long list the powers at variance may choose, in a manner indicated, the judges who shall then hear and decide any given case. Recourse to this Court is optional, but if the parties to a quarrel wish to arbitrate, the machinery is at hand, a fact which is, perhaps, an encouragement to its use.

The work of the First Peace Conference was very limited and modest, yet encouraging. But that the new century was to bring not peace but a sword, that force still ruled the world, was shortly apparent. Those who were optimistic about the rapid spread of arbitration as a principle destined to regulate the international relations of the future were sadly disappointed by the meager results of the Conference, and were still more depressed by subsequent events. For almost on the very heels of this Conference, which it was hoped would further the interests of peace, came the devastating war in South Africa, followed quickly by the war between Russia and Japan. Also the expenditures of European states upon armies and navies continued to increase, and at an even faster rate than ever. During the eight years, from 1898 to 1906, they augmented nearly £70,000,000, the sum total mounting from £250,000,000 to £320,000,000. Boen 4
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Such was the disappointing sequel of the Hague Conference.

But despite discouragements the friends of peace were active, and finally brought about the Second Conference at the Hague in 1907. This also was called by Nicholas II, though President Roosevelt had first taken the initiative. The Second Conference was in session from June 15 to October 18. It was attended by representatives from forty-four of the world's fifty-seven states claiming sovereignty in 1907. The number of countries represented in this Conference, therefore, was nearly double that represented in the first, and the number of members was more than double, mounting from one hundred to two hundred and fifty-six. The chief additions came from the republics of Central and South America. Twenty-one European, nineteen American, and four Asiatic states sent delegates to this Second Conference. The Conference was not European but international,—the majority of the states were non-European.

The Second Conference accomplished much useful work in the adoption of conventions regulating the actual conduct of war in more humane fashion, and in defining certain aspects of international law with greater precision than heretofore. But concerning compulsory arbitration and concerning disarmament or the limitation of armaments, nothing was achieved. It passed this resolution: "The Conference confirms the resolution adopted by the Conference of 1899 in regard to the restriction of military expenditures; and, since military expenditures have increased considerably in nearly every country since the said year, the Conference declares that it is highly desirable to see the governments take up the serious study of the question."

This Platonic resolution was adopted unanimously. A grim commentary on its importance in the eyes of the governments was contained in the history of the succeeding years with their ever-increasing military and naval appropriations, their tenser rivalry, their deepening determination to be ready for whatever the future might have in store.

That future had in store, for 1912 and 1913, two desperate Balkan wars and, for 1914, an appalling cataclysm. ✓

THE COLLAPSE OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

We have seen with what enthusiasm the bloodless revolution of July 24, 1908, was hailed by all the races of Turkey. It seemed the brilliant dawn of a new era. It proved, however, to be the beginning of a long series of disasters for the Turkish Empire. From that day to the outbreak of the European War

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six years later the Balkan peninsula was the storm center of the world. Event succeeded event, swift, startling, and sensational, throwing a lengthening and deepening shadow before.

The ease with which the Young Turks overthrew in those July days of 1908 the loathsome régime of Abdul Hamid, and the principles of freedom which they proclaimed, aroused the happiest anticipations, and enlisted the liveliest sympathy among multitudes within and without the Empire. The very atmosphere was charged with the hope and the expectation that the reign of liberty, equality, and fraternity was about to begin for this sorely visited land where unreason in all its forms had hitherto held sway. Would not Turkey, rejuvenated, modernized, and liberalized, strong in the loyalty and well-being of its citizens, freed from the blighting inheritance of the past, take an honorable place at last in the family of humane and progressive nations? Might not the old racial and religious feuds disappear under a new régime, where each locality would have a certain autonomy, large enough to ensure liberty in religion and in language. Might not a strong national patriotism be developed out of the polygot conditions by freedom, a thing which despotism had never been able to evoke? Might not Turkey become a stronger nation by adopting the principles of true toleration toward all her various races and religions? Had not the time come for the elimination of these primitive but hardy prejudices and animosities? Might not races and creeds be subordinated to a large and essential unity? Might not this be the final, though unexpected, solution of the famous Eastern Question?

Even in those golden days some doubted, not seeing any authentic signs of an impending millennium for that distracted corner of the world. At least the problem of so vast a transformation would be very difficult. The unanimity shown in the joyous destruction of the old system might not be shown in the construction of the new, as many precedents in European history suggested. If Turkey were left alone to concentrate her entire energy upon the impending work of reform, she might perhaps succeed. But she was not to be left alone now any more than she had been for centuries. The Eastern Question had long perplexed the powers of Europe, and had at the same time lured them on to seek their own advantage in its labyrinthine mazes. It was conspicuously an international problem. But the internal reform of Turkey might profoundly alter her international position by increasing the power of the Empire.

Thus it came about that the July Revolution of 1908 instantly

riveted the attention of European powers and precipitated a series of startling events. Might not a reformed Turkey, animated with a new national spirit, with her army and finances reorganized and placed upon a solid basis, attempt to recover complete control of some of the possessions which, as we have seen, had been really, though not nominally and technically, torn from her — Bosnia, Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Crete, possibly Cyprus, possibly Egypt? There was very little evidence to show that the Young Turks had any such intention or dreamed of entering upon so hazardous an adventure. Indeed, it was quite apparent that they asked for nothing better than to be left alone, fully recognizing the intricacy of their immediate problems, the need of quiet for its solution. But the extremity of one is the opportunity of another.

On October 3, 1908, Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria-Hungary announced, through autograph letters to various rulers, his decision to incorporate Bosnia and Herzegovina definitely within his Empire. These were Turkish provinces, handed over by the Congress of Berlin in 1878 to Austria-Hungary for "occupation" and administration, though they still remained officially under the suzerainty of the Porte. On October 5 Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria proclaimed, amid great ceremony, the complete independence of Bulgaria from Turkish suzerainty, and assumed the title of Tsar. Two days later the Greek population of the island of Crete repudiated all connection with Turkey and declared for union with Greece. On the same day, October 7, Francis Joseph issued a proclamation to the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina announcing the annexation of those provinces. Against this action Serbia protested vigorously to the powers, her parliament was immediately convoked, and the war spirit flamed up and threatened to get beyond control. Ferdinand was prepared to defend the independence of Bulgaria by going to war with Turkey, if necessary.

These startling events immediately aroused intense excitement throughout Europe. They constituted violent breaches of the Treaty of Berlin. The crisis precipitated by the actions of Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria brought all the great powers, signatories of that treaty, upon the scene. It became quickly apparent that they did not agree. Germany made it clear that she would support Austria, and Italy seemed likely to do the same. The Triple Alliance, therefore, remained firm. In another group were Great Britain, France, and Russia, their precise position not clear, but plainly irritated at the defiance of the

Treaty of Berlin. A tremendous interchange of diplomatic notes ensued. The British Foreign Minister, Sir Edward Grey, announced that Great Britain could not admit "the right of any power to alter an international treaty without the consent of the other parties to it," and demanded that, as the public law of the Balkans rested upon the Treaty of Berlin of 1878, and that as that treaty was made by all the great powers, it could only be revised by them, meeting again in congress. But neither Austria nor Germany would listen to this suggestion. They knew that Russia could not intervene, lamed, as she was, by the disastrous war with Japan, with her army disorganized and her finances in bad condition. And they had no fear of Great Britain and France. Thus the Treaty of Berlin was flouted, although later the signatories of that treaty formally recognized the accomplished fact.

Of all the states the most aggrieved by these occurrences was Serbia, and the most helpless. For years the Serbians had entertained the ambition of uniting Serbia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Montenegro, peopled by members of the same Serbian race, thus restoring the Serbian empire of the Middle Ages, and gaining access to the sea. This plan was blocked, apparently forever. Serbia could not expand to the west, as Austria barred the way with Bosnia and Herzegovina. She could not reach the sea. Thus she could get her products to market only with the consent of other nations. She alone of all the states in Europe, with the exception of Switzerland, was in this predicament. Fearing that she must thus become a vassal state, probably to her enemy, Austria-Hungary; seeing all possibility of expansion ended, all hopes of combining the Serbs of the Balkans under her banner frustrated, the feeling was strong that war, even against desperate odds, was preferable to strangulation. However, she did not fly to arms. But the feeling of anger and alarm remained, an element in the general situation that could not be ignored, auguring ill for the future.

But trouble for the Young Turks came not only from the outside. It also came from inside and, as was shortly seen, it lay in large measure in their own unwisdom.

The new Turkish Parliament met in December, 1908, amid general enthusiasm. It consisted of two chambers, a Senate, appointed by the Sultan, and a Chamber of Deputies, elected by the people. Four months later events occurred which threatened the abrupt termination of this experiment in constitutional and parliamentary government. On April 13, 1909, without

warning, thousands of troops in Constantinople broke into mutiny, killed some of their officers, denounced the Young Turks, and demanded the abolition of the constitution. The city was terrorized. At the same time sickening massacres occurred in Asia Minor, particularly at Adana, showing that the religious and racial animosities of former times had lost none of their force. It seemed that the new régime was about to founder utterly. A counter-revolution was to undo the work of July. But this counter-revolution was energetically suppressed by troops sent up from Salonica and Adrianople, and the Young Turks were soon in power again. Holding that the mutiny had been inspired and organized by the Sultan, who had corrupted the troops so that he might restore the old régime, they resolved to terminate his rule. On April 27, 1909, Abdul Hamid II was deposed, and was immediately taken as a prisoner of state to Salonica. He was succeeded by his brother, whom he had kept imprisoned many years. The new Sultan, Mohammed V, was in his sixty-fourth year. He at once expressed his entire sympathy with the aims of the Young Turks, his intention to be a constitutional monarch.

From the beginning the Young Turks failed. They did not rise to the height of their opportunity, they did not meet the expectations that had been aroused, they did not loyally live up to the principles they professed. They made no attempt to introduce the spirit of justice, of fair play toward the various elements of their highly composite empire. Instead of seeking to apply the principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity, they resorted to autocratic government, to domination by a single race, to the ruthless suppression of the rights of the people. They did just what the Germans did in Alsace-Lorraine and Posen, what the Russians did in Finland and in Poland, what the Austrians and Hungarians did with the Slavic peoples within their borders. The policy of oppression of subject races, the attempt at amalgamation by force and craft, provided Europe with much combustible material and the combustion finally came. The government of the Young Turks was just as despotic as that of Abdul Hamid and its outcome was the same, a further and decisive disruption of the Empire.

From the very first they showed their purpose. They, the Turks, that is the Mohammedan ruling race, determined to keep power in their own hands by hook or crook. In the very first elections to Parliament they arranged affairs so that they would have a majority over all other races combined. They did not in-

tend to divide power with the Christian Greeks and Armenians or with the Mohammedan Arabs. Their policy was one of Turkification, just as the Russian policy was one of Russification, the German of Germanization. They made no attempt to punish the perpetrators of the Adana massacres in which over thirty thousand Armenian Christians were slaughtered. The Armenian population was thus alienated from them. They tried to suppress the liberties which under all previous régimes the Orthodox Greek Church had enjoyed. As they intended to subject all the races of the Empire to their own race, so they intended to suppress by force all religious privileges. They thus offended and infuriated the Greeks, whom they also embittered by a commercial boycott because the Greeks would not agree to their repressive policy in regard to the Cretans. Their treatment of Macedonia was the acme of folly. They sought to reënforce the Moslem elements of the population by bringing in Moslems from other regions. This aroused the Christian elements, Greek, Bulgarian, and Serbian. Large numbers of these Christians fled from Macedonia to Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia, carrying with them their grievances, urging the governments of those countries to hostility against the Turks.

The Turks went a step farther. In the west were the Albanians, a Moslem people who had hitherto combined local independence with loyal and appreciated services to the Turkish authorities, in both the army and the government. The Turks decided to suppress this independence and to make the Albanians submit in all matters to the authorities at Constantinople. But the Albanians, for centuries remarkable fighters, now flew to arms. Year after year the Albanian rebellion broke out, only temporarily subdued or smothered by the Turks, who thus exhausted their strength and squandered their resources in fruitless but costly efforts to "pacify" these hardy, war-loving mountaineers.

Thus only a few years of Young Turk rule were necessary to create a highly critical situation, so numerous were the disaffected elements. There had been no serious attempt to regenerate Turkey, to bring together the various races on the basis of liberty for all. Turkey lost hundreds of thousands of its Christian subjects who fled to surrounding countries rather than endure the odious oppression. These exiles did what they could to hit back at their oppressors.

The Young Turks from the very beginning failed as reformers because they were untrue to their promises. Their failure led

to war in the Balkans and the war in the Balkans led to the European War. They spent their time in endeavoring to assert themselves as a race of masters. They sowed the wind and they quickly reaped the whirlwind.

THE TURKO-ITALIAN WAR OF 1911

While the Turkish Empire was in this highly perturbed condition and while the Balkan states were aglow with indignation at the treatment being meted out to the members of their races resident in Macedonia and were trembling with the desire to act, trouble flared up for the Young Turks in another quarter. Italy had for years been casting longing eyes on the territories which fringe the southern shores of the Mediterranean. She had once hoped to acquire Tunis but had found herself forestalled by France, which seized that country in 1881. At the same time England began her occupation of Egypt. All that remained, therefore, was Tripoli, like Egypt a part of the Turkish Empire. For many years the thought that this territory ought to belong to Italy had been accepted as axiomatic in influential quarters in the Italian government. Schemes had been worked out and partly put into force for a "pacific penetration" of an economic character of this land. Now, however, the time seemed to have arrived to seize it outright. Austria-Hungary had annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Bulgaria had declared her independence in 1908, and there had been no successful opposition on the part of Turkey or of any of the Great Powers. Was not this the ripe moment for Italy's project?

She evidently thought so, for, in September, 1911, she sent her warships to Tripoli and began the conquest of that country. It proved a more difficult undertaking than had been imagined. While she seized the coast towns, her hold on them was precarious and her progress into the interior was slow and costly, owing to the fact that the Turks aroused the natives against the invaders. Italy had given her ally, Austria-Hungary, to understand that she would not attack Turkey directly in Europe, as European Turkey was a veritable tinder-box which, if it once caught fire, might blaze up into a devastating and incalculable conflagration. But as month after month went by and Italy was producing only an uncertain effect in Tripoli, she resolved on more decisive action nearer Constantinople, hoping to bring the Turks to terms. She attacked and seized Rhodes and eleven other Turkish islands in the *Ægean*, the *Dodecanese*. This, and

the fact that an Albanian revolution against the Turks was at the same time attaining alarming proportions, made the latter ready to conclude peace with Italy so that they might be free to put down the Albanians. On October 15, 1912, was signed at Ouchy, or Lausanne, a treaty whereby Turkey relinquished Tripoli. It was also provided that Italy should withdraw her troops from the Dodecanese as soon as the Turkish troops were withdrawn from Tripoli, a phrase about which it was easy to quibble later.

The great significance of this war did not lie in the fact that Italy acquired a new colony. It lay in the fact that it began again the process, arrested since 1878, of the violent dismemberment of the Turkish Empire; that it revealed the military weakness of that Empire, powerless to preserve its integrity; and, what is most important, that it contributed directly and greatly to a far more serious attack upon Turkey by the Balkan states, which, in turn, led to the European War. The tinder-box was lighted and a general European conflagration resulted. The Italian attack upon Tripoli was momentous in its consequences.

THE BALKAN WARS

During the war the Balkan states were negotiating with each other with a view to united action against Turkey. This union was not easy to bring about, as Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece disliked each other intensely, for historical, racial, sentimental reasons, too numerous and too complex to be described here. However, they disliked the Turks more and they were suffering constantly from them. Massacres of the Christians in Macedonia in which large numbers of Greeks, Bulgarians, and Serbians lost their lives, inflamed the people of those states with the desire to liberate their brothers in Macedonia. By doing this they would also increase their own territories and diminish or end an odious tyranny. These nations found it possible to unite for the purpose of overwhelming the Turks; they might not find it possible to agree as to the partition among themselves of any territories they might acquire, since here their old, established ambitions and antipathies might conflict. It was because of the strength of these rivalries and hatreds that neither the Turks nor the outside powers considered an alliance of the Balkan states as at all among the possibilities. But the statesmen of the Balkans had learned something from the troubled history of the peninsula, and saw the folly of continuing their dissensions.

They also recognized that now was their chance, that they might never again find their common enemy so weak and demoralized, the general European situation so favorable.

Thus it came about that in October, 1912, the four Balkan states, Montenegro, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece, made war on Turkey. The war was brief and an overwhelming success for the allies. Fighting began on October 15, the very day of the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne between Italy and Turkey, although technically the declarations of war were not issued until October 18. The Greeks pushed northward into Macedonia, gaining several victories over the enemy, and on November 8, only three weeks after the beginning of the campaign, they entered the important city and port of Salonica, with Crown Prince Constantine at their head. Farther west the Serbians and Montenegrins were also successful. The Serbians won a great victory at Kumanovo where they avenged the defeat of their ancestors at Kossovo which they had not forgotten for five hundred years. They then captured Monastir.

Meanwhile the Bulgarians, who had the larger armies, had gone from victory to victory, defeating the Turks brilliantly in the battles of Kirk Kilissé and Lulé Burgas. The latter was one of the great battles of modern times, three hundred and fifty thousand troops being involved in fierce, tenacious struggle for three days. The result was the destruction of the military power of the Turks. By the middle of November the Bulgarians had reached the Chataldja line of fortifications, which extend from the Sea of Marmora to the Black Sea. Only twenty-five miles beyond them lay Constantinople.

The collapse of the Turkish power in Europe was nearly complete. Only the very important fortresses of Adrianople in the east, and Janina and Scutari in the west, had not fallen. In a six weeks' campaign Turkish possessions in Europe had shrunk to Constantinople and the twenty-five-mile stretch west to the Chataldja fortifications. This overthrow and collapse came as a staggering surprise to the Turks, to the Balkan allies themselves, and to the Great Powers. The Ottoman Empire in Europe had ceased to exist, with the exception of Constantinople, Adrianople, Janina, and Scutari. The military prestige of Turkey was gone.

In December delegates from the various states met in London to make peace. They were unsuccessful because Bulgaria demanded Adrianople, which the Turks flatly refused. In March, 1913, therefore, war was resumed. One after another the fort-

resses fell, Janina on March 6, Adrianople on March 26, Scutari on April 23. Turkey was now compelled to accept terms of peace. On May 30, the Treaty of London was signed. It provided that a line should be drawn from Enos on the *Ægean* Sea to Midia on the Black Sea and that all Turkey west of that line should be ceded to the allies, except a region of undefined dimensions on the Adriatic, Albania, whose boundaries and status should be determined by the Great Powers. Crete was ceded to the Great Powers, and the decision as to the islands in the *Ægean* which Greece had seized was also left to them. In December, 1913, Crete was incorporated in the kingdom of Greece. The Sultan's dominions in Europe had shrunk nearly to the vanishing point. After five centuries of proud possession he found himself almost expelled from Europe, retaining still Constantinople and only enough territory round about to protect it. This great achievement was the work of the four Balkan states, united for once in the common work of liberation. The Great Powers had done nothing. Europe felt relieved, however, that so considerable a change as this in the map of the Balkan peninsula had been effected without involving the Great Powers in war.

The Treaty of London, however, had not long to live. No sooner had the Balkan states conquered Turkey than they fell to fighting among themselves over the division of the spoils. The responsibility for this calamity does not rest solely with them. It rests in part with the Great Powers, particularly with Austria and Italy whose intervention and whose insistence upon the creation of a new independent state, Albania, out of a part of the territory now relinquished by the Turks precipitated a new crisis. For the creation of this new state on the Adriatic coast absolutely prevented Serbia from realizing one of her most passionate and legitimate ambitions, an outlet to the sea, an escape from her land-locked condition which placed her at the mercy of her neighbors.

Before beginning the war with the Turks, Serbia and Bulgaria had defined their future spheres of influence in upper Macedonia, should the war result in their favor. The larger part of Macedonia should go to Bulgaria, and Serbia's gains should be chiefly in the west, including the longed-for Adriatic seacoast. But now Albania was planted there and Serbia was as land-locked as ever. Austria was resolved that Serbia should under no conditions become an Adriatic state. She had always been opposed to the aggrandizement of Serbia, because she had millions of Serbs under her own rule who might be attracted to an indepen-

dent Serbia, enlarged and with prestige heightened. Moreover she believed that Serbia would be the pawn of Russia, and she would not tolerate Russia's influence on her southern borders and along the Adriatic, if she could help it. She did not propose to be less important in those waters than she had been in the past. Therefore Serbia must be excluded from the Adriatic. It was the blocking of Serbia's outlet to the sea that caused the second Balkan war between the allies. Intense was the indignation of the Serbians, but they could do nothing. They therefore sought as partial compensation larger territories in Macedonia than their treaty with Bulgaria had assigned them, arguing, correctly enough, that the conditions had greatly changed from those contemplated when that agreement was made and that the new conditions justified and necessitated a new arrangement. But here they encountered the stubborn opposition of Bulgaria, which refused any concessions along this line and insisted upon the strict observance of the treaty. Instantly the old, bitter hatreds flamed up again. The Serbians insisted that the expulsion of the Turks had been the work of all the allies and that there should be a fair division of the territories acquired in the name of all. On the other hand, the Bulgarians argued that it had been they who had done the heavy fighting in the war, which was true, that they had furnished by far the larger number of troops, that it was their victories at Kirk Kilissé and Lulé Burgas that had annihilated the power of the Turks in Europe, that they were entitled to annex territories in Macedonia which they declared were peopled by Bulgarians. Other considerations also entered into the situation.

Suffice it to say that Bulgaria intended to have her way. Her army was elated by the recent astounding successes, was rather contemptuous of the Serbians and Greeks, emphatically minimized the services rendered by these to the common cause, thought that it could easily conquer both if necessary, and could take what territories it chose. It was Bulgaria, whose war party had lost all sense of proportion, all sense of the rights of her former allies, that began the new struggle. She treacherously attacked Greece and Serbia at the end of June, 1913. Fierce fighting ensued for several days.

Bulgaria's action in plunging into this avoidable conflict was all the more foolhardy as her relations with her northern neighbor, Roumania, were also unsettled and precarious. Roumania had demanded that Bulgaria cede her a strip of territory in the northeast of Bulgaria, in order that the balance of power among

the Balkan states might remain practically what it had been. Bulgaria had refused this so-called compensation. The result was that Roumania also now went to war with Bulgaria. The Turks,



too, seeing a chance to recover some of the land they had recently lost, plunged into the mêlée.

Thus Bulgaria was confronted on all sides by enemies. She was at war with five states, not three, for Montenegro was also involved. By the middle of July she saw that the case was hope-

less and consented to make peace, by the Treaty of Bucharest, signed August 10, 1913, by which Serbia and Greece secured larger possessions than they had ever anticipated, and by which Roumania was given the territory she desired. Turkey also recovered a large area which she had lost the year before, including the important city and fortress of Adrianople. All this was at the expense of Bulgaria, who paid for her arrogance and unconciliatory temper by losing much territory which she would otherwise have secured, by seeing her former and hated allies victorious over her in the field and in annexations of territory which she regarded as rightfully hers. Bulgaria was deeply embittered by all this and only waited for an opportunity to tear up the Treaty of Bucharest which she refused to consider as morally binding, as in any sense a permanent settlement of the Balkans. The year 1913 remains a bitter memory in the minds of all Bulgarians.

The two Balkan wars cost heavily in human life and in treasure. Turkey and Bulgaria each lost over 150,000 in killed and wounded, Serbia over 70,000, Greece nearly as many, little Montenegro over 10,000. The losses among non-combatants were heavy in those who died from starvation, or disease, or massacre, for the second war was one of indisputable atrocity. On the other hand, Montenegro, Greece, and Serbia had nearly doubled in size. Bulgaria and Roumania had grown. The Turkish Empire in Europe was limited to a comparatively small area.

We must now examine the reaction of all these profound and astonishing changes in the Balkans upon Europe in general. In other words, we must study the causes of the war of 1914. For the Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913 were a prelude to the European War of 1914. The sequence of events from the Turkish Revolution of July, 1908, to the Austrian declaration of war upon Serbia in July, 1914, is direct, unmistakable, disastrous. Each year added a link to the lengthening chain of iron. The map of Europe was thrown into the flames. What the new map would be no one could foresee.

It may be said in passing that the new Albanian state proved a fiasco from the start and that it disappeared completely when the war began in August, 1914, the powers that had created it withdrawing their support and its German prince, William of Wied, leaving for Germany, where he joined the army that was fighting France. He had meanwhile announced his abdication in a high-flown manifesto.

CHAPTER XXXVI

THE WORLD WAR

IN August, 1913, the long-drawn-out crisis in the Balkans seemed safely over with the Treaty of Bucharest, to the apparent satisfaction of the people of Europe. It had not resulted in what had been greatly feared, a European war. That had been avoided and the world breathed more freely. But that this feeling was not shared by the governments of Austria and Germany has since been revealed. Though this was not publicly known until more than a year afterward, it is now established that on August 9, 1913, the day before the Treaty of Bucharest was formally signed, Austria informed her ally, Italy, that she proposed to take action against Serbia. She represented this proposed action as defensive and as therefore justifying her in expecting the aid of Italy under the terms of the treaty of the Triple Alliance. Italy through her prime minister, Giolitti, refused to accede to this view, stating that such a war would not be one of defense on the part of Austria, as no one was thinking of attacking her. The treaty of Triple Alliance required its members to aid each other only in the case of a defensive war forced upon a colleague. Austria, then, planned war upon Serbia, August, 1913. Whether she was restrained by the knowledge that Italy would not support her or by other considerations is a matter for conjecture.

Prince von Bülow, who for nine years had been Chancellor of Germany, has declared that the collapse of Turkey was a blow to Germany, which meant that it imperiled the plans which Germany was nourishing for expansion or influence in the Balkans and the East. It was on this ground that in 1913 new army and taxation bills, extraordinarily increasing Germany's preparedness for war, were carried through. This inevitably led to similar, though not to as sweeping, legislation in France.

Austria and Germany, therefore, were far from pleased at the outcome of events in the Balkans, and the former, a great European state of fifty millions, was planning action by arms against Serbia, a nation of now perhaps four millions, a nation both exhausted and elated by two years of war. Of course Austria knew that any such action would bring Russia upon the scene, and that was the reason for her desiring the eventual support of her two allies. While, for reasons that are somewhat obscure, Austria finally did not consider the moment opportune for making war on Serbia in August, 1913, she did consider it opportune in July, 1914, and from her action at that time came swiftly and dramatically the Great War.

The relations of Austria-Hungary and Serbia have already been alluded to, the former's annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908, and her part in the creation of the new state of Albania for the same purpose, to prevent Serbia's getting any outlet to the sea. Yet, though successful in this, she had not been able to prevent the growth of Serbia. Serbia had, however, submitted in 1908 and 1909 and in 1913, to demands which emanated from Austria-Hungary and which were deeply humiliating. On both sides there was, as there had long been, bad blood.

ASSASSINATION OF ARCHDUKE FRANCIS FERDINAND

Suddenly a horrible crime occurred which set in motion a mighty and lamentable train of events. On June 28, 1914, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, nephew of the Emperor of Austria, and heir to the throne, was, with his wife, assassinated in the streets of Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia. The men who had done the infamous deed were Austrian subjects, natives of Bosnia. But they were Serbians by race. An outburst of intense indignation followed against the Serbians, "a nation of assassins," it was declared. Serbia was, by Austrian opinion, held responsible, although the crime occurred on Austrian soil and was committed by Austrian subjects, and although Austrian methods of rule in Bosnia were of such a character as sufficiently to account for the dastardly crime. At any rate, the desire for war was expressed in many Austrian newspapers, which held the Serbian government responsible.

But four weeks went by and the Austrian government took no action. No information could be obtained by the diplomats in Vienna as to what she proposed to do. They saw no reason for any particular worry, as the government was evidently so self-contained, and they therefore took their usual vacations. It was intimated that Austria would make some demands upon Serbia, but that they would be of a moderate character. There was wide-spread sympathy with her and a general feeling that she would be justified in demanding certain things of Serbia. The representatives of the various European governments were kept in ignorance. A despatch, which was destined to shake the very foundations of the world, was being fashioned in utter silence.

THE AUSTRIAN ULTIMATUM

On July 23, Austria delivered this despatch to Serbia. It began by accusing the Serbian government of not having fulfilled

the obligations it had assumed in 1909 toward Austria. It demanded that the Serbian government should publish an official statement, the terms of which were dictated in the despatch, expressing its disapproval of the propaganda in Serbia against Austria-Hungary and its regret that Serbian officials had taken part in this propaganda. In the despatch the murder of the Archduke was ascribed to that propaganda. Then followed ten demands upon the Serbian government concerning the suppression of the Pan-Serbian agitation carried on by the newspapers and the secret societies of Serbia. The despatch demanded that the Serbian government should suppress any publication which fostered hatred of and contempt for the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, should take the most comprehensive measures for the suppression and extinction of the secret societies, should eliminate from the schools all teachers and from text-books anything that served or might serve to foster the propaganda against Austria-Hungary, should remove from the army and from government positions all officials involved in it, whose names the Austrian government reserved the right to communicate, and that Serbia should accept the co-operation of Austrian officials in the work of investigating the conspiracy of June 28. Other clauses in this fateful despatch concerned the arrest of the accomplices in the assassination and the prevention of the trade in arms and explosives across the frontier. Annexed to the despatch was a memorandum asserting that the murder of the Archduke and the Archduchess had been plotted in Serbia and had been executed through the complicity of Serbian officials.

This despatch, harsh in its language, dictatorial in its demands, was an ultimatum, for it required the acceptance of it in its entirety within forty-eight hours, and it allowed no time for investigation or discussion of the charges made and the problems created by the peremptory demand. No nation would issue such a note to an equal without intending and without desiring war. Issued to a power vastly inferior, it could mean only unprecedented humiliation or national extinction, if followed up at the expiration of forty-eight hours.

This Austrian ultimatum created a grave crisis. The ultimatum was not a passionate and unreflecting outburst of the Austrian government, swept away by a natural anger at the foul murders. It was a cold-blooded and deliberate document, composed after four weeks of secret preparation. The Russian ambassador had not been told that it was coming and had left Vienna for his vacation. The Italian government had not been informed, although it was an ally and was particularly concerned

with anything that affected the Balkan peninsula in any way or part. In this fact Italy was to find her justification for remaining neutral when the war finally broke out, as she regarded that war as an aggressive one begun by Austria. The ultimatum gave Serbia the alternative of accepting egregiously humiliating conditions, practically reducing her to the state of a vassal of Austria, or of accepting war.

England, France, and Russia tried to induce Austria to extend her time limit as the only way in which diplomacy might seek to act in the matter; as, moreover, required if the relations of nations were to be governed by a reasonable consideration for each other's rights or wishes. Their efforts were in vain. They then turned to Serbia, urging her, in the interests of Europe in general, to make her answer as conciliatory as possible. The result was that Serbia in her reply yielded to the greater part of what Austria demanded and that she offered, in case Austria was not satisfied with her answer, to refer the question to the Hague Tribunal or to a conference of the Great Powers.

No state ever made a more complete submission under particularly humiliating circumstances. Austria, however, immediately declared the Serbian answer unsatisfactory and prepared for war. She well knew that such action would necessarily draw Russia into the controversy. She had every reason a state could have for knowing that, after the defiance of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908, another attack upon a small Slavic people would deeply offend the leading Slavic power. Austria could not and did not expect to be able to wreak her vengeance upon Serbia without having to take Russia into account. Hers, therefore, is the responsibility for a deliberate and highly dangerous provocation of a great state. Russia, a Slavic power, could not be ignored by Teutonic powers in determining the future of Slavic peoples. If there was a single well-known fact in the whole domain of European politics it was that Russia was greatly interested in the fate of the Slav states of the Balkans. If there was any other well-established commonplace of European politics, it was this, that every Balkan question has long been considered as of general concern, as distinctly international. As a matter of fact Serbia's obligations of 1909, already referred to, were undertaken to the Powers, not simply to Austria. Whether she had or had not lived up to them was a matter for the Powers to decide, not for Austria alone.

It is not unlikely that Austria believed that Russia when confronted with the grim, blunt choice of war or abandonment of Serbia, would do what she had done in 1908 and 1909 and bend

before the challenge, leaving the Serbs to their own resources. But even if Russia's attitude should this time prove different, Austria was not apprehensive, for she had taken her precautions. She had before framing and launching her ultimatum to Serbia, assured herself that she would have the support of Germany.

The assassination of the Archduke had occurred on June 28, and as early as July 2, the German ambassador at Vienna had informed the Austrian government that his Emperor "would support any firm decision which Austria-Hungary might take."¹ On the same day Francis Joseph, Emperor of Austria, had indicated his intentions in an autograph letter to William II: "The efforts of my government must henceforth have as their object the isolation and diminution of Serbia." Serbia must "be eliminated as a factor in the politics of the Balkans." Three days later, on July 5, William II told the representative of Austria in Berlin, as the latter informed his home government, that "we could reckon on Germany's full support. He thought action ought not to be delayed. Russia's attitude would doubtless be hostile, but he had been prepared for that for years; and if it should ever come to a war between Austria and Russia, we could be convinced that Germany would stand by our side with her accustomed faithfulness as an ally. Russia, furthermore, he thought, was in no way ready for war and would certainly ponder very seriously before appealing to arms." William also added that, if Austria had really decided that military action against Serbia was necessary, "he would be sorry if we left unused the present moment which was so favorable for us."² On the following day the German Chancellor informed the Austrian ambassador that: "Austria must judge what is to be done to clear up her relations to Serbia; whatever Austria's decision may turn out to be, Austria can count with certainty upon it, that Germany will stand behind her as an ally and friend."

Thus, nearly three weeks before the publication of the ultimatum Germany had given Austria *carte blanche*, or, as we say in English, a blank cheque, or free hand. She gave it with her eyes wide open as to what it might imply in international complications. From that moment she became morally as responsible for what ensued as Austria.

¹ Kautsky, *Deutsche Dokumente* No. 11, p. 17.

² Quotations are from the first of the very useful articles by Professor Sidney B. Fay in the *American Historical Review* for July and October, 1920, and January, 1921. The origins of the war have given rise to an extensive and controversial literature which cannot be summarized or analyzed here. The more important titles of this literature are given in the bibliography of this chapter.

Armed with this assurance of the unconditional support of Germany, Austria had gone ahead, with the result that Europe was confronted by a dangerous crisis.

But that this was a European affair at all, Austria refused to admit. Her official position was that her action concerned herself and Serbia alone; that no other nation or nations were involved or had any rights in the matter. In this she was supported by Germany. Both Austria and Germany were aware, as we have said, that warlike steps against Serbia might bring Russia upon the scene and that, owing to the obligations of the Triple and Dual Alliances, a general European war might result, yet both refused to consider that Russia had any right to intervene; it was all a matter between those two, Austria and Serbia. The Austro-Serbian conflict could and should be "localized." This policy of "localization of the conflict," however, begged the whole question. It was an absolutely untenable position in the light of history, of reason, of interest, of the existing balance of power in the Balkan peninsula. The question was by its very nature a part of the Eastern Question, which over and over had been considered and known to be emphatically international. No aspect of that question was to be left to the determination of a state of fifty millions in conflict with one of four or five.

ENGLAND'S PROPOSAL

As soon as the Austrian ultimatum was known a proposal was made by England that the question at issue should be submitted to a conference to be held in London by the Great Powers not directly concerned, namely, Germany, France, England, and Italy. Perhaps these four might bring about the adjustment of the difficulties between Serbia and Austria. Russia signified her willingness, but the proposal was declined by Germany. The Kaiser's comment, written on the margin of the telegram containing this proposal of Sir Edward Grey, was as follows: "This is superfluous. As Austria has already explained her position to Russia and as Grey cannot propose anything else, I shall not join in; only if Austria expressly asks me to, which is not probable. In questions of honor and *vital* interests one does not consult others." Jagow, secretary of foreign affairs, thereupon wrote that Germany could not accept the suggestion as it "would practically amount to a court of arbitration" and that that could not be called together "except at the request of Austria and Russia." On a similar proposal, transmitted from Russia, that the Austro-Serbian affair be submitted to "a European arcopagus" the Kaiser's comment was: "Most certainly not."





Other suggestions of a somewhat similar nature looking toward delay and diplomatic discussion or mediation likewise fell before the opposition or indifference of Germany. Then when England asked Germany herself to suggest some method of mediation for the preservation of peace, she had nothing to suggest. She simply reaffirmed her position that the whole matter concerned merely Austria and Serbia. She was willing to appeal and did appeal to Russia to keep out, to refrain from mobilizing, but her appeal was always based on this thesis, that the quarrel did not concern Russia, but did concern simply Austria and Serbia, a point of view which, naturally, Russia did not and could not share. Germany was ready to co-operate with other powers in bringing pressure to bear upon Russia, but not in trying to get her ally Austria to consent to international mediation between her and Serbia, the fundamental matter.

Austria, peremptorily refusing to consider the reply of Serbia to the ultimatum as a possible basis for negotiations, declared war upon that country on July 28 and at once began an invasion. This action gave a new turn to events. The Tsar had already stated that "Russia will in no case disinterest herself in the fate of Serbia," and the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sazonov, had declared that the day Austria crossed the Serbian frontier Russia would begin to mobilize. She therefore began to mobilize on July 29. The relations between those two countries, Russia and Austria, now became the most pressing concern of those who were anxious to avert an extension of the conflict. Germany which, along with Austria, had hitherto rejected several peace proposals emanating from the Entente powers, now endeavored to induce her ally to moderate her pace. Bethman-Hollweg, seeing that after all the Austro-Serbian question could not be localized but was rapidly becoming an Austro-Russian question, now made repeated and vigorous proposals to Austria looking toward a peaceful adjustment of difficulties. But these proposals failed completely, first, because they came too late, secondly, because they were inadequately supported by the Kaiser, and thirdly because Austria had no intention whatever of honestly and sincerely accepting them. She proceeded as she liked and she did so because she pinned her faith upon Germany's secret promise of unconditional support. Austria counted on her powerful ally to protect her from any real Russian interference. Germany, by reason of her commitments, was, at the critical moment, in no effective position to protest the cashing of the blank cheque, that fatal gift of July 5.

Russia, after hearing of the bombardment of Belgrade by

Austria, began partial mobilization and a little later both she and Austria ordered, at practically the same moment, general mobilization. Germany now entered decisively upon the scene, assumed the leading rôle, and, by her action, turned what up to that moment was a merely Austro-Serbian war into a European war. Pronouncing the Russian mobilization a menace to herself, she sent an ultimatum to Russia on the afternoon of July 31, demanding the cessation of mobilization within twelve hours. Receiving no answer she declared war upon Russia on August 1. This declaration was followed on August 3 by one against France. As the German constitution forbade the Emperor to declare war except in the case of invasion of Germany by the enemy a preposterous charge was made, for which no proofs were given and which the Germans later admitted was without foundation, that French airplanes had attacked Nuremberg. Not only was the accusation both frivolous and false but France had, on the contrary, in order to avoid all appearance of provocation ordered her troops to keep ten kilometers behind the French frontier.

Because Russia ordered general mobilization she has been charged by some writers as responsible for the war. That such a charge may stand it is necessary to accept as true a dictum of the German General Staff that mobilization is an act of war. This dictum was now accepted, under pressure from the militarists, by the German government, which acted accordingly.

Concerning this pivotal point the opinion of an eminent American jurist and scholar is pertinent. "If any one of the events that precipitated the war can be regarded as decisive," says Professor Munroe Smith, "it was the action of Germany in declaring war because Russia was mobilizing. In international theory and practice, however, mobilization is not regarded as a sufficient cause for war. The proper answer to mobilization is mobilization."¹ And the same authority has also said: "The theory that mobilization is an act of war is a purely military theory on which no modern European government had acted before 1914."²

Had the German government, on July 31, really desired peace, it might have answered Russian mobilization by German mobilization, and then have rested on the defensive, urging with whatever emphasis it might consider desirable a continuation and intensification of negotiations. The operations of diplomacy, which require time, would then not have been abruptly stopped.

It is interesting to note that neither Russia nor Austria considered mobilization an act of war.

¹ Munroe Smith, *Militarism and Statecraft*, p. 46.

² Munroe Smith, *New York Times*, July 16, 1922.

It is also pertinent to inquire, with an English historian, "why Russia should not mobilize in the situation which was created by the Austrian note to Serbia, and by the subsequent conduct of Austria and Germany; and how Russian statesmen would have justified their conduct to their own people if they had failed to insure that their military preparations kept pace with the gravity of the crisis?"¹

And the comment of another English historian is relevant to this discussion: "Had she [Russia] left her protégé [Serbia] to the tender mercies of Austria, she would have forfeited all claim to be the champion of the Slavonic races and have handed over the Balkan peninsula and Turkey without a struggle to the irrevocable domination of the Central Powers. Russia could no more be expected to remain neutral in the face of an Austrian attack on Serbia than England in the face of a German attack on Belgium."²

This mention of Belgium brings us to the next stage in the development of this lamentable story.

THE POSITION OF ENGLAND

We have seen that the Dual Alliance was the inevitable outcome of the existence and power of the Triple Alliance, concluded between Germany, Austria, and Italy in 1882. The Dual Alliance grew out of the need, which both Russia and France felt, of outside support in the presence of so powerful a combination. If there was to be anything like a balance of power in Europe, Russia and France must combine. Both alliances were defensive. The action of Austria against Serbia brought Russia upon the scene. Russia's action brought Germany forward. Germany's action necessitated action on the part of France.

One state was free to act as it saw fit, its conduct not controlled by any entangling alliance, England. The Triple and Dual Alliances rested on definite treaties, neither of which had been made public, and imposed obligations upon the contracting parties. There had in recent years also grown up what was called the Triple Entente. The commercial rivalry of Germany and England, during the past fifteen or twenty years, expressing itself in a struggle for markets, in colonial competitions, in a striking development of naval power, had been an outstanding fact in recent European history. Great Britain, seeing that her policy of isolation was possibly becoming dangerous with so active and successful a rival in the field, thought, in the first decade

¹ H. W. C. Davis, in *English Historical Review*, April, 1924, p. 238.

² Gooch, G. P., *History of Modern Europe*, pp. 556-557.

of the twentieth century, to settle long-continued misunderstandings with France and Russia. This she did by a treaty with France in 1904 and by one with Russia in 1907. These agreements settled certain problems and provided certain measures in common, the former in Africa, the latter in Asia. During succeeding diplomatic crises the three powers worked in substantial harmony. But the Triple Entente was not an alliance; it was simply a diplomatic group that might be found working together when the interests of its members happened to coincide. There was no actual alliance between Great Britain and France and there was no understanding of any kind between Great Britain and Russia, with regard to any European policy or contingency. When the crisis of 1914 arose Great Britain was free to act as she chose in the light of what she considered her interests. The diplomatic correspondence shows that this was understood in Berlin and Vienna as it was understood in Paris and St. Petersburg. Reference should be made here, though no elaboration can be attempted, to England's efforts, from 1898 to 1901, under the Salisbury ministry, to form an alliance with Germany, whose failure had led to the subsequent *rapprochement* with France and Russia, and to her efforts to settle outstanding difficulties with Germany in Africa and the Near East just before the outbreak of the World War. That both those attempts had failed had certainly not been owing to England.¹

But while Great Britain had no alliances that necessarily involved her in the present war, yet as a European power, and as a great, imperial, colonial state, she had many and important interests for which she must care. It was for her interests that there should be no European war and it was also for the interests of Europe and the world. The negotiations of that week in July, from the issuance of the ultimatum to Serbia to the declarations of war, abundantly demonstrate that she made earnest, repeated, and varied efforts to bring about a peaceful solution of the problems that had been so suddenly thrust forward. She was wedded to no particular scheme or formula and invited Germany to make suggestions that might effect the adjustment, if dissatisfied with hers. But despite her efforts a war had come involving at least four large states, Austria, Russia, Germany and France, and one small state, Serbia. Would the conflagration spread? What would England do?

It was certainly not to her interest that France should be conquered by Germany, as that would reduce France to the

¹ Ward and Gooch, *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, vol. III, pp. 276-286, 476-481.

position of a satellite and would immensely augment the power and prestige of Germany. And if Germany were to conquer Russia and France, she, the mightiest military power in the world, would henceforth dominate the continent and would constitute a grave menace to England herself and to her colonial empire. Their turn would come next. If England cared to continue to exist as a Great Power she must bestir herself now. Later it would be too late. Moreover, England was bound in honor to prevent any attack upon the Atlantic seacoast of France, as, since 1912, she had had a naval agreement with France whereby the French fleet was concentrated in the Mediterranean in order that England might keep larger naval forces in the home waters. It seems probable that England would have been drawn into the war necessarily if France was attacked, which was, of course, the purpose of Germany. But her participation was rendered inevitable by Germany's attack upon Belgium.

Three of the small states of Europe, Belgium, Luxemburg, and Switzerland, had been by international agreements declared neutral territory forever. By these agreements the countries concerned should never make war, nor should they ever be attacked. The powers that signed the treaties bound themselves to respect and preserve that neutrality. The treaty guaranteeing the neutralization of Belgium was signed by England, France, Prussia, Austria, and Russia. For over eighty years that obligation had been scrupulously observed. Now, on August 2, Germany sent an ultimatum to Belgium, demanding that she allow the German armies to cross her territory, promising to evacuate it after peace was concluded, and stating that, if she refused, her fate would be determined by the fortunes of war. Belgium replied that she had always been faithful to her international obligations, that the attack upon her independence would constitute a flagrant violation of international law, that she would not sacrifice her honor and at the same time be recreant to her duty toward Europe, but that her army would resist the invader to the utmost of its ability.

As Austria's ultimatum of July 23 meant the annihilation of the independence of one small state, Serbia, Germany's ultimatum of August 2 meant the annihilation of the independence of another small state, Belgium. Germany's action was the baser and the more dishonorable, as she had formally and by treaty promised to respect the neutrality of the country which she was now about to destroy.

GERMANY VIOLATES NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM

The reason for this action was that the easiest way for German armies to get into France was over Belgian soil. Germany intended to crush France as rapidly as possible, then to turn upon Russia and crush her. The invasion of France direct from Germany would necessarily be slower, if possible at all, as that frontier was strongly fortified. The official statement of the Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, made in the Reichstag on August 4, declared that Germany was acting in self-defense: "Necessity knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and have perhaps already entered on Belgian soil. Gentlemen, this is a breach of international law. The French Government has, it is true, notified Brussels that it would respect the neutrality of Belgium as long as the enemy respected it. But we know that France stood ready for an invasion. France could wait, we could not. A French attack upon our flank in the lower Rhine might have been disastrous. Thus we have been obliged to ignore the just protests of the Governments of Luxemburg and Belgium. The injustice, I speak frankly, the injustice that we are committing we will endeavor to make good as soon as our military aims have been attained. Anybody who is threatened as we are threatened and is fighting for his highest possessions can think only of one thing, how he is to hack his way through." Thus the official, authoritative spokesman of Germany pronounced her own act unjust, thereby proclaiming the faithfulness of Belgium to all her obligations, admitted that Germany was doing Belgium a wrong, and that the action was in defiance of the law of nations. It was justified by necessity, he said.

A nation of sixty-five millions attacked a nation of seven millions, whose neutrality it had sworn to maintain, because, as the German Secretary of State, Jagow, said on that same August 4, with frankness, "they had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest way, so as to be able to get well ahead with their operations and endeavor to strike some decisive blow as early as possible. It was a matter of life and death for them."

ENGLAND ENTERS THE WAR

England could correctly assert that she had worked for peace "up to the last moment, and beyond the last moment." Now she entered the war because she had vital interests in the

independence of Belgium, and because of her explicit treaty obligations. For hundreds of years her policy had been to prevent the control of the Belgian coasts from being a menace to her own coast across the narrow channel, as they would be in the hands of a strong military power. Over this question England had fought or acted repeatedly for centuries against the Spaniards, against the French; now it was to be against the Germans. That in protecting her vital interests she would also be keeping her solemn promises and defending a small and peaceful state against the wanton aggression of a ruthless and mighty military power, engaged, according to its own admission, in a flagrant violation of the law of nations, was to her vast moral advantage in securing the spontaneous sympathy and support of her own people and widespread approval beyond her borders.

On the 23d of July, 1914, there was a dull midsummer peace in Europe. By August 4 seven nations were at war. The responsibility for this tragic, monstrous, unnecessary crime against civilization, against humanity, was lightly assumed. The situation was created by the authorized heads of various states. Any power that in that crisis showed a willingness to delay, to negotiate, to confer, was working in the interest of peace. Any power that declined to do this, that adopted a peremptory attitude, that issued ultimatums with incredibly short time limits, hastened the appalling entanglement and was ready for war, whether it desired or intended it or not.

The opinion of the outside world as to where that responsibility lies has been overwhelmingly expressed. That opinion was shared by a state that had for thirty-two years been the ally of Austria and Germany and was an ally in August, 1914. When asked on August 1, by the German ambassador, what were Italy's intentions, the Italian Government replied through its Minister of Foreign Affairs that "as the war undertaken by Austria was aggressive and did not fall within the purely defensive character of the Triple Alliance, particularly in view of the consequences which might result from it according to the declaration of the German Ambassador, Italy would not be able to take part in the war."

There are those who would place the responsibility of the war, not simply upon Austria and Germany, but upon the Great Powers generally. The bitter rivalries and hatreds of the nations, running back for generations, their efforts to score advantages over each other at every possible point and in every field, their malevolent and suspicious and intriguing diplomacies,

their frenzied competition for colonies and markets and raw materials and armies and navies, in short, their soaring and conflicting ambitions, these, it is asserted, and not the Austro-Serbian dispute, were the deep and therefore the true causes of the war and consequently, as all were involved in these ruinous rivalries, all were responsible for the final calamity. Clashing imperialisms, we are told, caused the war and as the imperialisms of England and France and Russia had on the whole been more successful than those of Germany and Austria, they must not be allowed to escape their full share of guilt in the settled judgment of mankind. Inflammable material was all about and consequently a fire broke out, apparently by spontaneous combustion.

To this explanation of the origin of the war it may be replied that imperialisms do not clash of themselves, that they are not impersonal forces subject to no human control, that as a matter of fact they are directed at any given moment, and were in July, 1914, by certain individuals, and that consequently it is both pertinent and imperative to inquire what the actual conduct of those individuals, the chiefs of states, was in that crisis. Because there are sources of friction between states is no reason why war must inevitably result between them. Rivalries and rancors have been repeatedly adjusted and assuaged, and apparently impending wars averted, because those in charge of the fortunes of the states concerned have had sufficient wisdom and good will to smooth out their difficulties before it was too late and for the very purpose of avoiding the risky and costly appeal to arms. England and France and England and Russia had more than once been on the verge of hostilities and yet those conflicting "imperialisms," or more correctly those individuals temporarily representing them, had deemed it wiser to stop short of the plunge over the brink and had not only avoided war but had, through study and negotiation, ultimately become friendly to each other and had even ended in forming, indeed, a cordial understanding.

The history of Europe from 1871 to 1914 shows again and again that friction does not necessarily mean fighting, that international difficulties are not insuperable, that it is possible to keep the peace if there is a mutual desire to keep it. Those years had witnessed the rise of many international crises as serious as that of 1914, all of which had been conjured away without resort to arms. It is certainly reasonable to believe that what had been done many times in the history of Europe might

have been done in 1914 had all the powers been willing to delay, to discuss, to seek a peaceful way out, to explore the possible grounds of compromise, had they, in short, been willing to do what had been done on many critical occasions in the past. But two of those powers showed no penchant for such a procedure. Quite the contrary — and war resulted.

THE WAR IN 1914

Austria's determination to wreak her wrath upon Serbia, to punish, humiliate, and master that small but independent and successful state, had led straight, and with incredible swiftness, to an appalling issue. Five great nations, Austria-Hungary, Germany, Russia, France, and England, and two small nations, Serbia and Belgium, had passed, within a space of twelve momentous days, from a state of peace to one of war. From the Ural Mountains to the Atlantic Ocean, from the North Sea to the Mediterranean, hundreds of millions of men found themselves caught in the meshes of a gigantic conflict, whose cost in human life and happiness and treasure must inevitably be tremendous. The world was stunned by the criminal levity with which Austria-Hungary and Germany had created this hideous situation.

The sinister and brutal challenge was, however, accepted immediately and with iron resolution by those who had done their utmost during those twelve days to avert the catastrophe, and not only great powers like France and England, but small ones, like Belgium and Serbia, never hesitated, but resolved to do or die. That the contest was not merely a material one, but that the most precious moral and spiritual interests were involved, was clearly seen and stated at the very beginning of the war by the responsible statesmen of France and England. In those early days Mr. Asquith, prime minister of Great Britain, expressed the common resolution of the western powers when he declared: "We shall never sheathe the sword which we have not lightly drawn until Belgium recovers in full measure all and more than all that she has sacrificed, until France is adequately secured against the menace of aggression, until the rights of the smaller nationalities of Europe are placed upon an unassailable foundation, and until the military domination of Prussia is wholly and finally destroyed." A cause dedicated to such aims as those was worthy of the supreme sacrifice it would pitilessly exact.

Why these references to Belgium and France? Because, in the military plans of Germany, these two were to be overrun and conquered first, then Russia, and then the dominance of Europe by Germany would be achieved and rendered unassailable. After that, let the world look out. It would henceforth receive its orders from Berlin and it would know full well the meaning of disobedience.

Germany had demanded free passage for her troops through Belgium. King Albert, one of the unsullied heroes of a war rich in heroes, had at that critical moment embodied the spirit of his people and had added luster to the name of Belgium forever when, in reply to the arrogant demand, he announced that "the Belgian Government is firmly resolved to repel with all the means in its power every attack upon its rights." Then the thunder-cloud broke. The mighty German army burst upon the land, resolved to get to Paris by the shortest route, the valley of the Meuse. The fortress of Liège stood in the way. It was bombarded by powerful artillery and forced to surrender on August 7. Brussels was occupied on August 20. But the fall of Liège did not clear the route to France. Namur stood in the way and here the Belgians were aided by the French, and by the British, hurrying to the scene their "contemptible little army," as the Kaiser is said to have called it. Namur was occupied on August 22. Mons was next attacked and the French and English were compelled to begin a retreat. Withdraw they must or the German armies would envelop them and a disaster like that of Sedan in 1870 might result. The great retreat from Mons southward continued day after day, night after night, rapid, harrowing, critical, incessant, annihilation constantly threatening. City after city in northern France fell into the hands of the Germans, who advanced to within fifteen miles of Paris. The government of France was removed to Bordeaux. The completion of German victory seemed at hand. August was a month of gloom for the Allies.

Then General Joffre, commander of the French armies, issued his famous order, stating that the retreat was over. To his generals he sent this message: "The hour has come to hold fast and to let yourselves be killed rather than to yield." And to the army Joffre issued this: "At the moment when we are about to engage in battle it is imperative that every one should remember that the time has passed for looking backward; every effort must be devoted to attacking and repulsing the enemy. Troops that can no longer advance must, at all cost, keep the ground

they have won and be shot down where they stand rather than retreat. In the present circumstances no weakness can be tolerated."

THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE


The decisive moment had arrived. There was no faltering, but the whole French army was nerved to supreme effort. From September 5 to September 10, along a line of more than a hundred miles from Paris to Verdun, raged the famous Battle of the Marne, one of the decisive battles of the world's history. The spirit in which these men fought was typified in General Foch, one of Joffre's subordinates, who at a critical moment telegraphed to his chief: "My right is in retreat; my center is yielding. Situation excellent. I shall attack." And attack he did, with great success.

The Germans were defeated. Their terrific, crushing blow, intended to eliminate the French from the war, had failed. They retired as precipitately as they had advanced, the French at their heels. Only when they were across the Aisne and in trenches already prepared for them were they safe. At the Battle of the Marne France had saved herself and Europe and the world.

After the Battle of the Marne the Allies sought to break through the German lines along the Aisne but were unsuccessful. Thereupon there ensued a race to the sea, an extension of the trenches northward to the English Channel. The Germans overran the western part of Belgium, seized Antwerp (October 10) and Ostend and tried to get to Dunkirk and Calais, but were arrested at the Yser River by the combined Belgian, French and English armies. This First Battle of the Yser lasted from October 10 to November 21, and was, on the whole, an Allied success. By the end of October the opposing sides were entrenched against each other all the way from Nieuport to Switzerland. The "war of positions," which was to last with only minor changes down to March, 1918, had begun.

As the result of all these events the Germans were in possession of a large area of northeastern France and of nearly all of Belgium. The possession of this territory greatly augmented their power to make war, for it carried with it ninety per cent. of the iron ore of France, and fifty per cent. of the coal of France, and the harbors of the Belgian coast became favorable bases for the submarine warfare adopted later.

The Germans had not only won great and rich territories in a two months' campaign: they had also won great hatred and



a moral condemnation so general and so intense that it is hard, if not impossible, to find its equal in human history. From the moment they stepped upon Belgian territory they trampled under

foot all considerations of humanity, of decency, of honor. No people was ever subjected to a greater display of heartlessness and cruelty than Germany showed in her treatment of Belgium. Not only were conscienceless pillage and systematic looting the order of the day, not only were towns and cities fined and mulcted of enormous sums of money, not only were villages fired, not only were works of art and public monuments destroyed, but large numbers of civilians, men, women, and little children, were murdered in cold blood or subjected to treatment worse than death. The Germans deliberately carried out a policy of "frightfulness," of terrorism, with all its horrors. It is no wonder that Belgium's most distinguished poet and man of letters, Maurice Maeterlinck, called the German "the foulest invader that the world has ever borne." A prosperous and peaceful people was ruined, and threatened with starvation from which it was only saved by the charity of the world. Intense was the indignation of the outside world as the martyrdom of Belgium was unrolled. The Germans were regarded as "barbarians" in their method of making war.

Such was the course of events in western Europe after the fateful August 4, 1914. Meanwhile events were occurring elsewhere. Russia, mobilizing far more rapidly than the Germans had supposed she could, invaded East Prussia about the middle of August, gaining several victories. The Germans were forced to withdraw some of their troops from the western front to meet this unexpected menace, and this contributed to the German defeat at the Marne. The victories of the Russians were short-lived, for under the command of General von Hindenburg the Germans defeated them disastrously in the battle of Tannenberg (Aug. 26-Sept. 1, 1914) and at the Mazurian Lakes (Sept. 6-12). Hindenburg was henceforth the idol of Germany. A legend of invincibility began to grow up about his name although the Russians were able to win a victory at Augustowo (Sept. 29-Oct. 4) and to invade East Prussia once more.

The Russians were more successful against Austria. Invading the Austrian province of Galicia they captured Tarnopol and Lemberg and Jaroslav and began the siege of Przemsyl, which surrendered in March, 1915. An invasion of Hungary was intended as the next step.

As Austria was thus fully occupied with Russia, the Serbians were able to expel the Austrian armies which had invaded their country (December, 1914). They crowned their successes by retaking their capital, Belgrade.

TURKEY ENTERS THE WAR

Other events of those months of 1914, which must be chronicled, are: the entrance of little Montenegro into the war out of sympathy for Serbia, the Montenegrins being Serbians by race (August 7); and the entrance of Turkey into the war on the side of the Central Powers (November 3). The latter was an event of considerable importance. Though European Turkey had been greatly reduced as a result of the Balkan Wars, the Ottoman Empire was still extensive, including Asia Minor, Armenia, Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine, and Arabia, in all over seven hundred thousand square miles, or an area more than three times as large as the German Empire, and with a population estimated at twenty-one millions. Its capital, Constantinople, was a city of over a million inhabitants, and its location incomparable, lying, as it does, at the point where Europe and Asia meet, and barring the entrance to and the exit from the Black Sea, that is, to and from southern Russia. The Sultan ruled over a most motley collection of peoples, over Turks, a minority of the whole population, and over Arabs, Greeks, Syrians, Kurds, Circassians, Armenians, Jews, and numerous other races. The only unity that these races knew was to be found in the oppression they all experienced from their government, which was an unrestrained tyranny. The government was strongly pro-German. Enver Pasha was minister of war, a man who had been a military attaché in Berlin, and had formed the most intimate relations with the German military circles. During most of his reign the Emperor of Germany had striven successfully to build up German influence in Turkey and by 1914 Turkey was the willing and eager tool of Germany, her army largely officered by Germans. The expected therefore occurred when the Turkish Government permitted two German warships, the *Goeben* and the *Breslau*, to enter the Bosphorus, whence they sailed into the Black Sea and bombarded Russian ports. Russia thereupon declared war upon Turkey, November 3, 1914, and England and France immediately did the same.

Turkey's entrance into the war was intended to be and was a threat at the Balkan states and at the British Empire, that is, at India and Egypt. It involved Asia and Africa in the war, Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine, Egypt. An immediate consequence was the dethronement of the Khedive of Egypt, who was plotting with the Sultan to expel the British. Great Britain

declared Egypt a protectorate of the British Empire, thus ending its nominal connection with Turkey, and appointed the uncle of the dethroned Khedive in his place, with the title of Sultan. Turkish attempts to invade Egypt and get control of the Suez Canal, thus cutting England's connection with India, were frustrated in the following year (February, 1915).

JAPAN ENTERS THE WAR

Still another power entered the war almost at the beginning, Japan (August 23, 1914). Japan had two reasons for participating. One was loyalty to her alliance with Great Britain which, concluded originally in 1902, had been renewed in 1905 and 1911. That treaty had been of the greatest service to Japan, increasing her international prestige and guaranteeing her territorial rights. It was a defensive alliance, each side promising the other support in certain contingencies in case of war.

Such a case having arisen, England now applied to Japan for assistance in protecting her trade in the East, and Japan loyally responded. But that protection could not be secured as long as Germany held her strong naval base at Kiauchau. The Japanese knew how Germany had acquired that base, seventeen years before, after having in conjunction with Russia and France forced Japan to relinquish the fruits of her victory in her war with China.¹ They therefore took pleasure in requiting this injury and in expressing their demand in the same language that Germany had used to them nineteen years before. On August 15, 1914, an ultimatum was issued by Japan to Germany demanding that she withdraw her fleet and surrender Kiauchau as necessary "to the peace of the Far East" and requesting an answer by August 23. Germany sent no answer to this ultimatum, but the Kaiser telegraphed to Kiauchau: "It would shame me more to surrender Kiauchau to the Japanese than Berlin to the Russians." On August 23, war was declared by Japan against Germany, and by the middle of November she had conquered the German colony. On October 7 she also occupied the Marshall Islands. From that time on until 1918 her participation in the war was slight. She was, however, one of the Allies, having agreed with England, France, and Russia not to make a separate peace.

¹ See above, pp. 623-624

ENGLAND CONTROLS THE SEAS

Meanwhile another aspect of the war was being played upon the high seas. The immense importance to the Allies of the naval preponderance of Great Britain was shown from the first days of the war and was made each day increasingly apparent. The British won a naval victory near Heligoland in August, the Germans won a naval victory off the coast of Chili in November, which was avenged by England in a complete defeat of a German fleet off the Falkland Islands (December 8). The total result of these events was the sweeping of German naval vessels from the high seas and the bottling up of the main German fleet in the Kiel Canal; also the sweeping of German merchant shipping from the ocean. Now and then a German raider might still get out and do damage. The submarine danger was as yet not serious. Owing to Great Britain's practical control of the great water routes of communication the transport of troops to the scene of battle from England, Canada, Australia, South Africa, and the transport of munitions and merchandise, and the exchanges of commerce, could go on, in the main, unimpeded. The importance of this fact cannot be exaggerated. It enabled the Allies vigorously to prosecute the war, and it kept industrial and commercial life active, a source not only of comfort and convenience, but of wealth, and wealth was necessary to the maintenance in full and increasing vigor of armies and navies and all the various war services.

Thus we see how crowded with decisive events were those months from August to December, 1914. The flames so lightly and joyously ignited by Austria and by Germany were spreading rapidly and portentously. By the end of that year ten nations were at war, Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Turkey on the one side, Serbia, Russia, France, Belgium, Great Britain, Montenegro, and Japan on the other. Two great nations, the United States and Italy, and many small ones, had declared their neutrality. Whether they would be able to maintain it, in a war which, as was already clear, affected every nation, not only in its economic life, but in its intellectual, moral, and spiritual outlook, remained to be seen.

The year 1914 closed with the Allies holding the Germans on the western front, having defeated them at the battle of the Marne.

THE WAR IN 1915

The Germans had conquered all but a small section of Belgium, had conquered northeastern France, and had dug themselves in from the North Sea to Switzerland. Attempts on the part of the Allies to dislodge them and to break through the line were made repeatedly in 1915. At the battle of Neuve Chapelle the English under Sir John French attacked over a front of a little more than four miles. The attack was preceded by the most terrific artillery engagement ever known in warfare. On that narrow front more than three hundred British cannon opened fire on March 10. After they had prepared the way the infantry pressed forward, gaining a mile. On the two following days the Germans delivered repeated counter-attacks but without success. The British held their new front but the casualties were extremely heavy. A mere local dent had been made in the German line. The battle was important as showing sharply how tremendous must be the effort and the sacrifice if the Germans were to be driven out of France and Belgium. Both England and Germany lost more in killed, wounded, and captured than the English and Prussians had lost in the battle of Waterloo.

From April 22 to April 26 occurred a similar battle on a narrow front, this time begun by the Germans. Here gas was used for the first time. The French line collapsed. Those who survived the gas retreated three miles. The battle is famous for this new feature of warfare, and for the remarkable coolness, heroism, and spirit of sacrifice of the Canadians. "On the Canadians the storm broke with its full force and Canadian militia repeated the glories of British regulars from Mons to the Marne. In British imperial history the Second Battle of Ypres will be memorable." But it broke no line and, like the battle of Neuve Chapelle, it was mere "nibbling," a word that now passed into current use to describe the character of the fighting.

All through the summer of 1915 there was only desultory fighting on the western front, broken by special attempts to break the line which would not break. One incident of importance was the relieving of Sir John French and the appointment of General Haig as commander-in-chief of the British armies. The issue was to prove that England had at last found her leader.


GERMANY INVADES RUSSIA

Other disappointments were reserved for the Allies during that bitter year of 1915. Germany's original plan of campaign had been, as we have seen, first to crush France and to eliminate her from the war, then to turn eastward and eliminate Russia, after which she would dictate whatever peace she chose to Europe. The battle of the Marne and the solid line of the French and English from Nieuport in Belgium to Switzerland had blocked this plan. France was not easily to be eliminated. Therefore the Germans adopted a new plan, namely, to crush and eliminate Russia, then to turn westward, settle accounts with France and bring England to her knees. Of course while attending to their eastern enemy, they must hold their western front tight, and even attack, if the opportunity offered. There must be no suspension or relaxation of effort anywhere, but the main emphasis must be put upon the eastern campaign, as it was the more inviting and promised the more immediate gains. There was an additional argument in favor of making the main effort in the east. Hindenburg, the new idol of Germany, from long years of study was minutely acquainted with all the natural features of that theater of war. What he had done at Tannenberg he could do again, and again, perhaps.

Therefore eastward the path of empire took its way. The developments there were destined to exceed the wildest imagination of the Germans. After Tannenberg the Russians, recovering, resumed the offensive, and again invaded East Prussia, whereupon Hindenburg fell upon them, administering a crushing defeat in the battle of the Mazurian Lakes (February 12, 1915). The Russians lost in killed and wounded a hundred and fifty thousand and a hundred thousand of them were taken prisoners.

This was a mere beginning. East Prussia was freed from the presence of the Russians. But they had overrun Galicia, a northern province of Austria. They must be expelled and then no foreign soldiers would stand on the soil of the Central Empires. Moreover the war should be carried straight over into Russia. The tables must be turned, and turned they were in a memorable fashion. All through the summer, from April to August, a mammoth drive of Germans and Austrians combined, under Hindenburg and Mackensen, went on over a wide front. Victory followed victory in rapid succession. The Russians were driven out of Galicia. Przemyśl fell on June 2; Lemberg on June 22.

Russian Poland was invaded. Warsaw, its capital, was captured on August 5. All of Poland was conquered and Lithuania and



Courland were overrun but the real German objective, the destruction of the Russian army, had not been attained. When the campaign was over the Russian line was still intact, but it

had been forced far back and now ran from Riga, in the north, to Czernowitz, in the south, near the northern border of Roumania.


It was a notable summer's work. Mackensen took his place beside Hindenburg, as a national hero. The process of Russian disintegration which two years later was to lead to the shameful Treaty of Brest-Litovsk had begun. Russia had lost 65,000 square miles of territory, a territory larger than New England. The military statistics of this war are uncertain, being subject to no control outside official circles, but it is said that Russian losses in killed and wounded were a million two hundred thousand and nearly a million in prisoners. The Russian commander, Grand Duke Nicholas, was removed from chief command and sent to the Caucasus. So much for the eastern front. As 1914 had seen the Germans seizing Belgium and northern and eastern France, 1915 had seen them seizing a large part of Russia. The Germans were entitled to the elation which they experienced and which they volubly expressed.

THE GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN

The Allies suffered another notable discomfiture during that year 1915, and a serious diminution of prestige, this time in the extreme southeastern point of Europe. They attempted the capture of Constantinople, the capital of the Turkish Empire, an extraordinarily difficult thing to do owing to topographical reasons. Could they accomplish this, then the Balkan states not yet in the war would probably enter it on the side of the Allies, and with that alignment Austria could be attacked and invaded from the south and east; also Turkey might be compelled to sue for peace or at any rate would be put on the defensive. And could the Allies control the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, they could secure a connection with Russia through the Black Sea. They could thus send to Russia the war supplies she so greatly needed and could receive from her the food supplies she produced.

In February and March a British and French fleet tried to force the Dardanelles. Penetrating the channel as far as the "Narrows," they could get no farther. The shores were powerfully fortified, and in the battle between the forts and the ships of war, several of the latter were destroyed. The fleet was forced to withdraw. Constantinople could not be reached that way. Next an attempt was made by land. After a costly delay Anglo-French troops, reinforced by troops from Australia and New

Zealand, called "Anzacs,"¹ who had been brought up by way of the Red Sea, landed on the peninsula of Gallipoli, Sir Ian Hamilton in command. But the Turks had had their warning and, under the command of a German general, Liman von Sanders,



were ready for them. The landing was effected only at a heavy cost and the positions which the Allies confronted proved impregnable. A flanking movement from Suvla Bay likewise proved

¹ A composite word made by the initial letters of the words Australian New Zealand Army Corps.

unsuccessful. The Allies held on all through the year, but they were foiled and in December they abandoned the attempt. Their losses had been enormous and nothing had been accomplished, save that possibly the expedition had kept the Turks from pressing any attack upon the Suez Canal. The reaction of this conspicuous and complete failure upon the hesitating Balkan states, Bulgaria and Greece, was disastrous. They, hitherto neutral, began to think that the Central Powers would ultimately be victorious and that it would be more prudent as well as pleasanter to be on the winning side.


BULGARIA JOINS THE CENTRAL POWERS

Bulgaria's dislike of Serbia, Roumania, and Greece was intense. She resented bitterly the Treaty of Bucharest¹ and only awaited a favorable opportunity to tear it up. With the Russians retreating week after week and month after month before the terrific onslaughts of Hindenburg and Mackensen, with the Turks and Germans blocking the straits of the Dardanelles and holding the British tightly to the coasts of Gallipoli, it seemed evident to Tsar Ferdinand and to his minister Radoslavoff that the Germans were the predestined victors in this gigantic war. Therefore, after a disreputable display of double-dealing, they enlisted Bulgaria on the side of the Central Powers (October 4, 1915). This action of Bulgaria had two immediate consequences. It linked the Central Powers with Turkey, completing the "corridor" to the East, to Asia. And it sounded the doom of Serbia.

Serbia had been the unwilling pretext of a war which had so soon broken all bounds, dragging the world with it toward the abyss. Austria's ultimatum to Serbia had been the signal for the general mêlée. Austrian armies had immediately invaded Serbia and had seized Belgrade, though only after having encountered a stubborn resistance, during which the Serbians had at one moment won a brilliant victory (August 20, 1914, and succeeding days), the first general battle on a European front. The Serbians, aided by the Montenegrins, fought desperately against the Austrian invasion, and by the middle of December their victory was complete. Belgrade was reoccupied on December 15. The Austrians retreated precipitately out of the land for which they had had such lordly contempt. Their retirement was a rout. Serbia even invaded Austria. A Serbian

¹ See above, pp. 652-653

author may be pardoned for writing: "In ten days the Serbian victory over five Austrian army corps was complete. Since the days when Scipio saved Rome from Hannibal, or when England destroyed the might of Spain, the world has never seen such a



spectacle, and never has victory been more deserved." General Misitch was the hero of this Serbian hour.

Such was the first chapter of Serbian history in the Great War. The second was very different. The Germans and

Austrians, fresh from their successes in Russia and Galicia, invaded Serbia in great strength in October, 1915, under General von Mackensen. At the same time the Bulgarians invaded her from the east. For two months the Serbians fought single-handed and with unquenchable valor against the overwhelming forces of Germany, Austria, and Bulgaria, left in the lurch, moreover, by their ally Greece, which was by treaty bound to aid them in a contingency like this. Serbia was completely conquered and crushed. A remnant only of her armies was able to reach safety on the coast of Albania, whence it was transported in Allied vessels to the island of Corfu. It is difficult to find words adequately to characterize the awful retreat across the barren Albanian Mountains, the unspeakable hardships endured. The war exacted another martyrdom. The Austro-Germans followed up their conquest by overrunning Montenegro (January, 1916).

Simultaneously with this conquest and extinction of Serbia another train of events was being started, whose full significance was not to be made manifest until two more eventful and discouraging years had passed. In October, 1915, an Anglo-French force landed at Salonica, the leading port of Greece. It had come to aid Serbia in response to an invitation from the prime minister of Greece, Venizelos. Constantine, the King of Greece and a brother-in-law of the German Emperor, did not propose to aid Serbia, although by treaty bound to do so. He now dismissed Venizelos and began a tortuous pro-German policy which was ultimately to cost him his throne.

The Anglo-French army marched northward to help the Serbians, but was unsuccessful and had to withdraw behind the lines of Salonica. But out of the union of this force, subsequently greatly enlarged, with the reorganized and reinvigorated remnant of the Serbian army which had found refuge in the island of Corfu, was to emerge in time salvation for the stricken land.

ITALY JOINS THE ALLIES

While the situation had, during the year, grown worse for the Allies in the East and in the Balkans, there had been a distinct and a promising gain for them in another quarter. Italy had entered the war on their side. For over thirty years Italy had been a member of the Triple Alliance, concluded in 1882, with Germany and Austria-Hungary. That alliance she had renewed

as late as 1912 and that renewal was to run until 1920. But when the war broke out in 1914 and when Italy was asked by her allies to co-operate with them, she declined on the ground that she was obliged to aid them only if they were attacked. Instead of being attacked they had themselves begun the war. Italy therefore adopted a policy of neutrality, which she maintained until May 23, 1915. Then, at the moment when the Russians were in full retreat, she entered the war on the side of the Western Powers. This was the great gain of the year for the Allies and one that bade fair to redress the balance of power in their favor.

The Italian Government, in acting thus, was but responding to a widespread popular demand. Ever since the Kingdom of Italy had been formed in the decade between 1859 and 1870 the Italians had been restless under the thought that their unification had been incomplete, that outside the boundaries of the state as determined at that time there were hundreds of thousands of Italians still subject to Austria, in the Trentino to the north, and in Trieste and the peninsula of Istria to the northeast. This was *Italia Irredenta* or Unredeemed Italy. This territory the Italian Government now endeavored to acquire, at first peacefully through direct negotiations with Austria-Hungary, then, that method failing, through war. Another motive also influenced the Government, the insistent popular demand that Italy do her share in the work of the defense of civilization against *Kultur*, of democracy and liberty against autocracy and despotism. The strong instinct of the Italian people was that they belonged with the Allies by reason of the principles they held in common with them. Their action in entering the war was naturally greeted with enthusiasm in France and England, and with deep resentment in Germany and Austria.

Italy declared war upon Austria-Hungary on May 23, 1915, upon Turkey on August 21, and upon Bulgaria in September. It was not until August 27 of the following year, (1916), that she declared war upon Germany. The reasons for this delay are none too clear. Whatever they may have been, the delay is now generally regarded as a mistake.

The intervention of Italy was followed shortly by that of the little independent republic of San Marino, which declared war upon the Central Powers, June 3, 1915.

Another Allied gain during 1914 and 1915 was the conquest of the German colonies. Japan seized Kiauchau, as we have seen, soon after her entrance into the war. In Africa, British and

French troops easily overran Togoland and Kamerun. German Southwest Africa was conquered by South African troops under General Smuts. A campaign against German East Africa was begun early and resulted in soon freeing that colony of most of the German troops, some of whom, however, remained untracked and undefeated until the end of the war. In the main the vast German colonial empire had shrunk to very small proportions by the close of 1915.

In the same year, 1915, occurred an event which shocked the world by its wanton and cowardly barbarity and which was in time to have far-reaching consequences, the sinking, on May 7, of the mammoth Atlantic liner, the *Lusitania*, off the coast of Ireland. This incident may best be described later. It should, however, be included in this untoward list of events which darkened, for the Allies, the year 1915.

THE WAR IN 1916

We have seen that Germany's original plan of war was to crush France first and then to turn against Russia and force her to her knees. This plan had been attempted in 1914, but had not succeeded. France had not been crushed but had, in the famous battle of the Marne, defeated the Germans, driving them precipitately back to the Aisne, had saved her own field army intact, had saved Paris and the most important fortresses of France, Verdun, Belfort, Toul, and Epinal. Unconquered and undaunted France was all through 1915 and in 1916 the hope and the mainstay of the world, the flaming and resolute soul of the Allied cause. After a year and a half of war Russia had, however, been badly defeated and had given many signs of that weakness and disintegration which were later to develop so rapidly and appallingly. England was not yet fully conscious of the part she must play; she had not yet brought herself to adopt universal military service, although she had accomplished wonders in volunteering. Italy had done little to justify the great hopes with which the Allies had greeted her entrance into the war. Belgium had been virtually wiped off the map; so had Serbia, Montenegro, and Albania; all had been overrun by the armies of the Central Powers and were securely held. France, however, stood defiant and resolute, tense, straining every nerve, steeled for every contingency.

But France had suffered terribly and the German military authorities believed it was possible to do, in 1916, what they had

failed to accomplish in 1914. This is the meaning of Verdun. The German General Staff thought that, by delivering one terrific, irresistible, deadly blow against the French army, they could smash it. Then peace would be in sight, as France would recognize the hopelessness of further struggle, the sheer impossibility of ever recovering Alsace-Lorraine. Verdun was a strong position, but, once taken, no equally stout defense could be made between there and Paris. The capital would fall and the fall of Paris would certainly mean the elimination of France. Incidentally, as the German Crown Prince was in command near Verdun, blinding military glory would irradiate the person of the heir to the Prussian throne. Could anything be more desirable or more appropriate?

VERDUN

On February 21, 1916, at 7.15 in the morning the storm broke upon Verdun, a place long famous in the military annals of France, but destined now to win a glory beyond compare. Never had there been so pulverizing an artillery fire as that which inaugurated this attack. The Germans had made enormous preparations, had enormous armies and supplies. It seemed humanly impossible to prevent them from blasting their way through. But the impossible was done. The French disputed every inch of ground, with incredible coolness and inexhaustible bravery. Nevertheless they lost position after position and in four days of frenzied fighting were driven back four miles. Then French reënforcements arrived, hurried thither by thousands of motors. And one of Joffre's most brilliant subordinates, Pétain, reached the scene and infused new energy into the army of defense. Superb and spirit-stirring was Pétain's cry to his soldiers: "Courage, comrades! We'll get them."

It is impossible to summarize this battle, for it raged for six months, from February to October, and was characterized by a multitude of incidents. The fighting back and forth for critical positions continued week after week and month after month. Douaumont and Vaux are the names of two subsidiary forts which stand forth most conspicuously in the murderous welter of repeated attack and counter-attack, of thrust and counter-thrust. The Germans were resolved to take Verdun, cost what it might. They were ready to pay the price but victory they would have. They paid the price, in irreparable losses, but victory they did not win. The French stiffened, under Pétain

and later under Nivelle, and with the electrifying cry, "*Ils ne passeront pas!*" "They shall not pass!", they baffled the fury of the enemy and at the end pitched him out of most of the positions he had won. Verdun did not fall. The military reputations of Pétain and Nivelle had grown enormously and the latter soon succeeded Joffre as commander-in-chief. The Crown Prince did not emerge from this enterprise irradiated with any blinding effulgence of glory.

THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME

The course and outcome of the later phases of the Verdun campaign were affected by another campaign which was being carried on simultaneously in another sector of the long line that ran from Belgium through France to Switzerland. This was the Battle of the Somme. This was an Anglo-French attack, stretching from Arras to some distance south of the Somme River, the English under General Haig, the French under Foch, the Germans under Hindenburg, who had been transferred to the west after his great successes in the east. England was now striking a new pace, which she was to continue and to increase, in participation in the war on land. In 1914 she had had only a small regular army of a hundred thousand men. This was rapidly increased by volunteering, which achieved notable proportions but not notable enough. Finally in January, 1916, she had adopted conscription for single men, and, in May, for married men as well. Thus she now had universal service for all between the ages of 18 and 41. She was training the new recruits hastily and was increasing her munition supplies enormously. She had taken over more and more of the line until she was now manning about ninety miles from the sea to the Somme.

The people of the Allied countries expected that their armies, thus enlarged and elaborately equipped, would attempt to break through the German lines. The Battle of the Somme was an endeavor to bring to an end the long deadlock on the western front. After a terrific bombardment, which had by this time become the customary prelude to an offensive, the general assault was begun on July 1. For a few days the Allies made progress, though on the whole very slowly. The railroad centers, Bapaume and Péronne, were their objectives. The German line stiffened and fiercely counter-attacked. The battle dragged and the rainy season set in, making it almost impossible to move the heavy guns over the muddy roads. While both the English and

the French took a number of towns and considerable bodies of prisoners, they were unable to attain their objectives. All through the summer and well into the fall the desperate struggle went on, dying down in October. The total area won by the Allies was small, about 120 squares miles. Nowhere had they advanced more than seven miles from their starting point. Nevertheless Haig was right when he announced that the campaign had been a success for three reasons, namely, because it had relieved Verdun; because, by holding large masses of Germans on the western front, it had enabled Russia to win a considerable victory on the eastern front; and because it had worn down the German strength. It was in the second phase of this battle of the Somme that a new and redoubtable engine of war was introduced by the British, powerful armored motor cars, quickly nicknamed "tanks," which could cross trenches, break through barbed-wire entanglements, and at the same time could scatter a murderous fire all about from the guns within. Machine gun fire against them was entirely ineffectual. Only when squarely hit by powerful missiles from big cannon were the tanks disabled.

There was also serious fighting during 1916 on the Italian and on the Russian fronts. The Austrians, supposing the Russians had learned their lesson in the previous year and that they would think twice before again assuming the offensive, left their eastern front lightly guarded and prepared to punish the Italians, their historic enemy, and now more hated than ever because of their "treachery" in breaking the Triple Alliance. In May the Austrians began an attack from the Tyrol. Controlling the passes of the Alps, they were able to form a large army and to threaten Verona and Vicenza. The Italians resisted desperately but lost a large number of guns and men. They also lost about two hundred and thirty square miles of Italian territory. But the Austrians had weakened their eastern front so seriously that the Russians were winning great victories over them in that theater. This in turn reacted upon the Italian campaign by forcing the Austrians to recall many troops in order to ward off the new danger. Therefore they were obliged to forego for the time being their dream of breaking into the plains of Venetia.

While the Russians had been forced by Hindenburg and Mackensen to make a great retreat in 1915, they had not been put out of the war and, in June, 1916, they began, under Brussilov, a new offensive, this time between the Pripet Marshes and the Austrian province of Bukowina. Brussilov's drive was for a while successful and netted far larger territorial gains than were

made on the western front in the Battle of the Somme. Brussilov was able to push the Austrians back from twenty to fifty miles, to take a large number of prisoners and to capture many towns and cities, including the important ones of Lutsk and Czernowitz. The campaign lasted from June to October, but after the first month no great progress was made and the offensive gradually wore down and stopped. Russia was far from having recovered what she had lost in the previous year. Indeed, she recovered practically nothing in the north from the Pripet Marshes to the Baltic Sea.


The interplay of these various campaigns was unmistakable. The Somme helped Verdun, the Russian drive helped Italy by freeing her of the Austrians and by enabling her to begin an offensive along the Isonzo which yielded Gorizia on August 9 and brought her to within thirteen miles of coveted Trieste. But while there was this interplay, this relieving of pressure in one region by bringing pressure to bear in another, the teamwork was most imperfect. The desirability of a unified command of all the Allied forces had hardly begun to dawn. It took the experiences of another year and more to drive that idea into the minds of the governing authorities of the various countries concerned.

ROUMANIA ENTERS THE WAR

The unhappy consequences of the lack of proper co-ordination in a common cause were conspicuously shown in another field in this same year of 1916, namely, in Roumania. Roumania entered the war on the side of the Allies on August 27, 1916. Her chief motive was to assure "the realization of her national unity," by which phrase was meant the liberation from Austria-Hungary of the three million Roumanians who lived in the eastern section of the Dual Monarchy, in Transylvania, and their incorporation in the Kingdom of Roumania. The principle of nationality was at the basis of Roumania's action, the principle that kindred peoples desiring to be united should be united. Roumania's declaration of war was naturally warmly applauded by the Allies. It was followed immediately by a Roumanian invasion of Transylvania, which achieved very considerable successes.

But the Germans were resolved to prevent this threatened mutilation of their ally and also this threatened cutting of the connection between the Central Powers and Turkey. Roumanian success, if unimpeded, would widen out into the Balkans and

imperil the famous "corridor" through Bulgaria and Serbia. The German General Staff determined, therefore, to strike with all the force at its command, to deal a blow that should be both swift and memorable. Two large armies composed of Germans, Austro-Hungarians, Bulgarians, and Turks, and under the com-



mand of Falkenhayn and Mackensen, were sent against Roumania. They conquered the southern part of the kingdom with comparative ease and entered Bucharest, the capital, on December 6. What was left of the Roumanian army withdrew to the north. Jassy became the provisional seat of Roumanian government. Peace was not concluded until much later, but meanwhile the Central Powers controlled most of the territory

of Roumania, and exploited its rich resources in wheat and oil. The corridor to Constantinople was widened rather than cut. From this time forth the German ambition to create a Middle



Europe, dominated by Germany, became more and more pronounced and more and more insistent.

The Roumanian disaster was due to the immense superiority

of German resources, equipment, and generalship; also to the mistakes of Roumania. One of these mistakes was the lateness of her decision to enter the war. None of the Allies was in a position to help her, except Russia, whose conduct was now equivocal. Had Roumania declared war in June at the moment of Brussilov's great victories, the outcome might have been very different. As it was she declared it when Brussilov's drive had been brought to a standstill. This was but one more proof of the fact that the Allies must bring about a closer correlation of their efforts, if they were to win.

One more state entered the European War in 1916, Portugal. On February 23, Portugal seized the German ships in her harbors, claiming that the shortage of tonnage created by Germany's submarine campaign justified the action. Whereupon Germany declared war upon her, March 9. A few days later it was officially announced by the Portuguese minister to the United States that "Portugal is drawn into the war as a result of her long-standing alliance with England, an alliance that has withstood unbroken the strain of five hundred years." This, it is curious to note, is a reference to a treaty signed in London on June 16, 1373, by which each country pledged itself to assist the other in case of war, a treaty quite as legitimate as that of the Triple Alliance, much more venerable, and far less injurious to the welfare of Europe. During all these centuries the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance has continued, frequently reaffirmed, the friendship it was designed to bring about still exists, the treaty concluded in 1373 has been broken by neither party and is still considered in force. Portugal participated in the war by sending an army to France and by aiding England in Africa.

THE NAVAL BATTLE OF JUTLAND

The year 1916 witnessed also a great naval engagement between England and Germany, the Battle of Jutland. England had given since the outbreak of the war remarkable evidence of her might upon the ocean. The mobilization of her fleet in the opening days was quite as noteworthy in its way as the mobilization of the German army, and as the latter entered forthwith upon a career of victory, so also did the former. The pressure of the British navy began at once to be felt where it was intended it should be, in Germany. A blockade of the German coast was established at the very outset, which was destined to be made steadily more effective. Germany's merchant shipping was swept

from the ocean, the vast fabric of her sea-borne commerce collapsed. The British fleet prevented Germany from importing such essentials as foodstuffs, petroleum, cotton, coffee, rubber, zinc, tin, so necessary in the work of war. The blockade was not perfect, as now and then a German raider could get through, sure, however, in the end, to be hunted down. But the attention of the world, the attention even of England herself, was not riveted upon this incessant naval war as it was upon the military operations on land. One reason for this was that the naval war was silent and unseen, although its effects were most important. Another was that the war on land was bitterly contested and gave rise to numberless incidents, was a tense, critical, and doubtful struggle, while the war on the sea was, generally speaking, devoid of incident. England's command of her element was never in doubt, and was even challenged only infrequently. Submarines could and did do occasional damage, even in one instance sinking three English war vessels, and there had been, as we have seen, two or three sea fights between small fractions of the fleets, Germany winning a victory in the early days off Chili, England a far more significant one subsequently off the Falkland Islands. These events were, however, of minor importance. But the main German fleet stuck tightly to its base, the harbor of Kiel, and the unremitting, perpetual stress of the blockade offered no sensations to a world which was surfeited with sensations as a result of the land warfare.

But on May 31, 1916, the German High Seas fleet, commanded by Admiral von Scheer, steamed forth, and skirted up the western coast of Denmark. It was sighted by the British scouts under Admiral Beatty, about 3.30 in the afternoon, an engagement immediately began, the main British squadron, under Admiral Jellicoe, coming up only later. The battle continued for several hours until darkness came on, between eight and nine. It was the greatest naval battle since Trafalgar and, in the strength and power of the units engaged, undoubtedly the greatest in all history. The result was inconclusive. Both sides lost important ships but both claimed to be victorious. That the real victor, however, was England was proved by the fact that the German fleet was obliged to return to Kiel and did not again emerge from that refuge. Britannia still ruled the wave, and it was extremely fortunate for the safety of democracy in England, France, Italy, and the United States, and for liberty everywhere, that she did.

Had England rendered no other service than this of making the seas safe for freedom and dangerous for despotism, the debt

of humanity to her would be incalculable. But she was doing far more than this. The utterances of her statesmen, like those of France, from the first of August, 1914, defined the issues at stake, and set forth adequately the appalling gravity of the crisis. Not only were those utterances profoundly educative but they were veritable trumpet blasts, summoning to action, in the interest of all that men in Western Europe and in America had long held most precious. In the darkest hours, and there were many such during those first three years, there was no faltering in high places, no talk of compromise of right with wrong, no weakening of resolution, no abatement of effort. It must never be forgotten that the leaders of France and England, and the nations they represented, were constant and valorous defenders of the New World, as of the Old, that it was their heroism and their immeasurable spirit of sacrifice that barred the way of a mighty and conscienceless military power toward universal domination. Never did men die in a holier cause. And they died in enormous numbers, literally by the million.

ENTRANCE OF THE UNITED STATES INTO THE WAR

In such a contest as that the United States belonged, body and soul. If she was to preserve a shred of self-respect, if she was to maintain inviolate the honor of the American name, if she was to safeguard the elementary rights of American citizens, if she was bound in any sense to be her brother's helper in the defense of freedom in the world, then she must take her stand shoulder to shoulder with the hosts of freemen in Europe who were giving and had long been giving the last full measure of devotion to that cause, then she must spend her manhood and her wealth freely and without complaint, as France and England and Belgium and Serbia had done.

From very early in the war there were Americans who endeavored to arouse their country to a sense of its danger and its duty, to persuade it to prepare, to fire it with the resolve to keep the nation's 'scutcheon clean. Among those who, by their quick and intelligent appreciation of the situation, by their courage and activity, rendered invaluable service in the campaign of national education were Ex-President Roosevelt and General Leonard Wood. Many Americans enlisted in foreign legions.

From August, 1914, to April, 1917, America passed through a painful, humiliating, and dangerous experience. Her declara-

tion of war was the expression of the wisdom she distilled from that experience. Her entrance into the war was the most important event of the year 1917, though not immediately the most important, for the collapse of Russia, occurring also in that year, had a quicker and more direct bearing upon the military situation. But in the end, if America kept the faith, she could tip the scales decisively.

We entered the war finally because Germany forced us in, because she rendered it absolutely impossible for us to stay out unless we were the most craven and pigeon-hearted people on the earth. Any one who counted on that being the case was entertaining a notion for which he could certainly cite no evidence in our previous history.

How did Germany force us into this war? What specific things did she do that could be answered in the end in one way and one way only?

GERMAN OFFENSES AGAINST AMERICA

The record is a long one, of offenses to the moral, the intellectual, the spiritual, the material interests of America. First, the wanton attack upon Serbia, a small state, by two great ones, Austria and Germany, and the flouting of all suggestions of arbitration or attempts to settle international difficulties, methods in which America believed, as had been shown by her own repeated use of them, and by her enthusiastic support of the efforts of the two Hague Conferences to perfect those methods and to win general adhesion to them. Second, the invasion of Belgium and the martyrdom of that country, amid nameless indignities and inhumanities. The indignation of America was spontaneous, widespread, and intense. The sentiment of horror, thus needlessly aroused, coupled with admiration for the brave resistance of the Belgians and sympathy for their sufferings, contributed powerfully to the creation of that state of mind which finally gained expression on April 6, 1917.

But the conquest and the inhuman treatment of Belgium were no direct infringement of our rights. The national indignation was profoundly stirred, the national sympathy aroused, but neither the sovereignty of the Government nor the persons or property of the citizens of the United States were affected. These were, however, not long to remain immune from attack. German and Austrian officials, accredited to our Government and enjoying the hospitality of our country, proceeded to use

their positions here for the purpose of damaging Germany's enemies. They fomented strikes among American munition workers and seamen; they caused bombs to be placed on ships carrying munitions of war; they plotted incendiary fires, and conspired to bring about the destruction of ships and factories. In 1915 the ambassador of Austria-Hungary, Dumba, and the German military and naval attachés, Papen and Boy-Ed, were caught in such activities, and were forced to leave the country. Under the supervision of Papen a regular office was maintained to procure fraudulent passports, by lying and by forgery, for German reservists. American territory was used as a base of supplies, and military enterprises against Canada and against India were hatched by Germans on American soil. These German plots were in gross defiance of our position as a neutral and of our sovereignty as an independent nation.

GERMANY'S SUBMARINE POLICY

While the diplomatic representatives of Germany were engaged in plotting criminal enterprises against Americans at home, the German Government itself had embarked upon a course of procedure that inevitably ended in the destruction of American lives and property on the high seas. In February, 1915, Germany proclaimed the waters around the British Isles "a war zone" and announced that enemy ships found within that zone would be sunk without warning. Neutrals were expected to keep their ships and citizens out of this area. If they did not, the responsibility for what might happen would be theirs, not Germany's.

Such was the announcement of Germany's submarine policy, a policy that was to have more momentous consequences than its authors imagined. A submarine is a war vessel and as such has a perfect right to attack an enemy war vessel without warning and sink her if she can. But neither a submarine nor any other war vessel has any right, under international law, to sink a merchantman belonging to the enemy or belonging to a neutral, except under certain conditions, and one of the conditions is that the persons on board, crew and passengers, shall be removed to the ship attacking or their lives otherwise absolutely safeguarded.

President Wilson, six days after the German proclamation, despatched a note to Germany announcing that the United States would hold the German Government to "a strict accountability" should any American ships be sunk or American lives lost, and

that the United States would take all steps necessary "to safeguard American lives and property and to secure to American citizens the full enjoyment of their acknowledged rights on the high seas."

To this the German Government replied that neutral vessels entering the war zone "will themselves bear the responsibility for any unfortunate accidents that may occur. Germany disclaims all responsibility for such accidents and their consequences." This was a clear announcement that not only did she propose to sink enemy merchantmen, but neutral merchantmen as well, were they found within the prohibited zone, without removing the passengers to safety or even giving them the warning necessary to enable them to take to the lifeboats, which, on the high seas, would themselves not be places of safety but which at least might perhaps give some chance for life.

On March 28, a British steamer, the *Falaba*, was torpedoed and one American was drowned. On May 1, an American ship, the *Gulflight*, was torpedoed without warning. The vessel managed to remain afloat and was later towed into port, but the captain died of heart failure caused by the shock, and two of the crew who jumped overboard were drowned. The Government of the United States began at once to investigate the case, as here apparently were all the elements calling for strict accountability. But before the investigation was completed, indeed before a week had passed, the case was overshadowed by another, the sinking of the *Lusitania*.

Germany's ruthless submarine campaign, in force since February, had resulted by the first of May in the sinking of over sixty merchant ships in the war zone, several of them belonging to neutral nations, with a loss of about two hundred and fifty lives, all of them the lives of noncombatants. Germany had deliberately adopted a policy that involved the killing of as many noncombatants, hitherto protected by international law and the usages of warfare among civilized nations, as might be necessary to enable her to achieve her ends. What she had done on land to hundreds and thousands of peaceful, unarmed, non-fighting people in Belgium and France she was now ready and resolved to do on the sea. But while she was torpedoing many vessels, yet England's commerce went on as before, thousands of ships entering and clearing British ports, and Great Britain was transporting an army to France without the loss of a single man. As the German people had been told that the submarines would quickly bring England to her knees and as they were not doing so,

something spectacular and sensational must be achieved to justify the promises and expectations, and to silence criticism or discouragement at home. Consequently, the largest trans-Atlantic British liner still in service was selected for destruction. The world, it was believed, would then take notice and people would think twice before entering the war zone. On May 7, off the Irish coast, the *Lusitania* was torpedoed twice without warning and sank in less than twenty minutes. Nearly twelve hundred men, women, and children were drowned, among them over a hundred Americans. This cold-blooded, deliberate murder of innocent noncombatants was the most brilliant achievement of Germany's submarine campaign and was celebrated with enthusiasm in Germany as a great "victory." The rest of the world regarded it as both barbarous and cowardly. The indignation of Americans at this murder of Americans was universal and intense. When, three years later, American soldiers in France went over the top, in the campaign of 1918, shouting "*Lusitania*" at their foes, they were but expressing the deep-seated indignation of an outraged people, an indignation and resentment which time had done nothing to assuage.

On May 13, President Wilson despatched a message to Germany denouncing this act as a gross violation of international law, demanding that Germany disavow it and make reparation as "far as reparation is possible," and declaring that the Government of the United States would not "omit any word or any act necessary to the performance of its sacred duty of maintaining the rights of the United States and its citizens and of safeguarding their free exercise and enjoyment."

Germany replied on May 28, evading the main issues of the American note and making many assertions that were quickly proved to be false. A correspondence ensued between the two governments, in which the President repeated his demand for disavowal and all possible reparation. In the end Germany offered to pay for lives lost but refused to admit that the sinking of the ship was illegal. No agreement was reached between the two nations. No action, however, was taken by the American Government.

All through 1915, torpedoing of vessels continued, and several Americans were drowned. The Government steadily proclaimed our rights, the German Government evading the fundamental principles involved, trying to confuse the issue by raising irrelevant points.

On March 24, 1916, occurred another major event in this

campaign of indiscriminate murder of innocent noncombatants, namely the torpedoing without warning of an English ship, the *Sussex*, while crossing the English Channel. Two Americans were injured and about seventy others, who were on board, were endangered. President Wilson again protested and declared the United States could "have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the German Empire altogether," unless the German Government "should now immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods of submarine warfare against passenger and freight-carrying vessels." Finally, on May 4, Germany agreed that henceforth merchant vessels should not be sunk without warning and without saving human lives, unless these ships should attempt to escape or offer resistance. But she appended a condition, namely that the United States should compel Great Britain to observe international law. If the United States should not succeed, then Germany "must reserve to itself complete liberty of decision."

President Wilson accepted the promise and repudiated the condition on the ground that our plain rights could not be made contingent by Germany upon what any other power should or should not do. To this note Germany sent no reply.

That the promise was entirely insincere, that it was the intention to keep it only as long as it should be convenient, that ruthless submarine warfare was to be resumed whenever it seemed likely to be successful, was admitted later by the German Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg. Sinkings continued to occur from time to time throughout 1916, and finally, on January 31, 1917, the mask of hypocrisy and duplicity was thrown aside and a policy of unrestricted and ruthless submarine warfare was proclaimed. Germany announced that beginning the next day, February 1, she would prevent "in a zone around Great Britain, France, and Italy, and in the Eastern Mediterranean, all navigation, that of neutrals included. . . . All ships met within that zone will be sunk." The insulting concession was made that one American passenger ship per week might go to England, if it were first painted in stripes, the breadth of which was indicated, and if it carefully followed a route laid down by Germany. "Give us two months of this kind of warfare," said the German Foreign Secretary, Zimmermann, to Ambassador Gerard, on January 31, "and we shall end the war and make peace within three months."

There was only one answer possible to such a note as this, unless the people of the United States were willing to hold their

rights and liberties subject to the pleasure and interest of Germany. On February 3, the President severed diplomatic relations with Germany, recalled our ambassador and dismissed von Bernstorff. Toward the end of the month Secretary Lansing made public an intercepted despatch from the German Foreign Secretary, Zimmermann, to the German Minister to Mexico, instructing him to propose an alliance with Mexico and Japan and war upon the United States, Mexico's reward to be the acquisition of the states of Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona. In other words, the United States was to be dismembered.

When, on April 2, 1917, President Wilson appeared before Congress and in an address, which was a scathing arraignment of Germany before the world, recommended a declaration of war against this "natural foe to liberty," he had a predestined and enthusiastic response, for he was merely expressing the pent-up wishes of the American people, who did not intend to have war made upon them indefinitely without their hitting back at the aggressor with all the force at their command, and who were resolved to share in the enterprise of saving the world from Prussian domination, or, in the words of the President, "to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world, as against selfish and autocratic power" and "to make the world safe for democracy." On April 6, Congress passed a resolution to the effect "that the state of war between the United States and the Imperial German Government which has thus been thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared," and it shortly proceeded to pass a series of important military, financial, and economic measures designed to enable the country to play a worthy part in the great struggle. The United States did not declare war upon Austria-Hungary until December 7, nor did it then or later declare war upon Bulgaria and Turkey. With the two latter diplomatic relations only were broken.

Thus a war, begun with incredible lightness of heart by Austria-Hungary and Germany upon the banks of the Danube, had expanded to include not only most of Europe, but Asia and Africa and now all of North America. Canada had been in the war since its beginning and had greatly distinguished herself on many fields. Now came the United States, unprepared, save for her navy, which at once began to prove its mettle and its value to our Allies, but potentially an immense addition to the fighting ranks, should its enormous and varied resources be developed and properly applied. The entrance of the United States into the war was followed by the entrance of the republics of Cuba and

Panama on the following day (April 7). In June, 1917, King Constantine of Greece was deposed and Greece joined the Allies July 2. Siam declared war on Germany July 22, Liberia on August 4, China on August 14, Brazil on October 26, and in the same year several Central and South American states broke off diplomatic relations with Germany.

Of more immediate and direct influence upon the course of the war than this intervention of the United States, which could only make itself greatly felt after a period of preparation, was a series of far-reaching and startling occurrences in another quarter.

REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA

The most important event of 1917 was the collapse of Russia and its withdrawal from the war. This meant an enormous increase of Germany's power and at the same time imposed a new and mighty burden upon the Allies, a burden which threatened to be too great for them to bear.

Russia had been badly defeated by Hindenburg in 1915, and Brussilov's campaign of 1916, after important initial successes, had been brought to a standstill. The result of these events was to arouse criticism of the government. The belief spread that the old familiar "dark forces" were in control once more, that they were using the distresses of the nation for their individual advantage, that the court was pro-German, that the Tsar was meditating a separate peace with Germany. Charges of incompetence and dishonesty were made against certain officials. The leading members of the Duma demanded that a responsible ministry be created, a demand supported by the army and the people, and that radical changes be made in the government in the direction of greater efficiency, such as were being made in France and England. In February 100,000 workingmen went on strike in Petrograd, and 25,000 in Moscow. An acute food crisis developed and lawless raids on bakeries occurred. When ordered to fire on the mobs some of the soldiers refused to do so, an ominous sign. On March 11 the Tsar dissolved the Duma, wishing to get rid of it. But the Duma refused to dissolve. A revolution was in full swing. There was considerable street fighting, the police being the particular objects of popular wrath. Revolutionary bands captured some important buildings and seized the Prime Minister Golitzin, and a former Prime Minister Stürmer, under suspicion of being involved in pro-German intrigues. The Duma now effected a *coup d'état*, voting to

establish a Provisional Government. The Tsar was informed of this change and required to abdicate. This he did on March 15. Thus ended the reign of Nicholas II, the last of the Romanoffs, a family which had ruled in Russia for three hundred years and more.

THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

The Provisional Government was a coalition representing the three different parties which had had most to do with bringing about this surprising change. Prince Lvov, the head of the ministry, represented the business men and landowners of a liberal type; Paul Miliukov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, long associated with Russian reform movements, represented the Constitutional Democratic party; and Kerensky represented the third group, namely the soldiers and workingmen. Kerensky was a Revolutionary Socialist, sympathetic with the popular demand for a juster division of the land in the interest of the agricultural masses. The ministry proceeded to give back to Finland her constitution, to promise self-government and unity to Poland, to endow the Jews with equal political, civil, and military rights. On March 31 it abolished the death penalty. A general amnesty was proclaimed and exiles in large numbers returned from Siberia and were greeted with frenzied enthusiasm. The public mood was optimistic and excited.

Revolutions once successful are difficult to arrest and have a way of passing rapidly through several stages, each more radical than its predecessor. The Russian Revolution formed no exception to this rule, but rather illustrated it afresh. The period of reasoned liberalism, of rational and ordered reform, did not last long. The Socialists entered aggressively upon the scene, organizing *soviets* or councils of workingmen and soldiers. These *soviets*, particularly the one in Petrograd, began to oppose the Provisional Government as much as they dared, and to impose their views. In regard to the war the Lvov ministry declared that free Russia did not aspire to dominate other countries or to get their territory, but that it would not allow its own country to come out of the war weakened or humiliated. On May 2 it announced to the Allies that Russia would continue in the war until a complete victory was achieved. The Petrograd Council or Soviet, on the other hand, was in favor of a general peace to be secured by the workers of all lands, and asserted that the war had been begun and was being carried on in the interest of

kings and capitalists. This Council was powerful as representing the capital and was striving hard to dominate the Provisional Government. On May 16 Miliukov, the able Foreign Minister, was forced out of the Government on the ground that he was an imperialist, he having expressed the hope that Russia would acquire Constantinople. A Socialist was appointed in his place and Kerensky now became Minister of War. This reorganized ministry was in favor of continued co-operation with the Allies and against a separate peace.

Kerensky soon became the dominant personality in the government. As Minister of War he endeavored to check the demoralization which was making serious inroads into the army. Discipline was disappearing, acts of disobedience, if not actual mutiny, were occurring at various points. Kerensky succeeded for a while in checking this alarming disorganization and even in arousing the army in Galicia to begin a new "drive" which made an advance of ten miles, only to be brought to a standstill by renewed mutinies, so that all that had been gained was lost (July, 1917).

On July 22 Kerensky became head of the Provisional Government and remained such until he and his colleagues were overthrown, on November 7, by the Bolsheviki of Petrograd. Kerensky was a Socialist and was strongly opposed to a separate peace with Germany, but was in favor of a revision of peace terms by the Allies, in the direction of the formula, "no annexations, no indemnities." The breakdown of discipline in the army continued to increase portentously. During the retreat in Galicia, generals found that they were obliged to discuss their orders with numerous committees of soldiers, and to secure their consent, before those orders could be executed. Officers were in some cases shot by their soldiers. Large numbers of troops retreated without making any resistance, so thoroughly pacifistic had they become as a result of the Socialistic propaganda carried on among them. Kerensky publicly characterized these acts as shameful and labored incessantly and with extraordinary energy to stop the growing anarchy and to restore the army as a fighting force, necessary even for the defense of the country, since the country was again threatened. His efforts were unavailing and conditions steadily grew worse. The Germans took the important city of Riga on September 2, with practically no opposition. The shame and impotence of a great state were being demonstrated every day anew.

THE BOLSHEVIKI SEIZE THE GOVERNMENT

That shame and that impotence were illustrated in perfection by the policy and conduct of the new rulers of Russia, the Bolsheviks, who succeeded in overthrowing Kerensky by violence on November 7, and in seizing the government, under the leadership of Lenine and Trotzky. Several of the ministers were arrested, and army headquarters were captured. Kerensky managed to escape, and was not heard of again for several months, when he finally appeared in London. Lenine became Prime Minister and Trotzky Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The new government announced its policy at once; an immediate democratic peace, the confiscation of all landed property, the recognition of the supreme authority of the *soviets* or workingmen's and soldiers' councils, the election of a constitutional convention. The Bolsheviks revealed themselves adequately, though not completely, in these demands. They were extreme Socialists, resolved to effect a Socialistic revolution at once. They were unwilling to fight Germans or Austrians. They were willing to fight their own fellow-citizens for the purpose of robbing them of their property. They cared nothing about national honor. "Honor" was not a word in their vocabulary; it was only a conception of hypocritical capitalists interested solely in feathering their own nests and exploiting the downtrodden. The Bolsheviks cared nothing for the good faith of Russia, for they wished and intended to desert Russia's allies and to make a separate peace with her enemies despite the fact that Russia had signed a treaty promising not to make a separate peace. Their moral standards were not above considering a treaty a scrap of paper, were not, therefore, superior to the standards of the Germans, in whose pay they were accused of being. As destroyers of a great nation, as artists in anarchy, as ruthless murderers of fellow-Russians, they were a great success.

It was evident that with such men in power Russia's participation in the war was over and that the burden imposed upon the Western Allies would be far greater than ever. The Bolsheviks immediately started peace negotiations with the Germans, concluding with them an armistice at Brest-Litovsk (December 15), where three months later they supinely signed what were probably the most disgraceful and disastrous treaties known in the history of any European nation, treaties that will be described later.

The Russian Revolution and the rise of the Bolsheviki brought about the rapid disintegration, not only of the Russian people, but of the Russian state as a territorial entity. Finland declared its independence. The Ukraine, an immense region in the south, did the same. Siberia later followed suit. The Germans had control of Poland, Lithuania, and the Baltic Provinces and consequently declarations of independence were not in order there. General Kaledin, the leader of the Cossacks, declared war upon the Bolsheviki in the name of the safety of the country. None of Russia's allies and none of the neutral states recognized the Bolsheviki as the lawful government of Russia. It was reserved for the Germans and Austrians and Turks to do that.

In December the Constituent Assembly, called by the Bolsheviki, met in Petrograd. When this proved unsatisfactory to the latter at its first session they sent a body of sailors into the chamber to disperse it. That ended the Constituent Assembly and gave a further illustration of the meaning of the Bolshevik formula about the self-determination of peoples.

The revolution in Russia in its immediate effects and the intervention of the United States in its possible ultimate effects were the two most outstanding events in the history of 1917. But, also, during that year military events of importance occurred. The eastern front saw comparatively little activity as, after the Russian Revolution, the Germans were content to watch the development of affairs in that country and in the main merely to guard the positions they had gained in Russia and Roumania, probably in the expectation of shortly imposing peace upon those countries and then being able to withdraw their troops from them and throw them with decisive force upon the western front.

THE WAR IN 1917

In the early months of 1917 the effects of the Battle of the Somme of the previous year were shown to be more important than had been supposed, for when the English and the French renewed their campaign in the same region they encountered a weakened resistance, the enemy withdrawing before them. Then ensued, in March and April, a retreat of the Germans to the famous "Hindenburg Line," called by their leaders a "strategical retreat." The Germans retired along a hundred mile front, from Arras to the neighborhood of Noyon, evacuating more than a thousand square miles of French territory which had formerly contained over three hundred towns and villages. But, com-


pelled to abandon this territory, they committed deeds which only deepened the odium in which German military practices were held in Allied and neutral countries. They devastated the country as no country in Europe had ever been devastated before, and they did it with scientific thoroughness and satisfaction. France recovered only a scene of indescribable desolation. Buildings, public and private, schools and churches, works of art, historical monuments and priceless historical records were ruthlessly destroyed; private homes were stripped clean of furniture which was carted away by the Germans, wells were filled with dung, orchards were cut down, roads and bridges and railways were blown up. If they must retire, the Germans were resolved to leave a region, hitherto one of the most fertile in France, ruined and blasted for years and even for decades to come. An eye-witness wrote as follows: "With field glasses I could see far on either side of every road for miles and miles; every farm is burned, fields destroyed, every garden and every bush uprooted, every tree sawed off close to the bottom. It was a terrible sight and seemed almost worse than the destruction of men. Those thousands of trees prone upon the earth, their branches waving in the wind, seemed undergoing agonies before our eyes."

Other events on the western front in 1917 were: the battle of Arras fought by the British, from April to June, and in the course of which the Canadians distinguished themselves at Vimy Ridge; the long-drawn-out battle of the Aisne, fought by the French from April to November, famous for the fighting about the *Chemin des Dames*; the British offensive in Flanders, from July to December, which yielded Passchendaele Ridge and other positions; the battle of Cambrai, in November and December, in which the Germans were compelled to retire several miles on a front of twenty miles.

THE INVASION OF ITALY

But while on the French front the Allies made considerable gains, in another region they sustained a serious reverse, in Italy. The Italians had seized Gorizia in 1916 and in the summer of 1917 they carried on a successful offensive along the Isonzo and the Carso Plateau. But with the breakdown of Russia and the spread of pacifism in the Russian armies the Germans were able to send large bodies of troops and a great quantity of heavy artillery to the aid of their ally, Austria. On October 28, 1917,

the Austro-German army seized Gorizia; on the 30th Udine fell; a rapid retreat of the Italians followed to the Tagliamento. The Germans announced that they had captured 180,000 prisoners and 1500 guns. The Tagliamento could not be held and the Italians were driven back to the Piave. For days the Allied world held its breath, fearing that what had happened to Serbia in 1915, to Roumania in 1916, was now in 1917 to happen to Italy, and that she would be conquered and eliminated from the war. But the Piave held and the attempts of the Central Powers to outflank it in the mountains to the north of Venetia, along the Asiago Plateau and other ridges, failed. There the



Farthest Italian Advance. Austrian Invasion, October, 1917.

invasion was halted. French and English troops were rushed to the aid of Italy and their arrival greatly helped and encouraged the Italians. But the world had had a bad shock and was apprehensive still, lest the Italian line should be broken. The Germans announced that the campaign had netted them 300,000 prisoners and nearly 3000 guns. Whether this was true or not, certain it was that they had freed Austria of the enemy and that they now themselves occupied four thousand square miles of Italian territory and that they were in a position to threaten the richest section of Italy, which contained, among other things, the great munition plants.

The Allied gains on the western front and those in Asia, which

will be referred to later, were but a slight comfort in view of the Russian and Italian disasters. The year ended in gloom in the Allied camp. But there was at least some satisfaction to be derived from the fact that Venice had not been taken, and that that matchless creation of art had not been damaged by the ruthlessness of the enemy as had the incomparable cathedral of Rheims, the masterpiece of Gothic architecture, the living embodiment of French history, whose every stone spoke of long lines of kings — and of Joan of Arc.

FIGHTING IN THE ORIENT

The year 1917, therefore, closed in gloom. The collapse of Russia, the disaster in Italy, were more alarming in their possible, if not probable, consequences than the scattered and costly gains of the Allies on the western front and the entrance of America into the war, perhaps too late to be of any material value, were reassuring. In western Asia, it is true, the year brought some encouragement to the Allies, but how durable or significant the successes there would prove to be it was quite impossible to forecast. As the Germans had loudly proclaimed their intention to link Berlin with Bagdad, and erect a Middle-Europe, and to extend it through Turkey and the great valleys of the Euphrates and the Tigris, and as this was nothing less than a direct threat at the British Empire in India and Egypt, it was natural and inevitable that England should accept the German challenge in that part of the world as she had accepted it in western Europe and on the high seas. Consequently, as early as 1915 an expedition had been sent out from India, under General Townshend, to prevent the consummation of the German plans. But the expedition failed disastrously. After having advanced two hundred miles up the Tigris and after having seized the city of Kut-el-Amara, General Townshend found himself besieged in that place by the Turks and after a few months, no relief having reached him, he was forced to surrender with his entire army, about ten thousand men, on April 28, 1916, after a siege of a hundred and forty-three days. Not only was this a serious reverse in itself, but it gravely injured Great Britain's prestige in the East. There was nothing for her to do but endeavor to repair the damage done. She at once organized another expedition on a larger scale and with more careful preparation, which she sent into Mesopotamia under General Maude, early in 1917. This expedition was successful. Kut-el-Amara was recaptured on

February 24 and on March 11 the British entered Bagdad in triumph. Bagdad was not of great strategic importance, but its capture exercised a decided moral effect throughout the world.

Toward the close of the year the British achieved other victories over the Turks, farther west, in Palestine. During the earlier years of the war the Turks had seriously menaced England's control of the Suez Canal and Egypt. The English resolved to eliminate this danger once for all by sending an army into Palestine, under General Allenby. This army gradually forced its way northward, captured Jaffa, the seaport of Jerusalem, in November, and entered Jerusalem itself in triumph on December 10, 1917. Great was the rejoicing throughout the Christian world at this recovery of its sacred city after seven centuries of Mohammedan control. The achievement of the medieval Crusaders was being repeated. Would the new victory of the Christian over the Infidel prove ephemeral, as had the earlier one?

The Germans were not downcast over the turn of events in these remote theaters of war. Nor had they any reason to be. On the whole they were holding the western front, and the eastern front had disappeared under the terrific blows they had delivered to Russia and which had laid her low. On the 22d of December the German Emperor was undoubtedly expressing the prevalent German opinion of the general situation when he said to the army in France: "The year 1917 with its great battles has proved that the German people has, in the Lord of Creation above, an unconditional and avowed ally on whom it can absolutely depend. . . . If the enemy does not want peace, then we must bring peace to the world by battering in with the iron fist and shining sword the doors of those who will not have peace. . . . But our enemies still hope, with the assistance of new allies, to defeat you and then to destroy forever the world position won by Germany in hard endeavor. They will not succeed. Trusting in our righteous cause and in our strength, we face the year 1918 with firm confidence and iron will. Therefore, forward with God to fresh deeds and fresh victories!"

THE BOLSHEVIKI AND PEACE

The first of the fresh victories were to be achieved on the diplomatic field and were to be supremely satisfactory to the Germans. They consisted of the treaties of peace imposed by them upon

Russia and Roumania, and upon the big fragments of former Russia which had declared their independence rather than remain connected with a country controlled by the Bolsheviki, namely the Ukraine and Finland.

The Bolsheviki demanded immediate peace and when they succeeded in driving Kerensky from power, and themselves assumed control, they began negotiations to that end. They signed an armistice at Brest-Litovsk, the German army headquarters, on December 15, 1917. The leading personages in the ensuing discussion were Kühlmann for Germany, Czernin for Austria-Hungary, and Trotzky for Russia. The negotiations were long and frequently stormy. Trotzky urged that the peace be based upon the principles of "no annexations, no indemnities." The Central Powers pretended to accept this formula. Their insincerity and duplicity in announcing their adhesion to this principle and to that of the right of peoples to determine their own allegiance were shortly made apparent. They refused to withdraw their troops from the occupied parts of Russia and they indicated clearly that their aims were the opposite of their professions. At this Trotzky balked and withdrew from the conference and the Russian Government announced that it would not sign "an annexationist treaty," but at the same time it announced that the war was at an end and it ordered the complete demobilization of the Russian troops on all fronts.

Germany, however, refused to accept this solution of "no war, but no peace." It insisted on a treaty in black and white. As the negotiations had been broken off by the departure of the Russian delegates on February 10, the German army immediately assumed the offensive and began a fresh invasion of Russia, advancing on a front of five hundred miles and to within seventy miles of Petrograd. This speedily brought the Russians to terms and they signed on March 3, 1918, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the most notorious "annexationist treaty" on record. Its principle provisions were: Russia surrendered all claims to Poland, Lithuania, Courland, Livonia, and Esthonia; she also renounced all claims to Finland and the Ukraine and agreed to recognize their independence and to make peace with them; she surrendered Batum, Erivan, and Kars in the Caucasus to Turkey, and she promised to cease all revolutionary propaganda in the ceded regions and in the countries of the Central Alliance.

Subsequently and in direct violation of the plain intent of one of the articles of the treaty, the promise of a large money indemnity was exacted from Russia.

By this treaty Russia lost an enormous territory, about half a million square miles, a territory more than twice as large as the German Empire. She lost a population of about 65,000,000, which was about that of the German Empire. A year or less of Bolshevism had sufficed to undo the work of all the Russian Emperors from Peter the Great to Nicholas II. So complete a mutilation of a great country Europe had never seen. Russia was thrust back into the condition in which she had been in the seventeenth century and which even then was found intolerable. Never in modern times has a great power surrendered such vast territories by a single stroke of the pen. Pacifism and internationalism had borne their natural fruit with unexpected swiftness. Gorky, the Russian novelist, and considered a radical until the Bolsheviki appeared and gave a new extension to that word, has estimated that this treaty robbed Russia of 37 per cent. of her manufacturing industries, 75 per cent. of her coal, and 73 per cent. of her iron.

What the future of the ceded territories should be was not indicated beyond the statement that "Germany and Austria-Hungary intend to decide the future fate of these territories by agreement with their population." A few weeks later the Central Powers dictated a pitiless treaty to Roumania, the Treaty of Bucharest, forcing large cessions of territory and minutely and ingeniously squeezing her of her economic resources for their advantage.

The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk laid bare the soul of Imperial Germany. It proved to all the world that, whatever her professions might be, her greed was unabashed and unrestrained. And this greed was characteristic not simply of her rulers, military and civil. All Germany applauded. The same Reichstag which in July, 1917, had voted in favor of the principle of "no annexations, no indemnities" now enthusiastically ratified the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the Socialists joining in. The rest of the world now knew, if it had not known before, what it might expect, if it was forced to pass under the same yoke. Germany stood completely unmasked. Her ideal was revealed in all its nakedness.

Having arranged matters in the East to her satisfaction, and no longer threatened or preoccupied in that quarter, Germany now turned practically her entire attention to the western front, confident that, by concentrated energy of attack, she could at last conquer there and snatch the victory which had so long eluded her and which would end the war. Transferring thither

her large eastern armies she was confident that now she could compel a decision and could force a settlement to her taste. One more campaign in France and all would be well. The spring drive was to be begun early, the intention being to separate the French and English armies and then defeat each in turn swiftly — before the Americans should arrive in any such numbers as to be able to influence the course of events.

THE WAR IN 1918

The drive opened on March 21, 1918. The mood in which it was begun was expressed by the Kaiser the day before: "The prize of victory," said he, "must not and will not fail us. No soft peace, but one corresponding to Germany's interests." A month later the German financial secretary added an appendant to this Imperial thought when he said in the Reichstag on April 23: "We do not yet know the amount of the indemnity which we shall win."

This great offensive, the greatest of the war, opened auspiciously and for three months proceeded according to the heart's desire. It was ushered in by the greatest gas attack Europe had ever known; also by a long-distance bombardment of Paris by a new gun of greater range than any previous gun had possessed. The ensuing onslaught was one of terrific force and was designed to spring the French and English armies apart at their point of juncture. The objective was Amiens. As a matter of fact the English left was, in the next few days, driven back toward Arras and the English center driven beyond the Somme. This actually made an opening. The English front was broken and a great disaster might have easily resulted, for the Germans now tried to turn the English right by cavalry. They were, however, met and checked by French cavalry just in the nick of time. But between March 21 and March 28, the Germans made great progress. Town after town fell into their hands, Péronne, Bapaume, Ham, Albert, Noyon, Montdidier. It was at this critical moment that General Pershing placed all the forces under his command absolutely at the disposal of Marshal Foch to be used as he might see fit. Foch had, so great was the danger, the greatest since the Battle of the Marne, been appointed, on March 28, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies on the Western Front. At last the Allies had achieved unity of command.

After a slight pause the Germans attacked the English in the north, in Flanders, at the point where their army and the Portu-

guese were joined. By April 12 the English had been forced to make a considerable retreat. It was then that General Haig issued a special order to his men which would have discouraged



and demoralized men less self-reliant and less fond of the blunt truth, however unpleasant. This utterance of the English commander will remain historic:

"Three weeks ago to-day the enemy began his terrific attacks against us on a fifty-mile front. His objects are to separate us from the French, to take the Channel ports, and to destroy the British Army. . . . Words fail me to express the admiration which I feel for the splendid resistance offered by all ranks of our army under the most trying circumstances.

"Many among us are now tired. To those I would say that victory will belong to the side which holds out the longest. The French Army is moving rapidly and in great force to our support. There is no other course open to us but to fight it out.

"Every position must be held to the last man. There must be no retirement. With our backs to the wall, and believing in the justice of our cause, each one of us must fight to the end. The safety of our homes and the freedom of mankind depend alike upon the conduct of each one of us at this critical moment."

The bitterest fighting continued and the British lost important positions near Ypres, the famous Messines and Wytshaete ridges, and then Mount Kemmel. But French reinforcements came and the Germans were checked. Ypres still held out.

The Germans had suffered very severe losses in making these attacks and gains. They needed time to reorganize their exhausted divisions. Suddenly, on May 27, Ludendorff launched a new attack in an unexpected quarter on a forty-mile front, from Soissons to Rheims. On the 29th Soissons fell. The Germans advanced rapidly. By May 31 they were at the Marne once more after four years. In four days they had taken 45,000 prisoners and an enormous amount of war material. They were held at Château-Thierry on June 2 by French reserves which were rushed to the scene. The Germans were within forty miles of Paris and had gained nearly a thousand square miles of territory.

The Americans were beginning to count. On May 28 they captured Cantigny and two hundred and twenty-five prisoners. Later they helped the French check the Germans at Château-Thierry. They also foiled an attack in Neuilly Wood, advanced two-thirds of a mile, and took two hundred and seventy prisoners. On June 6 and 7 the Marines advanced two miles on a front of six miles and seized Torcy and Bouresches. A little later they occupied a part of Belleau Wood. These were details but useful and auspicious.

On June 9 the Germans made an attack on a front of twenty miles from Montdidier to Noyon, pressing the French center back several miles but at great cost. Then came a lull.

On July 15 they began their fifth and final drive in this re-

markably successful campaign. Attacking on a sixty-mile front east and west of Rheims they pushed forward, crossed the Marne at several points and were evidently aiming at Châlons. They seized Château-Thierry.

From March 21 to July 18, 1918, the Germans had carried on a colossal offensive and had taken many prisoners, much territory, and enormous booty. They were astride the rivers that lead down to Paris, itself not far away. Might not one or two more pushes give them the coveted capital of France and seal the doom of the Allied cause? Elated by four months of victories, which had brought them nearer and nearer the intended prey, inflamed by visions of imminent and unparalleled success, they were eager for the final spring. Then all would be over and a peace could be imposed upon the West similar to that imposed upon the East at Brest-Litovsk. The world would recognize its master, would be re-shaped according to Hohenzollern ideas, and would henceforth receive its marching orders from Berlin.

WAS AMERICA "TOO LATE"?

Not many graver moments, if any, have ever occurred in history. The world stood gripped by an intensity of anxiety and apprehension, painful, heart-sinking, intolerable. Particularly in America did a great and desolating wave of dread and foreboding sweep over the public mind. Minutes seemed like hours and hours like weeks, so racking was the suspense. Had we arrived too late? We had been so slow in seeing our duty, in recognizing our responsibility in the desperate drama of our times, we had finally entered the war so unprepared, that it seemed only too likely that we were to pay, and that the world was to pay, a grievous price for our tardy perception and decision. And would that price include, for us, not only national insecurity, but national dishonor and disgrace? The answer to these questions hung upon events, and events thus far had not been reassuring, had, on the contrary, seemed to be converging toward disaster.

We had done much in material ways for the common cause since our entrance into the war. Our navy, efficient and ready, had begun, from the first day, to render useful and important services. But by the close of 1917, we had less than 200,000 men in France. How many of these were prepared for front-line work it is impossible to say. But certainly they were far too

few for the emergency. On March 27 Lloyd George, the British Prime Minister, made an urgent appeal for "American reinforcements in the shortest possible space of time" and declared that "we are at the crisis of the war, attacked by an immense superiority of German troops." The appeal was answered. From then on there was a rapid and increasing movement of American troops to Europe, 83,000 in March, 117,000 in April, 244,000 in May, 278,000 in June, and by the end of July there were 1,300,000 American soldiers in France. By November there were more than two million.

So desperate was the situation in mid-summer, 1918, that the French Government was prepared at any moment to leave Paris, as it had done in 1914.

But this moment was never to come. For Marshal Foch now struck a blow which freed Paris from danger, and which inaugurated a new and, as we now see, the final phase of the war. On July 18 he assumed the offensive, attacking the enemy on the flank from Château-Thierry on the Marne to the river Aisne. With French and American troops he took the Germans by surprise, and achieved a brilliant success. His entire line advanced from four to six miles, reclaiming twenty villages. Thousands of prisoners were taken, the Americans alone capturing over four thousand. A large number of guns were also seized. On the following days, the counter-offensive continued. Each day it achieved successes; each day it gained additional momentum. The Allied world passed through a new experience. An uninterrupted series of triumphs for the armies of Marshal Foch filled the days and then the weeks, after he had seized the initiative on July 18.

THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE MARNE

By July 21 the Germans, threatened on the flank, were forced to withdraw the troops which had crossed the Marne. The Second Battle of the Marne was over and took its place in history, alongside the First Battle of the Marne, having accomplished the same deliverance of Paris and having begun the deliverance of France. In that battle Americans had taken an important part, although it should not be exaggerated. Seventy per cent. of the troops participating in it were French. Forced to recross the Marne, the Germans next took their stand on the river Vesle. Bitter fighting occurred there. Again they were compelled to retreat and their next stand was at the Aisne.

Week after week their backward movement continued, stubbornly yet unsuccessfully contested. Foch's counter-offensive widened out far to the east of Rheims, far to the north of Soissons. Between the Argonne Forest and the river Meuse the main American army, intrusted with a formidable and difficult task, fought desperately day after day, pushing steadily but slowly and at great cost farther and farther north. West of the Argonne the French were driving the Germans back.

At the same time, the French and the British, with contingents of the other Allies, Italians, Belgians, Portuguese, Americans, interspersed, were attacking various points in the long line from Soissons to the English Channel. All these scattered attacks, carefully co-ordinated, were but parts of a comprehensive plan elaborated by Marshal Foch, who was now revealing himself to the world as one of the master-intellecets of the war. One does not know which to admire the more, the incomparable conception of this campaign or the marvelous execution. Unremitting pressure everywhere, damaging thrusts here and there, such was the evident policy, the purpose being to maintain in Allied hands the initiative and the offensive which had been seized on the fateful July 18. Without haste, without rest, all through August and September and October the gigantic assault continued. The Allies steadily advanced as victors over ground which a short time before they had been compelled to abandon. Verdun was freed from the German menace, so was Rheims, so was Ypres. It would be impossible in any brief space, or, indeed, at length, even to catalogue the long list of incidents and events, in themselves often of great importance and interest, in this vast and complicated movement. Many towns and villages, some of them in possession of the Germans since 1914, were recovered. All that the Germans had won in their drive from March 21 to July 18 was lost, and the Allies then pressed on to conquer the rest of the territory of France, so long held by the Germans, to smash their retreating lines, wherever established, and to hurl them out of France and out of Belgium.

One detail of importance and of great interest to Americans in this general campaign was the elimination of the Saint-Mihiel salient by Pershing's troops on September 12-13.

By the end of September, after paying a heavy price for their retreat, the Germans were back on the famous Hindenburg Line, an intricate and powerful system of defenses which they had for years been building. Here they planned to hold, and then to institute an aggressive peace propaganda among the nations

supposed to be tired of war. The only way to block this purpose was to smash the Hindenburg Line and to compel the enemy to hurry on incessantly toward Germany. Could this be done?

THE BATTLE OF THE HINDENBURG LINE


The Battle of the Hindenburg Line will perhaps rank in history as the decisive battle of the Great War, as momentous as the "Battle of the Nations" at Leipsic in 1813, which foreshadowed the doom of the Napoleonic Empire. In each case the arrogant dream of world power was summarily dissipated. As, after Leipsic, France had been invaded, so, after the Battle of the Hindenburg Line, the invasion of Germany seemed possible and likely. Napoleon, in a few months, had been compelled to abdicate. Might history repeat itself, after an interval of a hundred and five years? The climax of the four years' war was rapidly approaching.

The battle opened on September 26, with attacks on the two widely separated flanks. On that day the First American Army under General Liggett in conjunction with a French army under Gouraud moved against the Germans on the German left. The Americans fought between the Argonne Forest and the Meuse and at first advanced swiftly, taking many villages. Gouraud on the other side of the Argonne pushed forward. The Franco-American drive was not halted but rendered slower when German reserves were rushed to the scene.

Meanwhile Belgian and British troops had attacked the German right flank far to the north in Belgium and had been successful in driving a wedge between the Germans on the Belgian coast and those in the region of Lille. Again reserves were rushed by Ludendorff to meet this danger. But neither here in Flanders nor at the other extremity in the Argonne was the Allied pressure relaxed.

Finally Foch was ready for his chief blow. On October 8 he attacked the enemy, anxious about both flanks, in the center. The attack was made between Cambrai and Saint-Quentin by three British armies under Byng, Rawlinson, and Horne, aided by the French under Debeney. Here the British achieved perhaps the greatest victory in their history. Hope, repeatedly deferred, was realized at last. In three days the British drove straight through the Hindenburg Line on a front of twelve miles, and where it was strongest, and then pushed on into the open

country. That boasted defense was no longer invincible. Saint-Quentin fell and so, shortly, did Cambrai.



The consequences of this breaking of the Hindenburg Line were enormous. The British pushed on toward Valenciennes. Activity was redoubled along the two flanks and soon advances


were made pretty much along the whole line from the English Channel to Verdun. It was a wonderful co-operative movement with glory enough for all the Allies, and to spare. Laon, a tremendous stronghold, was soon evacuated. By October 16 the Germans had had to give up the Belgian coast, Ostend, Zeebrugge. Then Lille, Roubaix, and Turcoing were evacuated. In three weeks an amazing victory had been won over positions selected and long prepared by the Germans themselves. The Americans pushed steadily down the Meuse. After October 16 it was merely a question of time when the Germans would inevitably be driven back into their own country. Each subsequent day continued the tale of territory recovered, of towns captured, of a growing demoralization of the German army. The greatest battle of the war had been decisively won. It only remained to gather in the harvest. The superiority of French military science over German science was established, and the name of Marshal Foch took its place among the great names of military history.

Meanwhile in other theaters of this far-flung war momentous events were occurring, contributing powerfully to the gathering culmination. From every front and with each new day came news of victories so astounding and so decisive and attended with consequences so immediate and far-reaching that it was evident that the hour of supreme triumph was rapidly approaching, that a terrible chapter in the history of humanity was drawing to a close.

ALLENBY'S CAMPAIGN IN PALESTINE

From Palestine came the news that Allenby, who had taken Jerusalem in December, 1917, was on the go again. With an army of 125,000 men, among whom was a small French contingent, he carried out a brilliant campaign against the Turks. Beginning in the middle of September, and making a rapid and consummate use of cavalry, he was able to get around them and in their rear, enveloping them, and delivering a staggering blow in the plains of Samaria. In the course of a few days Allenby captured 70,000 prisoners and 700 guns and practically all the supplies of the Turkish army. Following up this victory he pushed up to Damascus, which he entered on October 1, 1918, taking 7,000 prisoners. On October 6, a French squadron seized Beirut, the chief seaport of Syria. Then began a rapid drive toward Aleppo, the object being to cut the Bagdad railway and thus isolate the Turks who were fighting in Mesopotamia. On

October 15, Homs, halfway between Damascus and Aleppo, fell, and also the port of Tripoli on the coast. A few days later Aleppo was taken. The fate of Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine, and Arabia was decided. Those regions, which for centuries had been under the blight of Turkish rule, were now freed. The



Turkish Empire in that quarter of the world was a thing of the past. Also the dream of a German road from Berlin to Bagdad now went a'glimmering.

SURRENDER OF BULGARIA

And while the Turkish Empire was being amputated in the East, it was being effectively isolated in the West. Bulgaria, which bordered Turkey in Europe, was being eliminated from the war. Almost at the very time that Allenby began his attack in Samaria, Franchet d'Esperey, a hero of the First Battle of the Marne, and now commander of the Allied army in the Balkans, an army consisting of French, British, Greek, Serbian, and Italian troops, attacked the Bulgarians between the Vardar and the Cerna rivers, and broke their lines in two, rendering their position highly critical. Ten days later, on September 29, Bulgaria signed an armistice which meant nothing less than unconditional surrender. She agreed to evacuate all the Greek and Serbian territory which she had occupied, to demobilize her army, to permit the Allied troops to use any strategic points in Bulgaria

they might wish to, as well as all means of communication. Bulgaria was thus out of the war. The Berlin-Bagdad dream was twice dead. Railroad communication between Turkey and Germany was cut. The grandiose German plan of a Middle Europe, of which the world had heard so much, was rapidly being pushed into the lumber-room of damaged and discarded gimeracks. Turkey was verging swiftly toward her fate. Serbia was quickly reconquered by the Serbians and for the Serbians, and it could only be a question of a short time before Roumania would be able to rise again, and denounce the oppressive Treaty of Bucharest which Germany and Austria-Hungary had imposed upon her less than five months before, on May 7, 1918, a treaty which had practically robbed her of her independence, both economic and political.

It was a matter of detail, though pleasing in itself, when on October 3, the self-styled Tsar of Bulgaria, Ferdinand, who had ruled for thirty-one years, abdicated in favor of his son, Crown Prince Boris, twenty-four years of age. Ferdinand was the second of the Balkan kings to lose his throne as a result of his conduct in the World War, Constantine of Greece having preceded him into exile in June, 1917. The new Tsar Boris III was shortly forced to abdicate and a republic was proclaimed. The republic, however, was short-lived, having failed to gain the necessary support, and the abdication was withdrawn.

VICTORIOUS ITALY

While such shattering events were occurring in the East, in the Balkans and in France, the war flamed up once more in Italy. It was in October, 1917, that Italy had suffered her great reverse at Caporetto. It was then that she was thrown out of Austria, across the Isonzo, and that she herself was invaded as far as the Piave. She had experienced colossal losses in men and in equipment. A year from that date, October, 1918, restored in morale and reinvigorated in every way, Italy assumed, under General Diaz, the offensive against the Austrians. Her attack was successful from the start and expanded steadily until she achieved an amazing triumph which largely effaced the memories of the previous year. The hostile line was broken and the Austrians were compelled to flee pell-mell toward their own country. It was a rout and resulted in the loss of some 600,000 prisoners and 7000 guns, the biggest haul of the war. Such was the battle of Vittorio Veneto (Oct. 24-Nov. 3). Caporetto was avenged.

TURKEY ELIMINATED FROM THE WAR

The atmosphere was clearing rapidly owing to these decisive events. Both Turkey and Austria were ready to quit the war. Both asked an armistice. On October 31 the Allied Powers granted an armistice to Turkey on terms that amounted to unconditional surrender. The Dardanelles and the Bosphorus were to be freely opened to the Allies, who might also occupy the forts that protected them. Access to the Black Sea was thus guaranteed. The Turkish army was to be immediately demobilized. The Allies were to have the right to occupy any strategic points they might desire or need to. Other terms completed the defeat of Turkey and registered her exit from the war.

AUSTRIA BEGS AN ARMISTICE

The armistice granted on November 4 contained similar conditions and also conditions even more severe. The Austro-Hungarian armies must be demobilized and must relinquish to the Allies and the United States a large part of their equipment. Austria must evacuate all territories occupied since the beginning of the war. Practically, too, she must give up the Trentino, Trieste, Istria and a part of the Dalmatian coast. All military and railway equipment must be left where it was and be at the disposal of the Allies. All German troops must be evacuated from Austria within fifteen days. All Allied prisoners held by Austria must be immediately restored to the Allies. A large part of the Austrian navy must be handed over. Several other provisions only emphasized in detail Austria's complete defeat.

Meanwhile Austria-Hungary was in rapid process of disintegration. Every despatch brought news of popular outbreaks from all parts of the Dual Monarchy. The Czecho-Slovaks declared their independence, dethroned the monarch and proclaimed a republic. Hungary declared her independence and apparently prepared to become a republic. It was rumored that Emperor Karl had fled, had abdicated, had been deposed. The truth was hard to discover, reports being so fragmentary and conflicting. Vienna evidently fell into the hands of the revolutionists and socialists and the German sections of Austria were said to have likewise declared their independence. The ancient empire was breaking up and several new states were rapidly evolving. Nationalistic, democratic, and socialistic forces were

struggling for recognition and control. What the ultimate outcome would be no man could tell. The very winds had been let loose. Whether the House of Hapsburg still existed was uncertain. That it was doomed to vanish completely and that, too, very soon, seemed assured, if, indeed, it had not already vanished. No one knew what the next day or hour would bring forth in this maelstrom of fermentation, in this confusion worse confounded.

The curtain was rapidly descending, the fifth act of the fearful tragedy of our times was closing with unexpected abruptness. Bulgaria, Turkey, and Austria-Hungary were out of the war. There remained the German Empire. Deserted by her Allies, and herself being rapidly driven from France and Belgium, and with the invasion of her own country not only probable but actually impending, what would this arch-conspirator of the age, this "natural foe to liberty," at home and everywhere, what would she do, what could she do, in a world so strangely altered since Brest-Litovsk, since Château-Thierry? The handwriting on the wall was becoming larger and more legible and more terrifying. The evil days were drawing nigh for a dread accounting. What would the proud and mighty German Empire do?

GERMANY SEEKS PEACE

What she did was to make a frantic effort for peace, appealing to President Wilson to bring about a peace conference, announcing her willingness to accept the various terms he had indicated in his speeches of the year as a proper basis for the new age, reforming her government rapidly in order to meet the more obvious criticisms which foreigners had made against it as autocratic and militaristic. The outcome of these manœuvres was the elaboration by the Allies and the United States at Versailles of the terms on which they would grant an armistice. These terms were to be communicated by Marshal Foch to such a delegation as the German Government should send to receive them at a place to be indicated by the Generalissimo. On Friday morning, November 8, Marshal Foch received the German armistice delegation in a railroad car at Rethondes in France and read to them the terms agreed upon for a cessation of hostilities. They were allowed seventy-two hours in which to consult their superiors and in which to sign or reject the armistice.

Meanwhile revolution had begun in Germany. On Thursday, November 7, mutiny broke out at Kiel. Several of the German

warships were seized by the mutineers and the red flag was hoisted over them. On that and succeeding days similar movements occurred in various cities and states, and revolutionary governments, local or regional, generally headed by Socialists, were announced from various localities, with what exactness one could not tell, from Hamburg, Bremen, Tilsit, Chemnitz, Stuttgart, Brunswick, Bavaria, finally from Berlin. Reports circulated like wildfire that reigning princes were abdicating or being dethroned, that workmen's and soldiers' councils or soviets were being formed in various centers and were seizing power. Demands were being made that the Kaiser abdicate. There were all the phenomena of a breaking up of the great deep. German society was being torn by alarming dissensions, the practical unanimity of the past four years was pounding to pieces upon the jagged reefs of defeat, and defeat with discredit and dishonor. The hour of retribution had struck. There was dismay and disarray in the public mind, vacillation and poverty of counsel among the military and political leaders of the land. Moral bankruptcy, as well as material, stared the German nation in the face, that nation which had been a unit in war as long as war offered chances for aggrandizement and loot. Socialists, with the exception of a paltry few, had worked hand in glove with militarists and Pan-Germans and the assorted hosts of embattled adventurers and soldiers of fortune; they had done this for four years, the easy tools of autocracy and egregious militarism. But now this band of international plunderers was falling apart. Each was seeking safety as it might from the fast approaching storm.

On Saturday, November 9, a wireless message picked up by Paris and by London announced, to the stupefaction of the world, that the Emperor, William II, had abdicated, and that his son, the Crown Prince, Frederick William, had renounced his rights to the throne, that a Socialist, Ebert, had been made Chancellor, and that a German National Assembly would be speedily elected by universal suffrage and that the Assembly would "settle finally the future form of government of the German nation and of those peoples which might be desirous of coming within the empire."

On the following day, Sunday, the world heard that the revolution was still spreading, that Cologne cathedral was flying a red flag, that Hanover, Oldenberg, Magdeburg, Saxony and other towns and states were seething with rebellion.

On Monday Americans awoke to the screeching of whistles

and the din of bells which signified that the armistice terms had been accepted by the German Government and that "the war was over," hostilities to cease at eleven o'clock that morning, Paris time. Rushing for their morning papers they ascertained this further fact that William II, German Emperor, who for thirty years had been the most powerful monarch in the world, had fled for refuge in an automobile to Holland. Thus the Last of the Hohenzollerns made his sorry exit from the scene, having plunged the world into turmoil and tribulation indescribable, the memory of which would haunt mankind with nameless horror for decades to come, the heartless, crushing cost of which would afflict and sadden generations yet unborn.

The Armistice was signed on November 11, 1918, the very day that Americans were fighting their way into Sedan and Canadians into Mons. In truth, as another has said, a New World had been called in to redress the balance of the Old.

CHAPTER XXXVII

MAKING THE PEACE

FOR four years, three months, and more, the world had been passing through the hideous ordeal by fire. The end had come suddenly, unexpectedly, as had the beginning in 1914. The agony of uncertainty, the distress of clashing hopes and fears, the tense strain of daily, hourly anxiety, the ever-present sense of indescribable suffering and woe, now gave way to the exultation of victory, to pride in the glory of the achievement, to gratitude to those who had won it. The sacrifice had, at any rate, not been in vain. The golden hour had arrived at last, so often and so long deferred. Liberty had once more triumphed in its century-old struggle with despotism and now the opportunity had come for the spirit of freedom to inherit the earth. Civilization had hung upon the arbitrament of the sword. The unconquerable spirit of the brave had once more saved the world.

But while the worst was over in the appalling tragedy of our times, while war was no longer to slay its thousands daily and create new carnage hourly, the clearing away of the colossal wreckage of the war, the new ordering of the world after a convulsion that had affected every part of it, would, it was obvious, require much time and patience. The Allies had refused to listen for a moment to the ignoble and dangerous suggestion of a peace without victory, since such an outcome would mean nothing less than peace with defeat. "The war has ended," wrote an editor immediately after the armistice, "in the decisive victory of the free peoples of the world — the only end which could be worthy of the ideals for which they have fought and could redeem the sacrifices they have made, the only end which could enable them to build a new and better order of civilization on the ruins of the old."

Mr. Asquith, prime minister of Great Britain, had said at the very outset of the war that England would never sheathe her sword "until the military domination of Prussia" had been "wholly and finally destroyed." That end was achieved at last.

The most mighty military despotism of the world was overthrown; an overweening national pride was abased; a powerful and vainglorious monarch was a fugitive from the wrath of man; the colossal structure erected by Bismarck was in process of dissolution — such were the surprising and dramatic incidents of the closing scene, incidents calculated to impress profoundly the minds of men. In the spring of 1918 the Prussian system was on the verge of a stupendous victory; in the autumn that system crashed in utter ruin. Retribution so swift and so complete has rarely been witnessed on this earth.

“Twenty years after my death,” Bismarck once said, “I mean to rise from my coffin, to see whether Germany has stood in honor before the world.” Bismarck died in 1898. Had he returned to life in 1918 his rage would have been Homeric at the reckless incompetence of his successors, wasting, in a wild, insensate gamble, the goodly patrimony he had left them, and leaving Germany pilloried before the conscience of mankind. Long before his death, indeed, he had had a presentiment of what might be. “That young man,” he had said of the Emperor William II, “will some day play his hand, play it at the wrong time and ruin his country,” a prophecy now literally fulfilled. *World-Empire or Downfall* was the title of a notorious book, issued a few months before the Great War began, and received with enthusiasm in the Fatherland. Bernhardi, its author, was right. Downfall it was to be. And the measure of that fall was in part indicated in the terms of the armistice which Germany signed on November 11, and which constituted the first steps toward peace.

THE ARMISTICE

The first clause in this document provided for the cessation of operations by land and in the air six hours after the signature of the armistice. The second clause provided for the “immediate evacuation of invaded countries; Belgium, France, Alsace-Lorraine, Luxemburg, so ordered as to be completed within fourteen days,” the evacuated areas to be occupied by Allied and United States forces. The significance of the clause was great as it assimilated the invasion of Alsace-Lorraine, which had occurred forty-eight years before, with the invasion of Belgium, Luxemburg, and France, which had occurred four years before. In other words, the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by Germany in 1871 was an act of violence and continued as such all through

the intervening years. The lapse of time had not weakened by jot or tittle the rightful claims of France to the lost provinces. It was just and fitting that Germany should be compelled to disgorge the booty she had acquired by the same process in both wars.

Other clauses provided that Germany must surrender in good condition much war material, 5,000 heavy and field guns, 25,000 machine-guns, 3,000 bomb throwers, 1,700 airplanes; also 5,000 locomotives, 150,000 railroad cars, 5,000 motor cars; also all the German submarines and 74 German surface warships of various kinds.

German armies must evacuate all the country west of the river Rhine, which should then be occupied by Allied and United States garrisons, which should also hold the three principal crossings of the Rhine, Mayence, Coblenz, and Cologne, together with the bridgeheads and areas at these points of a radius of nearly twenty miles. East of the Rhine there was to be a neutral belt of about six miles extending from the frontier of Holland to that of Switzerland. The cost of maintaining the troops of occupation in the Rhine Province was to be charged to the German Government. Other provisions of the armistice required Germany to renounce the treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest; to withdraw all German troops immediately from territories which were formerly parts of Austria-Hungary, Roumania, Turkey; to evacuate East Africa, and to repatriate all Allied prisoners of war without the right to have her own subjects liberated from foreign prison camps. Germany must also make restitution of the Russian and Roumanian gold which she had extracted from those countries and hand this over to the Allies to be held in trust until the signature of peace. The armistice was to run thirty days and might then be extended. The purpose of these various provisions was to render it impossible for Germany to renew the war with any hope of success.

THE EXECUTION OF THE ARMISTICE

Such were the main provisions of the armistice of November 11. No sooner made than the execution began. On November 19, Marshal Pétain, leading the French army into Metz, the capital of Lorraine, and Germany's strongest fortress west of the Rhine, was received with enthusiasm by the people, welcoming back the tricolor after forty-eight years of German rule. On November 22, Strasbourg set its clocks to French time and

General Gouraud, commanding the Fourth Army of France, made his triumphal entry, amid frenzied acclamations. Even Germans were forced to recognize the actual situation, so unmistakable was the expression of Alsatian feeling, now that the opportunity for expression had arrived. The *Cologne Gazette*, learning of the reception accorded the French when they entered Colmar and Saverne and Wissembourg and other Alsatian towns, said: "It is better not to deceive ourselves with illusions. The hatred of Germany shows itself all through Alsace with the violence of a hurricane. The French are received, in a delirium of enthusiasm, as true liberators."

Not only were Alsace and Lorraine thus recovered for France, in one of the most dramatic climaxes of history, but by the terms of the armistice the Allied armies had the right to occupy the Prussian Rhine Province and the left bank and the main crossings of the river. Accordingly three armies of occupation moved forward, the English to the north establishing themselves in Cologne, the Americans farther south and with their center in Coblenz, the French south of them, with their headquarters in Mayence. The last German soldier was withdrawn beyond the Rhine and Allied soldiers passed over it at the three places named in order to hold the bridgeheads and the surrounding areas.

While this systematic operation was proceeding on land, an event of profound significance was occurring on the sea. On November 18 the German fleet virtually surrendered to the Allied fleets, about fifty miles east of the Firth of Forth. Nearly four hundred warships of the Allies witnessed this event, having formed in two long columns six miles apart, between which moved the German ships. Naval history records no triumph as complete as this. The second naval power of the world, the proud creation of William II and modern Germany, had ceased to be, its ships forced to haul down their flags in the presence of the enemy and to be interned in a British harbor. Germany's sea power was at an end, nor was it likely that it would soon be permitted to revive and to disturb again the peace of the world. The German navy had won few laurels and its end was ignominious. It was now interned in British waters. Over seventy battleships had preferred abject humiliation to a test in battle. "The German flag," Admiral Beatty informed the German Admiral von Reuter, "is to be hauled down at sunset to-day, and is not to be hoisted again without permission."

THE PROBLEMS IN MAKING PEACE

An armistice is a mere suspension of hostilities. It is the first step toward peace, yet it does not always lead to peace. An armistice is concluded quickly under the pressure of circumstances with but little time for deliberation. A peace, however, if it is to be enduring and particularly after a war that has swept the whole world within its destructive range, must be the product of long consideration and reflection. It can hardly be hurried and yet hurried it is likely to be, necessarily, because of the general desire for the speedy resumption of the normal activities of life, and also because delay allows time for the dangerous development of all those revolutionary passions and appetites, those forces of discontent and disintegration which are often loosened and accentuated by war. After the uncertainties and hazards of war must come the certainties and assurances of peace. Moreover, as the iron must be hammered into shape when hot, so the changes effected by war must be speedily clinched and codified, before those who dislike those changes have recovered sufficiently to be able to oppose and block them. Otherwise what was won by the fighters may be lost by the peace-makers.

Thus after the armistice of November 11 and after the execution of its immediate provisions for the weakening of the enemy, the internment of his fleet, the occupation of a part of his land, men turned toward the far more difficult work of making peace.

On examination, how amazingly complicated the task! The variety and gravity of the problems demanding solution far exceeded those of the Congress of Vienna. Those problems fell naturally into several main classes although those classes were not mutually exclusive but were, on the contrary, extraordinarily intertwined with each other. There was first the problem of Germany. Germany must pay, both in territory and in reparations, for the enormous injuries she had done the world. It would be only just if she were to pay the entire cost of the war, yet that would be practically impossible since the war had cost all the nations probably two hundred billions of dollars. But that part of this colossal burden which was not to be borne by Germany must be borne by those upon whom she had forced the war, and for which the latter were not responsible. No "healing peace" could be made with Germany, because such a peace would be flagrantly immoral and unjust. The burden of paying for this German-made war must be placed squarely upon

the shoulders of Germany, as far as that was humanly possible. But the determination of this very point presented great difficulties of detail. An additional difficulty lay in the fact that the fall of the Empire had left Germany in political chaos, rival groups struggling for the control hitherto exercised by the now fugitive William of Hohenzollern.

This struggle and the steps taken by the new government that emerged from it to reorganize Germany will be described in a later chapter.

But the reorganization of Germany, important as it might be, was only one of a long series of measures that would have to be taken before the world could know once more even relative peace of mind. The general problem of European reconstruction presented innumerable aspects, bristled with innumerable difficulties, aroused the most varied hopes and fears. A mere catalogue of the changes introduced and of the questions raised by the world-wide war would be both extensive and disheartening, so great would be the labor necessary to bring order out of chaos, so essential would be unprecedented stores of wisdom and good-will. An adequate survey of these questions is impossible here, but one or two of them may be considered.

Take, for example, the question of national boundaries. In only a few cases could the boundaries of the future be the same as those of the past. From the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains, from Archangel to Salonica, changes in political frontiers had been effected by events and must be recognized in practice. A few nations might emerge unaltered from the alchemy of the war, Spain and Portugal, for example, Switzerland, Norway, and possibly Sweden. But where else was there another European state that would issue from the impending readjustment unchanged? The boundaries of the British Empire, of France, of Germany, of Austria and Hungary, of Italy and Russia, of Serbia and Greece and Roumania and Bulgaria, of Albania and the Turkish Empire, all these must be sketched anew. For the dividing lines of the past had joined the snows of yesteryear. The boundaries of Belgium and Holland and Luxemburg and Denmark must perhaps undergo rectifications. One thing at least was certain. The map of Europe on which we had been brought up had passed forever into the limbo of discarded things and men must begin forthwith to familiarize themselves with the features of a new, strange map. .

And they must become familiar, not only with a new Europe but with a new Africa and a new Asia and a new Pacific Ocean

as well, for German colonies and large parts of the Turkish Empire were destined to pass into other hands.

The territorial problems confronting the world in 1919 had a far wider sweep than those that existed a century earlier upon the downfall of Napoleon. They arose in large measure from the fact that a war begun for the extinction of one small state, Serbia, had resulted, not in that extinction, but in the destruction of three great empires, Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey, and in the defeat of a fourth, Germany, and the overthrow of its twenty-two monarchs. Meanwhile Serbia had emerged from the colossal wreckage covered with glory, stronger than ever in its national integrity, and destined to a great enlargement of its territory. It is doubtful if the history of the world contains a more ironical page.

Russia, Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Turkey, in 1914, bulked large on the map: Russia, 8,400,000 square miles, or one-seventh of the land surface of the globe; Austria-Hungary, 261,000; Germany, 208,000; Turkey, 710,000, or three and a half times as many as the German Empire; in all, 9,579,000 square miles, or more than three times the continental area of the United States, excluding Alaska, and with a population of two hundred and fifty millions. The Congress of Vienna had a small area and a population of thirty-two millions to provide for as the result of the Napoleonic wars, namely the Duchy of Warsaw, which was only a part of former Poland, parts of Germany on the left bank of the Rhine, and the Italian peninsula.

In all this area of more than 9,000,000 square miles, supporting a population of a quarter of a billion, no man, at the close of the Great War, could point out the boundaries. They had been burned away in the consuming heat of the fray. What should be put in their places remained to be seen. That the drawing of the new map would prove a highly contentious matter was certain beyond peradventure.

One thing the victors of the war were committed to, namely the recognition of two new states, Czecho-Slovakia and Jugoslavia, and the restoration of an old state, Poland. The first of these would consist of territories formerly belonging to Austria and Hungary; the second would consist of Serbia and Montenegro and territories formerly Austro-Hungarian; the third, of territories which for well over a century had been ruled over by Russia, Prussia, and Austria.

Such were a few of the outstanding territorial problems created by the war, and there were many others, which must receive

solution speedily, if peace was to be secured. In most cases the problems were intricate, in some obscure, in all sure to arouse the most heated passions. There was no remotest possibility that they could be settled amicably and in such a way as to leave no ill-feeling. They constituted the very stuff of which resentments and hatreds are made. Nevertheless settled they must be in one way or another.

WORLD PROBLEMS

Not only must Germany be forced to pay for the criminal destruction she had wrought in the war, not only must most of the frontiers of Europe be redrawn, not only must several new states be erected and guaranteed, but the economic development of these new states must be assured as well. Arrangements assuring peace, security, and good government must be devised for the vast territories severed from the Turkish Empire and for the former German colonies; for Armenia, Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia, for Constantinople, for the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. Moreover, the future of Russia, of China, of Persia, comprising a third of the population of the world, must be based upon sound institutions, or the peace of the world would be indeed unstable. Again, the whole body of international law, flouted by the Central Powers in this most lawless of wars, must be painfully and laboriously reconstructed anew, for unless nations know their rights and duties, unless they respect them and insist that they be respected by others, international relations rest on sand, and humanity is at the mercy of force and guile.

In short, in whatever direction one might turn in surveying the world on the morrow of the armistice, one could see only a tangle of thorny questions demanding answers, a profusion of perplexing problems of every description, and the prevalence of passions little propitious for a speedy issue out of all these troubles. Four years of world war had accumulated a staggering mass of unfinished business which the peace-makers must now confront, and through which they must hew their way, though dangers manifold should encompass them about on every side. The mere task of feeding the world was formidable, pressing, and acute, and the necessary means and methods hard, if not impossible, to find. In no country in the world was the economic life of the people normal or healthy; in many countries it was highly abnormal, sadly shattered and deranged. Agriculture, the basic industry, manufacturing, trade and commerce, all had been

severely damaged and dislocated by the war. A large fraction of the working population had been drawn from industry and commerce into the armies of the combatants. Less food was produced at a time when more was needed. Markets had been lost or changed. Gradually, under the inexorable pressure of the war, industry had been brought more and more under the control of the state and directed toward serving the needs of war. Business had been increasingly diverted from private to public control.

With peace would come demobilization, the return of millions of men to their homes, seeking their places again in the economic life of the various nations. Other millions would be thrown out of work by the fact that the great war industries, the munition plants, the ship-yards, the various supply services, would now be obliged to curtail production as rapidly as possible. Women had been employed in enormous numbers in place of the men who had gone to the fighting line.

Now an infinite number of such personal readjustments must be made. Herculean were the tasks confronting the governments. They must so order this necessary transition in the economic world from a war basis to a peace basis that there should not be a general outbreak of industrial strife in place of the prolonged and desperate armed strife of the last four years. The relations of capital and labor, always delicate and difficult of adjustment, might easily become more troublesome than ever. The existence and the urgent character of these numerous economic problems would enormously increase the burden resting upon the governments of the various countries, and that too at a time when international affairs of the greatest variety and gravity were likely to occupy their attention and challenge to the utmost their ability. But the war had been a people's war and the domestic interests of the masses must be taken into account, in determining the foreign policies of the governments. Internal and external affairs could not be separated into compartments and treated consecutively. They were intertwined, and government programmes must have simultaneously in mind both sets of interests, those of the masses of the population as well as those of the countries as wholes and as members of the family of nations. It might well prove in practice that the vastly increased responsibilities resting upon statesmen in so troubled and critical a period of history would exceed their powers as human beings and that their achievements in each of the two great spheres of activity, home affairs, foreign affairs, would

fall far short of the hopes and expectations of their constituents, and of themselves.

This was all the more likely to happen since extravagant hopes and expectations had unquestionably been aroused by loose talkers and writers, since programmes of reconstruction had been hastily brought forward in abundance whose realization in definite and concrete reforms could only be accomplished in years, if not in decades, if indeed they could ever be accomplished.

Many were the discordant noises, all declaring that they were the authentic voices of the people but frequently sounding suspiciously like the voices of special classes. In the very multiplicity of counselors, inevitable, it may be, in an age of democracy and a prolific printing press, lay the seed of much confusion and also of much future disappointment.

A LEAGUE OF NATIONS

One of the ideas which had been discussed during the war was that of a new international organization, which should be designed and empowered to prevent the recurrence of such a hideous catastrophe as that which was then devastating and desolating the world and which inevitably would leave a heavy, heartless heritage of sorrow and of debt behind it. The old organization, or as the critics preferred to say, the old disorganization of the nations had broken down and was utterly discredited. It must be discarded forever. Any attempt to set it up again after the tornado had passed must be defeated. The nations must not be allowed to relapse into their former habits and methods, habits and methods that had led straight to bankruptcy. The old diplomacy, with its alliances, frequently secret, with its intrigues, with its general irresponsibility to the people whose destinies it assumed to control, must give way to a new diplomacy, open and above the board, dedicated to the task of eliminating jealousies, rivalries, and hatreds and of introducing and encouraging the spirit of friendliness and co-operation among the nations. Particularly must war be outlawed. The phrase that this was "a war to end war" became current, as did also the words, "never again." Both expressed the determination to annihilate once for all this immemorial curse of mankind.

This indignant and passionate resolve to find a better way to settle international difficulties in the future than had ever been found in the past enlisted the support of many men in France

and England and America. Societies were formed in those countries for the purpose of arousing public opinion to the feasibility as well as the desirability of a new organization of human society which should serve the interests of mankind, should express the conscience of mankind. In the United States the League to Enforce Peace was founded in Independence Hall in Philadelphia in June, 1915, with Ex-President Taft as president. In the following year President Wilson gave it as his opinion that, "When the great present war is over, it will be the duty of America to join with the other nations of the world in some kind of a league for the maintenance of peace." This thought was quite in line with long-existing aspirations of the American people, as shown in their enthusiastic advocacy, at the Hague Conferences, of peaceful methods in adjusting international contentions and in the approval they had often given to the principle of arbitration.

But a league of nations that could prevent war or even render it less probable could not remain a mere aspiration; it must be translated into a definite organization, with definite powers and obligations, and with a machinery for achieving its lofty purpose. It might easily happen that when the attempt should be made to embody the aspiration in a concrete institution, grave and perhaps insuperable difficulties would arise. No two persons might agree, much less two nations, as to the practical means whereby the aspiration could be realized. To desire a constitution is one thing; to draft it is quite another thing, and much more arduous; and to get the draft accepted by those who are to be bound by it may be something more formidable still. The cause would not be aided by those uncritical and enthusiastic advocates who wrote and spoke as if only a league of nations were needed in order to realize the dreams of poets and seers throughout the ages, of peace on earth, good-will to all. A lush sentimentalism, expressed in high-sounding phrases, would not help things along very far, but would, on the contrary, be likely to do more harm than good.

Such, then, were some of the elements in the general situation revealed by the suspension of hostilities in November, 1918. Humanity had narrowly escaped a great and terrible doom. It had passed through an intense strain of desperate endeavor; it had hovered long over the brink of failure and disaster. In the end it had achieved an astounding victory. Despotism had challenged liberty for the control of the world and despotism had gone under. Reigning houses that had ruled for centuries and

that had held the world in awe had been scattered like chaff before an avenging wind. Hohenzollern, Hapsburg, Romanoff thrones had crashed to earth and all their satellites of petty kings and princes had run madly for cover, thinking themselves happy if they escaped with their lives to Holland or Switzerland. Monarchies became republics overnight throughout central and eastern Europe. Autocracies yielded to democracies. Peoples, little accustomed by their previous experience or training to govern themselves, were now forced to do so, or to yield to new forms of oppression and misrule. The dictatorship of self-appointed radicals might be as ruinous to domestic happiness and to foreign peace as the old dictatorships of divine-right monarchs had been. Nationalistic, racial, social, economic questions surged up in every direction.

It was in a world like this that the Allies who had won the war prepared to meet, in order to confer upon and to determine the terms of peace which they would offer their defeated enemies. Having agreed among themselves what those terms should be they would then submit them to the latter for acceptance. Only after the necessary treaties had been made and ratified could the war be considered at an end; only then could the work of reconstruction be seriously begun.

The function of the Peace Conference was of course to make peace with Germany but did its members approach their task with any definite ideas as to what that peace ought to be? Had they any programme, any body of principles, any chart and compass, to guide them in their work? Had they given any pledges, had they limited their freedom of action by preliminary agreements among themselves or with their enemies?

In a way and to a certain extent they had. The Germans in asking for an armistice had accepted the terms laid down by the President of the United States "in his address of January 8 and his subsequent addresses on the foundation of a permanent peace of justice." President Wilson's various utterances delivered in 1918 therefore have a direct bearing upon the making of the Treaty. Accepted with certain reservations by the Allies it was understood that they would form the basis of negotiations. The speech of January 8 was the most outstanding of the President's pronouncements. In it he laid down "Fourteen Points" as "the programme of the world's peace," the "only possible programme, as we see it." A month later on February 11, he made another speech in which he laid down "Four Principles"; on July 4 one setting forth "Four Ends"; and on September

27 one stating "Five Particulars." Thus there were at least twenty-seven points or items in the President's programme for peace, which, he asserted, was America's programme. It is quite impossible to summarize them here. Some were quite precise, some quite vague. Some appeared to conflict with others and some were, by November, 1918, no longer relevant to the situation, so rapidly had events moved in that memorable year. But however uncertain and sketchy they were in some respects, they had been accepted as the basis of negotiation by both sides, neither of which was any too confident as to what they meant, for points apparently precise were seen, on examination, to be susceptible of different interpretations.¹ But each side hoped for the best.

¹ The Fourteen Points, succinctly stated, were as follows: (1) "Open covenants of peace openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view." (2) "Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas . . . alike in peace and in war." (3) "The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace." (4) "Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety." (5) "A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims based upon . . . the interests of the populations concerned which must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined." (6) "The evacuation of all Russian territory. . . ." (7) "Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations . . . without this healing act the whole structure and validity of International Law is forever impaired." (8) "All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored . . . and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine . . . should be righted." (9) "Readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be affected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality." (10) "The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development." (11) "Roumania, Serbia and Montenegro should be evacuated . . . Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea, and the relations of the several Balkan states to one another determined along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality. . . ." (12) "Nationalities under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened" to all nations under international guarantees. (13) "An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea. . . ." (14) "A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike."

The place chosen for the Peace Conference was appropriately Paris, which Meredith once called "the goddess of the lightning brain," "valiant unto death for a principle" and which had been the nerve-center of the Allied cause, the throbbing heart of the coalition, from the first day to the last of the racking struggle. The first session of the Conference of Paris was held on January 18, 1919, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This formal meeting had been arranged by the Inter-Allied Supreme War Council and by the representatives of the five Great Powers, which had decided, among other things, the number of representatives that each state should have at the Conference. The United States, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan were to have five delegates apiece, and the British Dominions and India were also to be represented, two delegates each from Australia, Canada, South Africa, and India and one delegate from New Zealand; Brazil was given three delegates; Belgium, China, Greece, Poland, Portugal, the Czecho-Slovak Republic, Roumania, and Serbia two delegates each; Montenegro, Siam, Cuba, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay one delegate each. This would make an assembly of about seventy members. While the larger states were given a larger representation, each state was to have but a single vote. This preliminary distribution of delegates was almost immediately altered, owing to the protests of Belgium and Serbia which had fought and suffered from the first day of the war to the last and which now found themselves allotted only two representatives, whereas Brazil, which had not actually fought at all, had three. Belgium and Serbia were forthwith given three apiece and the new Kingdom of the Hedjaz was given two.

President Wilson decided to attend the Conference in person, thus departing from the previous practice of the government. The chief reasons prompting this unprecedented action was his intense desire to secure a league of nations and to see that the peace in general should conform to his principles. If the latter needed interpretation, who would be a more authorized and official interpreter than himself? He appointed as associates on the American delegation, Secretary of State Lansing, Colonel Edward M. House, Mr. Henry White, and General Tasker Bliss. The Prime Ministers and Foreign Secretaries of England, France, Italy attended: namely Lloyd George, Balfour, Clemenceau, Pichon, Orlando, Sonnino. The Prime Ministers of several British Dominions also attended as did those of Serbia and

Greece and Roumania, Pachitch and Venizelos and Bratiano. Belgium sent her Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hymans; Czecho-Slovakia sent Kramar; Poland, Dmowski; and many other men of importance and distinction were among the delegates.

The Conference was opened by President Poincaré of France in a masterly address. "Forty-eight years ago to-day," he said, "on the 18th of January, 1871, the German Empire was proclaimed by an army of invasion in the Palace of Versailles. It was consecrated by the theft of two French provinces. It was thus, from the very moment of its origin, a negation of right and, by the fault of its founders, it was born in injustice. It has ended in opprobrium.

"You are assembled in order to repair the evil that has been done and to prevent a recurrence of it. You hold in your hand the future of the world."

M. Clemenceau was unanimously elected president of the Conference. Subsequently committees were constituted to investigate the great subjects which would require settlement and to report; committees on Responsibility for the War, on Reparations, on International Labor Legislation, on Regulation of Ports, Waterways and Railroads, and on a League of Nations. Of the last of these President Wilson was made chairman, he having announced that his main interest in the work of the Conference was centered in the League of Nations and having emphasized the importance of it in various speeches delivered in France, England, and Italy before the opening of the Conference. Commissions were also appointed on the various territorial problems.

THE CONFERENCE OF PARIS

The Conference of Paris, thus formally opened on January 18, 1919, continued in session throughout the year. The tasks confronting it were so varied, so difficult, and so complicated, and any solutions that might be reached fraught with consequences so grave, that necessarily progress could be made only slowly, if it were to be made wisely. Decisions so momentous for the future as these would inevitably be must be the product of long and mature consideration or they would leave the world in a worse welter than that in which it already found itself. Time was of the very essence of the problem, time to study every suggestion comprehensively and minutely, time to make innumerable adjustments between conflicting plans and interests, time to distil a reasonable unity of agreement from the daily clash of

many minds, time, also, to feel the way into the unknown and the untried, for in much of its necessary work the Conference would be without light or guidance from the past. Yet, and this was the stern paradox of the situation, time was the very thing which the world could least afford to grant unstintingly, for its most urgent need was to begin immediately the stupendous work of rehabilitation, to resume speedily its normal activities and to increase their pace, if body and soul were to be held together. European society, battered and shattered by the agony of the long struggle, impoverished in every way beyond the possibility of calculation, might easily disintegrate still further, might indeed break up into warring factions driven by elemental passions, unless it could quickly concentrate its attention upon the problem of recovery. Thus, circumstances being what they were, the Conference was compelled to work under unfavorable conditions.

The inner history of the Conference of Paris cannot now be written with any assurance of accuracy or completeness. Much of what went on within its councils and committees is veiled in utter secrecy. The records kept of its proceedings have not been published or have appeared only in fragmentary or conjectural or perhaps interested reports, difficult to control.

But a few things may be stated, of a quite general nature. And one is this, that as far as the procedure of the Conference was concerned history repeated itself in a very striking way. There had been, especially in America, much eloquent denunciation of the Congress of Vienna and President Wilson had made himself the spokesman of this indignation and had demanded a new diplomacy which should operate frankly and in the sight of all, should make only "open covenants, openly arrived at." But this was not to be. As a matter of fact the procedure of the Conference conformed, in this respect, quite closely to that of the Congress of Vienna. To be sure the former had several plenary sessions to which the press was admitted, whereas the latter had no general sessions. But the public meetings of the Conference were merely full-dress parades or, at best, only formally ratified decisions reached elsewhere. The real work of the Conference, as of the Congress, was done in numerous committees, in informal conversations, and in the secret sessions of the representatives of the Great Powers, the "Big Five," or the "Big Four" with Japan left out, or the "Big Three" with both Japan and Italy missing. Only fragmentary records of these meetings have been given to the world.

THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES

The immediate and pressing duty of the Conference was to draw up the terms of peace which were to be offered Germany. This must necessarily precede everything else. After several months of investigation and discussion agreement was reached and the result was the draft of a treaty, the longest on record, a treaty which would fill a volume of two hundred pages. This was submitted, on May 7, 1919, to the representatives of the German Government, sent to Versailles to receive it. There was to be no direct and oral negotiation between the German delegates and the members of the Conference, but the former were given a certain length of time in which to study the document and to make in writing whatever suggestions they might care to. In due course they submitted arguments and counter propositions which filled a volume not much smaller than the original draft. Most of these propositions were rejected by the Conferees, a few changes were made to meet the German objections, and the amended treaty was then returned to them on June 16. Acceptance was required by June 23, under threat of a renewal of war and the invasion of Germany. On the last day of this stated period the German National Assembly at Weimar passed, by a vote of 237 to 138, a resolution to the effect that "the National Assembly agrees to the signature of peace." On June 28 the Treaty of Versailles was signed by Dr. Hermann Müller, German Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Dr. Johannes Bell, and by the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers, the Chinese delegation refusing to sign as a protest against the Shantung award which will be described later. This historic event occurred in the same Hall of Mirrors in the Palace of Versailles where forty-eight years before the German Empire had been proclaimed. Time had brought its complete revenge. By an appropriate coincidence the Treaty of Versailles was signed on the 28th of June, the fifth anniversary of the assassination of the Austrian Archduke, Francis Ferdinand, at Sarajevo, which had been made to have such amazing and lamentable consequences.

THE COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

The first part of the Treaty of Versailles provides for the creation of a League of Nations. The League is to consist, at the outset, of two classes of states, first, the original signatories

of the treaty, thirty-two in all, and secondly, certain others, thirteen in number, which are to become members on acceptance of the invitation to join.¹ It will be noted at once that the Central Allies, Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, Turkey, were not included in the League, nor was Russia nor any of the states which had recently claimed independence from Russia; nor is Mexico to be found among those invited to accede. Provision is made for the admission of new members by a two-thirds vote of the Assembly, and for the withdrawal from the League of any member, after having given a two years' notice, "provided that all its international obligations and all its obligations under this Covenant shall have been fulfilled at the time of its withdrawal."

The chief bodies created by this Covenant for the accomplishment of the purpose of the League are an Assembly and a Council, the latter being, as will be seen, far the more important. Every member of the League is to be represented in the Assembly and may have three representatives, or fewer if it desires. Each state has, however, but one vote. There is thus equality of voting power among all the members, whether large or small. It should be noted that in the Assembly the British Empire has collectively six votes, for, in addition to the single vote allotted to the Empire as a whole, five of the constituent members of that empire have each a separate vote, namely, Canada, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand, and India.

The Council, on the other hand, represents, not the theoretical and assumed equality of states, but their actual and obvious

¹ *Original Members of the League*

United States of America	New Zealand	Hedjaz	Poland
Belgium	India	Honduras	Portugal
Bolivia	China	Italy	Roumania
Brazil	Cuba	Japan	Serb-Croat-Slovene State
British Empire	Ecuador	Liberia	Siam
Canada	France	Nicaragua	Czecho-Slovakia
Australia	Greece	Panama	Uruguay
South Africa	Guatemala	Peru	
	Haiti		

States Invited to Accede

Argentine Republic	Denmark	Persia	Sweden
Chili	Netherlands	Salvador	Switzerland
Colombia	Norway	Spain	Venezuela
	Paraguay		

inequality. It is intended to be at the outset a small body of nine, and five of the nine shall always be the British Empire, the United States, France, Italy, and Japan. In addition to these five there shall be four others to be selected by the Assembly "from time to time in its discretion." Until the Assembly is organized and makes its first selection the Covenant itself determines that these four shall be Belgium, Brazil, Spain, and Greece. Each state represented on the Council is to have one vote and may not have more than one delegate. Provision is made for the possible enlargement of the two classes of members that compose the Council, the permanent and the temporary. Any member of the League, not a member of the Council, may, however, be represented on the Council whenever any matter is under consideration which specially affects its interests. Nothing is said as to who shall decide as to whether that case has arisen. Presumably, therefore, it is for the Council itself to decide, not the state which considers itself affected.

The Council shall meet as occasion may require and at least once a year. No such definite requirement exists in the case of the Assembly, which shall meet "at stated intervals and from time to time as occasion may require." Who is to decide as to whether the occasion has arisen is not stated. Both Council and Assembly may deal at their meetings "with any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world." This is a charter as liberal as the wind, since the history of the past appears to show that almost anything may, under favoring conditions, affect the peace of the world. Except where otherwise expressly provided in the Covenant or in the other articles of the Treaty all decisions, either in the Council or in the Assembly, must have the unanimous vote of those present, a provision which enables any state, even the smallest and most insignificant, to exercise a veto. Obstruction is easy, as unanimity is generally hard to obtain among any considerable body of human beings.

The seat of the League is to be Geneva, but the Council may at any time establish it elsewhere. There is to be a Secretary General, appointed by the Council with the approval of the majority of the Assembly. A Secretariat, as elaborate as shall be needed, shall be established, to preserve the archives, conduct the correspondence and discharge the clerical work of the League, its expenses to be apportioned among the members of the League.

As the motive force behind the creation of the League was the desire to find some method of maintaining peace and preventing

war, as this is, indeed, the avowed purpose of this organization, the clauses of the Covenant bearing upon this matter are the supreme features of the document, are, in fact, its very pith and marrow. Facile idealists had iterated and reiterated in every strain that this was the last war, the war to end war. If this consummation devoutly to be wished were to be attained it must be through the League; and both before the Covenant was drawn up and after it had been completed it was recommended by its sponsors either as actually assuring this end or as going a long way toward it.

THE PROBLEM OF DISARMAMENT

The supposed causes of war or kinds of contention that have been wont to lead to it in the past are treated in various ways. The swollen armaments of Europe have been regarded, at least for a full generation, as a menace to peace, an incitement to war, and the First Conference of the Hague in 1899 attempted, unavailingly, to restrict their growth, to reduce their size. Now, after the most devastating war in history, the problem is again approached and the Covenant devotes an article to it. And that article says that the Council of the League shall formulate plans for the reduction of armaments for the consideration and action of the several Governments, that after these plans shall have been adopted by the several Governments the limits therein fixed shall not be exceeded without the consent of the Council. The Governments shall also consider how the evil effects attendant upon the private manufacture of munitions can be abated and are to exchange frankly and fully with each other information as to military and naval programmes.

Under this article it is possible to bring about a reduction of armaments, just as it has been possible to bring it about by international agreement at any time during the past twenty years, and no more possible now than then. It cannot be said that the Conference of Paris has treated this problem any more effectually than did either of the Conferences at The Hague. It does little more than point out once more the well-known gravity of the problem and promise to study it. Indeed one of its stipulations may tend to impede rather than to further the process of reduction. While the Council is to formulate plans for reduction, no state is obliged to accept those plans. But if a given state does accept them, then it can never in the future increase the size of its army or its navy or its air-service beyond the limits thus

fixed and accepted, without the permission of the Council, giving its unanimous consent. Thus if the Council should recommend for the United States an army of 500,000 men and the United States should agree, then, no matter how grave or desperate the emergency, the United States could not increase its army without the permission of the eight other states, be they European, Asiatic, or American, that are its colleagues on the Council.

THE PREVENTION OF WAR

This is, however, but one aspect of the general problem of the maintenance of peace, and one of the lesser aspects. More important than the reduction of armaments is the prevention or discouragement of their use. If a nation can be impressed with the fact that it is more likely to lose a war which it begins than it is to win it, fewer wars will be begun. This thought was borne in mind by the makers of the Covenant. Article X aims emphatically to give this impression. The war has created several new states and altered the boundaries of many old ones. Article X says, apropos of this: "The members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all the members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled." The obligation of every member of the League is as explicit as any obligation can be, the promise is clear and binding to respect and to preserve the territorial integrity and the existing political independence of all the members of the League. While, apparently, the Council only "advises" as to the actual steps to be taken in any given case, the obligation to respect and to preserve has been assumed by all and must be lived up to, otherwise this article is but a scrap of paper. The Conference of Paris put this article into the Covenant in order to throw an impregnable buttress around the entire Treaty by plainly warning any would-be disturber of the peace that if it should attack any member of the League it would be confronted by all the members of the League. With such an imposing array pledged to block its purpose, it might consider discretion the better part of valor, and desist in time. Of course this guarantee could only exercise this sobering effect if it was really believed by the would-be warring state that it would be actually enforced by the

members of the League, that, in other words, the latter were sincere and resolute in making their promises.

But the League aspires to prevent wars by adjusting international disputes before they reach the point of explosion. Any war or threat of war whether immediately affecting any of the members of the League or not is declared a matter of concern to the entire League. On the request of any member the Council shall be summoned and may take any action it may deem wise to preserve the peace. Any member may also at any time bring to the attention of the Council or the Assembly any circumstance whatever which threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends. The thought here is that misunderstandings, if freely and fully discussed, are frequently smoothed away, which is true, but it is also unhappily true that discussion often sharpens and envenoms differences of opinion.

By another clause the members of the League agree that if any dispute shall arise between them likely to lead to a rupture, they will submit the matter either to arbitration or to inquiry by the Council and that they will in no case resort to war until three months after the award of the arbitrators or the report of the Council. This clause, if observed, will prevent sudden attacks and allow peacemakers a reasonable time to attempt to adjust the difficulty. Had Austria followed such a procedure the war of 1914 would not have burst so suddenly upon the world and might indeed have been entirely avoided. This clause does not prevent war, since after the stated time has elapsed, the parties to the dispute may commence hostilities, but there is less likelihood of their doing so, owing to the intervention of this cooling-off period. The members also agree that certain questions of a justiciable nature, as distinct from questions of national policy, shall be submitted to a court, either one agreed upon by the parties to the dispute or the Permanent Court of International Justice to be established by the League. Disputes as to the interpretation of a treaty, or as to any question of international law would come within this category. If one of the parties accepts the award of the court, the members of the League will not make war upon it, but if one declines to accept it, the Council shall propose the steps that shall then be taken.

If there should arise between members of the League any dispute likely to lead to a rupture which is not submitted to arbitration, the members agree to submit it to the Council, which shall

investigate the matter and attempt to effect a settlement. If the Council fails it shall publish a report concerning the facts in the case and containing its recommendations, so that the world may judge and the pressure of public opinion may be brought to bear upon the uncomplying party or parties to the conflict. If the report of the Council is unanimous, exclusive of the members representing the parties to the dispute, the members of the League will not go to war with the party complying with its recommendations. If it is not unanimous, then the members shall take such action as they shall consider necessary.

Such a dispute shall be transferred from the Council to the Assembly in case either party to the dispute requests it.

Thus we see that the members of the League agree not to go to war without first submitting their disputes to one form or another of investigation or arbitration. They do not agree necessarily to accept the results of the arbitration, nor do the other members of the League not parties to the quarrel agree to force them to. They merely reserve the right to act as they see fit. Here, then, is no prohibition of war; but, if war comes, it must come only after a certain period of time. It must not come precipitately.

THE USE OF ECONOMIC WEAPONS

But supposing any member of the League disregards its obligations, breaks its promise to allow an investigation or arbitration, and begins a war in the good old way, summarily. What happens then? Something quite important, as laid down in Article XVI. The offending state shall *ipso facto* be deemed to have committed an act of war not merely against its enemy, but against all the other members of the League as well; and those other members "hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all intercourse between their nations and the nationals of the covenant-breaking state, and the prevention of all financial, commercial, or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking state and the nationals of any other state, whether a member of the League or not." Here is a tremendous force, if applied, and applied it must be "immediately" if the members of the League are to keep their promises. This is the economic pressure about which the world has heard so much recently as a preventive of war. In addition the Council must recommend to the several governments concerned what effective military, naval, or air contingents the members of the League

shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League.

In other words the economic pressure must come, it appears, instantly, and the nations have no right to delay or to discuss their obligations. These obligations are explicit and peremptory. Whether they have any right to refuse the military force that the Council shall subsequently "recommend" is not clear.

Similar provisions look toward investigation and arbitration, in the case of disputes between states not members of the League, or between such states and those states that are members. And it is agreed that if a state outside the League begins a war upon one within, without first observing the procedure described, then Article XVI, that is, the economic boycott and possible war, shall be applied to that state by all the members of the League.

There are other clauses in this Covenant than those which have been described. Their purpose is the same, the maintenance of peace by the elimination of the causes of war. As, in the opinion of its framers, secret diplomacy has caused many wars in the past, secret diplomacy must be abolished. Henceforth there must be no private arrangements between various powers, but every treaty or international engagement entered into hereafter must be forthwith registered with the Secretary of the League and published, else it shall not be binding; and all such engagements hitherto made, if inconsistent with the terms of the Covenant, must be abrogated. But says Article XXI: "Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace."

As territorial greed and colonial rivalries have been prolific causes of war in the past the Covenant sets up a new system for disposing of the lands that have fallen into the hands of the Allies as a result of the war, such as the German colonies and Turkish territories. These are not to be divided up among the victors as spoils, but are to be regarded as held in trust for the benefit of the peoples concerned. The various areas are to be intrusted by the League to various members of the League under mandates setting forth the degree and kind of authority that they may exercise, guaranteeing certain rights to the natives, and requiring annual reports from the mandatories. The mandates may vary according to the community. But these vast stretches of the earth are not to be annexed to the colonial

empire of any state. They are to be held in tutelage by the League of Nations until such time as they may be able to stand alone. The conduct of any mandatory in the administration of the territory assigned to it is subject to the supervision of the League, that is, to the enlightened opinion of the world. The method by which this supervision and control shall be carried out is vital to the success of the new system.

Such are the main provisions of the Covenant which announces a new experiment in international affairs. The Covenant may be amended at any time by a unanimous vote of the Council and by a majority of the Assembly.

INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION

There was another feature of the Treaty of Versailles which was intended as a sort of companion piece to the Covenant and which provided for another international agency which was to work in close connection with the League of Nations, as an International Labor Organization, to consist of all the states forming the League of Nations. It was hoped and expected that this organization would, by bringing about international co-operation in the industrial sphere, contribute to social peace and therefore to the peace of the world. The commission which drafted the labor clauses of the Treaty of Versailles was presided over by an American, Samuel Gompers, and counted among its members such leaders in the labor movement as Barnes of England and Vandervelde of Belgium. Part XIII of the Treaty represents the work of the commission. It provides for an International Labor Conference and an International Labor Bureau. The Conference is to meet annually and is to draw up agreements for regulating and improving industrial conditions. These agreements are to be put in the form of "draft conventions" and "recommendations" which each member-state is required to lay before the proper legislative body within eighteen months, but which are to become binding only when accepted and enacted by that body. The final decision, therefore, in all such matters, rests with the government or legislature of each country. There is therefore no super-parliament and no compulsion save what may lie in the pressure of public opinion in each instance. The Conference is composed of four delegates from each country, two representing the government and two representing employers' and workingmen's associations. In other words the state and capital and labor are to collaborate in this labor parliament

whose powers are merely advisory. The first International Labor Conference was held in Washington in 1919; the second in Genoa in 1920; the third and fourth in Geneva in 1921 and 1922.

The International Labor Bureau, consisting of experts, recruited from different countries, is the permanent working member of this organization, preparing meetings, conducting investigations, making reports, publishing the results of its inquiries, and acting, in general, as a clearing-house of information and suggestion in regard to labor problems and conditions. It is required to be established at the seat of the League of Nations. The relations of the Labor Organization to the League are defined in the Treaty. The Labor Bureau is "part of the organization of the League": it is "entitled to the assistance of the Secretary-General in any matter in which it can be given," but it is not subject to the control of the Council of the League nor is the Labor Organization as a whole subject to the Assembly of the League, except in the matter of its financial support. It is practically a co-ordinate and autonomous body, connected with the League by the fact that it is designed to serve the same purpose, namely the promotion of peace throughout the world. It has its own building, its own staff, its own library, its own organs of publication. Its chief director has thus far been M. Albert Thomas, a French Socialist who had been Minister of Munitions during the war.

THE TREATY WITH GERMANY

Of the four hundred and forty articles of the Treaty of Versailles only twenty-six are devoted to the League of Nations. The remainder set forth the measures and precautions which the Allied world has seen fit to adopt in regard to Germany, the determination of the future boundaries of that country, the political changes in Europe which she must recognize, stipulations in regard to her future military organization, and in regard to penalties and reparations. Elaborate sections of the Treaty concern financial and economic matters, German colonies, ports, waterways and railways, labor organization and legislation. These sections represent the price that Germany must pay for the unexampled losses, the immense sacrifices, the incredible exertions which her aggression imposed upon the world. Considering the infinite complexity of the problems raised by the war, the multitudinous details that must be studied and adjusted

as a result of a struggle that left no human being, no corner of the world, unaffected, the wonder is that the Treaty of Versailles is not far longer than it is. The reader should carefully study the entire document if he would see how grave a thing it is to tear up the charters of the world, to throw into the caldron the established and beneficent institutions, relations, and usages of men. Only a few of the more conspicuous features of the Treaty can be described in this chapter.

THE BOUNDARIES OF GERMANY

The boundaries of Germany are drawn anew. She loses Alsace-Lorraine, which reverts to France. Slight changes are provided for along the Belgian frontier. Provision is made for the people of the larger part of Schleswig to resume their former connection with the kingdom of Denmark if they so desire. For the purpose of discovering their sentiments Schleswig is divided into two zones, and plebiscites are to be taken in each, conducted, not by the German authorities, but under the authority of an International Commission. The northern zone will vote as a unit and if the majority favors reincorporation in Denmark it is to occur forthwith. The voting in the southern zone will be by communes and the Five Great Powers shall, after the plebiscite, draw the boundary line between Schleswig and Germany, a line which shall take into account the result of the voting and also geographical and economic conditions. Germany agrees to abide by their decision. In these plebiscites, as in others provided for by the Treaty, women are to vote as well as men.

Thus another of the wrongs committed by Bismarck and his policy of blood and iron is to be righted. The territorial booty of the war of 1864 must be, in part, disgorged, just as that of the war of 1870 must be. In another region, in the eastern part of Prussia, wrongs committed by Frederick the Great a century and a half ago are also to be righted. Germany recognizes the Republic of Poland, that miracle of our times, and extensive areas of Prussia are renounced in favor of this old, new state. Some of these are ceded outright by the Treaty and in others plebiscites are to be held to determine the wishes of the people. Thus in a part of Upper, or Southern, Silesia, seized by Frederick in his famous raid of 1740, and in a part of the province of East Prussia the exact boundaries would not be known until the people should have been consulted and until the Five Great Powers

should have finally determined the frontier. But whatever the outcome might be, Germany agreed to abide by it. Not all of Frederick's annexations would be lost — only those parts which were mainly Polish in race and in sentiment, but the eastern contours of Germany would differ greatly from those of the past. In this redrawing of the map of Germany two other changes must be noted. Germany renounces, in favor of the Five Great Powers, Memel, in the extreme northeastern tip of Prussia, and agrees to accept whatever disposition may be made of it. She also renounces in their favor the city of Danzig, which is henceforth to be a free city and to be placed under the League of Nations. Danzig had belonged to the former kingdom of Poland, but had been seized by Prussia in the second partition in 1793. The Poles, both because they regarded this city as rightfully theirs and also because it was their only possible seaport, pleaded for its inclusion in the new state, but the Conference of Paris did not grant it to them. It took Danzig from Germany, but did not give it to Poland, but it undertook to negotiate a treaty between the Free City and the Republic of Poland whereby the latter might include the former within its customs boundaries and might enjoy its use as a port, quite without restriction. The executive of the Free City, under the League of Nations, is to be a High Commissioner appointed by the League. Danzig is connected with Poland by a strip of territory, a "corridor" which thus separates the main body of the Prussian state from that part which lies east of the corridor, namely what is left to Prussia of the province of East Prussia. These terms of the Treaty have given great dissatisfaction both to Germany and to Poland.

Thus, by the Treaty, Germany has lost probably five million of her population, but, in the main, she has only lost those peoples conquered by force and belonging to other nationalities. She has only lost, or is to lose, her French and Danish and Polish subjects. The liberation of these peoples is one more triumph of the powerful and unconquerable spirit of nationality, a force which has greatly transformed Europe since the French Revolution and which is still transforming it.

In still another region Germany has lost control, at least provisionally, of territory that was hers before the war, of the Saar Basin, contiguous to France. This region, in part, had belonged to France, but had been acquired by Prussia in 1815. It is not to be returned outright to France. Like Danzig since 1793, it has become Germanized and as the framers of the Treaty of Versailles have professed the principle that peoples must not be

subjected to alien states, a principle to which they have conformed more or less in their actual conduct, a quite complicated arrangement has been worked out in regard to the Saar Basin, a territory having an area of about 700 square miles and a German population of about seven hundred thousand. As compensation for the destruction of the coal mines in northern France and as part payment toward the total reparation due from Germany for the damage resulting from the war, Germany cedes to France in full and absolute possession, with exclusive rights of exploitation, the coal mines of the Saar Basin. But Germany does not cede the territory itself to France, only the mines. But in order that the French may have complete freedom in working these mines, without, however, extending their sovereignty over the territory itself and over its German population, which, say the conferees of Paris, would create or tend to create another Alsace-Lorraine with the Germans this time as the victims, the framers of the Treaty have evolved elaborate and intricate arrangements for the immediate future of the Saar. Germany renounces, not the territory, but the government of the territory to the League of Nations, which is for fifteen years to act as trustee for the inhabitants, who at the end of that period shall have the right to indicate by a plebiscite under which sovereignty they prefer to be, whether that of Germany, or that of France, or whether they wish to continue indefinitely under the League of Nations. The voters having indicated their desires, the League of Nations shall finally decide on the sovereignty under which the territory is to be placed. Meanwhile, during these fifteen years the government shall be in the hands of a commission of five representing the League and appointed by it. Within the territory of the Saar Basin this Governing Commission shall have all the powers of government hitherto belonging to the German Empire or to Prussia or to Bavaria.

Not only does Germany agree in this Treaty to recognize the independence of Poland, but also that of the Czecho-Slovak Republic in whose favor she renounces certain territories in Silesia. She also recognizes the independence of Austria with whatever boundaries may be determined upon by the Five Great Powers and Austria. She agrees that this independence shall be inalienable, except with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations. This means that Austria shall not be joined with Germany, even if the people of both countries desire it, save with the approval of the nine states represented in the Council.

Germany also agrees to respect as permanent and inalienable the independence of all the territories which were part of the former Russian Empire on August 1, 1914, and she undertakes to recognize all treaties that may be entered into by the Five Great Powers with states now existing or coming into existence within former Russia and to recognize the frontiers of any such states as determined therein. She also agrees to the abrogation of the Brest-Litovsk Treaties and all other agreements she has made with Bolshevik Russia. Outside of Europe she not only cedes her colonies to the Five Great Powers, but she renounces treaty rights and privileges which she has hitherto enjoyed in Morocco and Egypt, and she recognizes the French Protectorate of the former, the English Protectorate of the latter, and abandons all rights of intervention. She renounces, in favor of Japan, all the rights and privileges she has enjoyed in China since 1898, that is, her rights in the province of Shantung.

DESTRUCTION OF GERMAN MILITARISM

Such are Germany's territorial losses as set forth in the Treaty of Versailles. Another important section of the Treaty severely limits her freedom of action in another field, in the field of her greatest interest hitherto. If the terms of a treaty can prevent Germany from again becoming a great military and naval power, able to menace the world, prevented she will be. In great detail the Treaty determines just what forces she may have in the various war services, just what equipment. In a general way these clauses reduce the armed power of Germany to a standard hitherto reached and exceeded by many a small state. If these clauses are enforced Germany will no longer be able, by rattling her shining saber, to alarm or terrify her neighbors. Any campaign that she may undertake against them can only be economic or political and propagandist, not military. But will it be possible to enforce these provisions?

After 1920 her army may not exceed one hundred thousand men, including not more than four thousand officers. Universal compulsory military service is abolished and the German army may only be constituted and recruited by voluntary enlistment, and the period of service is made so long as to act as a deterrent. Privates and non-commissioned officers must enlist, if they enlist at all, for twelve consecutive years; officers for twenty-five. Not more than five per cent. of these may be discharged for any

reason in any one year before the expiration of their term of service.

These clauses reveal the fact that the authors of them had learned one of the minor lessons that history has to teach. Napoleon, after his conquest of Prussia in 1806, forbade that the Prussian army should henceforth number more than forty-two thousand men. The Prussian Government accepted the requirement under compulsion, but it hit upon the ingenious device of having these men serve with the army only a short time, only long enough to learn the essentials of the soldier's life. Then they would be mustered out and others would pass through the same training. By this method several times forty-two thousand men received a military training and were able to take the field in those final campaigns which landed Napoleon at St. Helena. The framers of the Treaty of Versailles intended that, in this respect at least, history should not repeat itself. But not feeling sure that the German of to-day might not in his turn hit upon some device of gaining indirectly what he is forbidden to get directly, they have provided that "educational establishments, universities, societies of discharged soldiers, shooting or touring clubs, and, generally speaking, associations of every description, whatever be the age of their members, must not occupy themselves with military matters" and must, in particular, neither instruct their members nor allow them to be instructed or exercised in the profession or use of arms. Nor may government officials, such as customs officers, forest guards, coastguards, or the local police, be assembled for military training. All military schools not absolutely necessary for the training of the officers of the army are abolished, as is also the Great General Staff, which has bulked so large in the thought and imagination of mankind during recent years.

Thus Germany may henceforth produce only a certain number of soldiers. She may also produce only a certain amount of munitions and equipment and that amount is laid down in tables printed in the Treaty. It is also provided that the manufacture of arms and munitions or any war material shall be carried out only in factories approved by the Five Great Powers. All other such establishments shall be closed within three months of the coming into force of the Treaty. Moreover importation into Germany of arms, munitions, and war material of every kind is strictly prohibited, as also is the exportation of such products from Germany. Nor may Germany manufacture or import

asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases, nor armored cars or tanks.

Germany is forbidden to maintain or to construct any fortifications either on the left bank of the Rhine or on the right bank in a zone extending fifty kilometers or about thirty miles east of the Rhine. All existing fortresses and fortified works within that area and also west of the river are to be disarmed or dismantled.

The German navy is to be restricted to six battleships of the large type, six light cruisers, twelve destroyers and twelve torpedo boats and the personnel of the navy must not exceed fifteen thousand men, inclusive of officers, who must not exceed fifteen hundred. The warships interned under the armistice of November 11 are to be surrendered. All German submarines are to be handed over to the Five Great Powers, and Germany is forbidden to acquire in the future any submarines, even for commercial purposes.

The fortifications, military establishments and harbor of Heligoland are to be destroyed, nor shall they ever be reconstructed. The Kiel Canal shall be free and open to the commercial and war vessels of all nations at peace with Germany on terms of entire equality.

The armed forces of Germany must not include any military or naval air forces. The manufacture or importation of aircraft, or engines for aircraft, is forbidden in all German territory. All material of this nature already existing in Germany must, with a slight exception, be delivered over to the Five Great Powers.

Such are the drastic provisions, which, if executed, will destroy that German militarism which has cost the world so intolerable a price. But how are they to be enforced? The Treaty provides that the Five Powers shall establish Inter-Allied Commissions of Control which shall be charged with the duty of seeing to their complete execution by the German authorities. These Commissions may establish their organizations in the capital of Germany, may proceed themselves, or send agents, into any part of Germany, may demand whatever information or aid they may desire of the German Government, which shall bear all expenses connected with the delivery, the destruction, the dismantling, the demolition provided for by the Treaty.

The Treaty also provides another novelty in the art of terminating wars which may in the future have a tendency to restrain would-be disturbers of the general peace and to cause

them to think twice before gaily plunging ahead. It publicly arraigns William II, formerly German Emperor, "for a supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties" and it announces that a court shall be constituted to try him, consisting of five judges, one appointed by each of the following, the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan. It shall be the duty of this court to fix the punishment it may consider appropriate "with a view to vindicating the solemn obligations of international undertakings and the validity of international morality." Also military tribunals are to be established to try other persons accused of having committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war, such persons to be handed over by the German Government on request to the Allies, which Government also agrees to furnish whatever documents and information may be needed.

REPARATION

There is another and extremely important section to this Treaty, that concerning the reparation which Germany must make for the enormous economic injury she has inflicted upon her enemies. By the Treaty she accepts the responsibility of herself and her associates for all the loss and damage to the Allied governments and the Allied peoples caused by the war. But as the payment of so monstrous a sum is quite beyond her and their resources, she is to escape from a large part of what would be only a just penalty. But she definitely undertakes to make compensation for all the damage done to the civilian population of her enemies. This means that she must make good in money and in materials and in labor the desolation and destruction she has caused, must help restore the ravaged lands to their former condition, rebuild the demolished villages and cities, restore the loot she has carted away to Germany, replace tool for tool, factory for factory, ship for ship, and, in general, work and pay for the rehabilitation of the countries she has overrun and devastated. But how much does all this mean? Obviously this can not be determined off-hand, but only after an exhaustive investigation. The Treaty provides, consequently, that the amount of the above damage for which compensation is to be made by Germany shall be determined by an Inter-Allied Commission to be called the Reparation Commission, which shall make the necessary investigation and shall notify the German

Government on or before May 1, 1921, as to the extent of her obligations. This Commission will be one of the chief agencies for the execution of the Treaty. It will sit in Paris and, no doubt, its activities will run for many years. It will consider from time to time the resources and the capacities of Germany, and will issue specific demands and will indicate how they are to be satisfied.

In order to enable the Allied powers to proceed at once to the restoration of their industrial and economic life, pending the full determination of their claims, Germany shall pay over to the Reparation Commission before May 1, 1921, twenty billion gold marks, normally about five billion dollars. What she must pay beyond that remains to be determined, but may easily run up to a hundred million marks. Germany also agrees to the direct application of her economic resources to reparation, that is, agrees to deliver ships and coal and dyestuffs and chemical products and live stock and other things to her enemies, the amounts in general to be determined by the Commission — all these commodities being credited to her reparation account. For instance, as an illustration, she is to hand over all her merchant ships of 1600 tons and upward, half of her ships of a tonnage between 1000 and 1600 tons, a quarter of her tonnage of steam trawlers and a quarter of her tonnage of other fishing boats; and in addition she must, for a period of five years, build ships for the Allies to the amount of 200,000 tons a year. All this is retribution for her merry years of submarine piracy. "A ton for a ton" may well take its place alongside "a tooth for a tooth" as an expression indicating the operation of even-handed, methodical justice among men.

This equitable principle is to be applied in the realm of sentiment and the human spirit, as well as in the realm of matter. Germany undertakes to furnish to the University of Louvain manuscripts, printed books, maps, corresponding in number and value to those destroyed in the burning by Germany of the Library of Louvain. She is to restore to France certain archives and diplomatic papers, trophies and works of art, carried away from France by the German authorities in the course of the war of 1870-1871, and particularly the French flags taken in that war. She must give back to the King of the Hedjaz the original Koran of the Caliph Othman, stated to have been presented to Emperor William II by his friend the Sultan. And certain works of art must be restored to Belgium also.

COMMENTS OF LLOYD GEORGE ON THE TREATY

Such are a few of the provisions of this monumental treaty. In presenting it to Parliament a few days after it was signed the British Premier Lloyd George said in discussing this very reparation section just described: "I do not think any one can claim the terms imposed constitute injustice to Germany unless he believes justice in the war was on the side of Germany." The terms of the Treaty in some respects were terrible, he said, but terrible were the deeds which justified them, and still more terrible would have been the consequences had Germany triumphed. "The world is rocking and reeling under the blow that failed. If the blow had succeeded the liberty of Europe would have vanished." Concerning the territorial terms of the Treaty Lloyd George declared that the territory taken from Germany was a matter of restoration, a restoration of Alsace-Lorraine, taken by force from the land to which its people were deeply attached, a restoration of Schleswig, the taking of which he described as the "meanest of Hohenzollern frauds, robbing a helpless country on the pretence that they were not doing it and then retaining the land against the wishes of the population," a restoration of a Poland torn to bits by Russian, Austrian, and Prussian autocracy and now reknit under the flag of Poland. "They are all territories," he added, "which ought not to belong to Germany."

And he also said concerning other aspects of the Treaty: "Having regard to the uses Germany made of her army there is no injustice in scattering and disarming it. If the Allies had restored the colonies to Germany after the evidence of the ill treatment of the natives, and the part the natives have taken in their own liberation, it would have been a base betrayal. Then take the trial of those responsible for the war. If wars of this kind are to be prevented, those personally responsible for them, who have taken part in plotting and planning them, should be held personally responsible. Therefore, the Entente decided that the man who undoubtedly had the primary responsibility, in the judgment, at any rate, of the Allies, should be tried for the offenses he committed in breaking treaties he was bound to honor, and by that means bringing on the war. It was an exceptional course, and it's a pity it was, because if it had been done before there would have been fewer wars."

The Premier proceeded to argue that this was not a vengeful

peace, that it was not vengeance "to take every possible precaution against a recurrence of the war and to make such an example of Germany as will discourage ambitious rulers and peoples from ever again attempting to repeat this infamy. The German people approved the war, and, therefore, it was essential in the terms to show, if nations entered into unprovoked wars of aggression against their neighbors, what lies in store for them."

It might well be considered ominous that even before the Germans had signed this Treaty in the famous Hall of Mirrors at Versailles on June 28, 1919, two of its explicit terms had been already broken. On the very eve of signature the Germans had sunk the fleet that lay interned since the armistice in Scapa Flow, thus avoiding the surrender provided by the Treaty. And in Berlin the French flags captured by the Germans in 1870 had been burned in front of the statue of Frederick the Great in Unter den Linden. German officers and soldiers of the Guard Cavalry Division had entered the War Museum and taken out the flags, already packed for delivery to the French. They had soaked the flags in gasoline and as they had tossed them into the flames the crowd had sung "Deutschland über Alles." While the Treaty had not been signed at the time these incidents occurred, yet the German Government had already announced that it would accept the terms which had been submitted to it weeks before. The world was given a sufficient hint that breaches or attempted breaches of the Treaty might be confidently expected in course.

RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY

The fate of the Treaty now lay with the parliaments of the various countries to which it was submitted for ratification. With it were coupled in the case of the English, French, and American parliaments certain treaties between the United States and France and between France and Great Britain by the terms of which the two powers agreed to move immediately to the aid of France if any unprovoked act of aggression should be made against her by Germany. These treaties were signed at Versailles on the same day as the treaty with Germany and were designed to reassure the French, who did not feel that an untried and uncertain League of Nations offered them a sufficient protection against a neighbor much larger than France and quite likely at the opportune moment to try to wipe out the humiliation of 1918

by beginning a war of revenge. It was provided that this virtual Franco-Anglo-American Alliance should remain in force until the Council of the League of Nations should decide that the League itself assured sufficient protection.

It was provided in the Treaty of Versailles that it should come into force as soon as the ratifications of Germany on the one hand and of three of the Five Great Powers on the other should have been deposited in Paris. The German National Assembly ratified on July 9, by a vote of 237 to 138, 5 deputies refusing to vote. A few days later the British Parliament approved it, and also the Anglo-French Treaty, with practical unanimity, after only a few days' debate. The French Parliament ratified in October and the Italian Government announced its adhesion in the same month. The necessary number, therefore, had ratified. Would the enforcement of the Treaty begin forthwith? Would the League of Nations begin immediately to function?

AMERICA AND THE PEACE

The European nations were reluctant to set the new machinery in motion without the co-operation of America. And in America the Treaty hung fire. There was at that time but slight opposition among the people of the United States to that part of the Treaty which directly concerned Germany. The overwhelming opinion was that the terms imposed upon her were just and necessary. Only three of these four hundred clauses and more aroused any vigorous protest and those were the three that concerned the disposition of Shantung, the transfer of Germany's rights and privileges in that Chinese province to Japan. But the twenty-six articles concerning the League of Nations precipitated a long and bitter debate, both in the Senate and among the people. All through the summer and fall of 1919 the League was the theme of constant discussion, increasing in intensity and acrimony as it progressed. Both in its fundamental principles and in its special provisions it was attacked and defended in many able speeches. The lines of cleavage were mainly between the Democratic Administration supporters and the Republican opposition, which was in a slight majority in the Senate. Every shade of opinion was expressed during the course of the debate. There were those who favored accepting the Treaty exactly as it stood without the elimination of a letter or a phrase. There were those who favored rejecting it outright and in its entirety.

And between these extremes were men who wished a few changes and those who wished many. Of these some wished to effect the changes through amendments, which would involve resubmission of the entire Treaty to the Peace Conference, and some wished to make them through "reservations," which, they held, would not require resubmission.

On September 10, 1919, the Committee on Foreign Relations reported the Treaty to the Senate with several amendments and four reservations recommended by the Republican majority of the Committee and opposed by the Democratic minority. The debate proceeded. Finally toward the end of October the amendments came to a vote and were defeated. Many voted against them not on principle, but simply because they were opposed to any procedure that might necessitate reopening negotiations with Germany. They were willing to vote for the same changes if expressed in the form of resolutions. After the defeat of the amendments the tense and crucial struggle began. Finally after much debate the majority of the Senate adopted a series of fifteen reservations which were included in the ratifying resolution. These reservations stated the conditions under which the United States would accept the Treaty of Versailles, including the Covenant of the League of Nations. Most of them, indeed, had reference only to the Covenant and embodied many of the criticisms leveled against that document during the discussion. One of them provided that if the United States should desire to withdraw from the League it should be the sole judge as to whether it had fulfilled all its obligations. Another had reference to the famous Article X and announced that "The United States assumes no obligation to preserve the territorial integrity or political independence of any country or to interfere in controversies between nations or to employ the military and naval forces of the United States under any article of the Treaty, unless Congress shall in any case so decide, Congress possessing the sole power under the Constitution to declare war." In other words not the Council of the League, nor the President of the United States, but Congress should determine whether the army or navy should be used and for what purpose, and Congress would have the same right to decline as to accept the recommendations of the Council. Another reservation asserted that no mandate should be accepted by the United States except by action of Congress, which meant that the President might not alone commit the United States to such an undertaking. Another reservation declared that the United States reserved to itself

exclusively the right to decide what questions were of a domestic nature and refused to submit any such either to arbitration or to the consideration of the Council or Assembly of the League of Nations. Another concerned the Monroe Doctrine, declaring that the doctrine was to be interpreted by the United States alone and lay wholly outside the jurisdiction of the League of Nations. Still another withheld the assent of the United States from those clauses of the Treaty which concern the transfer to Japan of Germany's rights in Shantung. The United States was to have full liberty of action in any controversy that might arise under those clauses between China and Japan. Another reservation provided that, if the United States should at any time adopt any plan for the limitation of armaments proposed by the Council of the League of Nations, it should nevertheless retain the right to increase such armaments without the consent of the Council whenever the United States should be threatened with invasion or be engaged in war.

Such were the more important of the so-called Lodge reservations. Embodied in the clause ratifying the Treaty they would require a two-thirds vote of the Senate. This they could not secure unless a considerable number of Republicans and Democrats should combine. But most of the Democrats were opposed to them and in favor of ratifying the Treaty without reservations. President Wilson denounced the Lodge reservations as amounting to a "nullification" of the Treaty and urged the Democratic Senators to vote against the ratifying resolution in which they were incorporated. Thus it came about that on November 19, 1919, the Senate refused, by a vote of 55 to 39, to pass the ratifying resolution, that is, refused to ratify the Treaty. In March of the following year the treaty was again brought before the Senate and again failed of ratification, the vote being fifty-seven in favor to thirty-seven opposed. The necessary two-thirds were lacking by seven votes. The question was now made a prominent feature of the presidential election of 1920. The result of that election was the defeat of the Democratic party by the largest plurality known in our history. The ratification of the treaty was now quite out of the question. Separate treaties of peace with Germany, Austria, and Hungary were therefore negotiated by the new administration and were ratified by the Senate on October 18, 1921. The United States has thus far refused to become a member of the League of Nations.

TREATIES WITH AUSTRIA AND BULGARIA

Meanwhile, before the era of peace could fully dawn upon a weary world many other negotiations would have to be brought to a head, many other treaties would have to be made and ratified. The Treaty with Germany, no doubt the most important of the series, would be but one. Nor could it stand alone, as others would be needed properly to complete it. This was foreseen in the document itself, which repeatedly required German assent to other treaties not yet made. After Germany came Austria, and the Conference of Paris submitted its terms to Austria before the Germans had accepted theirs, on June 2, 1919. Then followed a period of examination and consultation, followed by counter proposals. Finally the amended treaty was submitted to Austria on July 20, and was signed by her on September 10.

This treaty sealed the doom of the Dual Monarchy, which had broken up into its component parts. The House of Hapsburg was gone and several states had divided its coat of many colors. Henceforth there were to be a Republic of Austria, a Republic of Czecho-Slovakia, presumably a Republic of Hungary, and parts of the former empire were to go to Italy, Roumania, and Jugo-Slavia. The treaty was made with Austria alone, now sunk to the rank of one of the small states of Europe.

This document will be known in history as the Treaty of Saint-Germain, as it was signed in the former royal castle in that suburb of Paris. In general terms it follows the scheme of the German treaty. The Covenant of the League of Nations comes first, which Austria is compelled to accept, although, like Germany, she is not to be admitted to the League until the other members so decide. The boundaries of Austria are carefully defined and she recognizes the new states that have arisen out of her collapse. Her disarmament is required in as great detail as that of Germany. Henceforth her army is not to exceed thirty thousand men, and the size and character of its equipment are strictly limited. All surplus armament must be turned over to the Allies. The manufacture of arms is restricted to a single factory controlled by the state. Compulsory military service is abolished. Austria's navy henceforth is to consist of three patrol boats on the Danube. No military or naval air forces may be maintained. The amount that Austria is to pay for the damage done to the civilian population of her enemies and to their property is to be determined by the Reparation Commission,

which shall take into account her resources and capacity. She, too, must build "ton for ton and class for class" in replacement of all merchant ships and fishing boats lost or damaged owing to her activity in the war. She, too, must devote her economic resources directly to the physical restoration of invaded allied territory and she must surrender certain works of art, and certain designated pieces of jewelry and of furniture and also certain historical records, taken from Italy, in times past, by the House of Hapsburg.

On September 19, 1919, another treaty was started on its way by the Conference of Paris, that with Bulgaria, requiring her assent to the League of Nations, the reduction of her army to ten thousand men, the recognition of new frontiers, and the obligation to pay over from time to time to the Reparation Commission at Paris certain sums of money, fixed in the original draft at approximately \$445,000,000. After several weeks of discussion, this treaty was signed toward the close of November, 1919. It will be known in history as the Treaty of Neuilly.

Conditions in Hungary were so unstable and uncertain that the Conference of Paris had adjourned before the negotiations with that state were brought to completion by the signature of the Treaty of Trianon, on June 4, 1920. That Treaty will be described in a later chapter. Nor did the Conference make peace with Turkey, a matter that was, indeed, destined to hang fire for several years. Russia, too, remained necessarily outside the range of profitable, if possible, negotiation.

WIDESPREAD DISCONTENT

Thus as the year 1919 drew to its close the outlines of the new Europe were only partially sketched, the stupendous work of settlement of a distracted globe was only in its initial stages. Whether even that which had been accomplished would be soon overturned by new irruptions of disorder and dissension, no one could predict with confidence. The air was filled with the clamor and the clangor of discordant voices and strident passions. Everywhere the mind of the nations was unsettled, everywhere there was deep unrest, everywhere a fermentation of revolutionary doctrine, everywhere disappointed expectations. Explosive materials were only too abundant and the danger of new conflagrations only too real. The twelve months following the armistice with Germany will not rank among the happy years of history, so rancorous and so ubiquitous was the spirit of contention

that filled it. Labor unrest in every country, strikes in every industry, induced by the high cost of living, by the sight of conscienceless profiteering, and furthered in some cases by political plotters and intriguers of every hue. In every country there were those who were eager to overturn existing institutions, who fostered and favored subversive doctrines and tried to exploit industrial unrest for their own sinister purposes. Everywhere there were those who believed in the "socialization" of great industries, such as railroads and mines, that is, the taking over of the industries by the state or by the workers themselves, and the expulsion, even the expropriation, of those who owned them.

In another sphere, also, there were manifestations of the spirit of disorder which constituted points of danger. The newer states were quarreling with each other over boundaries; racial hatreds and the old, familiar lust of power were showing themselves still unvanquished. Decisions of the Conference of Paris were in certain quarters being flouted or treated with scant consideration. How far this defiance would go no one could foresee, nor what its consequences might be.

THE CHALLENGE OF THE FUTURE

Nevertheless the great results of the war were so obvious and so substantial that the public mind could not remain permanently depressed. The great and memorable tragedy of our times could not end in roaring and ignoble melodrama. What had been won by the sacrifice and sorrow of countless millions was not likely to be lost by the levity or malevolence of blunderers and marplots. The sober sense of mankind would reassert its sway and would insist that human destinies should not be made the sport of class or faction. Leadership would not pass to the patrons of disorder, to the preachers of sedition, to sophisters and quacks and missionaries of moonshine. It was quite safe to say that the race had distilled enough wisdom from its stern and costly experience to be unwilling to jeopardize its future and to imperil civilization by following false gods, by embracing the spirit of unreason.

That future lay no longer in the hands of hereditary rulers or of privileged aristocracies. It lay in the hands of the people themselves. The challenge was to them and to them alone. It was unbelievable that those who had so magnificently responded to the demands of duty should now cease to feel its commanding spell. "France," said Premier Clemenceau to the school children

of that country, "is calling us in peace as she did in war." And President Poincaré said on the same occasion and to the same audience: "The dead alone have the right to rest; but we must continue their work and realize their wishes. Yesterday France found soldiers. To-day she must find citizens." These utterances of the official leaders of the great country which fought the good fight and kept the faith from the beginning to the end of the greatest war of history might well be the watchword of the future and the trumpet call to action among every people and in every land.

CHAPTER XXXVIII

GERMANY SINCE THE REVOLUTION

ON November 9, 1918, Germany swept her kings and princes from their thrones and proclaimed the republic. A miracle had happened, the sudden and complete collapse of a proud and mighty empire which had for nearly half a century exulted in its strength, and which had imposed with singular force upon the imagination of the world. No change so astounding had occurred within the memory of living men. Twenty-two thrones were vacant, hastily abandoned by their occupants, who, preferring personal safety to the risks of a struggle for their retention, had decamped, each as best he could, to some place of refuge, their leader, William of Hohenzollern, to Holland, and their next greatest, of the House of Wittelsbach, to some château in the mountains of Bavaria. A most conspicuous feature of the revolution was everywhere the dissolution of the army which was in full process. That wonderful machine, which generations of experts had made a monument of mechanical efficiency, was, as a result of defeat, going precipitately to smash.

German army officers and the German conservative parties have an explanation of the Revolution which they are trying to make the German people believe, namely that the army was not beaten in the field but that it was "stabbed in the back," by the radical elements of the population, that the disasters that had fallen on the Fatherland were not due to the mistakes or the incompetence of the Great General Staff or of the Government but to the civilians who failed to support the authorities in the hour of need, who were traitors to the national cause, who, in short, caused the Revolution. If this conception should be generally accepted, then the high army command and the monarch would come forth unscathed and responsibility for the disaster would be fixed upon the people, particularly upon the Socialists. In the opinion of these interested critics, the people, not their rulers, military and civil, were the authors of this "national crime," the Revolution of November, 1918.

The facts do not bear out this explanation, so considerate of the Ludendorffs and Tirpitzes who in the latter part of the war

not only controlled the military and naval policy of Germany but who practically controlled the state as well. The Imperial Government would not have been overthrown, had the German army been able to withstand the enemy, had it not been forced back step by step all through the late summer and early fall of 1918, had not catastrophe in the field been seen rapidly approaching. That government had faced serious internal troubles during the war and had overcome them easily. Such discords, dangerous to the national cause, had remained circumscribed in scope and had proved but temporary, because the German people as a whole had continued steadfast in their support of the authorities and of the task in hand. The revolutionary propaganda which was being carried on by the extreme wings of the Socialist party had but slight effect upon the general public.

The general public, in fact, was quite unaware of the situation. It had been systematically kept in ignorance. Ludendorff knew as early as October 1, 1918, that it was necessary to end hostilities as soon as possible and had insisted that the government should propose an armistice to the Allies. But the people were ignorant of this. They knew that the Bulgarian armies were being routed, but that the Entente could win was a view not entertained — at worst there would only be a peace without victors or vanquished. Had not Admiral Tirpitz, the great promoter of submarine warfare, assured the German people that "American aid was and would remain a phantom." Had not Stresemann, head of the National Liberal party declared, on October 31, that there was "no immediate danger on the western front." Had not a former Vice-Chancellor of the Empire announced hardly two weeks before the armistice; "We do not dream of abandoning our conquests in the East; we shall stick to the good old German dictum 'Keep what you have.'"

The German Revolution did not come, as German conservatives claim, from the interior of Germany, was not the result of Socialist agitation among the people and in the army. The Revolution was the natural result of defeat. The people who had endured heavy privations for four years would have held out still longer had only the army held. It was because the military front was giving way that the imperial régime was overthrown. Germany was to learn the lesson which France had learned under two Napoleons that the price of safety for military autocracies is continuous victory or at least is the absence of serious defeats. But now defeats were coming thick and fast in the months of September and October, 1918, German defeats in France, defeats

of the allies of Germany in Turkey, in Bulgaria, and in Austria-Hungary. These had their natural repercussion, popular effervescence everywhere, shaking thrones, the crumbling of the established order, the overthrow of those whose ambition and whose folly had led their peoples to the abyss.

In Germany the spirit of revolt first flamed up, not among factory workmen influenced by Socialist propaganda, as conservatives to-day declare, but in Kiel, Germany's chief naval port, and in the warships lying there. At Kiel on November 4, occurred the first revolutionary rising. A Soldier's Council seized the ships and the local authority. This was the signal for a widespread and spontaneous movement. In one city after another councils of workingmen and soldiers sprang into existence and assumed control. The revolution did not break out in Berlin until after it had swept through the states of the south, of the north, and of the west of Germany. It was in Bavaria that a republic was first proclaimed, with Kurt Eisner, a Jewish journalist, an Independent Socialist, as chief minister. The news from Munich precipitated events in the imperial capital. The Majority Socialists woke up, anxious lest the more radical Socialists, the Independents and the Spartacists should install themselves in power. On November 8, they issued an ultimatum to the Chancellor, Prince Max of Baden, demanding the abdication of the Emperor, the renunciation of the Crown Prince, and the complete submission of the military to the civil government. Prince Max withdrew from office, handing over his powers to Friedrich Ebert, one of the leaders of the Majority Socialists. On the following day, November 9, another of the leaders of that party, Scheidemann, proclaimed the German Republic from the balcony of the Reichstag. At the same moment the leader of the extreme Socialists, Karl Liebknecht, was waving the red flag from another balcony, that of the Emperor's Palace, where in August, 1914, William II had harangued the people and the soldiers amid wild acclaim. While these surprising and unexpected events were occurring in Berlin, William II was making all haste toward Holland as a refuge from the wrath of men. The author of the famous phrase, "our future lies upon the sea," was now swept from his throne by a revolution which issued from that very fleet which had been designed and built up in order to assure that future, and was now a fugitive in a country which would be under the sea had not the hand of men erected artificial barriers against its assaults.

The German Revolution of 1918 cannot be compared with

the French Revolution of 1789. It was no outgrowth of active, sustained and bitter criticism of existing institutions, no work of a people dissatisfied with the social and economic conditions of their country, no indignant protest against a long-continued denial of political liberty and political education to the people. It had no background of preparation. It was a storm that had suddenly blown up, not the explosion of a slowly gathering hurricane. It was a distinctly limited revolution with none of those aspects of roseate optimism, of that generous and ardent faith in the coming of a new era for suffering humanity that had characterized the French Revolution of the eighteenth century. It was not the culmination of a long-delayed movement of reform but was only a sudden change of régime, brought about by military defeat.

This brief and sudden crisis, which swept away the supposedly strongest monarchy in Europe and set up a republic in its stead, greatly changed the face of German political life and was likely to change much more. Not only did the Emperor disappear from the scene which he had dominated for thirty years, but the Bundesrat, the organ of the princes, vanished necessarily when they vanished, and the Reichstag, in the whole affair, gave no sign of life. The conservative political parties, which had controlled the Reichstag since the founding of the Empire, now collapsed with the collapse of the royal power. They were destined to reappear later, with different names and programmes, but upon the course of events at this juncture they exercised no influence. They shared the general discredit which had fallen upon everything connected with the old régime, a régime which had seemed so strong and which had proved so weak in a moment of adversity. All tried to recoup their damaged popularity by assuming popular names. Even the Catholic Center, sacrificing to the spirit of the hour, changed its historic appellation for one which might sound better to the general ear, the Christian Popular Party.

Since these former inveterate supporters of a discarded government were now prone upon the ground, there remained to govern Germany only the Socialists, who had constituted an opposition party during the Empire, who had never been entrusted with power, and who had had no actual experience and training in governing. Unfortunately for them, however, the convulsions of a period of unprecedented war and of popular ferment had worked its ravages upon them as well as upon the parties of the right. United under a single banner all through the Empire, a compact and growing party, their unity had been destroyed

by the issues of the war. The Social Democratic party, famous for its spirit of discipline, its power of cohesion, a party for which over five million Germans had cast their votes in 1912 and which was much the largest group in the Reichstag, was now cut in two and was apparently in process of further disintegration. An opposition party for fifty years, having steadily voted against the military appropriations which had made Germany so redoubtable on land and sea, and which had encouraged the aggressiveness of the governing classes, the Socialists in 1914 ceased their opposition and were drawn along in the wake of the militarists, whether because, after all, they felt themselves patriots first and Socialists afterwards, or because they felt their weakness in the presence of the mighty passions evoked by the outbreak of the war. But some of them were uneasy from the beginning in their new and strange position of supporters of militarism. In December, 1914, Karl Liebknecht, the son of William Liebknecht, the well-known collaborator with Bebel in the upbuilding of the party, was the first to vote against the war appropriation bills. In 1915 another member of the Reichstag joined him. A little later, three of the most influential Socialists, Karl Kautsky, expounder of pure Marxism, Edward Bernstein, the advocate of revisionism, and Hugo Haase, another party leader, published a document condemning a war of conquest and urging the Reichstag to reject further war appropriations. Twenty members acted in this sense in December, 1915. In 1917 a new party was formed under Haase, calling itself the Independent Social Democratic party. The bulk of the Socialists, however, remained within the old organization and continued to be known as the Social Democratic party. With the advent of Bolshevism to power in Russia in 1917, there was a still further splitting up, an advanced wing of Communists, advocating Russian methods, appearing upon the scene, led by Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg. These Communists were generally called Spartacists.

Thus when the government of Germany fell for the first time into the hands of the Socialists on November 9, 1918, it found them seriously divided into three main fractions. Would the gravity of the situation, would the unexpected opportunity for the realization of their aims cause them to forget their differences and to co-operate in bringing about the socialized state which all three fractions professed to desire?

At first the two chief groups, the Majority and the Independent Socialists united, each group appointing three commis-

sioners. These six men constituted the new government. They adopted some very important measures. Universal suffrage was proclaimed, the vote being given to all men and women over twenty years of age. The right of unrestricted public meeting was guaranteed. Censorship of the press was abolished. New insurance laws were promised. But this harmony did not last long. From the beginning there was friction between the two factions. The differences that divided them were really fundamental. The Social Democrats or Majority Socialists were a relatively moderate party, not emphasizing the particular tenets of socialism. They believed that the first requirement of the situation was the introduction of free, democratic institutions and processes so that the political education of the citizens of the German republic might begin at once. They considered it dangerous and unwise to try to set up immediately the Socialist economic system. The Independents, on the other hand, believed that Germany should break completely with the past, that advantage should be taken of the unexpected opportunity to found the new Germany solidly upon the social and economic principles which Socialists had been proclaiming for half a century as the only true and scientific bases for society. The Social Democrats believed in democratic and parliamentary government, the Independents advocated the dictatorship of the proletariat. The former desired that a national constituent assembly should be elected as speedily as possible; the latter desired the postponement of the elections and of the making of the constitution. The quarrel became acute. Troubles broke out in Berlin and blood was shed. At the end of December the three Independents withdrew from the Government. The Government, born of the revolution of November 9, was forced to turn its arms against the revolutionists. The experiment of a Socialist revolution was abruptly ended after a month and a half of trial.

The Social Democrats or Majority Socialists then attempted to run the government alone, the Independents having been eliminated. New riots occurred in Berlin, more serious than the preceding ones. On January 16, 1919, Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, leaders of the Spartacists or extreme Communists, were killed. It soon became quite evident that the Social Democrats could not alone govern Germany. The elections to the National Assembly, held on January 19, 1919, did not give them an absolute majority, which, moreover, they did not give to any other party.

It was evident that if the Social Democrats wished to continue to govern they must have the support of the moderate bourgeois, the Democratic party and the Center, and this would necessarily mean compromise and an abatement of the demands of the Socialists. Such a combination was effected and continued until June, 1920. The National Constituent Assembly met in the small and quiet city of Weimar, rather than in Berlin, because of the state of unrest which prevailed in the capital. The People's Commissioners resigned. Ebert was elected President of the Republic; Scheidemann, a leader of the Social Democrats, became the head of the ministry.

The new ministry faced a very troubled situation, both at home and abroad. At home the Communists, bent upon revenge for the murder of their leaders, only waited the favorable moment for a new insurrection. During an entire week in March (March 4-10, 1919) Berlin was the scene of frenzied street fighting. The Social Democrats, in order to put down the Communists, turned toward the officers and soldiers of the old imperial army and, under the vigorous leadership of Noske, organized a force capable of resistance. The more the Government was threatened by the radicals, the more it veered toward the conservatives. This had a momentary advantage and a more serious disadvantage. The advantage was that the Communist insurrection was put down, after much loss of life and property; the disadvantage lay in the fact that to accomplish this the Government had been compelled to appeal to those who were secretly opposed to the whole new régime brought about by the Revolution and who were only biding their time to attack it. To strengthen the national sentiment against the disruptive internationalism of the Communists the Government told the people of Germany that they had not been conquered by the armies of the Entente but had yielded only to the pressure of the blockade. Already in December 1918, the troops returning from the front had been received in Berlin as victors, had marched through the Brandenburg gate, flags flying, as had the victors of 1870, and Ebert had said to them "You return to your homes undefeated." The danger in such statements lay in the fact that they encouraged the conservative parties, the monarchists, only too eager to exploit the disorders of the day and the widespread fear of Communism for the purpose of preparing a restoration of the Empire. As a matter of fact the Communists were put down in Berlin and Munich and generally throughout the country, but it was a costly victory for the Republic as

certain reactionary elements in the population, particularly groups of former army officers and politicians connected with the fallen régime, were thus encouraged to plot more boldly against the Republic itself. The attempted Kapp-Lüttwitz *coup d'état* of March, 1920, was the consequence of this appeal to the army and to military sentiment as a protection against the revolutionary extremists.

Meanwhile the Peace Conference was in session in Paris and was slowly elaborating the treaties that were to be the basis of the new Europe. There is little doubt that the Germans expected that, because they had overthrown the Empire and proclaimed a democratic Republic, much would be forgiven them and that the demands upon them would be light. To be sure the Kaiser had said, on the eve of the great drive of March, 1918; "The prize of victory must not and will not fail us. No soft peace but one corresponding to Germany's interests." And the Secretary of the Treasury had said in April that "we do not yet know the amount of indemnity we shall win." And as late as July the demand had been general that Belgium should be retained. All this was forgotten and all the complicity of the German people in the war, when the Treaty of Versailles, with its demand for the cession of certain conquered territories and reparation for the colossal damage done, was submitted. The Germans were so indignant when they heard of the terms of peace, nationalist feelings ran so high, that Scheidemann and his colleagues, rather than sign the document, resigned. Thus disappeared the second ministry since the abdication of the Kaiser.

Gustav Bauer, a Social Democrat and trade-union leader, formed the new cabinet. The Assembly at Weimar approved the signing of the Treaty by a vote of 237 to 138. This majority was composed of the Social Democrats, the Independent Socialists, and most of the Center party. Feeling vaguely the danger represented by the reactionary parties, and vividly the danger represented by the Communists, this ministry, like its predecessor, was particularly concerned about the organization of the army as the sole means of preserving the present experiment. The former danger proved the real one as on March 13, 1920, General von Lüttwitz, commander of the army, conspiring with Dr. Kapp, a former Prussian official, attempted to seize power and overturn the Republic. The Government was forced to flee precipitately, first to Dresden, then to Stuttgart.

Seeing the Republic seriously in danger, all the Socialist parties, the Majority Socialists, the Independents, and even the

Communists, united for the first time since the Revolution and, joined by the liberal bourgeoisie, fought the Counter-Revolution by means of strikes and by means of arms. So effective was their resistance that at the end of a week the conspiracy collapsed, its leaders fleeing the country.

The first attempt at a *coup d'état* in the interest of reaction had failed but the parties which had prevented its success did not preserve their union after the crisis was over but flew apart again. The Bauer ministry, discredited by its flight, gave way to that of Hermann Müller, a Social Democrat. Under this ministry the elections to the Reichstag were conducted in accordance with the provisions of the new Constitution of Weimar. The elections favored the parties of the extreme right and the extreme left. The middle or moderate groups were greatly reduced in number. The continuing popular uncertainty and unrest reinforced the party of order. On the other hand, considerable numbers of the working classes swung from the Social Democratic party to that of the Independents, indignant with the Majority Socialists for their feeble attitude toward the reactionary parties, their frequent compromises with them, and their apparent indifference to all projects of socialization.

The elections, which on the whole showed a distinct growth of conservative feeling throughout the country, meant the downfall of Müller and the creation of a new ministry under Fehrenbach, one of the leaders of the Center party. This ministry distinguished itself from its predecessors in that it rested solely upon the bourgeois parties. The Social Democrats were now eliminated from power, as the Independent Socialists had been eliminated earlier. The conservative parties, either openly or tacitly, were favorable to the restoration of the monarchy. The conservatives were exultant that within two years of the Revolution they had been able to form a ministry of their own color, and to expel socialism in any of its shades from the Government; all the more exultant as they were able to do the same in Prussia as well. But their cheerfulness was of short duration. Involved in difficult discussions with the Entente Powers concerning the fulfilment of certain obligations of the Treaty of Versailles, this "Cabinet of Big Business," as it was often called, indisposed to accede to the demands finally made upon it for an immediate settlement of the questions of reparation and disarmament, finally resigned on May 4, 1921, and was succeeded several days later by the Wirth government, resting upon a combination of

the Center, Majority Socialist and Democratic parties whose foreign policy was more conciliatory.

This rapid recital of the governmental history of Germany during the first three years after the Revolution shows several things. One of these is the prevailing ministerial instability. As the Germans are divided into numerous political parties, no one of which represents a majority of the voters, each ministry must rest upon a coalition. Coalitions are proverbially fragile, prone to split asunder because of personal rivalries or divergencies of opinion on matters of policy. It is also evident that the currents of public opinion in Germany during this period were confused and contradictory. The German people, without serious training in the art of self-government, accustomed to exercise but a feeble influence upon the course of national policy, suddenly found itself invested with complete power which it did not know how to use, which it could use only clumsily and hesitantly. There had been no serious demands for a republic; no republican party had been evolved with definite programmes and recognized leaders and ready to assume control when the moment should arrive. Yet the Republic had come and, moreover, had come in the whirlwind, and it confronted on every hand the colossal wreckage of the war, enormous debts, a demoralized economic life, dislocation of social classes, loss of national prestige and cohesion, the lack of able or experienced leadership, the danger of national disintegration. With the loss of prestige had also vanished the legend, carefully nurtured for two generations, of German invincibility, and everywhere alarming cracks appeared in the political framework of the nation, that framework which was Bismarck's masterpiece, and which, created by blood and iron, seemed dependent for its very existence upon the continued efficacy of those agencies in the service of Prussia and Germany.

That efficacy having failed, there was on the morrow of defeat a marked recrudescence of that particularism, that states-rights feeling which the Iron Chancellor had been at such pains to combat and conquer. Everywhere separatist tendencies showed themselves throughout Germany, bitter criticism of the overlordship of Prussia which had proved so vexatious and so disastrous, jealousies of North Germany on the part of South Germany, talk, and even action, about the creation of a new state or of several states out of Prussian territory, along the Rhine particularly, the new states not to be entirely independent but to have a place of importance in a new federation based on approximate equality, and not, as the late one had been, on a

practical subserviency to Prussia. There was for several months after the armistice grave danger that German unity would be greatly undermined and might indeed disappear, and that too, not because of the intrigues of foreigners, not because of a desire of the conquerors, natural enough under the circumstances, but because of the passionate spirit of dissension which burst forth spontaneously among the Germans themselves as soon as the rigid compression of the war period was removed, a spirit of dissension which threatened to submerge the Bismarckian state beneath the violence of the flood. Was Bismarck's work, after all, artificial and illusory? Created by the sword was it destined to disappear by the sword? Had it failed to strike roots in the minds and hearts of the people during the half century when it had seemed so solid and imposing? Was it really only a fair-weather structure, unable to resist the stress and strain of times of trouble?

This tendency to a more vigorous assertion of local independence was reinforced by certain factors in the crisis which Germany was traversing. For instance, the fear of Bolshevism rendered those states which were naturally conservative desirous of restricting its field of action as narrowly as possible, and what could do this as effectively as the strengthening of the individual states? Conservatism should, it was widely believed, intrench itself behind state boundaries and thus the waves of revolution or radicalism might be broken, might at least be prevented from sweeping over the entire territory of the Republic. Another force that contributed to the strength of this particularistic movement was the general aspiration for "liberty," a large word, the fashion of the moment, and one which was susceptible of a multitude of practical applications.

THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION

To counteract and arrest this tendency toward separatism, out of the chaos of the hour to rescue the vital principle of German greatness, the principle of unity, and so to embody it in fundamental institutions that it would be even stronger than ever, was the dominant thought and aspiration of those who undertook to lead in the framing of the new constitution of the German Republic. A National Assembly had been elected on January 19, 1919, by the most democratic suffrage that had ever been invoked for such a purpose, perhaps the most democratic ever known. Every German, man or woman, over twenty years

of age had the right to vote, and every voter was eligible to election. The result was an assembly of 423 members, 39 of whom were women. Thirty million votes were cast, or 90 per cent. of the possible total. Of these the Social Democrats obtained 11,400,000; the Center or Catholic party, 6,000,000; the Democratic party, 5,600,000; the German National People's party, or Extreme Conservatives, 3,200,000; the German People's Party, less extreme Conservatives, 1,200,000; the Independent Socialists, 2,300,000. Of the members chosen to the Assembly, 163 were Social Democrats, 89 were Centrists, 74 were Democrats, and the others 42, 22, and 22 in the order given. Only 45 of the members had belonged to the Reichstag of 1914. The Assembly consisted, therefore, of new men.

It met on February 6, 1919, in Weimar, a small and sleepy town, associated in German history with liberal and literary memories. Berlin was wisely avoided, as offering too many opportunities for the organizers of riots and insurrections. On February 10, the Assembly adopted a provisional constitution, which became immediately operative. It then proceeded to work out the definitive constitution which was finally adopted on July 31 and put into force, without popular ratification, on August 11, 1919. The man who may be considered the chief author of the constitution was Hugo Preuss, of Jewish origin, a professor of law, a man who had, by the independence of his ideas, incurred the disfavor of the late Imperial Government and had nearly been driven from his chair in 1917. Preuss was now Secretary of the Interior, a member of the Democratic party, and had been made the draftsman of the new constitution. Though the document in its final form discarded many of his views and suggestions, nevertheless, it was he who played a predominant part in the long and difficult discussions.

Preuss's fundamental idea was that the national unity of Germany must at all costs be saved, and even strengthened. He did not dare, nor was he inclined, to adopt Bismarck's formula of German unity achieved by Prussia, for the advantage of Prussia, and with Prussia securely seated in the saddle of united Germany. Prussia's leadership and dominance were, in his opinion, things to be destroyed, not restored. Preuss wished to organize a democratic state, a pacific state, in which the military power should be the docile servant of the civil power and not its lord and master. Germany had nothing to gain and everything to lose from the continuance of the commanding authority previously held by Prussia, a state now discredited by

the ruin it had brought about, a state traditionally hostile to those liberal ideas to which satisfaction must now be given. Preuss wished the future Germany to be so strong and centralized that any separatist tendencies would be easily snuffed out, but he wished, at the same time, to reduce the power of Prussia, whose yoke, he held, had before the war become odious to all the states of the Empire. He believed so strongly in national unity that he would have been glad to sweep aside all the federated states and have made Germany a unitary nation like France or Italy or England, subdivided only into administrative areas. Recognizing, however, that that was quite impossible, the local states-rights feeling being centuries old and having even been intensified by the Revolution, he sought to achieve his ends by other means. It was impossible to make Germany a unitary state. She must remain a federation. But the authority and the jurisdiction of the central government must be made as extensive as possible and the rights of the individual states, beginning with Prussia, must be as circumscribed as the situation would permit. "It is impossible," Preuss said, "from a legal, political, economic point of view, to maintain a republic of forty million people in the midst of another republic of seventy million." Preuss's centralizing ideas aroused great opposition, particularly on the part of all those who believed that without a strong Prussia there could be no strong Germany. But they had a measure of success, as we shall see.

The Constitution of Weimar is a composite document showing the influence of the past, the impress of the troubled moment in which it was drawn up, and also, in some of its provisions, seeming to foreshadow the spirit of the future. This complexity of origin must be constantly borne in mind in any attempt to pass judgment upon it. Inspired in part by other federalist constitutions, like those of the United States and Switzerland, it is particularly permeated with the ideas of the constitution which had been drawn up in 1849 by the Parliament of Frankfort, that first and ill-fated attempt to achieve German unity by liberal methods and for liberal ends.

Under the Constitution of Weimar the former name of the German national state, *Deutsches Reich*, is preserved, the name, that is, which had been the official designation from 1871 to 1918, but that state is declared a republic based upon the sovereignty of the people. The national flag is changed from the black-white-red tricolor of the Empire to the black-red-gold of the liberal students' clubs of 1815, colors which symbolized the

aspiration for political freedom and for national unity. But Germany is to have, at the same time, a commercial flag and this is to consist of the former imperial flag with the new national colors in the inner upper corner. It is provided that each state of Germany must also have a republican constitution, resting upon a democratic suffrage. The old states are preserved, so that Germany will constitute a Federal Republic, like that of the United States, not a unitary one, like that of France. The republic, then, is the form of government not only of the nation but of each component part, the fundamental framework of the new structure. In the words of Preuss "the restoration of the monarchy in a single one of the German states would bring with it the ruin of the new national unity." It is significant that a proposal earnestly urged in the Constituent Assembly to split up the large states like Prussia into a number of small ones and to unite a number of the petty states into larger units so that the average state might number about two or three million people and all states might be approximately equal, was rejected. The inveterate particularism which we encounter all through a thousand years of German history thus showed itself still vigorous. And in the new Germany, as in the old, Prussia is larger than all the other states combined and is likely, consequently, to exercise a preponderant and decisive influence. The strongest argument brought forth in this discussion was that as the dismemberment of Prussia would give the greatest pleasure to the enemies of Germany, and had, indeed, been one of their avowed war aims, Germans owed it to themselves to see that those enemies should not have this additional trophy of their victory.

Nevertheless, while this frontal attack upon the territorial integrity of the former German states failed, yet a way was provided in Article 18 of the constitution for possible future changes in state boundaries which might perhaps in time achieve the same end, namely, the approximate equality of the various members of the federation, their liberation from the undue influence of a single partner in the union. The constitution sanctions the principle of the mobility of state frontiers, for it provides that, by means of a national law, the territorial limits of the different states may be modified if the population of the area or areas concerned so desires. A simple national law will also suffice to transfer a province from one state to another, even if one of the states affected does not consent, provided a plebiscite has first been held and three-fifths of the votes recorded

are in favor of the change, if the three-fifths represent a majority of the total number of voters.

Under the operation of this provision of the constitution the map of Germany has already been somewhat retouched. Instead of the 25 states which made up the Empire in 1914 there are now only 17. The eight petty Thuringian duchies¹ have fused into a single state of Thuringia with 1,600,000 inhabitants, and the 75,000 inhabitants of Saxe-Coburg have united with Bavaria. Whether the internal map of Germany will undergo further alterations remains to be seen. Certain it is that many plans have been brought forward and discussed for the fusion of two or more states or for the detachment of individual provinces, dissatisfied with their present status.

In the new Germany, the central organ of the state is to be the Reichstag, not, as formerly, the Emperor and the Bundesrath. Under the Constitution of 1871 sovereignty belonged to the federated princes, Germany being governed by an association of monarchs, led by the most powerful of them, the King of Prussia. Such a system, naturally, could not survive the disappearance of the monarchs themselves. After the Revolution the democratic principle was destined to be applied on perhaps a larger scale than in any other country, *representative* democracy in the case of the highest organs of the state, the Reichstag and the President, and *direct* democracy, introduced alongside the other and expressing itself in the referendum, the initiative and the recall. The people are sovereign, and political supremacy has definitely passed to the Reichstag, that is, to the chamber elected directly by the people. The Chancellor and cabinet ministers are responsible to the Reichstag and must withdraw when no longer supported by the majority of that body. In other words, the parliamentary system has succeeded the system of personal government under which the monarch appointed and removed his ministers without asking the opinion of the peoples' representatives.

The Reichstag is chosen by universal and secret suffrage. The age qualification has been reduced from twenty-five under the constitution of the Empire to twenty-one, and women as well as men have the vote. The census of 1919 showed the population of Germany to be about 60,000,000. Of this number about 37,000,000 enjoy the franchise. All are eligible to the Reichstag,

¹ Saxe-Weimar, Saxe-Meiningen, Saxe-Altenburg, Saxe-Gotha, Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt, Schwarzburg-Sonderhausen and the two former principalities of Reuss.

women as well as men, at the age of twenty-five. Members are not chosen by single districts, but on a general ticket and by the proportional system. The election must be held on a Sunday or a holiday. The Reichstag is elected for four years. It may be dissolved by the President but only once for the same cause. The Reichstag is the lawmaking body. Legislation may be introduced into it by any member or, under certain circumstances, by the President or by the Reichsrath, but elaborate provisions are made for the use, under specified conditions, of the popular referendum and initiative in the enactment of legislation.

Under the Empire it was the Bundesrath rather than the Reichstag that was the real seat of the authority of the Government and of the Prussian leadership. It represented the princes of the several states and its powers and influence were much more extensive than were those of the Reichstag. Under the new constitution the Bundesrath is succeeded by the Reichsrath, or National Council, a body which, like the former, represents, not the people, but the Governments of the states, or *Länder*, as they are now called, the word state being formally abolished by the constitution. In the Reichsrath every state shall have at least one vote. In the case of the larger states one vote will be accorded to every million inhabitants, but no state shall have more than two-fifths of the entire membership. The object of this provision is to prevent Prussia from having a majority, as she would be entitled to, if representation according to population were rigorously adhered to. However, as a matter of fact, she has a larger representation than she enjoyed in the old Bundesrath. The new council, like the old, represents, not the people of the several states, but their Governments, but these respective Governments now depend, not upon princes, as they formerly did, but upon local legislatures elected by universal suffrage, a most important difference. The Reichsrath is, therefore, indirectly subject to public opinion.

Moreover, the powers of the Reichsrath are much inferior to those formerly enjoyed by the Bundesrath. It plays a certain part in legislation. The Government of the Reich brings its bills, in the first instance, before the Reichsrath. If the latter accepts them, then they go to the Reichstag. But if it rejects them, the Government may, nevertheless, lay them before the Reichstag, stating at the same time the dissentient views of the Reichsrath. The Reichsrath may veto a law passed by the Reichstag. In that case the law in question shall be sent back to the Reichstag. If the Reichstag reaffirms its vote by a two-

thirds majority, the bill becomes a law without the consent of the Reichsrath, unless the President within three months submits the matter to a popular referendum. On the other hand, if the Reichstag reaffirms its position by a mere majority vote the bill fails, unless the President orders a referendum. The veto possessed by the Reichsrath is, therefore, suspensory, not absolute. The real seat of legislation is the Reichstag. The Reichsrath is not a co-equal legislative chamber. Laws may be enacted without its consent, under the conditions stated.

The executive head of the state is to be a President chosen by the whole German people, women as well as men.¹ This strictly universal suffrage, indeed, is to prevail not only in national elections, but also in state elections. The President, who must be at least thirty-five years of age, is chosen for seven years, but may be re-elected, how often the constitution does not say, or may be deposed, before the expiration of his term, by a referendum. Should the referendum, however, result in his favor, it is to count as a new election. By a law, passed subsequent to the adoption of the constitution, on May 4, 1920, it is provided that the President must be elected, if elected on the first ballot, by an absolute majority, but that, if the first ballot shows no absolute majority, then a second ballot shall be held in which a plurality shall decide. The President has supreme command over all the military forces of the nation, but he is subject to the Reichstag in such matters as a declaration of war or a conclusion of peace. He may make alliances and other treaties with foreign powers, but certain of these require the approval of the Reichstag. He has the power to use the armed force of the nation to compel the individual states to fulfil their obligations under the constitution. Under him are the Chancellor and other ministers, who are declared responsible to the Reichstag. Any of the ministers may be compelled to resign by an explicit vote of that body.

Unlike the United States, the German Reich has no Vice-President, its framers not wishing, in the words of Preuss, a "Republican Crown Prince." The President does not possess the right of veto but he may nevertheless play an important part

¹ President Ebert was, however, elected by the Assembly of Weimar. He was really provisional president, it not being considered wise to proceed to a popular election until it was definitely known what the new boundaries of Germany would be, after the various plebiscites provided for by the Treaty of Versailles. In October, 1922, the Reichstag, by a vote of 314 to 76, decided to prolong his term until June 30, 1925. There will thus be no popular election of the president until that time.

in the legislative process. He may to a certain extent delay the actual putting into force of a law which has been passed; he may in certain cases order a popular referendum before promulgating laws; and he may, with the counter-signature of a single minister, dissolve the Reichstag, a provision which gives him a very considerable power.

May not the office of President serve as a loophole for the establishment of a dictatorship or the restoration of the monarchy? May it not be considered significant that a proposition to exclude from the presidency all members of the former ruling families of Germany was voted down by 198 votes to 141? It is further provided that the President may, in the case of civil disorder, act at once upon his own initiative, and, without the countersignature of the Chancellor or of the Minister of War, may summon "the help of the armed forces," and may, at the same time suspend a number of the articles of the constitution which guarantee the liberties of the citizen and freedom of speech, writing, and public meeting. While he must "without delay" inform the Reichstag of these exceptional measures and while the Reichstag may demand that they be abandoned, nevertheless it seems more than likely that a resolute, reactionary President, bent upon restoring monarchy and supported by the army, could easily go as far as did Louis Napoleon in France in 1851. The German Constitution wishes two things at the same time, things which may, perhaps, not harmonize with each other, namely the parliamentary system of government and a strong presidency.

The student should note the further fact that while a president of the republic succeeds the former emperor, no local presidents have been set up in the place of the deposed kings and dukes and princes of the former twenty-two sovereign states. The executive power of the various "lands" is vested in ministers. Thus the King of Prussia is not succeeded by a President of Prussia, but by a ministry selected by the president of the Prussian Chamber, acting in agreement with the leaders of those political parties which for the time being form the majority of the Chamber. It might be dangerous to confront the President of the Reich with a President of Prussia in the same city, Berlin, which is the capital of both. Friction of the most serious sort would probably result.

The subjects on which the central government may legislate henceforth are much more numerous than was the case under the former Empire. The fundamental rights and duties of German

citizens are set forth and important sections of the constitution concern the social life, the economic life, education and schools, religion and religious organizations. Private economic enterprises, for instance, may be "socialized," that is, transferred to public ownership, with compensation to the former owners. "All mineral treasures and all economically useful forces of nature are under the control of the nation," that is, private rights in mines, water privileges, and so on may be turned over to the nation through legislation. Workmen's and Economic Councils are recognized and are to be built up and their rights and duties defined. In this section of the constitution we plainly see the influence of Russian sovietism.

The constitution of the German Empire of April 16, 1871, is formally annulled.

Such are some of the features of the Constitution of Weimar. It was not submitted to the people for ratification, but was declared in force on the day of its publication.

This constitution really carries the unification of Germany considerably farther than Bismarck was able to carry it. The federal government becomes more important, that of the individual states less important. Indeed, it is significant that the expression "state" is entirely eliminated from the constitution and that the former German states are now called "territories" or "lands" (Länder). Under the former constitution Bavaria and Württemberg possessed certain special powers in regard to military organization. These powers they now lose, the central government being given supreme control of all the German forces. Greater centralization than before will occur in the spheres of railroad ownership and control, and of financial administration and taxation, and there will be a complete unification of the postal systems. Bavaria loses her separate postage stamps. The stamp collector may consider that part of his task finished, as the last Bavarian stamp has been issued.

The constitution of the German Reich was born of circumstances and shows in many of its provisions the direct influence of the political and economic crisis which followed upon the military defeat. During the war, industry had been brought into close subjection to the state; employers and employees alike had found themselves regulated and directed and disciplined, and also guaranteed certain rights, by outside authorities, whose decisions were determined by patriotic and military, not economic considerations. Yet the operation of the blockade and the increasing difficulties of life had aroused some unrest among the

laboring classes which became more acute at the time of the final disaster and the Revolution. To meet this crisis, which might easily exceed all bounds, the manufacturers of Germany without delay sought to effect satisfactory working arrangements with the laboring classes. On November 15, 1918, the representatives of both groups signed an agreement which recognized that trade unions should have the right to take part in determining the laboring conditions which should prevail in factories. This pact between capital and labor must be worked out in detail in order to be effective.

The idea that working men should be represented in the conduct of the establishments in which they work was not new in 1914 but it became much more widespread as a result of the war. The old conception that a manufacturer was a "master in his own house," able to conduct his business as he saw fit, to determine above all the conditions of employment, was undermined by the war. For the workingmen of Germany the Revolution seemed to herald the beginning of a period of great social reform. The old authority of the state had disappeared, the former rulers were in exile or in hiding. The idea of liberty was abroad in the land and seemed to know no limits. What was more natural than that those who worked in the factories should control them? The constitution-makers of Weimar were confronted by a double necessity, firstly, that of regulating conditions of labor and of production in the factory itself, and secondly, that of modifying, more or less, the prevailing property system. They met the former by providing for the possible establishment of "factory councils," the latter by providing, under certain conditions, for the "socialization" of industry.

Article 165 of the constitution says: "Workers and employees are entitled to coöperate, in common with the employers and on a basis of equality, in regulating wage and work conditions and in furthering the general economic development of productive forces. The organizations of either side and their agreements shall be recognized." The article proceeds to announce the creation of an entire hierarchy of workingmen's councils, from the council in the individual factory to councils including a district or a province, the whole to be capped by a National Economic Council in which representatives of the workingmen shall sit together with representatives of the employers, to consider economic questions. Drafts of bills on social and economic questions which are of fundamental importance must be submitted by the Government of the Reich to the National Economic

Council before being introduced into the Reichstag, and the Council itself is entitled to initiate such bills.

One of the ideas at the bottom of this article is that of the need of a separate parliament for economic matters side by side with the ordinary parliament for political affairs. The functions of the state, it is held, have so enormously increased during the last generation or two that a single parliament is not able to discharge them all. A very large number of those functions are economic and ought to be discharged, not by ordinary politicians, who are overworked and moreover are generally quite ignorant of economic processes and problems. The machinery of the modern state is inadequate to its tasks. To fulfil the general economic functions which have devolved upon it new institutions are needed, a new economic constitution quite as important as the political constitution, probably more important.

The attempt to carry out the principles involved in this clause has met with great and systematic opposition. Article 165, which in the opinion of many contains much of the future, remains as yet largely a prophecy, if prophecy it be. The plan is still but a sketch. The individual factory councils have been created by a law passed in 1920. Established in factories employing twenty or more workmen, they represent the economic interests of the employees in their relations with the employer. These factory councils are elected by the workers themselves, male or female, of eighteen years of age or over. They have two main functions; a certain right of intervention in the hiring and dismissal of workmen, and the right to express opinion concerning questions of production, such as the purchase of raw materials, new machines and other equipment. But the councils are not given any rights of formal control, it being feared that they would become too powerful. After all they are hardly more than consultative bodies. But their creation recognizes, in a halting and restricted way, the demand of the laboring classes for a voice in the management of the factories in which they work. They are more important for the principle involved than for their actual achievement. Yet it is quite evident that the rights of labor have been extended by this legislation. "Where factory councils are in existence," says a recent writer, "arbitrary conduct on the part of the employer in regard to matters fundamentally affecting conditions of labor is rendered impossible, and the legal position of the worker in the industry is firmly established. Rights hitherto exercised by the employer without any restriction — such as, for instance, the right to issue factory

regulations, to fix penalties and to give notice of dismissal at will — have been limited. The worker's sense of his own personality has been raised. But, above all, the worker's sphere of influence has been extended to a province from which he was hitherto excluded. This province is the conduct of the business. It is true that the powers of the factory council in this sphere are not so far-reaching as in the sphere of the regulation of conditions of work. The actual right to a voice in business decisions has nowhere been conceded to the factory council. The employer, however, is obliged to answer questions put to him with regard to these matters; he must discuss them and must lay facts and figures before the council."

Article 165 provides not only for Factory Councils but also for District Councils and for a National Economic Council. In 1921 the District Councils were in process of preparation. The National Economic Council was established in June, 1920. Its rôle is an ungrateful one, that of presenting opinions to the Government or to the Reichstag. It has no power of action. It is a consultative, not a legislative body.

The Constitution of Weimar also makes another promise to the working classes, that of socialization (Article 156), namely, the transference to public ownership of "private businesses suitable for socialization." The movement for socialization reached its zenith during the period of the Revolution and succeeded in securing this recognition in the constitution, but its success has not gone beyond that. Attempts to translate the verbal promise into acts have failed, bitterly opposed, as they have been thus far, by manufacturers and business men. Moreover, Socialists themselves are more or less uncertain as to the practical application of socialization. The very meaning of the word has been endlessly discussed and analyzed. Kautsky, one of the leaders of the pure Marxians, has warned reformers against being in too much of a hurry. Socialist leaders understand that the revolution involved in the word socialization must necessarily be slow and must proceed step by step, that it cannot be consummated all at once. Nevertheless, the word itself is popular and has seized the imagination of the working classes. The Government has been forced to appoint committees to investigate the subject and to prepare plans. But nothing has thus far been accomplished. The question of socialization still remains in its theoretical stage, has not yet emerged into the realm of the practical. Discussion rages between capital and labor over the merits and the possibilities of the scheme, but thus

far no legislation undermining the existing system of private production has been passed. Big business is violently opposed to all projects of the sort and the power of big business has increased enormously in Germany since the Revolution of 1918. The advocates of socialization, blocked at every stage, are tending to concentrate their demand upon a few industries, and particularly upon one, that of coal-mining. The general instability of the political and economic situation of Germany is little conducive to fundamental and problematical changes.

CHANGES IN GERMANY

But the Germany of 1923 is not the same as the Germany of 1918, and is even less like that of 1914. Great changes have taken place, some of which are obvious and striking, while others are more or less obscure, complex, and difficult to characterize. The Old Régime has been abolished. Twenty-two princes have lost their crowns. The army has been reduced, it appears, to about a hundred thousand men, and the army officers do not at present play as conspicuous and important a rôle as they formerly did. The navy was surrendered at the end of the war, or rather was sunk by the Germans in order to prevent its surrender. The mercantile fleet is much smaller than it was although it is being rapidly rebuilt. While the office-holding class, the famous bureaucracy, has continued on the whole unaltered, and remains largely typical of the social groups it has hitherto represented, namely, the nobility and the more conservative members of the middle class, nevertheless democratic influences are filtering in and are gradually altering the tone and tendency of the administration. There has been no violent or sweeping change, yet new influences are beginning to show their effect. The revolution of 1918 was only a half-revolution. It did not even sweep aside the men and the parties that were responsible for the colossal calamities of the war. The judges of the courts, the diplomats, the professors of the universities for the most part remained in office and preserved the same ways of thinking as before, remained as always, adherents of the Empire, supporters of reaction. Disturbances, strikes, deeds of violence tend to become less frequent after several years of unrest. As no political party possesses a majority either in the Reichstag or in most of the local legislatures the government is carried on by coalitions whose constituent elements change from time to time. The various parties.

those of the right and those of the left, tend to neutralize each other, and the political education of the German people, so long delayed and so narrowly restricted, is now being bought at a heavy price and under difficult conditions. "The lack of political education contributed to the downfall of Germany," said a minister of foreign affairs recently.

Within the economic sphere the same opposition of interests, the same struggle of contradictory forces for supremacy, show themselves. Unlike what has happened in certain other countries, the German Revolution has not appreciably changed the organization of German agriculture. There has been no new distribution of agrarian property. Large estates have not been cut up into small. Naturally the large landowners have no desire to see their power reduced and they are aided in an unexpected quarter in their resistance to change. The Socialist trade-unionists agree with them in opposing a further extension of petty proprietorship, thinking that their ideal of the socialization of the land will be more easily attainable if the land remains under the control of big landowners and is not divided up among the peasants, who are most recalcitrant to all ideas of socialization, most obstinately attached to the idea of private property. But while there has been no agrarian revolution, German agriculture no longer yields the same returns as before the war, one reason being the high cost of fertilizers, another being the lack of labor. The 300,000 Poles, the 100,000 Ruthenians who, before 1914, used to come to harvest the German crops, no longer come. Germany has also lost the rich plains of Poland. The situation is serious, therefore, for a country which, even before the war, was very far from self-supporting.

In the industrial sphere we observe a remarkable development in two directions since the armistice, namely an extraordinary growth of colossal industrial combinations, and a rapid extension of trade unionism. The concentration of industry in Germany had proceeded far before the war, but since its close it has gone much farther. "Captains" of industry have become veritable generals and marshals of industry, so vast and swift and incredible has been their increase of power. At the very moment when the old feudal nobility was swept from its posts of influence, a new financial aristocracy leaped into its place, and is the dominating force in Germany to-day. The new trust magnates have carried their audacity and imagination and organizing ability to unheard-of limits. The so-called "vertical" trust has

supplanted, or rather has absorbed, the previous "horizontal" trust and is far more inclusive and wide-reaching.

This significant and mighty movement has thus far embodied itself in its most sensational and striking form in the person of Hugo Stinnes, a man who was born at Mülheim on the Ruhr in 1870 and who has won encomiums and denunciations in profusion by his astonishing activities since the close of the war. "Never have such power, capital, boldness and enterprise been concentrated in one German. To the Socialist he is a Satan who desires to 'Stinnesize' the whole nation; to the Pan-German he is a Messiah, sent to avenge and save Germany." Such is Maximilien Harden's characterization of the man. Others have called him the "Bismarck of the new régime," "Germany's new business Kaiser," "the man who grabs everything in sight," "the man who controls Germany's destiny." *Germania*, the organ of the Catholic Center party, has called him an ebon-bearded "Assyrian tyrant." He is the great exponent of that system of industrial organization known as the vertical trust. This is a kind of mammoth trust of trusts. The predecessor of this form was the "horizontal" trust, namely, the union of the plants and concerns engaged in the same kind of production, the purpose of the combination being the elimination of competition, the establishment of monopoly within a single field, such as the steel or the coal industry. The vertical trust, however, seeks to consolidate not only those industries which produce the raw materials such as coal or iron but all those industries which are based on these and which progressively transform them into the most varied finished products. All the stages of production from the extraction of the mineral from the soil to the delivery to the ultimate consumer of the completed article are controlled by the same comprehensive organization. Fuel is the basis of the system. Once that is assured all the other industries are built upon that foundation. Thus mining, smelting and metal industries, chemical and electrical industries, agriculture and all those agencies of transportation and sale, such as railroads, steamship lines, wharves, warehouses, hotels, all are brought within the same comprehensive ownership and management. Paper mills, pulp mills, printing firms are also included in the same combination since advertising is necessary and since newspapers are desirable in order that political pressure may be brought to bear upon legislative bodies, that public opinion favorable to the combination may be created, and that the trusts' views on labor questions may be presented to the public. A list of the concerns

included in the Stinnes trust is bewilderingly long and varied. The influence of this consortium is enormous with its seven or eight hundred thousand workmen, and its colossal capital. With the sixty or more papers which it is said to own it exercises a widespread political influence and that influence is used in favor of conservative classes and causes, monarchist claims and aspirations, high finance, big business, and against the masses and the workingmen. Stinnes is a dominating force in the German People's Party, whose concern for the people is limited to the exploitation of the name. He is a factor which must be reckoned with by the Government at every stage. He completes the cycle of his activities by being a member of the Reichstag and of the National Economic Council from which so much was hoped by liberals and from which so little has thus far come. As a member of the latter body he has been instrumental in defeating the socialization of German industries and mines.

"It is, perhaps," says a recent writer, "one of the greatest tragedies of the war that the masses of defeated Germany, after having freed themselves politically, should now have come under the economic control of a few men like Stinnes. Nor could a stranger paradox be conceived than this — one man emerging from a vanquished country as the world's greatest war-profitier and thus named 'the man for whom the war has been fought.'"¹

"It was early in the war that Stinnes entered the political field," says this same writer. "During the occupation of Belgium and Northern France, he was frequently called to the General Headquarters as an economic adviser. His advice was in support of the policy of stripping Belgium of her factories, machinery and raw material. Stinnes was responsible also for the deportation of Belgian workers to be used to increase the output of munitions in Germany. And it was the hand of Stinnes that demolished the factories and coal-mines of Northern France."

The Stinnes trust is not the only one. There are several other gigantic combinations which are in full process of development and prosperity and which employ hundreds of thousands of workingmen. The industrial concentration represented by them has reached an extraordinary pitch and is the most characteristic feature of the economic life of contemporary Germany. Walter Rathenau, himself a big industrial, declared that Germany was in process of being divided up into a dozen "industrial duchies over which a few sovereign potentates may exercise their

¹ *Atlantic Monthly*. April, 1922, p. 547.

tyranny." A few combinations, organized monarchically, dominate the economic life of Germany. And these few magnates, in whom the industry of contemporary Germany is incarnated, are not content with controlling merely the economic life of their country. They seek to control its political life as well and, at the same time, they seek to escape from the control of the state. And they are branching out into other countries, buying mines or factories or forests or newspapers in Austria, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Argentina, and casting their eyes on the immense supplies of raw materials of Russia. Thus they have become factors in the internal life of other countries and in international affairs.

Thus the power of capitalism has vastly expanded and increased in Germany at the very moment when for the first time the Socialists have seemed about to attain the goal toward which they had long been striving. And yet many Socialists, far from being discouraged by the emergence of this bitterly hostile opponent, seem to entertain the traditional belief of their party that this "super-capitalism" will render all the easier the overthrow of the system of private property, and that increasing industrial concentration will but hasten the advent of the Socialist state.

While the most important aspect of the economic life of Germany since the war is this mighty concentration of capital within the hands of a few uncrowned kings, the veritable successors in power of those who have lost their crowns, there is another aspect which should be mentioned and which has an opposite tendency. The war caused an immense development of the trade unions of Germany, and the crisis of uncertainty that succeeded has driven into them increasing numbers of workmen who have sought through them protection against the dangers that threatened from a capitalist class stronger than ever and subject to slight restraint, now that the state, which had hitherto given much thought to the welfare of the working classes, was weakened by the Revolution. Their membership has grown with surprising rapidity. They have become a political as well as an economic power, and constitute a well-organized element in the political situation. Rejecting, at least for the time being, all radical or extreme programmes, such as the expropriation of the capitalists, they have tried to assure the close co-operation of capital and labor, not the overthrow of the existing social order. Their policy has been one of moderate reform. Resisting the temptation to try revolutionary experiments, they have sought to extend their rights

and particularly to win for the laboring class a larger share in the control and profits of industry. They have become a political power, tending to eclipse that of the political parties. It was the trade unions, and not the Government, which was a fugitive, that brought the Kapp-Lüttwitz attempted *coup d'état* to a speedy and inglorious end by ordering a general strike and it was they who issued an ultimatum to the Government at that time, demanding the acceptance of eight "points" before they would terminate the strike, these points constituting a veritable programme aiming at the socialization of big industries, and the democratization of the army and the civil service. This programme is bitterly opposed by the conservative parties, but remains in the eyes of the trade unionists a statement of their minimum demands.

The trade unionists constitute one of the chief supports of the new régime in Germany as, speaking generally, the big business men are supporters of the old, potential supporters at least, even if not for the moment actively reactionary. They have rendered great services to the republic by collaborating with the Government in questions of domestic and even foreign politics. Some of their members have participated as experts in the various conferences to which Germany has been invited. They take an active part in the social legislation of the Reich. Many of their leaders have risen to high position in the state, Ebert to the presidency, Bauer and Müller to the chancellorship, Stegerwald to the premiership of Prussia.

The trade unions have stoutly resisted the attempts made by the Bolsheviks to win them over to the faith of Moscow. They have steadily rejected Communism, or "Asiatic" Socialism, as it has been called. Indeed the fear of Bolshevism has been one of the reasons for the rapid development of the unions.

The trade union movement has spread beyond the limits of the so-called laboring classes and has won a large following among the new proletariat produced by the war, namely, the employees and office holders who belong to the middle class, but who have felt the economic reactions of the war, the high cost of living and the insufficient salaries, even more keenly than have the manual laborers.

Whether the tendency represented by the trade unions or that represented by the trust-building capitalists will win control of Germany is one of the absorbing issues of to-day. And the fate of the republic will largely depend upon the outcome. If neither force should gain a clear predominance, if each should partially

neutralize the other, the uncertainty and instability which have characterized the recent past would continue in the future. At the moment these lines are being written there can be little doubt that capitalism is more powerful than labor, — yet not powerful enough to ignore it.

Germany's foreign relations are determined by the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. Some of the obligations imposed upon her by that treaty have been discharged; others have been the cause of contention and negotiation between her and the Allies, particularly those concerning reparations. A long series of conferences at Spa, Paris, London, Boulogne and other places has been held since the summer of 1919 to consider ways and means of carrying out the stipulations of the Treaty. There is a strong party in Germany which preaches resistance to the Treaty, denounces it as pitiless and preposterous in its demands, insists upon its complete revision, revision not only of its financial but of its territorial and military clauses. This party seizes every occasion offered by passing events to arouse and envenom popular opinion against the late Allies, particularly against France. It probably does not hope to be able to reopen the discussion by force of arms, knowing full well the comparative weakness of Germany for the time being. But there is a chance of discrediting the Republic, held responsible for the odious peace, and, by discrediting the Republic, the way for the restoration of the monarchy would be made easier, and, with the monarchy restored, other consequences of the defeat might be obliterated and the old prestige and power regained. The revision of the treaty has become the fixed demand of public opinion, so strong that even those who favor a policy of reconciliation with the conquerors, who favor frankly recognizing Germany's responsibilities and her duty to expiate her mistakes, are unable to go as far as they would like to for fear of being accused of lack of patriotism. In the hope of breaking the treaty, Germany has tried to get the support of this state or that, England, Italy, the United States, against the others, but thus far in vain. More and more she has been looking toward Russia as furnishing the most likely ally and as offering the most inviting openings for her commerce, her industries, her workmen, her engineers. The Russian Alliance looms larger and larger in the public mind. Merchants and manufacturers see markets and profits in it, whereas military and political reactionaries see the creation of a means of ultimately extinguishing Poland, odious to both classes alike.

The boundaries of the new Germany have gradually been determined by the plebiscites provided by the Treaty of Versailles for various doubtful areas. The carrying out of the treaty in the circles of Eupen and Malmédy has resulted in the transfer of those places to Belgium. The plebiscites in the two zones of Schleswig showed the northern zone as overwhelmingly in favor of incorporation in Denmark, the southern as equally in favor of remaining in Germany. The two consultations of the people of certain sections of East Prussia, the Allenstein and Marienwerder regions, have resulted in favor of Prussia. The disposition of Upper Silesia will be described in a later chapter. Suffice it to say here that that territory has been divided between Germany and Poland.

FOREIGN POLICY

In the domain of foreign policy one of the significant acts of the German Republic since the Conference of Paris was the signing on Easter Sunday, April 12, 1922, at Rapallo, near Genoa, of a separate treaty with Russia. The treaty provides not only for that legal recognition of the Soviet Government which the present Russian authorities have been eager to obtain from the nations which have been indisposed to accord it, but it provides also for the renunciation by both parties of all public and private claims against each other arising out of the war. Thus all indemnity claims, as well as pre-war debts, are reciprocally cancelled, and the German government and German nationals abandon all demands for the compensation or restoration of German property confiscated or "nationalized" by the Soviet Government,—this on condition that "the Soviet Government shall not satisfy similar claims made by any third state." Consular and diplomatic relations are to be immediately resumed and the economic needs of the two countries are to be treated "with reciprocal feelings of good will." Each Government agrees to give the other "most-favored-nation" privileges.

The announcement that the two most populous states in Europe, each of which was hostile to the arrangements laid down in the various treaties concluded at Paris, had come together in a formal agreement, inspired considerable apprehension and alarm among other nations, which were not allayed by the declaration of the authors of the Treaty of Rapallo that it was an economic agreement, and nothing more. What assurance was there that there were no secret clauses; what reason to believe

that this was not merely the first step in the building up of a Russo-German military alliance, "a hungry Russia," in Lloyd George's words, "equipped by an angry Germany," and both bent upon revenge?

It is hardly necessary to say that this action of Germany and Russia has not facilitated the work of those who have been striving for a general reconciliation of the nations of Europe. It has but confirmed the worst fears and suspicions of the French that to sup with these two powers they will need a long spoon, that the old Bismarckian methods still dominate the diplomacy of the German Reich. It is too early to say what the repercussions of this treaty will ultimately be, but it can be safely prophesied that the relations of Germany and Russia will be attentively watched for many years by a skeptical and disillusioned world.

Not only is the political situation in the new German Republic uncertain and precarious but the financial condition of the country is alarming. Her industries are active, there is little, if any, unemployment, and her captains of industry are heaping up great fortunes and acquiring unprecedented power. Her territory was not invaded during the war, her farms and mines and factories were not destroyed or devastated, as were those of France. As a French writer has said "not a German window-frame was shattered" by the enemy. Her people were taxed far less during the war than were the people of England, France, or Italy. Yet while there are abundant evidences of private prosperity, while the dividends of her stock companies are large and often astounding, the Government is poor and is unable to meet its current obligations, and a government of slender financial resources is a weak government, a ready prey of her enemies. Germany has paid but a slight fraction of what she owes her enemies on reparations and in August, 1922, she confessed that she was unable to pay any more and asked for a moratorium for several years. The root of her difficulty is not the burden laid upon her by the Treaty of Versailles but her own financial recklessness. She has followed a policy of wild inflation of her currency by enormous and rapidly increasing issues of paper money. At the time of the armistice, November, 1918, seventeen billion of paper marks irredeemable in coin were in circulation. By the end of 1919 this paper circulation had increased to 35 billion, by the end of 1920 to 68 billion, by the end of 1921 to 113 billion, and by July, 1922, to 169 billion. In 1914 a dollar would pur-

chase four German marks, in October, 1922, it would purchase between two and three thousand.

The responsibility for this policy must be shared by both the Imperial and the Republican régimes. While England and France imposed new and heavy taxes upon their citizens during the war, and raised enormous loans, to meet the war expenditure, Germany took a different course. Her Secretary of the Treasury declared that the Allies would ultimately be forced to pay all the war expenses of the Central Powers. Therefore why bother the German citizen with such unpleasant burdens. Only in the latter part of the war, when the outlook did not seem quite so rosy, did the German government introduce a system of taxation and loans, and then only on a very limited scale. Meanwhile it paid its war expenses with paper money. After the war England and France began to reduce their paper money circulation. Germany did the contrary, increasing hers, with some restraint at first, and then by leaps and bounds. Since 1910 the paper currency of France has been reduced 11 per cent.; that of Germany has been increased by over 170 per cent. (September, 1922). What the end will be, let him tell who can.¹ At least it can be said that such procedure is not conducive to economic health.

POLITICAL PARTIES

The Revolution of 1918 brought about a considerable change in the political parties of Germany, effecting the fusion of some, the disruption of others, and modifying to some extent their programmes and particularly prompting them to assume more popular names. Thus the former parties of the Right, the Conservatives and Free Conservatives, reappeared, after a brief eclipse, as the German National Party. This party consists of men whose policy had contributed greatly to the outbreak of the war, men who had done their part in pushing Germany toward the abyss. Ultra-annexionists during the war, they were sternly opposed to all talk of peace. Advocates of unrestricted submarine warfare, they had provoked the intervention of America. They have learned no useful lesson from the war and among their leaders is Helfferich who said that the Germans would "know how to make the conquered people drag for years and years the ball and chain of the billions of war indemnity" which they would exact. Another is Herght who had said that

¹ These facts are taken from an article by A. D. Noyes in *Scribner's Monthly* for September, 1922.

the United States could not land "three soldiers upon the soil of Europe."

The German National Party is the chief center of reaction in the German Reich. It is the representative of the old régime in the new Germany. It aims to restore the monarchy and the former military and political power of Germany. It is bitterly opposed to democracy, to socialism in any of its forms, to the republican régime, to the Jews. It denounces the French and the Treaty of Versailles unceasingly and is resolutely opposed to those Germans who recommend a conciliatory foreign policy, hurling at all such the abusive term of "the French party," that is, virtually traitors to the Fatherland. It has fought desperately against disarmament; it seeks in every way to prepare the military rehabilitation of Germany, to stimulate the determination to recover the lost provinces, particularly Upper Silesia and Alsace-Lorraine. This party has been increasingly successful in the elections. It includes the great landed proprietors, the officials of the old régime who have lost their positions, many prominent capitalists, the university world very largely, both faculties and students, and the peasants who are traditionally conservative and opposed to all collectivist theories. Marshal Hindenburg is the hero of this party. The Pan-German League is continuing in connection with this party the same propaganda it has been pushing for thirty years. The old German imperialism is not dead but is represented in a very lively form by the German Nationals. Should they ever become a majority party the peace of Europe would be menaced.

Another party is the German People's Party, or the Populists, as its members are sometimes called, — the successor, in the main, of the former National Liberals of the Empire. This is the party of "big business," of the upper bourgeoisie, of the great capitalists and captains of industry. It is the equal, perhaps the superior, in influence, of the German National party. Like the latter it is monarchical and nationalistic, is opposed to the republican constitution of Weimar, dwells willingly upon the merits of the Hohenzollerns and of Prussian militarism. But it differs from the German National party, not so much in principle as in practice. Its main interest is the economic restoration and expansion of Germany as that of the German Nationals is the military and political restoration of the old régime. Its leaders — and foremost among them is Stinnes — are men of great capacity and energy, men of limitless ambition, who have definite aims, but know how to compromise with situations and

with other parties, if something definite is thereby to be gained. While the German Nationals really desire revenge, the Populists would be content with wealth and economic power. The latter are not the stiff reactionaries that the former are, but are supple, adaptable, practical, hard-headed business men. They might become sincere republicans — if they could themselves control the republic.

These two parties are clearly parties of the Right as the Socialist parties are of the Left. Between the groups are two parties not as clearly defined, with points of contact with both Right and Left. One of these is the Democratic party, largely descendant from the old Progressive party, with some of the more advanced National Liberals. It is a party of the bourgeois, which is opposed to handing over the fate of Germany to the devotees of the old régime, or to the Socialists, alone. It is composed of dissimilar elements which find it difficult to agree upon a common programme, the more conservative wing not essentially differing from the People's party, the more advanced wing more radical than many of the Majority Socialists. The party has lost ground in the recent elections, probably because of this lack of definiteness in programme. It contains men who are convinced and thorough-going republicans, along with men who have rallied to the republic but who regret the fall of the Empire. It counts in its ranks such men as Siemens, the great industrialist, Bernstorff and Brockdorff-Rantzau, former diplomats, Dernburg and Hugo Preuss. Frederick Naumann and Walter Rathenau, now dead, were members of this party. Among its conspicuous journalists are Theodor Wolff and George Bernhard.

The other moderate party is the former Center party which as a result of the Revolution changed its name to that of the Christian People's party. The new label has not taken, however, and the old is the one in use. It is the Catholic party, and it contains the most diverse elements, noblemen, merchants, Bavarian and Rhenish peasants, Westphalian miners. Preserving essential unity in the defense of the interests of the Church, its attitude toward economic and social and many political questions is less clean-cut, more uncertain. It seeks to hold its conservative and its democratic elements together but the team is frequently restive, wishing to go in different directions. Representing very divergent social classes and points of view, it is, as it has always been, an opportunist party, tacking now in this direction, now in that. Commanding a large number of votes, its aid is sought by the parties of the Right and the parties of

the Left. It has in the main thus far supported the Republic, but should the people show a tendency to turn toward the conservative and reactionary parties, it would, it is quite safe to say, make a new adjustment. Among its prominent leaders in recent years was Erzberger, a strong and active democrat, bitterly hated by the Nationalists and assassinated by them in August, 1921. Joseph Wirth, who became Chancellor in May, 1921, belongs to the Center party.

Such then are the chief conservative and moderate parties of contemporary Germany. The parties of the Left are the Socialists, divided into the two main groups, the Majority and the Independent Socialists, and into two or three small ones. These have already been described. Sometimes working together, sometimes apart, the Socialists are the main support of the present régime, the only parties of whose devotion to the Republic one can speak with certitude. They have shown themselves from the beginning convinced republicans and adversaries of the militarist empire, while the bourgeois parties are impregnated with a monarchical spirit and with monarchical traditions.

As no party has a majority among the voters or in the Reichstag the ministry must always represent a coalition and a coalition is generally of weak vitality. The party system of present-day Germany rests in most unstable equilibrium. The Cuno ministry which succeeded the ministry of Wirth at the close of 1922 proved as short lived as had its predecessors, resigning on August 12, 1923, and being succeeded by a ministry under Stresemann, supported by the leading bourgeois and Socialist parties.

The Majority and Independent Socialists have latterly effected a kind of union, how durable time alone will show. They are now generally known as the United Socialists. The extreme Socialists or Communists stand apart.

CHAPTER XXXIX

THE REPUBLIC OF CZECHO-SLOVAKIA

THE close of the World War was signalized by events of the most sensational and far-reaching character. Those nations which had, with such incredible lightness of heart, appealed in 1914 to the arbitrament of arms as offering the surest and swiftest way to the realization of their ambitions were now compelled to recognize that they had woefully misread their horoscopes. The baseless fabric of their vision vanished into air, into thin air. In contrast to the hopes and purposes they had entertained the actual situation in the autumn of 1918 was a hideous, grinning mockery. The smiles of fortune now gave way to her frowns and the way of the transgressor was seen to be sometimes altogether hard.

It would require a volume adequately to appraise the consequences of the war, but in October and November, 1918, the handwriting on the wall was visible from afar and was legible enough for all concerned. It announced the doom of the great adventure and the arrival of the day of reckoning. For none was the reckoning as severe as for Austria, whose ultimatum to Serbia in 1914 had set the monstrous conflagration. For her allies, Turkey, Bulgaria, and Germany the issue of the conflict meant defeat; for the Dual Monarchy it meant annihilation. The Grand Turk was destined to lose a considerable part of his spacious domains; the petty prince who had pompously called himself the Tsar of All the Bulgars was to see his pretensions wither and his throne become untenable; Germany was to undergo a startling political revolution involving the disappearance of twenty-two sovereigns, big and little, and involving much else. But however heavily adversity, born of defeat, might weigh upon these states, at least their separate statehood was to continue. No so that of Austria-Hungary. The Ottoman Empire, the Kingdom of Bulgaria, the German Reich were still to appear, however altered, upon the map of Europe. But the Austro-Hungarian monarchy was to disappear utterly.

The reasons for the collapse of this great empire, the oldest and the proudest in Europe, were numerous. Many nations have

in the past experienced grievous defeat without, in consequence, completely disintegrating into their primitive elements, and the reason has been because those elements have in the course of time become fused and have gained the strength of fusion. This process had never taken place in the case of Austria-Hungary. Austria was not a nation, it was only a dynasty resting upon an aristocracy, a bureaucracy, an army, and a church. And that dynasty had adhered for centuries to a principle of government which was the very negation of sound statesmanship. It had sought to rule by playing off its motley peoples, with their racial and linguistic and historic differences, against each other, by encouraging the spirit of dissension to such an extent that the various rivalries would neutralize and nullify each other. Divide in order that you may rule, such was the dangerous motto of the House of Hapsburg. The Emperor Francis I, contemporary of Napoleon and Metternich, had expressed this jejune political philosophy succinctly when he said, observing how beautifully his different peoples detested one another; "From their antipathies springs order, and from their mutual hatred the general peace." For a long time this easy method worked to the satisfaction of its sponsors. But after all the surest way to disrupt an empire is to stimulate the disruptive forces within it. Then when the moment of strain and stress arrives those forces will show their power. It is the most serious charge that can be brought against the intelligence and the morality of the House of Hapsburg that, for generation after generation, its representatives, instead of acting as peace-makers among its discordant races, acted rather as disturbers of the peace, and deliberately and systematically fanned the flames, pitting nationality against nationality, race against race, in unholy indifference to the fundamental iniquity of such procedure and to its arrant unwisdom. With rare unreason all the elements of eventual disaster, all the dynamite that lies in hate, were heaped up about the existing régime, waiting only for the moment of explosion.

The Hapsburg princes might, by a policy of fair play, by assuring life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness to their several nationalities, by introducing a real federal state organization with large spheres of local self-government reserved for the separate units, have evoked such a thing as a common patriotism, a common loyalty, based upon general contentment and well-being. But this was never their thought nor their endeavor. Systematic oppression of the Slavic and Latin peoples under

their sway, in the interest of two privileged races, the Germans and the Magyars, such had been their pleasure. The races that were opposed to this German-Magyar rule became naturally and inevitably the enemies of the Hapsburg monarchy. The memories of indignities and injustices endured were kept alive and vivid by repeated acts of arbitrary power.

To these peoples came, in August 1914, sudden war, a war manifestly designed among other things to crush the Slavs of Serbia and thus put an end to the troublesome aspirations of the Slavs within Austria-Hungary, thereby consolidating for an indefinite future the system in vogue since 1867. The war had effects quite contrary to those intended. Instead of consolidating the Dual Monarchy it rendered possible, and it hurried along, its internal decomposition, until, at the end of four years, the proud state lay in utter ruin. No common patriotism was evoked by the war because no common patriotism existed in the hearts of the dissimilar and discordant peoples which had historically been brought together under the Hapsburg scepter, because the Hapsburg policy had not been of a character to create it. Indeed, most of the Slavs of the empire were indignant at being compelled to fight in a cause of which they disapproved, to fight fellow-Slavs in the interest of Germans and Magyars. Austria was plunged into war without her peoples or their representatives being in any way consulted. The Austrian Reichsrat had been prorogued in March, 1914, and was not convened again until May 30, 1917. The Hungarian parliament, however, was in session at the outbreak of the war, and enthusiastically approved the policy of the Government but the Hungarian parliament represented only the dominant race of Hungary, the Magyars. The resentment of the Slavs, particularly of the Czechs, expressed itself during the war in wholesale desertions to the Russians and the Serbs. It has been estimated that over 30,000 Czechs deserted to the Serbs, that about 300,000 surrendered voluntarily to the Russians, perhaps 30,000 to the Italians. The Austrian government was naturally led by this alarming and dangerous disaffection to the adoption of vigorous methods of repression. A veritable reign of terror was introduced. Perhaps 20,000 Czech civilians were imprisoned as "political suspects" and nearly 5,000 were condemned to death by courts martial. A Polish Socialist leader declared in the Reichsrat in February, 1918, that there had been 30,000 executions in the province of Galicia alone. But imprisoning, shooting, hanging on an unprecedented scale only increased the

widespread disaffection, only loosened still further the cohesion of the state. The feeling, every day confirmed, that the victory of the Central Powers would mean the enthronement of the Germans and the doom of the Slavs, whom the Germans hated and despised as belonging to an inferior stock, as worthy only of serving "as mortar for a nobler race"; the feeling, too, that Austria would be bound hand and foot to Germany, should the Central Powers win, and that all real independence would disappear, all these considerations and still others confirmed the subject races of Austria-Hungary in their desire to escape once for all from bonds that had long been burdensome and that had now become intolerable. Czecho-Slovaks, Jugo-Slavs, Rumanians, Italians, Ruthenians were finally and completely estranged by the odious military régime which treated them as enemies and which completely eradicated any surviving instincts of solidarity, of common citizenship.

The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy collapsed in October, 1918, as a result of military reverses and the long exhaustion of the war. In prosecuting the war to this victorious conclusion the Entente Allies contributed the blow that brought the "ramshackle" structure to the ground. But this had been no part of their intentions. They had wished to defeat Austria, not to destroy her. While the disaffected races had appealed for their help, they did not get it in any serious measure. President Wilson in his Fourteen Points, made public in January, 1918, had expressly disclaimed any thought of disrupting the Empire. He only demanded autonomy for the subject races, and autonomy is a word that lacks precision and is certainly far removed from independence. But events moved rapidly in 1918. By the middle of the year, the Allies recognized the claims of the Czecho-Slovaks and the Jugo-Slavs to unity and independence. The former they recognized as an independent state and an ally in arms. The Czecho-Slovaks, indeed, believing that the most impressive argument for their cause would be to furnish soldiers ready to give their lives for it, raised and organized considerable bodies of troops which fought side by side with the Allies in France and Italy and in Russia.

Seeing the storm that was blowing up from every quarter of the sky the Emperor Charles made a despairing attempt to prevent the threatened dissolution by proposing on October 16, 1918, the conversion of Austria — not of Hungary, be it noted — into a federal state composed of free nations, German, Czech, Jugo-Slav and Ukrainian, each with its own defined boundaries.

Galicia was to be free to unite with Poland. But it was too late. Dissolution was in fact already in full process and its speed was accelerating every day. The long pent up discontent of the Austrian nationalities finally exploded and the Dual Monarchy lay in fragments. Power passed from the old established authorities of the Empire to newly improvised national councils, representing the nationalities. There was no fighting, for nowhere did the revolution meet resistance. Neither the Emperor as a person or as a symbol, nor the dominant Germans and Magyars, could evoke any spirit of loyalty or chivalrous devotion in the hour of need, for their previous records had not been calculated to inspire such sentiments. The panoply of power which had long invested the ancient House of Hapsburg with wide authority over the thought and imagination of men now vanished overnight. None were now so poor as to do it even momentary reverence. Provisional governments sprang up where formerly there had been at least formal unity. The Czechs were solidifying a government they had been elaborating for some time in conclaves in Prague and Paris; Croatia was preparing to unite with Serbia; the Tyrol, Trieste, the country along the head of the Adriatic were being occupied by the Italians; Roumanians were invading Transylvania; the Poles of Galicia were negotiating with the new Poland which was arising from the hot ashes of the world's greatest war. All were staking out their claims and planning for a future more to their taste than the past had been. There was to be, if not a new heaven, at least a new earth. On November 12, the last of the Hapsburgs withdrew and the field was cleared for the new combinations and creations.

Such was the situation when the Peace Conference met in Paris. That conference has been subjected to much intelligent criticism and to much that has been unintelligent and fatuous. Unnecessarily feeble have been many of the comments concerning its decisions regarding Austria. It has been charged that the Conference "Balkanized" central Europe, that is to say that it wilfully split up a large political and economic unit into numerous fragments, jealous of each other, full of the spirit of unreason, incapable of living or letting live, self-assertive, aggressive, quarrelsome, intent upon the realization of their own petty ambitions, their own local advantages, indifferent to all considerations of the general good. It has been said that the Conference sacrificed the well-being of fifty million people by subordinating their economic interests to purely political considerations, by

destroying the vast and delicately organized economic system which bound the different parts of the Empire together into a union profitable to all, with its sources of supply, its markets, its modes of transportation available for all and contributing to the prosperity of all. In place of an economic organization slowly built up out of the needs of the people and responsive to those needs there was henceforth to be economic disorganization. The work of many decades was to be wantonly undone. The free and vital movement of industry and commerce was now to be arbitrarily interrupted because of this chopping up of a great empire into numerous small states which would have their tariffs and their tariff wars, with all their sorry progeny. Economic prosperity, the chief and fundamental good of life, was to be lightly tossed aside merely in order to satisfy excessive nationalistic and racial aspirations. Realities were to be exchanged for baubles.

To such criticism it is sufficient to reply that it was not the Conference of Paris that destroyed the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. It merely registered the fact of dissolution. When the Conference opened Austria-Hungary was already a thing of the past, nor could the Conference have possibly restored it, even had it ardently so desired. All that the Conference had to do was to discharge a large amount of business left unfinished by the sudden demise, to make a multitude of adjustments between the eager and contentious heirs.

Furthermore, it should also be pointed out that most of the peoples of the world prefer such things as independence and liberty to economic prosperity, if they are compelled to make the choice. This has been proved so many times that it would seem to be unnecessary to call attention to a fact which is fundamental to any true interpretation of history. A purely economic interpretation is of all the least adequate and the most neglectful of essential factors. The various Austrian peoples well knew that the attainment of their aspirations would mean economic loss and hardship, at least for a considerable time. But this knowledge was no deterrent as they did not put their chief emphasis upon economic matters.

The states among which the former territories of Austria-Hungary were divided are called the "succession" states. This division had already been roughly achieved by the action of several of those states which had seized the territories which they considered theirs or which they were bent upon possessing. But such action was, from the nature of the case, provisional and

lacked finality. It was the duty of the Conference of Paris to make the necessary treaties of peace, to define and recognize the boundaries between the "succession" states, and to solve other problems arising out of the new situation.

The treaties of Saint-Germain with Austria and of Trianon with Hungary determined the future status of those two states, hitherto united, but now separate, and each much reduced in size and altered in internal organization. The treaty of Saint-Germain was signed on September 10, 1919, but months passed by before it was ratified by the Allied Governments. Indeed, it was not until July 16, 1920, that it actually entered into force. The Hungarian treaty was not signed until June 4, 1920, and was not ratified until much later.

On these and other accords concluded with Poland, Roumania, Italy, Czecho-Slovakia, Jugo-Slavia, was to rest the new Central Europe, accords too numerous and too detailed to be described here. Suffice it to say that the Hapsburg inheritance was divided among those five states and among two additional ones, namely, what was left of Austria and what was left of Hungary. These were the successor-states. A difficult and highly contentious problem, only slowly worked out by the Conference of Paris, was that of drawing boundaries and assigning peoples in such a way as to satisfy the demands of approximate justice, to serve the cause of peace and security in Europe, to give promise of reasonable durability. It was natural that the allies or friends of the Entente, Czecho-Slovakia, Italy, Roumania, Poland, and Jugo-Slavia should fare better at the hands of the Conference than their enemies, the Germans of Austria, and the Magyars of Hungary.

In the following chapters we shall trace the recent history of the several states that either owe their very existence or their great enlargement to this sudden and complete disintegration of an ancient empire.

One of the most significant and promising is that of the Republic of Czecho-Slovakia, and also one of the least known. Even its very name is new. Men had long known of the Kingdom of Bohemia, of its geographical situation, of its history. Why was not this historic and famous name retained when the time came to give this country once more the independence it had long possessed and which it had lost four centuries earlier? It was not retained because the new republic was to be no mere restoration of the former state of Bohemia but was to be something very different. Bohemia was to be not only the kernel

but a large part of the new construction, but it was not to be all of it. There was to be added to it Slovakia, a region in northern Hungary, which the Magyars had conquered and held since the tenth century, as the Hapsburgs had held Bohemia since 1526. The Czechs of Bohemia and the Slovaks of Hungary had not for a thousand years been united with each other, yet they were sister races, speaking practically the same language, although with variations. Each of these two closely related branches of the Slavic family saw in the World War the opportunity for independence, the one from the control of the Austrians, the other from the control of the Magyars. But each saw that, without the other, it would be numerically so weak and geographically so exposed to attack that it would be unable long to maintain its independence, even if acquired. The union of the two was essential to both. Self-interest of the most obvious sort prompted their union and will prove the strongest force in perpetuating it, capable of counteracting, in all probability, the friction that may arise between two peoples which, though related, have had different histories and been subjected to different formative influences.

In a way, then, the Republic of Czecho-Slovakia has a national tradition which runs back many centuries, yet it is one of the youngest of states. During the war France and Italy had accepted the aid of Czecho-Slovak legions on the French and Italian fronts, thereby virtually recognizing Czecho-Slovakia's claim. In August, 1918, Great Britain had recognized her as an Allied nation and in the following month the United States and Japan had virtually done the same. On October 18, 1918, the Czecho-Slovak Declaration of Independence was formally issued in Paris by three gifted and sagacious patriots, Professor Masaryk, Dr. Benes (pron. Benesh), and General Stefanik, men who had voluntarily gone into exile during the war and who, each in his own way, had worked day and night to present the cause of his country to other peoples who were profoundly ignorant of it and who were themselves occupied with problems of their own, harassing and exacting enough to absorb all their time and thought. The Declaration of Independence which these men drafted and issued to the world deliberately rejected the divine right of kings in favor of "the principles of Lincoln and the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen." On October 27, the Austro-Hungarian Government recognized the rights of the Czecho-Slovaks.

Thus by the end of October, 1918, the Czechs had regained the

independence which they had lost nearly three hundred years before in the fatal battle of the White Mountain in the early days of the Thirty Years' War. Immense was the enthusiasm of the people at their liberation, an enthusiasm unaccompanied by violence. On November 16, there met in Prague the first body representative of the Czecho-Slovak people, the National Assembly. It decided unanimously in favor of a republic and it unanimously elected Masaryk, who was still abroad, its first president. Dr. Kramar (pron. Kramarsh), a man who had long been a leader of the Young Czechs, who had during the war been condemned to death for treason and had later been pardoned, the only man at the beginning of the new republic who enjoyed a reputation comparable to that of Masaryk, now become first prime minister and Benes became minister of foreign affairs. These two men were appointed the delegates of the republic at the Conference of Paris.

The problems confronting the new state were varied and formidable but were faced with serenity by a people exultant and electrified at being master of its own destinies once more after centuries of oppression. Prime Minister Kramar at the first session of the National Assembly expressed the national mood and determination when he said: "At home we feel sufficiently confident of being able to rely upon our own powers alone, and that without injustice to others. We shall count upon the devotion of all towards the State and we shall show that not only have we been able to achieve our liberty but that we know how to preserve it and to be really free — worthy of our great past, of our traditions and our sufferings."

The most important immediate problems demanding attention before the general work of reconstruction could be taken up were the determination of the boundaries of the new republic and the framing of a national constitution. The former was the work of the Conference of Paris, the latter of the National Assembly sitting in Prague. The former was an international concern, the latter a domestic affair.

The frontiers of Czecho-Slovakia were determined by the peace treaties of Versailles, Saint-Germain, Trianon. The difficulties in drawing them were considerable. What should be chosen as the basis of the decision, history or ethnography? In that part of the new state which had formerly belonged to Austria, the former kingdom of Bohemia, the historic frontier and the linguistic did not agree. The central mass of the territory was peopled by Czechs, but around it, to the west and north, was a

zone peopled by Germans, and the relations of Czechs and Germans had for centuries been those of ceaseless and bitter strife, whose intensity had only deepened in recent decades. The contentions of these two peoples had grown so fierce that for years before the war the Provincial Diet had practically ceased to function, the vocal turbulence of the factions whenever it met showing the futility of attempting to continue its sessions. Wherever the two races naturally came together, in school or factory or church, there had been war, or at best an armed truce. The mutual repulsion was extreme. It was difficult to get them to work together in the same shop, nor would they consent to take the train from the same station. In many a village, whose population was certainly too small to justify any such luxury, were two railroad stations, one for the Germans, and one for the Czechs. Should peoples, filled with such a long-standing and comprehensive dislike of each other, be forced to live together in the new republic? The Peace Conference decided that they should, and, as it seems to the author, for good and sufficient reasons. States cannot live by ethnography alone. History is often mightier than ethnic purity, and must prevail. While in general the powers assembled in Paris considered that the political boundaries they had to draw ought, whenever possible, to conform to the linguistic boundaries, they recognized that there were exceptions to the operation of the rule, and here was one of the exceptions. Pare off this fringe of Germans whom you find around most of Bohemia and you mutilate a kingdom which had had a glorious history in the Middle Ages, succeeded by an unhappy one of several centuries under the Hapsburgs, but which had never relinquished its claims even in the darkest moments, which asserted that it had never ceased to exist and that it had a right to be restored in its entire extent by a conference whose high mission was, in part, to redress some of the injustices of the past. The Germans of Bohemia had never belonged to the modern German Empire. Ought the mere fact that there was within Bohemia a considerable minority of Germans to be considered a reason for dismembering an ancient state which was now miraculously on the point of restoration?

Other reasons for recognizing the historic boundaries of Bohemia, rather than the ethnographic, were that the former gave a territory which was a geographic unit, an economic unit, and which was, from a military point of view, defensible. Had the historic boundaries not been adopted, Prague, the capital of the new state, would have been only about thirty miles from the

German frontier and the passes through the mountains would all have been in German hands.

The Czechs argued for historic frontiers in determining the part of Austria that should go into the making of the new state. They argued against historic frontiers, in the case of Hungary, part of whose territory, namely Slovakia, they coveted. Here they appealed to the right of national self-determination. There was no doubt that Hungary's territorial unity was a thousand years old. On the other hand there was also no doubt that the Slovaks, long outrageously oppressed, would welcome the chance to get free of the hated Magyar rule. The claim to Slovakia was, therefore, made to rest upon the right of self-determination. But the drawing of the boundary line was very difficult owing to the fact that there is between Slovakia and Hungary no natural frontier, and that the process of Magyarization carried out for several decades had blurred the ethnological line.

The Czecho-Slovak Republic, as finally delimited by the treaties, has a population, according to the census of 1921, of nearly 14,000,000 and an area of about 55,000 square miles, about the size of the state of New York or of England and Wales. It is about six hundred miles long and at its maximum breadth about a hundred and eighty miles wide. Like the former Austria, to which it is one of the successors, it is a polyglot state. Of its fourteen million inhabitants, thirty-five per cent. are neither Czechs nor Slovaks. About three million are Germans, about 750,000 are Magyars (in Slovakia), and nearly half a million are Ruthenians or Little Russians. Thus the new state confronted from the outset one of the most contentious and difficult problems within the field of government, the problem, that is, of making peoples of different race and different speech, each with its history of wrongs inflicted or endured, co-operate together harmoniously in the building up of the commonwealth. Austria had failed to solve this problem and had gone to smash, in some measure because of that very failure. Would Czecho-Slovakia be wiser in its methods and happier in its achievements than had its predecessor, or would the issue be the same, bitter racial and nationalistic hatreds and rivalries culminating at the propitious moment in convulsions and collapse? The challenge to the leaders of the new state was peremptory and inevitable. Would they have the necessary stores of wisdom and good will to enable them to avoid in their treatment of German and Magyar minorities the evil courses which the Germans and Magyars had so long followed toward them? Would they repay injustice and

oppression by moderation and fair play? Or would the world witness the same old tragedy once more, only with the rôles reversed? Would the various languages be equalized and, therefore, cease to be badges of superiority or inferiority, or would the dominant race insist upon precedence and prestige for its idiom to the dark and rankling displeasure of the others? Even if themselves inclined to be reasonable and considerate would the fierce passions of the war and pre-war period so far subside as to render possible a policy of reconciliation and of progressive legislation?

A good start, at any rate, was made with the constitution. In process of drafting for a year or more, the constitution bears the date of February 29, 1920. It shows conspicuously the influence of French and American example. The American principle of the division of powers into the legislative, the executive and the judicial, was largely applied. The organs of government are a president and a parliament consisting of two houses, a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies. The constitution may be revised by a majority of two-thirds of the total membership in each of the two chambers.

The President of the Republic is chosen for seven years by the two chambers meeting together as a National Assembly. He may be re-elected for a second term, but he may not be chosen for a third until after an interval of at least seven years after the expiration of his second term. This restriction does not apply to the first President, Masaryk, for whom a special exception is made because of the high regard in which he is universally held. If the presidential office becomes vacant by the death of its occupant a new election must be held within two weeks; if the President is prevented by illness or for any other reason from discharging his functions, the executive power is exercised by the ministry; if this prevention, however, continues beyond six months, the National Assembly shall, if two-thirds of the ministers propose such action, elect a substitute. The president represents the Republic in its international relations, is the head of the army, possesses the pardoning power, and summons, prorogues, and dissolves the chambers, to which he may send messages or which he may address in person. He does not possess the veto power. He has the right to demand a new deliberation upon a law submitted for his signature but if the chambers, on roll-call, maintain their position, or if the Chamber of Deputies alone, by a two-thirds vote, declares itself for the second time in favor of the law, the President has no

further power of resistance but must promulgate the law forthwith. The President is not responsible at law for his acts, each one of which must be countersigned by a minister who thereby assumes responsibility. He may be impeached, however, by the Chamber of Deputies, but in one case only, treason. If found guilty his punishment is loss of office and disability ever again to hold it.

The Chamber of Deputies consists of 300 members elected for six years; the Senate of 150 members elected for eight years. Women may vote and may be chosen to either chamber under the same conditions as men. Universal suffrage exists, and voting is not only direct and secret but is also obligatory. To vote for Deputies one must be at least twenty-one years of age, for Senators at least twenty-six. To be eligible for the Chamber one must be twenty-six years old, for the Senate forty-five. In the first parliament chosen under this system, thirteen women were elected to the Chamber of Deputies; three were elected to the Senate. The proportional system of representation is established in the interest of minorities; in order that the election may represent the real thought of the voters, and not be vitiated by adventitious circumstances. It is forbidden to sell or offer any alcoholic drink either on election day or on the night before.

A measure passed by the Chamber of Deputies and rejected by the Senate may, nevertheless, become a law if the Chamber of Deputies passes it again by a vote of the majority of its entire membership. The two houses are, therefore, far from equal.

Parliament must hold at least two ordinary sessions a year, in the spring and in the autumn, and it may be summoned by the President of the Republic at other times, and must be summoned if a majority of the members, or in certain cases, two-fifths, demand it. There is, in addition, the striking provision that during the intervals between sessions, when Parliament is not sitting, a permanent commission, consisting of sixteen deputies and eight senators, elected by the respective chambers and on the system of proportional representation, shall have the right to pass urgent legislation and to exercise control over the Government. Such measures lapse unless confirmed within two months by the Parliament at its subsequent meeting. Cabinet ministers are appointed by the President of the Republic. They are responsible to the Chamber of Deputies. They need not themselves be members of either house.

A constitutional tribunal consisting of seven members is given the power to judge the constitutionality of laws.

Those civic rights which are customary in free countries are guaranteed, liberty of speech, of the press, of meeting, of conscience. All religious confessions are declared equal before the law. Minorities, whether religious or racial, are assured special rights. Every linguistic minority representing at least twenty per cent. of the population has the right to use its own language in all its relations with public officials, who must reply in the same language. Every "important" minority may have its language taught to its children in the public schools. Czechoslovak is the state language and may be used everywhere and on all occasions. While it is sometimes declared that there is no such language, but that Czech is one tongue and Slovak another, it appears that they are practically one, that, with the exception of about a thousand words, most of which, moreover, resemble each other, the vocabulary is the same, and that the essential difference lies only in the pronunciation.

Such are some of the provisions of the constitution, a document liberally democratic and one which seeks to satisfy the demands and needs of the various races and religions within the borders of the republic.

But a tree is judged by its fruits. It is too early yet to say whether the political institutions of Czecho-Slovakia are adapted to the solution of the problems of the national life. Those problems are both numerous and grave. The peoples at whose expense the new states of Europe have been created have been industrious in proclaiming that these states have not within them the strength of life, that, artificial results of a war which turned out one way and might easily have turned out another, they lack the leaders and the traditions and the experience necessary for success, and must, therefore, shortly disappear; that they are little fitted to withstand the rough usage of the world, to hold together upon the choppy sea of politics. Whether these interested and pessimistic prophecies, generally born of an evident desire that the thing prophesied shall happen, will come true, remains, of course, to be seen. But the five years of history that have rolled by since the war would seem amply to justify a reasonable optimism. The old ordering of Europe in too many cases left untapped rich sources of talent and intelligence and character and good will which the benign and fructifying spirit of independence naturally evokes. The senseless and criminal wasting of precious human capacities in the interest of certain dynasties and privileged classes and racial dominations has without question incalculably impoverished as well as poisoned

the public life of Europe. With the liberation of national and popular energies and aspirations, hitherto cruelly and cunningly repressed, with the achievement of independence rendering possible the realization of a greater dignity of life, a greater self-respect, a livelier sense of usefulness, opportunities will be opened up in various parts of Europe for the emergence and free expression of many a personality which, under the old system, would have been hounded into silence or conspiracy or fruitless opposition. We may confidently expect to see the new states, now in control, for weal or for woe, of their own destinies call forth and utilize the activity of men of originality and power. The school of adversity may have trained leaders who now will know how to guide their peoples safely through the dangers of freedom. What happened in America, in the Revolution and after, may well be repeated in many a European country. Groups of vigorous and able individuals may find careers of large usefulness and honor as citizens of independent nations which otherwise would not have been opened to them. New conditions may call forth new men, some of whom may find niches in their nation's or the world's hall of fame.

The pertinence of these remarks is excellently illustrated in the case of Czecho-Slovakia since 1914. The war that then broke out was intended by its authors permanently to blight, if not to annihilate at once and forever, the dream of the Slavs, and, among them, of the Czecho-Slovaks, for independence. Instead, it realized that dream and, incidentally, in so doing it revealed to the world some very admirable and impressive characters of which it was up to that time supremely ignorant. Foremost among these are Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, first president of the republic and Edward Benes, its first minister of foreign affairs.

Those who are inclined to think lightly or humorously of professors as unconscionable blunderers or dolts in politics, if they are so imprudent as to wander thus far afield, would do well to cast a passing glance at these two new figures on the world's great stage, to compare them with others who have had a different and supposedly more appropriate and promising origin, and possibly to distil a drop or two of wisdom from an examination of their exploits in the domain of public affairs.

It was quite in the tradition of the Czechs to find their leaders in the class of intellectuals. The great national hero is John Huss, priest, philosopher, professor, reformer, a man who was burned on the shores of Lake Constance because he would not

recant his religious beliefs when ordered to do so by the Council of Constance. Probably the next best known son of Bohemia is Comenius, one of the world's most famous educators. The Czech national revival of the nineteenth century, without which the Czechs could not conceivably have achieved their present fortunes, was largely the work of scholars, among whom were Dobrovsky and Jungman and Safarik and Kollar, philologists and archaeologists, and Palacky, "the greatest of Slav historians and the creator of the national consciousness of Bohemia," whose work, according to Gooch, "was not only an achievement in scholarship but a political event, a trumpet call to an oppressed nationality to raise its head and prove itself worthy of its past." Masaryk and Benes are worthy successors in this dynasty of scholars to whom the new nation owes so much.

Thomas Garrigue Masaryk was born in 1850 of parents so poor that the problem of his education was a very difficult one. After passing through the primary school, he was apprenticed to a blacksmith and worked for some time at that craft. But nothing could long hold him back, so ardent was his desire for knowledge and for the intellectual life. He went through a preparatory school and then entered the University of Vienna where he devoted himself particularly to the study of the classics and the natural sciences; then to the University of Leipsic for work in philosophy. At the age of thirty-two he was appointed to the chair of philosophy at the University of Prague. From this coign of vantage his influence radiated not only throughout Bohemia but throughout the Slavic world in general. Not only the youth of his own country but thousands of young Serbs and Croatsians, Bulgarians and Russians, received the instruction and stimulus of this very clear-sighted and very honest scholar and thinker. Masaryk's lecture room was a fruitful nursery of sound and critical thinking, and a powerful generator of fresh moral purpose and energy.

Bohemian philosophy had long felt the influence of German thought. It was now to be given a different turn, as Masaryk, reacting against German speculation, emphasized particularly English philosophy as expressed by Hume and Spencer and Mill, as expressed also in the positivism of Comte. Realistic, scientific in method, insisting that nothing be accepted which has not first been rigorously tested and proved, Masaryk exercised a profound and healthy influence upon a multitude of students. He taught them that the truth must be sought for diligently, must be always held in reverence, that it is the truth that makes

men free. An intense patriotism and a deep love of humanity were not found contradictory or mutually exclusive by this practical philosopher, as they have often been by extreme nationalists and by extreme internationalists.

The problem of the small nations began to interest him and he began to preach that the first duty of a people like the Czechs was the slow and laborious one of developing their culture to the highest point, intellectually, morally and materially. Only thus could they hope to maintain their individuality in the face of an adversary as strong in numbers and in resources as was Germany. Masaryk denounced the old method of nationalist agitation which consisted in extravagantly praising everything Czech, in forever harping upon the glories of the past as in some way ensuring the future. He hated false patriotism and all its manifestations and he was not afraid to tell the truth even when it was disagreeable to his fellow-countrymen. Thus, some time after his arrival in Prague, he challenged the authenticity of certain manuscripts which were generally considered as ancient and glorious national relics, and as proving that the nation had attained a high degree of culture as early as the tenth century, and quite without the aid of foreign influences. In collaboration with some of his colleagues, he was able to prove, by an appeal to philology and to sociological criticism and historical analysis, that the manuscripts were false, and he took occasion to drive home the lesson that the culture and the policy of a nation can never be based upon forgeries. Whereupon, for a time, he became vastly unpopular and his name a term of opprobrium, synonymous with that of traitor, the last of insults which men hurl at each other in their anger. But in the end, this reputation for truth-telling, for downright honesty, served Masaryk well, as it had served Washington before him, and became the source of that vast moral influence which he was destined to exert upon all classes of the Czech population.

In the field of politics, as in that of scholarship, Masaryk waged unrelenting war upon all humbugs, illusions, and meaningless rhetoric. He founded a party which he called the Realist Party and whose motto was "to have no illusions on the real state of things," to look the facts of social and political life straight in the face, to see things as they really were, and not to deal in mere catchwords or phrases. The application of this principle to the study of the national problems and conditions gave great vigor and freshness to his discussion of public matters, whether in his university lectures or in his numerous

books or in his speeches in parliament. He expounded his programme in the Austrian Reichsrat and in a newspaper which he edited. His fame began to spread to other countries when, in the first decade of the new century, he denounced the tortuous and dishonest methods of Austrian policy in regard to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the shady transactions of Austrian diplomacy in its relations with the Serbs.

When the war broke out in 1914 Masaryk, considering its purpose to be the secure and final enthronement of Germanism in Central Europe, the definitive extinction of all the hopes of the Slavic peoples, left Bohemia on a self-imposed mission for his country. He was to return in triumph exactly four years later, acclaimed unanimously as president of his liberated country. Those four years he spent in France, Italy, Switzerland, England, Russia and the United States, arguing for the independence of his native land, establishing personal contacts with important statesmen in the Allied countries, organizing the Czecho-Slovak legions in Russia, whose marvelous efforts in Siberia rivalled the Odyssey and made their new name known the world over, and founding and directing the Czecho-Slovak National Council in Paris, which served as the spokesman of a people completely surrounded on all sides by its enemies, completely cut off from its friends, and muzzled as thoroughly as any people in Europe.

Such was the man who, by universal acclaim, became President of Czecho-Slovakia when Czecho-Slovakia became independent, a man exceptionally equipped for the position to which he was called. For Masaryk was a man of the widest cultivation, knowing England and Germany from long periods of residence in them and from deep study, thoroughly familiar with the history of French thought and with current French ideas, the author of an important book on *The Spirit of Russia*, a study of the history and philosophy and religion and politics of a country for which he had always felt the liveliest interest, thoroughly conversant with Austro-Hungarian and Balkan problems, and well acquainted with the New World through his marriage to an American lady. Masaryk, as another has said, was, when the crisis of his life came, "better prepared than perhaps any statesman of his time to grapple with the great European problems which the war had raised."¹ Respected for his absolute honesty and sincerity, personifying the highest qualities and ideals of his race, a man of Spartan tastes, indif-

¹ R. W. Seton-Watson, in Temperley, *A History of The Peace Conference of Paris*. Vol. IV, page 353.

ferent, as we have seen, to popularity, he had this additional title to the regard of his countrymen that in 1916 he had been condemned to death *in contumaciam* and that as a method of intimidating him, he being safe abroad, his daughter, Dr. Alice Masaryk, had been imprisoned, and had remained without trial in solitary confinement for nearly a year, only released finally as a consequence of the indignant protests of certain women's societies of America. It is no occasion for surprise that since Czecho-Slovakia has achieved her independence she has named her loftiest mountain peak, and also her university at Brunn, after her first President.

Around this Father of his Country, as Masaryk was considered, had gathered a group of followers and disciples, one of the ablest of whom was the son of a peasant, Edward Benes, formerly a student of Masaryk and subsequently his colleague at the University of Prague. Benes had spent many years studying at the universities of Prague, Paris, Berlin, and London. In 1914 he was a lecturer at his own university and was favorably known in university circles for his knowledge of law and economics and philosophy and sociology. He was thirty years of age, with no reputation in politics, with no ambition, indeed, save that of carrying on the work of Masaryk, within the field of education and letters. But the war launched him upon a very different career. He became Masaryk's right-hand man, collaborating closely with him at every stage. Escaping with difficulty from Bohemia during the war, he settled finally in Paris and became the center of multitudinous activities, the purpose of which was to win over the public opinion and the public men of the Allied countries to the idea of Czecho-Slovak independence and to the conception of a new central Europe free from Germanic control. The war and the subsequent years of peace-making revealed him as a magnetic personality and as the possessor of diplomatic talents of a high order, which talents were shown at the Conference of Paris and in the Council of the League of Nations. In 1918 Benes became the foreign secretary of the Czecho-Slovak Republic and was shortly recognized as one of the straightest thinkers and most constructive minds in the diplomacy of contemporary Europe.

The only other Czech who at the beginning of the republic enjoyed a reputation comparable to that of Masaryk was Dr. Karel Kramar, prime minister of the first cabinet, long recognized as one of the most intelligent and liberal of party leaders, a man hated by the Austrian Government, arrested and im-

prisoned on the charge of treason in 1915, and condemned to death in 1916, a sentence which the government did not dare to execute but which it commuted to fifteen years of penal servitude. Released in 1917 by the operation of the amnesty proclaimed by the new Emperor Charles, Kramar was destined to play an important part at the inception of the new state, although his ministry was to have only a brief existence.

The new republic had need of all the talents it possessed, for the problems confronting it were varied and formidable. Both in foreign policy and in domestic, questions of the most complex character must be answered. Under the leadership of Masaryk and Benes and the men they have gathered around them, these questions have been taken up and solved or carried some distance toward solution. Of primary interest has been the development of the foreign policy of the state. Czecho-Slovakia, with its fourteen million inhabitants, is a rich and well-ordered country, but with potential enemies within and without. Surrounded on three sides by a cordon of German states and with about four million Germans upon her territory and those four million largely concentrated toward the German frontier, her situation is full of danger. A landlocked state, she possesses no seaport and her only way of reaching the sea is over railroads owned by other nations. To be sure, definite rights of access to Hamburg and Stettin and Trieste are assured her by the treaties, but will these rights be sufficient to the needs of her commerce or will the assurance be permanently respected? During the war the Germans had considered a grandiose plan for the organization of Central Europe, and that plan had rested on the control of the Slavs for the advantage of the Germans. But the outcome of the war was very different from that contemplated by the theorists of this high-flying conception. Instead of establishing a wider overlordship over the Slavs of Central Europe, Germany lost even those Slavs who had long formed a part of her Empire. The destinies of Central Europe were henceforth to be in the hands of a restored Poland, a Czecho-Slovakia and a Jugo-Slavia, all Slavic states, and in the hands of their friends, the Western Allies, whose military successes and diplomatic decisions had destroyed the German dream and substituted another for it, namely, the dream of the Slavs themselves. Naturally the Germans of Germany and Austria, and the Magyars of Hungary, close partners in the plan now so unexpectedly and unceremoniously set aside, hated the new

arrangement and would be ready to tear it up at the propitious moment.

The consolidation of the new European order, born of the war and defined by the treaties that ended it, naturally, inevitably, became the basic principle of the foreign policy of the Czecho-Slovak Republic. A child of the Allied victory, the new state could only continue to live if the victors should permanently remain in command of the field. Let the treaties of Versailles and Saint-Germain and Trianon be upset and her title deeds and guarantees would disappear and her hold on life would become precarious. Even with all the aid she could get, her situation would be none too comfortable. Blocking for the Germans the alluring pathway to the East, occupying a territory essential to the Central Europe which the Germans had marked out for themselves, Czecho-Slovakia is alike a challenge and a defiance. As the rearrangement of central Europe is the keystone of the new European order, and as Czecho-Slovakia is geographically the very center of the center, it follows that the international relationships of the new republic must present two aspects, one general, the other limited. Within the sphere of general continental politics the closest accord with the great Western Allies, France and England, the strict observance of the treaties, are the objects aimed at by those in charge of the Czecho-Slovak foreign office. Within the more limited sphere of central European politics the preservation of the status quo, that is, of the arrangements sanctioned in that part of the world by the treaties, is the basic purpose. This thought has achieved its most conspicuous expression in the creation of the so-called "Little Entente." By a series of treaties, concluded in 1920 and 1921 under the direction of Benes, Czecho-Slovakia, Jugo-Slavia, and Roumania have united in an alliance to preserve the peace in central Europe, to secure the maintenance of normal economic conditions and to block all attempts at reaction that may be made of a character to threaten the existence of the new states. Particularly does the Little Entente aim to prevent a restoration of the House of Hapsburg to power. This purpose concerns, particularly, Hungary, as there is little likelihood, owing to conditions, of such a restoration being attempted in Austria, the other part of the former Dual Monarchy. The efficacy of this alliance was proved in the part it played in April, 1921, and in October, 1921, in helping to prevent Charles of Hapsburg from recovering the throne of Hungary.

In forming the Little Entente, the three powers were not only

prompted by the most obvious self-interest, as a restored royal house would inevitably be driven to attempt to recover its lost territories and its lost prestige, but they were acting in conformity with the view expressed by the Paris Conference when it declared on February 2, 1920, that "it is not within the intention nor can it be regarded as the duty of the principal Allied Powers to intervene in the internal affairs of Hungary or to dictate to the Hungarian people what form of government or of constitution they shall adopt; nevertheless, the Powers cannot allow the restoration of the Hapsburg dynasty to be regarded as a question concerning the Hungarian nation alone. They declare, therefore, that a restoration of this nature would be in conflict with the very basis of the peace settlement and would neither be recognized nor tolerated." The Little Entente has indicated that it will regard the restoration of the Hapsburgs to their former thrones as a *casus belli*.

On another point of foreign policy Czecho-Slovakia is equally emphatic. She is absolutely opposed to the union of Austria with Germany. Should this incorporation occur, she, a nation of fourteen million, would find herself nearly surrounded by a nation of sixty-five or seventy million, and would exist on sufferance merely. Moreover, a Germany thus augmented, with Vienna as its second city, and resting on the Danube, would exert a great pressure for the annexation of the three or four millions of Germans in Czecho-Slovakia and, having re-established a direct connection with Hungary, would encourage that state to try to recover its former Slovak territories. Those who are inclined to believe that Germany and Hungary have accepted their defeat and will not seek to tear up the treaties should at least not expect the Czechs, threatened as they are, even now, by the very situation in which they find themselves, to cherish any illusions in regard to peoples whose nature and quality they have had abundant occasions to observe during many painful centuries.

Still another feature in the foreign policy of Czecho-Slovakia which the observer, interested in seeing the contemporary world as it is, should not lose sight of, is her opposition to the foundation of a Danubian confederation. Looking with intense suspicion upon all such plans as merely the beginning of a contemplated restoration of the former hated empire and the former oppressor, the House of Hapsburg, she has been and will be found to be steadfast in her opposition to any combination that might, under any name or form, restore the old Austria-Hungary.

Such are certain of the fixed points in the outlook of the Czecho-Slovaks over the international horizon. But while refusing bluntly to consent to any rehabilitation of the odious régime to whose overthrow they have so greatly contributed, while refusing to compromise in any way the independence of their country, which they have achieved at such costs and which they are resolved to maintain, they have frankly recognized the economic interdependence of the "Succession States" and have sought to create a system of agreements with them covering various aspects of economic life such as transportation, ports, telegraphs, exchange of goods, finance and banking, thus hoping gradually to bring about peaceful, normal, regular economic conditions conducive to the stability of the new European order and consequently to the security and prosperity of the republic. But in the conclusion to this end of numerous treaties with their neighbors and with the Allies, the Czecho-Slovaks have made it plain that nothing is to be done which shall restrict or impair the economic and political sovereignty of their state.

Within the sphere of domestic politics much has been achieved since 1918 and much is in course of being achieved. The statesmen of Czecho-Slovakia are engaged in making a modern democratic nation. To accomplish the end they have in mind, they have many problems to solve, the adjustment of racial differences, regional differences, social differences. Czecho-Slovakia, like the former Austro-Hungarian Empire is, as has already been said, a polyglot state. Of the 14,000,000 inhabitants, thirty-five per cent. are of different races and speak different languages than the Czechs and Slovaks. There are about three million Germans in Bohemia and Moravia, about 750,000 Magyars in Slovakia, and about 460,000 Ruthenians or Little Russians in the eastern tip of the country, under the Carpathians. Whether these racial and linguistic minorities will co-operate harmoniously with the Czechs and Slovaks in the development of the country or whether they will be centers of irredentism, sources of obstruction, advocates of secession; whether they will inflame and poison the political and social life of the commonwealth, or whether these hardy and traditional passions will gradually subside remains, of course, the secret of the future. It is well not to be unduly optimistic. In Europe the fusion of races that have countless bitter memories, and countless grudges to repay, presents no such easy problem as Americans, who have happily been spared much of the misery of history, are apt to think. Certain it is that the German deputies to the Czecho-Slovak parliament on one occasion in 1920

struck up the *Watch on the Rhine* and *Deutschland über Alles* and then quit the hall, as an expression of their discontent. The Germans and the Magyars of Czecho-Slovakia will have the support, at least moral, of their brothers in Germany and Hungary.

However, there are forces of a better augury active in the state. Economic interests tend to hold the Germans and the Czechs of Bohemia together, and while the world ought to know by this time that economic motives are not the most powerful in determining men's conduct, that men will often willingly sacrifice obvious economic advantages in order to realize such ideals as liberty and independence, still in normal times the cohesive effects of material needs require no proof. Also just treatment of minorities by majorities may tend in the same direction and the future may see, what the past has seen only too infrequently, the fading of racial animosities.

There are not only differences of race to be adjusted in this new republic, but there are also marked regional differences which may or may not become sources of misunderstanding, irritation, and friction. The different sections are unevenly developed both from the point of view of education and of material prosperity. In Bohemia and Moravia the standard of education is high and there are very few illiterates. This devotion to education is entirely in the traditions of the former kingdom of Bohemia, with its great heroes, Huss and Comenius, leaders of the highest intellectual and moral distinction. On the other hand in Slovakia the situation is deplorable. Of the subject nationalities of Hungary none were more grossly or systematically misruled than the Slovaks. It was the intention and the policy of the ruling Magyars to keep them undeveloped in order to keep them weak and powerless, and the process of Magyarization was carried out among them with relentlessness. For forty years before the independence of Czecho-Slovakia, there had not been in Slovakia a single secondary school using the Slovak language. The Magyars would allow Magyar schools which might carry on the work of Magyarization but not schools conducted in the language of the people. They followed a deliberate and heinous policy of stunting two and a half million human beings in their development. Not only were the Slovaks given no secondary schools by the state, they were even forbidden to found private schools of their own.¹ The number even of their primary schools

¹ For further information on the Magyar methods in Slovakia see R. W. Seton-Watson, *Racial Problems in Hungary* (1908) and Ernest Denis, *Les Slovaques* (1917).

was reduced from 1921 in 1869 to 429 in 1909. The natural result of such oppression was a backward and ignorant population, high illiteracy, poverty so great and an outlook so hopeless that thousands and tens of thousands of Slovaks were driven to emigrate to the United States. The Ruthenian provinces, to the east of Slovakia, and constituting the extreme tip of the republic, were still worse off, being on a level with Russia in backwardness, illiteracy there rising as high as seventy-five per cent.

How, out of a country of such various cultural levels, to make a nation that shall feel and think along similar and harmonious lines is one of the problems challenging Czecho-Slovak statesmanship. A promising beginning has been made. Between 1918 and 1921 the Government established some 2,000 additional primary schools and forty or more high schools, so that it is only a question of time before a great improvement will be achieved in this domain.

Another question, raised into high relief by the revolution of 1918, was that of land reform, a reform long recognized as desirable both from a social and economic point of view. It was now seen to be a possible reform. Immense landed estates belonged to an infinitesimal proportion of the population, perhaps to a tenth of one per cent., while large numbers of people did not own a single acre of their native land. "The great majority of the landlords," says President Masaryk "were nobles of foreign origin who acquired their estates at the hands of the Hapsburg conqueror from 1621 onwards, when, after the battle of the White Mountain, the lands of the Czech nobles and yeomen were confiscated, the owners being executed or, as adherent of the Moravian Brotherhood and other Protestant churches, preferring to pass into exile rather than surrender their faith. The demand for the nationalization of the great landed estates was thus not only supported as a social and economic necessity, in order to provide the landless population, notably the legionaries, with land, but was, deep in the minds of the people, regarded as a legal rectification of the wrongs suffered through the confiscations which followed the defeat of the White Mountain."

That the demand for agrarian reform was widespread and emphatic is shown by the fact that a law sequestering the great estates was passed unanimously by the National Assembly on April 16, 1919. This law gives the state the right to seize and distribute estates larger than 370 acres in the case of noble land or 600 acres in the case of other land. This land is not confis-

cated but is paid for by the state, according to certain standards laid down by the law. For the work of buying and selling the land, a State Land Office has been established. The land is in general to be divided into small farms of about 37 acres, an amount considered suitable for cultivation by a single family. This land is to be paid for by the new proprietor, though means of gradual payment have been instituted so liberal that persons with very slight means can practically acquire holdings, paying only a tenth of the value down and being given credit for the remainder. The object of the law is the division of land among peasant proprietors. The process was to begin with the acquisition by the state of the very large estates containing 12,350 acres or more.

Much other legislation of a social and economic nature has been passed since the revolution of 1918, laws establishing the eight hour day for those engaged in industry and agriculture (with certain exceptions), laws enlarging the scope of the accident and sickness insurance system and increasing the payments to the insured, sickness insurance being made to include maternity insurance, laws securing pensions to the widows and orphans of the insured, laws concerning the housing problem and also encouraging building operations by means of state aid, laws concerning unemployment, employment of ex-soldiers, the regulation of "sweating" industries, and finally laws for the construction of necessary highways, railroads and canals.

Of all the states that have inherited all or part of their territory from the late Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, Czecho-Slovakia is from the economic point of view the richest and most progressive. Her activity, about equally divided between industry and agriculture, had made her the most prosperous of the Austrian lands. This prosperity rests upon two factors, important natural resources and a population which is hard-working and intelligent. Prague and Pilsen rank among the great industrial cities of Europe. In certain branches of industry Czecho-Slovakia stands high, as, for instance, in the production of sugar and glass. She is the second largest beet sugar producer in the world and the only state in Europe which can export sugar. Her glass has been famous since the fifteenth century. Paper and porcelain, leather goods and chemicals, beers and wines are among her characteristic products and the metal and textile trades have been extensively developed. Czecho-Slovakia possesses coal and iron, though not enough for her needs. Her foreign trade is increasing with the natural though slow

movement back toward normal conditions of labor and industry and with the conclusion of commercial treaties with other powers. As a land-locked country she can only reach the markets of the world by sending her commodities over railways and rivers which belong to other nations. But under the peace treaties she possesses the right of transit and she has secured docks and warehouses of her own in Hamburg. How smoothly such arrangements will work or how many impediments may be thrown in the way of their free development remains to be seen.

The geographical position of Czecho-Slovakia, the very center of Europe, is favorable to her serving as intermediary between the East and the West of the continent. The character of her economic system makes it certain that she will be a great exporter. Her business relations will probably be closest with her immediate neighbors, Germany on the one hand, and Hungary, Bulgaria, Jugo-Slavia, and perhaps ultimately Russia, on the other.

Czecho-Slovakia is a country which has a distinguished background in the history of letters and the arts, and in moral and religious movements, some of which have reached far beyond its borders. In the course of the centuries, the country has been embellished with the creations of architecture and painting and sculpture. Prague is from this point of view one of the most interesting capitals of Europe. Music may properly be called a national art, an old tradition among both Czechs and Slovaks, a popular art in the literal sense of the word, expressing a people's soul and a people's aspirations. It was noticed during the World War that the population flocked not only to the theater but to the concert halls as to temples where their patriotic fervor, their hope of a future freed from foreign oppression, would receive inspiration and exaltation. The names of Smetana and Dvorak, the composers, of Kubelik, the executant, are widely known abroad. It is reasonable to expect a richer efflorescence of the arts now that national liberty has been achieved.

In other domains this new country has its traditions in the past of those peoples which are now its constituent elements. In education it has a long record of devotion, as has been already indicated, a record which gives every assurance of continuing with the founding by the Republic of two new universities, the Masaryk University at Brunn, and the Comenius University at Bratislava, the new baptismal appellation of what was formerly known to students of history as Pressburg.

In religion there is great diversity of allegiance. Before the Thirty Years War about 90 per cent. of the Bohemians were

Protestants. As a result of that war and the loss of independence and of the Counter-Reformation the situation was reversed and about 90 per cent. of the population became Catholic. A great deal of the spirit of John Huss, however, has always been present in the Bohemian people for whom he has ever remained the national hero despite the fact that he was burned at Constance as a heretic. Even before the revolution of 1918, there had been in Bohemia a certain movement of revolt summarized in the cry "Away from Rome," a movement which resulted in some increase of the ranks of free-thinkers and Protestants. According to President Masaryk about 1,000,000 persons left the Roman Catholic Church between 1918 and 1921. Many of these became free-thinkers but a considerable number proceeded to found what they called a national Czecho-Slovak Church. Many priests demanded changes in the church, such as abolition of celibacy, the use of the vernacular in church services, and a more democratic administration of church affairs. Upon the Pope's refusal to meet these demands, the dissatisfied elements seceded and in January, 1920, founded the Czecho-Slovak Church, which has about 120 churches and over half a million members.

There are in Czecho-Slovakia, beside the Catholics who are in the overwhelming majority, about a million Protestants, and half a million adherents of the Greek Church. The Jews number about 350,000, too few to create a problem such as that which exists in other countries of Eastern Europe.

CHAPTER XL

THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND

THE reappearance of Poland at the Conference of Paris as a sovereign state was one of the most impressive and spirit-stirring events of our age or, for that matter, of any age. A nation which had had a great and memorable history and which had then undergone vivisection at the hands of its neighbors came to life again and found once more a local habitation and a name. The partitions of Poland had long been considered the classic adventure in international crime of the eighteenth century, ranking with the seizure of Silesia in the coolness of its villainy and greatly eclipsing it in the magnitude of the operation. The second or third largest state in Europe was completely effaced from the map and where one sought its name, one found only the names of Prussia, Russia, and Austria. Whatever consecration time can give to successful wrong was bestowed upon this famous rape, and those who had performed it went their prosperous way, rejoicing, quite free from any weak qualms of conscience, and not seriously disturbed by the reappearance from time to time of the ghost of murdered Poland. The soul of Poland might still exist but it was tightly imprisoned on all sides.

The declaration of war in August, 1914, opened up for the Poles a gloomy and agonizing prospect. After a century and more of grievous oppression, they saw themselves herded together in the ranks of the German, Austrian, and Russian armies, about to be hurled against each other in fratricidal strife, brother pitted against brother, and both against their mother country. There followed four years of varied horror; the state of siege with all its vexations and cruelties toward those suspected of not being loyal to their oppressors, and who should not be so suspected? four years of invasion and counter-invasion, of armies moving back and forth and systematically ravaging or robbing as they moved; four years of terrible isolation from all friends, of ignorance of what was going on in the world, an ignorance only diversified by the lying or embroidered accounts of Austrian or German news agencies, relieved very infrequently by a little

precise information from some person who had miraculously managed to get out of the country and then back again, and who was able to report things not to the liking of the Austrian and German general staffs.

What hope was there for the Poles in such a war? In whatever direction they might turn, what could they see but continued subjection to others? If the Central Powers should win, Russia might be compelled to give up her Poles, but who would get them, if not the Austrians and Germans? If Austria and Germany should lose, would not the outcome be merely the reverse, subjection to Russia instead of to Austria and Germany? To be sure, throughout the war, the one side or the other tried, as its fortunes waned or waxed for the moment, to lure the Poles to hearty co-operation against its enemies by promising them a restored and united Poland in the end, but the promises were always specious, always qualified by some ambiguity or reservation that rendered them null, or nearly so, in the eyes of the Poles, whose experience in the past with the triple band of oppressors did not lead them to repose an unlimited confidence in them now. The burnt child fears the fire and fearfully keeps at a safe distance from its dangerous and deceptive warmth.

The only hope for the Poles in the war was that both sides, Russia on the one hand, and Germany and Austria on the other, should come out of it defeated. And such a hope could not reasonably be entertained, so preposterous it seemed. Nevertheless, the preposterous happened. Russia was defeated by the Central Powers and compelled to sign the treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The Central Powers were defeated by the Allies and compelled to sign the Versailles and other treaties. The ground was cleared for a new structure, and one more substantial and more comfortable for its occupants than that whose uncertain and shadowy plans had, during the war, been dangled before them by their oppressors.

Long before the opening of the Conference of Paris the problem of Poland had been envisaged from a very different angle than that of the partitioning powers. As early as May, 1917, the attitude of the Poles themselves was defined by the Polish members of the Austrian Parliament who declared that "the desire of the Polish nation was to have restored an independent and united Poland with access to the sea." More important, because having more force behind it, was the opinion of the Entente Powers, whose education in this matter, as in others, had been backward but was now beginning to catch up with the

possibilities and requirements of the situation. On January 5, 1918, Lloyd George, stating that he was speaking "for the nation and the Empire as a whole" declared that "an independent Poland, comprising all those genuinely Polish elements who desire to form part of it, is an urgent necessity for the stability of Western Europe." This was putting the project on high and permanent grounds. An independent Polish nation was declared necessary not only because the Poles themselves might desire it but because it was essential to the stability of Western Europe, that is, because it would be of direct benefit to England and France and Italy and other states, as well as to the Poles. Three days later, on January 8, 1918, President Wilson expressed practically the same thought when, in the thirteenth of his fourteen points which must be secured in order that this world "be made fit and safe to live in," he said: "An independent Polish State should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant."

Thus, before the Conference of Paris met, the existence of a restored Poland was recognized by the victors who gave to Poland two votes in the Conference itself, as they gave two to Czecho-Slovakia, Roumania, Greece, and others.

But the Polish problem was not solved by these and other similar pronouncements; it was merely stated as a problem which ought to be solved in conformity with certain fundamental principles. It was the business of the Conference to apply those principles in detail to the actual facts of the situation, to determine just what was an "indisputably Polish population," what precise territories included it, and what exactly would constitute "a free and secure access to the sea." If Poland was to be restored, and all the Allies were agreed that she was to be, what was Poland anyway? She was already recognized as an independent state in the Conference of Paris, casting two votes on occasion, but she was a state without boundaries; evidently no seemly or safe condition for any state, young or old, to be in. This was a matter that must be attended to at once.

A most perplexing matter it was and one that was to drag distressingly and to be settled to no one's satisfaction; one, indeed, that was settled only piece by piece. A beginning was made in the Treaty of Versailles, which defined the boundary on the side of Germany; which, in other words, decided what terri-

tories Germany should give up to the new state. This was the most important aspect of the whole subject, although it was only one aspect. Into the details of the long argument and the complicated, involved decision we cannot enter here. Suffice it to say that Poland received the larger part of Posen and a part of the province of West Prussia. Most of East Prussia was to remain German but in two sections plebiscites were to be held in order to determine the wishes of the people, in the Marienwerder and the Allenstein districts. The access to the sea was provided for by the famous "corridor," a comparatively narrow strip of territory indisputably Polish in population. This arrangement has been denounced by the critics of the Treaty of Versailles on the ground that this corridor cuts off Germany from the province of East Prussia, largely left to her, and that this is something the Germans can never be expected permanently to endure. The wisdom and justice of the decision have been succinctly and convincingly presented by an authority on Polish history, as follows: "Certainly it would be an undesirable arrangement if there were any just way of avoiding it. But it may be remarked, in the first place, that this is the only solution of the problem that corresponds to the ethnographic situation, to the unhappy way in which Germans and Poles have come to be distributed here as the result of centuries of conflict. This solution merely restores the territorial situation that existed for three hundred years down to the time of the First Partition. Moreover, the continuity of German territory cannot be maintained without denying Poland access to the sea. Either East Prussia will have to trade with Germany across Polish territory or Poland will have to trade with the outside world across German territory. It is a question of balancing the respective interests at stake. And who will argue that the right of the million and a half Germans in East Prussia to have a land connection with Germany (they will always have an easy communication by sea) outweighs the right of over twenty million Poles in the hinterland to a secure access to the Baltic? Clearly the Polish interest involved is incomparably the greater and ought to take precedence. Every effort has been made in the Peace Treaty to assure untrammelled railway and trade communications between Germany and East Prussia across the intervening Polish territory. Further than that it seems unnecessary to go to secure the interests of the rather small, detached German colony around Königsberg."¹

¹ Lord, in Haskins and Lord, *Some Problems of the Peace Conference*, pages 179-180.

But the control of the corridor to the sea would be of slight advantage without control of its natural terminus, the port of Danzig. Danzig is the end of the corridor, the port of entry, the port of exit, for the Vistula, the great river of Poland. Danzig had belonged to the former Polish republic and had greatly prospered as all the ocean commerce of the country had passed through its harbor. Prussia acquired it in 1793 in the Second Partition. Very prosperous and contented under Polish rule, Danzig largely lost its prosperity under the Germans. The Poles, because they regarded the city as rightfully theirs and also because it was their only possible outlet to the sea, expected that it would be included in the new state. That it was not was owing to the opposition of Lloyd George, with whom President Wilson was persuaded to agree, Clemenceau acquiescing, though unwillingly. The reason given for not doing the obvious thing was that Danzig and the region round about, with a population of about 300,000, was overwhelmingly German in stock and speech and sympathy, that it was undesirable to incorporate in Poland so large a body of persons who would necessarily be a discontented and therefore a weakening element in the state. The reason is not impressive coming from men who lapsed easily from the principle here involved in their settlement of other questions that came before them. Three hundred thousand Germans of the Austrian Tyrol were handed over to Italy on strategic grounds and three million to Czecho-Slovakia on historic grounds. The same arguments might have been applied to Danzig with greater force from the point of view of Polish national defense and with equal force from that of historic right.

The Conference of Paris, instead, saw fit to make a most complicated and artificial arrangement. It took Danzig from Germany but did not give it to Poland. It provided that it should be made a Free City or State under the protection of the League of Nations and with close connections with Poland. It promised that the Allied Powers should negotiate a treaty between the Free City and the Republic of Poland whereby the latter should include the former within its customs barriers, whereby a part of the port should be constituted a "free zone," and whereby also Poland should have the free and unrestricted use of the docks and quays necessary for the free movement of exports and imports. Poland is to have charge of the foreign affairs of the Free City as well as of the protection of its citizens abroad. Poland is assured the control of the railways, post

offices, telegraph and telephone systems that connect her with Danzig. The executive of the Free City is a High Commissioner appointed by the League of Nations. A diplomatic representative of the Polish Government stationed at Danzig acts as intermediary between the Republic and the Free City.

Thus the three hundred thousand people in this zone of 1800 square kilometers are subject to three governments, to their own in some respects, to the Polish in certain others, and in still others, to the League of Nations, representing some fifty states. It would not be easy to organize a system that would expose more surfaces to friction, and it need occasion no surprise that serious friction has already occurred. The High Commissioners thus far appointed by the League of Nations have been Englishmen. In 1920, when the Russians invaded Poland and came within twelve miles of Warsaw, the precariousness of Poland's famous "access to the sea" and the dangers to her national safety that lay in these complicated arrangements were abundantly established, the fragility of paper guarantees in the practical exigencies of life again amply demonstrated. The course of that campaign, so critical for the Poles, brought into harsh light the importance of the "question of Danzig." The Poles, could they or could they not use the port which the Treaty of Versailles had placed at their disposal? For six critical weeks in July and August, 1920, they could not. The dockers of the port refused to unload an English boat carrying munitions for Poland. The Poles replied by cutting off food supplies which were on their way to Danzig. The fear of famine generated troubles. A mob of 20,000 persons went to the palace of the High Commissioner and began to smash in its doors when the Prussian police arrived and re-established order with machine guns. There were several kill and wounded. German workmen, armed with clubs and knives, started a mad hunt for Poles. Some time later the Danzig laborers permitted British soldiers to unload the munitions, which reached their destination, not, to be sure, when the need was greatest, but in the fulness of time.

This was hardly the unrestricted enjoyment, the free use of a port. All through the year, in fact, there was almost constant wrangling between the German and Polish elements in the Free City, much contention between the Free City and Poland, and frequent appeals were taken by one or both from the decisions of the High Commissioner to the supreme authority, the Council of the League of Nations.

Whether the relations between the various elements of this

complex construction will with the lapse of time become smooth and normal; whether economic advantage will make its influence felt in reconciling the Danzigers with the Poles, since the fact is that if Danzig is necessary to Poland, Poland is likewise necessary to Danzig; whether the magic touch of mutual and reciprocal self-interest will suffice to make an artificial and involved arrangement work practically in a reasonably orderly and beneficent way remains to be seen. It can only be said that the experiment thus far has not been of a character to inspire excessive optimism.

In another section of former Prussia, it was provided by the Treaty of Versailles that the new boundary line should be drawn only after a consultation of the people concerned, namely, in Upper Silesia. That the majority of population there was Polish-speaking was indisputable. The proportion of Poles to Germans was 65% to 35% for the region as a whole. But did speech indicate preference? And even if it did was that the only thing to be taken into account?

So strong was the claim of Poland that the Peace Conference originally decided to grant Upper Silesia to her outright, but toward the end of its sessions, under the influence of the vigorous German protests and the criticism of the British Labor Party, Lloyd George succeeded in reopening the matter and in effecting a different arrangement. Upper Silesia was a most important mining and industrial section of Germany. It had produced, before the war, a fourth of Germany's coal, more than 42,000,000 tons a year. It was rich in lead and zinc. The prospect of losing so valuable a territory aroused the Germans to bitter protest, and it was finally decided that the people of Upper Silesia should express their wishes and that after they had done so, the principal Allied and Associated Powers should draw the boundary line, taking into account not only the showing of the plebiscite but the geographical and economic conditions of the region as well.

By this decision the Conference precipitated a long and stormy struggle which lasted over two years, which inflamed the passions of Poles and Germans to fever heat, which led to warlike acts within the fated area itself, and which incidentally strained the relations of the Allied Powers among themselves almost to the snapping-point. Into the multitudinous and most exciting details of this chapter of contemporary history, it is quite impossible to enter here. On several occasions it seemed as if war might again break out over the application of this supposed pacific method of adjusting differences. The plebiscite, when it

was finally held on March 20, 1921, resulted in a total of 717,000 votes for Germany to 483,000 for Poland. In 664 districts there was a German majority, in 597 a Polish. It was for the Allies to draw the line in view of all the relevant facts, but the Allies could not agree. Indeed, the relations of France and England, the former favoring the Poles, the latter the Germans, became so tense as to threaten a rupture. Unable to come to a decision themselves, the Allied Powers finally referred the matter to the Council of the League of Nations, agreeing to accept its decision. In October, 1921, the Council rendered its decision, which was to divide the industrial region between Germany and Poland, and it drew the frontier accordingly. But, the Council declared that, "owing to the geographical distribution of the population and the mixture of the racial elements, any division of this district must inevitably result in leaving relatively large minorities on both sides of the line and in separating important interests." As this industrial region had long been a unit it would be desirable to provide for the continuance of its normal economic life for a period of years. Thus an abrupt cutting of economic connections could be avoided and the necessary readjustments could be made gradually. The Council, therefore, recommended that a general convention be concluded to this end between Germany and Poland, covering such matters as railways, water and electric power, postal service, coal and mine products, employees' and workers' federations, social insurance, and freedom of movement between the respective zones, and the protection of racial minorities. During the provisional period, which was to last fifteen years, Upper Silesia should be under a special régime. To superintend the execution of these provisional arrangements, a Mixed Commission was to be set up, composed of an equal number of Germans and Poles with a president of some other nationality, to be designated by the Council of the League of Nations. These recommendations have since been incorporated in an elaborate agreement worked out between Germany and Poland.

The region whose status has thus been determined, after much discussion and contention, covers about 4000 square miles and had a population in 1919 of a little over 2,000,000. Its importance is due, as has been said, to its rich coal and zinc mines and to its highly developed iron and steel industries. The decision of the Council of the League of Nations, which was formally ratified by the Allies, gives to Poland about 1,300 square miles, less than a third of the total area, but this zone includes 47 per

cent. of the population, three-fourths of the coal production, all of the zinc mines and works, practically all of the iron mines, and half of the capacity of the steel industries.

Before the war the mines in Upper Silesia, which are now allotted to Poland, produced about 32,000,000 tons of coal, those now allotted to Germany about 10,000,000 tons. Germany produced in 1913, leaving out of account Alsace-Lorraine and the Saar Basin, 174,000,000 tons, of which the area now assigned to Poland produced about 19 per cent. As the pre-war production in the territory of Poland, outside of Upper Silesia, was about 9,000,000 tons, the production of Poland will be increased between three and four times. As her pre-war consumption was about 18,000,000, it is evident that Poland may, for some time, be a coal-exporting country, until at least her own industrial life is much more developed than it is at present.

The decision, then, allots to Poland decidedly more of the mineral wealth and manufacturing industries of Upper Silesia than it allots to Germany. Germany, however, retains more than two-thirds of the territory and much the larger amount of agricultural and forest land.

The Upper Silesian plebiscite was the last of those ordered by the conference of Paris for the purpose of aiding in the determination of the boundaries of the future Germany. Meanwhile, the plebiscites required in the districts of Marienwerder on the Vistula and of Allenstein or Mazuria had resulted in favor of Germany. The population in those districts, while Polish in speech, was Protestant in religion and had never felt the spell of the Polish nationalist movement.

By the series of decisions which have thus been described, the western boundary of the new Republic of Poland was defined, the boundary, that is, between Poland and Germany. But this was only a part of the problem. The southern and eastern boundaries also presented problems of some difficulty and required much time for settlement.

Upper Silesia had not, for six or seven centuries, been a part of Poland, but south of the Carpathian Mountains there was a large Austrian province, Galicia, which had belonged to the Polish kingdom and which had constituted Austria's part of the booty of the three partitions. The collapse of Austria, in 1918, resulted in setting this district adrift. But what its future status should be was not entirely obvious or simple. The western part of the province was overwhelmingly Polish in race but the eastern part presented a mixture of peoples, Poles, Ruthenians and Jews. Here

the Poles represent only 27% of the population but they have always been the dominant class. Their rule has latterly been resisted, but ineffectually, by the Ruthenians, who constitute 59% of the total population. The Ruthenians are of the same race as the Little Russians or, to use a term that has become current during recent years, the Ukrainians. For many centuries the Poles and Ruthenians lived peaceably together but the development of the sense of nationalism in the nineteenth century ultimately touched this corner of the world as it touched and transformed so many others. The ground was not very favorable for the new seed, since the Ruthenians were nearly all poor and ignorant peasants, with only a small educated class of professional men, too small to furnish adequate leadership. Nevertheless, the anti-Polish feeling of the Ruthenians grew, greatly favored by the Austrian government, true to its traditional policy of stirring up the races under its rule against each other so that the one might neutralize the other and none be strong enough to prevail. The Germans, too, stimulated by devious processes the growth of the Ukrainian movement as a way of annoying and possibly menacing both Russia and Austria.

This Ruthenian nationalism, partly natural, partly artificial in origin, had not developed sufficient coherence or sufficient clearness of aim to be in a position to act effectively at that moment of unusual liquidation and rearrangement which was furnished by the end of the war. Although the Ruthenians only numbered about three and a half million, they were divided into two parties, one wishing the creation of an independent Ukrainian nation, the other some kind of a union with Russia, though not until after Russia had purged herself of Bolshevism.

For some time after 1918 a confused and sanguinary struggle unrolled itself in Eastern Galicia, a region that had been fought over during four years by Russians and Austrians, and terribly devastated. There now followed more fighting and more devastation, this time at the hands of Poles and Ukrainians. The Peace Conference intervened only to show its powerlessness. The Poles had no intention of losing so large a province and insisted upon its complete incorporation within the Republic of Poland. In the end, after much pulling and hauling with the Allies, they practically achieved their purpose. Galicia will form an integral part of the Polish state.

We have not yet exhausted the difficulties encountered by resurrected Poland in the initial and necessary work of getting her boundaries defined. We have discussed the problems

presented in the west and south. In the east, also, there were complications. Where should the boundary line between Poland and Russia be fixed? After the revolution of March, 1917, resulting in the overthrow of Nicholas II, the Provisional Government of Russia under Prince Lvov recognized the principle of "an independent Polish state including all regions with an indisputable Polish ethnic majority." But the distressing fact is that here as in many other parts of Europe ethnography speaks with a dubious voice, in most uncertain tones. There are large debatable zones in which there are no "indisputable" ethnic majorities and yet such regions must be placed somewhere, either on the one side or on the other of the projected frontier.

The eastern boundary of Poland was still more difficult to draw because Russia was not a member of the Conference of Paris, because the Allies were not at war with her, and because they had no right and no desire to dispose of her territory without her consent. Moreover, they had no diplomatic relations with her and, therefore, negotiations were impracticable. Yet the question was one which did not admit of indefinite postponement. Consequently the Conference in December, 1919, drew a provisional eastern boundary for Poland. This, the so-called "Curzon line" the Poles refused to accept, as sacrificing too much, and by later direct negotiations with the Soviet Government they were able to secure a line much farther east and consequently giving them a much larger territory (Treaty of Riga, signed March 18, 1921).

Thus it was not until nearly three years after the independence of Poland had been solemnly proclaimed, on November 9, 1918, that her boundaries were definitely defined, nor were they even then entirely defined, for the line between Poland and the new state of Lithuania was still uncertain. Here contention centered particularly about the city of Vilna, and gave rise in time to an ineffectual attempt at mediation by the League of Nations. In April, 1923, the Council of Allied Ambassadors finally recognized the *fait accompli* and definitely assigned Vilna to Poland. Thus ended the long and difficult process of establishing the frontiers of the resurrected republic.

This decision concerning Vilna prompted the Lithuanians to an act of imitation. They seized by force the important port of Memel, placed by the Treaty of Versailles at the disposition of the Allies. As year after year had gone by with no determination by the latter as to its future status the Lithuanians resolved to precipitate a decision. Their action in settling the question by

force ultimately received the sanction of the Council of Ambassadors, a sanction enveloped in phrases designed to save the face of the latter body, whose power and pretensions had been so nonchalantly flouted.

The new Poland, one of the notable by-products of the World War, has within it the potentiality of becoming, under favoring conditions, almost a Great Power. In area it is the sixth state of contemporary Europe and covers about 150,000 square miles. Only Russia, Germany, France, Great Britain, and Spain are larger in territory. Poland's population, as shown by the first census (1921) taken since independence was achieved, exceeds 27,000,000, placing her fifth among the states of the Continent, outranking Spain. Her natural resources are rich and varied. Her forests are extensive and her soil naturally fertile. Important deposits of coal and oil, of zinc and lead, of salt and potash render possible a large industrial development, which, indeed, had successfully begun under Russian and Prussian rule. Warsaw in 1921 had a population of over 900,000 and Lodz, the chief manufacturing center, of nearly half a million. Animated by the stirring and poignant memories of a great and tragic past, stubborn and unshaken in devotion to the national ideals, Poland has awakened from the long period of subjection and, elate with the newly acquired freedom and independence, presses forward with eagerness and hopefulness to her new destinies, whatever they may be. A self-reliant, hardy, energetic people, long tempered in the hot furnace of adversity and misfortune, tough in fiber and resolute in purpose, the Poles are well aware that not all the perils have been avoided, and are conscious of the opportunity that has come to them, after incredible vicissitudes of fortune, to attain a healthier national life than they have ever known, if only they themselves reveal sufficient intelligence and character, a sufficiently true and accurate sense of measure and reality.

But more will be needed for the preservation and development of restored Poland than the mind and soul of her own people can furnish, for the difficulties and dangers, within and without, that menace the future, are numerous and grave. Called into renewed existence by the victory of the Allies, that existence will be threatened by anything that may undermine the harmony of the Allies in their determination to preserve the new European order which their victory has brought forth and which is embodied in the various treaties. Created at the expense of Germany and Russia and Austria, out of territories long ruled by them, Poland

has, in those three powers, the possible and even probable enemies of the future. The enmity of Austria may be disregarded because of the utter collapse and impotence of that state. But a reorganized and ambitious Russia would constitute a formidable danger toward the east, and Germany, it may be affirmed with practical certitude, is and will remain the sworn enemy of Poland, hating her very existence, and resolved, when conditions favor, to end it. Should either neighbor attack her, or more serious still, should both combine to repeat in the twentieth century the notorious achievement of the eighteenth and to effect a new partition, Poland's independence could only be safeguarded by her sponsors of Versailles, chiefly France and England, or by other factors in an international situation which she would herself not be in a position to control. The viability of Poland, like that of the other states of central Europe which have issued fresh or greatly remodeled from the peace deliberations of Paris and its suburbs, will long be more or less precarious, dependent upon circumstances, not all of which can be foreseen. Something more than the vigilance and wisdom of her rulers will be required if she is successfully to surmount the dangers that environ her from her geographical position and the animosities which have thus far dogged her footsteps and which inhere in her very situation.

There are complications, also, of an internal nature, which throw many a shadow before her. One of these is the difficulty of welding together into a firm and homogeneous unity three very dissimilar sections, each of which has had a different history and been long subjected to different formative influences, each of which had left a distinct trace behind. Before the war there had been three Polands, Russian Poland, the largest, with Warsaw as its center, Austrian Poland, or Galicia, with its capital at Cracow, and Prussian Poland, revolving about the city of Posen. Each section had lived under a different régime for well over a hundred years and the impress of so long a period could not fail to be profound. The laws, the institutions, the economic conditions, the policies of each of the three partitioning powers had differed, and the three groups of the same family had lived a different life. The result was a more or less different mentality and outlook and competence characterizing each group. Uniting the three branches of this distracted and unhappy family was the powerful, unconquerable sense of nationality which transcended frontiers, the ever-present consciousness of a glorious past and of a hateful present, the spell of a history that could not

be forgotten, the intangible, indestructible cement of a common patriotism. But, nevertheless, the three sections were unlike socially, politically, economically. German Poland was the most prosperous and progressive. The Poles of Austria had enjoyed a greater measure of political power, and had, therefore, had a greater opportunity for a certain education in the arts of government and administration. The Poles of Russia represented on the whole a lower stage of development, having been associated with a less intelligent, a more backward society.

The leaders of the new Poland, therefore, were confronted with the preliminary and formidable task of fusing into a single body of citizens three great aggregations of people whose bondage to three masters had made three peoples standing on different planes of development, more or less lacking in comprehension of each other, unaccustomed, necessarily, to team-work since that was the fundamental consequence of their having been imprisoned into three compartments as nearly hermetically sealed against each other as the fear and the ingenuity of the three oppressors could contrive. The three Polands lived side by side but were more or less strangers to each other. Such was the essential meaning of their fate, of their having been divided into three troops of captives subject to other wills than their own, of their hard, involuntary servitude. An incidental and important consequence of this state of affairs was that the natural leaders of the three fragments of this disrupted family knew each other imperfectly, had had no training in co-operation and no responsibility in the conduct of affairs. Only in Galicia had the Poles possessed a certain autonomy, only there had they had a certain political training. The education which the Poles had not been able to secure in bondage they must secure in freedom, at a moment of unparalleled difficulty, a moment filled with imperative and distracting problems of every kind, all clamoring for immediate solution. The Poles must, from the nature of the case, learn the baffling art of statesmanship in the hard school of experience, at the very moment when they were engaged in the most exacting of all enterprises, the creation of a state. But they came to their task with the exhilaration of men freed at last from degrading servitude and for whom the doors of opportunity had finally been flung wide open.

Everything had to be created quickly. The state itself, the army, the educational system, systems of taxation, of law, of administration, measures of relief for a people that had suffered desperately from the war, all must be improvised, and improvisa-

tion means haste and waste. The vast work of reconstruction must be begun forthwith by a people that was utterly impoverished, whose fields had been ravaged, whose industries had been destroyed, whose tools and machines had been stolen or wrecked, whose factories had in many cases been burned or blown up by the Germans, whose railroads and highways had gone, for long stretches, to wrack and ruin. How to build a habitable home for the new nation when most of the means were lacking, how to restore the agencies of an ordered and efficient economic and social life in a land whose people were very poor and very hungry, that was the problem. Making bricks without straw is easy by comparison.

But the Poles went at it undismayed. The clearing away of the colossal wreckage, the building up of the new social fabric would require years and years, but the labor was begun on the morrow of the armistice.

Poland's independence was proclaimed on November 9, 1918, the day when the thrones of Germany were falling "in cascades." Five days later General Joseph Pilsudski, freed from the Magdeburg prison where he had been confined for more than fifteen months, assumed, in response to the practically unanimous voice of the Polish nation, the leadership in the state and immediately convoked a Constituent Assembly which confirmed him in his office. Though quite unknown outside of Poland, Pilsudski was known to every Pole and was regarded as the natural and predestined chief, the first President of the Republic of Poland. This was not the first time, as, for instance, was shown by the history of America, when a trusted military leader became the chief political factor in the state.

Pilsudski was a Pole, born in 1867 on the family estate near Vilna, in that Lithuania which had long formed a willing part of historic Poland and which had furnished many distinguished figures to Polish history, among them Kosciusko and Mickiewicz. As a student of medicine at the University of Kharkov, he had incurred the disfavor of the Russian government and had, in 1888, been banished for five years to Siberia. Returning to Poland he managed for eight years to elude the Russian police. Caught at last, in 1900, he feigned insanity, devising new forms of madness. After about a year in a lunatic asylum, he escaped to London, at that time one of the chief centers of the Polish Socialist Party. In 1902 he was back in Russia again.

"He can hardly be described as a Socialist in the usual meaning of the term," says a well-informed writer in *The New*

Europe. "He is a nationalist with foresight and a Socialist without faith. Imbued with the traditions of the old Polish fighters for liberty, of the Legionaries who had followed Napoleon, and of the Polish Democrats who had started the insurrections of 1830 and 1863, he is a spiritual descendant of the Europe of Garibaldi and Mazzini. He and his associates from the Right Wing of the Polish Socialist Party adhered to socialism because they recognized in it the only powerful revolutionary and democratic force of our time — and their supreme aim was by revolutionary means to win Polish independence."

Not primarily interested in the labor problem and yet with considerable knowledge and understanding of it, Pilsudski's chief preoccupation was political in nature, the recovery, by whatever method circumstances might favor, of Polish independence. His was a life, therefore, of secret preparation and intrigue, to which for many years he was dedicated. Forced to manoeuvre incessantly, to burrow secretly underground, in order to avoid the authorities who were always on the watch for him, his activity was mainly directed toward the creation of at least the nucleus of a Polish army, which might, at some critical juncture, emerge from secrecy, equipped with leaders, well-trained, ready, and capable of expansion.

All this preparation aimed at armed revolution against Tsarist Russia, and when the war came Pilsudski and his men fought for a while on the anti-Russian side. But in 1915 he stopped recruiting for the army which he had himself created. He was determined not to develop a force which could be used by Austria and Germany, for their own advantage, not for that of the Poles. He desired a Poland independent not only of Russia but of the Central Powers as well. His attitude brought him into conflict with the military authorities of Austria and Germany and landed him ultimately in the prison of Magdeburg. But his preliminary work had been so well done that it continued to develop in secrecy even after he had himself been seized and deported to Germany.

Pilsudski had proved himself the most determined anti-German as well as anti-Russian leader in Poland. This fact was also attested by Prince Max of Baden, the momentary chancellor of the tumbling German Empire. On November 2, 1918, the Prince wired to Warsaw that he would release Pilsudski only "provided he abandon his hostile attitude with regard to the Occupying Powers, which has led to his removal from Poland." A few days later the revolution in Germany liberated the stubborn prisoner

and caused the transient occupant of Bismarck's chair to vanish incontinently from the scene.

Such had been the career of the first President of the Republic of Poland. He had given evidence of the possession of exceptional abilities as a soldier, as an organizer. Whether there was in him the making of a statesman remained to be seen. The moment was one that called loudly for an able steersman and strategist upon the dangerous field of politics, national and international. A people threatened with starvation, hungry for land, divided into parties reactionary and radical, and environed by enemies, had sore need of a moderating influence, and of sagacity as well as of courage in high places.

One of Pilsudski's early acts was the appointment as prime minister of the man who was in the opinion of the world Poland's most widely known and most distinguished citizen, Ignace Paderewski. Paderewski, an intense patriot, was also a citizen of the world. As a great musician his name had long been familiar not only to the people of every country of Europe, but to Americans, to Australians, to all the tribes of men. What had not been generally known before, this master pianist of the age, now prime minister by one of the romantic twists of an epoch rich in surprises, showed that he was an accomplished diplomat, a student of history and economics, a storehouse of political information, an engaging personality, with influential friends in every land. His rare intellectual equipment and his wide personal contacts had from the beginning of the war been placed at the service of his country, to its great advantage. In Switzerland at the outbreak of the conflict, Paderewski organized a Polish Relief association which soon had branches in other lands. Coming to America in 1915 he exercised a great influence upon the millions of Poles of this country. He, himself, raised perhaps \$150,000 by concerts and addresses for the aid of his countrymen in distress and was the agent of raising many times that amount. When America entered the war he earnestly urged the American Poles to go to the front, and during the war perhaps two hundred thousand of them fought under the American flag. He also offered France a Polish Legion, which was accepted and which fought at Château-Thierry. He founded a Polish National Committee in Paris to work for the interests of his country, to plead its cause, to secure friends for the hour of opportunity which might come.

This man, who knew Europe so well and was so well known, became Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs in

January, 1919. In the following month, a general election was held for a Constituent Assembly. The election resulted in the return of about 400 members favorable to the ministry, about 80 Socialists and 15 Jews. Paderewski's tenure of office was to prove brief, lasting only from January to December, 1919, but it filled a critical year and its achievements were of the first importance. By his position it was his duty to control the work of the Polish delegation at the Conference of Paris and to lay the treaties of peace concluded there before the Polish Parliament. This he did, securing the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles on August 1, 1919, by 285 votes to 41. But, despite this victory, his prestige was diminished and his position shaken, because, while the Poles gained much at Paris, they did not gain all that they desired. The arrangements concerning Danzig and Upper Silesia gave great offense, the Poles regarding both of these territories as rightly theirs and as necessary to their prosperity and their security. When, later in the year, Paderewski was obliged to appear before the Parliament as the supporter or apologist of other unpopular measures of the Allies, one concerning the rights of minorities, which offended the *amour-propre* of the Poles and seemed an infringement upon their sovereignty, and another concerning the disposition of Eastern Galicia, his explanations and appeals failed to carry conviction and he was forced to resign. These measures were little more satisfactory to him than to his critics, but he had the wisdom, which is essential to the statesman if he would be successful, and not a futile doctrinaire, to be content with what one can get out of a highly competitive world in which there are other minds and other interests than one's own, confiding in the hope that a more sympathetic future may consent to favorable rectifications and adjustments.

We have seen that the boundaries of Poland were difficult to draw and that the process of drawing them was not complete in 1919 and that their permanence, once drawn, was exposed to many dangers. The new republic, born of the war, was not destined to know relief from war for long months after the cessation of the great conflict upon the main theaters of operation. Owing to the dilatoriness, the mistaken judgments, and the multiple distractions of the Conference of Paris, many contentious matters were long left dangling in various parts of Europe, where a prompt decision might possibly have averted conflicts. Thus in 1919 the Poles and Czecho-Slovaks came to the verge of war over the possession of the valuable coal lands of the former

Austrian duchy of Teschen, an inauspicious beginning of relations between the two newly-liberated neighbors. A highly industrialized and populous though not extensive area, Teschen was a valuable prize, lying temptingly on the border of the two countries and with a mixed Czech and Polish population. The Prime Minister of Great Britain later admitted in the House of Commons that he "had never heard" of Teschen but that that unknown spot had "very nearly produced an angry conflict between two Allied States, and we had to interrupt the proceedings and try and settle the affairs at Teschen." This unwelcome intruder upon the deliberations of the great seriously annoyed the Conference of Paris, impeding its progress, and constituting a dangerous point of tension and unrest, likely at any moment to affect injuriously the interests of Europe and its peace. It was not until the middle of the following year (July, 1920) that the five Great Powers (America included), divided the little duchy between the two republics in such a way as to secure to Poland the town of Teschen while to Czecho-Slovakia were given the coal mines and an important stretch of railway. Thus tardily was one of the minor difficulties in the rearrangement of Europe settled without further recourse to arms.

Throughout 1919 the Poles were at war with the Bolsheviks, encouraged in this by the Allies, whose policy, though vacillating, was to regard the Poles as defenders of the first line against those would-be revolutionizers of the world. In the autumn of that year the Bolsheviks were prepared to make peace on Poland's terms, but the Poles were advised by the Allies to continue fighting and in the following year the conflict widened out and passed through several swift and dramatic phases. To the southeast the Poles invaded the Ukraine, partly because that was one way of weakening the Bolsheviks, partly also because of a desire to expand their territories in a region which had once been theirs. Advancing rapidly and seizing great quantities of war material, on May 8, 1920 they entered Kiev, capital of the supposed state of Ukraine. But their stay was destined to be brief, for the Russians opened a counter-offensive farther to the north which speedily developed into an alarming menace to the very existence of the new republic. Advancing continuously they were by August 12 within twelve miles of Warsaw, nearer to the capital of Poland than the Germans had ever been during the Great War to the capital of France. They cut the main line of railroad that connected Warsaw with Danzig, the only place whence help from the Allies might come. The world held its breath as the

meaning of the possible collapse of Poland dawned upon it. Was Bolshevism to conquer this state, which had thus far served as the center of resistance to its spread, was it then to come into direct contact with Germany with its restless, disturbed and radical elements, was its march to the Rhine to find, after all, an unimpeded way? The procrastinating Allies now woke up. They had had two ends in mind when at the close of the Great War they had re-established the Polish state, firstly the accomplishment of an act of historic justice, and secondly "the desire to create a strong state which should act as a protection to civilized Europe against Bolshevik Russia and should serve to separate Russia from Germany and thus to prevent the dangerously active Communist Party in Germany receiving support from Soviet Russia." During 1920 Poland did, in fact, as we have seen, serve as a bulwark against the spread of Bolshevism.

In the latter part of July, 1920, the Allies sent a mission to Warsaw to help the Poles. Its most important member was General Weygand, one of Marshal Foch's ablest aids. Weygand, who was to act as military adviser, was to be assisted by several hundred French officers. The Allies were also prepared to send munitions to the hard-pressed Poles, but not soldiers. Trotsky, Russian Minister of War, took occasion to announce that Poland would shortly cease to be a defensive buffer for Western Europe and would become instead a bridge by means of which the social revolution could pass from Russia to Western Europe.

The Allied mission, which was principally a French mission, was an encouragement to the Poles but at the same time the dangerous defect in the treatment of the Danzig problem by the Conference of Paris was conspicuously shown. A cargo of 150,000 rifles, sent by the Allies for the Polish army, was held up by the German dockers of Danzig who refused to unload them. It was only after long delay that the arms so sorely needed reached their destination. It was quite evident that the Poles did not possess the much advertised and repeatedly promised free access to the sea. The actions of the British High Commissioner were, in the opinion of the Poles, equivocal and unfriendly. The faults, the involved artificiality of this Versailles' creation, were rendered sufficiently clear at the first test.

The Poles faced the critical situation with high spirit and accustomed valor. Peasants and workingmen, the people as a whole rallied *en masse* around the flag, resolved to preserve their newly acquired freedom or to die in the attempt. For them it was a life and death struggle, a tense and tragic moment, decis-

ive of their destinies. In London and in Paris, the situation was likened to that critical one six years earlier when the Germans had seemed about to seize their intended prey. The two situations offered another point of similarity. As the Germans under von Klück had invaded France too rapidly, imperilling their communications by the swiftness of their advance, so now it was shortly to be proved that the Russians had done the same or worse. In August the Poles began a counter-offensive. The Russians, taken by surprise, were unable to meet the unexpected attack. Disorganized, and compelled to beat a retreat more rapid than their advance had been, they ran a great risk of being completely cut off. During the second half of August they lost nearly 100,000 men in prisoners alone. Having planned a peace that would mean the real subjection of the Poles to Soviet Russia and the revolutionizing of Poland along Soviet lines, they were now compelled to accept terms of a very different nature. The Treaty of Riga, signed on March 18, 1921, a treaty very favorable to Poland, ended this strangely chequered campaign. For Poland 1920 had been a most eventful year. Her eastern boundary was now defined, as already stated, and lay far to the east of the so-called "Curzon line" which the Allies at Paris had tried to impose upon her. While this boundary might in the future be questioned by the Russians and might become a cause of a new conflict, for the time being, at least, the Poles had won a respite from the storm and stress of war, and a greatly needed opportunity for the establishment and consolidation of fundamental institutions and for the study and solution of pressing domestic problems.

For Poland was, after two years of independence, still living under institutions which were avowedly provisional. A Constituent Assembly had been elected in January, 1919, under a system of universal suffrage, women voting as well as men, and of proportional representation. Between five and six million persons had taken part in the election.

The constitution as finally adopted, after long discussion, on March 17, 1921, declares that Poland is a republic, that both sexes shall enjoy the franchise, the voting age being twenty-one, that the legislative power shall consist of two houses, a Diet and a Senate, both chosen by universal suffrage, that to vote for members of the Diet one must be twenty-one years of age, for members of the Senate thirty, that to be eligible to the former one must be over twenty-five, to the latter forty or over.

The executive power is exercised by a president and a council

of ministers responsible to parliament. The president is elected, not by popular vote, as many desired, but by the two chambers meeting together. He must be over forty years of age and his term of office is seven years. Should he die in office his duties are to be discharged by a council of three, consisting of the speaker of the Diet, the Prime Minister and the head of the Supreme Court. The president is the supreme commander of the army, except in time of actual war, when the Minister of War is responsible for all military affairs.

Many members of the Constituent Assembly desired a legislature consisting of a single house, but the bicameral system was adopted. But the Senate is given powers inferior to those of the other chamber. Its veto, for instance, may be over-ridden by a three-fifths vote in the Diet.

All citizens are equal in the eyes of the law, all have the right to protection of life and liberty and property. Freedom of conscience is guaranteed and freedom of religion. There is no established church. All denominations enjoy equal rights, although the constitution declares Roman Catholicism to be the dominant religion.

The constitution provides that economic bodies, including a Supreme Economic Chamber, may be established by law to watch over and provide for economic interests. This system has not yet been worked out in practice. Insurance for unemployment, for illness and for accident is guaranteed.

Such is the formal constitution of the republic, quite firm and rigid. It provides, to be sure, for its own revision, from time to time, in the light of experience. But the political life of a nation, though it may express itself through the forms and channels furnished by its fundamental statute, is not wholly, and sometimes not largely, determined by them, and institutions which resemble each other on paper often present dissimilar aspects in actual operation. The constitution of Poland adopts the parliamentary system of government, that of a ministry responsible to parliament. In England, where this device was invented, the ministry consists of men who are members of parliament, who, generally and normally, belong to a single party, and who have therefore a certain unity of thought, a certain common body of principles and purposes. But the political life of Poland, as it has developed during the past four years, shows a considerable divergence from the standard, classic model created by the Mother of Parliaments. Parties in Poland are not two or three but many, very many — and consequently mostly very small.

To create, out of this medley of unstable fragments, a unified body of ministers, capable of following a definite and coherent policy, is most difficult. Endless compromises or adjustments or bargains must precede the painful formation of the ministry and can only furnish an insecure basis for it, when formed. A multiplicity of shifting party groups renders difficult the normal functioning of the parliamentary system, and there has already appeared in Poland, as in Czecho-Slovakia and other countries where the same conditions prevail, a tendency to construct ministries, not out of members of parliament, but from outsiders, "technicians," "experts," administrators pure and simple, not administrators who are at the same time politicians. Such men consider themselves clerks of the popular chamber, merely in the cabinet to carry out its will, not leaders responsible for its policy as well as for the execution of it. What the permanent effect of this innovation in procedure, should it persist, will be upon parliamentary institutions it is too early to say.

Many and insistent are the problems confronting Poland at the outset of her new career. One of these, here as elsewhere in eastern Europe, is the problem of the land. Poland is primarily an agricultural country, a nation of peasants. These peasants are poor and ignorant, particularly those who were formerly subjects of Russia. The agricultural population, denser in numbers than anywhere else in Europe, save in Italy, Belgium and Holland, without technical instruction, with few highways and railroads, lives in houses or huts which lack windows and chimneys and which shelter alike parents, children and animals. How to develop safe and sane political and social ideas out of such an environment? And yet this class, materially and morally indigent, constitutes four-fifths of the population and now possesses the vote. Poland must necessarily be a democratic country. In order to be an intelligent democracy, the mentality of the peasant must be enriched and changed.

Another aspect of the matter is this. A large part of the land, 40 per cent., has been held by only 18,000 proprietors, and much of this has been left uncultivated. This means that the rest is overcrowded, is insufficient for the population. A better, a more even division of the land is imperative and, as a consequence, in the effort to improve the conditions of the masses and to conjure away the agrarian crisis, the Polish Diet, in July, 1920, passed certain rather drastic laws. A general land office is established and is authorized to take over land formerly held by the Prussian Colonization Commission or by the government

or by large proprietors and to sell it, in small parcels, to those who will actually cultivate it, preference being given to soldiers wounded in the war. Such farms may range in size from 150 to 600 acres, according to location. Lands so taken from private owners are not to be confiscated outright but are to be paid for.

What the social effect of this radical legislation will be can hardly be foreseen. It may not necessarily mean increased production since many of the large proprietors were able to apply to farming more intelligence and of course more capital, in the form of machinery, fertilizers and improved methods, than the poor and ignorant peasant can apply. For this reason there is likely to be a certain loss that can only be slowly overcome by the general raising of the peasant class to a higher level of intelligence and well-being, a long and complicated process. That the general contentment of the peasants will be increased by the operation of the new land laws seems probable.

But the agrarian problem is after all only one of the many problems that clamor for study and solution. And there is this fact, also, which the reader ought never to forget in his survey of the difficulties which the newly created or resuscitated states of Europe are experiencing, namely, that they are forced to solve quickly and summarily problems which England or France or Germany has been able to solve with deliberation, tentatively and progressively. But neither Poland nor Czecho-Slovakia, to take only two examples, has time for preliminary study, for experiment. Rapid creation, not slow and cautious evolution, must be the order of the day, in these and other countries. Inevitably, therefore, will there be much misdirected effort, many mistakes and disappointments, much heart-burning along the way. Even though compelled to by circumstances you cannot create a nation in a day. If you try, your work will be more or less feverish and certainly incomplete.

The vast enterprise of industrial reconstruction has been attacked with resolution by the Poles, but the problem is bewildering in its complexity, and what the achievements have been, thus far, it is quite impossible to state with any precision or sense of certitude. It is the problem of restoring factories which have been systematically destroyed or rifled of machinery by the Germans, of securing raw materials, of winning back the old trade connections and markets or creating new ones, of settling troublesome relations of employer and employee, rendered more difficult than ever by widespread unrest and misery, the unhappy products of the war. Moreover, where are the Poles to find the

means for this resumption and development of industry, the one absolutely essential prerequisite, capital? They cannot buy machinery and set it going, they cannot exploit mines, they cannot purchase raw materials or pay their laborers without capital. But the war destroyed the capital of the world on an enormous scale, it inflated currency in most countries by vast issues of paper money, thus reducing its value and violently affecting exchange and rendering trade and commerce a wild risk and gamble, if not bringing them completely to a standstill. In this regard, Poland is among the chief sufferers, although many of her sisters are in a similar plight. Virtually bankrupt, with an enormous and an expanding budget which will not and does not pretend to balance, with the state compelled to pay in paper money because it has little else with which to pay, with a currency constantly depreciating and prices mounting dizzily as a result, Poland is not, it must be admitted, in a brilliant position to carry out the imperative work of reconstruction. She, as well as many other states similarly conditioned, faces a long and troubled future which can only slowly clear up. She has already made many a beginning but they are only beginnings. It remains to be seen how even such a measure as the agrarian reform described above can be carried out without capital, something which cannot be improvised and which is so hard to find. But measures designed to improve the material conditions of workingmen have been passed, such as the eight-hour day, the regulation of the labor of women and children, cheap housing, the reduction of the number of holidays, excessive in this Catholic country which has many saints upon its calendar and a serious economic hindrance to a country needing, above everything else, a speeding up of activity along every line, an increase of productivity for its reconstruction.

One of the most important questions confronting Poland is that of the Jews, a problem that has many aspects, racial, moral, social, economic. There are more Jews in Poland than in any country in the world, except Russia. They constitute, indeed, one-seventh of the population. For many centuries both the people and the government of Poland were very tolerant, furnishing a refuge for the Jews who were persecuted in other countries and who came from Germany, from Spain, from Bohemia. Among such Jewish immigrants the German element predominated, and succeeded in imposing its language, for the Jews of Poland spoke a badly corrupted form of German, Yiddish. From the end of the eighteenth century, the Poles sought to

assimilate the Jewish population, removing various restrictions, only in the end to find their efforts frustrated by the Russian government, interested in encouraging dissension as a convenient method of ruling.

Public opinion in Poland remained indulgent toward the Jews down to about 1895. Then the government of St. Petersburg thought of another method of crippling Polish nationalism by thrusting upon the Poles troublesome problems that would divide them and weaken their efforts for the recovery of their independence, by driving Russian Jews into Poland. The new-comers were entire strangers to Poland and they were to render vain all attempts at assimilation. They asserted and developed in their schools and newspapers nationalistic ideas of their own, and sought to increase the diffusion of Yiddish rather than to adopt the language of the people among whom they were living. As the use of their own language was the only weapon the Poles possessed at a time when the Romanoffs were engaged in a violent campaign of Russification, the Jews, standing aloof and indifferent, if not hostile, came to be detested as unpatriotic, as traitors, as national enemies scarcely disguised. The Jewish press of Poland openly combatted Polish autonomy. This defiance by the Jews of the cause which had been dearest to every Polish heart since the partitions of the eighteenth century is the fundamental reason of Polish anti-Semitism. Economic factors entered in to irritate and exacerbate relations. The Poles, seeing almost all their trade and a part of their industry in the hands of those who were indifferent and often hostile to the national cause, became apprehensive. The economic boycott of the Jews by the Poles of Posen before the war was essentially an attempt to free the commerce of Poland from Jewish domination, regarded as a domination of those whose patriotism was suspect.

This lack of national feeling among the Jews, this absorption of theirs in furthering their own racial rights and aspirations, this cold indifference or positive hostility toward Polish national aims, both angered and alarmed the Poles, as they would have angered and alarmed any other people similarly situated. The situation was still further envenomed by the war and by the events which followed it. During her occupation of Poland from 1915 to 1918, Germany found among the Jews precious allies quite ready to co-operate in the odious work of espionage and delation. The prominence of Jews in the Bolshevist movement, a movement which is in theory the very negation of nationalism,

served but to accentuate the hostility of the Poles, to whom patriotism was the breath of life, was a religion. Moreover, no sooner had the German danger been removed than the Bolshevist danger appeared, threatening, as we have seen, the very existence of the republic. And, although they defeated it in 1920, the Poles have a lively fear that it may reappear. Again, the action of the Conference of Paris, in imposing upon them the Minorities Treaty, has been hotly resented by the Poles. Regarded as largely the work of the Zionists and of powerful international Jewish influences, they see in it not only an infringement of their sovereignty, such as no one of the nations imposing it would for a moment consent to in its own case, but as a distinct encouragement to the perpetuation and expansion of separatist tendencies directly subversive of that national unity and independence which had been the pillar of cloud by day and the pillar of fire by night which the Poles had followed during so many heart-breaking decades. By that treaty not only shall Jew and Gentile enjoy the same civil and political rights but the Jews shall have the right, in towns or districts where their numbers are considerable, to publicly-supported schools in which the instruction shall be given in their own language, not in Polish. And in such regions they shall be assured "an equitable share in the enjoyment of the sums which may be provided out of public funds under the state, municipal or other budget, for educational, religious or charitable purposes," and "educational committees appointed locally by the Jewish communities of Poland," shall, "subject to the general control of the State, provide for the distribution of the proportional share allocated to Jewish schools" and for the organization and management of these schools. Other clauses assure not only racial minorities of Poland unrestricted use of their languages in private intercourse, in the press and in public meetings but "adequate facilities" for their use in courts of law. It is also provided that the Jews may not be compelled to perform any act which constitutes a violation of their Sabbath, nor shall they be placed under any disability by reason of their refusal to attend courts of law or to perform any legal business on their Sabbath." No elections, general or local, may be held on a Saturday.

These clauses and others are placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations. "Any infraction, or any danger of infraction, of any of these obligations may be brought before the Council of the League which may take such action as it deems proper."

To many Poles, these provisions seem likely to make the Jews not an equal but a privileged class, seem to favor those who, in their opinion, have shown themselves more friendly toward German domination than toward Polish independence, who live, and wish to live, separate from the rest of the nation, who have no intention of being assimilated and who have secured guarantees which will render assimilation extraordinarily difficult, if not utterly impossible, and who can, through the influence of powerful Jewish elements in other countries, interject, through the League of Nations, a greater or less international control of what are considered in all the great nations of the world purely domestic questions.

The judgment of an American scholar concerning these minorities treaties of which the Polish is but one and those imposed upon Roumania, Jugo-Slavia, and Czecho-Slovakia are the others, may profitably be quoted:

"Equality of treatment to the degree specified in the treaties places restrictions upon the action of a people in making laws or modifying their constitution that may prove unendurable. Such restrictions are really a limitation of national sovereignty respecting internal affairs. They are justifiable only if the League of Nations will see that the minorities do not become a privileged class and do not carry on ceaseless and unjustifiable agitation. In the United States, there is solidarity, in part through a common language. In central Europe the languages of the minorities are retained, and the state is compelled to countenance and even to develop them. Linguistic differences will be perpetuated and even increased. Irredentism will continue. Many of the wisest men of Europe and America deprecate these treaties; they regard them as a standing invitation to quarrel."¹

The first national elections under the new Polish constitution were held toward the close of 1922. Marshal Pilsudski, refusing to be a candidate for the presidency, was succeeded in the headship of the state by Gabriel Narutowicz, Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was assassinated a few days later by a person who was insane. On December 20, 1922, Stanislaw Wojciechowski was chosen president by the National Assembly.

¹ Bowman: *The New World*, 287.

CHAPTER XLI

ROUMANIA

ONE of the countries that suffered greatly and profited greatly from the war was Roumania. As one of the "Succession States," she has entered into the possession of a considerable part of the patrimony of the defunct Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. A nation of eight million inhabitants in 1914, she has become one of sixteen or seventeen million. Larger in area than Italy or England she covers as much territory as New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania combined. She has grown great quickly and her people now see opened up before them possibilities of which they formerly hardly dreamed.

This country, which has thus conspicuously benefited from the victory of the Western Allies, had been for thirty years revolving in the German orbit. Her royal house was German, a branch of the imposing and flourishing family of Hohenzollern. The king, Charles I, had come to Roumania from Germany, the land of his birth, forty-eight years before and for forty-eight years had labored zealously to introduce German methods into the army, the government, the schools, the industries and commerce of his principality. The Queen, Elizabeth, better known as "Carmen Sylva," was a German princess who by her devotion and her tact, by her interest in things Roumanian, had increased the favor in which this German family was held. The connections between Germany and Roumania were more than personal, for in 1883 Roumania attached herself to the group of powers which had recently founded the Triple Alliance. The agreement effecting this was never submitted to the Roumanian parliament, probably because its ratification might have been difficult to procure. Nevertheless it was constantly renewed and was the underlying fact in the nation's foreign policy. For thirty years Roumania considered herself and was considered a part of the German system of alliances which dominated Europe. The practical results of this secret and yet well-known connection were that Austro-German finance and commerce were able to secure a control in Roumania which was sometimes very irksome to the latter.

In one respect this union with Austria and Germany was unnatural, and prejudicial to the attainment of what were regarded as the national aims, namely the liberation and incorporation in Roumania of several million Roumanians who lived outside Roumania, namely in Hungary, where, moreover, they were the victims of oppression. Roumania, being an ally of the oppressor was estopped from any attempt to emancipate and annex her unhappy relatives.

The outbreak of the war in 1914 obliged the rulers of Roumania to take an account of stock. The King, a German by birth and proud of the fact, wishing to be loyal to his allies and convinced, moreover, that they would win, was anxious to enter the war forthwith upon the German side. But the political leaders of the various parties whom he consulted gave contradictory advice, most of them recommending neutrality, some of them enlistment on the German side, while others urged the precise contrary, intervention against the Germanic Powers as offering the obvious and providential way of liberating the Roumanians of Transylvania, a part of Hungary contiguous to the kingdom of Roumania.

The policy of neutrality, of watchful waiting, won the day. Though King Charles died in October 1914 and was succeeded by his nephew Ferdinand, whose wife was an English princess, Marie of Edinburgh, the policy remained unchanged. For two years the Roumanian government steered an uneasy course between the two camps of combatants, not knowing which would win, a pardonable ignorance shared by most of the world, and not wishing to imperil destiny by betting on the wrong horse. At last after two years of coquetting with both sides, enthusiasm waxing and waning as successes and reverses succeeded each other, Roumania accepted the terms of those who could, and were inclined to, offer the most advantageous territorial reward for her co-operation. On August 17, 1916, she agreed to enter the war on the side of the Entente, assured of the realization of her historic and racial aspirations, if the Entente should finally prove successful, and promised "the same rights as her Allies" in the negotiations and discussions of the Peace Congress which would be held at the end of the war. Article V of this secret treaty of alliance pledged all the contracting parties to make no separate or general peace except jointly and simultaneously.

Great was the exultation in the Allied countries over this acquisition of a new recruit; great also in Roumania, whose masses were thrilled with the prospect of finally uniting into a

single nation all the members of their race, those on the one side of the Carpathians with those on the other. The declaration of war was immensely popular.

The exultation, however, was premature, and was followed by a speedy and a rude awakening. The Austro-Germans, under Mackensen and Falkenhayn, somewhat assisted by the Bulgarians, eager to repay the grudge that had arisen out of the Balkan war of 1913, easily defeated the Roumanian armies, which failed to receive the expected aid of their allies, and entered Bucharest. The Roumanian Government and Parliament fled to the north and installed themselves in Jassy, in Moldavia. For two years the Germans ruled most of Roumania with an iron and a grasping hand. The country was combed quite clean, cattle, horses, food stuffs, metals and rolling stock being seized by the victors and carried off. Typhus broke out, exacting a heavy toll from the unhappy victims.

But the Roumanians did not sue for peace. Setting themselves doggedly to work, their resolution stiffening under adversity, they proceeded to reorganize their army and increase its efficiency under French instruction, and their government adopted a programme of much-needed reform, proclaiming a policy of universal suffrage and of division of the big landed estates. Parliament enacted legislation along these lines. But soon came another disaster, the accession to power of the Bolsheviks, the consequent withdrawal of Russia from the war, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Roumania's position was very serious, cut off as she was from all Allied support, and now threatened with war with the Bolsheviks. The reorganized Roumanian army which, in July and August 1917, had inflicted severe defeats upon the German invaders, was, it was felt, quite unable to meet the new situation. Most reluctantly, under the stern pressure of necessity, the Roumanian government decided to make peace with the Germanic Powers. The Treaty of Bucharest of May 7, 1918, sealed, it was thought, her doom once and for all. Its terms were crushing. She must give up the Dobrudja, and, what was far worse, all the Carpathian passes and valleys that led into her defenseless plains. Her economic subjection to the Central Allies was complete and was ingeniously and ruthlessly organized. She was as prostrate as a nation could possibly be.

In this case, however, pride, the pride of insolent power, was only a few steps before its fall. In September, 1918, Bulgaria sued for peace. On November 3 came the armistice with Austria-Hungary. On November 9 Roumania re-entered the war and

when, two days later, the armistice with Germany was signed, her army was in Transylvania and in Bukovina.

Roumania's experience at the Conference of Paris was not a happy one. So far from having "the same rights as her Allies" in the negotiations and discussions of that body she found that the Great Powers, which controlled both procedure and decision, regarded this promise, whose sweep the Roumanians had probably exaggerated as elevating them to the rank of a Great Power, as having lapsed, the Treaty of 1916 as no longer binding, owing to the fact that Roumania had made a separate peace with Austria and Germany, despite the formal undertaking of that treaty. Extenuating circumstances were not given their due weight by the Great Powers. Moreover Roumania found that she was allowed only two delegates at the Conference whereas Belgium and Serbia were allotted three, although they were smaller than she. The relations of the big states and the little at Paris were characterized by much the same friction and resentment as at Vienna, a century earlier. The former, conscious that the main burden of the late conflict had been theirs and that theirs would be the main burden of guaranteeing the new arrangements of the future, which arrangements were, moreover, of such great and obvious advantage to the smaller states themselves, were impatient at the stiff opposition which some of their proposals and decisions encountered on the part of those who, they felt, ought to show gratitude to their benefactors rather than the unpleasing spirit of criticism. Anxious to get things done, to set the world in order as speedily as possible, and not seeing how that could be accomplished if discussion was to be dragged out indefinitely, as it would be if every voice were heard as long as it would like to be heard, and impatient of the contentions of the small states among themselves, the leaders of the Conference of Paris compressed negotiations and adopted decisions which seemed to those most intimately affected by them as lacking in tact as well as in an accurate or sufficient comprehension of, or sympathy with, the needs or the desires of the peoples concerned. The Great Powers were prone to consider the small as too ambitious and too grasping, as too little inclined to ignore the large and permanent aspects of the difficult problem of establishing a peace which might be general and reasonably enduring. The latter, on their side, considered the former as too domineering, as suffering from the illusion of superior wisdom and virtue. Personal factors, also, entered in to affect the issue, as they always do in any aggregation of individuals momentarily engaged

in dealings with each other. Mr. Bratiano, the leading Roumanian delegate, did not produce a favorable impression upon M. Clemenceau or Mr. Wilson. For that matter neither did they produce a favorable impression upon him.

Out of this sorry clash of interests and personalities arose one of the lesser crises of the eventful life of the Conference of Paris. Roumania refused to sign the treaties with Austria and Hungary, which were the ones that directly concerned her. She also refused to sign the treaty concerning minorities, submitted at the same time. Her refusal continued for several months and was only brought to an end by the sharp and peremptory pressure of the Supreme Council, threatening an immediate breach of diplomatic relations if she should persist longer in her recalcitrant attitude. Fearful of the consequences of complete isolation Roumania finally yielded, but, naturally enough, with a lively sense of grievance against her former allies.

Roumania's specific objections to the treaties she was compelled to sign were mainly two. Although her boundaries were liberally drawn and included most of the territories she desired they did not include quite all. She claimed all of the Banat, a region in the south of former Hungary which was inhabited by a mixed population of Roumanians and Serbs. While she was given the larger part, the Conference properly assigned to the Serbs that part which was peopled predominantly by Serbs and which, moreover, by reason of its geographical location, was essential for the adequate defense of Belgrade, the capital of Serbia.

The other and more serious objection was leveled at the minorities' treaty and the reasons were much the same as those expressed by the Poles against the largely similar document forced upon them. The right assumed by the Great Powers of imposing upon the smaller states certain obligations which the former would not consent to impose upon themselves was resented. Here we have again the same old difficult problem of the relations of the big and the little. The smaller states claimed full equality with the greater. They were willing to accept provisions that should apply equally to all but they were not willing to concede an interference by foreign governments which was limited only to certain states. The crux of the problem was, in the case of Roumania, as in the case of Poland, the guarantees provided for the Jews.

Moreover, the motives, the arguments, the forces behind the making of the minorities' treaties were enveloped in some obscu-

city, and are still so enveloped. The proceedings of the Committee that framed them had not then and have not yet been published, and this fact gave rise to rumors and innuendoes, impossible to prove or to disprove, of doubtful influences at work. The disaffection of the smaller states exploded at the plenary session of the Conference on May 29, a session which was carried over to the 31st. As the press were excluded and the proceedings were regarded as confidential, our information regarding what was said in them is not as full or certain as we would like it to be. Suffice it to say that the Great Powers insisted that, as it was they who had largely won the war, it was their duty to make the peace, and that as they were consenting to the resurrection or great enlargement of Poland, Roumania, Czecho-Slovakia, Jugo-Slavia, and were transferring to them large numbers of people of different races, languages and religions from those of the majority, they had the right and were in duty bound to see that states which they were so conspicuously aiding should not be in a position, by unjust or tyrannical treatment of such minorities, to imperil the peace of the world. As the permanence of the treaties could only be guaranteed by the Great Powers, the latter were under the heaviest obligations to see that nothing that could be avoided should be allowed to bring them into question. "Take the rights of minorities," said President Wilson. "Nothing, I venture to say, is more likely to disturb the peace of the world than the treatment which might in certain circumstances be meted out to minorities. And, therefore, if the Great Powers are to guarantee the peace of the world in any sense, is it unjust that they should be satisfied that the proper and necessary guarantees had been given?"

So also with boundary questions. "The chief guarantors are entitled to be satisfied that the territorial settlements are of a character to be permanent, and that the guarantees given are of a character to insure the peace of the world. . . . How can a power like the United States, for example—for I can speak for no other—after signing this treaty, if it contains elements which they do not believe will be permanent, go three thousand miles away across the sea and report to its people that it has made a settlement of the peace of the world? It cannot do so. And yet there underlies all of these transactions the expectation, on the part, for example, of Roumania, and of Czecho-Slovakia, and of Serbia, that if any covenants of the settlement are not observed, the United States will send her armies and her navies to see that they are observed." "In those circumstances," he

asked, "is it unreasonable that the United States should insist upon being satisfied that the settlements are correct?"¹

Whether the President was by inference unduly committing his country to a possible future of incalculable intervention in the affairs of Europe, whether he was by suggestion arousing or confirming an expectation on the part of European powers which might not be realized, are questions that were later hotly discussed in the United States. But at any rate the air was now cleared as far as the Conference was concerned. The Great Powers had defined their attitude with precision. They were resolved to carry through their policy in regard to the protection of minorities and, one by one, the states to which they intended to apply it were forced to yield. Roumania held out for many months. Her delegation withdrew from Paris and her government sought in every way, by evasion and delay and political manoeuvre, to avoid submission, but in the end, as already stated, it saw itself compelled to accept the unpopular treaties.

Roumania's relations with the Great Powers were rendered still more complicated and aggravated at this time by a sharp and prolonged controversy between her and the Conference of Paris over Hungarian affairs. In March 1919 a Communist revolution had broken out in Hungary and the régime of Béla Kun, which was shortly to make itself notorious, was established. A Soviet dictatorship was set up which announced an alliance with the Soviet Government of Moscow and a determination to war upon all *bourgeois* countries in the approved Bolshevik manner. These Hungarian Communists first attacked Czecho-Slovakia, intending to break through and establish a connection with Russia. Then the march of Bolshevism westward toward the Rhine might begin. But the Czecho-Slovaks were not so easily swept aside and the Red army decided to attack the Roumanians. The Roumanians, on their side, counter-attacked successfully and were about to march on Budapest, when the Allies in Paris ordered them to stop. The Roumanians, however, ignored the order, not sharing the hopes entertained in Paris of a possible peaceful arrangement with Béla Kun but believing it desirable to end the Communist régime in Hungary, and that the only way to do it was to occupy the capital. They therefore

¹ TEMPERLEY, *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, vol. V, pp. 130-131. The words quoted are from the President's own version of his speech issued from the White House, October 11, 1919, being the short-hand notes of his stenographer.

continued their advance, entered Budapest on August 8, 1919, and occupied it and a large part of Hungary for several months, only withdrawing as the result of a practical ultimatum from the Supreme Council. Those months were filled with bitter contentions between Roumania and the Allies, with frequent and somewhat contradictory orders from the latter, and procrastination and disobedience from the former. That the Roumanians had a juster view of the nature and requirements of the situation, and that they rendered a distinct service to Europe in suppressing the Bolshevik régime in Hungary, seems quite evident.

But there is another side to the story. The Roumanians during their occupation of Hungary seized all kinds of things, food products, railroad cars and engines, munitions, cattle, and shipped them off to Roumania. Charged with inhuman conduct and with defying the principle adopted by the Conference of Paris, that reparations for damages in the war should be regarded as a collective undertaking, not as a policy to be enforced by any single country, however provoked and aggrieved, the Roumanians point out that the armistices of November 1918 with Germany and Austria had secured for the Allies vast quantities of material sorely needed by them, coal, rolling stock and so forth, that they themselves, on the other hand, had after nine months of waiting received no compensation in kind for their material losses, that their services in the war merited consideration from the Allies, that over 300,000 of their soldiers had been killed and that a larger number of civilians were dead as a result of Roumania's participation in the war, that as the Hungarians had been most conspicuous in the recent systematic pillaging of Roumania they were justified in recovering the things which had been carried away from their devastated land, or their equivalents. If the Allies would not help them, had they not the right to help themselves?

At any rate the visit of the Central Powers to Budapest in 1916 was now returned with interest by that of the Roumanians to Budapest in 1918. Memories of injuries suffered are not generally short, nor, on the other hand, are they conducive to the speedy resumption of friendly relations and the abatement of the desire for retaliation. They constitute, rather, strong links in the vicious and very human circle of measure for measure, tit for tat.

The Conference of Paris condemned these actions of the Roumanians and demanded their cessation, and reimbursement

to the victims. This was one of the reasons, though not the sole one, for the peremptory summons from Paris for the evacuation of Hungary by the Roumanians and their withdrawal behind the boundaries assigned them. The Roumanian occupation left a bitter legacy of hate among the Hungarians. The importance of this fact need not, however, be unduly exaggerated. The Magyars had always hated the Roumanians and had long grossly oppressed those of that race resident in Hungary. Their hatred was not likely to be diminished by the outcome of the war, with its feature of abasement of mountains and exaltation of valleys. Those who recommend to the offending parties speedily to forget the passions which their history had unhappily evoked should ask themselves, in all sincerity, whether they would do so themselves under similar circumstances. The effacement of hateful souvenirs will only be brought about by the alchemy of patience and slow time.

Roumania issued from the war and the subsequent peace treaties more than doubled in size. The fundamental principle of the Conference of Paris, that of nationality, a principle widely though not universally applied, operated greatly in her favor. She acquired Transylvania and part of the Banat from Hungary, nearly all of Bukovina from Austria, and Bessarabia from Russia. But in acquiring these extensive territories she acquired about 3,750,000 non-Roumanians, namely, about 1,500,000 Magyars and 400,000 Germans or Swabians from Hungary, about a million Ukrainians or Russians in Bessarabia, and about 750,000 Jews, numerous in Bukovina and considerable in other sections. These non-Roumanian populations were, in general, ethnic islands surrounded by Roumanians and it was for geographical reasons impossible to separate them from the encircling majority. Thus at the very moment she was realizing her national aspirations, the union of all Roumanians under one flag, Roumania was acquiring a difficult and perplexing problem, that raised by the incorporation within the kingdom of racial elements which would prefer a different allegiance. Roumania Irredenta had become Roumania Redeemed but, in the process, new irredentisms had been created, inferior in numbers to the old, but, like the old, disruptive in their tendency. Whether she would be able or inclined to rule these reluctant peoples with such wisdom and such tact that their regret at being separated from their brothers would cease to be a danger to the unity of the state and would gradually be transformed into frank and loyal allegiance, only the future could show. Doubt on this

point was the chief motive for the adoption of the minorities' treaties by the Great Powers, which sought to reduce racial discrimination and consequent racial discontent to a minimum, thus eliminating as far as possible a source of friction which had hitherto been a prolific cause of war.

Another problem confronted Greater Roumania, which, as we have seen, confronted Poland. The peoples now brought together had long formed parts of several different states, had had different histories, had lived under different laws and institutions, stood upon somewhat different planes of development, intellectual, social, economic. Could elements so dissimilar be fused into a single folk, be rendered sufficiently homogeneous so that their comprehension of each other, their sympathy with each other, would more than counter-balance the effects of their long separation, and so that their diversities of character and aptitude and outlook would duly enrich the common life and not disorganize or disrupt it? In other words could essential unity of mind and heart be evolved out of the obvious and prevalent diversity? Could the nation be made one and indivisible, not by compulsion, which defeats its own end, but by the evocation and the stimulation of the spirit of concord and mutual confidence?

One thing is evident from the start. Greater Roumania will not be a mere continuation or enlargement of the former kingdom. It will be something different. The peoples and regions which have been added to the original provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia are so considerable in numbers and in size that they are bound to affect profoundly the course of Roumanian history. They will have a large and, perhaps, a predominant share in the new legislation which must be enacted covering all phases of the national life. They will introduce a new note, which may become, indeed, a keynote. The newly annexed provinces, which formerly were parts of Austria, Hungary and Russia, have already begun to show their power in the new All-Roumanian Parliament. The old political parties are in full process of rearrangement and readjustment to a very altered situation and new parties have appeared upon the scene with new leaders and representing new interests. Political life, it is quite safe to say, will cease to be a preserve for a small minority of professional politicians and cliques, disputing the possession of power with each other and exercising the mechanism of the state primarily for their own advantage. The masses have entered the political arena and already a new political orienta-

tion is apparent, though it cannot yet be defined or described with certitude.

The Old Roumania was oligarchic in political and social structure. The New Roumania is democratic. Universal suffrage has been proclaimed and this means, among other things, that the dominant political power will henceforth be in the hands of the peasants — if they develop the necessary leadership and organization. Bessarabia and Transylvania have already sent large peasant delegations to the parliament in Bucharest, and the old-line parties are coquetting for their support and old-line politicians are beginning to discover virtues in the new electors which had previously escaped their notice. The peasant is commanding an amount of attention in high places which he has never known before. A new ferment is abroad in the land.

See how it works. Before its union with Roumania, and influenced by the local conditions and by events in contiguous Russia, Bessarabia, which had proclaimed its independence, had solved its land problem along Bolshevist lines, by confiscating the estates of the great landowners and distributing them among the peasants, without the payment of compensation. Roumania herself had already adopted a policy of agrarian reform as a part of that national regeneration which followed her defeat by Germany in 1916, just as the regeneration of Prussia a century before had followed the defeats of Jena and Auerstädt. Great estates were to be seized and divided among the peasants. But the owners were to be compensated and the maximum size of farms was to be 500 hectares, whereas Bessarabia had voted that no holding should exceed 100 hectares. Obviously it was undesirable if not impossible to have two standards side by side in the same country, particularly when one was more popular than the other. The two must be brought into line. The Bessarabians were persuaded to accept the principle of compensation and the Roumanians reduced the size of the normal holding.

The execution of this agrarian reform is gradually being effected. According to a statement made by the Minister of Agriculture in September 1920 the government had expropriated 5,500,000 acres, of which 4,000,000 were already in the hands of the new peasant owners, the remainder being in the hands of the communes, or awaiting distribution.

Let no one suppose that agrarian reform is something new in Roumanian history. Repeatedly have great estates been

divided into small to appease the discontent of the masses. Prince Couza in 1864 carried through a sweeping and very creditable reform, which, however, did not go far enough. Over 4,000,000 acres were distributed at that time among 400,000 peasants. But, the farms still proving too small for the support of the peasant families, the state divided up the national domains, which constituted about a third of the national territory. This relief, in turn, proved only temporary and the condition of the peasants subsequently became so hard that they rose in revolt in 1907, a revolt put down with difficulty. Eleven thousand peasants paid for their desperation with their lives. Again more land was parcelled out. This process, recurrent in Roumanian history, is apparently now approaching its completion as the result of the war. Roumania is to-day overwhelmingly a land of peasant proprietors. Satisfactory statistics are lacking but as long ago as 1912 there were more than a million peasant holdings of less than twenty-five acres each, compared with four thousand large estates, of two hundred and fifty acres or more. It may prove, after the present reform, that the holdings are too small for the support of a population whose birth rate is high and, after a few years, discontent may reappear. But at least it may be noted, in passing, that so many people now have a stake in the soil that Bolshevism has thus far found comparatively few recruits in Roumania.

The agrarian problem, here as elsewhere in eastern Europe, will not be solved, if it is ever solved, until a far-reaching change has been brought about in the agricultural population itself. The great ignorance of the peasantry must be dispelled, their primitive methods must yield to more enlightened ones, they must receive not only an elementary general education but a definitely agricultural education as well, if the soil is to be intelligently cultivated. This is a more fundamental reform than that of land-division, one that will require much more time and thought but one which Roumania must undertake, a reform already sadly belated. The peasants are very ignorant. Perhaps 70% of them are illiterate. They are also very superstitious. Innumerable religious holidays, on which the peasant will not for the world consent to work, greatly reduce his output. A mental revolution must succeed the material revolution, and the raising of the intellectual level of masses of men is a process that seems unconscionably slow to reformers eager to re-create the world forthwith. Yet it must be undertaken, and under what conditions! — in a country prostrated by war, ravaged by

the enemy, burdened with an enormous debt, and with an enormously depreciated currency. As the chief exports of Roumania are necessarily agricultural, and as her normal foreign markets are restricted or cut off by the unfavorable state of exchange, it is very difficult for her to buy the manufactured articles which are so necessary even for agriculture itself.

For Roumania herself manufactures very little. The industrial development of the country is recent in origin and has not proceeded far. Her potential wealth is very great. She has large deposits of petroleum, and coal, iron, copper, and lead are to be found in her mountains. The vast resources of her forests have hardly been touched. But her industries are only just beginning and probably do not employ more than 300,000 workers. Industrial legislation lags behind the standards of most western countries. Trade unions are few and feeble. Lack of native capital and of trained organizers, managers, and technical experts is one of the reasons why there is so little industry in the country. There are as yet not enough capable and experienced natives properly to exploit the resources of the country, to build up big industries, yet the Roumanians are very reluctant to let foreign capital and foreign experts invade too freely the field which they themselves cannot adequately cultivate, fearful, above all else, of foreign pressure or even foreign domination. This Roumania is stoutly resolved to avoid, even, if necessary, at the cost of her material prosperity. What is true of her is true of many of the other countries which we are passing in review. Intensely nationalistic, all of them, they are suspicious of the intrusion of foreign influences, sometimes occult and sometimes only too apparent, into their political and economic life. The history of the exploitation of backward countries is very vivid in their minds.

Anyone who has visited these countries since the war is impressed with the prevalent optimism and energy of their populations. They bear the hard conditions of life without repining because they have gained something which they have more at heart than even economic well-being, namely liberty, independence, unity, the opportunity to make or mar their own destiny, things more precious than riches in the opinion of all vigorous and self-respecting peoples.

The rejuvenated peoples of Europe are facing their grave and multitudinous problems with courage and with equanimity. Attacking first one and then another they have made considerable progress within a brief period of time. The consolidation of

their newly-won position has been their first preoccupation. And in this field the recent history of Roumania is significant and instructive. Adjoining powerful neighbors, resentful of her possession of territories which once were theirs, she has sought to look ahead and to prepare for contingencies before they actually arise. Her first aim has been to establish friendly and close relations with the Succession States and this she has accomplished, thanks particularly to the wise statesmanship of Take Jonescu (d. 1922), one of her most brilliant lawyers and a man of wide knowledge of other European countries, a knowledge based upon long residence in several of them and upon the maintenance of intimate personal relations with their leaders. A liberal in domestic affairs, Take Jonescu's absorbing interest was in international politics, for which, having had as a young man an international education and commanding several languages besides his own, he was eminently well fitted. As Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1920-21 his record of political achievement was remarkable. The aim of his international policy was the creation of a Balkan *bloc*, "the Balkans for the Balkans." Meeting in Venizelos of Greece and Pashitch of Serbia and Benes of Czecho-Slovakia not only personal friends, but sympathetic collaborators in an undertaking of mutual utility he was able with them to contribute greatly to the speedy improvement of relations between the Balkan states and to the establishment of serious guarantees for the future.

Roumania and Czecho-Slovakia concluded in 1921 a treaty of defense against Hungary, the state which had been compelled to cede to each important territories and which might at any time try to recover them. Article I of this treaty provides that in case of unprovoked attack on the part of Hungary upon either of them "the other Party binds itself to contribute to the defense of the Party attacked." Roumania had signed a similar treaty with Jugo-Slavia. Czecho-Slovakia had signed one of the same nature with Jugo-Slavia the year preceding. By this series of bilateral engagements was constituted the "Little Entente" which, as we have seen, owed its inception to the statesmanship of Benes of Czecho-Slovakia and which was formed primarily for defense against Hungary and a Hapsburg restoration, and of the treaties of Trianon and Neuilly.

Take Jonescu sought also to bring Roumania and Poland closer together, — hoping to draw the latter country ultimately within the circle of the Little Entente. It was found impossible to do this directly but as the two countries have similar interests in

regard to Russia they signed on March 2, 1921 a treaty binding each to help the other in case either is attacked without provocation on its present eastern frontier and to follow an identical foreign policy toward their eastern neighbors. This treaty is to last five years. After two years either country may give six months' notice of withdrawal.

Good relations also exist between Roumania and Greece, sealed and symbolized in 1921 by the marriage of Crown Prince Charles and Princess Helen of Greece and of Princess Elizabeth of Roumania to Prince George of Greece. In the following year another royal marriage, that of King Alexander of Jugoslavia and Princess Marie of Roumania, strengthened the friendship of two countries which, amid all the chaos of Balkan history, have never made war upon each other. These family alliances may contribute to the spread and consolidation of a common foreign policy in the center and southeast of Europe, a region profoundly altered as a result of the late war.

CHAPTER XLII

JUGO-SLAVIA

ANOTHER astonishing result of this epochal war was the creation in the Balkans of a great state composed of most of the Southern Slavs, "the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes," for such is the awkward but official title of this new member of the family of nations. The name by which the busy world, with less accuracy but with more speed, calls this new community is Jugo-Slavia, land of the Southern Slavs, Jugo meaning southern. Northern Slavs are those who live in Russia, Poland, Czecho-Slovakia. Southern are those who live in the Balkans and in the southern sections of former Austria and Hungary.

Here again we witness the triumph of that ubiquitous and emancipating spirit of nationality which has continued so wondrously to transform the world during the past century and a half and which imposed itself peremptorily upon the Conference of Paris as the basic principle of its decisions, to be ignored only at the peril of the permanence of its handiwork. The Northern Slavs, as we have seen, are no longer to be ruled from Berlin and Vienna but from Warsaw and Prague; the Southern no longer from Vienna and Budapest but mainly from Belgrade. One branch of the Southern Slavs, the Bulgarians, is, for various and sufficient reasons, still living outside the fold. The family is divided and will remain divided as long as historical memories continue to exercise their present spell over the minds of its various members, unhappily but effectively estranged by many melancholy deeds of omission and commission in the past, by a tale that has been already told.

The story of the attainment of independence and unity by the Poles and by the Czecho-Slovaks, complicated enough, is simple in comparison with that of the Jugo-Slavs. Here we have confusion worse confounded, wheels within wheels, most admired disorder, a riot of forces working at cross purposes. The Southern Slavs had never lived together, had never constituted a state but had been split and shivered into many frag-

ments, by natural processes and by artificial, and had been treated very variously, and generally very badly, in the rough and tumble of existence. Their lot had usually been one of servitude and yet the servitude of one branch differed from the servitude of another. They lacked even that primitive unity which is represented by a common oppression.

Yet this fortuitous concourse of racial atoms has in our own day and with incredible rapidity become crystallized into a single mass, which may or may not prove brittle, but which at present is a fact.

Into this jungle of South Slav history let us now penetrate, seeking to discover the reasons for a change which at first glance seems quite past comprehension. The labyrinth must be considerably thinned out, the story must be much simplified if we are to find our way at all, and a simplified story is after all a distorted story. However, only at this risk can we hope to gain even an approximate understanding of a most interesting and significant event.

To anyone aspiring to make a nation out of this material the prospect even ten years ago was most uninviting. In 1914 the Southern Slavs were distributed in the following manner. Some of them had succeeded in establishing the independent kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro, whose rise and history we have already traced. The others were in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy but their relations to that strange, composite state varied from section to section. Some constituted the triune Kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia-Dalmatia, a kingdom you would have some difficulty in accurately describing, it being partly fiction and partly reality. In this inner combination there was the inevitable diversity which the student soon comes to recognize as normal and characteristic of the Dual Monarchy. For Croatia-Slavonia belonged to Hungary, though enjoying, and having for centuries enjoyed, a measure of autonomy, possessing its own legislature, as well as representation in the legislature of Hungary. Dalmatia on the other hand, though a part of the Triune Kingdom, was one of the seventeen provinces of the Austrian Empire and had its local Diet at Zara, as the other sixteen provinces had theirs in various places. Some of the Southern Slavs were in the Banat, an integral part of Hungary. Slovenia, which, despite the temptation, is not to be confused with Slavonia, consisted of parts of Carniola, Carinthia, Styria, and Istria, provinces of Austria, each with its local legislature, and was peopled with Southern Slavs, who also formed the population of

Bosnia and Herzegovina. But Bosnia and Herzegovina had a special position in that perplexing medley which men called the Dual Monarchy. They belonged neither to the Austrian Empire nor to the Hungarian Kingdom but to both combined and were ruled, by a special device, by both. From 1878 to 1918, just forty years, Bosnia and Herzegovina were under this joint administration. As if the cup of confusion were not already full there was Fiume, which from 1887 to 1918 was under Hungary but possessed a certain autonomy of its own. The reader who has a mathematical turn of mind might try to reckon up the number of governments, national and provincial, under which the Southern Slavs were living at the outbreak of the war which was to prove, for most of them, their war of independence. Before they could achieve their independence and their unity two historic empires had to be destroyed, the Turkish and the Austro-Hungarian. The former had been disrupted, piecemeal, during the course of the nineteenth century. The latter collapsed suddenly in October, 1918.

There were even more obstacles to the unity of the Southern Slavs than there were to the achievement of their independence. For they were divided among themselves by some very serious differences. The Serbs belonged to the Orthodox Greek Church, the Slovenes and Croatians to the Roman Catholic, and there were, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, hundreds of thousands of Moslems, for the Turkish conquest, centuries before, had made many converts, by suasion or by interest, just as the two other churches had done in their day and way.

Then there were also differences of language between the Southern Slavs, or at least differences of dialect. While these were not so formidable as to render the various branches of the race unintelligible to each other, still they exercised a certain estranging influence. And, as if this were not enough, those who spoke virtually the same idiom, like the Serbs and the Croatians, used different characters when they wrote it, which made the single language look like two. The former used the Cyrillic alphabet, which looks like Greek, and is Greek, with a few additions of which the Greeks never dreamed. The other used the Latin characters, which we likewise use.

The inquisitive student, wishing to be thorough, will be rewarded for any pains he may take in the search for other differences among the various groups of Southern Slavs, for he will find still more; for instance, the divergent psychological and social effects produced by the various conquests which this

region of Europe has known in its changeful history, Roman, Byzantine, Turkish, German, Magyar. Ethnology, geography, folklore, each has revelations of its own, quite worth while and essential to a larger understanding. But for our purposes this summary analysis will and must suffice.

The builders of a united Jugo-Slavia obviously had work enough cut out for them. But as they were many, and as they operated through a long space of time, they succeeded. For it must never be supposed that theirs was a work of improvisation, carried through in a dizzy rush between the years 1918 and 1920. Those years were merely years of culmination and their crowded history merely the final, or at any rate, the latest chapter in a long story.

The Jugo-Slav movement is not a recent one, however it may appear to the vulgar, generally absorbed in their own routine of life and only aroused to cast a glance beyond their customary horizon by something spectacular and sensational. Just as the unification of Italy and Germany had had its heralds in certain poets and thinkers of the eighteenth century, isolated voices crying in the wilderness and heard only by a few ears similarly attuned, just as the noise of the French Revolution had awakened responsive chords in Italy and Germany, in Poland and in Greece, so was the unification of Jugo-Slavia, consummated yesterday, prepared by seers and actors of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, of its own and other lands. And Napoleon, too, had passed that way as he had passed nearly everywhere, and had left a certain and a distinct impression. After Wagram, having defeated Austria, Napoleon had resolved to cut her off from the sea, a thing which has been repeated in our day, and he had taken her Slovene and Croatian and Dalmatian provinces and had made them into a separate Illyrian Kingdom, which he had incorporated in the French Empire and which, though its history proved brief, exercised long after an influence upon the imagination of many Jugo-Slavs, just as the brief history of his kingdom of Italy exercised a potent spell over that of many Italians long after that kingdom had vanished from the scene.

Napoleon soon passed to Saint Helena and Illyria reverted to Austria. But the spirit of Jugo-Slav nationalism did not melt away but continued to express itself and with increasing frequency, as the Jugo-Slavs themselves became more conscious of their essential identity and as the investigations of their scholars and the inspiration of their poets added to their knowledge of

their past and suggested the possibilities of the future. This was a long, slow evolution, filling the nineteenth century. The contagious influence of the kindling French philosophy, borne over Europe by the Revolutionary and Imperial armies, was followed by the romantic movement in literature and art, with its cult of popular memories, its respect for national traditions. The different groups of Southern Slavs, aroused also by the stirring efforts which the Northern Slavs, the Poles and Czecho-Slovaks, were making to preserve or realize their individuality, were shaken out of their torpor and came to feel their essential oneness. What were Slovenes and Croats and Serbs but three names for a single folk? Did they not all speak the same language, whatever variations existing between them being only of minor significance? Were not their popular legends, imparted to each new generation, the same? Were not their social conceptions and their institutions similar?

Such ideas were at first restricted to narrow circles, but gradually these circles widened until the more active and intelligent elements of the different sections came to have a lively sense of their common origin, their common destiny, their duty to achieve and to maintain their essential unity in spite of all obstacles.

For a long time these national aspirations possessed no political character, and, had the House of Hapsburg possessed a moderate amount of wisdom, it could have used them for its own advantage. But that House was quite as incapable of understanding its own interests as of respecting the most elementary rights of its subjects. Instead of appearing to them as a protector, its customary and congenial rôle was that of oppressor. Sowing the wind for a century or so, it in the end inevitably reaped the whirlwind and was swept incontinently away. It long found willing helpers in its maltreatment of its Slavic peoples in the Germans of Austria and the Magyars of Hungary. As a result of this maltreatment the non-political nationalist or racial sentiment of the Southern Slavs became political, and in the end became, what it had at no time needed to become, disruptive.

This long and complicated chapter of history can not be narrated here. A leading feature of it was the alienation of the Croats from the Magyars. For centuries these peoples had been close allies in the wars against the Turks. But after 1848 their relations began to change. Hungary began to enact legislation prejudicial to the interests and increasingly injurious to the

rights of the Croatsians. After the *Ausgleich* of 1867, which established the Dual Monarchy, the situation grew rapidly worse. Fundamentally the *Ausgleich* was a bargain between the Germans of Austria and the Magyars of Hungary designed to assure the supremacy in the state to those two races, and to no more. It represented the very negation of what should have been the basis of a polyglot empire, the equal and equitable treatment of all its races. The Compromise of 1867 established dualism at the expense of the lesser nationalities. It closed the door to Slavic aspirations. It handed over the Slavs of Hungary, bound hand and foot, to their enemies, the Magyars. As the consuming ambition and resolute intention of the Magyars was to Magyarize the other races within the kingdom and as they were prepared to stop at nothing to achieve their end, the Slavic revival which we have described now encountered in them its most dangerous foes. After 1868 the history of Croatia was one long succession of illegal and arbitrary acts designed to stamp out her individuality and succeeding in gravely undermining her historic rights. It was a carnival of injustice, chicanery, dishonesty and violence on the part of the oligarchy of Budapest, diversified by fraud and forgery, and by a jesuitical Machiavelism which pervaded and poisoned all the relations of public life. Croatia was subjected to what at times amounted to a régime of terror. Into the details of this deliberate and continuous maltreatment of Croatia by Hungary we cannot enter, but the reader, if he is interested, may be referred to the various books of Mr. Seton-Watson, an authority upon the subject.

Austria ruled her Southern Slavs with less of violence but with the same indifference to their wishes and well-being, and with a ready resort to despotic processes when the moment seemed to call for them in order to maintain the system definitely established in 1867 by the famous and, to the Slavs, infamous Compromise.

The results were not what were expected. A régime of intimidation and of injustice generally ends in provoking resistance, in tempering the steel of the victim, in developing leaders and programmes of action among the oppressed minority. And this was what happened in this case. In the stern school of unhappy experience the founders of Jugo-Slavia were being formed and equipped for a future which they themselves could not clearly foresee but which they felt was approaching and would prove decisive. Ideas were ripened rapidly in this heat, differences of opinion and of policy melted away and the

several branches of the Southern Slavs, Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, were fused together in a common patriotism. Seeing that they would never have fair play from the powers that were or a decent chance for the intellectual or political or economic development to which they felt entitled, they stiffened, and waited for events. The things that divided them, as, for instance, religion, dropped into a very secondary position. The Catholic Slovenes and Croats and the Orthodox Serbs, being equally the victims of oppression, had an equal interest in escaping from it.

The air of the Dual Monarchy in what proved to be its last days was charged with electricity. "We shall liberate ourselves," said a great Slav scholar, "not by stupid quarrels but by serious acts, and, as it were, by means of a new history. Our task is to render the people capable of the destinies which await it." The younger generation of Southern Slavs felt, in increasing measure, the gravity of the situation and their duty toward it. Many of them went to the University of Prague, a shining center of Slavic intellectual effort, where they followed the courses of Professor Masaryk, profiting from his large and liberal teaching and returning to their own country with a livelier hatred of oppression, with a larger tolerance of feeling toward each other and with a determination to break once for all with outworn methods and wretched prejudices which had served hitherto to divide them against themselves. As the Magyar despotism deepened the influence of this spirit deepened too.

The national revival in Croatia which has just been sketched furnishes us the key to this tangled chapter of history. Croatia was inhabited by two branches of the Slavic people, the Croats and the Serbs. Unless those two should come to feel their essential unity, it was quite useless to consider a still wider unity, one comprehending all the Southern Slavs. But this nucleus was formed in the way just indicated, through a growing enlightenment and through common suffering. The march toward the independence and unity of October, 1918, was marked by several historic steps. Thirteen years earlier, in October, 1905, the deputies in the Hungarian Parliament from Croatia, Dalmatia, and Istria took occasion to draw up the so-called "Resolution of Fiume" in which were set forth the reforms necessary for the establishment of a solid friendship between Croats and Magyars. Leaders in this movement were two Dalmatians; Dr. Trumbic (pron. Trumbitch), a lawyer and politician, and Dr. Supilo, editor of a newspaper in Fiume,—

men who henceforth were in the forefront of the campaign. It is interesting to note that the Resolution of Fiume announced explicitly the doctrine of self-determination, a doctrine destined to exercise its potent witchery upon a later day and upon a world-wide stage. "Every nation," said the Resolution, "has the right to decide freely and independently concerning its existence and its fate." No one of all those who later bandied this phrase about ever added anything to its lapidary perfection.

A month or so after this announcement from Fiume the Croat and the Serb parties in the Diet of Dalmatia asserted publicly that "the Serbs and Croats are one nation," a statement from which there was no wavering henceforth. The political creed of the Southern Slavs had reached the stage of crystallization in fitting formulas.

But political, like religious, creeds usually need interpretation. What did this one mean? Did those who framed it intend or hope to apply it to all of Jugo-Slavia or only to that part which was subject to the House of Hapsburg? The situation was this; eight million of the Southern Slavs lived in Austria-Hungary; four million lived in the independent Kingdom of Serbia. Was it the ambition of those within the former to unite with those of the latter in forming a single state? Or was it their ambition merely to secure their own union and a more favorable status within the Dual Monarchy? If they were agitating for the former were they not working for an end that was treasonable, the disruption of Austria-Hungary for the advantage of the Kingdom of Serbia? If for the latter, were they not simply demanding a reorganization within the Dual Monarchy, a reform, therefore, purely domestic in character, and quite legitimate?

Needless to say they themselves declared that the latter was their aim and that their loyalty to the House of Hapsburg was not to be impugned. They were only demanding better treatment and a recognition of the obvious fact that they, the Southern Slavs, were a separate people; that they were merely appealing from a monarch badly advised to one who ought to be advised more wisely. And it is quite safe to say that had their monarch agreed with them, had he made them comfortable and contented within their own home, they would have cast no glances beyond; that Jugo-Slavia, in short, would have been permanently divided into two sections, the larger under the House of Hapsburg, the smaller under the House of Karageorge. It is interesting to note that at the opening of the twentieth

century the best informed observers thought that the union of the Southern Slavs would be accomplished by Austria and under her direction. As late as 1911 Mr. Seton-Watson, one of the profoundest students of the problem and a pronounced friend of the Jugo-Slavs, held that a Pan-Serb ideal was beyond the range of realization and ought not to be realized, that it, moreover, would be fatal to the development of civilization in the Balkans. "The union of Croats and Serbs must and will be brought about," he said, and it can only be by Austria.

But the House of Hapsburg missed one more golden opportunity as it had missed so many in its variegated past. Francis Joseph refused to be better advised. Only the exceptional incapacity of the governing classes in Vienna and, very particularly, in Budapest, which set themselves like adamant against the proposals that came from the Southern Slavs, could have given the Kingdom of Serbia the chance which was about to come to it of acting as the deliverer and unifier of the Jugo-Slavs, of playing, in the Balkans, somewhat the rôle that, half a century earlier, Piedmont had played in Italy. The governing classes in Austria and Hungary preferred to denounce the Jugo-Slavs of the Dual Monarchy as traitors in disguise, and tried to unmask them in great state trials, the Agram Treason Trial of 1909, the Friedjung Trial a little later, only to fail utterly and disgracefully, the documents which Professor Friedjung, a well-known Austrian historian, brought forward to establish the treasonable connections between the Croat and Serb leaders of Austria-Hungary and the government of Belgrade being proved to be impudent and clumsy forgeries fabricated with the connivance of most "respectable" and highly-placed Austrian officials, who lost nothing by being exposed as vulgar criminals but were rewarded with additional and more attractive appointments by the authorities whose disreputable servants they were.

Such was the situation in 1914. The resentment of the Croats and Serbs of the Dual Monarchy had reached the boiling point when their constitution was abolished in 1912. But the war which began two years later and which, in the intention of Vienna and Budapest, was to settle the Jugo-Slav question once for all, settled it, in fact, but in a very different way from that which was in the mind of its authors. Intended to seal the doom of the Kingdom of Serbia as a really independent center of Slavic life, to destroy it as a focus for the national aspirations of those Serbs who lived outside; intended also to clear the way

for Pan-Germanic eastern programmes, over the prostrate forms of the Jugo-Slavs, it issued, after resounding reverberations around the world, in a most astonishing backward kick.

What was the effect of that war upon the Jugo-Slav movement which we have been attempting to portray? One effect was that it completed the alienation of the Southern Slavs from their former masters, and another was that it opened a path of hope, a path which was long enveloped in obscurity, and which was rough and tortuous and thick-set with difficulties and which seemed at times to end in a blind alley, a street without a thoroughfare.

The Great War began with shots fired by Austrian guns across the Danube at Belgrade. Twice in 1914 the Austrians crossed into Serbia expecting an easy victory. Twice they were thrown back, suffering, at the hands of a people they despised, the first humiliations of the many they were destined to experience. Then in the fall of 1915 back they came again, this time supported by the Germans and Bulgarians. The combination overran the country, and held it henceforth as in a vice until the autumn of 1918. Serbia as an independent nation seemed to be forever extinguished, awaiting only the position that would be assigned to it in the comprehensive and ambitious scheme of a Middle Europe under German auspices. All that was left of the little state, the so-called Piedmont of the Balkans, was the Government that had taken refuge in the island of Corfu and the Serbian regiments which that Government had managed to re-form, after the defeat, and to send to the Allied camp of Salonica.

The war was designed by those who precipitated it not only to end the independence of the Kingdom of Serbia. It was designed also to end the Jugo-Slav movement wherever it might be found. And no sooner had it begun than the civil and military authorities of Austria-Hungary entered upon a policy of severe repression of the Jugo-Slavs within the Dual Monarchy. They treated the population of Croatia and Bosnia and Dalmatia as hostile, just as they did the people of Serbia. Many thousands of Jugo-Slavs were arrested, thrown into prison, or into internment camps where a large proportion of them died. The properties of the victims or of their relatives were confiscated. Treason trials became the order of the day and death sentences were frequent. This was the way Austria and Hungary ruled their southern provinces during the four years of war. Such procedure could only lead to one of two results, either the

complete crushing of the spirit of the victims or their complete estrangement from the monarchy.

While this régime of repression was being carried out in their home land a certain number of Jugo-Slav leaders, who had managed to escape to foreign countries, formed a Jugo-Slav Committee with headquarters in London and Paris and with a programme of a united and free Jugo-Slavia. Among them were Trumbic and Supilo, who, as we have seen, had helped to frame the Resolution of Fiume. The Committee membership consisted not only of European Jugo-Slavs but also of representatives of the Jugo-Slav colonies in North and South America. Its purpose was to interest the Entente Powers in its cause, but it met at first with an indifferent response. Jugo-Slavia was far away and its affairs excited but little curiosity. Moreover England and France at that time were not greatly aroused against Austria-Hungary, which their leaders were inclined to consider as necessary to the European state system, as holding in some kind of useful balance the unstable elements of various nationalities. Their wrath was directed primarily against Germany. The difficulties confronting the Jugo-Slav Committee were therefore enormous, — general indifference, wide-spread ignorance on the part of the Allies, and feeble resources on their own. But it kept stoutly at work, conducting its propaganda as best it could. One of the things it did, which caught the attention of the Allies, was the organization of Jugo-Slav legions from among the Jugo-Slav prisoners in Russia. These troops fought for the Allied cause in the Roumanian campaign. They were later transferred, via Murmansk, England and France, to the Salonica front. One brigade, cut off, could only be gotten out through Siberia. The Jugo-Slavs did, on a lesser scale, what the Czecho-Slovaks, more favorably circumstanced, did on a larger.

Not only did the Jugo-Slavs receive slight attention or encouragement from the Allies during the early years of the war, but, on the contrary, they experienced a heavy blow in the entry of Italy into the war in May, 1915, for Italy had only decided to throw in her lot with the Allies on terms that were very prejudicial to the cause of the Jugo-Slavs. By the Treaty of London of April 27, 1915, the Entente Powers guaranteed to Italy, in the case of a successful outcome of the war, an extensive area around the head of the Adriatic and down its eastern shore, in Gorizia, Carniola, Istria, and Dalmatia and including many of the Adriatic islands. More than 700,000 Southern Slavs

lived within this area. Thus not only were Austria and Germany sworn enemies of Jugo-Slavia, but within the Entente too there was a dangerous rival, powerfully supported, and a rival may easily become an enemy. The Treaty of London was a secret agreement but the Jugo-Slavs soon learned of its provisions with substantial accuracy. Depressing to them, the treaty was of service to Austria-Hungary in her efforts to rally the Slovenes and Croats in defense of the national territory. The Entente Powers were represented as ready to betray their natural allies.

But even this serious setback did not cause the Southern Slavs to deflect from the course upon which they had entered, and to which events, as well as general considerations of ultimate advantage, forced them to adhere. The brilliant deeds of the Serbian army stirred their blood and the subsequent conquest of Serbia by the Austro-German-Bulgarian combination evoked their lively sympathy. The Jugo-Slavs saw more and more clearly that they must hang together or they would hang separately. There was nothing to hope for from the Central Powers, whereas a victory of the Entente might bring great advantages, though not all that they might wish. Desertions of Jugo-Slav soldiers from the Austrian armies in which they had been necessarily enrolled to the armies of the Entente persisted and increased.

The national idea continued to develop among the Jugo-Slavs, favored by certain events. The death of the Emperor Francis Joseph on November 21, 1916, and the accession of the young Emperor Charles introduced a somewhat milder régime into the Austrian Empire. A number of prominent Slavs, imprisoned for political offenses, were released. Particularly did the summoning of the Austrian Parliament, which had not been allowed to meet since 1914, offer an opportunity for the dissatisfied to express publicly their grievances and desires. The Jugo-Slavs at once put forward their demands in the following words: "The union of all the Jugo-Slav territories of the Monarchy in an independent state organism, free from the rule of any foreign nation, and resting on a democratic basis, under the scepter of the Hapsburg-Lorraine Dynasty." The reference to the dynasty was considered by many people as indicating persistent loyalty to the Austrian connection. It, however, was apparently dictated merely by prudence. Without some such phrase discussion would be immediately suppressed, and persons advocating secession from the state would be treated as traitors. As it was,

the supporters of this resolution were generally so regarded and denounced.

It was left for the Southern Slavs residing outside the Dual Monarchy, not for those within, to repudiate the Hapsburgs, to demand complete separation from Austria-Hungary, and to announce a very definite programme for the future independent state. The Prime Minister of Serbia, Pashitch, and the president of the Jugo-Slav Committee in London, Dr. Trumbic, after long negotiations and discussions, issued on July 20, 1917, the Manifesto of Corfu, a document of capital importance and which has been called the birth certificate of the future Jugo-Slavia. After declaring that the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes constitute a single nation, and after appealing to the doctrine of self-determination, the Manifesto lays down the principles that the future state shall be called "The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes"; that it will be "a constitutional, democratic, and parliamentary monarchy under the Karageorgevitch Dynasty"; that the united state shall have a flag of its own and that the three constituent members shall all have their own flags as well, which shall "rank equally and may be freely hoisted on all occasions"; that the two alphabets, the Cyrillic and the Latin, shall also rank equally, as shall also the three religions, the Orthodox, the Roman Catholic, and the Mohammedan. The Manifesto also announced that the future constitution would be framed by a special constituent assembly elected by universal suffrage, that all citizens would be equal in the eyes of the law and that the suffrage would be universal, equal, direct, and secret. It also proclaimed the freedom of the Adriatic to all nations.

The publication of this manifesto marked a decisive step forward in the Jugo-Slav movement. It furnished a banner for the nationalists in all Southern Slav lands, and laid down the chief lines of future development. None of the Entente Governments officially expressed approval of it but it was well received by the peoples of the Entente countries, and seemed to clarify and crystallize public opinion both at home and abroad. But statesmen lagged behind. Mr. Lloyd George said on January 5, 1918, that "the break-up of Austria-Hungary is no part of our war aims" and that, if genuine self-government on democratic principles were given to the nationalities, "Austria-Hungary would become a Power whose strength would conduce to the permanent peace and freedom of Europe." Three days later in his famous Fourteen Point Speech President Wilson expressed practically the same view; "The peoples of Austria-Hungary,

whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development."

But this issue, like so many others that were pending, was not to be determined, though it might be helped or retarded, by statesmen, foreign or domestic, but was to be decided by the fortunes of war, by the generals and soldiers in the field. Events moved with great rapidity in the year 1918. In September Bulgaria sued for peace after a final campaign in which the Serbian troops took a leading part. In October Austria-Hungary collapsed and dissolved into its constituent elements. In various parts of Jugo-Slavia local national councils sprang up to take over provisionally the direction of affairs. A swift and bloodless revolution was accomplished. Jealousies of Serbs and Croats and Slovenes, projects entertained by some of a separate Croatia along with a Greater Serbia as the desirable arrangement for the future, two states instead of one, were all swept aside in the general Jugo-Slav enthusiasm. The Italian danger, for the Italian troops had advanced to occupy those Jugo-Slav lands which the Treaty of London had assigned to Italy, also acted as an accelerator of opinion and of action. On December 1, 1918, the union was effected of the Jugo-Slav territories which were under the control of the National Council at Zagreb, and the old Kingdom of Serbia. The new Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was proclaimed.

Meanwhile a revolution had occurred in the Kingdom of Montenegro. A so-called National Assembly had met on November 26, had declared King Nicholas and his dynasty deposed, and had voted the union of Montenegro with Serbia. Whether this assembly represented the real opinion of the kingdom or whether it was merely a packed, irregular body, usurping a power to which it had no right, are questions that have since been much discussed, though apparently the discussion is decreasing. In any case there is at present a dissentient party in Montenegro which regards the action of the Assembly as illegal, and which would like to see it undone.

Thus a new state had come into existence, a state of Southern Slavs. But what would its boundaries be? Would they be spacious enough to include all the Southern Slavs? We have already seen that the Italians had long had their eye not only upon those Austrian territories where there were unredeemed Italians but also upon those where there were Jugo-Slavs and

which the Jugo-Slavs themselves wished and intended to redeem. Hitherto Austria had been the chief obstacle to the unity of the Southern Slavs. Was Italy now to slip into her place? What would the Great Powers have to say? They had not yet recognized the new arrangement. Would they do so, and, if so, on what terms? These were matters that must be settled and consequently the new nation looked forward, in hope and in fear, to the convening of the Conference of Paris. Pashitch, a Serbian, Trumbic, a Dalmatian Croat, and Zolger, a Slovene, were sent to represent her there.

They ran forthwith right into the teeth of a fierce and wracking storm, and one that was to be unconscionably long in subsiding. Into the details of this tumultuous chapter in diplomacy we cannot enter here and yet the details alone can do it justice and can give an idea of the fury of the blast. The claims of Jugo-Slavia and of Italy clashed violently. Italy took her stand upon the Treaty of London which gave her not only Trieste, a predominatingly Italian city, but wide districts in Istria, Gorizia, and Dalmatia, territories which, with the exception of the western part of Istria, were overwhelmingly Jugo-Slav in population. Dalmatia, for instance, had a population of over 600,000, of whom less than 20,000 were Italians. Yet the Treaty of London gave the larger part of it to Italy. Italy took her stand upon treaty rights, Jugo-Slavia took hers upon ethnology, each using other arguments whenever it seemed desirable. Italy claimed Fiume, too, though not included in the Treaty. Jugo-Slavia also claimed it by ethnical right as well as by an imperative economic necessity, it being the only good port in sight, if Italy was to have Trieste and Pola. Was the kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes to be deprived of access to the sea as the kingdom of Serbia had been in 1913 after the Balkan Wars?

The boundary between Italy and Jugo-Slavia was not drawn by the Conference of Paris, although it was one of the topics that most occupied and disturbed that body. Great Britain and France supported Italy on the ground of treaty obligation. President Wilson supported Jugo-Slavia, refusing to recognize the Treaty of London as binding, because it was the offspring of secret diplomacy and because, in his view, it was expressly abrogated by the Allies themselves when they accepted his Fourteen Points and other formulae as the basis of the armistice.

The Adriatic crisis continued all through the life of the Conference of Paris and remained unsolved when that Conference adjourned. Nor was it ever settled by the Great Powers,

although they made several more or less contradictory efforts to settle it. A solution was finally reached by direct negotiation between Italy and Jugo-Slavia, culminating in the Treaty of Rapallo (November 12, 1920). Italy had a certain advantage in these negotiations owing to the eclipse of President Wilson. By the Treaty of Rapallo, Italy secured a frontier considerably farther east than the so-called Wilson line. She secured most of Istria and a strip of territory connecting it with Fiume, but not that city itself. But neither did Jugo-Slavia acquire Fiume, which was henceforth to be a free port under the League of Nations. But Italy gave up all claims to Dalmatia, with the exception of the single town of Zara, which became a free city under Italian sovereignty. She also gave up most of the islands along the Eastern Adriatic which she had claimed and which were finally secured by Jugo-Slavia. By this treaty Italy acquired about 500,000 Jugo-Slavs. The Jugo-Slavs acquired a few thousand Italians along the Dalmatian coast. Yet they were compelled to guarantee special linguistic and other rights to their few Italians, whereas Italy signed no corresponding guarantees for the half-million Slovenes and Croats now within her boundaries.

Thus the prolonged diplomatic controversy ended. As long as it continued the new state of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was prevented from undertaking the work of national consolidation which was so imperative. Her boundaries finally defined, she now turned to pressing domestic questions. Elections for a national assembly to draft a constitution were held on November 28, 1920. One of the chief subjects of discussion in the assembly was whether the new state should be federal or unitary. There were other lines of cleavage also. The peasant and Catholic parties of Croatia wished to set up a republic but the majority voted for a constitutional monarchy. There was dispute about the name of the new state, the Croats and Slovenes wishing to call it Jugo-Slavia, but the Serbs vigorously objecting, not willing to have their name, which had long been the name of a state, eliminated entirely from the appellation. And so the awkward title of Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was written into the fundamental law.

The constitution as finally drawn up is a long and elaborate document. It is fundamentally the old constitution of Serbia writ large — with of course many variations in detail. It provides for a legislature consisting of a single chamber, the Skupshtina. The suffrage is universal, the proportional system

of representation is established, as is parliamentary government. "The official language of the kingdom is Serbo-Croatian-Slovene," declares Article 3, an article which appears to settle from on high a much mooted philological question by declaring all three one and the same language.

The new constitution went into effect on June 28, 1921. The state thus created consists of two former independent kingdoms, Serbia and Montenegro, and of Bosnia, Herzegovina, Croatia, Dalmatia, Slavonia, three or four small sections of western Bulgaria, acquired on the ground of necessary frontier rectification, and a part of the Banat of Temesvar, a region of former Hungary, now divided, as has been already said, with Roumania. The new state has a population of about 12,000,000, whereas Serbia at the outbreak of the war had one of about 4,000,000. Jugo-Slavia does not include all the Southern Slavs, though it does include the large majority. Five or six hundred thousand Slavs are now subject to the House of Savoy, and about 5,000,000 form the independent state of Bulgaria. Nor does Jugo-Slavia include only Southern Slavs. Within the new state are perhaps 450,000 Germans, about the same number of Magyars, 150,000 Roumanians, and 250,000 Albanians. These racial minorities, though not relatively large, may give trouble in the future, as may also the small Bulgarian districts on the eastern border, taken for strategic reasons.

Whether the unity of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes is as strong and deep as the leaders of the Jugo-Slav movement have assured the world, whether it can stand the strain of the acute party and local conflicts which have hitherto been customary in the Balkans and to which it will inevitably be exposed, whether the fusion of the constituent elements is increasing in completeness and will continue to increase, are questions as difficult to answer as they are vital in character. Certain it is that there is a lively demand in Croatia and Slovenia for a larger measure of autonomy than that provided by the constitution. This demand may prove strong enough to force a revision of the constitution in the direction of a looser federalism; it may conceivably lead to civil dissension and even to the disruption of the state; or the disaffection may prove but temporary and may be assuaged by some less extreme adjustment. All that can be done here is to indicate the cloud upon the horizon, without attempting to say whether it will expand or disappear.

The foreign policy of Jugo-Slavia is that represented by the Little Entente, one of whose members she is. She has also signed

with Italy an agreement for common action in case any attempt should be made to restore the Hapsburgs to the throne of Austria or of Hungary.

Jugo-Slavia is largely an agricultural country and in most sections the land is held in small properties by the peasants. In her forests and her mines she has immense resources, as yet largely undeveloped. She is poorly provided with railroads. Illiteracy is very high. That the work of economic exploitation may proceed capital is necessary and capital is very difficult for a small, partially devastated, and newly-founded country, to secure. Jugo-Slavia confronts many and serious difficulties. But she has in the past confronted difficulties even more serious and has conquered them.

CHAPTER XLIII

THE REPUBLIC OF AUSTRIA

THE nations which we have been describing in the last few chapters are called the Succession States, successors and self-appointed legatees of the oldest and proudest royal family of Europe, the House of Hapsburg. They are the states which have succeeded the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy which collapsed in the month of October, 1918, with a suddenness and a completeness that can be matched with difficulty in the history of the world. The necrology of empires records few, if any, instances of death as dramatic or impressive as that of this illustrious and historic realm. It vanished from the scene ingloriously amid the lightnings and the thunders of a world war which, for those who had begun it, was at last drawing to a catastrophic close.

But Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Roumania, Jugo-Slavia are not the only succession states. When those countries had divided Francis Joseph's coat of many colors, to their approximate satisfaction, there was something still left over, namely Austria and Hungary, both brought low, indeed, from their former high estate, greatly changed in form and feature, and sadly shrunken in their fortunes and their prospects. These, too, the present Republic of Austria and the kingless Kingdom of Hungary, are succession states also, the lesser heirs of a great inheritance. Let us examine their recent history.

The Republic of Austria was proclaimed on November 12, 1918, by the German-speaking deputies of the former Reichsrath who since October 21 had been constituted as a Provisional National Assembly. At the same moment that these men declared German Austria a republic they also declared that it would form an integral part of the German *Reich*. The Emperor Charles renounced all share in affairs of state. A provisional constitution had been already adopted, extremely democratic in character. The transition from the old system to the new was bloodless, the natural representatives of the former régime yielding without a struggle. But the new republic

was of revolutionary origin. It was not evolved by any legal process out of the old constitution. There was a break in historical continuity. The present Republic of Austria is a new state. It is not simply old Austria rebaptized.

It was confronted at the outset with redoubtable problems, both foreign and domestic. It was a republic which did not know what its boundaries would be and which was forced to await the pleasure or convenience of its enemies, who would settle this fundamental matter. Its government might argue about the matter and argue it did with ability and finesse. But the decision lay, not in Vienna but in Paris, and the Austrian delegation was not in Paris and was not expected until summoned to receive the draft of the treaty which would so profoundly affect the future of the republic. Austria's argument was that, as she accepted President Wilson's Fourteen Points unreservedly, she had a right to have them honestly applied. She renounced all claim to keep Czechs or Slavs or Italians within her territory if they did not wish to remain. But the doctrine of nationality, of self-determination, must be extended to the German element of the former monarchy, as to the other racial groups. If it were, then the Germans of Bohemia and the Germans of Western Hungary would be joined with the Germans of Vienna and the neighboring provinces and a state of some ten million people would result. In case of doubt Austria asked only a fair plebiscite, to be conducted preferably by an Allied commission.

Logically this position was very strong. If there was anything incongruous in the German Austrians appearing in this unaccustomed rôle of zealous defenders of the sacred rights of races, they who, with the Magyars, had up to then held those rights in slight esteem, the incongruity did not affect the correctness of their present attitude. The mere fact that they and their Magyar colleagues had been famous oppressors of other nationalities might cast some suspicion upon the nature of their sudden conversion to the doctrine of the hour. But it did not alter the fact that self-determination, being announced as the corner stone of the new order, ought to be applied systematically, and not merely when its probable operations would prove pleasing to its sponsors.

But when the Austrian delegation was summoned to Paris to receive the draft of the treaty which they were expected to sign, they found, probably not to their amazement, but certainly to their great chagrin, that Northern Tyrol with its 300,000 intensely loyal German Austrians was to go to Italy, and that

the 3,000,000 Germans of Bohemia, who hated the Czechs like poison, were to be included in Czecho-Slovakia, that the new Austrian Republic was to be a nation not of ten million, but of six million and a half, that it was to be a truncated nationality, that while there was to be an Italy Redeemed there was to be an Austria Irredenta, which might never be redeemed, because to those who have is given while from those who have not is taken away even that which they have. Strategic arguments were assigned as justifying the transfer of Northern Tyrol, birth-place of Andreas Hofer and many other Austrian heroes, and historical and economic arguments to justify the incorporation of the Germans of Bohemia and Moravia, despite their desires, into the new Czech state. And yet strategic and historical and economic arguments were not allowed the Austrians when they would operate to their advantage, only when to their disadvantage. Naturally the Austrians regard the Fourteen Points as a fraud and the doctrine of self-determination as a delusion and a snare, a fabric of organized hypocrisy and insincerity. It should be said, however, that it was this doctrine that won them a small strip of Western Hungary. This, however, they regarded as rather a mockery than as a consolation.

The argument of the Austrians would have been unassailable if the Allies had ever promised to consider ethnology and nothing but ethnology in reconstructing the map of Europe. But it certainly would have been absurd to have judged and decided every boundary question from that single standard. Life is more complex than that and many factors inevitably enter into the creation of states. History is one of the most powerful of these elements and cannot wisely or safely be ignored. It cannot be maintained that the Conference of Paris applied principles consistently everywhere, but in the case of Czecho-Slovakia they did the only thing that was consonant with the success, the security, the durability of the state they were helping on its way in a world of danger, of a people which had conspicuously aided the Allies in their time of stress. The Austrians were too prone to forget that the Allies owed much to the Czechs, whereas Austrian contributions to the well-being and triumph of the Allies had not been notable. It would have been neither just nor reasonable to let bygones be bygones thus nonchalantly and to treat victim and offender as if there were no difference between them. One can quite well appreciate the Austrian feeling in this matter without conceding that it alone should be considered, to the exclusion of all other considerations.

In another matter also the Austrians were destined to disappointment. They desired, as we have seen, to become a part of the German *Reich*. Article II of their Fundamental Law of November 12, 1918, declared that "German Austria is a constituent portion of the German Republic." The principle of self-determination was again invoked. If Austria wished to be a part of the German Republic and that Republic wished to have her, who had the right to forbid the banns? She would be united with a people of the same stock, speaking the same language, and the union with that large political and economic body would enable her to live, which she could not do if reduced to the status of a petty nation, without resources, and surrounded by states that were inflamed against her.

The Conference of Paris forbade the banns peremptorily and explicitly, inserting provisions into the treaty with Germany and the treaty with Austria which required both countries to renounce their plan. Was Germany to be permitted to come out of the war larger than ever, and more preponderant in Europe? Was she to maintain and even increase her crushing numerical superiority over each of the other great Occidental powers? She might lose Alsace-Lorraine and her Danish and Polish provinces, but if she could annex Austria she would be more populous than ever and would sit astride central Europe from Hamburg and Bremen nearly to the Adriatic, and would be master of the Danube as well as of the rivers flowing north. An exchange of Strasbourg and Posen for the imperial city of Vienna would be willingly accepted as a piece of incredible good luck. And, having gained a prize which was beyond even Bismarck's dreams, Germany would be in a position to try again the realization of her ambitions under better auspices than before, to attack her neighbors and rewrite the odious treaties, this time according to her heart's desire. And who could doubt that she would attempt precisely that, if she should consider the moment ripe? Was the war to be permitted to end in a triumph of Pan-Germanism?

Obviously France could not for a moment consent to any such an outcome of the Allied victory, to any such issue of a conflict in which her very life had been at stake and had been so nearly taken. The most elementary considerations of future security forbade her acquiescence in such a plan. France, with her population of at most 40,000,000, would be exposed to danger enough from her mere proximity to a people of at least 60,000,000, and a people, moreover, almost inevitably bent upon revenge.

And not only France but Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Roumania, Jugo-Slavia would be directly threatened by this union of their enemies of yesterday and their likely enemies of tomorrow, by this augmentation of Germany's strength and this more favorable delineation of her boundaries. Czecho-Slovakia, for instance, would be surrounded on three sides by Germany and its existence might be easily ended at the proper moment. And with Germany a neighbor of Hungary, through her annexation of Austria, the Magyars would be quickly brought within the German orbit, and the Magyars had grievances enough against the Czecho-Slovaks, the Roumanians, the Jugo-Slavs for having parcelled up "their" territories. The last end of these new states would be worse than their first. Were the Allies anxious to help on that process of building up a Germanic Middle Europe which they had just blocked at such fearful cost?

The interests at stake were not only those of France and the newly created or newly enlarged states of central and eastern Europe. All Europe, the entire system of European reconstruction, the durability of the whole set of treaties which were being drafted, the very basis of the new European order would be gravely threatened by such a consummation. This was no mere harmless detail in the complicated work of readjustment. It was a pivotal point. The peace of the world was involved. It was not for the Allies to labor in the interest of those who would be only too glad to undo all their work and fashion a very different Europe, to the advantage of those who have never accepted their defeat. The decision of the Conference was that Austria should not be allowed to join Germany except with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations whose decision must be unanimous; including, therefore, necessarily the vote of France, always to be a member of the Council.

The solution of the difficulties which confronted the new republic was not therefore to be found in uniting it with the German *Reich*, which would mean an important change in the European equilibrium and might constitute a menace for the peace of the world by augmenting the power of the German *bloc* in the heart of Europe. There is one thing more sacred than the right to self-determination of a single people, and that is the right to life of all the other peoples, their right to live free from the constant apprehension of a reopening of the bloody conflict. The constitution of a formidable German *bloc* would mean the political and economic subjection of the neighboring states. That would be the immediate or the early result of

the union of Austria with Germany. Then, once its first dreams of aggrandizement were realized, Pan-Germanism would not be slow in revealing its remote ambitions.

This union is therefore not likely to be permitted until at least it is reasonably evident that Germany has undergone so profound a change in mind and outlook, has become so truly pacific that she does not constitute a danger to her neighbors, and that she had no intention of tearing up at the first convenient opportunity the treaties upon which the new Europe rests.

It has often been said that it is absolutely useless to forbid this union since Austria cannot live as an independent state. This argument is one that cannot be refuted, not because it has been proved by experience but precisely because the experiment has never been made. It is also said that Europe has no right to interpose its veto against the realization of the wishes of both the peoples directly concerned. It is pertinent to recall, however, that the Great Powers nearly a century ago decided, in the interest of the European equilibrium, that the French-speaking Belgians should not be united with France, and that Belgium has been able to live an independent life and that no Frenchman today dreams of claiming annexation. What has happened in the case of Belgium may happen in the case of Austria.

One thing at least in regard to Austria should never be forgotten, namely that it was not the Allies which divided up the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It was the peoples of that Empire themselves.

The proclamation of the Republic of Austria on November 12, 1918, meant the end of the old order and the beginning of a new. The dynasty of Hapsburg-Lorraine was set aside and its members were banished from the country unless they would give guarantees that they would accept without reservation the laws of the republic. A large part of the Hapsburg family domains was confiscated and the nobility was abolished. The Emperor did not abdicate, but withdrew, first to a castle on the Danube, and, in March, 1919, to Switzerland.

The government of Austria after October, 1918, was entirely in the hands of new men. They faced an appalling situation, threatened starvation, manifold misery, anarchical disorganization everywhere, the woeful legacy of war. The collapse of the Empire severed the Austrian provinces, and particularly the great city of Vienna, from the customary sources of food-supply, as those sources were now largely included in, and jealousy guarded by, the new states arising from that collapse. And

not only the food-supply but the coal necessary, also, for the support of life, the maintenance of transport and of industry. Czecho-Slovakia which now possessed the coal mines would not send the precious fuel to Vienna. Hungary, the granary of the former monarchy, kept her produce for herself. The setting up of the new political barriers was followed by the erection of economic barriers as well and Vienna was for a while almost hermetically closed. And not only did the new succession states harden their hearts against this reminder of former oppression, but the agricultural provinces of the Republic itself refused to help the capital in its dire distress, or helped only by exacting exorbitant prices for their produce. Unemployment on a large and increasing scale aggravated the difficulties of the situation. Compelled to seek abroad for many of the barest necessities, the republic could acquire only with great difficulty a modicum of what it needed. Starvation was at the doors. To prevent its conquest of Vienna the government was forced to buy, if it could, at high prices and sell at low, which was storing up new troubles for the future in a sadly disordered budget. At the beginning of 1921 the annual deficit of Austria was estimated at over fifty billion kronen. To meet this the government had to contract what loans it could abroad, which were neither numerous nor large. For the rest it was driven to rely upon the printing press, a method that was sure to end in financial catastrophe, yet the only method that remained.

This critical condition of the new Austria called forth to a certain extent the sympathy and attention of former neutral and even enemy states which did what they could to prevent the worst from happening, particularly to save Vienna from starving. The Allied Food Commission under the direction of Mr. Hoover organized the shipment and distribution of supplies on a large scale. But the chief preoccupation of the Austrian Government during two years after the armistice was the procuring of at least the necessary minimum of food. The problem remained and still remains a serious one, Austria herself producing only about half the food she needs.

The economic condition of Austria began to improve somewhat in the course of 1921 and it seemed that the corner had been turned. Methods of rehabilitating the country and putting it upon a sound basis had been carefully studied by several international bodies, but had as yet yielded slight results. The financial situation, bad all over the world, was particularly bad here, and would not easily yield to treatment. Moreover it was

none too clear what the treatment should be or how it should be administered. Only slowly was a certain relief to be worked out by the agency of the League of Nations.

Meanwhile the commercial hostility of the states surrounding Austria, which was so marked on the morrow of the war, is showing some tendency to abate, and commercial treaties, mutually advantageous, are gradually being concluded between her and her neighbors, and this ought to contribute to the creation of a better condition of affairs. The new states are coming to see that the hope of all of them lies in a certain measure of co-operation and that a continuation of harsh and illiberal policies is the surest way to retard their own economic development. This process is one that cannot be hurried but the pressure of circumstances is steadily urging it on.

The boundaries of the Republic of Austria are laid down in the Treaty of Saint-Germain. The state is divided into eight provinces, Vienna, now set apart as a separate province, Lower Austria, Upper Austria, Vorarlberg, Salzburg, Styria, Carinthia, Tyrol, the latter three much reduced from what they were before the war. By the terms of the treaty Austria has shrunk from 116,000 square miles to 32,000 square miles. She is a land-locked state, having no access to the sea. In this she resembles Switzerland, Czecho-Slovakia, and Hungary, with which she is contiguous. But she has been granted certain rights of transit to the sea over the territory of intervening countries. Of her six million people, a disproportionate number, nearly two million, live in Vienna, a city whose future is problematical. It has been generally thought that this metropolis, the former capital of a powerful empire, the seat of a brilliant court, of a vast administrative system, employing thousands and thousands of officials, a business, banking, and commercial center with ramifications all over the country, a city rich in museums and galleries and educational institutions known throughout the world, one of the most attractive and gayest residence towns of Europe to which the rich were wont to repair to spend their money, must suffer irretrievably from its new position as the huge head of a small agricultural state, that it must inevitably lose its importance and prestige and sink into a mere melancholy reminder of faded glories and departed splendor. Something of this may, indeed, prove to be its ultimate fate, yet it seems to begin to appear that the economic predominance of Vienna reposes upon a much more solid basis than was at first supposed, after the collapse of the empire whose heart it had been for so

many centuries and from which it had drawn its wealth and its lustre.

The political structure of the Austrian republic is laid down in the new constitution which went into force on October 1, 1920, and which is one of the longest and most detailed constitutions to be found anywhere. This document establishes a federal, not a centralized, republic, the provinces having considerable powers. It establishes universal suffrage, women as well as men having the vote, the voting age being twenty-one. It provides for a parliament of two houses, an Assembly (Nationalrat) elected by popular vote for four years, and in accordance with the principle of proportional representation, and a Federal Council (Bundesrat) chosen by the Provincial Diets in proportion to their population, the smallest province or state having at least three representatives, the largest not more than twelve. Virtually, however, the parliament consists of a single chamber as the powers of the Federal Council are merely advisory. Its veto can be overridden by a mere majority in the popular house. The two houses combined elect the president of the republic whose term is for four years and may be once renewed. The president must be at least thirty-five years of age. Members of reigning or formerly reigning houses are not eligible to the presidency. The cabinet is elected by the Assembly or popular house. The constitution sets up an elaborate system of courts and it is interesting to note the creation of a so-called Constitutional Court which has the power to decide whether laws, either Federal or Provincial, are or are not constitutional. This court has the right to quash an illegal decree or an unconstitutional law.

The first president elected under this constitution was Dr. Michel Hainisch, chosen on December 9, 1920. Born in 1858 Dr. Hainisch, by profession a lawyer, had held various offices under the old Empire and was the author of many books on sociology and politics. Once a Radical Socialist, he has in his later years become a Conservative Agrarian.

The first parliament under the constitution was elected in October, 1920, and resulted in the return of three principal parties, the Christian Socialists (82), a peasant and clerical party whose strength is in the provinces, the Social Democrats (66), whose strength is in the cities, particularly in Vienna, and a German Nationalist party (20), whose name indicates its programme. The opposition here shown is that between peasants and town-workers. The reactionary or conservative parties of

the old empire have largely disappeared from the scene. While some legislation demanded by the working classes has been passed and certain measures have been enacted of a socialistic tendency, the generally disorganized and distressing conditions prevailing throughout the country since the close of the war have militated seriously against the success of any attempts to set up a new economic order. The country has been living from hand to mouth and has had no time to provide for other than the most pressing needs. Social legislation on a considerable or practical scale will have to await a calmer time and a riper consensus of opinion.

Since December, 1920, Austria has belonged to the League of Nations, and the League has latterly been empowered to attempt the financial and economic rehabilitation of the country, an attempt which appears to be in a fair way to succeed. An agreement was concluded in September, 1922, at Geneva and under the auspices of the League, by which Great Britain, France, Italy, and Czecho-Slovakia were to loan Austria about \$130,000,000 for the purpose of rehabilitating her finances and stabilizing her currency. This loan was to be secured by the control of the Austrian customs receipts, the state tobacco monopoly and other assets. The League of Nations was authorized to direct and supervise the execution of this plan, which amounted to a practical receivership, or financial dictatorship, of the debtor state.

CHAPTER XLIV

HUNGARY SINCE THE WAR

Not only did one of the two members of the Dual Monarchy, Austria, suddenly dissolve into its constituent elements in October, 1918, but the other, also, Hungary, crumpled up and collapsed under the staggering blows of military defeat and disaster. The day of judgment had come simultaneously for two states which had long defied all the weather signals of the time and had sailed cheerfully forth upon the uncertain sea of war and international adventure with a very combustible cargo aboard. The more one studies the history of Austria and Hungary during the last half-century, the more profoundly is one impressed with the essential frivolity and ineptitude of their ruling classes. Hardly a trace of statesmanship, hardly a breath of liberalism, hardly an indication that those in power knew that they were living in a most dynamic century and that it behooved them, above all else, accurately to appraise the nature of the forces which were at work and to seek to canalise and direct them rather than merely to block them and forbid their movement. In an age when the restless and aggressive spirit of nationality was abroad in the world as never before, when the desire for national independence among subject peoples was greatly stimulated by the resounding successes of Germany and Italy and other states, when the doctrine that a people with a distinct national self-consciousness, born of history, of a common language, and of a culture peculiar to it, has the right to live its own life, had become a gospel, the House of Hapsburg and the governing oligarchies of Austria and Hungary were as blind to the signs of the times, blazing as those signs were, as ever the privileged classes of France in the eighteenth century. And yet that House and those oligarchies had an unrivalled opportunity to study and to measure this phenomenon for, from one end of the Dual Monarchy to the other, the ferment of nationalism was the main feature of the situation, and showed no signs of abating, but was on the contrary striking out farther and farther and deeper and deeper every day.

Instead of showing statesmanship or ordinary common sense and prudence, the governing classes of Austria and Hungary resorted to all the ruses and chicaneries of petty politics, uniting a lamentable narrowness of vision with a misplaced audacity in the service of the state. Revealing no creative ability, and devoid of imagination and of sympathy, these hand-to-mouth politicians with their musty policies of class and racial domination were engaged in sapping and mining, during half a century, the very ground on which they stood. Finally the ground gave way in October, 1918, and their rickety and fantastic structures ignominiously collapsed.

There was less excuse for the fate which their folly invited in the case of the Hungarians than in the case of the Austrians. For the lords of Hungary, the Magyars, had themselves long served in bondage, had seen their rights trampled upon, their aspirations flouted, had themselves felt the compelling attraction of freedom, and had struggled bravely and heroically to attain it — and, having attained it, had proceeded forthwith to refuse it to those who lived with them within the confines of Hungary and whose ancestors, many of them, had lived there longer than had theirs. This was the great refusal. For fifty years the Magyars, a minority of the population of the kingdom, had followed a ruthless and sometimes ingenious policy of Magyarization, despite the stubborn opposition of the Roumanian, the Serb, the Slovak within their gates. Naturally the passions thus developed were bound to explode with damaging effect when the shell that contained them should be worn too thin longer to do its work. The shell was in that condition at the end of an unexpectedly long and exhausting war and it shattered into fragments at the final touch. The Magyar state, the object of so much laudation and idealization by its admiring architects, had proved for half its inmates a suffocating prison, “a pestilential charnel-house,” to quote a famous phrase which Louis Kossuth had hurled at Austria in the great days of 1848, and the prisoners seized the occasion to escape, exultantly and with no trace of regret. A government that so completely alienates half its citizens has no just ground for complaint, or even of surprise, if the tables are some day entirely turned against it.

“The Magyar State,” says a recent writer, “rested on the two pillars of a restricted suffrage and a unified Kingdom. Either universal suffrage or a federalized State would have enabled the different nationalities to realize their aspirations and

to overthrow the Magyar hegemony. Both proposals were, therefore, anathema. The Magyars claimed to be a 'national State' but their idea of such a State was the oppression of three or four nationalities for the benefit of a fifth."¹

In short Hungary had nowhere laid up friendships for a possible hour of adversity. That hour had now arrived. On October 16, 1918, the Emperor Charles issued a proclamation favoring the federalizing of Austria. This death-bed repentance had no effect in Austria as it came much too late. To Hungary, however, it came as a "bombshell," as one of her leaders, Andrassy, said. For federalism might save Austria but it would only mean the doom of Hungary, a state which, the Magyar oligarchy declared, had been a "unitary" state for a thousand years and must continue such. To federalize Hungary would be to transfer power to the majority, who were non-Magyars; would mean, in other words, the dethronement of the dominant race.

But dethronement it was to be, at least for the moment. The ground was prepared. The disasters now raining down upon the Central Powers threw into deep discredit those who had up to this time been conducting the Hungarian state and had now landed it on the very edge of a precipice. Moreover there was widespread discontent because the extension of the suffrage, often promised, had never been granted. The Social Democrats, whose numbers had greatly increased in recent years, had been prevented, by the artful processes in vogue in Hungarian elections, from securing any representation in parliament and were consequently discontented. Confidence in the King and the Government was shattered; authority was undermined.

On October 31, 1918, a revolution broke out in Hungary whose object was the establishment of a republic and separation from Austria. Count Tisza, the masterful embodiment of the hated régime, was assassinated. Count Karolyi, a representative of an important Magyar family, a great aristocrat but a radical in politics, became the man of the hour, head of the ministry. The King, called upon to abdicate, did not reply directly to the demand, but on November 13 issued a proclamation announcing his withdrawal from all affairs of state. On November 16 Hungary was proclaimed a People's Republic and Karolyi was later elected provisional president.

The Karolyi Government lasted until March 22, 1919, when it gave way to a Communist régime. Count Michael Karolyi

¹ H. W. V. Temperley in *A History of the Peace Conference*, vol. IV, 486.

was born in 1875. By birth and by fortune he belonged to the great Magyar aristocracy but he was regarded as a traitor to his class and was consequently bitterly hated by it, for he, a great landowner, a born aristocrat, and a Magyar, had for years advocated the emancipation of the peasants, the division of the big estates, and universal suffrage, things utterly odious to the reigning oligarchy. He now added to his enormities, in their eyes, by proposing the recognition of the non-Magyar nationalities and the transformation of Hungary into some sort of a federation. Accused by the nobles of being an incorrigible demagogue and popularity-hunter, a man without honor or principles, a Cataline, willing to sacrifice his country for personal advantage, as anxious to fish in troubled waters and as surrounded by a scurvy crew, he appears to the outsider as merely a man of generous ideas, ideas which ought in large part to have been adopted long before for the well-being of Hungary. But he was not a man of sufficient force to dominate a crisis, not a man of action, able to direct and control the wild forces of a revolution, not a man of constructive talent, capable of laying the foundations of a new society in a time of turmoil, of snatching order from disorder. Accomplishing little and disappointing many who had looked to him as to a guiding star, he soon disappeared from the scene.

He was succeeded by Béla Kun and his cohorts of "Reds," or Communists. A Soviet system, in the Russian style, was soon set up and although it lasted only from the end of March to the first of August, 1919, it wrote a sorry and an ugly chapter of Hungarian history. Born in 1886 of a Jewish family named Cohen, Kun had, after a somewhat shady past, finally become a journalist. Enrolled in the Hungarian army during the war, he had been taken prisoner by the Russians. While in Russia he became indoctrinated with Bolshevistic theories. After the collapse of the Central Powers he was sent back to Hungary by Lenin to work for Bolshevism in that country. Events, and his own audacity, favored him and he leaped into the light as the result of an insurrection which he organized. He did not become the official head of the state — a stone mason named Alexander Garbai (born 1879) was made President of the Republic — but Kun took control of the Foreign Office and was the real director of the government. He was in close relations with Lenin and was ready to go to any length to achieve his ends, "the destruction of capitalistic production and society and the creation of communistic production and society by securing the dominion

of the workers over the exploiters by means of a dictatorship of the proletariat," to quote a central phrase from the so-called Soviet constitution. This dictatorship was to be exercised through soviets or councils for which only workingmen, soldiers, and peasants could vote. All others were denied the suffrage.

Communists were put into all the important positions and invested with extensive, if not dictatorial, powers. The existing judicial system was abolished, the judges being removed from their positions. The courts were done away with and "revolutionary tribunals" composed only of Communists were put in their place. The Communists, numbering only a few thousand, perhaps fifteen, in the entire country, were compelled, naturally, to resort to terror as the only means of maintaining so petty a minority in power. Large numbers of persons were imprisoned and there were many murders. The press was thoroughly gagged, all newspapers being suppressed except three Communist journals. The right of public meeting did not exist, except for Communists. Measures were taken to destroy the capitalistic system and to set up a socialistic one. All private property was declared to be the property of the state. Stores and business houses were closed and their goods sold for the benefit of the state. Trade became a state monopoly. Even education felt the vivifying touch of Bolshevik thought. In the secondary schools the pupils elected Pupils' Councils whose duty it was to supervise and control the activities of the teachers!

As a social and economic experiment this Communist régime was a fiasco. All that it accomplished was the disorganization of industrial life, with consequent widespread suffering. As all classes, save the small group of Communists, were being ruined by these policies, all were ready to turn against these new oppressors and end their tyranny, at the first opportune moment. The trade unions, which the Communists tried to destroy, because they represented the principle of democracy, a principle which Communism rejects, became hostile, as did of course the terrorized middle classes, and the peasants, also. Offered nothing but a worthless paper money for their products, the latter refused to part with them, and the cities, and particularly Budapest, were threatened with famine. Many peasants were killed by the "terror troops" under Szamuely, one of the most repulsive figures thrown up by this convulsion. An additional unhappy feature of the situation was the rapid development of anti-Semitic feeling which was, in part, due to the fact that most of the leaders of the Hungarian Soviet were Jews, Béla

Kun, Szamuely and others. A counter-revolutionary army was being recruited and drilled by Admiral Horthy, a man who had had an excellent record in the Austrian navy during the war.

Kun, with dangers thickening about him, struck out wildly, and the whole fantastic fabric tumbled quickly to earth. Prompted either by the need of food or by the desire to get into connection with the Bolsheviks of Russia, he struck at the Roumanian army, which was occupying a part of Hungary. The result was that the Soviet troops were beaten and that the Roumanians entered Budapest on August 8, 1919. Kun had not awaited their arrival but had a week earlier fled to Vienna. In July 1920 he escaped to Russia, where his talents and his services were appreciated by the Soviet Government. Szamuely committed suicide.

The Roumanians were at first regarded by many Hungarians as deliverers from a horrid nightmare. But this feeling soon changed into one of bitter hatred. The Roumanian occupation lasted from early August until November 11. Constantly at variance with the Supreme Council in Paris, which had forbidden their entering Budapest and which repeatedly demanded their withdrawal, the Roumanians remained three months and more. The friction, which had developed at Paris between them and the Great Powers, continued and became more pronounced. Nor was the fault mainly on the side of the Roumanians. The relations of the Powers with Béla Kun had been characterized neither by firmness nor an intelligent understanding of the situation. The Roumanians considered that they had rendered a distinct service to European peace by stamping out Bolshevism in Hungary. This feeling was shared by their neighbors in central and southeastern Europe. In this matter those most directly threatened showed a truer understanding of the exigency than did the Great Powers far away.

But there was, however, another side to the medal. The Roumanians, now in Hungary and in Budapest, as the Hungarians and Austrians and Germans had for two years been in Roumania and in Bucharest, proceeded to see that the return visit was in harmony with the style already set. This meant the exacting of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. In other words the Roumanians seized vast quantities of supplies of all kinds and shipped them off to their own country. They were resolved to remain in Hungary until they had recouped themselves for the losses they had experienced in the invasion and spoliation of their own country. The feeling was natural enough

but it was only pouring oil on the fire, intensifying the ugly hatreds of the war and militating against the chances of a restoration of peace to a harried continent. The conduct of the Roumanians was severely condemned by the Supreme Council.

How extensive the reprisals were it is quite impossible to say, as the matter is highly controversial. But that they went to the extreme limit seems certain. A recent Hungarian writer, who probably does not err on the side of leniency, states that the Roumanians took grain, fodder, cattle, 1151 locomotives, 40,950 railway carriages, 4,000 telephone installations from the Budapest central exchange, the telephones and typewriting machines from the government offices and schools, beds and bed-linen from hotels and prisons, and scientific apparatus from the schools.

Whether this catalogue is correct or not and whether or not there was a measure of justification for the severe retaliation, one thing is indisputable, namely that the hatred of Roumania is universal and frenzied among all classes of Hungarians and that this is one of the factors of the present situation in that part of the world. It should, however, also be remembered that the Magyars had always despised the Roumanians and that, of all their subject nationalities, they had treated their Roumanian subjects with the greatest injustice and severity, probably because they feared them most, knowing that they were looking to their fellows in the Kingdom of Roumania as their destined deliverers. This fact may, perhaps, somewhat reduce the force of their frantic denunciations of a people whom they would have denounced anyway. It may also caution us against reposing full faith in what are possibly considerable exaggerations. At any rate Hungarian hatred of Roumanians did not begin with the occupation of 1919, — nor will it soon end. That much, at least, is certain.

The reaction of these events, particularly that of the Bolshevik tyranny, was quick and decisive. The former governing oligarchy of Hungary, anxious to recover its power, was now aided by the general determination of many classes of society that a repetition of such experiments should be rendered henceforth impossible. The evil of unbridled radicalism is that it is apt to generate an excessive movement in the other direction. Socialism, compromised by its unholy alliance with Communism, had lost the support of many who might have continued to favor it, had it not appeared in so destructive and hateful a form. Law and order, threatened for a moment with complete destruc-

tion, now reasserted themselves and with increased rigidity. The Red Terror was succeeded by the White Terror.

The different ministries which followed the overthrow and flight of Béla Kun sought to restore authority and in order to do it several times resorted to martial law. In January and February 1920 elections were held for a National Assembly, the old parliament with its Table of Magnates and its Table of Deputies having been abolished when the republic was proclaimed. For the first time in Hungarian history elections were held on the basis of universal and secret suffrage. Intimidation, which had long been a conspicuous feature of elections in Hungary, was, however, not entirely lacking in these. The result was an overwhelming victory of the conservative parties, the Christian Nationalists securing 68 seats, the Small Landholders 71, the Socialists none at all, and the Democrats a bare half dozen. With such an assembly reaction began at once. On March 1, 1920, the Assembly elected Admiral Horthy (b. 1868) as regent, styling him officially "Protector of the Magyar Republic." On March 23 it was declared by a mere Government Order that Hungary was a Monarchy and should be so described in all official documents. Thus ended the Hungarian Republic. The monarch, Charles IV, to be sure, was living in exile in Switzerland. But he had not abdicated. He had merely renounced the exercise of power until a more convenient season, and the Assembly, a thoroughly monarchical body, in electing Horthy regent, had shown that it considered Charles still the crowned and lawful sovereign. Horthy was to serve only during the pleasure of the Assembly.

The reason why Charles did not take up his residence in the massive royal palace which crowns the hill of Buda and why a Regent sat there instead was, not that the Hungarians did not wish him back, but that the Great Powers and the powers which were shortly to form the Little Entente refused to let a Hapsburg, be it he or any other member of the family, mount the throne. The Powers in Paris took occasion on February 2, 1920, to repeat their declaration of the preceding August that "they cannot admit that the restoration of the Hapsburg Dynasty can be considered merely as a matter interesting the Hungarian Nation, and hereby declare that such a restoration would be at variance with the whole basis of the Peace Settlement, and would neither be recognized nor tolerated by them." On August 14, 1920, Czecho-Slovakia and Jugo-Slavia made an agreement, which Roumania later joined, an agreement con-

stituting what is generally known as the "Little Entente." While this document nowhere states explicitly that the restoration of the House of Hapsburg to the throne of Hungary would be regarded as a *casus belli*, while it merely declares that "in case of an unprovoked attack on the part of Hungary against one of the contracting parties the other party pledges itself to come to the assistance of the party attacked," the real meaning of the agreement was, as Dr. Benes, the Czecho-Slovak Foreign Secretary, bluntly stated on February 5, 1921, that "the resolve not to permit the return of the Hapsburg was the basis and groundwork of the Little Entente."

The seriousness of these declared intentions of the Great Powers and the "successor states" was shortly to be tested. On Easter Sunday (March 27, 1921) Charles, having escaped in disguise from Switzerland, and aided and abetted by the landed aristocracy and the higher clergy of Hungary, appeared before Regent Horthy in the royal palace at Budapest and demanded back his throne. The attitude of the Hungarian Government was correct. Horthy refused to surrender supreme power until ordered to do so by the National Assembly which had invested him with it, and requested Charles to leave, which he did, withdrawing to Steinamanger, a small town in western Hungary. On April 1, the Powers in Paris renewed their previous declaration. On April 2 the Hungarian National Assembly passed a resolution refusing restoration and expressing the opinion that Charles' presence in Hungary was a national danger and urging him immediately to leave the country. The Little Entente was more emphatic, began military preparations, and delivered an ultimatum demanding Charles' expulsion before April 7. On April 5 Charles recrossed the frontier and regained Switzerland.

Six months later Charles made a second attempt to regain his throne, the more serious of the two and the more dangerous. Escaping by airplane from Switzerland, and accompanied by his wife, the Empress Zita, he reached Hungary, where he was joined by a small force of armed royalists, at whose head he marched upon Budapest. The Allied Powers and the Little Entente immediately made it evident once more that they would not tolerate his restoration. Again the Hungarian Government, thoroughly monarchical in feeling though it was, followed a correct policy. It sent troops against the King, who was badly defeated about twelve miles from Budapest and was taken prisoner. He and the Empress were arrested, and, practically on orders from the Powers, Charles was deposed by the National

Assembly and compelled to renounce all claims to the throne. He was handed over to the Allies for internment on the island of Madeira, where, on April 1, 1922, he died of pneumonia, at the age of thirty-five, leaving as his heir and claimant an eight-year-old boy, Prince Otto.

Meanwhile, in 1920, Hungary had been compelled to make peace with its enemies in the Great War. The Treaty of the Trianon was signed on June 4, 1920, eighteen months and more after the armistice. The long delay was largely due to the Allies. This treaty, which the Hungarian National Assembly ratified on November 13, 1920, is anathema throughout the length and breadth of Hungary. Few Hungarians consider themselves morally bound by it. Its terms have been already indicated in connection with our discussion of the boundaries of Roumania, Czecho-Slovakia, Jugo-Slavia and Austria, to all of which countries Hungary was forced to yield important territories. Through the loss of these territories the Kingdom of Hungary has become one of the smallest states in central Europe. Instead of an area of 125,000 square miles, which it had before the war, it now has one of 35,000 square miles; instead of a population of about 21,000,000, it now has one of less than 8,000,000. Like Austria, Hungary is a small state with a great city of over a million inhabitants as its capital. It has lost far the larger part of its coal and iron mines, its forests and the raw materials for its industries. The old kingdom was predominantly an agricultural country; the new will necessarily be more exclusively agricultural and will have to rely upon the export of its surplus agricultural products to pay for the necessary manufactured articles which must, in great measure, be secured abroad.

But Hungary's most serious loss is in her pride. Resenting bitterly the humiliation of her present position, the sight of her former vassals, victorious and elated, who have risen as she has fallen, intensely conscious of departed glories, of a history of a thousand years of independence always practically with the same spacious boundaries, now torn and shattered, Hungary has bent to the storm which has passed over her, but is only biding her time. Surrounded by states which have rapidly grown great at her expense she refuses to accept her fate, is overwhelmingly monarchical in sentiment, and is, it may quite safely be said, resolved to reopen the case and quash the judgment, whenever a favorable opportunity arises. She is one of the danger spots of Europe.

All the more dangerous because there has apparently been no revolution in the national mind, the national outlook and aspiration. The old governing forces are back in power. The White Terror of reaction has exacted a heavier toll of lives than did the Red Terror of the Communists. Though the excesses of that terror have apparently passed, still martial law remained in force as late as 1921 and freedom of speech, freedom of the press, are held precariously by those who dissent from the official will and the official purpose. The Government of Admiral Horthy finds its great support in the military class, the officers and ex-officers of the army, in the official classes, in the big landed proprietors. The big landlords have apparently thus far largely blocked the strong demand for a thorough-going agrarian reform, although, under pressure, certain steps, which may prove fictitious, have been taken, despite them, in that direction. A bill has been passed designed to enable agricultural laborers to acquire small holdings of perhaps eighteen or twenty acres.

Certain anti-Jewish legislation has been passed with but few dissenting votes. Jews are now forbidden to own or lease landed property or to own more than one house. Foreign Jews, who have entered Hungary in large numbers since 1914, are, according to this legislation, to be expelled and other foreign Jews are not to be permitted to enter. Jews are "forbidden to hold positions in any school or university, or to act as managers of any theatrical enterprise, editors or managers of newspapers, or to hold any office, civil or military," and they are not to be allowed to hold a government contract or to have Gentile servants. As the Communist leaders were chiefly young Jewish "intellectuals," and in order to prevent the growth of a Jewish educated proletariat, it is provided that Jews shall be admitted to the universities only in the proportion that the total number of Jews bears to that of the population of the country, which is estimated at five per cent.

In September, 1922, Hungary was admitted to the League of Nations.

CHAPTER XLV

BULGARIA AND THE TREATY OF NEUILLY

BULGARIA entered the war on the side of the Central Powers in October 1915. The reasons which induced her to take this step were the promises she received of territorial gain, and the opportunity to take her revenge upon Serbia, Roumania and Greece for the treaty of Bucharest of 1913. She was to receive all that she had lost in the Second Balkan war, a war which she had perfidiously begun and which had led within forty days to her great discomfiture and her bitter humiliation, and she was to receive much more. Her king, Ferdinand, a German prince, possessed virtually the entire control of foreign affairs and, convinced that Germany would win the war, he considered the opportunity for aggrandizement too good to lose. Regarded as a very astute monarch, and so regarding himself, Ferdinand was a man of soaring ambition, bent upon retrieving the woeful lack of judgment which he had shown two years before and upon exalting himself to the first place in the Balkans. Surrounded only by servile and venal politicians he saw no obstacle in his way and he plunged his adopted country into an adventure of which he thought he saw the speedy and complete success. "The European War," he said at the time in a proclamation to his people, "is drawing to a close. The victorious armies of the Central Empires are in Serbia and are rapidly advancing." If ever a man thought he could read the future and could get rich quickly, in power and prestige, by taking advantage of an alluring prospect offering no element of risk, that man was Ferdinand of Coburg, who in 1908 had shaken off the last remnant of Turkish authority and had assumed the pretentious title of Tsar of All the Bulgars.

Before Ferdinand took the step which was to prove so fatal to his inordinate hopes and so costly for his people, he was obliged to listen for a few moments to a man who was unafraid and who drew a very different horoscope. Alexander Stambulisky (b. 1870), a peasant by birth, the able leader of the Agrarian or peasant party, told the King to his face that the

people were still suffering from the catastrophe of 1913 which he had caused, that they had lost all confidence in him, and that, should he repeat his criminal act of plunging them into war, he would lose his throne, if not his head. For this freedom of utterance Stambulsky was immediately sentenced to imprisonment for life and was kept in close and painful confinement for three years, only finally to be released by events which he had foreseen with such perspicacious vision. The honors in prophecy ultimately went to the bold, blunt peasant rather than to the self-complacent and vain-glorious king.

The advantage to the Central Powers, the disadvantage to the Western Allies of Bulgaria's entrance into the war did not arise from the military importance of the Bulgarian army, which, however, was an excellent fighting force and a desirable addition to the strength of the side on which it ranged itself. The value to Germany of the Bulgarian alliance and the corresponding damage to the Allies arose out of Bulgaria's geographical position. Standing between the Germanic Powers and their ally, Turkey, Bulgaria possessed an importance altogether out of all proportion to her population, which in 1914 was only about five million and a half. Had she remained neutral the conduct of the war would have been more difficult and less efficacious for the Central Powers, the problem for the Western Allies simpler and more hopeful. Her throwing in her lot with Germany rendered easy the crushing of Serbia, which was one of her most congenial war-aims, and the crushing of Serbia opened a clear road to Constantinople. The connection thus established between Berlin, Vienna and Constantinople possessed an importance difficult to exaggerate. It enabled the Central Powers to ship easily arms and men and munitions to Constantinople and the Straits, without the aid of which the Turks would have been compelled to abandon those strategic positions. It counted greatly in frustrating the Allied attack upon the Dardanelles and in causing the Gallipoli campaign to go amiss. The grip of the Central Powers upon Constantinople and the Straits prevented the Allies from sending war materials to Russia, which badly needed them, and also prevented them from securing the food supplies which were accumulated in great quantity in the Russian ports on the Black Sea and which the Allies could ill do without. This isolation of Russia from her companions in arms brought with it disaster on the field of battle and economic paralysis, potent causes of the Russian Revolution of 1917. This grip on Constantinople also rendered possible the use by the Central Powers

of the Berlin-Bagdad railroad, largely completed, thus enabling them to carry the war into Syria and Egypt, to threaten the Suez Canal, and to maintain contacts with the Mohammedan world. Bulgaria's intervention also forced the Western Allies to establish another theater of war, that of Salonica, and this meant a dispersion of their forces over three fronts, the Western, the Eastern, and the South-Eastern. Bearing these facts in mind and reflecting upon their significance, the reader will hardly need to be persuaded that, owing to her strategic position, the action of Bulgaria in lining up with Germany, Austria, and Turkey prolonged the war,—how much it would be impossible to say. The Allies quite appropriately, quite justly, as well as quite inevitably, were bound to give that fact considerable attention in the day of final accounting, if that should ever come.

Bulgaria's chief part in the war consisted in attacking her old enemy Serbia from the rear while Germany and Austria attacked her from the front. The combination easily achieved complete success, ending in the memorable and tragic retreat of the remnants of the Serbian army and of large numbers of harassed civilians across the Albanian mountains to the Adriatic sea. Bulgarian troops also fought Roumania and Greece. Their hatred of the former was manifested in every way and, in general, during the war, they indulged in unrestrained pillaging and in wanton destruction. Bulgaria declared that Serbia no longer existed and, had there later not been a decisive turn of fortune, she would have annexed as much of that country as would satisfy her people and as would have been permitted by her Germanic allies. The Bulgarian people enthusiastically supported their government and hailed each victory and every prospect of aggrandizement with enthusiasm. They had not caused Bulgarian intervention in the war—that had been the work of the King—but they associated themselves with practical unanimity with the activities and ambitions of the Government, revealing the same instinct for dominance over their neighbors, the same determination to become the "Prussia of the Balkans" which their rivals had long accused them of trying to become. The Bulgarian people cannot escape a large measure of responsibility for the sinister conduct of their civil and military leaders. They were whole-hearted accomplices in this war of aggression and revenge, good haters of their neighbors, more than willing to make the necessary sacrifices for the coveted national expansion.

When the turn of the tide in the great world conflict occurred in the autumn of 1918 Bulgaria was the first of the Central

Powers to sue for peace. Her King, who had played for high stakes, having lost them, abdicated and left Sofia amid the complete indifference of his people, who expressed neither joy nor sorrow. The ministers fled. Stambulisky was released from his prison, and Bulgaria awaited the decision of her victors as to the terms of peace to which she would be forced to subscribe. Those terms are contained in the treaty signed at Neuilly, on November 27, 1919, Stambulisky, who had become prime minister, signing for Bulgaria. Bulgaria was compelled to cede Southern Dobrudja to Roumania, although that territory was inhabited largely by Bulgarians and Turks. She was also compelled to cede certain regions on her western border to Serbia, Tsaribrod, Boseligrad, and Strumitza, although they too were peopled largely by Bulgarians. Serbia insisted upon these acquisitions for strategic reasons whose necessity, she maintained, had been shown by the advantage they had been to Bulgaria in the war. The Serbians in justification of their claim, which was in opposition to the ethnic principle, the principle of self-determination along the lines of nationality, urged various considerations in regard to the Bulgarian conduct in Serbia such as the fact that Bulgaria had entered the war in 1915 because she had been promised a part of Serbia, that Bulgarian authorities had at one moment declared that Serbia no longer existed and that it had become Bulgarian, that they had subsequently closed Serbian schools and churches and had burned them to the ground, that they had attempted even to stamp out the Serbian language, that they had devastated and ravaged the country, that they had committed nameless outrages upon Serbian prisoners and the civil population. In the opinion of the Serbs they were justified in demanding a better defensive frontier than they had previously possessed against a neighbor which had shown its character in the war and which would henceforth inevitably be animated with the spirit of revenge, born of defeat and frustrated ambition. The Western Powers were affected by the Serbian arguments and granted some, but not all, of the Serbian demands. They drew a boundary between the two countries which, in their opinion, placed each in a strong position for defense and in a weak one for aggression.

Another territorial cession that Bulgaria was compelled to make was the part of Thrace which she had acquired in the Balkan wars and which gave her an outlet on the Ægean. Most of Thrace was, by a later decision of the Allies, to go to Greece. This renunciation is the one most bitterly resented by

the Bulgarians of all they were compelled to make by the Treaty of Neuilly, because it meant that henceforth they were to have no territorial access to the Mediterranean. For this reason that treaty is odious to them. The ethnical principle was not violated in this instance as there was no Bulgarian majority in Western Thrace, a region of about eighty miles in length and about thirty in depth, but the national sentiment was mortally offended. It was no satisfaction to the Bulgarians to be assured, as they were by the Treaty, of the right of transit across that strip to the *Ægean* seaports. The loss of their *Ægean* littoral was galling in the extreme and made them the bitter enemies of the settlement imposed upon them, without preliminary consultation, by the Great Powers assembled in Paris.

Other terms in the treaty concerned the reparations which Bulgaria must pay for her disastrous adventure. She must atone for the damage she had done. She must pay two and a quarter billion of gold francs (about \$450,000,000) in semi-annual installments running through 37 years; also the cost of the armies of occupation and of various commissions; also she must furnish Greece, Roumania, and Serbia 70,000 head of live-stock by way of restitution for animals taken by her during the war; and she must supply 50,000 tons of coal annually for five years to Jugo-Slavia as compensation for the destruction of Serbian mines.

The military clauses of the Treaty of Neuilly were stringent and severe; an army which should not exceed 33,000, a volunteer and not a conscripted army, the soldiers enlisting for a period of twelve years, the officers for a period of twenty; only one military training school; only one munition factory and that to be controlled by the state; no tanks, no armored cars, no poison gas, no *aëroplanes*. Bulgaria has, as a matter of fact, since signing this treaty, been unable to raise even the number of troops permitted her, because her peasants will not enlist for so long a term of service, as this means that they must leave their homes and occupations for twelve years, must, in fact, become professional soldiers. Some modifications in these clauses of the treaty have since been allowed by the Great Powers in view of the manifest inability of Bulgaria to raise a force sufficient even for the preservation of internal order.

Such was the penalty imposed upon Bulgaria for her ill-advised and unlucky participation in the war.

One thing stands out conspicuously from the survey we have given of the recent history of South-Eastern Europe.

The war and the various treaties which followed it have radically altered the balance of power in the Balkans. The order in which those states stood, according to area and size of population was in 1914 as follows: Roumania, Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia. Now Bulgaria stands fourth, and is reduced not only relatively but absolutely in extent of territory and in number of inhabitants. The following table shows the situation in 1921.¹ It indicates a vital and far-reaching change.

	1914		1921	
	Square Miles	Population	Square Miles	Population
Bulgaria	47,750	5,550,000	45,000	5,200,000
Roumania	53,454	7,700,000	113,221	17,400,000
				(estimated)
Serbia (or Jugo-Slavia)	33,900	4,600,000	101,250	12,162,900
Greece	42,000	4,800,000	60,000	7,500,000

The defeat of Bulgaria in the war brought with it the overthrow of the old régime, now utterly discredited, and the beginning of a new era. The abdication of Ferdinand was followed shortly by the accession of his son, Boris III, a youth of nineteen who saw immediately that he could only hold his throne by abandoning all thought of personal rule and by conforming his conduct to the wishes of his people, by being in short a democratic sovereign, a king of peasants. For the overwhelming mass of Bulgarians were owners and tillers of the soil. Agriculture is the chief occupation of the people. Bulgaria is a land of farms, most of which are small. There are few industries and no large manufacturing towns. There is no aristocracy and no considerable body of rich people.

This sober and hard working peasant population ceased now to be merely hewers of wood and drawers of water and became, for the time being, the real directing force of the state, having found an able spokesman and leader in Stambulisky, a man of their own class, who had long opposed all that Ferdinand had stood for, a man of forty, huge in size, or as people said, "as big as a bull." This man had studied agriculture at the University of Halle, had been a schoolmaster, an editor, a politician, and was now the leader of the Agrarian or Peasant's party. The elections of 1920 placed that party in power.

¹ This tabulation is only approximate as far as Greece is concerned, the definite boundaries of that kingdom not having been drawn in 1921.

A new and significant direction was given to public policy by the advent of this party to power. Bulgaria became the typical peasant government of Europe. Its prime minister was a peasant by birth and the other ministers also were peasants, and the program of reconstruction and national development which was adopted and which was forthwith carried out revolved around the peasant and his problems. The interests of the peasants, in contradistinction to the interests of the bourgeoisie, were to have the right of way under this new dispensation. The men in power called themselves Socialists and they aspired to make Bulgaria a model state by socialistic methods. But contemporary socialism is a coat of many colors, and of a different cut according as it is English or German or Russian or Bulgarian. These Bulgarian socialists are bitterly opposed to communism and the abolition of private property, most of them being property owners and having the peasants' intense attachment to his possessions. Neither are they Marxian socialists. Marxian socialism, whose teachings and tenets have mainly grown out of a study of the conditions of modern industrial organization, and which rivets its attention mainly upon the improvement of the fortunes of the industrial proletariat, has slight points of contact with the facts of Bulgarian life, since Bulgaria has few industries but is a land of petty proprietors. The adherents of the new Agrarian Government of Bulgaria were often called "Green" Socialists in contradistinction to the "Red" Socialists of Russia and other countries. They insisted upon labor as the fundamental means of securing the reconstruction of the nation and they insisted, also, that those who would not labor must be forced to do so. The people must be compelled to work. The natural resources of the country must be developed to the highest pitch by private initiative and by state aid. Roads must be built, transportation by water and by rail developed, irrigation systems installed, waste lands reclaimed, all in the interest primarily of agriculture, the great national industry, the chief source of national wealth. And the national wealth must be developed in order, not that a small and favored class may enjoy the privileges of civilization, the arts and sciences, the culture and the amenities of social life, but that those benefits may become the possession of the great masses, in widest commonalty spread. The raising of the masses materially, intellectually, spiritually must be the central, pervasive, ever-present consideration in the mind of the democracy. There must be a reform in taxation to ease the burden which had for centuries

weighed heavily upon this hitherto dumb, driven class of humanity, the peasantry. Private property which is the product of private labor must be respected, but no one must, for instance, possess more land than he is capable of working. Education must be made really, and not merely theoretically, accessible to the masses, for only through education can they achieve complete emancipation. The peasants, seeing that their conditions have not improved but have remained essentially the same for countless generations, that their fate has always been that of an exploited class, must take control of public affairs themselves, must themselves organize society, and must no longer allow the bourgeois parties to direct the state, "a handful of lawyers and capitalists, assisted by journalists without faith, patriotism, morality or pity for the masses," a "tiny group of oppressors" who, by their superior intelligence and organization, "have up to the present fooled the rural population of millions and exploited them at their pleasure, that is to say in the way most suitable to their own private interests."

This peasant movement aims at the elevation of the agricultural masses who, in many countries, form four fifths of the population and who, even in industrial states, form a considerable fraction of it. It is a democratic movement, as it affirms that its programme must be carried through by peaceful means, by the ballot and the machinery of parliaments. It is not opposed to industries or professions as it needs their products and services. But industries and professions should be developed, their functions regulated, with a view to the interests of the agricultural classes, the immense majority. These Bulgarians regard the conduct of the Russian Bolsheviks as not only stupid and criminal in their destruction of the very things of which humanity has need, but as determined by the supposed interests of a small class, the industrial proletariat, whereas the real proletariat in Russia, and in most of eastern and central Europe, is the agricultural. The emphasis of the Socialists, beginning even with Karl Marx, had been put upon the wrong problem, industry, not upon agriculture. The principal task of the government should be to assure the prosperity of agriculture, as it will never cease to employ the largest number of workers.

Stambulsky and his followers, whose views have thus been summarized, were, it will be readily seen, launched upon a most formidable and difficult task, but one of undeniable interest. Moreover they did not consider their movement merely local,

limited to Bulgaria, but they aspired to make it international, as the interests of the peasants everywhere are fundamentally the same. This idea of an International Union of Peasants was definitely expressed for the first time at a Congress of the Bulgarian Peasant Union held in February, 1921, which adopted resolutions from which the following extracts are taken:

"The Congress of the Bulgarian Peasant Union invites the peasants of all nations to organize in the name of their common interests and to take political power into their hands when they are in a majority. Peasants thus organized have need of a powerful International Peasant Union. And this Union will play a great rôle in the rebuilding of humanity. The Union will have to struggle for the complete emancipation of the peasants against the menacing wave of reaction, against the anarchic power of the Communists, which would destroy all that the war spared, and fill the world with new wars of which the result will not be social equality but the most abject misery. . . . We send our fraternal and enthusiastic greetings to all peasant associations. Let us soon begin the building of the splendid edifice of the new era. . . . The International Union of the peasant masses of all countries will be founded, and listen to the peasant word which has too long kept silence. This Union is a great event of the new era and the importance of understanding and relationship between peasants will have a vast significance in international relations. We wait for this with joyful heart, and nurse the hope that the Union will much improve the hard fate of the peasants of the world."¹

Such was the ideal of the party then in control in Bulgaria, obviously an ideal difficult of attainment and of somewhat hazy outlines. Whether "Green" Socialism, "Green" Internationalism were merely ephemeral catch words or whether they represented germinal ideas of social justice and radical changes destined to shape the future of Bulgaria and of other countries in which similar economic conditions prevail, was not clear. It was evident that for their realization leadership of a high order, great executive and technical ability, and an exceptional intelligence on the part of the community would be required.

Passing from theory to practice it was certain that a striking change had come over Bulgaria since the war. Although the large majority of Bulgarians were small proprietors, and the agrarian problem was not acute as in other countries, still

¹ Quoted in L. Haden Guest, *The Struggle for Power in Europe*, pp. 262-

measures will be taken for the expropriation of Crown and Church lands and of all farms of over seventy-five acres and for their allotment to landless peasants. Bulgaria undertook seriously the duty of punishing its war criminals, those responsible for her entrance into the war and for acts contrary to the laws of war, and long terms of imprisonment and heavy fines were imposed, acts which hit particularly the bourgeoisie and which the latter regarded as arbitrary and oppressive. Advanced labor legislation was passed and the municipal ownership or operation of public utilities was furthered. Particular attention was paid to education, for which the Bulgarians had long been eager, ranking first among the Balkan peoples in the number of those who could read and write. The new Agrarian Government aimed to give a more practical and less literary tone to public instruction and to this end sought to create larger facilities for training in agriculture, arts and crafts, and practical science.

In these two directions socialization was attempted. Foreign trade was put under government control, the Government operating through the agency of consortiums. A consortium was created for the export of cereals and another for the import of medical supplies. The other measure of possibly far-reaching importance was the establishment of compulsory labor. A law was drafted in May 1920 providing for one year's service for all males of 21 years of age or older and of six months for all females on the completion of their sixteenth year. Bulgaria's neighbors suspected that a scheme of providing indirectly for the obligatory military service which was forbidden by the Treaty of Neuilly lurked in the clauses of this bill and their protests prompted the Great Powers to disallow this legislation. But compulsory labor was decreed for a period of ten days each year, for women as well as for men, for children as well as for adults. No one might gain exemption by the payment of money. The chief arguments for this obligatory service were the accumulation of work that had to be done, the inability of the state to pay for it, and the shortage of labor, all consequences of the war.

It was impossible to say beforehand how this principle would work in actual practice. Early results seemed reasonably satisfactory. In March and April 1921 over 600,000 school children devoted a week to manual labor. Armed with brooms and shovels and forks and buckets they cleaned streets, scrubbed floors, made walks and gardens, built fences, planted trees. Had it not been for this compulsion the work done by these children and by their

elders would have remained undone. The principle at the basis of this reform was that society might legitimately be called upon to give a certain amount of its time and strength for purposes that are social, that is, for the benefit of the community in general.

But this experiment in peasant statecraft and social ordering was destined to a sudden end. At three o'clock in the morning of June 9, 1923, the Bulgarian Government was overthrown by a *coup d'état*. All the ministers, with the exception of the premier, who was absent from the capital, were arrested by army officers and a new set of ministers were installed in their places. Professor H. Zankoff, of the University of Sofia, became prime minister and was surrounded and supported by a coalition of all the parties except the agrarian and the communist. Stambulisky, head of the late government, was killed on June 14, as an incident of a fight between some of his adherents and the troops of the new government. This is the official statement, but it is by no means certain that he was not simply assassinated. Thus the peasantry of Bulgaria lost the ablest leader they had ever had. Power passed from the hands of those who had dominated the country since the war into the hands of those who were their bitter enemies, who had been and were apparently to continue to be their chief victims, the bourgeois. For the Stambulisky régime had ignored the bourgeois, except as tax-payers. If the latter, who had now seized control by the dark and desperate device of a *coup d'état*, should show a similar narrowness and intolerance, they might find that, after all, authority so gained is ephemeral. For a government, to be stable, must recognize that a nation is composed of many and various elements, a fact which victorious parties, the world over, are too little inclined to remember, often to their own ultimate undoing.

CHAPTER XLVI

SOVIET RUSSIA

THE Bolsheviks or Communists of Russia, having seized control of the state by violence in November 1917 and having by violence turned the Constituent Assembly, popularly elected, out of doors on its first day of meeting because they did not like its complexion, were obliged by the requirements of the situation and by the promptings of their creed forthwith to give the world their measure as architects and builders of a new and perfected political and social fabric, in which mankind, cruelly and shamefully maltreated by the past, should find not only a greater contentment than it had ever known before but should also see opening up before it wide and inviting avenues of fruitful progress, of full self-expression untrammelled by the confining, deforming, and deadening institutions of long ages of blindness and of barbarism. Humanity was at last to throw off its strait-jacket, escape from prison, and become free, free in body and in soul. For Bolshevism was to issue the edict of emancipation of the world, was to strike off not only political and economic fetters, but intellectual and spiritual shackles as well.

Let us see how the Bolsheviks have met the challenge of their opportunity, how they have actually applied the new evangel, what sort of architects and builders they have proved to be in practice, how large the measure of emancipation which they have achieved. And first let us see what they have accomplished in the well-worn field of politics and government, a fundamental matter, for, in the Bolshevik philosophy, politics and industry and culture are interwoven in a manner and with a closeness eclipsing, quite, all previous efforts in the direction of general integration.

As the constitution of a country provides the necessary framework within which the national life moves and has its being, it is proper to examine at the outset the governmental conceptions and political technique of the self-appointed rulers of New Russia. The constitution of July, 1918, more or less amended and amplified in subsequent years, is their handiwork, the mirror of their

ideas of statecraft. A very long document, and one not always easy to understand, it proclaims the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic, the official title of the new government. Adopted hurriedly and with but little debate by an assembly of about a thousand members, from which all troublesome opponents had been expelled, an assembly called the Fifth All-Russian Congress of Soviets, of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Delegates, it instituted what, according to Lenin, is "an immeasurably higher form of democracy" than the world ever yet had seen. If this is true the world must radically revise its definition of democracy. Article 7 in Chapter IV announces the basis of the republic by saying "that now, at the decisive moment in the struggle between the workers and their exploiters, there can be no place for the latter on any governing body" and other articles render the thought more precise: "The following persons have neither the right to vote nor to be elected:— (a) those who employ others for the sake of profit, (b) those who live on income not arising from their own works." In other words, all aristocrats and all the middle class, the much talked-of bourgeoisie, manufacturers, business men, professional men, merchants, bankers, as well as those peasants who employ other peasants on their farms, are excluded from the franchise or from holding any position in the government. Only those who gain their livelihood by "productive" labor possess the right to vote. With these restrictions, which are quite formidable, the franchise is given to all men and women who are over eighteen years of age.

But does this "democracy" operate fairly and without favor for those who are declared within the fold? By no means. In electing representatives to a Soviet Congress the industrial workers are given a representative for every 25,000 voters, whereas it takes 125,000 peasants to secure the same privilege. In other words the electoral power of a man who works a machine is five times as great as that of one who works the soil. The same ratio applies to local or provincial bodies as to the national. There is thus no attempt to secure democratic equality. Nor do these unequal democrats vote directly for representatives to a national assembly, as do the voters of France or England or the United States. They vote for delegates to Urban or Provincial or County Soviets which, in turn, elect the delegates to the All-Russian Congress. This elaborate and intricate machinery facilitates the elimination by wire-pulling or, if necessary, by violence, of those who are considered undesirable by those conducting the election.

The highest authority in the state is declared by the constitution to be the All Russian Congress of Soviets, a body consisting of a thousand members or more. This Congress elects a Central Executive Committee of three hundred members, which constitutes the supreme legislative and administrative body in the state and which chooses a Council of People's Commissaries, or Cabinet, consisting of 18 members. In practice it is this latter body which wields the real authority. Even this body is led by an inner group.

This system combines the appearance of democracy with the reality of a narrow dictatorship of at most a half a dozen men, of whom the leaders have thus far been Lenin and Trotsky.

But the real political life of Russia is not to be found in the constitution. It is to be found in the Communist Party which, through its organization, its clubs, its committees of supervision, its manipulation of elections, is able to terrorize the country, to capture the offices of state, and, in short, to establish a monopoly of power. This party, which, on its own showing, has never numbered more than 600,000 members, only a fraction of whom are active, has since 1917 maintained a dictatorship over more than 130,000,000 people. Having seized power by a military *coup d'état*, it has gradually developed agencies of self-protection, a highly centralized administrative system with an immense number of officials under its control, a Red Army, also controlled by it, and a secret police and espionage system, carried out by a body known as the Extraordinary Commission, or Che-ka, a sort of revolutionary tribunal with indefinite powers of inquisition, with its agents everywhere, its torture chambers and its prisons, its summary processes. Established "to combat counter-revolution" the Che-ka counts its victims by the tens of thousands. The Secret Police under the rule of the Tsars was not so sinister or so irresponsible a body.

Using such instruments a small minority has been able to establish a tyranny which has never been surpassed in thoroughness or in scope in the history of the world. Having seized power by force that minority has used its power ruthlessly in order to preserve its acquired position. Organized terror has been its method, frankly admitted by the authors of this bloody and inhuman policy, though often denied by their foreign sympathizers. "No dictatorship of the proletariat is to be thought of without terror and violence," is one of Lenin's illuminating utterances, and another is, "we are firmly for the Red Terror against the capitalist class" — and the capitalist

class included anyone who believed in private property, any peasant, for instance, who would not give up his grain at the demand of a Bolshevik official, anyone, in short, who was either hostile or lukewarm to the ideas and policies of the self-imposed dictators. Terror has been used to crush, not only the bourgeoisie, but the peasantry, and even the other Socialist parties than the one to which the Bolsheviks belong. It has been impartially applied to all whom the Bolsheviks have, for whatever reason, considered dangerous to their retention of power or to the spread of their dogmas. The success of the Bolsheviks in maintaining themselves in power has not been owing to the superiority of their theories but to the superiority of their organization, and to the régime of blood and iron.

The triumph of the Bolsheviks has been gained not only by the violent suppression of the bourgeoisie but by the sweeping aside of all other Socialists than those who belong to their own group, particularly the Social Revolutionaries, and by treating them as suspect. Karl Kautsky, leader of the pure Marxians of Germany, states the situation as follows in his book on the *Dictatorship of the Proletariat*:—"The Socialist party which governs Russia to-day gained power in fighting against other Socialist parties, and exercises its authority while excluding other Socialist parties from the executive. The antagonism of the two Socialist movements is not based on small personal jealousies; it is the clashing of two fundamentally distinct methods, that of democracy and that of dictatorship. For us, therefore, Socialism without democracy is unthinkable."

And Kautsky adds: "How can a dictatorship remain at the helm against the will of a majority of the people? Can a Socialist system of production be built up on this foundation? This means the organization of production by society, and requires economic self-government throughout the whole mass of the people. State organization of production by a bureaucracy, or by the dictatorship of a single section of the people, does not mean Socialism. Socialism presupposes that broad masses of the people have been accustomed to organization, that numerous economic and political organizations exist, and can develop in perfect freedom. The Socialist organization of Labor is not an affair of barracks."

Lenin and Trotsky, outraged by this trenchant criticism, proceeded to excommunicate Kautsky from the fold, as they have excommunicated many other Socialist leaders. But this interchange of courtesies indicated the fundamental difference between

the two schools of Socialists. The Social Democrats of Germany, whom the Social Revolutionaries of Russia resembled, believed that Socialism would come into existence slowly, gradually, with the growth of capitalism to such a pitch of concentration that society would at the ripe moment merely take control of a perfected mechanism. They also believed in democratic processes, democratic training for the masses, in factories and political parties, since only a mature and instructed democracy could operate a socialistic system of production and distribution. They did not believe that progress could be made by violence, but only by the slow methods of education and moral suasion. The Bolsheviks, on the other hand, impatient of any such leisurely process, believed that the new social system could be hastened enormously by revolutionary action; that, to bring it to pass, democratic methods, with all their delays and hesitations, must be discarded; and that power must be concentrated in the hands of a few leaders who know exactly what they want and who have the energy and audacity necessary for a direct and immediate attack upon the existing system. As the majority of people do not yet believe in communism the work must be done by the enlightened minority. Salvation lies not in democracy, but in the dictatorship of the few for the sake of the proletariat. This dictatorship must be used, first to crush all opponents and clear the ground, then to lay the foundations of the new order. The Bolsheviks rejected parliamentary institutions, political democracy as middle-class superstitions, instruments of the exploiting bourgeoisie. It was just this exploiting bourgeoisie which was the enemy and which must be swept aside, with all its works.

This has been done effectively, by taking away their property, by reducing them to starvation or to exile, by denying them any share in the state, by depriving them not only of the right to vote, but of all positive political or civil rights, and by numberless acts of great or petty tyranny. Announcing in the first article of the constitution that all private property in land was abolished without compensation, that the entire land of Russia was national property, that "all forests, treasures of the earth, and waters of general public utility, all implements whether animate or inanimate" belonged to the nation, the new government indicated sufficiently its programme of "socialization," that is, the seizure of all private property and the vesting of it all henceforth in the nation, not only landed property, but factories, mills, mines, railways, banks, as well. Such was the ideal, the

goal to be reached as quickly as possible. The "parasitic strata" of society must be eliminated. Only thus could "the liberation of the toiling masses from the yoke of capital" be achieved.

The work of "liberation" had already begun. The estates of the great landowners had been seized by the peasants on the morrow of the overthrow of the Tsar, long before the constitution had been framed, and had been divided up among themselves, not in any orderly or systematic way, but by the very practical method of each peasant or group of peasants arming against every other, grabbing what he could and holding it if he had the power. But whatever the method, the result was the transfer to a new set of people of probably 135,000,000 acres of land. The landed aristocracy and the gentry were ruined. The state might declare and did declare the land the property of the nation. Should it, however, attempt to enforce this conception it would find that the hundred million peasants considered the land theirs, not the state's. The peasants had a very lively respect for right of private property, not always for the property of others, but always for their own. They did not at all share the belief of the Bolsheviks that private property was the root of all evil. But they were willing to profit by the transfer of the possessions of others to themselves.

The nationalization of industries was a more complicated matter. At first the workers in each factory were urged to take over the factory, ignoring the owner, to conduct it, to determine the conditions of labor, to sell or distribute the products. Managers, directors, owners were either driven out or were reduced to receiving orders from their former employees, not giving them. The results were, however, not satisfactory. The workers had not the requisite ability or training to administer such enterprises; moreover the opportunities and incentives to loafing or slacking on their jobs were too good to be missed. They everywhere increased their wages enormously and worked as much as they liked. The result was that chaos reigned in the industrial field, and that production fell off, thus creating a grave situation for a people that needed more rather than less after the long and exhausting war. Moreover the workers, like the peasants, showed a tendency to regard the factories as their own and to hold cloudy or lax views in regard to nationalization.

While this procedure was not a success in increasing the national production, it contributed greatly toward the primary end which the Bolsheviks had in view, the ruin of the bourgeoisie.

The next step in industrial experimentation was taken when it was decided on June 28, 1918, to nationalize all factories, that is, to confiscate them. The reason given was the Bolshevists' desire "to put an end to the economic disorganization, to the disorder in the distribution of supplies, and to simplify the dictatorship of the workers and the paupers." By the end of 1919 four thousand concerns with all their property were declared to belong to the nation. It was officially stated that this was "all Russian industry." This was not quite accurate, for the State took over only those factories which were large and well-equipped, leaving the smaller undertakings in the hands of their owners. All industry was to be controlled through the Supreme Economic Council, which had about fifty industrial departments, and a large number of local organs. State ownership and control of the principal means of production, distribution and exchange, such was the economic system set up by the Soviet government. But how would the system work? To work at all some general scheme must be evolved co-ordinating the various kinds of industries, furnishing them the necessary raw materials and the necessary supply of labor and providing also for the proper distribution of the finished products. Such a scheme could not be improvised. Moreover it would require an army of trained administrators, something always difficult to find in Russia, and now particularly so, since whatever training there was was the possession of the hated bourgeoisie, the "crushing" of whom was the primary object of Bolshevik statesmanship. Such a scheme was never forthcoming, though often loudly announced. The "nationalization" of industry was shortly to prove a dismal failure. Production fell off alarmingly and, in some lines, practically ceased. To secure the creation and distribution of even the reduced supply of commodities, the State was compelled to apply the principle of compulsion and of terror to considerable groups of people from whom the incentive of private gain had been removed.

A Communist state, if it is to monopolize all sources of wealth, all means of production, is at least bound to see that its citizens do not starve or die in larger numbers than they do under the capitalistic régime, the régime of private property and private enterprise. Otherwise the new system will seem inferior to the old and the sympathy and devotion even of those who have hailed the dawn with enthusiasm may turn into indifference or even into execration. The condition of the food problem is a test of the efficiency and validity of any social system.

At the very outset of their career as rulers the Bolsheviks had, as we have seen, issued decrees proclaiming the abolition of private property and the nationalization of the land. In practice, however, they had encouraged the peasants to seize the estates of the large landowners and divide them up. The peasants thought that the additions they thus made to their holdings were theirs in full ownership. They did not for a moment think that these new parcels any more than the old belonged to the nation. They belonged to themselves. The peasants were a hundred million strong and they believed intensely in the right of private property. They and their present rulers were poles apart in their economic conceptions. The Bolsheviks, recognizing in the peasants the greatest obstacle to the realization of their schemes proceeded rather softly at first and with discretion. They did not seek to drive into the peasant mind at all costs the blunt fact that what he thought was his own was not his at all. They rather glossed the matter over for the time being by distinguishing between the *ownership* which, it was declared, inhered in the nation, and the actual *possession* of the land which the peasants had enjoyed and intended to enjoy. As long as the peasants were not molested in their occupation of their farms they would not bother their brains much about the new, strange theories of the politicians.

But friction could not long be avoided. The Bolsheviks with their theory of national ownership of the land regarded the peasants as tenants at will of the Soviet Republic, required to render whatever services were necessary for the benefit of society as a whole. Consequently, in order to secure food for the army and the civil servants and for the workers of the cities, the Soviet authorities began to make requisitions upon the peasants. Encountering opposition, they at first tried to divide the peasants among themselves, by stirring up the poor and lazy against the thrifty and industrious. The latter were denounced as bourgeois, as "tight fists," as men who had all the cruel selfishness of the bourgeoisie, who would not give up their grain for the benefit of the workmen of the cities. Committees of the Poor Peasants, or Pauper Committees, were formed in each village, consisting sometimes of the unfortunate, often of loafers and even criminals, to spy upon their fellow peasants and denounce them to the government. Outbreaks occurred between the peasants who possessed something and these Pauper Committees. The government sent troops to support the latter and punish the former. But one result of this policy was that as early as the fall of

1918 the industrious peasants began to reduce the area of their fall sowing. What was the object of raising a surplus, if those who did no work could come and take it away?

This introduction of civil dissension into every village, this policy of inciting the poor peasants against the well-to-do, this discovery that even among the peasants there was a bourgeoisie and a proletariat, and this determination that the former, the "tight fists," must be strangled and crushed, as the better known bourgeois were being crushed, did not result in making communism attractive to the peasants, and naturally did not increase the agricultural production of the country, which was the essential thing. But the government's measures grew harsher, its exactions heavier, and it finally decreed that the entire agricultural produce should be confiscated by the state with the exception of the quantity necessary for the support of the peasants. The latter must hand over to the state all that they raised above the minimum allowed them.

Whereupon the peasants decided not to raise any more than was necessary to feed themselves and their families. At a time when agricultural production should have been increased, it was as a matter of fact decreased, the area under cultivation grew less, because the farmers had no incentive to labor harder, knowing that not they but others would enjoy the fruits of their labor. The only reply on the part of the rulers of Russia to this passive resistance of the peasantry was terrorism in its various forms. This terrorism cost the peasants heavily, and increased the general disorder and distress, but did not increase the area under cultivation or the food supply. On the contrary both grew less from year to year, and the natural and inevitable result was famine, which came in 1921 and which was the ghastly consequence of Bolshevik economics and statesmanship. A hundred million peasants could not be whipped by the dictators of Moscow into creating wealth which those dictators would forthwith seize for purposes of their own. The peasants preferred to hide their grain rather than sow it, preferred to slaughter their livestock for food rather than to see it seized by the Bolshevik authorities.

In 1921, with famine at the door, the governing authorities began to see a light and adopted a different policy, one no longer of confiscation, but of a tax in kind which should be paid by the peasants and which should be much lower than the previous requisition had been. And the peasants were assured the right to sell any surplus which they might raise in the open market, a privilege which they had not previously enjoyed under the Soviet

rule. Whether this return to a system which the Communists had done their best to destroy came too late remained to be seen.

In the field of industry the result of the Bolshevist experiment has also ended in disaster and approximate collapse. Russian industries were badly shaken by the war and the blockade. Under the guidance of the dictators of the proletariat they have been nearly ruined.

The first innovation of the new régime within the industrial field was the decree of November 14, 1917, issued only a week after the Bolshevik *coup d'état*, establishing the system of Workers' Control. The workmen of a given factory were, as we have seen, authorized and encouraged to take over the factory and administer it through a committee elected by themselves, and controlling the multiple operations of production, of sale and of financial management. The capital of the former owner was thus used by the men who had formerly been his employees, and used as they saw fit. The former owner was either entirely eliminated or made to work in some inferior capacity, subject to orders. As the workers had neither the necessary business training nor experience, and as under their own direction they increased their wages enormously and decreased their hours of labor, and as there was no co-ordination among different factories, production fell off rapidly and industrial chaos resulted.

The Bolsheviks, in view of the obvious failure of this method of conducting the manufactures of the country, and in order to put an end to this anarchy, proceeded to set up, in place of workers' control, a system of industrial nationalization. The factories, declared national property, were to be administered henceforth, not by haphazard and unrelated committees of workmen, but by a central and all-embracing bureaucracy with representatives everywhere, a body capable of comprehensive plans and action. But as a matter of fact bureaucratic nationalization of industry proved no more of a panacea than workers' control. The insistent national need was increased production. Instead, production continued to decrease in every line, and most alarmingly. The Bolshevik authorities, in the endeavor to counteract this disastrous tendency, were driven to adopt measures more and more arbitrary and more and more severe, culminating in the adoption of the principle of compulsory labor. That principle had from the beginning been applied to the hated "bourgeois," who had been forced to perform hard and repulsive labor, street cleaning, street paving, removal of offal, unloading of coal, draining marshes. But now, the principle of

compulsory labor was to be applied to the proletariat itself, in spasmodic and partial fashion, it is true, since nothing general and systematic could be carried through in Russia. In the name of state necessity labor must be mobilized and sent wherever needed. "The masses," said Trotsky to his fellow-Communists at a party congress, "should be in a position to be moved about, sent and ordered from place to place in exactly the same way as soldiers. . . . Without this we cannot speak seriously of any organization of industry on a new basis in the present-day conditions of disorganization and starvation."

In harmony with this thought a decree was issued in the spring of 1920 incorporating the whole population in special labor armies. Mobilization was forthwith begun, and continued through the year, though in a random and fragmentary fashion. Extremely severe punishments were threatened for those guilty of the evasion of labor conscription, fines, imprisonment, even trial before the Revolutionary Tribunal. To such a pass had things come in Russia that the industrial proletariat of the cities, the very class whose liberation from age-long exploitation had been the announced purpose and justification of the Bolshevik revolution, found itself the victim and the dupe of its so-called emancipation, threatened with a coercion far more stringent than they had ever known under the odious old régime.

Trotsky's attempted militarization of industry, however, had but very poor results. The industrial proletariat resisted, passively or actively, just as the peasants resisted, the tyranny of the state. Only, being a much less numerous body, it was seriously injured in the contest. Many of the workers left the towns and hid in the country in order to escape conscription. Those who could not escape went on strike, and for this they were punished ruthlessly. Having ground the faces of the former rich or well-to-do, the Bolshevik dictatorship was now grinding the faces of the poor. Moreover the labor of those who were actually compelled to work under this régime was much below normal in efficiency, owing to reduced physical and moral strength. Petrograd workers adopted in September 1920 a resolution to this effect: "We feel as if we were hard labor convicts where everything but our feeding has been made subject to iron rules. We have become lost as human beings, and have been turned into slaves."

Industrial nationalization, therefore, proved no more successful than agricultural nationalization. The nationalization of commerce also was a failure. In April, 1918, all foreign trade

had been nationalized, and in October of that year, all domestic trade. The commercial fleet was declared national property. All stores, big and little, were closed, and their contents confiscated by the state. The state was henceforth to be the sole agent of distribution of commodities. Private trading was made punishable with heavy fines and imprisonment, and in this domain, as in the domain of agriculture and industry, terror was the order of the day.

Industrial, agricultural, commercial nationalization led Russia straight to disaster. The economic life of the country was utterly demoralized and distress became general and intense. The dictatorship of the proletariat was in fact the dictatorship of a petty and unscrupulous minority, and for that minority the clouds were thickening. Its enemies were becoming more numerous as its incompetence and unabashed tyranny were more and more sharply defined against the murky background of a society in rapid process of disintegration. The theories of Bolshevism were discredited by its works.

These artists in destruction finally saw that in order to maintain themselves in power they must alter their course of action, must execute what they called an "economic retreat." Their aim had been to destroy capitalism and to bring about the world revolution. The world revolution, that is to say, universal communism, had failed to appear and the chances of its coming had been steadily growing less. Meanwhile the breakdown of agriculture, industry and transportation had brought unutterable woe upon Russia, and not that new and happier era which the Communists had promised. Throwing the blame for their failure upon the "rapacious" and "parasitic" classes of "capitalistic" countries and upon the stubborn, unintelligent Russian peasants, the Soviet authorities began to compromise with capitalism. In a speech delivered on March 15, 1921, Lenin announced that they must satisfy the peasants "economically," must consent to their having the right to buy and sell in open market as under the old régime, or "it will be impossible to maintain the power of the proletariat in Russia, in view of the slowing down of the international revolution." And he added certain observations which might, without undue intellectual strain, have been made much earlier: "In Russia the industrial workers are in the minority and the small farmers overwhelmingly in the majority"; "the transformation of the entire psychology of the petty peasants is a labor which will require generations"; "it is time to admit frankly that the peasants manifestly refuse to accept pro-

letarian dictatorship any longer. . . . We must grant freer economic relations between the workers and the peasants. . . . Freedom of economic relations means free trade, and free trade signifies a return to capitalism. Those who believe that in this Russia of peasants socialism can be reached, simply believe in Utopia."

These utterances sound like a complete renunciation of the whole Communistic experiment. Such was, however, not at all what Lenin had in mind. Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof. Concessions must be made to the long-established habits and prejudices of men, and the wise person is he who, in such circumstances, makes concessions enough to enable him to gain time. Lenin's proposals, soon embodied in decrees, were that henceforth the peasant's crops should not be seized by the state but should belong to the peasant, that he should pay a tax in kind, and that he might freely sell any surplus he might possess, and might buy any manufactured article in open market. In other words, shops might open again and might engage in private commerce. But such individual enterprise was to be encouraged only in the case of petty merchants. A certain freedom was to exist, henceforth, for small capitalists, but big enterprises, big capitalism, considered so dangerous, were to be still under the control of the state.

But how could merchants secure the manufactured articles which the peasants needed and which they were now to be permitted to buy,—provided they should have any agricultural surplus with which to pay for them? The industries of Russia, shot all to pieces, could themselves neither secure the raw materials nor produce the desired commodities in sufficient quantities to meet the needs. The authorities now invited practical manufacturers, experts, to come back and start up the factories once more and resume their accustomed role of leadership and direction. But factories cannot be run without capital and the dictators of Moscow had for three years done their best to destroy capital and capitalists, and had been eminently successful. Russian capital was pretty nearly, if not quite, extinct. As it could not be called miraculously into existence by a mere decree or by many decrees something else had to be done, something on a large scale, too, for in 1921 the food situation was such that widespread famine could be easily foreseen and hunger and misery often make men desperate and lead them into dangerous courses.

"The year 1921," says Professor Miliukov, "will be remem-

bered as the first year of the great Russian Famine. None similar to it can be found in Russian history. It is as unparalleled and unprecedented as the events which caused it." Miliukov adds that the famine began "as early as 1919 and 1920 with the shrinking of the planted area to three-fourths and two-fifths of its normal size." In 1921 the area under cultivation fell to half that planted before the war. Even had the crops been excellent within that restricted area there would have been a dreadful shortage of food. And the crops were poor! "The worst of it is," says this author, "that this situation is bound to last as long as the causes that brought it about last. Famine has become endemic in Russia."

What could the Government do to conjure or to mitigate the crisis? Half measures would surely not suffice. The ruin of industry, the decline in the productivity of labor, the diminution of the area under cultivation, the demoralization of the railroads, the fantastic depreciation of the currency, how could these and still other evils be remedied?

By an appeal to capital. Such was the only answer that this Government, founded on the negation of the right of capital to exist, could give. For four years the Soviet Government had been living on the reserves of the capitalistic era which had preceded its advent to power. The gold it had found in the Imperial Treasury and which had largely kept it going was, however, approaching exhaustion. There still remained at its disposition early in 1921 about £50,000,000, a paltry amount, considering the situation. When these were spent, what then? There could be no appeal to free Russian capital because none such existed. There could be no recourse to private Russian banks, for one of the first measures of the Communist Dictatorship had been to abolish all private banks and to confiscate their assets.

There was nothing left to do except to appeal to foreign capital, to appeal for help to those countries which had refused to accept the economic illumination that had shone for four years from the towers of the Kremlin, and which had continued along in the old and narrow ruts worn by ages of economic ignorance. The Soviet Government now set out to tap this inviting source of supply. All through 1921 and 1922 it made repeated and varied efforts to get "credits" from abroad; i.e., to get the aid of English, French, American capitalists, capitalists, in short, of any stripe. It asked for loans from foreign governments and, largely at the desire of Lloyd George,

it was given the opportunity to present its arguments at two international conferences, held in 1922, at Genoa and the Hague. Lloyd George was of the opinion that trade with Russia was necessary not only for Russian reconstruction but for European reconstruction; that nothing could be considered stable in Europe as long as so large a part of the continent stood outside the ordinary international relations and activities; that, if trade could be renewed between Russia and the other nations, not only would the grave problem of unemployment in the latter be put in the way of solution, but that Russia, by the renewed and daily association with those countries, would come to abandon her peculiar economic theories and would slip back into the old familiar grooves of private industry and individual enterprise. With an optimism which was far from being warranted by the facts the British Premier believed that the leopard had already changed many of his spots and would be only too glad to change the others if given a little encouragement.

The Russians on their side saw their opportunity in this manifest desire of other nations to resume trade with them. Wishing to emerge from the isolation in which they had stood for several years, desiring foreign recognition of their government, and particularly anxious for foreign capital, now that Russian capital had been destroyed, the dictators of Moscow proceeded to whet the foreign appetite by dangling before the world of speculators roseate pictures of great wealth to be easily acquired if only they would co-operate in a reasonable spirit with the Soviet authorities. These authorities, desperately needing money, developed an elaborate scheme of putting up the vast resources of Russia to the highest bidder — on conditions and for a consideration. Those resources, mines, forests, fisheries, should be put into the market. Foreigners who might be willing to invest their money in them should of course be guaranteed that they could retain their concessions long enough to enable them to make handsome profits. They must be assured that there would be, in their cases, no nationalization, no confiscation, no requisitions, things for which contemporary Russia was unpleasantly famous. They must also be assured of the right to hire and direct Russian labor so as to be able to carry on their enterprises.

In other words Russia was to be offered up to the tender mercies of foreign exploitation. That this would mean economic subjection, a condition similar to that of Turkey or China, a régime of capitulations and extra-territoriality, and special rights that native Russians could not enjoy, made no difference

to the Soviet Government as long as thereby it might hope to remain in power. No compunctions as to the probable fate of Russian labor under such a régime deterred it in its desire to carry through its scheme. Would these foreign capitalists be given rights of compulsion over their Russian workmen or would the Russian authorities use compulsion in order to supply them with laborers and to keep the latter up to the mark? It must be admitted that this champion of the poor and the oppressed, this enemy of all exploitation of the masses by "rapacious" capitalists, showed no weak and silly sentimentality in this crisis nor any morbid passion for consistency. But what is to be said, on the other hand, of the spectacle offered by the other nations, several of which had been Russia's late allies and friends and who owed much to Russia's indispensable and great assistance during the years of the war? They were showing, some of them, a repulsive keenness to profit by the weakness of the Russian state.

Thirty-five nations, including Russia and Germany, attended the Genoa Conference (April-May 1922). The premier of Great Britain was the center, round whom buzzed all the intrigues, all the greed, all the appetites of Europe. France attended the conference out of deference to the wishes of Lloyd George, but with no faith in the desirability or the possibility of any agreement with a nation which repudiated its debts and which denied the right of private property. The United States, urged to attend, declined, but sent a word of cooling wisdom which was not at all to the taste of the sponsors of the conference. "It is idle," wrote Secretary Hughes, "to expect resumption of trade until the economic bases of production are securely established. Production is conditioned upon the safety of life, the recognition, by firm guarantees, of private property, the sanctity of contract, and the rights of free labor." Until these things existed in Russia no co-operation would be possible.

The great illusion of Genoa, namely that it was possible to pacify and unite Europe and launch it upon a prosperous career, by an agreement with Russia, was soon dispelled. Another illusion, entertained by many, that Bolshevism was a thing of the past, that its famous "economic retreat" indicated a complete reversion of Russia to the type prevalent in the rest of the world, also soon went into the discard. Russia, by dint of being told that Europe could not exist without her, felt her position very strong. Having ruined Russia the dictators of Moscow appealed to Europe for immediate help but they did not abandon their

fundamental tenets. It was proved at the Conference of Genoa, to the satisfaction even of those who would fain be blind, that the basic principles of Bolshevism, the destruction of capitalism, and the annihilation of the capitalist class throughout the world, had not been abandoned but were as firmly held as ever by those who controlled the Russian state. Two antipodal systems of thought cannot be harmonized by any verbal ingenuity, however consummate it may be. Before the governments of Europe would loan money to Russia they must know whether that country recognized the obligation to pay them what they had already loaned her in the past, a debt which she had formally repudiated. But the Soviet representatives declined to give the necessary assurance that those debts would be paid. Before the governments could urge their private citizens to invest their money in Russian enterprises they must have assurance that those who had invested in such enterprises in the past would get their factories back, they having been promptly confiscated by the Bolsheviks upon their arrival in power. Such assurances were not forthcoming. It was merely stated that, if the powers would recognize the Soviet authority as a legal government in full and regular standing in the family of civilized nations, and would make Russia a large loan, then these other matters might be discussed in later negotiations.

Mr. Lloyd George had urged the calling of the Genoa Conference, and the participation in it of Russia and Germany, as a means of uniting Europe, as a means of founding the general peace and prosperity of a distracted world by a general spirit of co-operation and amity. But at the very outset of the conference Russia and Germany concluded a treaty of alliance, at Rapallo, on Easter Sunday, 1922, which showed that at least Russia was aiming not at a united but at a divided Europe. This action was immediately damaging in its effects upon the conference and it opened up an alarming future. Were Germany and Russia, both of which, for different reasons, were bitter enemies of the Treaty of Versailles, preparing to attack and destroy that settlement and erect one of their own in its place? The Treaty of Rapallo, which proved to be the sole positive achievement of Genoa, was a sharp warning to the former Allies that they would better remain united if they cared anything about preserving the fruits of their victory.

"The Genoa Conference," says an American diplomatist, "was a market for the purchase and sale of stolen property." It broke up because those who believed in private property and

those who believed in its destruction could find no common meeting ground. The Hague Conference which met a month later to continue the derisory discussion was shortly wrecked on the same jagged rock.

Meanwhile Russia had concluded an agreement with Germany, a state which like herself was willing to fish in troubled waters, whereby she received the official recognition she had demanded, was given back the Russian embassy in Berlin, and secured at least, it appeared, one good customer. It remained to be seen whether, unable to get general recognition, Russia could get piecemeal recognition, first from one nation and then another. More important still, it remained to be seen whether, if capitalistic governments who would not co-operate in loaning money to the Soviet autocracy and in encouraging their citizens to invest in Russian "securities," there were still private capitalists in those countries adventurous enough to do so in the face of the warning that, if the waters proved too deep, their governments would not aid in pulling them out.

The Supreme Council in calling the Genoa Conference said, in disclaiming any thought of intervening in the domestic concerns of Russia: "It is the right of each country to choose for itself the system it prefers." But this is precisely what the Russian people has not been permitted by the Bolshevik dictators to do. The Bolshevik government, founded on a military *coup d'état*, drove out of doors a constituent assembly which had been popularly elected, and has confiscated, not only property, but the rights of man, free elections, free speech, freedom of the press and of public meeting, civil and political freedom, in short, democracy. Lenin frankly declares that "liberty is a bourgeois superstition."

We have thus far concerned ourselves with the political and economic history of the Bolshevik experiment; an experiment that has been going on since 1917. We have seen its rise, its development, and its present-day tendencies, which indicate a limited and somewhat superficial reversal of policy though not of ultimate aim. Russia, which declares itself a Federated Soviet Republic, is none of these things, unless the dictatorship of a petty minority is a republic. Whatever federation exists is very slight and largely fictitious, and the soviets, that is, popular and democratic organizations of workmen and peasants vested with supreme political power, no longer exist. They also have been confiscated by this highly confiscatory government. They have been purged of all elements of opposition, have been brought

under the control of the government, have been made a mere instrument of the Communist Party. The men now in power in Russia are not generally workmen and never have been workmen but belong in large measure to the so-called intellectual class, a few lawyers, many journalists and professional revolutionaries. As for the peasants they enjoyed a larger direct representation in the first Duma under Nicholas II than they have ever enjoyed in the controlling councils of the Soviet Republic. One of the charges that may be justly brought against the Bolsheviks is that by their resort to traditional and exaggerated methods of arbitrary rule they cut short that promising democratic movement which began after the first revolution in 1905, and which began again after the overthrow of the Empire in March, 1917.

Not only is Russia exhausted, impoverished and disorganized economically, but she is much reduced in size. The advent of the Bolsheviks to power was the signal for the disruption of the state. Everywhere the border peoples broke away from the central government and declared their independence. Finland and Poland seized the occasion to throw off a yoke they had long hated. The Baltic provinces, Courland, Esthonia and Livonia, eager to be free alike of their German baron overlords and their Russian autocrats, broke loose and later appeared as two small, democratic, peasant republics, Esthonia and Latvia. Lithuania also reappeared upon the map. The Ukraine, a vast region of South Russia, tried to do the same and succeeded momentarily. In the southeast, in the region of the Caucasus, arose the republics of Georgia, Azerbaijan, Erivan, Armenia, and the long stretches of Siberia broke up into fragments. We have seen how far the Bolsheviks were willing to go in recognizing this national disruption in the treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Germany and Austria-Hungary.

Germany was required by the Treaty of Versailles to denounce the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk which the western Allies had never recognized. During the next two years, 1919 and 1920, the Soviet Government, which had been ready to make peace at any price with Germany and Austria, was almost continually at war with the non-Bolshevist elements in former Russia, led by Denikin, Yudenitch, Kolchak, Wrangel, and with the Lithuanians, Letts, Esthonians and Poles. These were in large measure civil wars. The Moscow government was able in the end, by developing a large and well-disciplined Red Army, to put down its internal enemies who questioned its right to rule and who tried

to overthrow it. It also overran the Ukraine and terminated its brief dream, putting in its place the fiction of an independent allied Soviet régime, — a fiction and nothing more. Later it did practically the same with the shadowy republics of the Caucasus. In the course of two or three years the militaristic energy of the Bolsheviks had won back much of what they provisionally lost, and these arch-internationalists had revealed a strong sense of nationalism. This sense had been reinforced and utilized by the conflicts which had gone on at the same time with foreign troops, with the English in the Archangel and Murmansk regions, with the Czechs, Japanese, and Americans in Siberia, with the Roumanians and the French in southern Russia, with the Esthonians, the Letts, and the Poles toward the west.

The total result of this complicated series of insurrections and wars was the re-establishment over a large part of former Russia of the power of the Russian state. Sometimes that re-establishment, as already hinted, was more or less disguised by an illusory recognition of semi-independence or half-alliance as "Associated Republics," as in the case of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia and the Far East. In reality, however, no one was deceived by such circumlocutions.

But, despite the vigor and general success of the Bolshevik authorities, they nevertheless do not rule over as much of the earth's surface as did Nicholas II. Finland, the Baltic provinces now known as Esthonia and Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland are gone and the Russia of today is a reduced Russia. Counting these losses and including also the losses of the Great War, 1,700,000 killed and probably several times as many dying as a result of its indirect effects, and including also the losses of the civil wars, of the emigration of two or three million of the former privileged and bourgeois classes, and the mortality occasioned by the economic exhaustion, the under-nourishment and starvation of immense numbers, and we have a notable diminution of the population of Russia. About 180,000,000 in 1914, that population has probably shrunk to something like 130,000,000 today. The abnormal increase in the death rate which has characterized the last few years will not quickly disappear and will continue to exact a heavy toll, owing to the epidemics and the unsanitary conditions of life, which cannot, even under the most favorable circumstances, be immediately stopped or remedied.

No country has in modern times experienced so violent or so complete a break with its past as has contemporary Russia.

The Romanoffs are gone, the nobility is ruined and killed or scattered. The elements of a monarchical reaction are few and apparently impotent. The land has been divided quite beyond recall, it is reasonably safe to say. The bourgeoisie has been crushed and perhaps half of its number are eating the bitter bread of exile. This colossal emigration of the bourgeoisie is a very serious matter as robbing the country of the ability, the training, the technical equipment, the enterprise of an educated class, never very large in Russia, a class which will be sorely needed in the work of future national restoration. The class of industrialists, which had sprung up only during the last two or three decades of the Empire has been swept away by the destruction of industry. The industrial working classes have lost the gains they so painfully acquired in the Factory Acts of the closing nineteenth and opening twentieth centuries, and have been frightfully worn down by the present misgovernment. The men of the liberal professions have been decimated, the intellectual, literary and scientific world has been bereft of many, if not of most, of its men of achievement and promise. Russia, which will need leaders in the future as never before, will have increased difficulty in finding them.

Meanwhile the peasantry, the overwhelming mass of the people, have benefited from the revolution, in one respect. They have more land. Russia will long be a peasant state, and all theories of communism will break themselves in vain against that granite block. Whatever hope there is for the future seems to lie in that sorely harassed, illiterate, ignorant, but hardy and vigorous class.

The old régime in Russia has disappeared forever. What the new régime will be is wrapped in obscurity. That it will be a peasant democracy seems as likely a prophecy as any. But when? At this point even the prophet may well refrain from attempting to exercise his art. Divination is a venturesome and presumptuous business.

At the present moment the government of Russia is the very negation of democracy and of all that democracy implies.

CHAPTER XLVII

FRANCE SINCE THE WAR

THE close of the war left the French Republic in a position of pre-eminence on the continent of Europe. Her government, long considered by many as the embodiment of the weakness of democracy, had proved itself rather the embodiment of its strength. For half a century overshadowed in the mind of the world by the power and prestige of the German Empire, France had been regarded not only as an inferior state, but as one whose inferiority to her neighbor was constantly increasing and was destined inevitably to continue to increase. The reasons for this gloomy outlook were commonly considered to lie in the nature of her government and in the character of her people. But the war had abundantly proved the fatuous superficiality of such critics. Both government and people had given a memorable account of themselves, and the Cassandras of decadence were estopped, at least temporarily, from their doleful incantations. France had been, from the beginning to the end, the heart of the Entente. Her valor, abundantly attested upon the battlefields of Europe from the time of Julius Caesar to that of Napoleon Bonaparte, had suffered no diminution and was universally recognized. The genius of her commanders was unsurpassed. The will of her people was made of iron. The pluck, the vigor, the bull-dog tenacity, the mastery of self, shown by the French democracy during the interminable struggle had brilliantly demonstrated the essential soundness of the national life. The men of Verdun were not the products of chance but of long training and a rich inheritance, both of mind and character.

If there was any fitness in things, it was inevitable that the Peace Conference, which was to sign and seal the verdict of the war, should be held in Paris, if it were not to be held in Berlin, and should be under the presidency of the veteran Prime Minister, Georges Clemenceau, whose indomitable courage and prodigious energy had been a tower of strength, a bulwark and a blazing beacon in the most desperate crisis of the war, whose driving force and swift intelligence had inspired his people with renewed

confidence and resolution. Long known as "The Tiger" in the animated and often venomous party struggles of the time, Clemenceau was now universally acclaimed as the Father of Victory and parliament took the earliest occasion to declare that he had "deserved well of the country," the highest official praise that can come to any Frenchman. It was this man who was to preside over the assembly of diplomats who were soon seen converging from all the corners of the globe upon the city which for four years had daily heard the thunders of the world's greatest war.

Had Clemenceau died at the Psalmist's appointed age, he would have been known only to those curious of the details of parliamentary politics. But he had lived long enough to have an opportunity to render a unique and mighty service to his country and, consequently, to the world. And now as head of the French delegation to the Peace Conference, and as the president of the Conference, he was to be one of the makers of the treaty with Germany. Fortified with a striking vote of confidence of the Chamber of Deputies (398 to 93), the man who had done so much to forge the victory now proceeded to try his hand in a very different and unaccustomed line of work.

The deliberations and decisions of the Conference of Paris have already been described. Important for all the world, for no country were they more important than for France. The provisions of the treaty, its merits and defects, were destined quite inevitably to dominate the political life of France for many years to come, furnishing the public, the press, the politicians with abundant material for debate. French domestic policy was henceforth to be determined by the necessities or possibilities of her foreign policy, or rather foreign and domestic policies were to be hopelessly intertangled, each reacting upon the other, sometimes in surprising ways.

Clemenceau's relations with his parliament during the Conference of Paris aroused considerable dissatisfaction and apprehension. He refused to consult it with regard to the terms of peace or to communicate to it those terms until the treaty was completed and had been signed by himself and his colleagues. The Chamber of Deputies indicated its dislike of this method, its sense that it ought not to be confronted with a *fait accompli*, which it might be forced to accept against its judgment, the bad along with the good. The Senate issued an unofficial manifesto, signed by every member present, reminding the Prime Minister of what France wished to have put into the treaty.

All this to no avail, for Clemenceau adhered to his policy of making the treaty without the intervention of the legislature.

The text of the Peace Treaty, signed at Versailles on June 28, 1919, was on June 30 laid before the Chamber of Deputies, along with the Franco-British and Franco-American Conventions accompanying it and considered by the French as virtually parts of it, as essential elements of the general compromise of conflicting and divergent interests worked out by the Conference. The attitude of Parliament toward the treaty was lukewarm. To many of its members the provisions for ensuring the security of France along the Rhine seemed unsatisfactory, insufficient. As the one dominant thought of France throughout the war and the dominant thought during the peace negotiations was, and the dominant thought today is, how to prevent another invasion from Germany, which had invaded France four times within a hundred years and would, in the practically unanimous opinion of the French people, try to invade her again, in order to wipe out the humiliation of the present war and realize her long cherished aims, the question of security was fundamental. Being a country of sixty million people while France was one of only forty million Germany was a terrible menace, how terrible any one who had lived through the Great War must recognize. Many members of the French parliament felt that the French delegation at the Conference had not secured the necessary guarantees in this vital matter.

There was much criticism in this connection of the Covenant of the League of Nations, even on the part of those who had long been advocates of peaceful methods of settling international disputes and who were sympathetic with the purpose of the League. The French representatives on the commission which had framed the articles concerning the League had tried to make those articles stronger, not weaker. They wished the League to possess sufficient force, physical force, to be able actually to maintain the peace of the world, the avowed purpose of its creation. The treaty provided for the disarmament of Germany, or rather the reduction of the German army to a moderate size. It provided also that the Allies should maintain an army in Germany for a possible fifteen years to enforce these stipulations. But after that period who could know whether Germany was living up to her treaty agreements? Her word alone France did not regard as sufficient. The French delegates, therefore, urged that a commission be established with powers of inspection to see whether she was keeping her promises or

not. M. Léon Bourgeois proposed an amendment to the Covenant to this effect. It was defeated, probably largely because of the opposition of the American and English delegations.

On a more serious matter the French had met the same opposition and had seen their views rejected. They desired the creation of an international military force strong enough to enforce the decisions of the League, in other words to prevent immediately the attack of one nation upon another. As the purpose of the League was the preservation of peace, it should be given the power to preserve it. The articles of the Covenant seemed to the French delegation quite inadequate in this regard. Those articles provided that disputes between members of the League should be submitted to certain processes of arbitration or conciliation and that no disputant should go to war until after a certain time and then only under certain conditions. Article XVI provided that violation of these provisions would be considered an act of war against all the other members of the League, which would immediately sever all trade and financial relations with the offending state, — the famous economic blockade, — and that the Council of the League should “recommend” to the several governments what military, naval, or air forces they should severally contribute for the protection of the covenants of the League.

The word “recommend” did not seem to the French a sufficient guarantee of action. They were thinking of a very real and very concrete possibility, of a thing that had occurred to them twice within fifty years and might occur again. The Council might “recommend,” but the nations were to decide what quotas they would send, if any. While they were discussing, or while they were raising and equipping their contingents, the damage might be done. France knew what it had meant to wait two years for England to get really ready for the late war, and three years for America. She did not care for a repetition of any such desperate and doubtful a period of waiting, of sickening tension.

Her representatives accordingly urged the Conference to give the League an international army, with a professional staff, ready to act, whenever peace should be threatened. It did not seem to them either sensible or safe to discuss the establishment and equipment of a fire department among forty or fifty nations after the blaze has broken out.

The French motion for such a military force was voted down, for reasons which are none too clear, since the debates of the com-

mission have not been published. But the insistent French apprehension had the effect of leading England and America to sign nearly identical agreements promising France aid, under certain conditions, if wantonly attacked. But England was not to be bound unless America ratified the Franco-American treaty, nor was America to be bound unless England ratified the Franco-British treaty.

Such had been some of the criticisms of the proposed League made by the French delegation at the Conference. They had desired to endow the League with some elements of force. They had wished to give it bones and sinews. But they had been voted down.

Now that the Treaty of Versailles, with the Covenant, was before the Parliament, it was quite natural that the same arguments should be heard there, and should also be given expression by the press. The French considered the method set up in the Covenant for the preservation of peace as too vague, too uncertain, too poorly organized. They did not consider that the first twenty-six articles of the Treaty of Versailles gave them any guarantee of real security. Objection was also made to the treaty as a whole on the ground that it did not provide clear or adequate means for its own execution but left too much to future adjustment among the Allies, which adjustment might lead to friction and even to serious crises, a premonition which was destined to prove only too well justified. As a matter of fact the treaty, thus critically received at the outset in France, became increasingly unpopular in succeeding years. The ablest and most luminous defense of it in Parliament was made by Tardieu, Clemenceau's right hand man in the negotiations. His argument was later elaborated and powerfully presented in a book entitled "The Peace."

But Parliament, however lukewarm its admiration might be, knew that there was nothing else to do than ratify the document which had been worked out with such difficulty and which necessarily represented a compromise. The treaty was ratified by the Chamber on October 2, 1919, by the strong majority of 372 to 53. Seventy-three members refrained from voting. Nine days later it was ratified unanimously by the Senate.

Now that the treaty was out of the way, it was possible to turn to other matters. The election of a new Parliament was long overdue, the present one having prolonged its life beyond its legal term, owing to the war. The election of 1919 was Clemenceau's last triumph. He himself sounded the keynote

when, speaking in Strasbourg early in November, he appealed to his countrymen to realize that the supreme duty of every Frenchman was to work, to work, to work; that only by unremitting and accelerated labor could they restore the ravages of war and enjoy the benefits of their victory; that internal peace was the primal duty of the hour. He emphasized the necessity of a stable government. The electors ought to return a large and solid majority of moderate men whose loyalty to republican institutions would be unquestioned. He pointed out the enemy, namely Bolshevism, which had made considerable progress in the land. The contest was between the National *Bloc*, comprising the moderate and conservative classes, and the Socialists, already partially affected by the ideas of Moscow and becoming more and more revolutionary. The result of the French election of 1919 showed an entirely different tendency from that revealed by the general election held at about the same time in Italy and that indicated by bye-elections in England. The moderate parties were returned in larger numbers than before and the conservative parties increased considerably. On the other hand the radical parties suffered great losses and the Socialists sank from a membership in the Chamber of over a hundred to one of 68, and several of their most conspicuous leaders had failed to be returned.

The nation thus emphatically repudiated Socialism, for out of 610 members in the new chamber over 500 belonged to the *Bloc*. Nevertheless, this does not tell the whole story, for, while fewer Socialists were elected to the Chamber the total popular vote for Socialist candidates was not far from 2,000,000, practically the same as in the elections of 1914.

After the elections to the Chamber in November came those to the Senate in January, 1920. They did not greatly alter the party complexion of that body. Among the new senators chosen was Raymond Poincaré, the President of the Republic, whose term of office was to expire on February 18.

Normally the election of the president of the French Republic takes place one month before the expiration of the presidential term. The newly chosen Parliament, therefore, proceeded on January 17, 1920, to the election of the man who should succeed Poincaré. To the surprise of the world, though not at all to the surprise of Frenchmen, that man did not prove to be Clemenceau, the "Father of Victory," whose popularity throughout the country was immense. In the party caucus held before the formal election by the National Assembly, Clemenceau

received fewer votes than did Paul Deschanel (b. 1856), at that time president of the Chamber of Deputies. Clemenceau immediately withdrew his candidacy and Deschanel was chosen President of the Republic by 734 votes out of 888 cast. The reasons why the highest honor within the gift of France was not bestowed upon the man who had done so much to save France from a German victory were various. The election was not by the people directly, who probably would have voted for Clemenceau, but by the Parliament, sitting as a National Assembly, and Parliament was filled with the enemies whom Clemenceau had made during a long political career, men whom he had opposed or driven from office or lashed with his particularly bitter tongue. The opportunity for the settlement of old scores was too good to miss. Again, all the Socialists, defeatists, all those Bolshevistically inclined, men whom Clemenceau had ruthlessly and successfully hounded and pounded during the war were naturally against him. Then there were many who, fully recognizing that he had been the right man in the right place as the great war minister, did not believe that he possessed the qualities needed in the presidency, the tact, the temperament, the social amenities which the occupant of that largely ceremonial office ought to possess. And there were many who thought it highly unwise to choose as president in a time so grave a man who was seventy-nine years of age.

Clemenceau now retired to private life, subsequently making long trips to Egypt, and to Japan, and proving that, if he was too old for the presidency, he was still young enough to hunt big game in the jungles of India.

Paul Deschanel, the ninth President of France, was admirably qualified for the office. Coming of an old republican family — his father, Emile Deschanel, a distinguished professor of literature at the Collège de France, had bitterly opposed Napoleon III and had been exiled by the latter — he had been introduced into politics by Gambetta, and had long been a member of the Chamber of Deputies and several times its president. Occupying that position during the World War he had played a great part as the national orator. "There were, indeed," says a recent writer, "few occasions of sorrow or thanksgiving which his eloquence did not either lighten or intensify. He delivered orations more frequently than he made speeches. Whether it was to hold German infamy up to execration, to sing the splendors of the dead of France, to pay a glowing tribute to an ally's achievements or to console the widow and the orphan

and spur on the living fighter, he always had at his command the delicate, if somewhat artificial, style of speech of the great Latins, which combined both the structure of the artist and the feeling of a man."

The new president was installed in office on February 18, 1920. His administration opened brilliantly, but it was destined to end shortly and tragically. In May, while travelling by night on an official journey, he fell from the window of his state-room while the train was proceeding at good speed. Several hours elapsed before anyone on the train noticed the accident. Meanwhile the President, who, strangely enough, had not been seriously injured by his fall, was able to walk to the nearest signalman's box. But the shock, coupled probably with the fact that he had long been working at too high a pitch, brought about a nervous breakdown of so serious a nature as to compel him to resign the presidency (Sept. 16, 1920). Though he later appeared to be recovering and was even elected to the Senate early in 1921, his work was over, for the following year he died (April 28, 1922).

He was succeeded in the presidency by Alexandre Millerand (b. 1859), at the time of his election Prime Minister. Millerand was one of the leaders of the French Bar, had served in several cabinets, and had been called to head the War Department immediately after the beginning of hostilities in 1914, at a time when the deficiencies of the military machine as revealed by the battle of the Marne had to be made good and that, too, speedily. In the discharge of this heavy task, he had shown energy and doggedness. After the war he had been sent as Commissioner-General to the newly recovered provinces of Alsace-Lorraine where he was confronted with a tangle of delicate and difficult problems, in the solution of which he displayed great tact, intelligence and courage. Cutting official red tape with cheerful alacrity, not afraid to assume responsibility, going directly at the object, intent upon securing results, he laid securely the bases of the new organization of the provinces, inaugurated carefully matured policies for the future, started a governmental tradition, and, incidentally, won great personal popularity among the Alsatians. Called to Paris to form a ministry upon the resignation of Clemenceau, his prestige continued to increase, and when M. Deschanel was compelled to give up his office, Millerand was chosen by 695 votes out of 892 to succeed him (September 23, 1920.).

Since the conclusion of the war two great and insistent

problems have been of commanding, almost exclusive, importance in the political life of France, the one the problem of national reconstruction, the other that concerned with the practical application of the Treaty of Versailles, largely the problem of reparations. The two problems were most closely connected and each presented a multitude of aspects. The one was primarily a domestic question, the other primarily a foreign question, but the interlocking of the two in this case went far toward justifying the dictum that in reality the only politics that count are foreign politics, so powerful, so pervasive, so determinative is the repercussion upon the internal life of a nation of its foreign relations. While this dictum does not contain the whole truth, since history cannot be compressed into a single formula, yet it is one which democracies have been particularly prone to neglect and which they have a particular reason to remember. Contemporary history ought to be sufficient to prove even to the most provincially-minded that foreign events have a profound and often a painfully palpable influence upon the individual life of every citizen in other countries.

The history of the application of the Treaty of Versailles, and especially the relations between France and England, the two chief agents in its enforcement, is a complicated, difficult and unfinished chapter. It has taken the form of numerous international conferences, Boulogne, Spa, Hythe, San Remo, Cannes, Genoa, the Hague, most of which have had to wrestle with the problem of reparations, reparations being the contribution which Germany must make toward the reconstruction of the countries she saw fit, in her great adventure, to invade and injure.

The injuries she had done to France were appalling. It would require many volumes to recount them. A summary statement cannot be made vivid enough or adequate enough to enable the reader even remotely to realize the sweeping extent of the destruction or the formidable nature of the problem of restoration.

There was, first, the loss in man-power, 1,364,000 killed, 740,000 mutilated. Besides these, 3,000,000 men had been wounded, and this number represented a grave diminution in the labor resources of the country. Nearly 500,000 had been taken prisoners and nearly all of these returned from Germany ill or weakened in health. The most serious aspect of the matter was that fifty-seven per cent of the soldiers between the ages of eighteen and thirty-two had been killed, that is to say more than half of the young generation, a loss that would be felt

rior many decades. "In order to grasp the full significance of these figures," says M. Tardieu, "apply them to the population of the United States. Had American losses been on the French scale, it would have meant the raising by Americans of about twenty-six and a half million soldiers, of whom four millions would have died."

"The decline in man-power went hand in hand with a decline in financial power," says the same author, who estimates that the net cost of the war, deducting all that Germany had to reimburse, was 150 billions of francs, and this enormous burden was accompanied with an enormous decrease in the nation's capital, owing to the destruction of the war.

For more than four years and three months France had been the principal theater of war. Enormous destruction was a natural and inevitable result. But much was destroyed, not as an unavoidable consequence of the clash of hostile forces moving back and forth over the country, but wantonly, intentionally; not because of military necessity, not because serving legitimate military purposes, but because of a deliberate purpose on the part of the invaders to weaken France so thoroughly that, long after the peace, she would not be able to compete in the markets of the world. Over 4000 towns or villages were either occupied by the Germans or necessarily evacuated by the French, and in these nearly 300,000 dwellings had been utterly destroyed and over 400,000 badly injured. Over 6,000 public buildings, churches, town halls, schools, had been destroyed and more than 10,000 seriously damaged, and many of these were among the architectural or historical glories of France. "With the destruction of towns, dwellings, and public buildings went also the destruction of shops, mills, factories, mines, and industrial establishments of every kind. The number of industrial establishments partially or totally destroyed was about twenty thousand. . . . The destruction of buildings was only a part, and often only the smaller part, of the industrial loss, the remainder including machinery, tools, equipment, and appliances of every kind, most of which were either entirely destroyed or else rendered useless by the destruction of essential parts. With the loss of machinery went also, in most cases, heavy losses of raw materials, stocks, and finished products."¹

¹ These facts, as well as those which follow, are taken from William MacDonald's *Reconstruction in France* (1922), an admirably comprehensive, thorough, and precise description, which everyone should read, of the remarkable courage, activity, and achievements of the French in the work of rebuilding their country since the close of the war.

Railways were either wrecked as the enemy withdrew or had been so worn down by the enormous amount of traffic they had had to sustain as to be almost worthless. Over 2400 kilometers of railway on the main lines and about as many on the small local lines in the devastated area needed restoration, partial or complete, as did over 2000 stations, tunnels, and bridges. Over 50,000 kilometers of highway, with bridges and culverts, needed reconstruction, as did a thousand kilometers of canals.

"To this destruction or serious impairment of houses, public buildings, factories, mines, and transport equipment is added unprecedented injury to the soil itself. An enormous mass of defensive works and military equipment cumbered the surface of the devastated zone from one end to the other." Barbed wire, trenches, gun emplacements, huts, shell holes, were everywhere and unexploded shells and bombs that might explode if hit by plow or spade rendered cultivation dangerous if not impossible. There were considerable regions where the surface soil had been blown away. "Poisonous gases intended to kill men also killed vegetation, and the soil was impregnated with chemicals the nature or duration of whose effects upon the various soil products was unknown." Many forests had been ruined or damaged. The war had completely destroyed nearly 30,000 wells and over 90,000 other wells needed repair. "Nowhere in the region could water safely be used for drinking or culinary purposes until wells had been disinfected and the water analyzed." Over 1,350,000 oxen, cows, sheep, goats, horses, and mules had, it is estimated, been carried away by the Germans down to November 11, 1918.¹

The picture is far from complete but it may suffice to suggest the vastness of the destruction accomplished, the stupendous character of the problem of reconstruction. The French buckled down to the huge and heavy task with their accustomed pluck and resolution. What they achieved in the various lines during the three years after the armistice cannot be told here. The reader should go for exact and comprehensive information to the sober and impressive account given, and buttressed at every point by definite statistical data, by Dr. MacDonald who summarizes his investigation in these words: "Never in history have a people and their government accomplished so great a task in so short a time."

The railways and water-ways have practically been restored. Substantial, though not as extensive, progress has been made

¹ MacDonald, *Ibid.* Chapter II.

with the highways. The record in industrial reconstruction has varied according to the industry and the region but has in any case been creditable. Thousands of industries have been re-established and in re-establishing them, as in rebuilding the railroads, the French have not been satisfied with merely the replacement of what had been destroyed. They have sought to plan for the future. French industry will be more scientifically and more effectively organized than it has been in the past. Less progress has been made in the restoration of the mines. Competent authorities estimate that the coal-mining industry achieved about one-fourth its former productivity by the end of May, 1921, and that the output was increasing. The revival of agriculture, involving the replenishment of live stock, the providing of implements and seeds, and the erection of farm buildings, after the preliminary work of clearing the land, has been less marked than the revival of industry, but has, nevertheless, gone far. Very little has been done toward restoring the forests and still less the public buildings, churches, and monuments.

The problem of reconstruction in last analysis is a problem of finance. Germany's obligation to repair a part of the damage she had done was explicitly stated in the Treaty of Versailles. The French, therefore, expected that the cost of putting their industries and agriculture back upon their feet would be borne by the German reparations. But until these should be actually paid, the French must themselves find the money, or else postpone the reconstruction of their country, a thing that was unthinkable. Since the armistice France has spent, it is said, about ninety billion francs for reconstruction. That amount has been borrowed from the people, by state or municipal loans, or by loans contracted by railroads, manufacturers, and mine owners. The effort has been tremendous. The limit has probably been reached. Meanwhile, as Lloyd George stated in 1922 in the House of Commons, not one penny of German money has gone to the restoration of the country which she ravaged and ruined on an absolutely unparalleled scale. Germany has made good a part of the live-stock which she had seized and has made considerable deliveries of coal and limited payments of money, which have gone to the support of the armies of occupation, but beyond that she has not gone. What the Germans do not pay the French themselves must pay. Whatever part of the burden is removed from the shoulders of the aggressor must be placed upon those of the victim. The advances that

France has made have been supposed to be to the account of Germany, to be repaid in the course of time. Whether they ever will be, remains to be seen. If not, the revival of France will be extremely slow and even doubtful.

The problem of German reparations has given rise to constant discussion and difficult negotiation between the former Allies themselves and between them and Germany, occasioning a long series of conferences whose decisions have not thus far proved final, the question still continuing to dominate the international situation. According to the Treaty of Versailles the Reparation Commission was to determine the total debt of Germany by May 1, 1921. This it did on that date, fixing the amount at 132 billions of gold marks, there being added to that sum the amounts loaned to Belgium by the Allies during the war. The payments were to be made in forty-two annual installments. The French share of the money to be paid by Germany was fixed at 52 per cent. This would constitute only a part of the charges France must incur for the reconstruction of the devastated regions. Should she in the end not recover even this, she would be compelled in all probability either to stop the work of further reconstruction or, in order to continue it, to resort to financial methods that would mean a return to inflation, arrested during the past two years, to a corresponding depreciation of the currency, to an increase in the cost of living, and to acute labor troubles which would draw in their train various and ominous social disorders. Unless relieved by German indemnities or by some sort of international co-operation, such as the much-discussed international loan, France might be forced into bankruptcy. Such is "the exact situation of France," said a careful French publicist in 1922,¹ "and it may be said without exaggeration that it is a very tragic one. The French are, I think, the people in the world who most hate a deficit and who have a horror of bankruptcy. Rather than face that extremity they will be ready to enforce upon Germany the penalties which, according to the Treaty of Versailles, they are perfectly entitled to enforce. They will use the rights which they derived from the treaty which was signed not only by their allies, England and America, but by the Germans themselves. The treaty gives France the right to seize German property in case the German Government does not fulfil its obligations. That will be, of course, a bad solution of the question of reparations, not a single sane

¹ Raymond Recouly at the Institute of Politics in Williamstown, Massachusetts, August 10, 1922.

Frenchman doubts it, but we will certainly try that solution before letting ourselves go into bankruptcy."

The problem of public finance, inextricably involved in that of reparations, which, in turn, is decisive for that of reconstruction, will long remain central and pivotal in the future history of France. It will require for its solution exceptional wisdom and courage. At best the charges upon the people will be so heavy and so multifarious as to affect every class of citizens, every walk of life, restricting appreciably the powers of self-development of the individual by reducing the resources available for his needs and tastes.

If it were not for this encompassing cloud of debt the outlook would be promising. The restoration to France of Alsace and Lorraine free of all financial obligations is an economic boon of the first order, to say nothing of its moral and political significance. It gives her the richest iron-ore beds of Europe, enabling her to become a great producer of iron and steel. It was these deposits which furnished Germany three-fourths of the iron mined within the former Empire. Alsace has oil wells and potash deposits of great value.

France has acquired full rights of ownership in the coal mines of the Saar. Should that basin return ultimately to Germany, the mines would not become German unless bought and paid for. France also gains from the altered status of Luxemburg. This neutralized duchy, for nearly eighty years a member of German Zollverein, was occupied at the beginning of the war by the Germans, who exploited its valuable iron mines to the full in munition-making. At the close of the war the Grand Duchess, a strong German sympathizer, was forced by her Francophile subjects to abdicate, and, by a popular vote held in September, 1919, this petty state of a thousand square miles and 260,000 people, too weak to stand alone economically, voted by a large majority to join the French customs union. But France refused, in favor of Belgium, this economic union and by an agreement subsequently reached between Belgium and Luxemburg, and coming into force on April 1, 1922, the customs barrier between these two countries was abolished for fifty years and the use of Belgian money in the Grand Duchy provided for. The economic union of Belgium and Luxemburg was thereby accomplished.

France has gained an enlargement of her colonial empire out of the general liquidation of the colonial possessions of Germany, about four-fifths of Cameroon and Togoland, and that part of

the Congo ceded to Germany in 1911. All German claims in Morocco are quashed and that source of friction is finally removed. France has also been given a mandate over Syria in the Eastern Mediterranean. Thus she is in a position to proceed unhampered with the development of that vast stretch of northwestern Africa which contains her most profitable colonies, Tunis, Algeria, and Morocco. The situation of these possessions, close to France, renders them enormously valuable, how valuable was clearly seen during the war. Colonial troops, colonial laborers, colonial produce were forthcoming in abundance and emphatically contributed to the final success of the Republic. The present colonial empire of France, including the countries for which she has a mandate, covers a total area of over 10,000,000 square kilometers, an area twenty times larger than France herself, with a population of 55,000,000. The general trade of her empire amounted in 1913 to three and a quarter billion francs, in 1918 to about five, and in 1919 to over seven billion. Its natural resources are extensive and varied.

From an economic and political point of view one of the most serious problems confronting contemporary France is her low birth rate. Germany has a population of over 60,000,000, France one of less than 40,000,000. Germany before the war increased by nearly a million annually. France remained stationary. In 1918, indeed, the number of deaths exceeded the number of births. If this disparity is to continue, it is only a question of time when France will be entirely outclassed by a neighbor which may desire to reopen, under such improved auspices, the age-long quarrel. To study this problem and to suggest practical measures for overcoming the grave menace contained in these figures a special national bureau was created in 1920. If economic expansion leads to an increase in population, as some economists think, then the greater present resources of France and the greater initiative of French business men, aroused by the experiences of war-time production, and likely to be still further augmented by the conscious study and imitation of German methods and organization, may lead to a higher birth rate and an increasing population. A recent writer has pointed out that it was the coal and iron districts of Germany that showed the greatest increase in population after 1871. France's resources in iron are now vastly greater than they were in 1914, and somewhat greater in coal.

The international influence of the Republic is stronger and more commanding than it has been in a long while. The power

and prestige of her eastern neighbor no longer overshadow her. The most authoritative voices in the councils of Europe are those of France and England. France is the most active and powerful defender of the treaties upon which the new order of the world rests, and as such she is the natural ally of the states of central and eastern Europe who find their title deeds in those very treaties. One of the members of the Great Entente, her connections with the Little Entente are close and are likely to become still closer. French diplomacy has a wider field than ever for constructive achievement. German models and methods are destined to enjoy a lesser vogue, and a renewed radiation of French influence has begun. A close military alliance with Belgium has been concluded and diplomatic relations with the Vatican have been renewed (May, 1921), after an interruption of seventeen years, an interruption occasioned by the famous separation of church and state in 1904-5. This renewal of relations has not produced any change in the laws adopted at the time of rupture. It simply means that France is to be represented at the Papal Court, which is an active center of international politics as of religion, and that the Pope is to have an official representative in France. Practical utilitarianism has in the main prompted this settlement, the desire to have a possible aid in the solution of various questions in Alsace-Lorraine and Syria in which France is interested.

CHAPTER XLVIII

GREAT BRITAIN AND HER EMPIRE

FRANCE and Great Britain had fought side by side, shoulder to shoulder, for four long years and more, and had been the two chief European architects of victory. This intimate and sustained union of two peoples who had been so often estranged in the past, was the dominant fact of the Great War, the tower of strength, the heart of oak of the Allied cause. It was a surprising experience for the two nations, rare though not absolutely unique. Their normal attitude toward each other had been one of hostility, tempered, during intervals of peace, by mutual distrust. Their interminable contentions during the Middle Ages had been carried over into the modern period with slight abatement. For a century and a quarter, from 1688 to 1815, they had fought repeatedly against each other, in Europe, in Asia, in America, running up a score of sixty years of war. Approximately one year out of every two had witnessed this primitive expression of mutual animus. The nineteenth century saw them less belligerent, saw them even co-operating transiently, as in the Greek war of independence and the Crimean war. But their harmony was most fragile and precarious and their colonial aspirations led to many clashes and kept their dislike of each other constantly fresh and green. If there was a law of nature in the world of international relations, it seemed to be that England and France must be forever pitted the one against the other. Any lull in the age-long controversy seemed only a breathing spell designed to enable the wearied combatants to get their second wind. If history had anything to say in this matter, it was that France and England must always be disputing with each other. Any deviation from this rule must be regarded as an abnormality.

But a fortunate and interesting feature of history is that it has its turning-points, and one of the most decisive of these came when the German Empire, in the full flush of prosperity and power, challenged both these countries at one and the same moment. At that instant a new era opened for the world, of quite incalculable significance. Old passions and pretensions

immediately subsided and in their place arose a sentiment of unity and comradeship that weathered the ordeal by fire and the ordeal by water and the ordeal by the sword. The Entente Cordiale or Cordial Understanding that had grown up in the years before the war, because the two nations had seen the same portent in the sky, became a formal alliance and a dynamic force upon a hundred battle-fields. Whether this fruitful spirit could withstand the shock of peace as it withstood the shock of war, no living man could tell. But sufficient unto the day was the good thereof. The student ought never to forget that but for the union of the French army and the British fleet Germany would have won the war. Not that it alone could have gained the victory but that it was sufficient to hold the enemy until such time as Britain and other countries could throw great armies into the field and organize fabulous expenditures for their support.

But peace hath her difficulties no less than war. And England, which had spent her man-power and her wealth most lavishly during the murderous struggle, was soon to see that the times which tried men's souls were not yet over, that the critical days were not ended when the armistice was signed in Marshal Foch's dining car in the forest of Compiègne. For all about, within the Kingdom and within the Empire, clouds were gathering, and alarming situations were developing, which were likely to disturb the well-earned right to peace.

For the moment, however, England, on the announcement of the signing of the armistice of November 11, gave herself up to rejoicing. Indescribable was the enthusiasm that found expression on the streets, in public meetings, in Parliament, everywhere. Day after day the jubilee continued. Popular emotion, long severely repressed, broke all bounds. The priceless services of England's soldiers and sailors were gratefully and exuberantly recognized, and when, in accordance with the terms of the armistice, the German submarines surrendered off Harwich and the German High Fleet, with its battleships of every type, steamed into the Firth of Forth and surrendered to Admiral Beatty, the primacy of England's sea-power was fittingly attested. Britannia still ruled the waves. A little later came the returning troops, and Field-Marshal Haig and Marshal Foch, and M. Clemenceau, and President Wilson on his way to Paris, their progress through the streets of London the signal for renewed and impressive outbursts of enthusiasm, for ovations without end.

In the midst of these exciting spectacles, of this exaltation of

the public mood, occurred the elections of the new parliament. The elections were long overdue. The existing House of Commons had been chosen in November, 1910 and should have ended in December, 1915, but, owing to the war, its life had been prolonged by successive acts until it had lasted nearly eight years. Meanwhile an electoral Reform Bill had been passed in 1918 enormously extending the suffrage, by giving the vote for the first time to women, some six millions of whom could meet the necessary qualifications, and to about two million men who, under the old system, were without a vote. An electorate so enlarged and so different from the old must obviously be consulted at the earliest possible moment. Moreover, with the Peace Conference impending, the Ministry must know whether it had the support of Parliament or not. The Ministry consisted of a coalition of Liberals and Conservatives under the leadership of Lloyd George. Did England wish to continue in times of peace the Coalition which had seemed to her so necessary in the time of war or did she now desire to resume her accustomed practice of entrusting the administration to a single party. One of the maxims of English politics is that England hates a coalition.

In this case, at least, she did not express any such proverbial dislike. On the contrary the Coalition won 478 seats in the new House and thus had a majority of 249 over all non-Coalition parties. A significant feature of the elections (held on December 14, 1918) was that the Labor party obtained 63 seats, whereas the Independent Liberal party under the leadership of Mr. Asquith obtained only 28. The Labor party thereby became the veritable Opposition. Another significant feature was the result in Ireland. Only 25 Unionists and 7 Nationalists were chosen, compared with 73 Sinn Feiners who, unlike the two former groups, demanded complete separation from Great Britain, and who, indeed, had already declared Ireland an independent republic, a claim which England, of course, had not recognized. None of the Sinn Feiners took their seats in Parliament. Their election had been intended as a demonstration of Irish opinion.

The electoral campaign had been conducted in a war-atmosphere. Popular cries of "Hang the Kaiser" and "Make the Germans pay" had been so strong that Lloyd George had promised that the trial of William II, the punishment of war criminals, and full war costs from Germany should be included in the Coalition programme at the Peace Conference, to which he and the British delegation soon repaired.

Meanwhile the rumblings of widespread social discontent were heard in the land and soon became louder and more insistent. This was the reverse side of the picture of national triumph and jubilation. During 1919 and 1920 and 1921 England was to pass through a period of economic tension and distress and of popular unrest similar to that which had, a century earlier, followed upon the dazzling success of Waterloo and the overthrow of an emperor more imposing than William II.

Within a few days of the armistice troubles began. Workingmen from various industries, particularly from the munition plants, appeared before the Prime Minister and demanded a living wage; railway men demanded an eight-hour day, which was speedily granted; workers in the shipyards, dock workers and engineers demanded consideration of their grievances; the employees of the London subway went on strike and stayed out until they secured an eight-hour day. Increased wages to meet the increased cost of living, and shorter hours were demanded in one industry after another. Unemployment began immediately upon the cessation of the war and increased rapidly as the army was demobilized and soldiers came home in large numbers, seeking their old positions or new ones. A tendency to work less rather than more, explicable by the tension of four years of war, was soon apparent. Moreover, revolutionary ideas were fermenting among certain sections of the working classes and the Russian revolution also was a disturbing influence. The coal miners insisted not only upon a 30% increase in wages and a six-hour day but upon national ownership of the mines. Some of their demands were granted but not nationalization of the mines, Lloyd George declaring that so grave a step toward socialism could only be taken with the consent of the nation as a whole, and not with that of a mere fraction of the nation. The Trade Unions favored using the weapon of the strike for purely political purposes, that is, "direct action" instead of constitutional methods, and decided at their Congress at Glasgow in September, 1919, that if the conscription acts were not repealed, and if the British troops were not immediately withdrawn from Russia, they would hold another congress "to decide what action shall be taken." Almost immediately thereafter and without warning, a great railroad strike was declared which speedily reproduced some of the aspects of life during the war. The government restricted the use of light and fuel. Hyde Park was used as a milk depot for London. The government appealed for volunteers to run trains and large

numbers responded. Army motor trucks were used on a great scale to bring food supplies to the capital. The strike ended after ten days, the strikers gaining certain concessions but not all that they desired.

While this recurrent disturbance of the economic life of the country was going on all through the year of 1919 a considerable amount of social legislation was being enacted. Bills were passed aiming at the solution of a pressing housing problem, at the securing of land for the veterans of the war, at the securing for women of certain rights which seemed logically to flow from the grant to them of the suffrage. A bill was passed providing that "no person should be disqualified by sex from the exercise of any public function, or from being appointed to any civil or judicial office or post, or from entering any profession or vocation." Women were made eligible as jurors. In November, 1919, Lady Astor, an American by birth, a daughter of Virginia, was elected to the House of Commons and was the first woman to take a seat in that body. The Lords, however, refused to consider that women, peeresses in their own right, could sit or vote in the Upper House.

The budget of 1919 was particularly important in that it established at last the principle which had long been urged upon the government of imperial preference as a means of binding more closely together the different parts of the British Empire. The duties levied on such imports as coffee, tea, sugar, tobacco, and motor spirits were to be reduced by a sixth, those on clocks, watches, motor-cars, motor-cycles, and movie-films by a third if these imports came from other parts of the Empire and not from other nations. The act applied to all the British dominions outside Great Britain, to all British protectorates, and to British India and to the native Indian states, and might, by an easy process, be made to apply to any further protectorates that might be brought under the British crown or to any territory for which Great Britain might procure a mandate from the League of Nations. The purpose of this legislation was to increase trade within the Empire, to reduce British dependence upon foreign states and to further the development of imperial resources. It was a form of protection, slightly disguised, and was expected to make the Empire more of an economic unit than it ever had been and consequently more of a political unit, to render it more self-sufficient, more secure. There was a certain opposition on the part of the Independent Liberals and some members of the Labor party, in the name of Free Trade, to this

system of preferential duties, but it was too weak to prevent its adoption. The economic, political, and social consequences of this departure from the policy hitherto followed will be watched with interest by other nations, as all will be affected by it.

The labor unrest continued to trouble subsequent years, although becoming less acute. It was particularly pronounced in the coal-mining industry. The demand for nationalization was still pressed but the government refused to consider it. Questions of wages and prices were not settled in a way satisfactory to the miners who accordingly struck in 1920, securing a part of what they desired. Another coal strike occurred in 1921, the most serious of all, lasting three months and settled only when the miners abandoned their demand for what amounted to an indirect form of nationalization. The damage to other industries was great as they were dependent upon coal, but the damage to the trade unions was also considerable as their funds were depleted and as many of them ran into debt. The influence of the new Russian economic theories gradually diminished as more came to be known about the effects they were having upon the Russian working-classes themselves.

But the problem of unemployment continued all through these years and was not solved. The life-blood of England lay in her commerce and her commerce was hampered at every turn by the disturbed and difficult economic conditions prevailing everywhere, owing to the enormous impoverishment of the war, the high taxes, the new national frontiers with their strange new tariffs, the depreciating currencies, and the generally unstable structure of society. The abnormal disorganization of the markets and the trade currents of the world had a more immediate and more profound reaction upon England's industries, since her commerce was world-commerce. Large numbers of her factories were compelled to shut down or to reduce the number of their employees. A grave social as well as financial question was thus presented and, as the economic revival of the world was slow and uncertain, it tended to persist. In January, 1921, the number of unemployed was 1,039,000; in April, 1,615,000 (not including the miners then on strike); in June, 2,185,000, and in addition there were at the last date 1,144,000 persons who were working only part time. From April to November, 1920, the foreign trade of Great Britain had amounted to 2,066,000,000 pounds sterling; whereas from April to November, 1921, it amounted to only 1,019,000,000 pounds.

Naturally the manufacturers and merchants of England, as

well as the laborers, clamored for relief and, as they generally asserted that their unhappy state was not caused by the war but by the treaties that closed it and by the unwise and mistaken policies of the governments subsequent to the war, they and their representatives in parliament and the press brought an increasing pressure to bear upon the Prime Minister to change the course of his diplomacy. The shiftings and turnings of Lloyd George in the numerous international conferences that have been held since the middle of 1919 found their motive and their explanation in this domestic situation. A considerable and influential body of English opinion held the Treaty of Versailles responsible for this state of affairs and demanded a revision of the treaty. Though Englishmen, it was generally believed in other countries, had had more to do than any other people with making that treaty what it was, and though in it they had safeguarded their own interests with the greatest care, they were now the ones most inclined to upset that charter of new Europe, particularly its reparation clauses. As British trade and British finance are always very formidable forces in British diplomacy, this altered British attitude became a more or less decisive factor in international politics. As the reparations provided for in the Treaty of Versailles were designed to furnish the means for a partial restoration of the countries devastated by the invader, and particularly of France, any British deviations from the line deliberately set down in the treaty instantly affected other countries, and most notably England's chief ally in the war, France. A dispute was thus opened, mainly between England and France, the two chief sponsors of the treaty, which has complicated and embittered their relations and which seems as far from solution as ever.

For England the basic problem of reconstruction is the reconstruction of commerce, for France the reconstruction of the devastated regions. The controversy, which has wide ramifications, and unexpected and surprising aspects, and in which all sorts of prejudices and aspirations, intrigues and jealousies, play their several and more or less hidden parts, bids fair long to absorb the attention, and perhaps baffle the ingenuity, of those who are responsible for the governance, not only of the two chief parties to the dispute, but of all other nations as well, since all are concerned in the issue. The revision of so comprehensive and vital a document as the Treaty of Versailles, or such an interpretation of it as may amount to an indirect revision, are things not to be undertaken except under the most

imperative and obvious necessity, since the consequences of such action are quite incalculable, since the last end of the matter may be worse than the first.

The post-war period was one of unrest not only throughout the British Isles but also throughout the British Empire. Several remarkable changes in the constitutional framework of the Empire were the ultimate outcome. The political status of various of its members was rapidly and radically altered. In the eastern and the western hemispheres, in the northern and the southern, wherever the subjects of the British Crown were to be found, there was a sense that the war was a turning-point in imperial history, that the time was ripe for a new departure, for innovations long desired and now possible. Local dissatisfaction with the existing system, ranging all the way from a desire for a greater participation in the councils of the Empire to a demand for complete and utter independence, showed itself everywhere. Four great empires, Germany, Austria, Turkey, and Russia, had broken down and disintegrated under the impact of the tremendous events of the day. What was to be the effect of that impact upon the fifth? Was it also to be disintegration or might it be transformation? The principle of self-determination, a new-fangled name for the old principle of nationality to which the Allies had given such vociferous allegiance during the war, and which had served their cause so conspicuously, was still reverberating round the world and the rulers of Britain were now to have their turn in noting its effects, its pulverizing tendencies. What is sauce for the goose is also sauce for the gander. Was the gander to show greater suppleness than the geese had shown, in dealing with this pervasive and infectious force, to display superior powers of judgment and precision, or was there to be only another exhibition of melancholy incompetence in high places in a time of crisis. The answer to this query is to be found in the very recent history of Ireland and India, of Egypt and South Africa.

England, having paid a fearful price for her salvation, 800,000 men killed and more than £6,000,000,000 of additional debt, had also drawn some very palpable profits from her costly participation in the war. Her colonial possessions were greatly augmented either directly, or in a roundabout way through the new mechanism of mandates. Forty-two per cent. of the population of the German colonies in Africa were assigned to her under the Treaty of Versailles while thirty-three per cent. went to France and twenty-five to Belgium. German Southwest Africa,

German East Africa, now called Tanganyika Colony, a part of Togoland, a part of Cameroon, now came under the British flag, as did also Kaiser Wilhelm's Land and the Bismarck Archipelago and other scattered islands. Great Britain also received mandates for the rich valley of Mesopotamia and for Palestine. Egypt, which had lived under the fiction of Turkish suzerainty, had been formally declared a British protectorate at the beginning of the war. The Empire had thus expanded by the addition of perhaps a million square miles of territory, if we call the territories held under mandate British territory. Spheres of British influence they surely are and sources of much future wealth for Britain,—coal mines, oil wells, tropical products of many sorts, phosphate deposits, cereals and cattle, pearl fisheries and raw materials of divers kinds for her industries. With all these assets and effects went other benefits, such as new ports, new coaling and cable stations, new opportunities for British shipping and for the investment of British capital. The catalogue of gains is a long and impressive one. And then there is the heightened prestige and the increased sense of security, with one serious rival, Germany, removed from the colonial field, and another, Russia, in a quite dilapidated condition.

But along with this striking expansion of the Empire went certain pronounced disruptive tendencies, also stimulated by the war, which, if not checked and countered, might undermine the colossal structure and turn the hypocritical favors of fortune into a by-word and a hissing. Let us examine a little more closely this darker side of things.

EGYPT

The declaration by Great Britain in February 1922 that Egypt is "a sovereign independent state" and the proclamation the following month (March 16) of the Sultan Ahmed Fuad Pasha as King of Egypt were important events and had behind them an interesting history. For forty years the English had practically been in control of the country, a control which had greatly benefited the masses of the Egyptian people, who had been raised from virtual slavery to a position of considerable prosperity. Lord Cromer's administration (1883-1907) had been one of great and distinguished accomplishment. Many drastic and far-reaching reforms had been carried through. The *courbash* (whip) and the *corvée* (forced labor) had been abolished, corruption in official position had been reduced, taxes

had been equalized, and water, the one essential in that country, had been distributed fairly to the poor as well as to the rich. Before the English came to Egypt the fellahin, or peasants, had been the victims of a cruel and sordid oppression. Now they had a chance in life, and they prospered as they never had in their history. The English were popular with the fellahin.

But they were not popular with the former native governing classes or with the educated. Among these, nationalistic feeling was strong and was growing. These men, or their predecessors, had been nationalists in 1881 when the English first intervened in Egyptian affairs, and the independence movement of 1882, suppressed by the British army, had been fought under the banner of "Egypt for the Egyptians." Moreover, the English had at that time and repeatedly thereafter declared that their "occupation" was only provisional and that they would withdraw when the necessary work was done. As they had stayed on and on and had shown no signs of going, the nationalist sentiment of the educated and prosperous Egyptians had been kept alive, and had increased. But this feeling after all was not general, was limited to certain minorities of the people, and did not touch the masses of the peasantry.

The World War, its effects and after-effects, rapidly changed the situation. Egypt had hitherto been nominally a part of the Turkish Empire. The English were only "advisers" to the native Egyptian officials who in turn were theoretically subjects of the Sultan of Constantinople. On the outbreak of the war this complex status of Egypt was simplified and made to conform to the realities of the situation. As the Egyptians were nominally subjects of the Sultan, and as the Sultan was the enemy of England, the "occupying" power, there was an urgent need for a clarification of the situation. Therefore on December 18, 1914, a proclamation of the English Foreign Secretary announced that "in view of the state of war arising out of the action of Turkey Egypt is placed under the protection of His Majesty and will henceforth constitute a British Protectorate." A second proclamation issued the following day deposed the Khedive, Abbas Hilmi, who was then in Constantinople and was adhering to England's enemies. His uncle, Hussein Kamil, was recognized as the future ruler and given the title of Sultan.

This action of Great Britain in deposing the Sultan and in declaring Egypt a British protectorate, without any consultation or explanation, was resented by the nationalists who saw

that the repeated promises of evacuation were now definitely withdrawn, that the English were in Egypt to stay. A religious element also entered into the situation. The Mohammedans of Egypt were not indifferent to the dangers to the caliphate of the war of the Allies against Turkey. The nationalist feeling grew. Still Egypt remained on the whole quiet during the entire war. There were a few plots against British authority but they were always discovered in time and suppressed. England had no notion of allowing her connections with Australia, New Zealand, and India, so essential to the successful prosecution of the war, to be cut by a few conspirators. She, therefore, imprisoned or deported them. The mass of the people took no part in these plots. Turkey and Germany made two attempts to get control of the Suez Canal and to invade Egypt. Both were unsuccessful. In April and in July, 1915, attempts were made on the life of the Sultan.

It was not until the war was over that serious trouble began. There were several contributory causes. The principles expressed by President Wilson and accepted by the Allies had a far-reaching effect upon the opinions of the educated people of Egypt. The British had repeatedly disclaimed any intention of remaining permanently in Egypt and now came the doctrine of self-determination, supported apparently by the victorious powers. In November 1918 an Anglo-French declaration announced that the policy of the Allies in the East would aim at the complete enfranchisement of the peoples so long oppressed by Turkish rule and the "institution of national governments and administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the local populations." The Egyptians naturally felt that their right to manage their own affairs was as good as that apparently assured the people of Syria and Mesopotamia. Moreover they considered themselves as much entitled to representation at the Conference of Paris as the Kingdom of Hedjaz, recently carved out of a part of Arabia and certainly not superior in development or intelligence to their own country.

Under these conditions the Egyptian nationalistic movement grew more and more pronounced. It ended by demanding complete independence, control of the Soudan, neutralization of the Suez Canal. But the British government was determined not to relinquish its control. Its protectorate was recognized by the Allies at Paris, including the United States. Moreover it was later recognized by the Treaty of Sèvres, between Turkey and

the Allied powers (1920), a treaty which, supposedly, would soon be ratified.

The leader of the Egyptian nationalists, Zaghlul Pasha, was, with three of his principal followers, arrested early in March, 1919, and deported to the island of Malta. The effects of this assertion of authority were quite the contrary of what had been expected. Anti-British demonstrations occurred in various places. Railroads were torn up at certain points, there was much looting, British soldiers and civilians were attacked, foreign quarters were besieged, Cairo cut off from the rest of the country. The "revolution" was quite serious and it was noticed that a change had come over the fellahin. Hitherto contented under English rule and appreciative of its undoubted benefits to them, the fellahin had become estranged by certain severe measures taken by the British government owing to the exigencies of the war. Laborers had been needed to build roads and dig trenches for the armies in Gallipoli, Sinai, Mesopotamia and Palestine and had been recruited from the Egyptian villages. Some had been sent to France. At first everything had gone satisfactorily as the service was voluntary and well paid. But as the demands of the war increased volunteering did not furnish sufficient numbers, and officials, most of them natives and not English, had resorted more and more to pressure to secure the necessary quotas. Thus an abuse grew up, often amounting to forced labor. As laborers were an absolute necessity, the British were either unable or disinclined to interfere with the arbitrary procedure of the petty officials. The securing of the necessary food supplies for men and animals was also in the hands of native officials and also created a lively sense of grievance among the fellahin who came to regard their former benefactors as oppressors. Was this what the British protectorate was to mean?

The rebellion of March 1919, which was quite general throughout Egypt, arose out of these conditions. While quickly suppressed it showed the English government that the situation was far more serious than it had suspected. The Government consequently decided to send out a mission under the chairmanship of Lord Milner "to inquire into the causes of the recent disorders, and to report on the existing situation in the country and the form of the constitution which, under the protectorate, will be best calculated to promote its peace and prosperity, the progressive development of self-governing institutions, and the protection of foreign interests." Unfortunately the mission delayed eight months before going to Egypt and when it arrived

it found itself boycotted by the nationalists. However it made an able and liberal report, recommending a large measure of self-government for the Egyptians. But popular violence continued, interspersed with acts of repression. Finally Lord Allenby, High Commissioner in Egypt, gave it as his opinion that Great Britain must either grant Egypt her independence, or prepare to annex her by force to the Empire. The result was the declaration already referred to that "Egypt is an independent, sovereign state" and the proclamation on March 16, 1922, of the Sultan Ahmed Fuad as King of Egypt.

But these declarations defined only partially the new status of Egypt. What arrangements should be made concerning the Suez canal, concerning England's communications with India and the East, concerning the defense of Egypt against possible foreign aggression, concerning the protection of foreigners and foreign interests in Egypt? None of these was settled at the time. "In all these matters," says the official communication, "the status quo is maintained, but we declare our willingness to negotiate specific agreements upon them with the Egyptian Government at some later date, when they desire it and circumstances promise success. In the meantime Egyptians will be free to develop national institutions in accordance with their aspirations."

These questions, and also the problem of the relations of the vast province of the Soudan to Egypt, might give rise to much future trouble. But at any rate Great Britain had turned a sharp corner in her Egyptian policy and had under the compulsion of circumstances, tardily foreseen, taken steps which could not easily be retraced. Meanwhile Egypt, a country of 13,000,000 people, fell to discussing what the future constitution should be. But this much has been accomplished. The protectorate has been abolished and Egypt no longer forms a part of the British Empire. But her independence may, after all, prove only a semi-independence. Whether she is capable of developing real self-government, wise, and intelligent, and fair toward the various elements of the population, or whether she will fall into the hands of a selfish and exploiting minority addicted to oriental methods of oppression and corruption, remains to be seen.

Meanwhile Lord Allenby declared in April, 1922, that the relations between the British Empire and the Soudan would remain as hitherto.

INDIA

India, too, like Egypt, has her nationalist movement, although it has not yet gone so far. This movement, of comparatively recent origin, has developed rapidly in our highly nationalistic age and is now taxing, and will, no doubt, long continue to tax, the wisdom and ingenuity of the British government. The situation is an anxious one and may well become still more difficult in the future. "The most serious and testing time probably has not yet arrived," said Mr. Lloyd George recently in the House of Commons, adding that under no circumstances will Britain relinquish her responsibilities in India. To what is this Indian ferment due?

India is really a continent by itself, with its population of about 325,000,000, with its forty or fifty different races, its hundred and fifty languages mutually exclusive and repellent. In area India is half as large as Europe. Of the population 247,000,000 are directly under British rule, and constitute what is known as British India. The rest are under native Indian princes whose states have been preserved, but who are practically under British rule. There are many religions in India, the two most important being the Hindu, counting over 200,000,000 followers, and the Mohammedan counting about a third as many. If the word India conveys to the mind of the reader the idea of essential unity, as does that of England or France, it is a misnomer. There is no such thing as an Indian nation, an Indian patriotism, an Indian public opinion. The population is divided historically, racially, linguistically, religiously, into very numerous sections; and deeply, not superficially, divided. These seething millions of men have never known liberty or self-government either before the arrival of the English among them or since they have been under English rule, and only a minute fraction of the people of India have any education. Yet millions of them are at the present moment clamoring for the same things for which western peoples have clamored in the past and which they have more or less achieved, millions are responding to the same emotions or fighting under the same shibboleths,—independence, nationalism, self-government, democracy,—as have exercised so powerful a spell over the Occidental mind. Whether we have here a nation in the painful process of creation or a system in process of dissolution, who shall say? Certain it is that a vast, and more or less obscure, fermentation is going on among these hitherto dumb

and driven masses of mankind, who constitute one-fifth of the human race.

India is Britain's leading colonial possession and is, in a very real sense, the corner stone of the Empire, the broad base, and much of the superstructure, of that colossal fabric. From an economic and political point of view it has been and is a most valuable prize. It has furnished a great market for British manufacturers, a rich field for British investors. Moreover, it has been most serviceable, contributing to the expansion of the Empire and, in the late war, helping to preserve it.

Before the World War the nationalist movement in India was not particularly serious, although the accession of the Liberals to power in England in 1905 and the appointment of Lord Morley, a veteran champion of Liberalism, to the Secretaryship for India, aroused hopes among Indian politicians for a larger measure of self-government. Some reforms were made at that time, but they were after all quite conservative and were far from satisfying the demand. The Great War bore striking witness, however, to the general loyalty of the people of India to the English connection as contributing, whatever its disadvantages or defects, to their well-being. The native princes offered troops and money on a liberal scale and many of them themselves served in Europe, and British India showed its devotion by raising recruits to be used as England might demand, and by sharing in the military expenditures. During the war India sent overseas 800,000 combatants and 400,000 non-combatants, besides great quantities of food supplies, although this meant much privation among the poorer classes. Indian troops and workers took part in the campaigns of Mesopotamia, Gallipoli, German East Africa, Egypt, and France. The situation in India was on the whole so satisfactory that the government was able to reduce the number of British troops stationed in India far below the normal standard. At one time, in fact, the original British garrison numbered only about 15,000 men.

With the prolongation of the war, however, the situation became less satisfactory. Rising prices and unusual regulations concerning trade and travel aroused some discontent. The large Mohammedan population became disaffected and more or less turbulent when it saw that the war was a serious menace to Turkey, the home of the leading Mohammedan state and the religious center of the Mohammedan world. Then, too, nationalist aspirations became more vocal and more earnest in India as

elsewhere under the influence of a war which was declared by the Allied leaders to be a war of liberation. Many Indians came to feel that the services they had so generously rendered merited not only the recognition which they received from the English authorities but a larger participation in the government of their country in the future. India's representatives sat in the Imperial War Conference side by side with the representatives of the Dominions, and yet India was not self-governing as were the others. Ought not the outcome of the war to be the frank recognition of equality among the component parts of the Empire? Ought not India to have the status of a dominion?

On August 20, 1917 Mr. Montague, Secretary of State for India, announced in the House of Commons that the Government's policy with regard to India was "that of increasing the association of Indians in every branch of the administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire." He added that "progress in this policy can only be achieved by successive stages" and that it was for the British authorities to be "the judges of the time and measure of each advance," a remark that naturally was not pleasing to extremists.

After the close of the war a beginning was made in harmony with this declaration of policy. A bill was passed in 1919 which established a measure of native participation, not in the government of India as a whole, but in that of eight of the larger provinces. In them the experiment was to be tried first. Based upon the assumption that India was not yet fit for responsible government in all its completeness, the new law provided a fairly large entering wedge. Each province has its governor appointed by the Viceroy. Each has an executive council and a legislative council, the former appointed by the executive, the latter having some appointed members but consisting in its large majority of members elected by the voters. The governor and the executive council are henceforth to have power over questions that are "reserved." But there are questions that are "transferred," that is, committed to the elected legislative council. Such questions are to be handled by that council, operating through "ministers," chosen from the elected members of that body. The distinctive feature of this new constitutional system is this so-called "dyarchy," or dual government, in the eight chief provinces. Law and order, the

administration of justice, the police, are among the subjects reserved. Among those transferred are local government, agriculture, education, public health, industrial development, public works. It is within this latter range of topics that the people will receive their training in the use of parliamentary methods. The ministers will normally resign if they should lose the support of the majority of the legislative council, as in other countries. For the provincial legislative councils the vote has been given to about five million people. The franchise is based on property qualifications which vary from province to province. It represents an enormous enlargement over the previous system which counted only about thirty thousand voters.

This dual form of government exists in eight provinces. It does not exist in the central government. But even there a change has been made, designed to give Indian opinion abundant opportunity to express itself, though not necessarily to control. Formerly the Indian legislature consisted of a single body of whom the majority were officials. Henceforth it is to consist of two houses, in one of which, the Legislative Assembly, there are to be 103 elected members out of a total of 144; in the other of which, the Council of State, there are 33 elected members and 27 nominated, and of these 27 not more than 20 may be officials.

The Viceroy or the Provincial Governor may, if the case is urgent, pass over the heads of the legislative assemblies bills rejected by them. This power to "certify" is one held in reserve to enable the Government of India to have its way in last resort if the crisis seems to justify such a peremptory procedure. But until that point is reached the elected representatives have a certain influence and even power. The normal course would be for the Viceroy or the Provincial Governor to use this right to "certify," very sparingly. Such has thus far proved to be the case (1922).

Thus a limited training in self-government is assured a fraction of the people of India. This is intended as a first step and other steps are expected to follow, if all works well. The Act of 1919 provides that the working of the new system shall be examined at the expiration of ten years, with a view to seeing whether the principle of self-government shall be extended, modified, or restricted. This allows time for a considerable experience, and also for elementary education to become more general.

Internationally India now stands on a basis of equality with

the Dominions. At the Paris Conference, as later at that of Washington, she was represented by separate delegates as were such self-governing countries as Canada, Australia, South Africa, and New Zealand. India signed the Treaty of Versailles and became a charter member of the League of Nations. Her status is that of equal partnership with these other parts of the Empire. Yet not equal, after all, for the Indian members of these conferences and of the League are not chosen by the people, even remotely or indirectly, as are the others. They are appointed by the British authorities who rule India.

The Government of India Act of 1919, intended as a first installment of a liberal and progressive policy, was well received by moderate opinion. But the radical nationalists would have nothing to do with it. Rallying around Gandhi, widely revered as a wise and holy man, the latter demanded the complete withdrawal of the English from India. They organized a boycott of English goods, they kept aloof from the elections held in conformity with the new constitution, they developed a definite "non-coöperation" movement, the thought being that, if native officials would give up their offices, if native lawyers would refuse to appear in the courts, if native children should not attend the schools, the English over-lords would soon find themselves isolated, with no contact with the people, functioning as it were in a vacuum. Passive resistance, civil disobedience, preached by Gandhi, were designed to the same end, the overthrow of English rule. While unsuccessful, they constituted alarm signals which the authorities would do well anxiously to consider, even after the arrest and imprisonment of the leader for seditious utterance. Though the non-coöperation movement met with wide-spread apathy among the people and began to decline after its first successes, it would not be wise to regard it as under all conditions destined to failure. Indicative of the unrest of the masses, it, or something like it, might easily reappear, if the constitutional reforms recently introduced should prove unsatisfactory or illusory. Or the radical Nationalists who at first abstained from voting for the provincial legislatures may find that their best policy is to take part in the elections in order to gain the power to bring about a constitutional deadlock. India's troubles are not yet over. What she needs particularly is economy in administration, and reduction of military expenditures, so as to produce a balanced budget. The present constitution cannot function if taxation continues to increase in a period of economic depression and of recurring deficits.

SOUTH AFRICA

Into still another part of the British Empire the World War brought serious trouble, South Africa. Indeed it was in the very nature of things peculiarly calculated to subject that state to a strain to which none of the other self-governing dominions was subjected. It had been only twelve years before that Briton and Boer had fought each other in grim and desperate combat, and although a remarkable reconciliation had been brought about by the grant of self-government to South Africa, and although many of the former Boer leaders had worked side by side with the victors in building up the new Union, still the conflict had left deep and bitter memories behind it and not all the Boers were as wise and magnanimous as were Botha and Smuts. Many of them thought that this new war did not at all concern them and that South Africa ought to remain neutral. Many actively sympathized with Germany. Some thought that the opportunity to pay off their score with the English and to recover the independence they had lost was too good to miss. The German Government unquestionably counted on Boer disaffection as a favorable element in the general world-situation.

But there is reason to believe that the majority of the Boers were behind Botha, Smuts, and other leaders of their race who believed that South Africa ought to support the imperial cause to the utmost of its ability. On August 7, 1914, the British Government cabled to the Union Government suggesting that if "they desired and felt able" to do so the seizure of German Southwest Africa would be "a great and urgent imperial service." General Botha, the prime minister, immediately proposed an expedition and was supported by a large majority of the Assembly. Botha himself took charge of the campaign and German Southwest Africa was overrun. But this action of the Government was the signal for a rebellion on the part of a section of the Boer population, a rebellion in which several of the men who had distinguished themselves in the war against England took part, Delarey, de Wet, and Beyers. The moving cause of the rebellion was the desire of those who participated in it to regain the independence which they had lost twelve years before. This unhappy internecine conflict lasted several weeks, ending in December, 1914. Perhaps 10,000 men took part in the rebellion and the number of those who sympathized with them was large. The Government losses were 132 killed and 227 wounded. The casualties on the

other side are not known, but over 5,700 of the rebels were either captured or forced to surrender. The punishments inflicted were few and comparatively light.

There was no further armed opposition to the policy of the Union government. But the same division of opinion expressed itself henceforth in political life, in elections, and in parliament. General Botha, the prime minister, had a majority sufficient to enable him to carry out his policies. The South African Union played a considerable part in the World War. Botha, as we have just seen, raised a force composed half of Dutch and half of British South Africans for the conquest of German South-west Africa which was completed by July, 1915. An army, commanded for a while by General Smuts, was also sent into German East Africa, the conquest of which was a more difficult matter but which was finally effected. South Africa sent 30,000 men to fight in Europe. All told she raised over 146,000 white troops for service in the World War, and native laborers and colored combatants enough to make the sum total over 230,000 men. In the latter part of the war, General Smuts represented South Africa in the Imperial War Cabinet sitting in London, and when the war was over General Botha and himself represented their country in the Conference of Paris and were among the signers of the Treaty of Versailles. This was the last important service of Botha, an able and trusted South African statesman, for he died soon after his return from Paris, at midnight of August 27-28, 1919, at the age of fifty-seven. As friend or as foe he had always been simple, modest, disinterested, a man of honor, large-minded, and warm-hearted.

His successor in the premiership was General Smuts, a native South African of Dutch descent born in Cape Town in 1870, educated in part in local institutions, in part at Christ's College, Cambridge, where he had a distinguished career as a student, taking a "double first" in the Law Tripos in 1894, a forerunner of the distinctions he was destined to attain in the legal profession, and as a soldier and a statesman.

Smuts was now called to a position well calculated to test all his qualities of mind and character, for he was to face one of the most pervasive and persistent forces of the modern world, the principle of nationalism. His attitude was sufficiently indicated by his utterances in the South African parliament during the debates on the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles. He repeatedly pointed out to his countrymen the position they had acquired as a result of the war. South Africa now had a voice

in the direction of the foreign policy of the Empire, was one of the "nations" of the British Commonwealth of nations, and as such had an equal representation with the others in the League of Nations. She controlled her own destinies. Greater freedom, Smuts asserted, she could not hope to possess, but, with so advantageous a status within the loose and liberal framework of the British Empire, she ought not to try to sever completely that connection.

General Smuts was, therefore, the pronounced opponent of that nationalism which had expressed itself in the rebellion of 1914 and which was now expressing itself in parliament under the leadership of General Hertzog, head of the Nationalist party, a party which has adopted republicanism as its creed, which aspires to restore the old republics of the Transvaal and the Orange River Free State, and which possibly aims at the conversion of the South African Union into a republic. Smuts stands for the maintenance of South Africa's place in the British Empire and a close co-operation between the Boers and the English. Hertzog and the Nationalists wish complete independence of Great Britain. Smuts has thus far obtained a working majority in the parliament but the elections since 1915 have shown a constant increase in the strength of the Nationalist party. Whether this will continue and whether a clash will come sometime between the two sharply opposed policies, time alone will tell. The student should not lose sight of the fundamental fact that the Dutch element in South Africa, which was wholly anti-British in 1900, is now divided. The racial opposition is, therefore, not as clean-cut and definite as it was formerly. A considerable amalgamation of the Dutch and British sections of the population has been brought about.

South African politics are complicated by race problems. There are four and a half times as many blacks as there are whites in the population and the former are increasing more rapidly than the latter. Difficult labor and social questions arise out of this numerical inferiority of the ruling class. This race problem is always present in the public life of South Africa. It even has its repercussions upon other parts of the British Empire. The whites of South Africa are opposed to the admission of immigrants from India because that would increase the proportion of colored people, already far too large in the opinion of the whites. Laws have been passed to restrict this danger. Such laws give offense to the Indians who, members of the same Empire, find parts of the Empire unfriendly and inhospitable.

As Indian sensitiveness to racial discrimination is very great, as Indian nationalism is a growing force, as Indians resent, with increasing impatience, the implication of inferiority within an empire which claims to be composed of equals, it will be seen that the anxieties of British statesmen are not decreased by this struggle between the white and colored races which is going on within the Empire — as, in fact, it is going on, in a more or less accentuated form, throughout the world.

IRELAND

In still another part of the British Empire the years of the world commotion were to be most critical and painful. As early as January, 1913, *Irish Freedom*, the organ of the Sinn Feiners, declared that war between England and Germany was practically inevitable and that such a war would be "Ireland's opportunity." At the same time Protestant Ireland, the province of Ulster, was becoming daily more determined to oppose, cost what it might, the application to it of a Home Rule bill which was being slowly pushed through Parliament and which at any moment might become a law. The opposition of Ulster to the doom that appeared to be impending was based on the ineradicable conviction that the religious and material interests of the Protestant and industrial North would be highly insecure in an Irish Parliament dominated by Catholics representing the agricultural South. The Ulsterites, in 1913 and 1914, were ready to go to any length to prevent this catastrophe, even to armed resistance, should that prove necessary. The contrasts and discords of Irish life were being intensified and sharpened to a very dangerous point in the months preceding the outbreak of the Great War. Ireland was a country only in a geographical sense. In every other sense, in spiritual, intellectual, economic, matters she was two countries, as dissimilar and as antagonistic as any two could easily be. From the point of view of national unity, both history and psychology seemed peremptorily to forbid the banns of North and South.

Into the details of the extraordinarily tangled and tragic record of the years which began in 1914 and which are not ended yet, we cannot enter here. It is a wild and fiery chapter in which the passions of men ran riot, a veritable witch's caldron. What that caldron will finally give forth we are not even yet entirely able to foresee. The boiling process still continues, the foaming

metal has not yet, perhaps, been cast into a final mould.¹ In this summary narrative only a few of the most conspicuous aspects of a turbid and turbulent history can be indicated.

Ever since the beginning of the Home Rule movement about 1870 the relations between England and Ireland had been in a state of tension. That tension reached the snapping point, or nearly reached it, during the Great War. England's extremity was, as *Irish Freedom* had correctly said, Ireland's opportunity, an opportunity that was not missed. England's enemies were potentially Ireland's friends and many Irishmen hoped for the victory of Germany, if that were the only way whereby the hateful connection of Ireland with England could be broken. German agents were active in Ireland, as they were active elsewhere. Indeed, in Ireland the field was particularly inviting. But while recognizing the presence of this factor in the situation and while certain shady transactions of the time attest its influence, it is more than likely that the course of events would have been substantially what it was, had there been no contacts between Irishmen and Germans.

A period of turmoil is always propitious for the enterprises of extremists and the extremists of Ireland were numerous enough and energetic enough to force the pace of Irish evolution, with or without encouragement from outside. Irish agitators had for forty years been demanding Home Rule, but now the more advanced of them were passing far beyond and demanding absolute independence.

On Easter Monday, 1916, there was an uprising in Dublin. The insurgents seized several buildings of strategic importance, the Castle, the Four Courts, the Post Office. Policemen and others were murdered. Shops were looted. Fires were set and in the end a considerable section of the city was reduced to ruins. The mob did its work in thorough fashion.

This rebellion had been preceded by a proclamation "To the People of Ireland" issued in the name of "The Provisional Government of the Irish Republic." The proclamation announced that Ireland was a sovereign and independent state and that "the Irish Republic is entitled to, and hereby claims, the allegiance of every Irish man and Irish woman."

There followed several days of uncertainty, of sniping, of difficult street fighting. In the end the rebellion was crushed by

¹ For an admirably informing and balanced account of this difficult period, written by a well-trained and fair historian, see *Encyclopaedia Britannica* New Volumes, II, 551-589, article by W. A. Phillips.

the use of infantry and artillery. It had been the work of a small minority and there can be little doubt that Mr. Redmond, the leader of the Home Rule Party in the House of Commons, correctly reflected the opinion of the overwhelming mass of the Irish people when he denounced the insurrection in vigorous and indignant terms. But the action of the British Government in executing fifteen of the ring-leaders and in sentencing hundreds to imprisonment caused a complete revulsion of feeling. Sinn Fein, momentarily discredited by its failure, revived under the influence of these events and spread with incredible rapidity. The fact that the sentences were such as might have been inflicted in any country, being, according to the codes of law prevailing in all civilized nations, the legal punishment for those who treasonably attack the state, made no difference with public opinion. Sinn Fein now had its "martyrs," who were far more powerful in death than they ever had been in life.

The political results of this Easter rebellion were very far-reaching. The old Home Rule Party, which had been built up by Parnell and which was subsequently led by Redmond and Dillon was now superseded by the Sinn Fein, or physical force, party founded by Arthur Griffith and led by Eamonn De Valera. This party put forth the old Fenian demand for a republic. De Valera's point of view is summarized in a phrase or two, uttered later in a party convention, and which declared that the object of the organization was to secure the international recognition of Ireland as an independent republic and to "make use of any and every means available to render impotent the power of England to hold Ireland in subjection by military force or otherwise." De Valera also said: "That there would never be peace in Ireland till they got their independence. When the war was over England would be tottering. The Allies could not win. All nations at the Peace Conference would claim their right to the freedom of the seas, and Ireland was of such international importance in that respect that her claim must be admitted."

The first opportunity to count the adherents of this Sinn Fein or republican party was offered by the parliamentary elections of 1918. The republicans secured a sweeping victory. The Home Rulers were practically wiped out, retaining only six seats. John Redmond had died on March 6, 1918, his death probably hastened by his chagrin at the failure of his life work. The Sinn Feiners won 73 seats out of a total of 105. The Unionists won 26, — 23 from Ulster and 3 from Southern Ireland. Thus Catholic Ireland voted for independence; Protestant Ireland for

the preservation of the union with England. The Sinn Fein members refused to take their seats in the Parliament at Westminster. Instead they met in the Dublin Mansion House, constituted on January 21, 1919 the Dail Eireann (pron. Dahl Eerahn) or Assembly of Ireland, subscribed to a solemn Declaration of Independence which was read in English, Gaelic, and French, and elected Count Plunkett, Arthur Griffith and De Valera as "delegates to the Peace Conference," a conference which they were not destined to attend. On the following day De Valera was elected "President of the Irish Republic," and he forthwith established a ministry with departments of foreign affairs, home affairs, finance, and defense. Michael Collins, who was later to organize a system of terror, became what amounted to a minister of war.

To meet this new situation a new Government of Ireland Act was passed in December, 1920, by the British Parliament. This act superseded the Home Rule Bill which had been passed in 1914 and which had then been immediately suspended until the close of the war. The new measure, recognizing the division of the country shown by the elections, provided for two separate parliaments in Ireland, one for the six counties of Northeast Ulster and another for the rest of Ireland. The two parliaments were to choose a joint Council of Ireland, consisting of forty members, to serve as a connecting link and to represent the theory or the possibility of Irish unity, "with a view," says the statute, "to the eventual establishment of a parliament for the whole of Ireland, and to bringing about harmonious action between the parliaments and governments of Southern Ireland and Northern Ireland and to the promotion of mutual intercourse and uniformity in relation to matters affecting the whole of Ireland."

The Ulster Unionists accepted this scheme of two parliaments, not because they liked it but because they were fearful of something worse. The Northern Parliament was therefore duly elected on May 24, 1921, and was opened by King George V in the following June with a moving speech.

The Sinn Feiners, however, would have nothing to do with this scheme. They took part in the elections for the Southern Parliament, winning 124 seats out of 128. But they refused to constitute the Parliament. Instead their elected representatives met in the Mansion House in Dublin, again proclaimed the republic, and elected De Valera as President.

The issue was now fully joined. A rebellious government confronted the lawful government and denied its pretensions *in toto*.

Lloyd George had accurately described the ineluctable situation in these words; "Sinn Fein rejected Home Rule and demanded in its place an Irish Republic for the whole of Ireland. Sinn Fein went further. It deliberately went to work to destroy conciliation and constitutional methods because it recognized that violence was the only method by which it could realize a Republic. . . . I fully admit, and I have always admitted that the declared policy of Sinn Fein and the policy of His Majesty's Government are irreconcilable. I believe that the policy of establishing an Irish Republic is impossible for two reasons; first, because it is incompatible with the security of Great Britain and with the existence of the British commonwealth; and second, because if it were conceded it would mean civil war in Ireland — for Ulster would certainly resist incorporation in an Irish Republic by force — and in this war hundreds of thousands of people, not only from Great Britain but from all over the world, would hasten to take part. . . . It has never been our policy to refuse compromise about anything but the Union itself and the non-coercion of Ulster. . . . I regret that . . . up to the present the directing minds of the Sinn Fein movement . . . believe they can ultimately win a republic by continuing to fight, as they fight today, and are resolutely opposed to compromise. So long as the leaders of Sinn Fein stand in this position and receive the support of their countrymen, settlement is, in my judgment, impossible. The Government of which I am the head will never give way upon the fundamental question of secession. Nor do I believe that any alternative Government could do so either."

Such was the situation when the King opened the new parliament of Northern Ireland in Belfast in June, 1921. Northern Ireland expressed impressively its loyalty to the British connection. Southern Ireland stood forth in grim and determined rebellion. Indeed for three years a guerilla warfare had been going on characterized by all the odious features of such warfare, cold-blooded murders, often of innocent people, ambushes, arson, looting, riots, raids, attacks and reprisals without number. The contest now deepened and there ensued a period of complete chaos. The British Government declared the Irish Parliament, the Dail Eireann, an illegal body, made many arrests, suppressed newspapers, seized the headquarters, the books and papers and funds of the Sinn Fein Association. Sinn Fein hit back by more assassinations, by violence of every kind. Orderly government no longer functioned and utter lawlessness prevailed in Ireland.

Finally on July 7, 1921 a truce was declared between the warring parties and each side appointed a delegation to attend a conference in London "to explore to the utmost the possibility of a settlement." After prolonged and very difficult negotiations, which were interrupted more than once and which were repeatedly threatened with failure, a treaty, or, more accurately, eighteen Articles of Agreement were drawn up and were duly signed on December 6, 1921. It had been officially stated that the basis of the conference was to be "How the association of Ireland with the community of nations known as the British Empire can best be reconciled with Irish national aspirations." Lloyd George had in his invitation to the conference made it clear that the British Government would under no conditions accept the establishment of an Irish Republic or any repudiation of allegiance to the Crown. Those extreme demands must be abandoned, but short of them England was willing to consider any arrangements that might lead to peace. In this temper Lloyd George and several members of his cabinet, Austen Chamberlain, Winston Churchill, Lord Birkenhead and others met Arthur Griffith, Michael Collins and three other representatives of Southern Ireland, and a scheme was found that ultimately all could sign.

Article I of the Agreement defines the Ireland of the future. "Ireland shall have the same constitutional status in the community of nations known as the British Empire as the Dominion of Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, the Dominion of New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa, with a Parliament having powers to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of Ireland, and an Executive responsible to that Parliament, and shall be styled and known as the Irish Free State."

The relation of the Irish Free State to the Imperial Parliament and Government is to be that of the Dominion of Canada, and the representative of the Crown in Ireland is to be appointed in the same manner as the Governor-General of Canada. The members of the Irish Parliament must take an oath of allegiance to the Crown. The share of the Free State in the debt of the United Kingdom and certain other charges are to be determined, in default of agreement, "by the arbitration of one or more independent persons being citizens of the British Empire." The Irish Free State is to undertake her own coastal defense, the defense by sea of Great Britain and Ireland being undertaken by the Imperial forces, these provisions to be reviewed by the two governments at the end of five years. The Free State shall

afford in time of peace such harbor and other facilities to the Imperial forces as are indicated in the annex to the treaty or such as may, from time to time, be agreed upon. "In time of war or of strained relations with a foreign power," it shall afford "such harbor and other facilities as the British Government may require." Ireland may have an army of its own as large in proportion to its population as the British army is in proportion to the population of Great Britain. The ports of Great Britain and of Ireland are to be freely open to the ships "of the other country" on payment of the customary dues. The Free State is to have no representatives in the Parliament in London.

The Articles of Agreement provide for the determination within a month by the Parliament of Northern Ireland whether Northern Ireland shall be included in the Irish Free State or not. If Northern Ireland decides to stay out then the provisions of the Act of 1920, which set up two parliaments in Ireland, shall continue in force as far as Northern Ireland is concerned, subject to any necessary modifications. In that case a commission shall be appointed which "shall determine, in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants, so far as may be compatible with economic and geographic conditions, the boundaries between Northern Ireland and the rest of Ireland."

Article XVI reads as follows: "Neither the Parliament of the Irish Free State nor the Parliament of Northern Ireland shall make any law so as either directly or indirectly to endow any religion or prohibit or restrict the free exercise thereof or give any preference or impose any disability on account of religious belief or religious status, or affect prejudicially the right of any child to attend a school receiving public money without attending the religious instruction at the school." This article is designed to protect the Catholics of Northern Ireland and the Protestants of Southern Ireland from adverse legislation.

Such were the Articles of Agreement establishing the Irish Free State, such the surprising outcome of an agitation which had covered half a century. These articles granted far greater powers than any of the Home Rule Bills which have been discussed in this history. Southern Ireland was to be as free as Canada, that is as free as was consistent with the continued existence of the British Empire. She might have her own army, her own parliament and ministry, her own coinage and stamps, and whatever legislation suited her on all local matters.

From all parts of the world this radical solution of a question that had so long tormented the British Empire and embittered

its relations with other peoples was hailed with satisfaction and with unfeigned relief and Lloyd George was showered with congratulations. It was universally thought that one, at least, of the numerous specters that had long haunted the world to its great discomfort had been laid.

But the shouting was premature. The clouds had parted for a moment and the sun had shone, also only for a moment. Then the heavens grew black again. While the British Parliament was immediately summoned to ratify the treaty, which it did by large majorities, opposition of the most determined and passionate sort speedily developed in Ireland. Two days after the signature of the treaty De Valera, "President of the Republic," announced his attitude in a "Message to the Irish People," in which he said: "You have seen in the public press the text of the proposed treaty with Great Britain. The terms of this agreement are in violent conflict with the wishes of the majority of the nation, as expressed freely in successive elections in the past three years. I feel it my duty to inform you immediately that I cannot recommend acceptance of this treaty either to the Dail Eireann or to the country."

The "President" then repudiated the agreement which had been signed by all the Sinn Fein delegates to the conference. Certain members of the Irish cabinet also opposed the settlement. Anti-treaty speeches freely criticised the action of the Irish delegates. Ireland's divisions had always been Ireland's undoing. At the very moment which the outside world regarded as one of amazing triumph for the Irish, the Irish themselves presented a spectacle for which even the most cynical were hardly prepared. Hitherto a unit in opposition to Great Britain, Sinn Fein was now torn with dissension. The discussion in the Dail Eireann concerning the treaty was long and impassioned and it was only by the narrow majority of 64 to 57 that ratification was finally secured (January 7, 1922). The cleavage between Griffith and Collins on the one hand and De Valera on the other was a wide one. De Valera declared that the delegates had had no right or authority to abandon the "republic." The delegates hotly resented the charge that they had exceeded their powers. They had merely brought home a document which assured an unexpected measure of self-government, a document which it was wise to accept. After the vote of ratification De Valera resigned as "President," and Griffith was elected in his place. Collins became the head of the "cabinet." A Provisional Government

was set up for the purpose of bringing the new Irish Free State into existence.

But the ratification of the treaty by the Dail Eireann was only



a first step. It was decided that the treaty and also a constitution of the Free State, to be drafted forthwith, should be submitted to the Irish electorate together. The contest was thus transferred to the people. The Republicans wished the elections

postponed, distrusting the voters. Some of them even went so far as to deny that the voters had any right to abolish the "Republic." It existed apparently by virtue of some new-fangled divine right. Some began to talk of a dictatorship of the army, the electorate being ignored. A confused and bitter contest speedily developed and Ireland was plunged once more into wild disorder, a veritable war between the adherents of the idea of a Free State and those of an absolutely independent republic. The Provisional Government insisted upon the recognition of its authority everywhere, but it encountered the armed opposition of the republicans. It was necessary to compel obedience to the Government, in a country in which government had long been considered the enemy, to be combatted by every means. It was necessary for the Government to take rebellious towns or districts by siege or by assault. The gulf between the hostile parties grew rapidly deeper and the struggle, this time between Irishmen, took on all the features which had previously characterized the controversy between Irishmen and Englishmen, attacks on barracks and forts held by the Government forces, ambushes, shooting-affrays, kidnapping, and murders. Public order rapidly deteriorated in many sections of the country. Personal security did not exist. Ireland had never in its long and troubled history witnessed a more acrimonious controversy. For month after month in 1922 the confusion and blood-shedding continued, the Provisional Government gradually gaining ground, carrying the war to the strongholds of the irreconcilables. It was apparently on the point of restoring order throughout the land when Arthur Griffith, the real founder of the Sinn Fein movement and more than any other man the creator of the Irish Free State, suddenly died on August 12, 1922, succumbing to heart disease at the very moment when the rebellion seemed about to collapse. A week later Michael Collins, the next most important member of the Free State Government, was shot down in cold blood by men hiding in ambush.

What the effect would be, upon the fortunes of the treaty and the Free State, of this tragic removal of the two ablest and most popular members of the new government, no one could say. Whether the Free State would crumble and collapse before it had really been instituted, whether the irreconcilable republicans would be able to seize power and carry through their plans, whether Ireland was destined to pass through a period of utter anarchy and chaos, or whether, startled and sobered by the prospect, the sound and healthy forces of the national life would

rally around the banner which had fallen from the lifeless hands of Griffith and Collins, no one knew.

Little by little, however, the Free State emerged from its dubious and dangerous situation, proving itself more than a match for its enemies. While the difficulties continued, while assassination and arson were destined for many months to play their traditional and sorry rôle in the harrowing and stormful history of Ireland, and while the Republicans refused to disarm, nevertheless the Free State was able gradually to consolidate itself. Men were found to take the places of those removed, ready to carry on their work. Thus William Cosgrave and Richard Mulcahy were chosen to the positions left vacant by the death of Griffith and Collins. The work of disconnecting much the larger part of Ireland from Great Britain was carried by successive steps to completion. In December 1922, the last British soldiers were withdrawn from Dublin, and the new constitution, drawn up by the Irish, was duly enacted by the Imperial Parliament on December 4. On December 6, 1922, the Free State was established by Royal Proclamation.

The Constitution declares the Irish Free State to be a co-equal member of the community of nations that constitutes the British Commonwealth, and that "all powers of Government, and all authority, legislative, executive and judicial in Ireland, are derived from the people of Ireland." The Irish language is declared to be the national language, but English is equally recognized as an official language, which is a wise provision, as most Irishmen do not speak the national language which has thus far been more a symbol than a practical means of communication of thought or passion. There is to be in the Free State no endowment of any religion. Freedom of religion, freedom of association, freedom of elementary education are proclaimed.

The Legislature, known as the Oireachtas, consists of the King, a House of Representatives (Dail Eireann), and a Senate (Séanad Eireann). The Dail has supreme power over all money bills, although the Senate may make recommendations. Other bills presuppose normally the consent of both Chambers, but the Senate is deprived of the power of unduly delaying a bill passed by the other house. The Constitution makes provision for the referendum, the initiative, and for proportional representation. Suffrage is universal, men and women having at the age of 21 the right to vote for the Dail, and at the age of 30 for the Senate. The members of the former body are chosen for four years, of the Senate for twelve. The Dail numbers at present 153 mem-

bers. It may be dissolved at any time, in accordance with the operation of the parliamentary system. The Senate consists of 60 members. The Executive consists of a Council of not more than seven members nor less than five. They must be members of the Dail and are responsible to it.

The representative of the Crown in the Free State is the Governor General. The first occupant of this position was Timothy Michael Healy, appointed December, 1922. The Free State Parliament met as such, for the first time, on December 6, 1922. The estimated population of the Irish Free State at the moment of inauguration was about three million two hundred thousand.

Ireland is only a geographical expression. While the Free State includes by far the larger part of the island it does not include all. Northern Ireland took the earliest opportunity (December, 1922) to vote itself out of the Free State and to declare for a separate existence. It has a parliament of its own, consisting of a Senate of 26 members and a House of Commons of 52, and possessing extensive and specified powers. Its executive consists of a Governor, appointed by the Crown, and of a ministry responsible to parliament. Northern Ireland is represented in the Parliament in London by 13 members, while the Free State has no representatives in that body. Northern Ireland had in 1922 an estimated population of about one million three hundred thousand.

CHAPTER XLIX

TURKEY SINCE THE WAR

WHILE the victorious Allies were able, after the Armistice, to make peace with reasonable celerity with most of their late enemies, while the new boundaries of the nations were set up generally and the new institutions attained a certain fixity, in one quarter of the much-distracted globe conditions long remained largely fluid and uncertain. Indeed essentially they remain so still. Not until nearly five years after the close of the war was peace made with Turkey, and, even then, the document that registered it, the Treaty of Lausanne, seemed decidedly lacking in all the attributes of finality or long endurance. That perennial and cheerless Eastern Question, which past generations were unable to solve and which may harass generations yet unborn, entered upon a new phase with the great convulsion of our day, a phase which cannot, however, be described with much precision or certitude. We stand in the midst of an unfinished chapter of contemporary history. Where so much is still tentative and doubtful, we may well be brief, seeking only to point out the main lines of change and settlement which have thus far appeared, and leaving in appropriate obscurity what is essentially obscure.

Turkey's entry into the war on the side of Germany in October, 1914, profoundly affected the course of the war. It cut off the Western Allies from Russia and Russia from the Western Allies, and thus contributed directly and powerfully to that revolution which was ultimately to work such havoc with the empire of the Tsars. But, more particularly, it enormously widened the theater of conflict, forcing the Allies to fight far from home, far from the bases of supply, and amid conditions of exceptional difficulty and strain. It nearly, but not quite, set the Mohammedan world aflame against the Christian, thus threatening the British and French colonial empires, with their hordes of Mohammedan subjects, with destruction in the consuming heat of religious and racial fanaticism. It subjected the Turkish Empire itself to the greatest strain it had ever known, causing all the fissures in its loose and unstable structure to widen portentously, and leaving

it in the end a derelict, battered beyond description. What the salvage might be from the colossal wreckage no one could foretell. The Turks, confronting the catastrophic consequences of their participation in the war, had need of all their fatalism.

The expedition to the Dardanelles, the Gallipoli campaign, the establishment of the Salonica front, the attacks upon the Suez Canal, the arduous fighting in Mesopotamia were consequences of this participation of the Turks in the war, necessitating a wide and costly dispersion of Allied effort, and leading, as the issue proved, to a more comprehensive victory. At the end of the war the vast stretches of the Arabic portion of the Turkish Empire, Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia, Arabia were lost to the Sultan, and General Allenby was in control. Constantinople itself had yielded to Allied occupation. The day of reckoning had arrived. The young Turk leaders, Taalat, Enver, Djemel, with their hands imbrued with the blood of hundreds of thousands of Armenians, assassinated or hounded to death by their orders, fled from the scene of their nefarious activity, seeking refuge from the wrath of men in unknown hiding-places. The Crescent was passing into penumbra and perhaps into permanent eclipse. Was Santa Sophia about to become once more a Christian church?

A severe peace was expected by the rulers and people of Turkey. They knew only too well that the crack of doom had sounded for a dominion that in 1914 had stretched from the Golden Horn to the furthest tip of spiced Arabia, a distance as far as that from San Francisco to New York. They knew that Arabia and Palestine and Syria and Mesopotamia were definitely lost, not only because British and Indian armies had swept over them right up to the gates of Asia Minor, but because the Arab tribes and peoples, fellow-Mohammedans, had turned against them, cleverly and adroitly induced by the British to take this step so decisive for their future and for the ultimate triumph of Allied arms. For these peoples, too, Orientals of Orientals, felt the lure of modern nationalism and seized with alacrity the opportunity of self-determining their destinies. The touch of the West was arousing strange breeds of men to unaccustomed thoughts and aspirations, was imparting a new life to a sleepy and supine section of the world. A transformation of the Levant had begun, whose ultimate issue defied the powers of prophecy. Whether one more instance of momentary illusion, or the indubitable dawning of a new day, let him pronounce who could. One thing was certain, Western Asia was astir.

The Turks also knew full well that in addition to the loss of extensive territories they must accept other distasteful terms from their conquerors; the restoration of the Capitulations, or special privileges for foreigners resident in Turkey, which that government had abolished at the beginning of the war; measures for the protection of Christians within the Empire; some kind of international control of the Straits and the Bosphorus. Such arrangements they were probably prepared to accept as the necessary penalty for defeat but, when the Allies went beyond and began to talk of the cession of Thrace, and Smyrna and a large region round about, resistance began to appear and rapidly crystallized. A new nationalism arose with which the world would be compelled to reckon, more limited in the territory it affected, more intense, and gathering leaders and momentum as month after month went by with no definite proposals from the Allies for a peace settlement, with only provisional and partial decisions which did not cover the whole field of dispute but which were sufficiently drastic to inspire alarm.

The main reason for the long inaction of the Allies was their absorption in the more pressing work of pacifying Europe, of drawing up the treaties of Versailles, Saint-Germain, Trianon, and Neuilly. But another reason was the division of opinion, the clash of divergent interests among the Allies themselves over the future of the Ottoman Empire. Great Britain and France, Italy and Greece became rivals in a field where rivalries had often operated in the past, to the advantage of the rickety and discredited régime of the Turks. It was the reappearance of this old and hoary phenomenon that prevented the speedy settlement of the terms of the Turkish treaty. It was this that enabled the Turks to get their second wind and to defy the treaty when it was finally presented to them.

From the end of 1918, Constantinople and its approaches were under the guns of the Allied fleets, and the Sultan in the Yildiz Kiosk preserved only the semblance of his power, presenting no serious obstacle to the will of the Allies when they themselves should know their will and should declare it. But in June, 1919, General Mustafa Kemal Pasha, an officer who had served with distinction in the defence of Gallipoli, left Constantinople and crossed into Asia Minor. There he displayed great activity, creating a separate government and army of his own and winning adherents to his programme, which was one of resistance to any attempt on the part of the Allies to partition Asia Minor (Anatolia), or Thrace. Under Kemal's leadership the national senti-

ment of the Turkish people was spurred to new efforts to check the disintegration of the empire and to recover as much of its former territory as circumstances might permit. Once more the mutual rivalries of the enemies of Turkey might be turned to account. The Kemalists, intent upon restoring the authority of the old Ottoman government, ignored or opposed the Sultan in Constantinople on the ground that he was no longer a free agent but merely a pawn in the hands of the Western Powers.

Finally the Allies were able to agree upon a treaty of peace which was to be submitted to the Sultan for his signature. This document is known as the Treaty of Sèvres and was signed by the Ottoman delegates on August 10, 1920. Its territorial terms reduced the empire to a state about the size of Spain. Turkey ceded Thrace west of the Chatalja line to Greece; also Tenedos and Imbros and the Aegean islands. Smyrna and a region around about were to be administered by Greece, under Turkish sovereignty, for a period of five years after which they might annex themselves to Greece by plebiscite. Greece received also the islands of the Dodecanese, islands which Italy had seized in the war with Turkey in 1911 and which she had held ever since. These islands were inhabited by Greeks, and they were now to be handed over to Greece with the exception of Rhodes, where a plebiscite might ultimately be held and might determine its future status, if England should cede Cyprus to Greece, a condition quite likely to postpone the plebiscite indefinitely. Turkey recognized the independence of Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine, and the new Arab kingdom of Hedjaz. Turkey was to retain Constantinople and a small European hinterland extending up to the Chatalja lines which are about twenty-five miles to the west. But the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora, the Bosphorus and strips of coast on both sides were to form a "Zone of the Straits" and were to be under the control of an International Commission, to be composed of representatives of various powers, this commission to have complete control of all the navigation of the Straits, its rules and regulations and financial charges. The Straits were to remain open and free to all nations in time of peace and were to be neutral in time of war. All fortifications within this neutral zone were to be demolished. Nominal sovereignty of the zone was to be divided between Turkey and Greece. The frontiers of the new Armenian state were to be referred to President Wilson for delimitation. The line which he finally drew included an area of about 30,000 square miles, with the port of Trebizond on the Black Sea.

Such were the territorial provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres. But this treaty, though signed by the powers concerned, was never ratified by any of them, and the Kemalist Nationalist Government of Angora, refusing to recognize the Sultan's signature, dedicated to it its undying hostility. Moreover the French and Italian governments began, almost on the morrow of the signature, to demand its revision, while the English government, though on the whole favoring it, nevertheless, followed a somewhat vacillating course in regard to its execution. The Treaty of Sèvres was, as a whole, never put into force and two years after its signature was generally recognized as dead or moribund.

Yet certain provisions of this incomplete and unratified treaty have been put into operation and such provisions are not likely to be disturbed. France has received from the League of Nations a mandate for Syria and is installed there in military force. England has received a mandate for Mesopotamia, and within that spacious area she has recognized the creation of the Kingdom of Irak, comprising the valley of the Euphrates and the Tigris, and the Emir Faisal, son of the King of Hedjaz, was crowned King of Irak at Bagdad on August 23, 1921. This state has a population of about 3,000,000 and an area of 143,000 square miles. East of the Jordan England has also recognized the Emirate of Transjordan, sometimes called Kerak, with a total population of possibly 180,000 Arabs, partly nomads, partly settled, and with the brother of Faisal, Abdullah, as Emir.

Great Britain has also been given by the League of Nations a mandate for Palestine. Embodied in the mandate is a provision for the establishment of a "National Home" for the Jewish People according to the principle laid down in the Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917, which reads as follows: "His Majesty's Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of that object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."

What this may mean remains to be seen, the term and conception of a "national home" being new to political science and of uncertain scope and significance. It represents the present status of the Jewish nationalist aspiration expressed in recent times in the movement called Zionism. Great Britain as the mandatory power is responsible for the carrying out of this purpose.

It has not yet indicated what its interpretation of the Balfour Declaration will actually be. It is quite obvious that the vague term "a national home" does not mean, and cannot safely be made to mean "a Jewish State." For Palestine as a Jewish State with supreme authority in the hands of the Jews would mean a clear and flagrant defiance of the principle of self-determination accepted as the underlying basis of the system of mandates created by the Conference of Paris. Palestine has a population of somewhat less than 800,000, of whom only about 80,000, or one in ten, are Jews, most of the rest being Arabs. The Arabs are absolutely opposed to the aims of Zionism. They consider Palestine their country, as it is, if majorities have any rights which the world is bound to respect. They regard the Balfour Declaration as the work of British politicians who have an eye to the advantage of British commerce and imperial expansion and who are sensitive to the influence of Jewish world finance. They see no reason why they should themselves be sacrificed to such considerations. There is an Arabic nationalist aspiration as there is a Jewish nationalism and a British imperialism. Whether the three can live together in harmony within the restricted area of Palestine remains to be seen. There are materials sufficient for a serious conflict. It should be noted, further, that there are nearly as many Christians as Jews in Palestine, 73,000 of the former, 83,000 of the latter.

Another change in the map of the former Turkish Empire is that represented by the rise of the Kingdom of Hedjaz. This state of Western Arabia, possessing a population of perhaps 900,000, achieved its independence during the Great War. It was a product of the policy adopted by the British early in the struggle of encouraging the revolt of the Arab world against the Turkish over-lords. Hedjaz was represented at the Conference of Paris by two delegates and was one of the high contracting parties of that famous assembly. It is important as containing the cities of Mecca and Medina, holy places for the followers of Mohammed. The King of Hedjaz is Hussein Ali. The Treaty of Sèvres recognized the Hedjaz as a free and independent state. Indeed that state was one of the signatories of the treaty.

The Treaty of Sèvres, although difficult to make, owing to the conflict of interests of those who drafted it, was nevertheless easier to make than to enforce. The delegates who signed it for Turkey represented only Constantinople and its vicinity.

It was not recognized by the Anatolian Turks, the Kemalists, who pronounced anathema upon it and who swore to resist it to the bitter end. It was clear that nothing but the application of force by the Allies could extort its acceptance by the Government of Angora. None of the Great Powers, England, France, or Italy, was willing to furnish men and money for that purpose. Those countries were exhausted militarily and financially by the war and the voters in each of them were opposed to further ventures. This situation created an opportunity for one of the small states of Europe for which she had been eagerly waiting and for which she was prepared. Venizelos, in the name of his country, offered the Greek army for the purpose, an army fully mobilized and already on the frontier of Thrace, ready to cross over. As the Entente Powers were confronted by only two alternatives, either the non-enforcement of the Treaty of Sèvres or its execution by the Greeks, they chose the latter and invited Greece to undertake the task of bringing the nationalist forces of Asia Minor to terms and compelling them to accept the new arrangements. France and Great Britain were already, as we have seen, in the military possession of the vast region east of the Mediterranean, Syria, Mesopotamia, and Palestine. It was for the Greeks to execute the rest of the treaty and this they were eager to undertake as it meant for them a war of liberation of the Greeks of Thrace and of the western shores of Asia Minor, famous sites of ancient Greek civilization, where an important Greek population has persisted, literally for thousands of years. The Aegean had historically been a Greek sea. Might it not become so again? Might not ancient Hellas be restored? Adrianople, Smyrna beckoned, and in the distance lay Constantinople, for more than a thousand years the proud capital of the Byzantine Empire, the upholder of Greek arts and letters, the center of Greek traditions, the creator of the Greek Church, the Christian Mother of eastern and southeastern Europe. Might not this incomparable city, which every Greek felt to be as rightfully the capital of Greece as the Italians of the nineteenth century had felt Rome to be theirs, finally, by a happy turn of fortune, fall as a prize of war into its appropriate place as the head and crown of a redeemed and re-united Hellas? The prospect was alluring. And the predestined leader in this final and culminating phase of the long war of Greek Independence, which had begun a century before, could be no other, it seemed, than Eleutherios Venizelos, who in a career of a few years had achieved the most magnificent results that could be

ascribed to any statesman of modern Greece, who had already greatly increased the patrimony of his country, and who, though a representative of a petty state, had become one of the commanding figures upon the great stage of European politics. The man and the hour alike seemed to foretell a rapid and supreme success.

But things are not always what they seem. The famous Eastern Question still had some surprises in store for a supposedly blasé and sophisticated world. It still possessed a power to embroil the best of friends and to set the nations on edge. It still had victims to devour.

The Greeks entered upon the task assigned them with alacrity and enthusiasm. They overran Thrace and occupied it, and Greek armies shortly were in possession of western Asia Minor all the way from Brusa in the north to Ashak in the south on the famous river which has enriched the English language with the word "meander" (modern Mendere). But the Turkish Nationalists, the Kemalists, despite this fact showed no inclination to accept the Treaty of Sèvres, relying on the nature of their country whose poor roads and natural features seemed to them likely to prove an ultimate defence from the invader, relying also on intrigue with Russian Bolsheviks, on the likelihood of dissensions among the Allied nations, and, in general, on the chance that something might "turn up" to confound and paralyze their enemies.

And something did turn up, something formidable. Venizelos, the architect of the fortunes of contemporary Greece, was suddenly overthrown in the very moment of his greatest triumph, and fortune showed once more how fickle she can be.

The World War had divided the Greeks into two sharply opposed camps, the Venizelists and the adherents of King Constantine. The King, brother-in-law of the German Emperor, had followed a personal policy at variance with that of his minister, and secretly and treacherously hostile to the Entente, which, in order to end his dangerous intrigues, had forced his deposition in June 1917. Constantine was succeeded by his second son, Alexander, and Venizelos, henceforth all powerful, ranged his country on the side of the Allies. Constantine, who did not renounce his rights, withdrew to Switzerland, where he labored assiduously to prepare his return, astutely encouraging all the discontented elements in Greece against the hated premier. Venizelos was at a disadvantage in meeting this occult and insidious campaign, as the exigencies of the situation demanded long absences in western

Europe in connection with the diplomatic enterprises centering in the Conference of Paris. Moreover these absences relaxed his hold upon the internal administration of Greece and he was in a poor position to check or correct the mistakes of some of his subordinate officials whose unpopular acts played directly into the hands of the watchful opposition.

When Venizelos returned from Paris to Athens in August, 1920, he was publicly thanked by the national assembly as the savior of his country. He announced that new elections would shortly be held, laying down as the sole condition of them that the question of the return of Constantine should not be raised. But raised it was by events, and became the central and absorbing interest of the voters. In the midst of the campaign King Alexander suddenly died as the result of the bite of a monkey. The crown was offered to Paul, the third son of Constantine, who declined, unless the Hellenic people should clearly indicate that they did not wish the return of his "august father." On the contrary this was precisely what they did wish, most ardently. They gave a crushing majority to the opponents of Venizelos. Only 120 of his followers were elected to the new chamber, whereas twice as many of his opponents were returned. Venizelos immediately resigned and left the country, not considering it a safe place to live in, party feeling running so high. An attempt had been made by certain monarchists to assassinate him as he was leaving Paris and had been praised by the Royalist press as glorious tyrannicide. Manifestly it was wiser for him to live abroad until a more convenient season.

On December 5, 1920, a plebiscite was held on the question of the recall of King Constantine. The Venizelists stated that they would abstain from voting. The result of the poll was announced as 999,954 votes out of 1,013,724 in favor of the return of Constantine, and while there was without doubt much official pressure to obtain this end, still public opinion had expressed itself with exceptional emphasis. Constantine and Queen Sophia, the sister of William II and the first of the House of Hohenzollern to emerge from the late hurricane, soon landed at the Piraeus and were received with great enthusiasm.

But this re-enthronement of the popular favorite was not without its disquieting features for the Greek people and for Constantine himself. The Allies had already announced before the plebiscite that as Constantine had been hostile to them during the war they could have no confidence in him, and that, in the case of his remounting the Greek throne they would reserve

to themselves "complete liberty in dealing with the situation." They now refused to recognize him and cut short the financial aid they were extending to Greece. Whether they would go further and oppose any projects he might have remained to be seen.

Constantine, back in power, announced that he would continue to act in harmony with his "Great Allies" in carrying out the Treaty of Sèvres and in reuniting the Greek lands around the Aegean. This meant the prosecution of the war with the Turks in Anatolia. He affected to believe that his own reappearance upon the scene would not alter the adherence of the Allies to their policy, and that the irritation they showed upon his return to Athens would prove only momentary; that, in short, their interests were identical with his and would continue to prescribe the same course of conduct. In this he was in error. In the two succeeding years Greece received the support of England alone and that a vacillating support, cordial at times, at times lukewarm. France, on the other hand, favored the Turks against the Greeks and demanded the revision of the Treaty of Sèvres, which would be accomplished only at the expense of the latter. The attitude of England and France was determined by general considerations of world policy in the Near East. Here the two countries appeared no longer as allies but as rivals. This difference of opinion and of purpose among the western Powers was ominous for the Greeks, favorable for the Turks. It contributed to the failure of conferences held in 1921 to bring about a final settlement of the Turkish question. Indeed the French went so far as to make peace with Turkey independently, an action which gave great offence to England and which subjected the relations between those two states to a considerable strain. On October 20, 1921, the French signed an agreement with the Government of Angora, promising to withdraw from the province of Cilicia where they had installed themselves and where they were hard pressed by the Kemalists. They gave Cilicia back to the Turks and in return were guaranteed immunity in Syria. Also they received certain concessions for French financial and mining interests, and the lease of a certain portion of the Bagdad Railway.

In this atmosphere of international intrigue, of rivalry, of the old familiar kind, for special political and economic advantages, the union of France and England, represented by the compromise of the Treaty of Sèvres, broke down. The only hearty supporters of that treaty were the Greeks. If it was

to be enforced they alone must enforce it. And to do so they must send armies across the Aegean Sea, and must tax still further a war-weary people. Was the task beyond their resources, material and moral? All through the years of 1921 and 1922 the exhausting struggle between the Greeks and the Anatolian Turks went on. In 1921 the Greeks were generally successful, advancing at one time to within fifty miles of Angora. It seemed that they would be able to compel the Turks finally to accept the Treaty of Sèvres, and might then proceed to consolidate their new position in Asia Minor. But the Turks held on, and, in August and September of 1922, they assumed the offensive, swept the Greeks rapidly back, and entered Smyrna. The defeated Greek troops, and hordes of civilian refugees in the last stages of distress, sought to reach the English and American ships in the harbor, but large numbers of them failed. Smyrna, fired probably by the Turks, burst into flames and burned for three days until all but the Turkish quarter was destroyed. Thousands and thousands of the wretched fugitives perished in the flames or were shot down by the Turks. The world was rudely awakened by these events, with their appalling climax, and became aware that the war which it had thought ended four years before had not ended yet, and might easily blaze up again in regions where it had died down, might still exact countless additional victims. The victory of Mustafa Kemal's armies in Asia Minor was complete.

What would be the effect of this overwhelming Turkish triumph? That was the redoubtable question. Would it mean not only the elimination of the Greeks from the mainland of Asia Minor but the extinction or renewed oppression of all non-Turks resident there, and resident there longer than the Turks themselves? Would the reinvigorated and triumphant nationalism of the Turks rest content with Anatolia or would it seek to get Thrace back again and, installing itself securely in Constantinople, recover once more the status of a European power, when the world had thought Europe at last freed from the scandal of Turkish misrule and inefficiency? And would the Turks, having recovered that much, not seek to recover all, even the Arabic-speaking portions of their former empire, would they not at the proper moment seek to reconquer Syria and Mesopotamia and the states of the Arabian peninsula? Such a possibility had the liveliest interest for England and for France, for Zionists and Arab kings and emirs, indeed, for the whole world. Would Constantine after his signal failure be again overthrown and

would Venizelos be recalled? These and many other questions surged into the public mind of the world in the autumn of 1922 on the morrow of the Turkish triumph. The answers to them, at least to some of them, were speedily forthcoming.

One of the earliest answers concerned Greece. The decisive events just described brought the Greek Government down with a crash and cost the Greek King his throne. In the Greek army, demoralized, disintegrated, and furious at what it considered its betrayal, the spirit of mutiny broke out. A revolutionary committee of army officers was formed which declared the King responsible for the disaster which had overtaken the nation, and demanded his immediate withdrawal. Constantine, recognizing the inevitable, formally abdicated on September 27 and for the second time took the road to exile, only to die very suddenly a few months later at Palermo (January 11, 1923). Constantine was succeeded on the throne by his son George, but the real government of Greece was a rigid military dictatorship exercised by a small group of self-appointed army officers, hitherto quite unknown. This group ruled with an iron hand. Several former ministers and officers of Constantine were summarily executed, including the late premier, Gounaris. Liberty of the press and of speech was suppressed and popular elections were postponed.

So much for the vanquished. What would the victors do, now that they had achieved a triumph more complete than any they had dreamed? Would the Turkish army, flushed with victory over the Greeks, for centuries hated and despised by the Turks, seek to cross over into Europe, to seize control of Constantinople, to recover Thrace, to wipe out the humiliation of the defeat of 1918, to replace the Crescent as high in the heavens as it had been in 1914. If it should attempt this, and the evidence was strong that such was its intention, would not war break out once more in the Balkans and might it not spread beyond? Was not Europe threatened with the revival of a general war?

The danger was serious and alarming. It was only averted, it seems, by the firm attitude of the British Government which announced its determination to oppose any attempt on the part of the Turks to cross into Europe and which took steps to reinforce the British troops in the threatened area, an attitude rendered all the more difficult by the simultaneous and hurried withdrawal of French and Italian troops, under the ill-concealed Turkish threat. In this critical hour, the old and costly divisions and jealousies among the Allies, which had largely caused the present catastrophe, showed themselves once more.

The mingled firmness and restraint of the British authorities proved sufficient to conjure the immediate danger, and after several weeks of standing on the very brink of war the Turks agreed to a conference with the European powers, a conference which should seek to determine terms of peace not only between the immediate combatants, the Turks and the Greeks, but between the Turks and the Allied Powers, the war which had begun between them, in 1914, never having been formally terminated. Before they would consent to enter that conference the Turks were promised the return to them of Eastern Thrace, which had been given to the Greeks by the Treaty of Sèvres.

The Conference of Lausanne, which was thus summoned to deal with one of the most tangled and obscure of all international problems, met on November 20, 1922, and was in session for eleven weeks, when it broke down, on February 4, 1923, on the definite refusal of the Turkish delegation to sign the treaty presented to them, five days before, by the allied leaders.

The discussions at Lausanne were long and involved, characterized by all the delays, intrigues, and backstairs influences long associated in the Western mind with every aspect of the Eastern question. The Turks had the advantage over the Allies in that they knew their own mind, were not at all in a hurry and were quite willing to continue fighting, whereas the Allies were more or less divided by conflicting rivalries and interests, were pre-occupied with many other problems, and were, moreover, as they practically announced from the housetops, unwilling to make any further appeal to arms in order to enforce their views. In other words, the Allies wanted peace so badly that they were ready to make it almost at any price. The record of the Conference was, therefore, one of repeated, almost continuous, concessions to the Turkish demands, of humiliating capitulations to Turkish nationalism and xenophobia. The Western Powers swallowed one bitter pill after another, only to find a fresh one presented for their deglutition. The Turks showed an inclination to act as if they had defeated the Allies, whereas, in reality, they had only defeated the Greeks. And the incurable weakness of the Allied delegates arose from the fact that they knew that public opinion in their own countries would not support them in any insistence that might result in further fighting. And not only did they know this but the Turks knew it equally well. As none of the powers was prepared for a war against Turkey, a diplomatic *volte face* from the attitude represented by the Treaty of Sèvres was inevitable. Yet after nearly three months of yielding, ac-

accompanied with obvious and unsuccessful attempts to hide their discomfiture under elaborate veils of diplomatic phraseology, the Allies still found the longed-for peace most elusive. The Turkish delegates refused to sign and announced that they must refer the treaty to the National Assembly of Angora for its sovereign opinion. That body refused to accept it but voted in favor of a resumption of negotiations. The Allies acquiesced and on April 23, 1923, the Conference was re-opened, and finally on July 24, 1923, a treaty was signed, in the main hall of the University of Lausanne, by the representatives of Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Roumania, and Turkey. Turkey retains Constantinople and recovers Eastern Thrace up to the Maritza and at one or two points even beyond. On the other hand she pays heavily for having fought on the German side, as she has been shorn of her non-Turkish provinces, Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia, Kurdistan, Hedjaz, and Yemen. In other words she has lost about a third of the population and about half of the area she possessed in 1914. This greatly reduced, impoverished, and backward state would soon drop into obscurity were it not for its possession of Constantinople, the Bosphorus, and the Dardanelles. The Capitulations have been abandoned, because of the rigid and uncompromising hostility of the Turks to anything that infringed their national sovereignty. The Armenians are left to their fate, whatever it may be. A wholesale removal of Greeks from Turkey and Turks from Greece is provided for, a compulsory migration which will necessarily be attended with much acute suffering, moral and physical. Thus the problem of the Christians in Turkey will be settled by the elimination of the Christians. An elaborate convention pretends to regulate the Straits in time of war and in time of peace.

Meanwhile the historic Turkish state has disappeared. The House of Osman has ceased to rule. The Sultanate has been abolished, the last Sultan dethroned and driven into exile. The very name "Ottoman Empire" has been discarded in favor of the designation "Turkey." Turkey is now a republic. All power, executive as well as legislative, is vested in a Grand National Assembly, elected for two years. This is the supreme, unique authority, choosing the Caliph, or head of the established state religion, and also the members of the Cabinet, which is now called the Council of Commissioners.

CHAPTER L

BELGIUM DURING AND SINCE THE WAR

ONE of the conspicuous and gratuitous victims of the war was Belgium. Having scrupulously observed all the international obligations imposed upon her by her privileged position of neutrality solemnly guaranteed by venerable treaties that bore the signatures of the great powers of Europe, having refrained from any act of provocation or disquieting ambition, pursuing the even tenor of her ways which involved no threat nor shadow of threat to any sister state, she suddenly found herself the prey of a faithless and pitiless neighbor which eighty years before had plighted her protection. The moral brazenness of the invasion of Belgium, which so profoundly shocked the conscience of the world and which was visited with such general condemnation of Germany, was, for Belgium, but the announcement of the malignant fate, the manifold woes to mind and body, that impended at the hands of the ruthless aggressor, the prelude of a tyranny that was to know no bounds.

The invasion of August 1914 itself was accompanied by horrors to which the world had long been unaccustomed and which seemed inconceivable in the modern age. No sooner had the German army crossed the Belgian frontier than, to quote the words of Belgium's most distinguished historian, Henri Pirenne, "it immediately put into practice a system of terrorism in its dealings with the inhabitants, hoping in this way to terrorize the Government, demoralize the army, and break the national resistance." "The forward march of the German army," continues Professor Pirenne, "was marked by an uninterrupted succession of atrocities. Once it was perceived that the Belgian army meant to offer a resistance on which Germany had not counted, pillage, burnings and massacres began. On the pretext that the inhabitants were armed, that *francs tireurs* attacked the German troops, the invading military command methodically organized the devastation of the country. Maps were issued to the officers indicating what towns and villages were to be burned down. The siege of Liège, with the preliminary repulses suffered by the

German regiment which first attacked the outer forts, gave the signal for a campaign of reprisals directed against the civil population." Some twenty villages were forthwith destroyed. "Scenes of indescribable savagery were enacted: 623 persons were shot, massacred, or driven with blows of the rifle-butt into the flaming houses to be burnt alive." The burnings were scientifically organized, a branch of the German army being specially trained and equipped for that purpose. "Between August 4 and August 20 in the province of Liège alone, 1061 persons were massacred, shot, hanged or burnt by the German troops; more than 2,000 houses and 4 churches were burnt deliberately and by order, not counting those destroyed by bombardment. In the province of Limburg during the same period 65 persons fell victims to similar cruelties."

As the invasion progressed other localities were similarly visited by scenes of horror, houses burned, civilians shot *en masse* on military order, often after useless and horrible cruelty. In the province of Namur 1949 inhabitants were murdered and more than 3,000 houses systematically burnt (not counting those destroyed by ordinary acts of war). The policy of terrorism was ruthlessly applied at Namur, at Dinant, at Louvain, and in the neighboring villages on the line of march. At Dinant "at nightfall on August 23 German soldiers rushed shouting about the streets, and everywhere fires broke out. The church, the town hall, the entire town was soon in flames. The inhabitants, arrested *en masse*, were either massacred, or else driven into different enclosed places where, after a while, a methodical extermination was commenced. In the presence of their families men were formed into groups and shot; 665 persons were killed, including 75 women, and 35 children. This horrible butchery was copied in the neighboring villages." At Latour, Prince Oscar, son of the Emperor of Germany, "presided in person over the execution of 71 inhabitants." At Louvain 79 men were shot in the presence of their wives and children, while 334 others "were sent captive to Germany, where they were paraded through the streets of Cologne under the insults and threats of the populace who pelted them with mud and stones."¹ The priceless library of the University of Louvain was destroyed.

¹ These detailed statements and charges, and many others, are to be found in the article on Belgium by Professor Pirenne in Volume XXX of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*. In writing this chapter I have mainly followed this article by the distinguished Belgian historian, whose trustworthiness is amply established by his entire career.

Such was the beginning of the martyrdom of Belgium, and martyrdom it was in every sense of the word, varied, interminable, characterized by every form of physical and mental suffering. Having easily occupied the country after a month's campaign, the Germans did not let it go but held it in a vise during the entire period of the war, giving an additional turn to the vise from time to time, as the vicissitudes of the prolonged struggle and the ingenuity of the German military and official mind suggested. Pitiless was the punishment meted out for four long years to this country whose only offence was that she lay between Germany and her principal enemy, and that she dared to try to defend her independence and neutrality, which she was bound to do not only by elementary self-respect but by solemn treaty obligations to which Prussia, and consequently Germany, was a party.

It is impossible, within the limits of this book, adequately to describe this odious chapter in the history of arbitrary and conscienceless oppression, associated mainly with the name of General von Bissing, the chief instrument employed by the German authorities in the execution of their tyranny. Germany was resolved to use, and did use, every resource Belgium possessed and upon which she could lay her hands for the prosecution of her war with the Allies. This was her primary and immediate aim. And the secondary aim, which she never lost from sight, was to prepare the ultimate annexation of Belgium to Germany, or at the least, the thorough and essential control of Belgium after the war should end in German victory. In any case Belgium should be ruined economically so that she could never hope to be an uncomfortable competitor with German industry in any sphere.

The Germans for four years ruled Belgium as uncontrolled and irresponsible masters. They imposed enormous fines and war-taxes upon cities and provinces and upon the nation as a whole. They established an elaborate system of espionage over the entire country. They set aside or undermined whatever national or local institutions, whatever machinery of self-government, might contest or impede the operation of their will, or might serve as a possible protection for the Belgian people. They arrested and deported to Germany, on mere military order, mayors of cities or other officials or private individuals who incurred their disfavor. In the end not only was the native administrative system entirely destroyed and succeeded by one composed of Germans, but the judicial system as well. The

constitution of Belgium became as much a piece of waste paper as had the treaty guaranteeing her neutrality. Edicts were issued and enforced which established the principle that should a penalty be imposed upon a guilty person, and should he be out of reach, the judge might inflict it upon some other person, in other words, a principle that sanctioned the punishment of the innocent where the authorities could not lay their hands on the alleged culprit. Thus the personal liberty of the Belgians was completely destroyed. "The same principle was applied by a series of edicts empowering the German authorities to take hostages who should pay with their lives for damage to railway tracks, to inflict heavy fines on communes, to deport the entire population of villages in whose area railway lines had been damaged, to punish whole families for faults committed by single members of them, to treat as guilty all persons found in company with anyone committing an offence. Again, the Belgian was penalized for 'not having done' or for 'having had the intention to do'" or for not giving information or not denouncing individuals desired by the authorities. As sufficient indication of the severity of this régime may be mentioned the sole "mitigation," namely, that a wife who did not denounce her husband in such cases might plead extenuating circumstances and was only liable to from three months to two years imprisonment or penal servitude!¹

Belgian industry was destroyed, as was personal liberty, by a series of drastic edicts and arbitrary acts of power. Requisitions of all materials desired by the military began at once and became, as time went by, more numerous and more rigid. Not only raw materials but machinery and tools were seized. German engineers and directors of German industry ransacked Belgian factories for machinery which was forthwith sent to Germany. In case such machinery could not be removed, it was broken up and pieces shipped to German factories. There were subsequently identified in Germany 24,308 Belgian machines. A large number of factories were seized and worked by the Germans; a large number destroyed and many more were marked for destruction. Of the 57 blast furnaces existing in Belgium, 26 had been razed to the ground, 20 were severely damaged, and 11 only remained fit for use at the end of the war. The coal mines were spared, Germany having need of them, but when the Germans were forced to retreat in the fall of 1918, orders were given to destroy them completely. These orders were not carried out, however, as the Germans were restrained by the emphatic threats

¹ Pirenne, *ibid.*

of economic reprisals from outside powers, if they did not desist from their purpose.

Thus the economic policy of the masters of Belgium aimed at two things, the utilization by the Germans for their own ends of all the resources and machinery of Belgian industry that they could so use, and the destruction, partial or complete, of the rest. This destruction would, in their opinion, serve two useful ends, the permanent or prolonged crippling of Belgian industry to the advantage of German industry in the economic competition of the future, and the justification of the policy of deportation of Belgian working-men to Germany.

For this deportation was the next thing on the programme. Deportation had begun early in the war as a punishment for those who refused to work for the Germans, for those who incurred the disfavor of the German authorities. It was now possible, with the breakdown of Belgian industry and the consequent throwing out of work of multitudes of Belgian laborers, to systematize and generalize this practice. As the direct and inevitable result of German policy, the unemployed of Belgium numbered many hundreds of thousands. Reduced to beggary, threatened with starvation, something must be done. The municipalities, by starting various public works, sought to give employment to these unhappy masses, only to find themselves suddenly forbidden by the German authorities to continue. If there was to be any relief for unemployment, it was to be of German invention and under the auspices of Germany. It was announced that if Belgian working-men between the ages of 18 and 50 would go to Germany to work, they would receive good wages and that the municipalities would then be permitted to provide employment for those under eighteen or over fifty. As this offer was not accepted, for reasons that require no explanation, another method was adopted. If laborers would not go of their own volition, they should be compelled to go. In the fall of 1916 the military authorities began the application of the new policy. All men between the ages of 17 and 60 were ordered to present themselves at indicated places. The military authorities then made their selection of those who were to be sent to Germany or to the fighting areas. The unlucky ones were then packed into trains and shipped off to various destinations. Ordered to work, to sign labor contracts, most of them refused and were subjected forthwith to cruel and barbarous treatment designed to break their spirit of resistance. The Germans appeared before the world in the second decade of the

twentieth century as slave-drivers. About a hundred and fifteen thousand of the able-bodied men of Belgium were thus deported either to Germany or to the fighting front. The system failed to yield the results that were expected by its authors, but it caused the death of considerable numbers, either because of the Allied bombardment, if they were in the exposed areas, or because of the inhuman treatment to which many were subjected if they were recalcitrant and refused to obey the commands of their masters. Even those who made a semblance of working rendered as inefficient service as they could.

This policy, though on the whole a failure, was continued, with some momentary relaxation, until the armistice. The advantages drawn from it were comparatively slight. But it was worse than a failure, it was a monstrous blunder. The indignation aroused throughout the world by this revival of slave-driving, did the German cause no good. Neutrals were indignant, and the United States was one of the neutrals at the time this ill-omened programme was instituted. One of the earliest and one of the most influential denunciations of the inhumanity of the deportations came from Cardinal Mercier, the leading prelate of Belgium, who protested to the Governor-General in these words: "I will not believe that the imperial authorities have said their last word. They will consider our unmerited sufferings, the reprobation of the civilized world, the judgment of history, the chastisement of God."

While the German authorities showed themselves quite callous to such considerations, their procedure was costly for themselves as well as quite unremunerative. It alienated still further the world's public opinion. It caused the iron to enter into the soul of Belgium more deeply than anything else had done, and it left behind it a record of horror that will not quickly disappear from the memories of men.

Not only did the Germans aim to destroy the economic prosperity of Belgium, not only did they mercilessly exploit Belgium's resources in men and in materials for their own advantage, not only did they labor to prepare for an economic absorption or control of Belgium after the war, but they did their best to disintegrate and destroy the Belgian nation. To this end, which they pursued from the beginning of the war to its close, they endeavored to stimulate and accentuate whatever parties, whatever differences of opinion, existed among the Belgians. Particularly did they exploit the language differences which had existed since time immemorial, and which had, in the years before the

war, led to serious contentions, dividing the country into two distinct, conflicting camps. Belgium, politically united, had never known unity of language. Its population possessed two mother tongues, not one, French and Flemish, the latter a language similar to the Dutch, and allied to the German. French was the language of the southern, or Walloon, part of the kingdom, Flemish of the northern. The last official census before the war, that of 1910, showed an approximately even division among the two. Out of a population of 7,423,784, more than 2,800,000 spoke exclusively French, more than 3,200,000 exclusively Flemish, and about 870,000 spoke both. Language differences had, in Belgium, as elsewhere in Europe, become more pronounced than ever during the previous half-century, and had given rise to animated and sometimes bitter controversies. Those speaking one language had become increasingly sensitive to any superiority, any privileged position possessed by those speaking the other, and in Belgium the French had long occupied such a position, owing to the fact that it was a great European language, with a rich historical and literary tradition. As early as 1850 a political movement was under way aiming to acquire for the Flemish a larger share in the national life, and gradually an important body of legislation had been enacted regulating the use of Flemish in official acts and publications, in the judicial and administrative sphere, in primary and secondary education. But the "Flamingants," as the militant leaders of this Flemish movement were called, were still unsatisfied and aspired to other conquests. There were in Belgium four universities, those of Brussels, Louvain, Ghent and Liège. The two last-named were state universities, organized by the state, supported by the public treasury. The two former were what we would call private institutions in the sense that they were not controlled by the state. Of these "free" universities one, Louvain, was frankly Catholic, controlled by the Church, and the other, that of Brussels, founded by the Liberals of the capital, was a lay institution, excluding all dogmatic conceptions from its programme. In all four universities French was the language of instruction and administration.

For years before the outbreak of the Great War, the Flemish party had advocated the transformation of one of the two state institutions, that of Ghent, into a Flemish university by the dethronement of French and the adoption of Flemish as the language in which its courses should be given. Was it not fair that a population comprising half of the inhabitants of Bel-

gium should have a university of its own? This controversy about the University of Ghent was burning brightly in 1914, generating much unpleasant heat.

The Germans, soon masters of the bilingual kingdom, saw, as they thought, in this situation a favorable opportunity to divide the Belgians in order better to rule them and ultimately to split their nationality asunder, destroying it piecemeal. The Machiavellianism was rather heavy but it was to prove persistent, although unsuccessful. At the beginning of the invasion the authorities of all four institutions had decided not to open the universities, in order that the students might have full liberty to join the army, a liberty which they magnificently used. General von Bissing invited the professors of the University of Ghent to reopen their courses. They unanimously refused. Somewhat later it was announced that the university would be transformed into a Flemish institution under the name of "Vlaamische Hoogeschool" and on December 31, 1915, a decree was issued by Bissing ordering this change.

The manoeuvre was too obvious and too gross. If the German authorities imagined that their tactics would be gratefully appreciated by the Flemish party, they were soon undeceived. From every corner of the land came indignant protests, and none more speedy or more vehement than those expressed by the Flemish leaders. Addressing the Governor-General directly, they wrote: "Honor and dignity are also, for an occupied country, priceless possessions. How would history judge us, Flemings as we are, if, at a time when our sons are still fighting in the trenches, we should accept advantages from the conqueror, even in the form of a bestowal of a right. In the past our people have always insisted upon regulating their own affairs in their own country."

In order to terrorize the professors of the University of Ghent who declined to be his tools, the Governor-General ordered the arrest and the deportation as prisoners to Germany without the slightest semblance of a trial, of two of their most eminent colleagues, Henri Pirenne and Paul Fredericq, whose influence over them he feared. The only result was a collective protest of the faculty of Ghent.

Von Bissing's attempt to create his "Flemish" university was a sorry comedy. He was obliged to resort to the services of a professor of the University of Munich to organize the new "Hoogeschool" and to round up a body of instructors and of students. This recruiting sergeant, after much labor and many

humiliations, was able to get together a hybrid teaching staff composed of a few renegade Belgians, a few Dutchmen, and many Germans, "*célébrités inconnues*," to quote Brand Whitlock's description, and a student body of perhaps two hundred, allured by various devices some of which were of a quite exceptional nature in the academic world, such as the promise of extra food rations, and in a number of cases, the privilege of choosing between a career of forced labor in Germany or of following the courses at Ghent. A refinement in educational policy was presented in the omission of Belgian history from the curriculum of the University.

The University, thus renovated, was solemnly inaugurated under the high patronage of the German authorities, the King of Bavaria honoring the occasion with his presence. It was, however, not destined to a long or a distinguished career. The wretched farce was soon brought to a close by the unexpected approach of Allied victory. The Germans reckoned without their host when they counted on the Flemings to help in the dismemberment of Belgium. The transformation of the University of Ghent was, in the words of Mr. Whitlock, "to be used as the thin wedge which, as they hoped, would divide the Belgian people and enable them to kill the very soul of the nation they had already violated and despoiled." This hope was doomed to utter disappointment. The spirit of Belgian nationality and of Belgian resistance was only strengthened by the sinister attack.

Another and more elaborate attempt to effect this disintegration of the Belgian nation, the one constant aim of the German conquerors, was the division, proclaimed in March 1917, of Belgium into two distinct parts, Flanders or the Flemish part to be administered from Brussels, and Wallonia or the French part to be administered from Namur. Each was to have its own ministry. In Flanders, Flemish was proclaimed the sole official language. In Wallonia, on the other hand, Flemish and German were to be considered official languages, along with French. A number of Belgians, the so-called "Activist Party," consented to be the tools of the German invaders in this projected ruin of their country. But the nation as a whole rejected peremptorily and with contempt this malign scheme made in Germany, and all its agents. A new explosion of public feeling showed the futility of the German purpose unless it should constantly be supported by the success of German arms. When the fortunes of war turned, this project necessarily lapsed, as did so many others.

While these assaults upon the soul of Belgium were in progress the body was in peril. The dislocation and destruction of the economic life of the country, systematically pursued, had its inevitable result. From the earliest days starvation impended and was only conjured away by a vast system of international relief in which the Allied Governments and the Commission for the Relief of Belgium, organized by Herbert Hoover, were the agents. By various means, public and private, vast amounts of foodstuffs were imported year after year, and distributed in the face of manifold difficulties, natural and artificial. While the Belgian people were thus being kept alive by the financial aid of the Allied governments and by private charity, the invaders were requisitioning various supplies for their own use and that of their compatriots. Besides the requisitions of Belgian produce, they sent home to Germany 92,000 horses (out of 317,000), 560,000 head of horned stock (out of 1,879,000), 250,000 pigs (out of 1,494,000), 3,000 sheep, and 1,690,000 fowls.

Such, then, were some of the blows that rained down upon the Belgians during four long years. The martyrdom of Belgium was no figure of speech but a grim and protracted reality. Yet the long torture of body and of soul did not crush the spirit of this people, nor cause it to capitulate before the oppressor. The honor of this small state was preserved untarnished by its citizens. And it should not be forgotten that, though the land and its resources were tightly held and exploited by the foreigner, though the King and his government were fugitives who had found a refuge upon the soil of France, though Havre and not Brussels was for the time being the capital of Belgium, and though the Belgian people found themselves faced by gigantic problems and provided with few means for their solution, yet they found a way of keeping in the field an army of 75,000 men with as many more in reserve, and thus contributed what they could to the general outcome of the war. If any one wishes to know what the contrary result would have meant for the world, what a German peace would have been like, he has only to remember the treatment meted out during the war to occupied Belgium and occupied France, he has only to recall the terms of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the Treaty of Bucharest.

But the peace that was to end the World War was to be dictated, not by the Germans, but by the victorious Allies. For the Belgians the most important question was that of the future international status of their country. They desired the revision

of the treaties of 1839 in the light of the instructive and costly experiences of the war. Those treaties had declared the perpetual neutralization of Belgium under the guarantee of the signatory powers. Events had proved that that guarantee was not worth the paper it was written on. The Belgians now wished the recognition of their untrammelled right to make treaties of alliance, of defence, and to act in military matters as they should see fit. This right they now secured. The Treaty of Versailles states that as the treaties of 1839 "no longer conform to the requirements of the situation" they are abrogated and will be replaced by other treaties. As a matter of fact, they have since been replaced by a defensive military alliance with France. Thus the régime of neutrality under which Belgium had so long lived has been definitely abandoned, as has that of Luxemburg also, by specific clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. The neutrality of Switzerland alone remains.

But the Belgians also wished a revision of the territorial provisions of the treaties of 1839 which deprived them of certain territories which they considered rightfully theirs and whose possession was essential to the defence of their country, as, they held, the war had abundantly proved. But in this matter, as in that of the question of the Scheldt, which they hoped to have reopened, they were doomed to disappointment. The Treaty of Versailles was the work of the Five Great Powers. As Belgium was not one of the five, she was shut out from their deliberations. Her people felt that they had not been given a proper chance to present and defend their interests. Their only territorial gains were the two Prussian cantons of Malmédy and Eupen, and, in former German East Africa, the districts of Ruanda and Urundi, ceded to Belgium as mandatory of the League of Nations, Great Britain securing the mandate for the rest, that is, for over nine-tenths of the former German colony. Belgium was not able to retain control over all the African territories she had conquered.

With the coming of peace and the return of the royal government to Brussels, Belgium was confronted, as was every other country, with the formidable problems of the removal of the wreckage of the war and the reconstruction of a terribly disorganized and impoverished society. The national debt had enormously increased, two-and-a-half million people, that is, a third of the population, were kept alive only by the aid of public relief, industry and commerce had been damaged and mangled beyond recognition. To the vast and varied work of national

rehabilitation, the Belgians applied themselves with zeal and with noteworthy success. Gradually economic life revived, in some branches with unexpected rapidity. New and heavy taxes were assumed, but it was clear that the restoration of the national finances was dependent upon the payment by Germany for the damages she had committed. Belgium would therefore inevitably have a continuing and vital interest in the success of the system of reparations decreed by the Treaty of Versailles. Belgian policy was almost certain to be the same as that of France, since the situation and the necessities of the two nations were similar. The close co-operation of the governments of the two countries during the period following the war lay in the nature of things, and what was to be expected has thus far been realized. The two governments have gone hand in hand toward the same goal, undisturbed by any serious divergence of interest.

Within the strictly domestic domain an important change was made in the institutions of Belgium after the armistice. Under pressure from the Socialists, parliament established in 1919 universal manhood suffrage at the age of 21. The Catholic party demanded, as compensation, that the vote be also given to women. The parliament yielded to the extent that women were given the right to vote in communal, but not in parliamentary elections. The first elections under the new system, held on November 16, 1919, resulted in the loss by the Catholic party of the majority it had enjoyed since 1884, and in considerable Socialist gains.

A question that has latterly much aroused public opinion, generating a heated controversy, is that of the transformation of the University of Ghent, the substitution in all its courses of instruction of the Flemish language for the French. What the Flemish people had desired before the advent of the Germans, what they had indignantly rejected at the hands of the Germans, they still desired. And now that the intruder had been thrown back into his own country it was felt that the question might properly be reopened and decided on its merits, by the Belgians themselves, without any immixture of foreign influence. The debates in parliament on this matter, in 1922 and 1923, were passionate and inconclusive, but it seemed likely that the Flemings would, in the end, achieve their object, though perhaps not in the precise form or to quite the extent desired.

Since the establishment of the League of Nations, Belgium has played a considerable part in its operations. From its inception she has been one of the members of the Council, and the president of the first Assembly was a Belgian, M. Paul Hymans.

CHAPTER LI

CONTEMPORARY ITALY

OF those countries of western Europe which had been victors in the World War, Italy is the one that has had, perhaps, the most troubled history since the signing of the armistice in the clearing of the forest of Compiègne on November 11, 1918. Some of the reasons for this unhappy state of affairs lie upon the surface and are easily understood. Others are less obvious, more complex and are connected with certain features of her previous evolution, and with certain characteristics of the national psychology. Victory had left Italy, as it had left the other Entente powers, exhausted and severely bruised and gashed. The return to the normal, to the life that had been known before the war, was not to be as easy or as rapid as men in their credulity and their craving for peace had imagined. The illusion that peace is a wizard's charm, capable, by a wave of a wand, of exorcising the evils of the body politic, was destined everywhere to be rudely dispelled, and in no country more drearily than in Italy. Peace was seen to be, not an open sesame to happiness and prosperity, but a disconcerting jumble of good and evil, somewhat rough and unsavory in taste, in short, bittersweet.

Hardly had Italy issued from her war in Tripoli which, though successful, had been costly and had imposed upon her budget a heavy financial burden which she had not yet had time to lighten, than the European conflict broke out in August, 1914. For nine months Italy remained neutral, torn between two contradictory sentiments. She did not desire war, knowing from her fresh experience the burden it entails and which was, in this case, by reason of the magnitude of the combat, bound to be aggravated and incalculable. But, on the other hand, participation in the war offered her a unique opportunity to realize some of her fondest dreams, the bringing within the kingdom of those Italians whom the work of the Risorgimento had been compelled to leave outside, the redeeming of Italia Irredenta, the final and complete achievement of her national unity, begun by Cavour fifty years before, and carried far, but not far enough. Apart

from this interest, often unsympathetically represented as purely selfish, though it was no more selfish than the legitimate national aspirations which other peoples, including our own, had expressed and realized in the course of their history, there was an idealistic side to Italy's intervention in the war, too often ignored abroad but very real. From the beginning of hostilities there was, in Italy, a popular sympathy with the Allied cause, which grew steadily in strength as the months passed, with their revelation of the deep meaning of the issues at stake. This moral response of the Italian people to the challenge of the crisis is one of the prominent reasons for Italian intervention in the war and explains the impatience of the masses with the delays of a realistic official policy and the general enthusiasm when the government finally gave way to popular pressure and enlisted in the fight on the side of the Entente.

Italy's services to the Allied cause were important and invaluable. The war was a rude affair for every nation caught within its grip. Italy, like her allies, experienced grave reverses as well as notable successes and some of her leaders, military and political, proved inadequate to their task. But without the Italians the Allies never could have won the war, a remark which may be made of every nation in turn. Had they not fought on the Carso, what would have happened in France? The collective effort of all was essential to the salvation of each, and it is idle and invidious to seek to award the palm for courage and bravery and endurance among so many valorous combatants.

Very heavy were the losses sustained by Italy as the result of her participation in the war. She had called more than five and a half million men to the colors. Nearly half a million of these had been killed, nearly a million had been seriously wounded and of this million more than two hundred thousand were permanently disabled. There was a widespread feeling among Italians that their Allies did not sufficiently appreciate the magnitude or the significance of these losses, a feeling that was to embitter the difficult days that were to come. It is easy to imagine how different the outcome would have been had Italy made this effort, not for the Entente, but for the Central Powers with which she had been allied for thirty years and more.

With the advent of peace and the meeting of the Conference of Paris came disillusionment and disappointment for the Italians and bitter and protracted contentions with their recent partners on the field of battle. The powers that entered the Peace Conference entered with numerous formal commitments

which they had been driven to make during the dark and critical days of the war. These agreements were justified by the gravity of the situation. One of the most important was the Treaty of London, of April 1915, by which, in return for her co-operation, explicit promises were made to Italy by France, Great Britain and Russia in regard to Tyrol, Istria, Dalmatia, southwestern Asia Minor and the islands of the Dodecanese. These pledges set forth the territorial rewards that Italy should receive in case of a common victory. They were exacted by the Italian government and were freely consented to by the leading Allied powers. They were binding in honor upon the parties concerned, unless international agreements may be converted into scraps of paper whenever they are questioned or are found, for one reason or another, inconvenient. These agreements, along with others concluded at different times with Japan, Roumania and other countries, were made in the form of treaties, the famous "Secret Treaties" which formed one of the hardest bones of contention thrown among the conferees of Paris.

But the situation in 1918 was very different from what it had been in 1915. The United States had entered the conflict in 1917, had contributed much to the final outcome, and the terms of the armistice had recognized, with certain reservations, as the basis and criterion of the future peace, the Fourteen Points of President Wilson, and the subsequent Four Principles, and Four Ends and Five Particulars enunciated by him during the year 1918. The powers, convened in the diplomatic halls of Paris, were confronted with a mass of linen which needed to be cleaned and ironed out. Did the Secret Treaties agree with each other and did the President's dicta agree with each other and did the two sets of affirmations agree with each other, or were they mutually repellent and destructive. The matter was not as simple as it seemed to many who brought the simple mind to the contemplation of international affairs. There was abundant material here for strong argument and for subtle casuistry, enough to satisfy the cravings of the most contentious or the most metaphysically inclined. A council of Byzantine theologians would have been content with the opportunity offered for the exercise of their special talents in the art of fine-spun exegesis.

Of these treaties the one destined to enjoy the greatest celebrity was that which concerned Italy, the Pact of London, made in consideration of her participation in the war. Generally called "secret," it was secret only in a Pickwickian sense.

Its terms were known almost at once and with substantial accuracy to the Jugo-Slavs, the people most immediately affected. It, and the other secret treaties, were, according to the testimony of Ambassador Page, made known to President Wilson by Mr. Balfour in the early summer of 1917. "This is the sort of thing you have to do when you are engaged in a war," said Mr. Balfour as he told the President of the territorial arrangements with Italy. It was later said that the President only "officially" heard of these secret treaties at the Conference of Paris. The distinction seems, to the lay mind, one without a difference.

But, without venturing further into the mazes of this particular labyrinth, and fixing our attention closely upon the obvious realities of the situation confronting the assembled diplomats of Paris, we must recognize at once that one of their most carking cares arose out of this problem of Italy's future frontiers. The problem was rendered all the more perplexing by the demand of Italy for Fiume, a place not covered by the Pact of London, and which the Jugo-Slavs considered should by all rights be assigned to them as their natural and only possible good port. The opposing nationalistic aspirations of Italy and Jugo-Slavia clashed along the eastern Adriatic and an adjustment between them was only reached after vast vexation of spirit, pretty generally distributed among all the parties to the controversy. This Italo-Jugoslav conflict was acute from the moment it first began to darken the deliberations of the Conference of Paris and remained acute and unsettled for many months after that Conference had adjourned. Its history has been already given in the chapter on the rise of Jugo-Slavia and need not be repeated here. Suffice it to say here that that history was characterized by repeated crises, many surprises, astonishing vicissitudes. England and France, having signed the Pact of London, were ready to carry out its provisions but were willing, and even anxious, to solve the problem in any practical way that could win the consent of their ally, Italy. But the Italian claims found a pronounced opponent in President Wilson who considered that they conflicted flatly with his principles, which had been accepted as the basis of the armistice. Point Nine of the famous Fourteen had stated that the peace should effect a rectification of the frontiers of Italy "along clearly recognized lines of nationality," and certainly the Pact of London violated that principle by providing for the annexation to Italy of several hundreds of thousands of Jugo-Slavs. While this vexatious dis-

cussion raged, the English and American newspapers generally asserted that Italy had spoiled her case by accepting the Fourteen Points. But this, as a matter of fact, she had never done. Just as England had refused to recognize as binding that "point" which asserted the freedom of the seas, "alike in peace and in war," and just as Point Ten had proclaimed the continuance of the existence of Austria-Hungary as desirable, a point which the President himself had since dropped, so in the discussion of the acceptance of the Fourteen Points as the basis of the armistice, Italy had made a reservation, Orlando having formally declared that he must make such a reservation to Point Nine as it was "liable to interpretations which Italy could not accept." As this reservation was as important for Italy as England's was for England, as presumably one reservation does not differ from another in glory, or in moral force, this attitude of the Italian Government should, in justice to Italy, have been given a publicity which it has, as a matter of fact, never received, perhaps owing to the negligence of the Italian Government itself, in not advertising it.

The discussion concerning Italy's Adriatic frontiers disturbed the Conference mightily and convulsed the public press. Repeated were the attempts made to draw a line that should suit Italy and the President, attempts as vain as those made by ingenious or ambitious minds to square the circle. All were blocked by the President's firm stand. The heat generated by this controversy threatened at one time to consume the work of the Conference. It was raised to the point of incandescence when President Wilson appealed directly to the Italian people, over the head of their Government, to accept his solution of the problem. The result of this unprecedented violation of universally recognized and correct international usage was exactly what might have been expected. It infuriated the Italians and jeopardized the work of the Conference. It is not difficult to imagine the national ebullition that would have occurred in America had the head of any foreign state assumed to bring pressure upon the President and the Congress by asking the American people to support him, not them.

The dangerous contention continued and was intensified. New propositions were made from one side or another, variants of each other. It came to be recognized that the Adriatic problem could not be solved as long as Mr. Wilson was in the White House, or rather as long as he was in real power. The boundary of Italy and Jugo-Slavia was not drawn by the Conference of

Paris but was ultimately settled, as already explained above,¹ by direct negotiation between the two countries concerned, and was incorporated in the Treaty of Rapallo of November 12, 1920.

By the final settlement of this troublesome Adriatic problem, Italy acquired most of Istria and a strip of territory connecting it with Fiume, but not Fiume itself, which was recognized as a fully independent state, a state consisting of about eight square miles of territory and a population of about fifty thousand. Italy renounced most of Dalmatia assigned to her by the Pact of London, with the particular exception of the town of Zara, which was made a free city under Italian sovereignty. By the Treaty of Rapallo, which entered into force February 2, 1921, Italy acquired about 3300 square miles of territory and about 910,000 inhabitants.

By the Treaty of Saint-Germain with Austria, previously concluded, Italy acquired all of the Tyrol south of the Brenner Pass, with a population of about 650,000. Her total acquisitions in Europe thus amounted to over 7,300 square miles of territory and somewhat less than 1,600,000 inhabitants.

Italy's new European boundaries were not drawn "along clearly recognized lines of nationality." Both in the north and in the northeast the boundaries clearly passed beyond those lines. In that part of the Tyrol which was henceforth to be included in the Italian kingdom were about 250,000 German-speaking peoples, all of whose sympathies were with Austria and who resented this transfer to an alien people. In the new Adriatic possessions were half a million or more Slavs, whose manifest inclinations were toward association with the new Jugo-Slav state. Thus in the completion of the work of national unification begun in 1859 by Cavour, in the redeeming of their unredeemed brothers the Italians now created new irredentisms, and annexed sources of disaffection, likely to fester and to plague the future of the kingdom. The situation was now reversed and instead of hundreds of thousands of Italians subject to Austrian control, there were now hundreds of thousands of the former subjects of Austria, resentful of their new status as compulsory subjects of the House of Savoy. The situation was not one conducive to the permanent peace of Europe. It should, however, be said that the number of the new "unredeemed" was somewhat smaller than that of the old. Numerically there was a certain gain.

In still another direction the Italians entertained aspirations

¹ Chap. XLII.

which they were, in the end, unable to realize. They wished to establish their control and influence in Albania, a country about the size of Vermont and lying opposite the heel of the Italian peninsula. Thus guarding the eastern shores of the entrance to the Adriatic sea, as well as the western, they might hope to make that sea an Italian lake. The situation seemed for a while favorable to such an enterprise. The newest of states, Albania, created in 1913, had disappeared at the first touch of the war of 1914 and was a derelict upon the waters. The war aroused the covetousness of several of Albania's neighbors, eager to seize or to divide the prize. The Austrian armies over-ran a large part of Albania and the Serbs and Greeks and Italians either sent troops into certain regions or staked out claims which only victory could transform into anything real and substantial. In June, 1917, Italy proclaimed the independence of Albania under Italian protection, and when the Austrian troops retreated, in the fall of the following year, the greater part of the country was occupied by Italian troops, while Serbian troops and an Inter-Allied contingent held certain sections.

Meanwhile the Albanians themselves were showing a tendency to take a hand in shaping their future destinies. Permitted by the Italians to form a new national provisional government within the area of their occupation, they were preparing the way for the re-establishment of Albanian independence. Albania's case was presented by an Albanian delegation at the Conference of Paris in 1919. The general tangle over the Adriatic question prevented the Conference from reaching any definite conclusion concerning Albania. President Wilson forbade the partitioning of the country. The Italians, it was asserted, were hoping for a mandate over this very mountainous and tumultuous territory. It was quite evident that they intended to stay. Italian officials gave offence to native sentiment by a lack of tact and sympathy, and the agreements by which Italy was to hand over parts of Albania to Greece and Jugo-Slavia naturally aroused great dissatisfaction.

The situation soon developed into one favorable to the display by the Albanians of one of their special talents. Past-masters in the art of guerilla warfare, their bands of irregulars attacked the Italian troops, which had been reduced to a dangerous minimum and which were further weakened by malaria. They pressed the Italians hard, finally virtually shutting them up in Valona and that city was itself attacked in June, 1920. While the attack was repelled, the Italians were in no mood for further

wars and the veteran politician Giolitti, who had just become prime minister, decided to end this unpromising enterprise. The result was an agreement whereby Albanian independence was completely recognized and the Italian troops were withdrawn. In September 1920 the evacuation occurred. Even Valona was abandoned, the Italians retaining only the island of Saseno which is supposed to dominate that harbor, the possession of which had recently seemed so important to multitudes of Italians.

Thus ended Italy's Albanian adventure. That youthful and precarious state, which had in seven years known such ups and downs and which had been seriously threatened with extinction, had managed to survive the tumult of the times and the ills of infancy, and was evidently destined to a modest place in the rather promiscuous and poorly assorted, as well as quite contentious, family of nations. No one knows how large its population is but it is estimated at over eight hundred thousand. Its government consists of a Diet, a ministry, and a Council of Regents composed of four members, two Moslems, one Roman Catholic and one Greek Orthodox, for this small country has three religions, sturdily supported by their adherents. It is difficult to classify this state, as, although it has Regents, it has, as yet, no king nor prince. Albania was formally admitted, in January 1921, to full membership in the League of Nations, Italy, Jugo-Slavia, and Greece, which so recently had planned her dismemberment, going on record as in favor of her admission. In 1922 an international commission was engaged in drawing the boundaries of the new state, not without difficulty and considerable popular perturbation.

Italian aspirations for territorial expansion were not limited to Europe, to the Tyrol and the eastern Adriatic, but extended beyond, to Africa and Asia. Only to a small degree, however, were her expectations destined to be realized. She had been promised by England and France that if those powers gained African territory as a result of the war, she, too, should receive additions in that continent. But there was delay in carrying out the promise. The colony of Libya or Tripoli was enlarged by small concessions by France and by considerable ones by England, and Italy was also given by England a part of British Somaliland along the Gulf of Aden. These additions to her colonial possessions were far from being commensurate with her desires.

Italy was destined to ultimate disappointment in another quarter. She was anxious to secure a foothold in Asia Minor,

opposite the islands of the Dodecanese, which she had won in her recent war with Turkey (1912), and in the various proposed divisions of Turkish territory, drawn up during the Great War by the Allied Powers, Southwestern Anatolia was to be her sphere of influence. But all these arrangements, such as the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916 and the Sèvres Treaty of 1920, rested on too many contingencies and were destined, with the rise and success of the Turkish nationalist movement under Kemal Pasha, to go a-glimmering. The territorial charter of the new Turkey was not to be determined by those transient and ephemeral compacts but by the Treaty of Lausanne, which the Powers succeeded in making during the course of the year 1923.

The total impression left upon the Italian mind by these post-war territorial adjustments, which we have thus passed in review, was one of disappointment. The Italians had the feeling that they had come out of the little end of the horn, that they had been made to play third fiddle to their colleagues, France and England, which, they thought, had not supported their claims as they should have done. This feeling, though only partially justified, was, nevertheless, important in that it influenced the trend of public opinion and of policy. There was, during the years immediately following the war, a distinct cooling of sentiment toward France and England and a certain revival of sentiment favorable to Germany, the ally of thirty years. The exaggerations and contradictions and devious manoeuvres of many of their own politicians during this period were ignored or glossed over by Italian public opinion, little considerate of the general interests of Europe and too inclined to nourish grievances,—in large measure imaginary. But a sense of grievance, however ill-founded, may be a factor in history as the annals of contemporary Italy were soon to show quite clearly.

During this period when the international position of Italy was being worked out in a way only partially satisfactory to the Italians, events of grave importance were occurring in Italy itself. Foreign policy and domestic policy can never be entirely separated and they react inevitably upon each other. For reasons of convenience we have thus far considered the former. It is necessary now to examine the latter. Italy has since 1918 gone through a severe and dangerous crisis in which the existence of the state itself and of the national institutions has been at stake. Revolutionary parties, seeing in the necessarily hard conditions and inevitable distress of the time a favorable oppor-

tunity for pushing their propaganda, became intensely active. A period of exceptional internal agitation followed upon the heels of the foreign war, threatening the political and social dissolution of the country.

Italy suffered cruelly from the increase in the cost of living which was everywhere the most obvious and most unavoidable legacy of the war. In none of the great countries of Europe did retail prices rise as high during the war. Taking the number 100 as the price unit, what cost 100 in 1914, cost 248 in January 1918, and 399 in January 1919, while on the last mentioned date the price current in Paris was 248. There was a serious shortage in such essentials as coal, wheat, meat, sugar. The causes of this situation were the same in Italy as in other countries but the results were more accentuated. Government measures, intended to meet the situation, were inadequate and ineffective. By selling bread below cost, the government built up a huge deficit which only increased the derangement of the national budget created by the war. By granting subsidies to certain classes, idleness was encouraged. By limiting prices, goods were driven from the market, only to reappear, in time, higher than ever. "The working classes," says a recent Italian writer, "were enjoying very high wages, and squandering their earnings, but were discontented because prices had risen, largely in consequence of the rise in wages. War profiteers, on the other hand, were seen indulging in an orgy of extravagance and vulgar display. It was only the people with fixed incomes who were really hard hit by the rise of prices and of taxation, but everybody alike grumbled and was dissatisfied. The extreme Socialist leaders exploited this situation for their own purposes, and encouraged the working-classes in the belief that they had been made to fight in the war for the benefit of the capitalists, while it was now their right to obtain an ever-increasing share in the nation's wealth, with no corresponding obligation to work and produce. The example of Russia was made the most of, and by depicting the condition of that unhappy country as an earthly paradise, they persuaded large masses of people that if a similar régime were introduced into Italy, everyone would be happy."¹

The prevalent discontent began to express itself shortly after the armistice, in a series of strikes in this trade and in that, and in every section of the country. Public officials, such as railway and post-office employees, as well as the workers in private in-

¹ Luigi Villari, in *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, XXXI, 629.

dustries, struck or threatened to strike, and were generally awarded higher wages, which meant a further increase in the prices of commodities, an increase all the greater because accompanied by a general disinclination to work and a consequent reduction of output at a time when more and not fewer goods were demanded because of the depletion or exhaustion of supplies by the operation of the war. These strikes were attended by more or less violence, rioting, pillaging of shops. The extreme Socialists, anxious to bring about a revolution of the Russian type, helped the disorderly work along to the best of their ability, aided in this by the apathy of government officials who did nothing to prevent or suppress the outbreaks, either because intimidated by the apparent strength of the movement or because half-sympathizing with it. The policy of Nitti, who had become prime minister in June 1919, after the overthrow of Orlando, was characterized by extreme weakness, innumerable acts of violence by Socialists and Communists passing unproved and unpunished. Charged by the nature of his office with the enforcement of law and order, Nitti merely looked on, while turbulence and crime enjoyed a practical immunity.

As the government was either unable or disinclined to discharge the primal duties of all governments, the preservation of order and the suppression of lawless factions bent upon discrediting or overthrowing existing institutions, certain elements of the population began to take it upon themselves to fight the forces of disorder and revolution with whatever weapons were at hand. These were principally ex-soldiers, young men of great energy and coming from all classes of society, men who had saved the country in war and were now resolved to save it in peace. Intensely nationalistic in feeling these men indignantly rejected the disintegrating internationalism of the Socialists, their constant depreciation of the national aims, their incessant disparagement of Italy's victories in the war, their criticism and even defamation of those who had won it, their offensive exaltation of individuals who had played a scurvy part in the dark and desperate days through which the country had recently passed, lukewarm adherents, sly purveyors of pessimism, even rank deserters from the army. This Association of Combatants, joined by committees of citizens resolved to react with whatever vigor they might against the corrupting and corrosive influences about them, was the nucleus of a movement, that of the Fascisti, which was destined to a great expansion and ultimately to a most emphatic triumph.

But it was at first quite feeble, merely a beginning, merely a rallying point for those for whom patriotism was a real and precious thing, and who wished to maintain order and to preserve the national ideals and the national institutions. For the time being, however, adherents of this group were few in number and poorly organized.

In the first parliamentary elections held after the armistice (November, 1919), the Combatants, as they were called at this time, gained only thirty seats. The most numerous party returned was the Socialist with 156 seats; the next largest the Popular or Catholic party with 101 seats. The Socialists had already adopted a revolutionary "maximalist" programme, had adhered to the Moscow Third International, having swallowed the Moscow programme whole, and aimed at the abolition of capitalism and the setting up of a Socialist republic of the Russian kind. The Catholics, while in general opposed to the Socialists, nevertheless contained an extreme wing whose principles and methods differed little from theirs. These Catholic extremists were particularly active among the peasants, and, though condemned by the bishops and even by the Vatican, they fanned the popular unrest. The remaining members of the new Chamber, most of them believers in the established constitutional institutions and practices of the country, many of them Nationalists, were nevertheless divided into several parties and could therefore offer but an ineffective opposition to the more radical and aggressive elements.

Such was the parliament, the most numerous party frankly revolutionary, the next most numerous, the Popular party, largely conservative, partly radical, bent upon following a policy of its own instead of co-operating closely with the others, the rest divided and subdivided. Ministries holding power from such a body would probably be weak ministries, resting upon a precarious foundation, little inclined to a clear or vigorous policy. And weak, indeed, they proved to be.

The situation, then, favored the restless and subversive elements in the state and they exploited it to the full. On the opening of Parliament, the King was enthusiastically acclaimed by the majority, but the Socialists, shouting "Long live Socialism," ostentatiously left the Chamber. In return for this gratuitous insult to a popular monarch, who had played a very honorable part in the war and who was the embodiment of patriotic sentiment, popular demonstrations of loyalty occurred and several of the Socialist members were pounced upon and beaten. On the

other hand, the Socialist successes in the recent elections encouraged radical labor leaders and discontented workingmen to renewed activity. The relaxation of discipline among government employees in the railway and postal services proceeded apace. Fresh strikes broke out among these classes, rendered partially unsuccessful by volunteers who offered to do the work so essential to the life of the nation, but partially successful in that Nitti, the prime minister, came forward with concessions. Other strikes and disorders followed, strikes in cotton mills, in the metal industries, and again on certain of the railways.

The weak ministry of Nitti was forced out in May 1920 owing to general dissatisfaction with its internal policy or mockery of a policy, and Giolitti came in. Giolitti's reappearance upon the scene was not reassuring. An old and battered parliamentary hand, Giolitti had bitterly opposed Italy's entrance into the war and was widely considered a Germanophile. His access to power did not promise that re-invigoration of the national consciousness, that pride in the victory, that determination that those who had achieved it should receive the whole-hearted and official approbation of the country, that position of honor and esteem to which their deeds entitled them, which, in the opinion of the Fascisti, were the things most necessary for the welfare and the moral health of Italy, the attainment of which, they considered, justified their movement.

But before things were to get better for Italy they were to get worse. Under the Giolitti ministry, the internal troubles of the country were not only continued but entered upon a more aggravated phase. The street railway employees of Rome struck and were aided by the electricians, who cut the electric supply, leaving the town in darkness, and sympathetic strikes were ordered in most of the towns of Italy. Returning to work after a while they endeavored to carry out a demonstration with red flags, but were attacked by the people who took occasion to wreck the offices of the leading Socialist newspapers and to beat up several Socialist deputies. In the metal trades workmen seized a number of factories and tried to compel the owners and managers to conduct them for the sole advantage of the laborers. The movement spread to the textile and chemical industries. "Red Guards" were organized, revolutionary tribunals set up, and outsiders trying to enter the factories were shot at. These essays in Communism passed unrebuked and unmolested by the authorities. The workingmen, finding it difficult to run the factories without the managers who knew the business, to get raw

materials and to market finished goods, ended by indulging to excess in the pleasures of the bowl and the factories became the scenes of some exceptionally convivial spectacles. As the conflict continued it became, as such conflicts almost always do, more bitter and more dangerous. In some cases the leaders of the workmen broke open the safes and filched the contents. Clashes between individuals occurred and there were some murders in which the "red" guards justified their name and color. Giolitti, the prime minister, who had, without any sign of displeasure, allowed the carnival of disorder to drag along unconscionably, at last decided that something must be done and summoned owners and workmen to meet him at Turin. An agreement was finally worked out which was accepted by the owners only under pressure from the government. The workmen finally evacuated the factories in which they had camped for several weeks, leaving them in a state of indescribable filth. After the factories had been cleaned up, work was resumed but Italian industry had not gained much from this costly and disgraceful experiment.

Meanwhile agrarian disorder had broken out in various parts of Italy, large estates had been seized by the peasantry, a few landlords had been murdered, more had been ruined. This movement had the support of the extreme wing of the Popular or Catholic party. While seriously disorganizing, and accompanied by more or less violence, it did not go as far as the industrial disturbance just described.

The public was becoming tired of these continued disorders and of the high-handed acts of an organized minority, and began to organize for self-defence. They rallied in increasing numbers to the Fascisti; the bourgeoisie, anxious to preserve their rights and their property, and many of the more solid workingmen and peasants and small landed proprietors joining the ex-officers and soldiers who had founded the Association of Combatants, already alluded to. The Socialists broke up into factions and a good number of the more moderate, disgusted by the actions of the extremists and the Communists, also joined the Fascisti. The latter, resolved to fight fire with fire, and to exact a tooth for a tooth, redoubled their activity. Groups of Fascisti organized in almost every town throughout the country and found plenty to do. In Bologna a veritable "red terror" existed, administered by a band of extremists. Two moderate members of the city council having been shot by hired assassins in the city hall, the public arose in anger and shook down the whole local Bol-

shevist system. The Fascisti burned the Labor Exchange, which was the headquarters of the Communists. In many of the communes of Italy the Socialists or Communists had secured control of the municipal government and used their petty force tyrannically. Robbery, extortion, blackmail became rife. To root out these nests of local despotism became one of the chief undertakings of the Fascisti, who used methods which, as their leaders admitted, were far from being evangelical. Frequent were the clashes between them and the Communists, and many an affray resulted in the loss of human lives. The Italy of 1920, with its passionate municipal and popular struggle, reminded one a little of the Italy of the Age of Despots, when politics possessed many of the characteristics of war.

Against this murky background of internecine dissension, which threatened the very existence of that nation which Cavour and Garibaldi and Mazzini had created, the smooth and crafty Giolitti, past-master in all the tricks of parliamentary manipulation and intrigue, but essentially lacking faith and courage, was an unimpressive figure from whom nothing fresh and vital was to be expected. Too old to change either ideas or methods, too blasé and cynical, Giolitti was incapable of any bold and creative policy, of any action that should seize the imagination of the people or fire their energies. Little adjustments of questions pending with foreign nations, timid and superficial measures of internal policy designed to tide the ministry along from day to day, this was all that could be expected, and all that was forthcoming. Yet the country was seething with emotion, was craving leadership, was anxious to have someone give it a dominant note, a watchword that should lift it out of the slough of dissatisfaction into which it had fallen, dissatisfaction with itself and with the rest of the world. And neither Giolitti, nor Nitti, who wanted Giolitti's place, could express that vigorous feeling of nationalism, of pride in the army and in the achievements of the war, which were in the air, their own records in the war and in the subsequent discussions of the peace having been so dubious, so little edifying.

Giolitti fell from power in June 1921, and was succeeded by the weak ministry of Bonomi, which, in turn, was succeeded, in February 1922, by the still weaker one of Facta. Whatever prestige parliament had ever possessed was being rapidly frittered away and was now well-nigh gone. Meanwhile Fascisti and Communists were fighting each other furiously. There was a general recrudescence of violence. The former were growing

rapidly in numbers and in power. Street fighting occurred in Rome, and in Florence toward the end of May 65,000 Fascisti assembled, cut off all communication with the outside world, and bombed or burned the surrounding villages, forcing their Socialist or Communist mayors to resign. The country seemed to be on the brink of a general civil war.

Toward the end of October 1922 events took a sudden and most dramatic turn. The Facta Ministry was in the last stage of decomposition. Its days were numbered. Behind the scenes the politicians were preparing the return to power of the old parliamentary prestidigitator, Giolitti. In other words, the people of Italy, restless, dissatisfied, anxious for a leadership which would really lead, tired of governments that did not dare to govern, eager for the adoption and execution of fresh and vigorous policies of a constructive nature, adapted to the new situation created by the war, were to be treated merely to a new chapter of the old and discredited game of political manipulation, a game which, in the opinion of the public, had become utterly stale, flat and unprofitable. It was generally felt that the needs of Italy called for something more than simply a new distribution of cabinet portfolios among parliamentary and party hacks.

This fervid, impatient national mood found a spokesman in that Fascist movement which we have seen battling its way up by rough and ready methods during the years of deceptive and imaginary peace which had followed the Conference of Paris. The word *Facismo*, the Italian name for this movement, was itself a programme. It was derived from the Latin *fascēs*, that bundle of twigs which Roman lictors carried round the axe, and which served as a symbol of authority, as an instrument of punishment, and as a reminder of the need of combined effort. In ancient Rome lesser criminals were whipped with twigs, greater criminals were beheaded with an axe. The Fascist movement had begun, as we have seen, among the ex-veterans of the war, young men who had fought with honor and who did not propose to see the victories they had won sacrificed and turned to ashes to please the pacifists, the "defeatists" of the war period, and the Communists who drew their intellectual sustenance from Soviet Moscow rather than from the native sources of Italian history, Italian greatness, Italian thought and Italian interests. Nationalists to the core, these men entertained a deep and abiding hatred of that international revolutionary Socialism, Marxist and German in origin, with its numerous Jewish affinities and its Muscovite sympathies, which seemed to them the deadly enemy

of the Italian people, bent upon the destruction of the national genius. Patriotism was the life-breath of the Fascisti, death to Communism their watchword. At first but a small group in 1919, they had steadily grown in strength, and latterly all kinds of people had joined their ranks in great numbers, ex-officers, ex-soldiers, university professors and students, the bourgeoisie, many of the working classes, many of the peasants, some even of the moderate Socialists. Standing for order, standing for justice to the men who had fought in the war, standing for the preservation of the national inheritance, the Fascisti developed a compact and coherent military organization, well equipped, well disciplined, well led. This was the army of the "Black Shirts," the dullness of whose costume was relieved by the medals which these young men had honorably won in the Great War. It was reputed to consist of several hundred thousand members, and was subject to the orders of a governing directory; at whose head stood a man of thirty-seven, immensely popular, a natural leader of men, Benito Mussolini. Round about this army were multitudes of civilian sympathizers, enthusiastic supporters who believed that it alone could pull Italy out of the slough of despond into which its numerous factions and its timid politicians had plunged it.

Thus far the Fascisti had been a lawless body or a body above the law, bent upon smashing the terrorism of Communists by a counter-terrorism. If they acted in a lawless way, it was, they said, because the law in Italy had broken down, its official representatives having miserably and shamefully run away from their imperative duties. With their rapid growth in numbers had grown their self-confidence and their ambition.

In October 1922 occurred a brief, dramatic, decisive struggle between the Black Shirts and the constituted authorities for the control of the state. While the politicians in Rome were discussing among themselves as to who the new prime minister, the successor of Facta, should be, the Fascisti were holding a congress in Naples, attended by perhaps forty thousand members and dominated by a wild enthusiasm for Mussolini. Mussolini had already on October 5 declared in a speech at Milan: "In Italy there exist two governments — a fictitious one, run by Facta, and a real one, run by the Fascisti. The first of these must give way to the second." Now at Naples, in the midst of the ministerial crisis in Rome, he said to the assembled Fascisti: "I take a solemn oath that either the Government of the country must be given peacefully to the Fascisti, or we will take

it by force." He called together the military leaders of his organization and ordered them to hold their forces ready to march, if necessary, upon Rome.

What would the Government in Rome say to such a bold defiance, such an insolent and peremptory challenge? Would it oppose force by force, and if it should, what would be the result? Might it not be the overthrow of the monarchy, the fall of another throne in Europe, exile for the House of Savoy? Victor Emmanuel III, head of that House, rejecting the advice given him by his immediate entourage to fight the issue through, showed typical Italian suppleness. He invited Mussolini to come to Rome and form his own ministry. He even sent his private motor car to meet him and bring him to the city. The progress of the royal automobile was impeded because the roads were crowded with Fascisti soldiers marching to Rome and insisting upon repeatedly acclaiming their leader. But Mussolini finally entered the Eternal City on October 30, wearing a soiled black shirt, much the worse for the trip in the open car. He went directly to the Quirinal and was ushered into the King's presence. The frenzied crowd outside cheered loud and long, interrupting the historic colloquy by calls for the men engaged in it. The King came out on the balcony three times and was received with thunderous applause. After the interview, Mussolini drove to his hotel and from a window addressed the thousands of admirers below. "To-day," said he, "Italy has not only a Ministry but a Government, a strong Government, such as she has needed for many years past, but never obtained."

Thus the leader of the Fascist insurrection, which had been in progress for three years, had become the President of the Council of Ministers, the real head of the state. Here was a veritable *coup d'état*, a seizure of power by force, or rather by the threat of force, which proved sufficient. The incident and its meaning, its essential violence and illegality, were partially veiled, for those who do not like to look upon the bald reality, by the action of the King in inviting the idol of Facismo to become prime minister. But Mussolini became prime minister not by the normal operation of parliamentary processes, not by the grace of the Chamber of Deputies, but by the grace of an organization outside parliament, ratified by a strong public opinion.

In a proclamation issued to the people on the morrow of these events, Mussolini called on the nation "to adapt itself to the hard necessities of the moment," and declared that "the Government understands how to govern and will govern. All its

energies will be directed to the maintenance of internal peace and increasing Italy's prestige abroad." "Only by work, discipline and concord," concluded this proclamation, "will the fatherland emerge from the present crisis to tread the path of prosperity and greatness."

What kind of a man was this who had thus been raised to the headship of the state by the momentum of a movement of which he was the driving force, a movement designed primarily to prevent a social revolution in Italy, to reawaken and intensify the patriotic spirit of the country, and to regenerate the national life? The question could be answered only partially and tentatively. The full revelation of Mussolini's personality could only come with time. That he was a born leader of men, that he knew the secret of appealing to the masses, that he was a person capable of prompt decision and of swift action, that he was an animating and magnetic figure, that he possessed in high degree the sense of organization and discipline, had been sufficiently demonstrated. But whether he possessed the qualities of the statesman, the knowledge, the judgment, the tact, the perseverance and the circumspection required for success in the field of politics, national and international, whether to his undoubted gifts as an agitator were added constructive ability and breadth of view, no one could tell. Mussolini's rise to power aroused wide-spread curiosity and his courage and audacity suggested promising possibilities. What was definitely known of him was this, that he was the child of working-class parents, his father having been a village smith in a little town in Romagna, that before the war he had been a convinced Socialist and an editor of the leading Socialist newspaper, the *Avanti*, that he had picked up whatever education he could but that it had been limited and unsystematic, that he had passed some time in Switzerland, living the hard life of an *émigré* and a militant Socialist, not unacquainted with the police, with imprisonment and with expulsion, that, when the Great War had come, he had left his party and repudiated its cosmopolitan and pacifist ideas, that he had advocated Italy's entrance into the war, that he had fought with gallantry and had been decorated for his exploits, that he had been severely wounded, and, incapacitated for the firing line, had become editor of a strongly nationalist newspaper, nationalism now dominating his every thought and action, that he had organized the Fascisti and had led them, through manifold dangers and vicissitudes, to a stunning triumph, that he had seized the imagination of a people whose

imagination had always been easily set aflame, and that the thrill of this new and dashing personality had not been diminished by the report that he had been known to drive his automobile at the rate of a hundred kilometers an hour through the streets of Milan, an exploit not calculated to displease a sporting age.

Evidently a man of action! Also a fighter accustomed to fight openly and above the board. But he was now prime minister of a great European state, a nation of nearly forty million people, and he had had no preparation, properly speaking, for a political career. Would he prove equal to the new and most exacting situation?

At least he did not lack self-confidence nor was he without certain definite ideas. One of these was that it was the business of the prime minister really to rule and not to be the timorous lackey of politicians and parties. His earliest acts in his novel position were indicative of his conceptions of the statesman's rôle. They strongly suggested, though perhaps they did not absolutely prove, that in his opinion the statesman must be a dictator. He organized a ministry taken from several parties but from which Socialists and Communists were conspicuously absent. Its most prominent member was General Armando Diaz, Italy's most outstanding military figure, hero of the battle of Vittoria Veneto, an event which Italians celebrate as their Allies celebrate the signing of the armistice. On appearing with his cabinet before the parliament, Mussolini treated the latter with cool and rare contempt: "I am to-day performing in this hall what is an act of purely formal deference toward you and for which I do not ask your thanks. Italy has given herself a Government outside, above, and against any designation by Parliament. Now I affirm that revolution has its rights and I add that I am here in order to defend and make the most of the Black Shirts' revolution by inserting it intimately as a force tending towards development, progress and equilibrium in the history of the nation." He added that he might have bivouacked his troops in the Chamber itself, that he might have turned Parliament out of doors, but that "at least for the present" he did not care to do so.

Evidently the new premier entertained scant respect for parliamentary institutions. They might perhaps be permitted to continue to function formally if they would frankly recognize that the real authority in the state lay elsewhere, and that they did not exist for the purpose of controlling or blocking the execu-

tive. Such was the hint which the orator conveyed to the Chamber with unmistakable clarity. The Chamber promptly took the hint, applauded the master who had cracked the whip, and proceeded to show all necessary docility. When, a few days later, Mussolini demanded that he be given virtually dictatorial powers until January 1, 1924, Parliament quickly passed the necessary measures, thus recognizing its own humiliation and its impotence — at least for the time being.

We will take leave of the new lord and master at this point. What account he would give of himself in the actual exercise of power, no one could foretell. That he embodied the will and the hope of the majority of the people can hardly be gainsaid. But the possession of power is a singularly perilous test for a tribune of the people who owes his position to a revolution, even though that revolution be, on the whole, a pacific one. It is one thing to arouse the masses and lead them to the conquest of power. It is another to regenerate the life of a nation, to balance a sadly disordered budget, to frame and carry through specific reforms, to work that most complicated of all machines, a modern government. Even in normal times the task is a crushing one, — and the times were anything but normal. Many a reformer looming large while in opposition has shrunk notably in stature when the moment has come to pass from the rôle of criticism to that of creation. But there can be no doubt that the accession to power of this young and vigorous chieftain was greeted with the greatest optimism, and the dismal croakings of the pessimists were swallowed up in the general rejoicing.

CHAPTER LII

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

THE first section of the Treaty of Versailles contains in twenty-six articles the constitution of a new instrument of international activity, the League of Nations. The same articles were incorporated textually in the other treaties subsequently concluded with Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria. The ratification of any or all of those treaties involved, therefore, recognition of the Covenant. We have seen that that country, the United States, whose representative at the Conference of Paris had been the most conspicuous factor in the creation of the League, refused to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, largely because of the presence in it of the Covenant.

The League came into existence automatically on the day when the required number of states exchanged their ratifications of the Treaty of Versailles, that is, on January 10, 1920. Its constitution has already been set forth. Let us now examine briefly its operation during the first three years of its history.

It will be remembered that the Covenant provided for three chief organs, a Council, an Assembly, and a Secretariat. The first and third began to function almost immediately; the second entered upon the scene several months later, in November 1920. The first meeting of the Council was held in Paris on January 16, the second in London on February 11, the third in Paris on March 13, the fourth in Paris on April 9, the fifth in Rome on May 14, the sixth in London on June 14. Thus during the first six months of its existence the Council had convened six times and in whatever place was considered most convenient. A small and permanent body, it can be summoned at any time, whenever it may seem necessary or desirable, and a few days notice is sufficient to enable its members to get together. Meeting frequently or infrequently, according to the pressure of events, and sitting as briefly or as long as it may choose, it is, in this regard, a flexible organ of action, adapting itself easily to the requirements of a constantly changing situation. Up to June, 1923 the Council had held twenty-four meetings.

The Secretariat, organized at first in London and transferred to Geneva some months later, when the necessary measures for housing it had been completed, is the agent of the League in the preparation of the work of the Council and of the Assembly and for the execution of their orders. Its internal machinery, its boards and commissions, have been gradually set up as the need for them has appeared. It constitutes at present (1923) a technical staff of about three hundred persons, representing some twenty nationalities, using the two official languages, French and English. Many of its members are experts, or are supposed to be, in the various lines of investigation or control to which they are assigned. Like the Council, the Secretariat is a flexible instrument and may be enlarged or diminished or otherwise altered, as circumstances may require or suggest.

The Secretariat not only prepares the work and executes the decisions of the Council and the Assembly, but it places at the disposal of these two bodies, and this is likely to prove its most important service, as extensive, detailed, concrete information as can be brought together upon the topics and problems that one or the other may be considering. By keeping this body of information up to date and in accessible form, the Secretariat is able to furnish a mass of positive and sifted data upon which the Council and the Assembly may, if they care to, base their decisions. The League of Nations is primarily and essentially an organ engaged in diplomacy, not in legislation. It is a new piece of machinery added to the other devices and usages of diplomacy, which it was felt did not wholly suffice to carry on the international work of the present age. Diplomacy is like politics, an art and not a science. But there is every reason why diplomacy should have a scientific basis, should follow a scientific method, just as painting and sculpture and music are subject to the laws of science and may be permeated with its spirit. The League of Nations, through its Secretariat and its various standing commissions, would seem to be equipped to furnish this solid substructure to the diplomatic discussions and creations of an age which demands, with increasing insistence, the application of more substantial knowledge and of a keener and more objective critical spirit to the solution of its problems, in the international as well as in the domestic sphere, than have been hitherto bestowed upon them.

The other organ of the League of Nations is the Assembly. In the Council only a few nations are represented, while the

Assembly is composed of delegates from all the nations which are members of the League. There is state inequality in the one body, state equality in the other. The first Assembly was held in Geneva in November and December 1920, and was the first gathering of the nations of the world under a written constitution. One of its earliest decisions was that it should meet every year henceforth on the first Monday in September. This Assembly consisted of the representatives of forty-two states. It admitted six new states to membership in the League, among which were Albania and two ex-enemy states, Austria and Bulgaria. The second Assembly admitted three more, namely Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The third admitted another, Hungary. Thus at the close of 1922, the League consisted of fifty-two states. Those remaining, for one reason or another, outside were the United States, Germany, Russia, Turkey, Egypt, Ecuador, Mexico, and Ireland. It is interesting to observe that Switzerland, selected as the seat of the new international capital, consented to enter the League only with reservations safeguarding certain historic rights, namely those establishing and guaranteeing her neutrality in war, rights dating from 1815 and to which she clung tenaciously. The League accepted these conditions. Even then Switzerland voted in favor of membership in the League only by a narrow majority.

Since its inception in January 1920, the League of Nations has accomplished much useful and some important work. Although it can never be said with certainty that wars which did not actually break out would have broken out had not certain specific things been done, it can be asserted that the League of Nations has intervened efficaciously in certain international disputes of the kind which have frequently in the past led to war. One of these was the Aaland Islands dispute between Finland and Sweden. These Baltic islands were claimed by both, by Finland on the ground of undisputed possession for a hundred years, by Sweden on the ground that the inhabitants of the islands are Swedes in language, in sentiment, and in economic interests, all of which was true. The Aalanders had themselves voted by an overwhelming majority of 95 per cent. in favor of union with Sweden. They appealed to the right of self-determination. Finland asserted the right to preserve the integrity of her national territory.

It should be noted that it was not the parties concerned in the quarrel but a third power, Great Britain, which requested the mediation of the League, basing her request upon Article

11 of the Covenant which declares that any member of the League may bring before it any matter affecting international relations or likely to disturb the peace of the world, a very wide charter permitting all kinds of what the world has hitherto called "interference." An elaborate and able investigation of every aspect of the problem ensued under the auspices of the League. The result was a decision by the Council that the islands were to belong to Finland but that they were to be demilitarized and given the most extensive rights of self-government. Sweden accepted the decision, though under protest.

In the case of another dispute, that of Poland and Lithuania for the possession of Vilna, the intervention of the League, solicited by both the parties concerned, had less satisfactory results. After elaborate investigations and after exhausting all possible efforts at conciliation, the League was unable to secure a settlement owing to the strength of the passions involved on both sides. It had, however, probably succeeded in postponing hostilities, and there is a chance that hostilities temporarily averted may in the end be found to have been permanently avoided. It was not until April, 1923, that this problem was settled and then not by the League but by the Council of Ambassadors. It must be remembered that the League has no power to enforce a decision; whatever power it possesses is moral and intellectual, not physical.

In another quarter the mediation of the League achieved a distinct success, that is in the question of the division of Eastern Silesia between Germany and Poland. This extremely complicated and dangerous question has already been described.¹ Suffice it to say here that the Supreme Council, in which England and France were the leading members, had completely failed to find a solution, and in desperation appealed to the Council of the League. The Council quickly found one, which the Powers at once accepted. Thus a particularly threatening subject was removed from the field of immediate contention. In still other difficult problems the League has already played a helpful part, in that of the Albanian frontiers, and in that of the financial reconstruction of Austria.

But not only has the League of Nations played a part, and an important one, in clearing up some highly contentious international questions; it has also had to discharge certain delicate and complicated tasks imposed upon it by various clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, for the League was intentionally woven

¹ Chap. XL.

into every part of that document in the expectation that that procedure would compel the ratification of the treaty by the Senate of the United States. The expected result was not achieved, but those states that have ratified the Treaty of Versailles have necessarily recognized the League as the agent for the execution of many of its articles. Acting under these, the League has organized and administered the territory of the Saar Basin and will continue to control that entity until at least 1935; has organized the Free State of Danzig, placed under its protection; and has begun the surveillance of the manner in which the mandates to the former German colonies and the territories torn from Turkey are being executed by the powers to which they have been assigned.

The League of Nations has, by the investigations of various commissions, done much to throw light upon and to contribute to the solution of many economic, financial, commercial, social and humanitarian problems which have to do not primarily with international peace but with the general well-being of the world. A financial conference, called by the League, and held at Brussels in 1920, brought forth an amount of financial and economic data not available before, and a transportation conference, meeting under its auspices at Barcelona in 1921 and representing forty nations, drafted a series of conventions which, when ratified by the various parliaments, will do much to liberate and stimulate the movement of commerce. The League has considerably furthered the crusade which had long been going on against opium and other drugs; also that against the white slave traffic. Among the social and humanitarian activities of the League may be mentioned its interest in problems of international health, its despatch of an Epidemics Commission to Poland to fight a wave of typhus that might otherwise have spread over Europe and have threatened more distant sections of the world. The repatriation to their native lands of nearly half a million prisoners of war whom the armistice found destitute and helpless in Russia and Siberia and who were threatened with cold and hunger and death; the assistance rendered hundreds of thousands of Russians and Armenians who had fled in terror from their homes and were refugees upon the face of the earth, without resources, without work, — these conspicuous services to humanity stand to the credit of the League of Nations which by its machinery, ready to function when the need arises, is well adapted to confront emergencies without a regrettable loss of time.

We have described the primary organs of the League, namely

the Council, the Assembly and the Secretariat. Another organ, created in 1921, has been added to these and may prove of great importance, a Permanent International Court of Justice. The Council and the Assembly are political bodies and their functions are fundamentally political. The Court, however, is, by definition, a judicial body, representing the idea of law in international affairs. It is intended to be an impartial, permanent, judicial organ, capable of settling international disputes of a purely legal character without the intrusion of political considerations. It is not intended to suggest arrangements, adjustments, compromises, as a way of harmonizing the conflicts that may arise between states, as the Council and even the Assembly may do. It is intended to declare the law and to do nothing else.

The agitation for the creation of such an agency did not begin with the Conference of Paris. The subject had been earnestly discussed by the Second Hague Conference in 1907 and a certain solution had been reached at that time. The need of such a court had been clearly laid down by Elihu Root, Secretary of State under President Roosevelt, in his instructions to the American delegates at that Conference. The delegates were ordered to work for the creation of "a permanent tribunal composed of judges who are judicial officers and nothing else, who are paid adequate salaries, who have no other occupation, and who will devote their entire time to the trial and decision of international cases by judicial methods and under a sense of judicial responsibility."

The Hague Conference failed to create a court of that character, and the fundamental reason for its failure was that it was unable to solve the problem of how to select ten or twelve judges from fifty or more nations to the satisfaction of all. The big powers wished to be always represented upon the court and the little powers would not consent to so partial an arrangement. Were not all nations equal in law, whether big or little? The Hague Conference did establish a Court of Arbitration but this consisted, not of a definite body of judges meeting at stated times, but of a panel of some two hundred names from which any two states which might agree to arbitrate a pending difficulty might select a number of judges for that special purpose. As in no two cases would the judges chosen be likely to be the same, there might be no continuity of development in such an institution.

The discussion, therefore, continued and it resulted twelve years later in the insertion, in the Covenant of the League of

Nations, of Article 14, which charges the Council with the drawing up of a plan for a permanent court of international justice and with submitting it to the members of the League. Acting in accordance with this provision, the Council invited a number of prominent jurists, among whom was Mr. Root, to formulate a plan. This was later approved, with some changes, by the Council and the Assembly, and by the parliaments of the various members of the League. It was Mr. Root who suggested the method of selecting the judges which was satisfactory to both big and little states, the difficulty which the Second Hague Conference had been unable to surmount. The Council, representing state inequality by the permanent membership in it of the Great Powers, and the Assembly, representing the cherished principle of the equality of all states, were given an equal voice in the election of judges. The Council and the Assembly are to vote separately. Any candidate who has an absolute majority in both bodies is declared elected. Thus the Great Powers, probably controlling the Council, and the Little Powers, certainly controlling the Assembly, have a veto on each other.

In September 1921, eleven judges and four deputy judges were elected in this way and the Permanent International Court of Justice was instituted. Among the judges chosen was a citizen of the United States, Professor John Bassett Moore, although the United States had no part in the proceedings. The first regular session of the Court was opened on June 1, 1922, a preliminary session for the purpose of organization having been held in the preceding January. The seat of the Court is at the Hague.

It should be noted that the Permanent Court of International Justice as thus instituted does not supersede the Court of Arbitration created by the Hague Conference. The latter continues to exist. The new Court is merely an additional agency for the peaceful settlement of differences between states, an agency employing a different method and aiming at a different objective. The one "arbitrates" a difficulty; the other decides what is the law that applies to it.

The judges of the new Court are elected for nine years and may be re-elected. They receive salaries varying from \$6,000 to \$24,000, depending on the days of actual service. They may not exercise any political or administrative functions but there is nothing to prevent their practicing their usual professions in the intervals between the sessions of the Court, except that no judge may act as agent, counsel, or advocate in any case of

an international nature. The only one of the judges who is required to reside at the Hague is the President of the Court, who is elected by his colleagues. The expenses of the Court are borne by the League of Nations. The official languages of the Court are French and English but the Court may, at the request of the parties involved in any given case, authorize the use of another language.

"The jurisdiction of the Court," says Article 36 of the Statute creating it, "comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and all matters specially provided for in Treaties and Conventions in force." In other words, the Court does not possess compulsory jurisdiction over all disputes which may arise between the members of the League, but it is there merely to try those cases which the parties to them may agree, in the individual instance, to refer to it. Thus its activity may be limited or extensive according as the members of the League resort to it infrequently or frequently. They are not required to resort to it at all if they do not wish to.

There were those who desired to give the Court compulsory jurisdiction but they were unsuccessful in bringing this about. There was, however, added to the Statute of the Court an optional clause which any state may accept, thereby pledging itself to compulsory jurisdiction on all, or on a series of specially defined, disputes of a legal nature (Art. 36), with states which are also parties to the optional clause. About twenty states have accepted this clause but among them is to be found no one of the Great Powers.

Such is the new international tribunal. It is hoped that by its decisions it may be the means of defining and developing and certifying international law and of giving it an influence over the minds of men such as it has never had before, an influence severely shattered by the events of the last few years. But whether it will be able to play so important and difficult a rôle will depend upon whether two political bodies, the Council and the Assembly, choose men to sit upon the Court who are eminent and qualified jurists or whether their choice will be influenced by political considerations. The success of the Court will also depend, it goes without saying, upon the character of its decisions and upon the way in which those decisions are received, matters upon which we have little evidence as yet, concerning which prophecy would be entirely futile.

We have thus passed in review some of the activities and some of the achievements of the League of Nations during the first

three years of its existence. There are other phases of this brief history which deserve mention. The League is only one of the agencies used for the discharge of the international business of the contemporary world, nor is it, thus far, the most important. The old diplomatic machinery in use among the nations has remained intact and continues to function according to the old methods. Undoubtedly the greater part of the international business of the world will continue to be transacted through the ordinary diplomatic channels, as hitherto. Then again, more conspicuous thus far than the League, and more directly influential, has been the Supreme Council, that is the prime ministers of the Allied states, who have held a long series of conferences, really continuations of the Conference of Paris, and who have reached decisions concerning international questions of primary importance. Failing to reach them in certain matters, they have latterly manifested a tendency to refer such matters to the League of Nations, as if it were a handy-man ready to tackle problems which either the want of sufficient leisure or of sufficient harmony among themselves has prevented them from solving. But the Governments of Europe have shown that they intend to keep the control of the most important matters in their own hands, yielding the field to the League only when compelled to by dissensions among themselves.

The governments of the world are, therefore, using and are likely to continue to use various instruments for the accomplishment of their ends, namely the long-established, traditional system of ambassadors and ministers, also special conferences of the chief Allied powers for the enforcement or interpretation of the Treaty of Versailles, larger conferences, like that of Genoa in 1922, to which other countries such as Germany and Russia were invited, and, finally, the machinery of the League of Nations, whenever they feel inclined. The relation of the League to the governments should be clearly understood and always kept in mind. The center of authority in the League is not in the organs of the League itself, but is in the Governments, that is, speaking generally, in the cabinets of the countries composing the League. There is the supreme power, the real initiator of policy. It is the Governments that appoint the members of the Council and the members of the Assembly. The members of those bodies do not exercise an independent authority but are under instructions, or may be placed under instructions at any moment, from the appointing power. As they are appointed by the Governments they may be removed by them; in other words, they are fundamentally

agents of the executives of the different countries, just as are the members of the diplomatic services of those countries, or the special plenipotentiaries sent to individual conferences. It is not the parliaments, much less is it the voters, who determine directly the choice of the representatives at Geneva, or the character of the policies which they follow. The Governments may allow a certain freedom of action to their delegates, just as they may do to their diplomatic agents. But impulsion comes from above, not from within. Ultimate decision comes from London, Paris, Rome, Tokio and other capitals, not from the free and unrestrained impulses or reflections of the men gathered together upon the shores of Lake Geneva. If the national ministries care to keep their hands off and allow the subordinates really to make independent decisions, they may do so, just as they may, if such is their will, with conferences or congresses held outside the framework of the League. And not only may the national ministries exercise this direct influence upon the debates at Geneva, but many of the decisions of the Council and Assembly are only valid when ratified by the Governments, sometimes by the parliaments. In this latter case ultimate authority rests with the legislatures. The League of Nations has thus far shown none of the characteristics of a super-state. It is one of the instruments, and the newest, which the world possesses for international collaboration. Its decisions express the amount of harmony or of discord which its members are able or inclined to generate. They possess, generally speaking, the value of decisions reached by a conference of plenipotentiaries.

Bearing in mind the considerations just stated as to where the real power lies in this new institution created by the Treaty of Versailles, what are we to say of the relative power of the two organs of the League, the Council and the Assembly? This, that the experience of three years shows that the former is the more important body. What the experience of the future may show we will not attempt to forecast, remarking only that it may be very different. In our own history it has sometimes been the Senate, sometimes the House, that has exerted the greater influence, but up to the present it is the Council that has, on the whole, been the initiating body in the League of Nations, and the most fruitful in achievement. It is also the one that has developed the most *esprit de corps*, the most salient personality. A small body, and practically a continuing one, for its sessions are frequent and its membership, as a matter of fact, quite stable, it is more efficient, its members knowing each other well and

working in a quiet and non-oratorical atmosphere, and finding it easier to adjust difficulties and effect compromises than larger gatherings do. Conversational argument is the feature of its meetings, since one cannot be eloquent, and therefore perhaps long-winded, in a small committee, the environment not being sympathetic, as one's associates are so few in number, and so little impressed with the oratorical effusions of others, so blasé. There is here a gain in speed.

In the large field of international administration, the Assembly can do little more than exercise a certain control. It examines the measures taken by the Council and the results obtained, and votes the appropriations necessary for the continuance of the various undertakings. In the solution of political questions, such as the Silesian and Austrian affairs, it is the Council that counts and not the Assembly, and it is the Council consequently that gains prestige and power from any successes that are achieved. The Assembly, meeting for only a month a year, and requiring unanimity for most of its decisions, is not an organ well adapted for action and execution. Its rôle is poorly defined in the Covenant, being expressed in terms so large that all precision, a thing highly desirable in such a matter, is lacking. The Assembly evidently has a power of initiative, but are the steps it takes in using that power efficacious or merely platonic? It would be difficult to answer that question at the present moment. The record of the three sessions thus far held is far from throwing a clear light upon it. One thing is certain, that we are far from possessing in this body that "parliament of the world," that spokesman of mankind, expressing "world opinion," whatever that may mean, which many enthusiasts hoped, at the time of its creation, it would prove to be. It is a much less pretentious and imposing a body. An instrument of the Governments, its members appointed by the Governments, its decisions generally requiring the ratification of the Governments, its actual rôle is much more modest. Several of the decisions of the Assembly of 1921 had not received the necessary ratification when the Assembly of 1922 adjourned. However, the Assembly offers a certain field, more limited than had been hoped, for the expression of views on international affairs which might not otherwise gain the attention of so large a public. It also, without question, is an arena for the display and struggle of purely personal and national ambitions. Each Assembly has contained many able men, among them several prime ministers, like Benes of Czecho-Slovakia or Branting of Sweden, several ministers of foreign

affairs, and members of national parliaments, men who bring to their task experience in public affairs, powers of criticism, and, in some cases, real constructive ability. This association of such men with each other, even for a brief period each year, this interplay of national and international points of view is of obvious utility.

Any constitution, to adapt itself to the constantly changing conditions of life and thought, is likely to need amendment from time to time. The Covenant of the League of Nations will prove no exception to this rule. "The Covenant," says one of its admirers, "was a brilliant improvisation drawn up at the Peace Conference in a few weeks by a Commission working at red-hot pressure. . . . In result, many of its clauses have a vague or semi-political meaning. This fact has been of a certain advantage, for the conditions under which the Covenant was drawn up were such as to make precision dangerous. It resembles Napoleon's ideal of a constitution which was that it should be 'short and obscure.' The Covenant is certainly both. It contains hardly a sentence, certainly no one article, whose meaning is absolutely clear."¹

One may question the brilliancy of the improvisation, one may doubt whether improvisation at red-hot pressure was the happy way to create so grave a document, and may believe that a slower and less sensational method would have given a more mature and more generally acceptable result; one may deny that Napoleon was an authority on the qualities that a constitution should possess; but one can hardly dissent from the view that the Covenant is a state paper that would gain much from greater clarification, greater precision in many of its clauses, that, in short, amendment might make it a more satisfactory instrument, terminating much formidable criticism.

The desirability of making certain changes in the Covenant has been felt within the circles of the League itself almost from its inception. Many amendments have been discussed and some have been rejected while others have been started on their way to possible adoption. Curiously enough, a difficulty was found at the outset in that very article of the Covenant which provides a process of amendment, namely Article 26, which reads as follows: "Amendments to this Covenant will take effect when ratified by the members of the League whose representatives compose the Council and by a majority of the members of the

¹ H. W. V. Temperley, *The Second Year of the League*, (London, 1922), pp. 57-58.

League whose representatives compose the Assembly. No such amendment shall bind any member of the League which signifies its dissent therefrom, but in that case it shall cease to be a member of the League." It will be noted that this article lays down merely the requirements for *ratification* of amendments, that is for the final stage in the process, but that it says nothing as to who shall draft the proposed amendments, or how. Shall this preliminary and essential work be done by the Assembly alone, or by the Assembly and the Council? And what majority shall be required for the acceptance of a proposed amendment by the drafting body? Shall it be a mere majority or a majority of two-thirds or three-fourths, or shall a unanimous vote be required?

On this vital matter Article 26 is silent. Yet how can the amending process be even started without a preliminary agreement concerning it? The Covenant is based upon the principle that unanimity is required in all votes in both the Council and the Assembly, unless otherwise especially stated. But unanimity in this case would almost inevitably mean that no amendment could be framed, that the Covenant must remain unchangeable in a world of change. Suffocation would ultimately result.

There was some reason to believe that the intention of the framers of Article 26 had been to permit amendment of the Covenant either by a simple majority or a three-fourths majority, and not to require unanimity. But if so, they had neglected to state the fact, and their neglect practically raised the question as to whether it was really possible ever to amend the constitution. Feeling that this poorly edited article itself needed amendment, before any other changes could profitably be considered, the Second Assembly drew up in 1921 and adopted the following clauses: "Amendments to the present Covenant, the text of which shall have been voted by the Assembly by a three-fourths majority in which there shall be included the votes of all the members of the Council represented at the meeting, will take effect when ratified by the members of the League whose representatives composed the Council when the vote was taken, and by a majority of those whose representatives formed the Assembly. If the required number of ratifications shall not have been obtained within eighteen months after the vote of the Assembly, the proposed amendment shall remain without effect."

In order that the legality of the Assembly's action might not itself be questioned, it was urged that this amendment of Article 26 ought to be carried unanimously. This was done by the

Assembly. No vote was cast in the negative, although there were 14 abstentions.

Thus a real danger to the utility and continuing life of the League was conjured away, or rather, will be when the necessary number of states shall have ratified the amendment, as they presumably will do.

Interesting amendments have also been proposed to Article 16, concerning the use of the economic weapon, to Article 18, concerning the registration of treaties, to Article 21, concerning "regional understandings" or the possibility of "leagues within the League," the last named being urged by Mr. Benes of Czecho-Slovakia in the interest of such combinations as that of the Little Entente. None of these has been accepted by the Assembly. An amendment to Article 1 concerning the admission of states, an amendment proposed by the Argentine Republic, would have had the effect of admitting Germany and other states to the League upon their own volition and without the conditions laid down in that article, such as the giving of "effective guarantees" of their "sincere intention to observe" their international obligations or to regulate their armaments in such a way as might be prescribed by the League. This proposal was rejected and this rejection is given as the reason why the Argentine Republic withdrew for the time being from active participation in the League. It has been suggested, however, that the real reason for this action was that she, the leading representative of Spanish America, was not chosen to the Council, whereas Brazil, which represents Portuguese America, was given membership in that body. Spanish America was at that time unrepresented in it.

It was inevitable that Article 10, which President Wilson had declared to be "the heart" of the Covenant and which had contributed so much to the defeat of the League in America, should be considered as meriting amendment, and a definite proposition to this effect was early brought forward by Canada. Her delegates urged the impropriety of the members of the League undertaking to respect and preserve, as against external aggression, the territorial integrity of all members of the League when no examination had ever been made as to whether the boundaries of those states were just and ought to be permanently assured; when, indeed, at the time of the adoption of the article, some of those boundaries had not even been drawn. The proposal to amend this famous article has, however, revealed the strength of the forces in favor of its maintenance unchanged, among them the

feeling of France, which sees in it a possible protection, also that of the small states generally, and, in particular, that of the newly created or newly enlarged states of central and southeastern Europe which regard it as a bulwark of their independence and integrity. The Canadian proposition has not been accepted and it seems a reasonable prophecy to say that Article 10 will long remain unchanged.

While Article 10 stands as written and with no official interpretation that tends to weaken it, Article 16, concerning the economic weapon, and to which reference has already been made, became in 1921 the object of a long series of proposals, adopted by the Second Assembly, which should they become the policy of the League would seem likely to decrease, if not to nullify, the effect and universality of the much discussed economic pressure as a preventive of war.

In 1922 a step was taken by the League which may well in time have important consequences. The Council had hitherto consisted of four permanent members, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan, and of four non-permanent members, representatives of the lesser states. Almost from the beginning there has been a demand for an increase in the number of these elective members. The natural and inevitable competition among the forty and more powers not represented upon the Council tended to become more acute as time went on, and an increasing pressure for the enlargement of the Council developed. This became very apparent at the meeting of the third Assembly in 1922, national intrigues and rivalries revolving around this question, intrigues and rivalries which were not conducive to the harmony of the League. The result was that the Council was enlarged by the addition of two new members, Sweden, representing the Scandinavian states, and Uruguay, the smallest of South American states, representing Spanish America.

This is probably but a first step. What will the consequences be? It may reasonably be doubted whether the enlargement of the Council will increase its effectiveness and it is not unlikely that the larger the Council becomes the less inclined will the Great Powers be to entrust it with important business. Also should the pressure for the enlargement of the Council continue, and there is reason to expect it will; should the Council be increased to a dozen or fifteen members, it would also almost certainly undergo a change of character. The requirement that the decisions of the Council must have the unanimous consent of all its members has not worked badly thus far, has, indeed,

been an advantage. But the unanimity among eight men, knowing each other intimately and accustomed to make mutual concessions, is easier to secure than among a dozen or fifteen. The more numerous the Council becomes, the more difficult it will be to maintain the rule of unanimity, for it will become a principle of death, the veto of a single state, be it a large one or a petty one, sufficing to prevent action. A chief merit of the Council thus far has been that it has been able to act with reasonable speed.

But if, in order to avoid paralysis, it should be decided that a majority should suffice for decisions, even if it be a reinforced majority of two-thirds or three-fourths, the League of Nations would be entering upon a new and difficult path. Admit the principle of the vote by majority and you break clearly with the classic principle of state sovereignty and, whether you wish it or not, you take a decided step toward the principle of the super-state. Before that step is taken there will be some memorable discussions and contests in the League.

But it is unnecessary to borrow trouble of the future, the present containing enough. It is sufficient here merely to point out the fact that the adoption of the majority system of voting would involve an essential modification of the present constitution of the League.

The record of the League's activities during the first three years of its existence, presented summarily in this chapter, establishes the fact that here is a useful, and at times a very useful institution, whose influence, whose achievements, no one is at liberty legitimately to question. Its humanitarian work has been varied and efficient. It has been the means of settling a number of delicate international problems. It has, by its technical and extensive investigations of economic and social problems not yet settled, already thrown much light upon them and will perhaps have contributed to their future solution. It has worked out an elaborate and flexible organization and is better equipped than ever to operate, when invoked, with intelligence and with speed. But the great impulse behind the creation of the League was not the desire to provide the world with a more convenient and more efficient instrument for humanitarian purposes, such as the relief of suffering, the prevention of disease or of its diffusion, the abolition of evils such as the white slave traffic or the trade in opium or other noxious drugs; nor was it the desire to provide the means for the administration of bankrupt states like Austria, or new political creations such as the free city of Danzig or the

basin of the Saar. The performance of just such tasks was, without doubt, included in the conception which the founders of the League had in mind. But their primary and absorbing pre-occupation was the creation of an organization able to prevent future war.

What light does the history of the past three years throw upon their success in this laudable intention? An uncertain light. The period has been too brief and the experiment has been conducted under too exceptional circumstances, to justify seeing positive conclusions. It is often said, as we have already indicated, that the League averted probable wars by its management of the Aaland Islands and Albanian questions, and it may be true. But it may also be said, in regard to the former, that it was highly unlikely that Sweden, a country which had not fought for the retention of Norway in 1905 but had allowed that country peacefully to sever its connections with her, would have gone to war in order to wrest a few thousand citizens from Finland. In regard to the latter, experience is more enlightening as actual fighting was brought to a close by the intervention of the League. On the other hand, the League, either because of lack of power or because not summoned to intervene, counted for nothing in the Russo-Polish war of 1920 or the Greco-Turkish war.

In a related field the League has thus far been even less successful, in the reduction of the world's armaments. There have been debates in the Assembly and in one of the important commissions of the Assembly. There have been investigations and reports, but this activity has not yet led to any direct result. This may be because there has been too pronounced a disposition to consider the subject from a sentimental rather than from a practical and rational point of view, or it may be because of the inherent and formidable difficulty of the problem. But certain it is that the only positive achievement in the sphere of the limitation of armaments since the close of the Great War has been accomplished not at Geneva but at Washington, and has affected the navies and not the armies of the world. The Assembly of 1922 appears to have recognized the blunt fact that many states, and most conspicuous among them France, will never consent to any extensive reduction in armament, unless they receive in exchange a more definite and substantial guarantee of security than that proffered by the clauses of the Covenant, clauses which inspire at best but a limited confidence. It is quite safe to say that no serious progress will be made in this direction unless a satisfactory guarantee is found, a guar-

antee more tangible, more obvious, and more solid than any yet forthcoming. The demand for this protection cannot be eluded. It constitutes the most serious, most insistent challenge to the wisdom and the address of the League.

Whether the world possesses in the League of Nations, as at present constituted, a more effective, a more practical means of preventing war than it possessed before is, after all, as debatable a matter as it was in 1919 when the Covenant was recommended to a war-sick world. On the one hand, it may be stated, that the League possesses no physical but only moral force, that its new court lacks compulsory jurisdiction, that the economic weapon seems to have been weakened by the resolutions of the Assembly, and that opinion as to the obligations carried by Article 10 appears as blurred as ever. On the other hand, the League offers a swifter and a broader method of international conference than the world has ever had before, and conference may prevent war. Further, the general activities of the League may gradually create a more contented world, offering fewer points of friction. And the fact that the League has continued to exist during three troubled years, that its membership has increased, and that through it the nations have co-operated fruitfully in a number of important matters, is obviously of good augury.

INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION

Forming a real part of the League of Nations, yet occupying a semi-autonomous position within it, is the International Labor Organization whose establishment and powers have already been described.¹ One of its chief functions is to hold an International Labor Conference each year for the purpose of drawing up "draft conventions" or "recommendations" designed to improve the general industrial conditions of the world. Four conferences have thus far been held and have formulated a considerable number of recommendations, some of which have been accepted by several nations or are in process of discussion by them. The character of their activity is indicated by the subjects treated in these suggestions, one limiting the hours of work in industrial undertakings to eight in the day and forty-eight in the week, others concerning the employment of women at night, and before and after childbirth, concerning the employment of children, and still others regulating conditions of labor in agriculture and at sea. Latterly this organization has undertaken the systematic study of problems of emigration and immigration.

¹ Pp. 752-753.

CHAPTER LIII

THE CONFERENCE OF WASHINGTON

THE United States had declined to ratify the Treaty of Versailles and had consequently refused to enter the League of Nations, mainly because it did not care to become involved in all the entanglements of European politics, and to assume the unknown obligations contained in certain sweeping and indefinite articles of the Covenant. Refusing to co-operate in working the new and hastily designed mechanism of international negotiation and action, it was at once accused of a resolution to follow a policy of isolation in a world in which isolation was impossible, of a selfish indifference to the welfare of the world, of an egoistic insensibility to its paramount need for peace. The charge begged the whole question and was, therefore, as puerile as it was footless. Independent action and isolation are not necessarily one and the same thing. The United States had never followed a policy of isolation since it had become a nation in 1776. Nor did a comparison of its history with the histories of the other great powers suggest that it was likely in the future to be less solicitous than they about the reign of justice and of peace among men, less willing to make sacrifices for such supreme and beneficent ends. All that could justly be said was that the United States declined to be associated with a particular organization and that it reserved for itself liberty of action in foreign policy.

That the desire for a peaceful ordering of the world was earnest and widespread, everything indicated. That the liberty of action might be made greatly to enhance the cause of peace, to further the true interests of other nations as well as of their own, was a view ardently entertained by multitudes of Americans, whether private citizens or government officials. That such was the case was abundantly proved by the interest and enthusiasm aroused by President Harding's convocation in 1921 of a conference in Washington to consider the general question of disarmament and specific questions relating to the Pacific and the Far East. Authorized by an act of Congress, this conference

met on November 12, 1921, and continued in session until February 6, 1922, when it finally adjourned, leaving the fate of its decisions in the hands of the parliaments of the nations concerned, for their approval or disapproval.

The motives prompting the summoning of this conference were varied. One was the desire for a reduction of the armaments of the world, armaments which constituted a heavy financial and economic burden for the nations which carried them, and which were widely considered as likely to provoke further wars. The Conference of Paris had decreed a large measure of disarmament, but only for the nations defeated in the late conflict. But neither it, nor the succeeding conferences held in Europe, nor the League of Nations had accomplished anything, beyond some discussion as yet barren of results, in the line of disarmament of the victors and the neutrals in the Great War, who were much more numerous than the vanquished. This, the most difficult and most complicated of questions, was as far from solution as ever. Might not a new and more promising effort now be made to find a way out of the impasse? By attempting to do too much, with its scheme of new world organization, had not the Conference of Paris done too little? Might not a more modest attempt yield a more palpable result? By a concentration of attention upon certain aspects merely of the general world situation, might not a distinct though limited progress be registered, and possibly a practical example set and a useful method indicated?

The Conference of Washington was not a general world conference but was restricted to a few powers, those most immediately concerned in the settlement of the problems that prompted its convocation. It was hoped that by definitely limiting the subjects to be discussed and the number of participants in the discussion, the conference would not prove unwieldy and would not lose itself in protracted rambles over the whole surface of international affairs but might hew close to the line. In the mind of those who called the Conference, the limitation of armament was regarded as closely connected with certain problems of the Pacific and the Far East, and this conception determined the list of invitations sent out from Washington. Greatly interested in the former were our chief associates in the late war, England and France and Italy and Japan. Interested in the latter were those same powers and also China, Holland, Belgium and Portugal: consequently, it was these eight powers which were asked to come to Washington. One Pacific power was not

invited, Russia, because she was in the grip of a revolutionary government whose legality has not been recognized by the other states, and because that government was the declared enemy of the political, economic and social system represented by the latter. Moreover, it would have been difficult in 1921 to state with any precision what were the territories included within the Soviet Republic. The Russian government protested against this neglect of the American government to include her among the negotiating powers, and practically declared in advance null and void all decisions the conference might make upon Pacific and Far Eastern matters.

The Conference of Washington consisted, then, of the representatives of nine states, six European, one American, and two Asiatic. The sessions of its various commissions and committees were not open to the public, but long and fairly detailed communiqués of their discussions were given to the press, and the decisions reached were announced in plenary and open sessions of which there were six. Those decisions, embodied in seven main treaties and in several supplementary agreements, concerned navies and submarines, poison gases, the status of the islands of the Pacific, and Chinese affairs. Under these general heads were included a large number of special and distinctive matters, each arousing a particular contention of its own, and all closely inter-related. It was not found possible to separate these numerous subjects sharply from each other, and to study and decide each independently and in sequence. All were more or less intermingled, discussions were carried along simultaneously, and the solutions reached in one category were affected by those reached in the others. In other words, few questions were decided exclusively on their merits, but there was the usual give and take of diplomacy. Concessions here had to be paid for by concessions there. Adherence to principle was necessarily tempered by a recognition of the claims of expediency, if the attainment of the possible was not to be sacrificed to the desire for the rigid and unrealisable ideal. The spirit of compromise, which is the only spirit by which conflicting principles and clashing interests can be harmonized to any practical end, hovered over the proceedings of the conference and shaped its results, to the unconcealed displeasure of intransigent reformers.

Into the details of these manoeuvres for position and advantage on the part of the several powers represented at Washington, and of the measures employed to bring about the final adjustment of opposing wills, we cannot enter here. Suffice it to say

the way of the intriguer was rendered harder in this conference than in most of its predecessors. On the whole, though not entirely, subterranean methods were in considerable disrepute.

The Conference of Washington was summoned to consider primarily the question of the limitation of armaments. But while that question might be considered in its entirety, yet it was, after all, a single aspect of the problem that the organizers of the conference had particularly in mind, the possible limitation of naval armaments. The war and the course of events subsequent to the war revealed a new and striking situation in regard to naval power. The rivalry of England and Germany was now over, after a feverish competition of twenty years. The German fleet was at the bottom of the sea and Neptune's trident, which William II had once said must pass from the hand of Britannia to that of Germania, was still in the firm grip of the jolly tars of England. But the grip was less secure than was at first supposed, for, on sweeping the horizon, the British Admiralty perceived a new and lusty rival in the West. The American navy, long in process of becoming, had now attained formidable proportions and seemed destined speedily to attain proportions more formidable still.

At the outbreak of the war, the American navy was a poor third to that of England and of Germany. We had hitherto followed a quiet policy of shipbuilding, but the war enormously accelerated the pace. Stirred to unwonted reflection by the emergence and the menace of the German submarine, Congress, in August 1916, adopted a policy of large and rapid naval expansion. It authorized the building, within three years, of ten first-class battleships, of six battle cruisers and of many smaller vessels. With the entrance of the United States into the war early in the following year, the actual building of the ships was suspended and the government turned its attention to the construction of submarines and a merchant fleet capable of transporting armies and supplies. But with the return of peace, the programme of 1916 was resumed and between 1918 and 1921 the building of the ships authorized was begun. There was much talk of even extending the programme. In 1900 the tonnage of the American navy was less than a million; but in 1920 it was nearly three millions. Naval expenditures had expanded from about \$137,000,000 in 1914 to over \$433,000,000 in 1921.¹

¹ These facts and many others in this chapter are drawn from Buell, R. L., *The Washington Conference* (1922), the most important book that has yet appeared upon that subject.

What did all this mean? It meant, in brief, that the United States intended to have a navy as large as any in the world. President Wilson had demanded in a speech delivered in St. Louis in February, 1916, that we should have "incomparably the most adequate navy in the world," and while the adverb had been later dropped as due perhaps to the excessive warmth of impromptu eloquence, the fundamental idea was retained and was in the mind of Congress when it adopted later in the year the programme just described. The succeeding administration of President Harding followed in the path thus marked out. That the United States had no such need of a large navy as had England was obvious. The United States would not starve if its communications with the rest of the world were cut off. England would. Moreover, the British Empire, whose population was four times as large as that of the United States, was scattered everywhere over the face of the waters. In comparison, our transoceanic possessions were few and relatively unimportant. Yet we were suddenly challenging the naval supremacy of England, a growth of several centuries, and a natural result, if not a necessity, of her position and her economic requirements.

But a redoubtable navy was arising not only in the West. In the East, also, in Japan, a similar instrument was in process of rapid creation. In 1914, in 1915, and again in 1920, the Japanese government had expanded its naval programme and by 1928, if nothing intervened to stop the feverish activity, Japan would be provided with a large and powerful navy of the latest, post-Jutland design. Spending \$85,000,000 in 1917, she was spending \$245,000,000 in 1921, one-third of her entire national budget. In 1927 her appropriations for this programme would need to be \$400,000,000 and she would be spending as much as the United States, a country twice as large in population and whose inhabitants had an average income of \$350 to hers of \$29.

Meanwhile England, burdened by the extraordinary cost of the recent war, and with a greatly disorganized internal economic life, was in no position, at least for the time being, to engage in this merry competition. Indeed her Admiralty announced in 1920 the abandonment of the two-power standard upon which it had insisted for a generation. Henceforth England would be content with a navy as large as that of any other single power, instead of as large as those of any two powers. It should also be pointed out that between 1916 and 1921 she did not begin the construction of any new capital ship, and that at the same

time perhaps two hundred of her old ships had become obsolete or were far advanced in obsolescence.

A capital ship is, by the definition adopted by the Conference of Washington itself, a war vessel whose displacement exceeds 10,000 tons or which carries guns whose calibre exceeds eight inches. It was estimated that should the naval development of the three countries continue as planned without change, the United States and England would in 1924 possess each 33 capital ships and Japan 17. But the fleets of the United States and Japan would have an advantage over that of England because they would contain relatively more ships of the newest type, the type, that is, that was developed as a result of the lessons learned from the battle of Jutland, and which was characterized by stronger armor and larger guns.

Such was the situation in 1921. Naval competition of increasing intensity whose limit could not be foreseen — such was the unexpected phenomenon of the years which followed immediately upon that war which many optimistic people had thought was destined to end war. It could only be a question of time when England would re-enter this costly struggle with redoubled energy.

Against whom were these redoubtable engines to be used? This was a question that no one cared to answer, or could answer with frankness or certitude. A war between England and America was widely declared to be unthinkable, but history amply attests the fact that what is considered impossible to-day may become very real tomorrow. There were several sources of friction between Japan and the United States and there were elements in the population of both those countries which were doing what they could to fan and foster the spirit of suspicion, and at any moment unfortunate incidents might arise to aid them. The prospect was not reassuring. The United States was in the best position to stand the strain of this race for naval supremacy, because it was the richest of the powers involved. But even for it the costs would prove a tremendous burden. Moreover, the apparent endlessness of the expense was repugnant to the national conscience and the opinion was widespread that large armaments increase the probability of their ultimate use and that, meanwhile, they embitter international relations.

On November 12, 1921, at the opening session of the Conference of Washington, Charles E. Hughes, the American Secretary of State, in a speech remarkable for audacity, for frankness, and for precision, called halt upon the perilous tendency of the

time and delivered the most serious blow at the prevalent practice which it had received within the memory of man. Refraining from that emotional exuberance and rhetorical extravagance which characterized so much of the current peace propaganda, holding himself well within the bounds of the reasonable and the practical, he advocated, not disarmament, but a limitation of naval armament, and he proposed to that end a definite and detailed programme. "We can no longer content ourselves," he said, "with investigations, with statistics, with reports, with the circumlocution of inquiry. . . . The world wants a practical programme which shall at once be put into execution." He suggested a "naval holiday." "For a period of ten years there shall be no further construction of capital ships." In addition, he called upon the United States, Great Britain and Japan to scrap some sixty ships already in existence or in process of construction, with a total tonnage of nearly 1,900,000. That the United States was not asking others to do something she was disinclined to do herself, but that she was prepared to make even greater sacrifices than she was demanding, was shown by the fact that she was ready to scrap 30 ships to England's 23 and Japan's 17, and that the tonnage scrapped would be, in round numbers, for herself 845,000, for England 583,000 and for Japan 449,000.

Passing over the details of Secretary Hughes' carefully elaborated scheme and fixing our attention upon one or two of the more outstanding features, we note the all-important fact that when the proposed number of ships had been actually scrapped and when those not scrapped should in the course of time be replaced by new constructions, which replacements should be limited to 500,000 tons each for Great Britain and the United States, and to 300,000 for Japan, the navies of the three countries would be in the ratio of 5 — 5 — 3.

Such, most inadequately described, was Mr. Hughes' proposal for the limitation of naval armament, a proposal which profoundly impressed the Conference and the public. Mr. Balfour, the chief of the British delegation, expressed the prevalent opinion when he declared this speech to be "one of the landmarks of human civilization" because it actually combined "profession" with "practice."

But it is much easier to propose a plan than it is to get it adopted. While all the powers concerned immediately accepted the proposal "in principle," many weeks of stiff and tense negotiation were necessary to bring the project through. Japan

insisted stubbornly upon being allowed a larger percentage. Unable to secure this, she demanded the right to retain one of her best ships, the *Mutsu*, which, by Secretary Hughes' schedule, was destined for destruction. In the end this demand was granted, but at the same time the quota to be allowed to the United States and Great Britain was proportionately increased, the ratio of 5 — 5 — 3, or one hundred per cent. for those two powers to sixty per cent. for Japan, was preserved. Even then Japanese adherence was gained only by another and more serious concession. In return for agreeing to a navy forty per cent. inferior to that of the United States, Japan insisted that the United States must agree to stop all further fortifications in the Pacific islands. As the fortifications, naval bases, coaling stations which the latter power possessed had in no case been developed in a manner adequate to the needs of a possible war in the Far East, this Japanese demand virtually meant that America must definitely renounce all hope of supporting her favorite policy of the Open Door in the Orient, or even of defending the Philippines, by arms. If America wished to bring about the limitation of armaments, it must be at this price. The price was a heavy one and the renunciation might practically prevent her from following any but a verbal policy in the Orient, which might prove far from efficacious. But the price was paid and America consented, as did England, to the adoption of the *status quo* "with respect to fortifications and naval bases in the Pacific region." But there were certain exceptions. This restriction was not to apply to the Hawaiian Islands, to Australia, to the islands of Japan proper or to those lying off the coasts of the United States and Canada, — except the Aleutian islands. England was to have the right to continue certain developments of her naval base at Singapore.


Another serious difficulty had to be overcome before the central idea of Mr. Hughes' famous speech could be lodged in an actual treaty, signed and sealed. That speech had defined the future strength of the fleets of the United States, Great Britain and Japan. But the ratio to be applied to the navies of France and Italy was left for the time being in abeyance. When later it was proposed that that ratio should be fixed at 1.75 compared with the 3 for Japan and the 5 for the United States and England, France objected and demanded more. Her argument was as follows. Mr. Hughes' proposal was frankly based upon the *status quo* of 1921, that is, it recognized, and would continue in the future, the comparative strength of the different navies

as they stood at the time of the meeting of the Conference. But France was, in 1914, involved in a naval building programme which, had she been able to carry it through, would have given her a far larger fleet in 1921 than she actually possessed. The war had forced her to suspend this programme and to concentrate her efforts upon her land armies. She had ceased work upon her four new super-dreadnoughts already begun, and since 1914 she had not even launched a submarine. But since that date England and Japan had gone on building on a great scale and the navy of the United States had grown extraordinarily. Was the *status quo* of 1921 fair to France? Was it just that she should be heavily penalized for doing a thing which had been of the greatest advantage to her allies, for directing all her resources to the prosecution of the war on land? Mr. Hughes' ratio worked admirably for the United States and England, assuring their superiority on the seas, which superiority, moreover, in the case of the former, was one of very recent origin. France was now virtually told that she must henceforth accept the position of a fourth-rate naval power, inferior to Japan, whose services to the world had certainly not been more conspicuous than hers.

Whether the capital ship ratio was fair to France or not, it was insisted upon and in the end France yielded, but with a reservation which precipitated a new and bitter controversy and which seriously affected the final outcome of the Conference. She accepted the ratio in capital ships but declared that it would be impossible to accept the corresponding reductions in the case of such "defensive ships" as light cruisers, torpedo boats and submarines. "The idea which dominates the Washington Conference," telegraphed M. Briand from Paris, "is to restrict naval armaments which are offensive and costly. But I do not believe that it is the programme to deny to a nation like France, which has a large extent of coasts and a great number of distant colonies, the means of defending its communications and its security."

M. Briand's telegram settled one controversy, that of capital ships, and opened another, that of the submarines. It accepted the ratio proposed for the former but not that proposed for the latter. Immediately a discussion began, mainly between France and England, which generated an unpleasant and dangerous amount of heat and which ended in gravely restricting the scope of the possible achievements of the Conference in the direction of disarmament. The British delegation demanded the total





abolition of the submarine, declaring that it was not really an instrument of war, that recent history showed that it was no defense for weak nations and that it had done little damage to battleships, but that its only successes were against merchant vessels, that its use for this purpose was barbarous and had been universally condemned, that it was merely a weapon of murder and piracy and ought to be summarily suppressed. The French, Italian and Japanese delegations joined the British in expressing their execration of the way in which the submarines had been used in the recent war. Nevertheless, they held that they were "useful and effective means of defense," that they had proved serviceable against battleships and as scouts, and that, in the words of the French representative, it was unwise to limit them unreasonably "since we have before us an entirely new weapon, concerning which no one of us can foresee the possible transformation and growth, perhaps in the near future."

It was found impossible to harmonize such utterly divergent views or to agree upon any of the practical propositions which were brought forward. The result was that the Conference was unable to take any restrictive action in regard to the building of submarines. The nations might, therefore, build as many as they should choose. But the failure to abolish the submarine was somewhat offset by certain resolutions introduced by former American Secretary of State, Elihu Root, and later adopted by the Conference in a special treaty, signed by the five powers, the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan. That treaty reaffirmed as principles of international law the well-known rules about "visit and search," in regard to merchant ships, and the removal to places of safety, before such vessels could be sunk, of their crews and passengers, and declared that belligerent submarines were not exempt from these rules. Article IV of the treaty reads as follows: "The Signatory Powers recognize the practical impossibility of using submarines as commerce destroyers without violating, as they were violated in the recent war of 1914-1918, the requirements universally accepted by civilized nations for the protection of the lives of neutrals and non-combatants, and to the end that the prohibition of the use of submarines as commerce destroyers shall be universally accepted as a part of the law of nations, they now accept that prohibition as henceforth binding as between themselves, and they invite all other nations to adhere thereto." Article V of the same treaty prohibits "the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases, and of all analogous

liquids, materials and devices." The five powers accept this prohibition for themselves and invite "all the civilized nations" to adhere thereto.

The Conference of Washington therefore stopped competition in battleships, at least for ten years. It did not stop nor did it limit competition in the building of submarines or of aircraft. It forbade the use of submarines in the way made hideously memorable to Americans by the sinking of the *Lusitania*, and to the English by the narrowness of their escape from starvation. Henceforth, if its stipulations were observed, there could be in war no repetition of the recent German achievement of sinking 12,000,000 tons of merchant shipping and the drowning of 20,000 non-combatants.

The Conference of Washington accomplished nothing in the matter of military armament as distinct from naval armament. The subject was brought up for discussion but was speedily laid aside as a result of the decided stand of France. The attitude of that country toward the reduction of her army was stated by M. Briand, prime minister of France and head of the French delegation at the Conference. That attitude was based upon her need of security. There could be no physical disarmament of France until Germany had disarmed "morally," that is, until she had conclusively shown that her temper and her purposes had changed, that she recognized her responsibilities and her wrong-doing, and that she was not merely waiting and planning for a new war of revenge. There were few indications that she had undergone any such change and many that she was a highly dangerous neighbor to France and enemy to the peace of the world. Had not her greatest military leader, Ludendorff, just published a book in which it was stated that war was of God and eternal peace a dream? With 7,000,000 men trained by the late war and who could be mobilized at any time, with her systematic evasions of the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, with her "police" organizations, ostensibly designed for the preservation of internal order but really for the expert training of men who could instantly become officers, should a new war break out, and with her war industries essentially intact and readily available, Germany was a menace so formidable that it would be suicidal for France to disarm. Yet the Government of France was doing what it safely could. France had already reduced her army since the armistice by a third, and her military service from three years to two, and an additional reduction was contemplated. But, said M. Briand, "if

any one asks us to go further, I should have to answer clearly and definitely that it would be impossible for us to do it without exposing us to a most serious danger." If the other nations would voice their readiness to guarantee the security of his country, if attacked, then France would be willing and happy to adopt another plan, but M. Briand said that thus far he had heard no such voice.

This attitude of France was natural and inevitable. It is quite safe to say that any other nation, in the same situation and confronted with the same problem, would have acted and spoken in the same way. Nevertheless, her answer gave offence to all those who hoped that the Conference of Washington would introduce a new era of reduced armaments, not only on the sea but on the land. Public opinion, and for that matter much official opinion, passed lightly over the essential difficulty in its eagerness to inaugurate a new dispensation. No nation will disarm if it feels that thereby it will imperil its security. This is axiomatic, as all experience attests. Disarmament, therefore, will wait upon the discovery of a substitute for armament that shall offer at least equal, if not better, guarantees of protection, equal, if not superior, weapons of defense. But neither at Paris nor at Geneva nor at Washington was this fundamental difficulty either sufficiently recognized or sufficiently studied. But until the discussion should be concentrated, not upon the evils of war but upon the necessity of national self-preservation as the central aspect of the matter, no considerable progress could be made. There is some evidence that the Third Assembly of the League of Nations in the fall of 1922 was becoming aware as to where the real crux of the problem lay. But the Washington Conference which preceded that meeting did not wrestle with the problem. It merely recognized the obstacle furnished by the firm attitude of France, and passed on to the consideration of other matters.

There were several other topics of great importance upon its programme as announced, — the future of the Pacific, the future of the Far East which included the problem of China, and of the relation to China of Japan, and, to a lesser degree, of the Occident. Under these general heads was a tangle of delicate and knotty questions, questions whose increasing insistence and gravity had been the chief reason for the summoning of the Conference and which, obviously, it must attempt to answer. The answer was not destined to be either easy or very satisfactory. Nevertheless, the labors of the Conference in this field succeeded,

at least provisionally, in somewhat relieving a dangerous situation, in somewhat reducing an ominous international tension.

The tension was primarily that existing between the United States and Japan. This was nothing new, but in 1921 it had reached a point which it had never reached before and which was unfavorable for the peace of the world. Japan had objected to the annexation of Hawaii by the United States and the United States had objected to any considerable immigration of Japanese. Friction had arisen in California out of the desire of Japanese settlers in that state to extend their land holdings and to send their children to the public schools. But these were lesser matters. In 1921, what most disturbed and somewhat alarmed public opinion in the United States was Japan's policy in the Orient, not her policy in the Occident. That policy was aggressive, watchful, continuous, and successful, and it crossed and thwarted American policy and American sentiment at many points. The end of the World War accentuated the growing suspicion and estrangement. With German imperialism out of the way, at least provisionally, Americans came to feel more generally than they had felt before that Japanese imperialism was the menace of the present and of the future, and that it was the same in essence, the same in spirit, in method and in purpose as the one now laid low.

This opinion of America was based upon an observation of the recent history of Japan and of the present tendencies, and the more Americans observed, the less satisfied they became. Japan's policy toward China for a generation offended American sentiment and counteracted a long established American tradition. That sentiment and that tradition, expressed by the term of the "Open Door," demanded the recognition of the independence and the territorial integrity of China and of the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China. Japan had readily accepted, as had other powers, the principle of the open door as long as it was limited to a general phrase, but when it came to embodying it in actual conduct, her record was far less satisfactory. As a result of the Chinese-Japanese War of 1894-5, Japan had acquired from China the island of Formosa and the group of the Pescadores. As a result of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, she had acquired the Russian leases of Port Arthur and the Liao-Tung peninsula, the cession of the southern half of the island of Saghalin, and had forced the withdrawal of Russia from Korea, whose independence was to be assured, but in

which Japan was recognized as having "paramount" interests. Five years later Japan had destroyed even the shadowy semblance of Korean independence and had formally incorporated that country in her Empire. The World War of 1914-1918 offered her an unexampled opportunity to extend her power and to consolidate her position in China and in Asia, which opportunity she exploited to the full. She declared war upon Germany, seized Kiauchau and the province of Shantung which were thereupon guaranteed her in 1917 by secret treaties with the Allies and which were definitely handed over to her by the Treaty of Versailles. Further, taking advantage of the weakness of China and of the preoccupation of the Western Powers in the war in Europe, she had forced, by a forty-eight hour ultimatum, the notorious "Twenty-one Demands" upon China, which not only gave her the practical control of Manchuria, which not only extended the leases of Port Arthur and Darien to 1997 and of the Southern Manchurian Railway to 2002, but which also established a virtual protectorate over China. As a further result of the Great War, her armies were in Eastern Siberia, held Vladivostok and had seized the northern half of the island of Saghalin.

Along with this remarkable military and political expansion, had gone measures designed to secure the economic supremacy of Japan, in the vast areas brought under her influence, and the increasing practical exclusion of other powers. Japan's economic policy was more efficient than that of Russia and less liberal even than that of Germany. The Open Door was being gradually but firmly closed.

By the Treaty of Versailles, as has just been stated, Japan was recognized as the heir of Germany in regard to all the rights, titles and privileges which the latter power had enjoyed in Kiauchau and the province of Shantung. President Wilson's consent to this transfer had aroused vehement opposition in America and was one of the reasons for the refusal of America to accept the treaty. Japan had, it is true, given a verbal and informal promise to the President that she would return the political sovereignty of this territory to China, but American public opinion was by this time very sceptical in regard to Japanese promises and, moreover, it noted that this particular one concerned political sovereignty alone, Japan "retaining only the economic privileges granted to Germany."

Behind this aggressive, persistent, successful policy of political and economic expansion, the American people saw something

more than merely the energy of an ambitious and efficient people, imitating Western imperialism as it had imitated so much else that was of Western origin. They saw that a certain international political arrangement had facilitated and encouraged this, to them unwelcome, development of Japan's position in the Orient, namely the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, an alliance which had subsisted since 1902. They believed that Japan never could have gone so far had it not been for that alliance, which, moreover, they believed had encouraged British imperialism in Asia as well. Moreover, a fundamental provision of that alliance gave great offence to America. In the treaty as first concluded in 1902, Japan and England promised each other that in case either one should be involved in war in defense of its territorial rights or special interests, the other would remain strictly neutral, but that in case any third power should join in the hostilities, then the other contracting power should support its ally by arms. But as early as 1905 the Alliance was altered. Hitherto England had been obliged to give military aid to Japan, or Japan to England, only in case of the intervention of a third power. Now each agreed to come to the aid of the other and make war and peace in common, if either party should become involved — and without waiting for the intervention of any third power. The military obligation was thus greatly enlarged.

This obligation was in force from 1905 to 1921. What did it mean? The Anglo-Japanese Alliance had been at first directed against Russian imperialistic policies in Asia. It had later served against another imperialistic power, Germany. But now both Russia and Germany had been eliminated as a menace to the peace of Asia. Against whom was the treaty now directed, if against anyone? What was the need of its continuance? Americans observed that it would operate in this way, namely, that if either China or the United States should ever care to challenge Japan's position in Asia by force, it would be confronted by the combined military and naval strength of England and Japan. As from the nature of things no such challenge could come from China, a feeble military power, a disorganized state, against whom would the Alliance operate?

The idea of a possible war between England and America was utterly repugnant to both countries. Yet the fact remained that the former was legally bound, under certain conditions, to take up arms against the latter. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, with its ten-year term, was due to expire on July 13, 1921. The United States made it very plain that in her opinion it ought

not to be renewed. Yet England, anxious though she was not to offend the United States, desired, for various reasons, to preserve the Alliance, and Japan was strongly opposed to its abandonment. Statesmen of both countries "assured" the United States that it was "well understood" that the Alliance would never be directed against her. But whatever the understandings might be, the terms of the Alliance were explicit. Moreover, the United States objected to the Alliance, not primarily because she feared war with England and Japan, as she was morally certain that England would not take up arms against her whatever the terms of the treaty might be, but because she believed that the Alliance had distinctly fostered and would continue to foster, Japanese militarism and imperialism in Asia. A fresh and striking illustration of its tendency was at hand. The Alliance had contributed to the defeat of China and the discomfiture of President Wilson at the Conference of Paris, because it absolutely prevented England from opposing the Shantung award; in other words, from freely considering the merits of the matter.

As the date for the expiration of the Anglo-Japanese agreement approached, Lloyd George hit upon a scheme that would prolong it indefinitely and that yet would, it was hoped, satisfy those opposed to and those in favor of the Alliance, — a plan as ingenious as it was futile. The United States remained unpropitiated by the ministerial cleverness.

Such were some of the aspects of the Far Eastern situation when the Conference of Washington opened in November, 1921. One of the achievements of the Conference was the abolition of this Anglo-Japanese Alliance. This was accomplished by the means of a larger combination, into which the smaller one was absorbed. The Four-Power Treaty, signed by Great Britain, Japan, the United States, and France, was the method devised for removing this obstacle from the international scene. That treaty did not create an alliance, one of four powers to take the place of one of two. But it substituted for an alliance an agreement designed to safeguard the interests of the nations concerned and to provide a method of adjusting disputes and meeting dangers that might arise in the future. The four powers agreed to "respect" the rights of each other in their "insular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean," declaring, in a separate document, that this phrase did not include the islands of Japan proper. They agreed that if any controversy should develop between them

“arising out of any Pacific question and involving their said rights,” and which cannot be settled by ordinary diplomatic processes, then they shall meet in joint conference for the purpose of considering and adjusting the matter; that if any outside Power shall threaten their “said rights” by aggressive action, the Four “shall communicate with one another fully and frankly,” in order to “arrive at an understanding as to the most efficient measures to be taken, jointly or separately, to meet the exigencies of the particular situation”; that the Treaty shall remain in force for a period of ten years and shall continue in force thereafter, subject to the right of any of the Four Powers to terminate it upon giving twelve months’ notice; that as soon as this Treaty is ratified, the Agreement between Japan and England “shall terminate.”

A “Déclaration,” accompanying this Treaty and designed for the satisfaction of the United States, provided that the Treaty should not be considered as involving the assent of the United States to “mandates” granted in the Pacific under the Treaty of Versailles, should not prevent her making separate agreements concerning islands held under mandates, and declaring also that the controversies contemplated in the treaty should not be held to include those questions which “according to principles of international law lie exclusively within the jurisdiction of the respective Powers.” Such questions as immigration and the independence of the Philippines were in the minds of the authors of these reservations.

Another set of problems, namely, those concerning China, demanded consideration at the hands of the Conference of Washington. If the policy of the “Open Door,” if the recognition of the territorial integrity and political independence of China, objects to which the American government had over and over again declared its adhesion, were to pass from the domain of words to the domain of realities, much of the work of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries would have to be undone, for those centuries had brought about very numerous and intricate infringements upon both the commercial and political and territorial and institutional freedom of China. Treaty restrictions, exacted generally as the result of wars, held that country tightly enmeshed, and imposed upon her a variety of obligations to foreign powers prejudicial to her interests and well-being. These encroachments upon her territory and her freedom of action had increased greatly during the past twenty years. At the time when the Washington Conference was opened, Japan possessed

undeniable political and economic ascendancy over Manchuria, Shantung, and a part of Siberia, and other powers possessed rights that derogated from China's sovereignty and rendered her international position humiliating and weak. Had not the time come to begin the work of liberation from the aggressions and injustices of the past?

It can hardly be said that it had. The Conference of Washington accomplished some things in this direction but not many. The work of history is not easily reversed. The Chinese delegation presented China's demands in a series of ten resolutions which, had they been accepted and acted upon, would have given China administrative and political independence, would have undermined the "vested interests" of foreign powers, would have given her the right to make her own tariffs as she might choose, would have abolished extra-territoriality in its various forms, and would have preserved her neutrality. But the achievements of the Conference were to have no such scope or significance. China was given the right to raise her tariff somewhat, but not as much as she desired or as was necessary to put the national finances in good condition. Her tariff was still to be made to serve primarily the interests of foreign powers, as had long been the case, instead of her own interests. When China asked the right to manage her own postal system, she was not given it. For some fifty years, various nations had maintained their own post offices in China. In 1921 Japan maintained there about 125 post offices, Great Britain and France about a dozen each, and the United States one. China was powerless to inspect the mail going through these agencies and smuggling of such things as opium and morphine could not be prevented by the Chinese authorities. Yet, although the Chinese postal system had long been efficient, the Conference only hesitatingly granted this entire minor request. A resolution was passed providing for the voluntary withdrawal of foreign post offices by January 1, 1923, on condition that China maintain an efficient service and that she continue the supervision of "the foreign Co-Director General."

The request for the abolition of extra-territorial rights in China was not granted but, considering that any determination in the matter "must depend upon the ascertainment and appreciation of complicated states of fact in regard to the law and the judicial system and the methods of judicial administration in China," the Conference decided that an international committee should be appointed to inquire into the matter and to report

within a year, each power concerned being free to accept or reject any or all of the recommendations of the committee.

The demand for the withdrawal of foreign troops from China was accepted in "principle," but the practical execution was to be made the subject of "a full and impartial inquiry," the Powers being deemed free "to accept or reject all or any of the findings of facts or opinions expressed in the report" that would follow the inquiry.

Where there was such slight eagerness to meet the Chinese point of view, the efforts of the Chinese delegation to find out how extensive and what precisely were the "foreign commitments," the "private contracts" of foreigners in China, were blocked quickly and decisively by the interested Powers. And, of course, the relinquishment of foreign lease-holds was not secured, chiefly because of the opposition of Japan. These included the British leaseholds of Wei-hai-wei in Shantung, and Kowloon, opposite Hongkong, the French lease of Kwangchow-wan in South China, and the Japanese leases in Port Arthur and Darien. Mr. Balfour announced that England was willing to give up Wei-hai-wei but not Kowloon, M. Viviani declared that France was ready "to join in the collective restitution of territories leased to various powers in China," under conditions, and the Japanese delegates announced that they wished "to make it clear that Japan has no intention at present to relinquish the important rights she has lawfully acquired and at no small sacrifice." Nothing, therefore, was accomplished directly by the raising of this question. Later, something was accomplished in another way.

Few indeed were the practical measures taken at the Conference of Washington for the liberation of China from the trammels which the aggressions of other nations had imposed upon her and which had rendered illusory her territorial integrity and her political independence. But while in practice the powers were little disposed to sacrifice their actual "vested rights," they were very willing to join in general statements of the most reassuring character concerning their policies and purposes in China. A treaty was signed by all the nine powers at the Conference whose declared aim was "to safeguard the rights and interests of China and to promote intercourse between China and the other Powers upon the basis of equality of opportunity." The Powers recognized once more, as they had done before, the principle of the Open Door, a principle now formulated anew and with somewhat greater pre-

cision than ever previously. If they should carry out in practice what they expressed in words, a large liberation of China would result, a real invigoration of her national life and institutions. But in view of the previous record of the Powers and of the revelations of their temper at the Conference of Washington, the reader may well preserve an attitude of considerable scepticism as regards the value of this treaty.

There was one practical question, recent in origin, which the public opinion of America would not allow the Conference to elude, the question of the Japanese occupation of Shantung, which had lain uneasily upon the national conscience ever since the Conference of Paris. The Conference as a whole, indisposed frankly to take up this matter itself, referred it to China and Japan for direct negotiation. That negotiation was long and difficult and was brought to a conclusion largely through the efforts of Mr. Hughes and Mr. Balfour. A treaty was made between the two powers concerned which provided for the withdrawal of the Japanese from Kiauchau, the former German leased territory, and its restoration to China. A more important matter was the disposition of the Tsinan-fu railway, the control of which carried with it the virtual economic control of the province of Shantung. It was finally agreed that China was to purchase this railway for about \$32,000,000, but that until complete payment was made the railway was to have a Japanese traffic manager, subject to the direction of a Chinese managing director, a Japanese accountant and a Chinese accountant of equal rank. As the actual payment, which is on the instalment plan, will not be completed for five years, there remains a chance, given the disturbed internal conditions of China, that obstacles may be placed in the way of payment. The economic control of Shantung will, therefore, remain, at least provisionally, somewhat in doubt.

As to the problem of Siberia, raised by the late war, all that the Conference accomplished was to bring forth a statement from the Japanese delegation to the effect that "it was the fixed and settled policy" of Japan to respect the territorial integrity of Russia and to observe the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations.

Such was the work of the Conference of Washington, a valuable work, yet one whose value is unequal and, in parts, problematical. The probability of a war between England and the United States was now reduced to a minimum, one between Japan and the United States was rendered less likely. On the other hand, the Open Door in China remains a theory, not a reality,

a principle and not a fact. It may reasonably be argued that Japan's position in the Orient is stronger than ever, unless moral force, the only weapon the United States is willing to use, should be sufficient to restrain her imperialism. World opinion, declared Mr. Root at one of the sessions of the Conference, "is the greatest power known to human history." It may well be doubted whether such a thing as "world opinion" has ever existed, but it is not forbidden to hope that it may come to exist some day, and that it may be of the right kind.

CHAPTER LIV

THE ECLIPSE OF THE ENTENTE

ONE subject, of capital importance, remains to be considered, the fate of the Treaty of Versailles. That document is none too popular in the world to-day, but this fact need occasion no surprise and need not unduly disturb us. Unless all types of human nature had changed it was to be expected that the defeated would denounce as an outrage a document that signalized their discomfiture. All treaties are unpopular with those who, by their terms, are required to pay the piper. And the Treaty of Versailles, perhaps the most comprehensive and varied treaty on record, exposes so large a surface, treats so many questions, delivers so many verdicts, offends so many interests and so many schools of thought, Socialists, Pacifists, Communists, that it was inevitably bound to raise a multitude of enemies whose collective voice was quite sufficient to cleave the general ear. The critics might not agree among themselves, nor did they in this instance, one reserving his denunciation for this section or provision or aspect of the treaty, another for that. The widespread clamor might consist of dissonances rather than of harmonies, but the result was the same, a most horrendous din. And criticism came from the victors who had drawn it up and who might be expected to support it, as it came from the vanquished who had but a slight share in its composition and who were its predestined opponents, dedicated to its revision or annihilation, as Hannibal was dedicated to the destruction of Rome,—an enterprise, be it said in passing, which proved beyond his powers.

M. Poincaré, President of the French Republic, whom the formidable document displeased in certain of its features, said, on the morrow of its signature: "The Treaty of Versailles will be a continuous creation." This observation has been abundantly vindicated by subsequent history. For that treaty differs to-day in several respects from what it was on June 28, 1919. For instance, those clauses which promised the trial of the Kaiser and the war criminals have practically been dropped after a preliminary and half-hearted attempt to enforce them. Again,

the treaty was based upon the assumption that it would have behind it the support of America. That support lacking, its practical, though not its juridical, force has been diminished and particularly has the experiment of the League of Nations been conducted under very different conditions from those contemplated when the clauses ordering it were written. The "continuous creation" of this part of the treaty has undoubtedly produced an institution departing, how far it would be difficult to say, from the original conception of its founders.

Other clauses might be mentioned which have been nullified or altered by the course of events since the midsummer of the year 1919. We will mention only one. That entire section of the treaty which establishes a system of reparations which Germany must pay for the damage done to those whom she unjustly attacked has thus far not been fulfilled. Around its elaborate and somewhat flexible provisions has raged a fierce discussion, among the Allies themselves, and between them and Germany. The result has been thus far a deadlock, that is in a certain measure, a nullification of the clauses in question. At the present moment, July 1923, the whole matter is in suspense, having meanwhile contributed greatly to the unfortunate and costly embroilment of the world.

It is impossible here to summarize the discussion of this subject, which has given rise to a vast controversial literature. Suffice it to say that the treaty imposed a heavy financial burden upon Germany, but one much inferior to the financial burdens imposed by her action upon the Allies. It established a special agency for the final determination of the exact sums she must pay and for their collection, the Commission of Reparations. It soon became apparent that the treaty was seriously defective in that, while establishing a severe, yet just, obligation, it provided inadequate means for compelling its discharge. There was no reason to suppose that a country like Germany would ever execute its promises, signed and sealed, unless held constantly and firmly to the punctual performance of the articles of agreement. And in the matter of compulsion the treaty was very weak. Indeed the vicissitudes of the controversy over reparations has brought into relief the imperfections and the vices of the Treaty of Versailles as nothing else has done. The makers of that document asserted, to the point of wearisome iteration, that, unlike their predecessors in diplomacy, they were dominated in their work by a higher and more virtuous philosophy of statecraft. But, as a liberal and learned Frenchman has recently said: "The

traditional diplomacy, which did not possess the high preoccupations, rational and moral, of the new diplomacy, did possess, on the other hand, certain positive and realistic qualities. Its solutions were often imperfect but, most of the time, they were clear. The old treaties had a definite character; they settled questions. Thus the Treaties of Vienna, which, according to the consecrated phrase, treated peoples like herds of cattle, nevertheless assured Europe a long peace. On the contrary the Treaty of Versailles leaves a quantity of questions in suspense, indicating only the principles which ought to dominate their solution."¹

Nowhere does the Treaty of Versailles more completely justify this stricture than in the section devoted to the problem of reparations. Strong in the assertion of rights and principles it is most defective in all that concerns penalties for non-observance. Unless one assumes that the apparent standpoint of its authors was sound and sufficient, namely, that once formally accepted by Germany the latter would faithfully and scrupulously, however reluctantly, observe its terms, a standpoint as naïve as it was rash, and one not justified by any previous revelations of either history or psychology, one must admit that the lack of clear and certain compulsion in its provisions offered a minimum of a guarantee and invited a maximum of discussion, and consequent uncertainty to the interested parties. Those parties were, after the unexpected withdrawal of America from participation in the execution of the treaty, France and England, Italy and Belgium, and Germany. These five were destined, as the issue was to prove, to diverge from each other, in ways dangerous to the effective enforcement of the reparation programme, — and perhaps disastrous.

The period that succeeded the war proved disappointing. Peace did not come, as pictured in ancient fable, abounding and robust, charged with fruits and flowers. She had been so long awaited, so ardently desired that the majority of men had formed altogether too uncritical, too optimistic a notion of what she would be like. Disappointed that she did not bring back prosperity in her train, deceived in their hopes, which were entirely unreasonable, many men, shortsighted and superficial, fell upon the Treaty of Versailles, holding it responsible for the existing situation, which was certainly distressing. The economic consequences of the peace, disastrous consequences of course, became

¹ Joseph Barthélemy, *Revue Politique et Parlementaire*, March, 1923, p. 481.

the shibboleth of the hour. It ought not to be necessary to point out that no treaty, whatever its provisions, could restore to the economic organism of Europe its former vigor. It ought to be superfluous, but it is not, to recall the very evident truth that the real source of the world's suffering lies chiefly and overwhelmingly elsewhere. We are experiencing not primarily the economic consequences of the peace, but the economic and numerous other consequences of the war. This matter, however, involves certain embarrassing questions of responsibility which many of the critics of the Treaty would prefer to transfer to the authors of the peace rather than to the authors of the war.

But, whatever the causes of the distress and disorder of the world, the work of reconstruction must obviously be undertaken and pushed as vigorously as possible. The basis of reconstruction, as laid down in the Treaty of Versailles, was the right of the victors to reparations for damages inflicted by the war. The country most deeply concerned in this policy was France, to a lesser degree Belgium, England and Italy. Of the victors then, France became the most insistent defender of the Treaty of Versailles because, despite its numerous and grave defects, it at least decreed the essential thing, the right to reparations. But in practice it soon became evident that this right would be extraordinarily difficult to enforce. The subject became the theme of endless discussion, of frequent conferences, of agreements reached, only shortly to be re-opened. As the years went by France saw her prospects of ever recovering her just due becoming constantly less and threatening utterly to disappear. By 1922 what had she received? Certain reparations in kind, of which the most important were deliveries of coal, irregular at that, and obtained only by repeated threats of penalties to be imposed; also a partial reimbursement of the expenses of her army of occupation, — these and not much else. Very little, if anything, paid by the German Government for the restoration of the devastated regions. If Germany would not pay for this restoration, France herself must do so, or it must remain indefinitely postponed. One fact was registered by the passage of time, namely that, either because she could not pay or because she would not, Germany at every moment, fiercely, and often successfully, resisted the claims and orders of the Reparation Commission, and that her record in the matter of deliveries of coal or coke or live stock was one of repeated delays or of failure, partial or extensive, to discharge her obligations. Over and over again was the Commission obliged formally to register these acts

of commission or omission and to protest against them. Particularly determined was Germany's resistance when it came to any payment of money, and very vehement was her opposition to giving any of the positive guarantees or securities for payment which the Allies might suggest. Meanwhile she was spending enormous sums on the replenishment and expansion of her economic equipment, factories, shipyards, railroads, canals, so that when the moment for normal world trade should come again, she would probably be in a better situation than any of her competitors. Indisposed to seek seriously to repair the damages she had inflicted upon others, her governing classes were most eager to work for themselves, and to see the state assume formidable burdens in order to place the national industries in the most perfect condition anent the day which must come in time when Germany might try to resume that economic war with the rest of the world which had been interrupted by the late conflict on the field of battle, with its unexpected consequences. And another alarming aspect of the situation, which cast deepening shadows before it and which threatened the Allies with the total loss of their hopes for partial remuneration of their just claims, was the reckless, and, as it seemed to increasing numbers of people, the dishonest financial policy of the German government with its issues of paper money, at first moderate and later fantastic and unrestrained, until the dollar which, in 1914, could buy only four German marks could in 1923, buy twenty, thirty, forty and ultimately hundreds of thousands of them. This wild inflation might ruin multitudes of Germans, but it had its advantages for a few, indeed for precisely those rich industrialists who had, according to Rathenau, become the economic barons of Germany, replacing the feudal and military barons of the old régime. But whatever the effect of this inflation upon the Germans might be, it would perhaps be for the Allies disastrous, even catastrophic. For it meant inevitably the ultimate bankruptcy of the state. Then where would reparations be? By a bankruptcy, which Frenchmen, and increasing numbers of other people, came to believe was, in considerable measure, intentional, deliberately organized, and therefore fraudulent, reparations might vanish into air, thin air, and become such stuff as dreams are made of.

Unhappily for the French their leading partner in the enforcement of the peace, as recently in the prosecution of the war, took a different view of the situation and of the measures that should be adopted to meet it. As the months went by the divergence of England and France became more and more accentuated,

whether in the numerous conferences that succeeded each other, or in the discussions of the Commission of Reparation, or in the independent policies which each country followed more or less outside the framework of the Treaty of Versailles. England, whose representative, Lloyd George, had had perhaps more to do with making the reparation clauses of the Treaty than anyone else, soon began to change her tone. Never denying the right of France to reparations, she, however, soon came to put less and less emphasis upon them and more and more upon the reconstruction of Europe as a whole, including Russia and Germany, and the central states. When the French talked of their devastated regions, the English talked of theirs, their idle factories, their army of unemployed, and they were prone to ascribe their economic distress to the burden of reparations that hung over Germany like a pall and prevented her recovery, thereby preventing her from becoming a profitable customer again. This was much too easy and too complacent a theory of the causes of England's economic difficulties, many of which must be ascribed to her own questionable or unwise domestic measures and not to the Treaty of Versailles or to the state of Central Europe or Russia or France, or to reparations, or to something outside herself, making for misery.

But, whether rightly or wrongly, English opinion generally held that the demands made upon Germany were exaggerated, were far beyond her power to pay, and that they explained the continuance of the world crisis. From this attitude flowed several consequences whose effect was steadily to weaken the French-English entente and to encourage German resistance. The English regarded this resistance as justified, at least to a certain extent, and were emphatically opposed to the adoption of coercive measures to make the Germans pay, measures which the French were more and more coming to believe the only ones that would yield any results. Thus the reduction of reparations, constantly demanded by the Germans, was held to be reasonable and inevitable by the English, who urged the French to moderate their claims, and to consent to the reduction. Otherwise Europe could never be restored. The French replied that to refuse France, the obvious and great victim of the war, the reparations without which she could not live, and to aid the Germans, the chief creators of the world's present poverty and distress, to escape their just obligations, on the assumption that only thus could the world begin to mend, was an iniquitous proceeding and a reversal of the moral law. As between an action that perhaps

might impede the highly problematical restoration of Europe and a certain and inevitable crippling, if not the utter ruin, of France, obviously it was not difficult for Frenchmen to choose. They must insist upon reparations to the full possible extent, and that extent did not mean merely the present capacity of the German government, fraudulently on the verge of bankruptcy, but meant the future productiveness of German industry, left uninjured and intact by the war, and even expanded and perfected in its equipment since the armistice. They pointed out that England had secured some very important advantages over Germany as a result of the war, that her mastery of the sea was no longer threatened by the latter, that the German navy and the German mercantile fleet had almost entirely been handed over or were lying at the bottom of the ocean, that German submarines had been destroyed and that Germany was forbidden by the Treaty of Versailles to construct or acquire submarines in the future, even those intended for commercial purposes, that the largest and best parts of the German colonial empire had been added to the British Empire, that Germany for many, many years, would not become, if indeed she ever could, the redoubtable rival of England that she had been in the two decades before the war, that not only was England's security immensely augmented by these and other facts, but that very palpable advantages resulted from them to English industry and commerce.

What, on the other hand, was the prevalent French opinion of their own situation? It seems perfectly safe to say that the French negotiators of the Treaty of Versailles would never have signed that document, nor the French Parliament have ratified it, had not their English and American colleagues agreed to guarantee the security of France and to see that ample reparations were forthcoming. Guarantees of a military nature France must have, and this was her most poignant preoccupation at the Conference of Paris; and reparations, too, have an obvious connection with national security. Only when President Wilson and Lloyd George agreed to sign defensive treaties promising the support of their two countries to France in case of an unprovoked attack upon her by Germany, did the French negotiators abandon their own ideas as to the best method to attain the end desired. What was the result? President Wilson's signature was shortly seen to have no value. The Senate refused to ratify the Treaty of Versailles and never seriously considered the defensive military treaty. As England had made her observance of the latter conditional upon its acceptance by the United States, she was

not bound to observe or execute it alone. In the most important single matter that came before them, namely the future security of France, the American and English negotiators at Paris had assumed a responsibility which they should never have assumed without having had overwhelming evidence that their action would have the support of their respective countries. One of them, at least, lacked that assurance. While the Treaty of Versailles and the defensive military treaties were not formally connected, yet in reality they were most closely associated, for the latter were written and signed only because the former was recognized by the American President and the British Prime Minister as defective, at least provisionally, as a guarantee of French security. The ability of Lloyd George to win the acceptance by Parliament of the Treaty of Versailles and the military convention could not reasonably be doubted. But the ability of President Wilson to secure the ratification at home of his work at Paris was, at least, problematical. To make the future territorial security of France dependent upon the conjectural influence of the American Executive with the American Senate, which had already given numerous monitory evidences of its indocility, was, to put it mildly, a grave and hazardous decision. The outcome is sufficiently well known. The method adopted at Paris of settling this fundamental and vital matter was both unsound and risky, in other words, unworthy of a great conference in a great crisis of history. This was certainly no way to treat the primary necessity of a nation that had been the bulwark of the Allied cause, that had, in the convulsions of the times, lost an ally, Russia, whose service to her for a quarter of a century had been precious, and that stood confronting a people more populous and essentially more powerful than itself, a people which, if the past had any light to throw upon the present, would in all likelihood, seek to recover its former possessions and to requite the humiliation of defeat.

As time went by, France saw the other promise of the Treaty of Versailles which meant the most to her, namely reparations, gradually disappearing, under the dilatory and obstructive methods of the Germans, constantly demanding a reduction in their debt, pleading extenuating circumstances and at the same time following out an extravagant and reckless financial policy, which diminished the value of the mark to the vanishing point, and presaged speedy bankruptcy. The problem of reparations led to a series of discords and disputes between France and England, as England was generally found arguing for what it

called moderation, a moderation which the French thought was entirely at their expense. The French hoped for a moment that the overthrow of Lloyd George on October 19, 1922, and the advent to power of the Conservative party under Bonar Law might bring about a more cordial co-operation between the two Allies.¹ But the elections which followed that event were anything but reassuring. Mr. Lloyd George was head of a government that rested upon a coalition of Conservatives and Liberals. But the majority of his Conservative supporters finally became restive and considered that the return to the old system of strictly party government was, for many reasons, desirable. When, therefore, they indicated that they were no longer disposed to support the coalition, Lloyd George's majority vanished over-night and there was nothing for him to do but resign. But in the electoral campaign which ensued the essentials of Lloyd George's policy with reference to France and reparations were not assailed by many of the Conservative candidates. And there was, from the French standpoint, another disquieting sign, the attitude of the Labor candidates. The Labor Party had been slowly growing for many years and there was a widespread belief that it would emerge from the present struggle at least the second party in Parliament. Such proved to be the case. The strength of the parties in the new House of Commons, elected November 15, 1922, was as follows: Conservatives 344, Labor 138, Asquith Liberals 60, Lloyd George Liberals 57. From neither branch of the Liberal party had the French any reason to expect support for their point of view, and still less from the Labor party. There was much discussion during the campaign as to whether the Labor party was a Socialist party or not. Indeed there was discussion within the party itself as to its precise complexion. Certain it was that it contained a very large number of Socialists, and it proceeded on the opening of the new Parliament to choose as its official leader an able and convinced Socialist, J. Ramsay Macdonald.

This party, now the official Opposition, had, during the campaign, advocated, within the purely domestic field, such measures as the nationalization of mines and railways with increased share of control for the workers, a national housing scheme, an increase of the inheritance and super-taxes, a reduction of the taxes on incomes below £500, no taxation of those below £250, a gradu-

¹ Mr. Bonar Law was compelled, owing to ill health, to resign in May, 1923, and was succeeded in the premiership by Mr. Stanley Baldwin, at that time Chancellor of the Exchequer.

ated levy on fortunes exceeding £5000; real independence for Egypt, real self-government for India, and the acceptance of the constitution of the Irish Free State. Within the field which particularly interested the French, that of foreign policy, the Labor party had advocated the revision of the Peace Treaties, and reparations "within the capacity of Germany to pay," a phrase which meant but one thing, the further reduction of the claims of the Allies against their recalcitrant debtor. As the Labor party would have about a hundred and fifty votes in the new Parliament and as it might, in the near future, if the confident predictions of its supporters should be realized, secure control of the Government itself, its programme was of undoubted importance to other nations as well as to England herself.

Thus as the French examined the results of this local English crisis which had interjected itself into the general European crisis they saw that no change had occurred favorable to their point of view. Meanwhile events were taking place in Germany itself which were not calculated to reduce the tension between that country and France. The fairly conciliatory Wirth ministry, which had enjoyed the support of the Majority Socialists, fell, and was succeeded, on November 22, 1922, by the ministry of Dr. Cuno, Manager of the Hamburg-American Line, the seventh Chancellor the republic had seen since its proclamation in 1918. As the Social Democrats refused to join this ministry it could only count on the support of the frankly "bourgeois" parties. Cuno himself claimed to be of no party and he organized a so-called Business Ministry. As his own affiliations were with the big business interests whose power had become steadily more and more apparent, it seemed likely that his conduct would be one pleasing to those interests.

Such then was the situation at the close of 1922. The French became convinced that the Germans did not mean to pay for the damage they had done. They on their side were determined to collect what they could upon a bill which was just. They were willing to grant a moratorium for a certain length of time, that Germany might try to put her finances in some kind of order, but they insisted upon possessing some positive guarantees, some security, in case of continued default or bad faith. It was over this proposal to bring a greater pressure to bear upon the German government than had been brought before to compel it to a policy of payment that the final discussions between England and France occurred. At a conference held in London in December 1922 and at one held in Jan-

uary 1923, the sharpness of the disagreement of the two powers was shown to be too great for continued co-operation. A few days later, on January 11, 1923, the French began the occupation of the Ruhr, the richest industrial and coal-producing region of Germany. The English government condemned this action as doomed to failure, as certain to make a bad situation worse. English, and many American, economists and bankers held this occupation an economic mistake, but the French observed that there was some reason to believe that wisdom would not necessarily die with economists and bankers, and that the limitations of their powers as prophets had been proved in 1914 when many of them had asserted that the war could not last six months, whereas Lord Kitchener, whose pretensions to economic knowledge were slight, had asserted that it would very likely last three years.

In entering the Basin of the Ruhr, what the French did was to seize the most valuable single asset of the defiant and slippery debtor. In 1919 President Wilson and Premier Lloyd George assured the French that if they would abandon certain securities upon which they were inclined to insist, they should receive protection and payment. Having received neither but being left in the lurch by the nations whose representatives made the promise, the French had come to see, by 1923, that if they were to have protection and payment it must be through their own efforts. From the authorities of the Anglo-Saxon countries France had received nothing but advice to abate her claims, those countries in their own cases not abating theirs. Reluctantly she came to the conclusion that she must break, if possible, the manifest determination of the directing classes of Germany not to make any real effort to comply with the terms of the Treaty of Peace, even if, in so doing, she should encounter English opposition, an opposition which would encourage her opponents and weaken her action.

The English and American critics of the French programme chiefly emphasized economics. They desired the economic rehabilitation of Germany, so that that country might become the customer she had been before, and therefore contribute to the general rehabilitation of Europe. But before attaining this apparently liberal attitude both England and America had carefully assured themselves that she would not become unduly dangerous. America had raised her tariff, she had adopted, among others, measures that, for instance, would practically keep German dyes out of the country. England had protected

her vital interests by taking most of Germany's colonies and shipping and by adopting a policy of protection for her key industries.

The French point of view was both political and economic, and Frenchmen saw no reason why they should not have the same right to consider their vital interests as Englishmen and Americans had to consider theirs, especially as they were really much more serious, including national security, obviously the most serious of all. Consequently when the government of M. Poincaré ordered the occupation of the Ruhr, January 11, 1923, it had the determined and overwhelming support of the French people. France had as ally Belgium, and as partial ally Italy, the latter power agreeing largely in principle but being prepared to participate only slightly in action.

We may well close the discussion of this matter by quoting the judgment, not of a French official but of one of the most eminent, most objective and least chauvinistic of French historians, Professor Seignobos of the University of Paris, who summarizes the reasons for this French intervention in the Ruhr as follows:

"France was damaged by Germany. She has a right to complete reparation, and intends to preserve that right intact, even though she may consent to delay.

"After three years of waiting France decided to apply force to collect her debt, and she is using the army which she keeps up for her security, and using it to carry out an operation of justice and not of war. Perhaps she will get nothing out of it, but she certainly would have gotten nothing out of the moratorium without security, and she would have increased her own danger and encouraged the Germans to fight.

"To replace armed force we are offered an arbitration by neutrals and experts, who are to fix Germany's capacity to pay. But these experts would take the point of view of bankers and business men. They would consider Germany's capacity to-day, while France bases her hopes upon Germany's capacity in the future, and she has not enough confidence in German good faith to be content with promises without a material pledge. For, once free of the Ruhr occupation, Germany would reconstitute her army, conquer Poland, and then turn against France.

"The two countries [England and France] do not differ about the facts, as Mr. Bonar Law pretended, but about the interpretation of the facts. These facts are the deficit of the German budget, and the fall of the mark. The English think

that they show Germany's incapacity to pay — the French that they show her determination to pretend to be ruined.

“France is still more astonished that the British public cannot see why she bears the cost of a great army. French democracy has a horror of war. There are no doubt some officers who have made warlike threats, and there are certainly some journalists who have printed pseudo-historical fairy tales about the Rhineland and the Rhine frontier. But neither of these groups will ever govern France. The French army on the Rhine is an instrument not of domination but of defense, and it represents, not the imperialism, but the fear, of Frenchmen. In spite of her strong army, France feels weak before even a disarmed Germany, with her more numerous population, her more powerful industry, her aristocracy imbued with the cult of force, and her people trained to military obedience. France is in fear of being attacked, and her fear has increased since she has felt that she no longer has the support of England.”¹

What the outcome of the French action in occupying the basin of the Ruhr would be, no one could foretell. The resistance encountered proved more serious and more systematic than had been expected. The French Government, taking a leaf out of Bismarck's diplomacy and out of the German methods of making France pay at the close of the War of 1870, announced that the French army would remain in the Ruhr, as the German army had remained in France, until the final and complete liquidation of the debt incurred by the Treaty of Peace. The French were thus pledged to the proposition that history can, at least in one of its aspects, be made to repeat itself. Whether this proposition was, in this instance, sound or senseless could not be stated with certainty. The prophets disagreed.

¹ Charles Seignobos, *The Observer* (London), March 4, 1923.

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CHAPTER I

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REIGN OF LOUIS PHILIPPE

For sources: see, ANDERSON, *Constitutions and Documents*, No. 105, the constitution of 1830, and No. 106, the electoral law of 1831; ROBINSON and BEARD, *Readings in Modern European History*, vol. II, No. 213, LOUIS BLANC's labor programme. Illustrative extracts from parliamentary speeches are in PELLISON, *Les orateurs politiques de la France de 1830 à nos jours* (1898), pp. 1-208. The most recent, most authoritative and best history of France during this period is by S. CHARLÉTY, *La Monarchie de Juillet*, vol. V in LAVISSE's *Histoire de France Contemporaine* (1921). Provided with valuable bibliographical notes. The most extensive French history of the reign of Louis Philippe is that by THUREAU-DANGIN, *Histoire de la monarchie de juillet*, 7 vols. (1884-1892). Very different in interpretation and emphasis is FOURNIÈRE's *Le règne de Louis Philippe* (JAURÈS, *Histoire Socialiste*, vol. VIII). HILLEBRAND, *Geschichte Frankreichs 1830-1848*, 2 vols. (1877-1879), is a work of value. LOUIS BLANC's *Histoire de dix ans* (1830-1840), 5 vols., is important for the radical movements of the time. See also, STEIN, L., *Geschichte der sozialen Bewegung in Frankreich*, 3 vols. (1850). Covers years 1789 to 1849. An admirable treatment of the first five years of the reign is found in STERN, *Geschichte Europas*, vol. IV, chaps. I and XII. A favorable view of the policy of Louis Philippe is given by Professor BOURGEOIS in *Cambridge Modern History*, vol. X, chap. XV, and vol. XI, chap. II. See also BOURGEOIS, *History of Modern France, 1815-1913*, vol. I.

On the history of the Republicans: WEILL, *Histoire du parti républicain*, pp. 33-275, a careful study based upon a large number of pamphlets, memoirs, and newspapers, and containing an excellent bibliography and index. I. TCHERNOFF, *Le parti républicain sous la monarchie de juillet* (1901), shows that the doctrines of the republicans were changing under the stress of new and imperative needs and were not a mere repetition of revolutionary phrases. Carefully documented. OCTAVE FESTY's *Le mouvement ouvrier au début de la monarchie de juillet*, 2 vols. (1908), covers the years 1830-1834, and is an important monograph tracing the growth of

labor organizations and the development of the ideas and programmes of the working class. DEBIDOUR, *L'Église et l'État en France*, pp. 413-480, describes the relation of the church and state during the reign. DEBIDOUR, *Études critiques sur la Révolution*, etc., has essays on *Louis Philippe émigré* and *Metternich et le gouvernement de juillet*. A. BARDOUX, *Guizot* (1894), is a criticism of Guizot as statesman, historian, political orator, critic, and publicist. Other biographies are J. DE CROZALS, *Guizot*; I. TCHERNOFF, *Louis Blanc* (1904); E. ZEVORT, *Thiers* (1892); DE MAZADE, *Thiers, Cinquante années d'histoire contemporaine* (1884); and JULES SIMON, *Thiers, Guizot, Rémusat* (1885).

CHAPTER VIII

CENTRAL EUROPE BETWEEN TWO REVOLUTIONS

For Prussia during this period no very satisfactory history exists. SYBEL covers these years briefly in *The Founding of the German Empire*, vol. I, pp. 82-141. The fullest treatment in German is that of TREITSCHKE, *Deutsche Geschichte*; among the important subjects treated are the Zollverein, vol. IV, pp. 350-406; railroads and telegraphs, vol. IV, pp. 581-598; accession and early reign of Frederick William IV, vol. V, pp. 3-60; on dissatisfaction with the reign and general confusion, vol. V, pp. 138-275; on economic conditions, vol. V, pp. 433-523. An English translation of this work is now available. KAUFMANN, *Politische Geschichte*, covers this period, pp. 193-218; 273-304. On the Zollverein: see also, B. RAND, *Economic History*, chap. VIII; also W. H. DAWSON, *Protection in Germany* (1904), chaps. I and II, the best book in English on German commercial policy, and coming down to the tariff of 1902. WENDELL, H. C. M., *The Evolution of Industrial Freedom in Prussia, 1845-1849* (1922), interesting and valuable.

On Austria: see, SPRINGER, *Geschichte Oesterreichs seit dem Wiener Frieden*, Zweiter Theil, pp. 1-134; LEGER, L., *A History of Austria-Hungary from the earliest Time to the Year 1889*. Translated by Mrs. B. HILL (1889), chaps. XXVII-XXIX; WHITMAN, S., *Austria* (Story of the Nations Series), chaps. XXII-XXIII. On Hungary: EISENMANN, L., *Le Compromis Austro-Hongrois de 1867, Étude sur le dualisme* (1904), pp. 1-71, contains an excellent survey of the old régime in Hungary, a description of the Hungarian constitution and the relations of Hungary to the Austrian monarchy, and an account of the awakening of the new ideas and the prepara-

tion for revolution; a very valuable monograph, containing a bibliography of the source and secondary material. FLORENCE ARNOLD FORSTER, *Deák, A Memoir*, first published anonymously in 1880 with a preface by M. E. GRANT DUFF, is a very useful biography. On Bohemia: E. DENIS, *La Bohême depuis la Montagne-Blanche*, 2 vols. (1903). Vol. II, 675 pp., constitutes probably the best history of Bohemia from 1815 to 1901, detailed and full. Pages 87-231 cover the years 1815 to 1848. Some of the subjects treated are the Czech renaissance, literature, science, the Metternich régime, the growth of the spirit of nationality, the years 1848-1849.

For Italy: THAYER, W. R., *The Dawn of Italian Independence*, vol. I, pp. 379-453; vol. II, pp. 1-76; also the various histories cited above by KING, STILLMAN, CESADESCO, PROBYN. L. C. FARINI, *The Roman State from 1815-1850*, translated by W. E. GLADSTONE, 4 vols. (1852). Farini was a Liberal politician opposed to Clericals and Republicans, and generally well informed. R. M. JOHNSTON, *The Roman Theocracy and the Republic, 1846-1849*, pp. 1-112, on the election and early years of the pontificate of Pius IX. BULLE, O., *Die italienische Einheitsidee in ihrer literarischen Entwicklung von Parini bis Manzoni* (Berlin, 1893). A valuable monograph on the early presentation of the ideal of national unity as contained in the writings of Parini and Alfieri, on the intellectual movement during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic period, mirrored in the works of Monti and Foscolo, and on the patriotic significance of Manzoni's productions. Important as showing the pre-Mazzinian development of the idea of unity. The best biography of Mazzini is that by BOLTON KING, *Joseph Mazzini* (1902). Pages 1-221 are devoted to a chronological account of Mazzini's life, 222-341 mainly to a presentation of his principal teachings. Includes a bibliography. MYERS, F. W. H., *Essays — Modern*; contains an excellent study of Mazzini's life. Some of the works of Mazzini have been translated into English and published in six volumes under the title, *Life and Writings of Joseph Mazzini* (1890-1891). A small collection of *Essays by Joseph Mazzini* has been made by THOMAS OKEY (1894). There is now being published in Italy a complete collection of Mazzini's writings, *Scritti editi ed inediti di Giuseppe Mazzini*. This will probably number sixty volumes when completed, will include the vast correspondence of Mazzini, and will inevitably constitute a most important source for the history of Italy during the awakening. There is an interesting essay on Mazzini in W. R. THAYER's *Italica* (1908), and brief popular sketches may be found in J. A. R. MARRIOTT's *Makers of Modern Italy*, and in R. S. HOLLAND's *Builders of United Italy* (1908).

CHAPTER IX

CENTRAL EUROPE IN REVOLT

Excellent general accounts of the revolutions of 1848-1849 are to be found in FYFFE, *History of Modern Europe*, single volume edition, pp. 707-804, three volume edition, vol. III, pp. 1-148; and in ANDREWS, *Historical Development of Modern Europe*, vol. I, chaps. IX and X. MAURICE, C. E., *The Revolutionary Movement of 1848-1849, in Italy, Austria-Hungary, and Germany, with some Examination of the Previous Thirty-three Years* (1887), contains a great amount of information, poorly presented; also contains a bibliography.

For Austria, the chief authorities are FRIEDJUNG, H., *Oesterreich von 1848 bis 1860*. Vol. I covers the period from 1848 to 1851 (1908); SPRINGER, *Geschichte Oesterreichs*, Zweiter Theil, pp. 135-774; HELFERT, J. A., *Geschichte Oesterreichs seit 1848*. For Hungary, the most important treatment is EISENMANN, *Le Compromis Austro-Hongrois*, pp. 75-148. Consult, also, ARNOLD FORSTER, *Deák, A Memoir*, pp. 72-112. KOSSUTH'S *Speeches in America*, explaining and defending the Hungarian movement, were edited by F. W. NEWMAN and published in New York in 1854. For Bohemia: DENIS, *La Bohème depuis la Montagne-Blanche* (1903), vol. II, pp. 235-381.

For Germany: see, SYBEL, *The Founding of the German Empire*, vol. I, pp. 145-492; vol. II, pp. 3-82; KAUFMANN, *Politische Geschichte Deutschlands*, chap. V; MATTER, P., *La Prusse et la Révolution de 1848* (1903). VEIT VALENTIN, *Die erste deutsche Nationalversammlung* (1919). The best account of the German revolution is in HANS BLUM'S *Die deutsche Revolution, 1848-49* (1897). A sketch of the attempts to achieve unity before 1848, followed by an account of the revolutionary movements in the several states and of the work of the Frankfort Parliament. Bismarck's opinions on the revolutionary events are in his *Reflections and Reminiscences*, vol. I, chaps. II and III. Vol. I of the *Reminiscences of Carl Schurz* (1907), a revolutionist and refugee, is exceedingly interesting on these years.

For Italy, by far the best account in English is THAYER, *Dawn of Italian Independence*, vol. II, pp. 77-415. On the French expedition against the Roman Republic: see, BOURGEOIS et CLERMONT, *Rome et Napoléon III*; also the scholarly and very graphic book of G. M. TREVELYAN on *Garibaldi's Defence of the Roman Republic* (1907). Chapters I, II, and III give an admirable account of Garibaldi's previous career, and chaps. XII-XVII a description

of his famous retreat. An excellent bibliography is appended. Garibaldi's own account is contained in his *Autobiography*, translated by A. WERNER, vol. II, pp. 1-51. On Mazzini's connection with the Republic: see, BOLTON KING's *Life of Mazzini*, chap. VII.

CHAPTER X

THE SECOND REPUBLIC AND THE FOUNDING OF THE SECOND EMPIRE

The Constitution of 1848 may be found in ANDERSON, *Constitutions and Documents*, No. 110. There are clear accounts of the Second Republic, by BOURGEOIS, in *Cambridge Modern History*, vol. XI, chap. V, and by SEIGNOBOS in LAVISSE et RAMBAUD, *Histoire générale*, vol. XI, chap. I. The most valuable and most critical history of this period is by CHARLES SEIGNOBOS, *La Révolution de 1848 — Le Second Empire (1848-1859)* (1921), being vol. VI in LAVISSE's *Histoire de France Contemporaine*. Excellent bibliographies. Other general histories are: PIERRE, V., *Histoire de la république de 1848*, 2 vols. (1873-1878), anti-Bonapartist; GORCE, *Histoire de la deuxième république*, 2 vols. (1887), written from the standpoint of sympathy with a liberal monarchy, critical of the republic, and merciless towards socialists and socialistic theories. An admirable counterweight to this is GEORGES RENARD's *La république de 1848 (1848-1852)*, vol. IX of *Histoire Socialiste*. Part I, pp. 1-227, is devoted to the political history, Part II, pp. 227-384, to the economic and social evolution. Important for the period are: DEBIDOUR, *L'Église et l'État en France*, pp. 481-523 on the expedition to Rome and the Falloux law concerning education; BOURGEOIS et CLERMONT, *Rome et Napoléon III* (1907), a study in diplomacy, based upon unpublished official documents as well as upon published material, and showing that the Roman expedition of 1849 prepared the Empire by forming a close alliance between Louis Napoleon, the clergy, and the army; WHITEHOUSE, H. REMSEN, *The Life of Lamartine*, 2 vols. (1918), the best biography of Lamartine in English, scholarly, and well-written. QUENTIN-BAUCHART, P., *Lamartine, homme politique*, 2 vols. (1903-1908). E. N. CURTIS, *French Assembly of 1848*, a scholarly monograph, studying thoroughly the influence of American example in the making of the French constitution of 1848. Excellent recent studies are: FERDINAND DREYFUS, *L'assistance sous la deuxième république* (1907), 220 pp., a treatment of the question of poverty and an account of

the various measures of social reform passed at this time; WEILL, G., *Histoire du parti républicain en France*, chaps. IX and X; I. TCHERNOFF, *Associations et sociétés secrètes sous la deuxième république, 1848-1851* (1905), 396 pp., a treatise based upon much unpublished material in the archives of the ministries of justice and the interior; aims to show that the *coup d'état* was prepared by the previous systematic destruction of republican organizations; a collection of valuable documents; MARRIOTT, J. A. R., *The French Revolution of 1848 in its Economic Aspect*, 2 vols. (1913), contains reprints (in French) of LOUIS BLANC's *Organization of Labor* and EMILE THOMAS' *History of the National Workshops*. I. TCHERNOFF, *Le parti républicain au Coup d'État et sous le Second Empire* (1906), 676 pp., richly documented, shows that the *coup d'état* was far from being received by the laboring classes with amiable indifference; I. TCHERNOFF, *Louis Blanc*, 1904; TÉNOT, E., *The Coup d'État*; THIRRIA, *Napoléon III avant l'Empire*, 2 vols., is an apology for the Prince President, diffuse, useful as showing the state of public opinion, as the author has industriously ransacked English and French newspaper files; CHEETHAM, F. H., *Louis Napoleon and the Genesis of the Second Republic; being a Life of the Emperor Napoleon III to the Time of his Election to the Presidency of the French Republic* (1909), is a popular, readable narrative, but adds nothing to our knowledge; JERROLD, *The Life of Napoleon III, Derived from State Records, from Unpublished Family Correspondence, and from Personal Testimony*, 4 vols. (1871-1874), is sympathetic and full; FORBES, A., *Life of Napoleon III*, is popular, superficial, untrustworthy; H. A. L. FISHER, *Bonapartism, Six Lectures Delivered in the University of London* (1908), is popular and brilliantly written, attempts to show the essential unity of the two Napoleonic régimes, more interesting and suggestive than convincing; PELLISSON, *Les orateurs politiques*, pp. 209-277, contains interesting extracts from parliamentary speeches. ALVIN R. CALMAN's two volumes on *Ledru-Rollin* treat at length the career of that Radical.

For the Second Empire, the leading secondary authority is GORCE, *Histoire du Second Empire*, 7 vols. (1894-1905), the fullest and ablest history we have of the period from 1850 to 1871, very important, not only for the history of France, but of Italy and Germany also. Presents a wealth of information with great lucidity, admirable impartiality, and largeness of view. Vols. I, pp. 1-131, and II, pp. 1-129, cover the field of this chapter. CHARLES SEIGNOBOS in Lavissee, *Histoire de France contemporaine*, vols. 6 and 7, fresh, informing, critical, of the first importance. TAXILE DELORD, *Histoire du Second Empire*, 6 vols. (1869-1875), an older work,

based on careful research, strongly opposed to the Empire. ALBERT THOMAS, *Le Second Empire* (*Histoire Socialiste*, vol. X), very instructive; see chaps. I and II. There is no satisfactory account of the Second Empire in English. Chapters I and IV in vol. II of ANDREWS, *Historical Development of Modern Europe*, are clear and well-balanced, but necessarily restricted. See, also, *Cambridge Modern History*, vol. XI, chap. X. For the history of the relations of church and state: see, DEBIDOUR, *L'Église et l'État en France*, pp. 524-550; for history of the republican party: WEILL, *Histoire du parti républicain*, chaps. XI-XIII; I. TCHERNOFF, *Le parti républicain au Coup d'État et sous le Second Empire*; for description of the political system of the autocratic Empire: H. BERTON, *L'évolution constitutionnelle du Second Empire* (1900). Part I treats of the despotic empire and the constitution of 1852. A very important monograph. For labor and social questions and movements: WEILL, G., *Histoire du mouvement social en France, 1852-1902* (1905), chaps. I-III.

CHAPTER XI

CAVOUR AND THE CREATION OF THE KINGDOM OF ITALY

The general histories of Italy on this period are: KING, *A History of Italian Unity*, 2 vols., the most extensive and informing history in English, thoroughly documented. Vol. I, pp. 353-416, and all of vol. II concern the period of this chapter; CESARESCO, *The Liberation of Italy*, pp. 165-415, written with much charm, sympathy, and understanding, but without scientific apparatus; STILLMAN, *The Union of Italy*, pp. 242-325; PROBYN, *Italy 1815-1890*, pp. 159-242. There is an excellent chapter in WALPOLE's *History of Twenty-five Years*, vol. I, pp. 206-308. Much the best account of Napoleon III's Italian policy and of the war of 1859 is in GORCE, *Histoire du Second Empire*, vol. II, pp. 211-449, and vol. III, pp. 1-123; and on the annexations, *Ibid.* vol. III, pp. 125-212, a treatment marked by admirable lucidity, keenness of analysis, solidity of judgment, and sustained interest of narration. For Cavour see THAYER, W. R., *The Life and Times of Cavour*, 2 vols (1911), the best biography of Cavour in any language, brilliantly written. A masterly and authoritative work. CESARESCO, *Cavour* (1898), a brief biography of unusual merits, well-informed, just to the other figures of the time as well as to Cavour, epigrammatic, full of color and life. Countess Cesaresco traces the shifting diplomacy of the period with precision and comprehension. Her chapters

on the internal reforms in Piedmont and her revelation of Cavour's activity between the interview of Plombières and April 1859 are admirable. WILLIAM DE LA RIVE, *Le Comte de Cavour, Récits et Souvenirs* (Paris, 1862), an intimate portrait by a close personal friend. This has been translated into English by EDWARD ROMILLY (London, 1862), but the French edition is preferable. D. BERTI, *Il Conte di Cavour avanti il 1848* (1886), important. VILLARI in his *Studies, Critical and Historical* (London, 1907), has a chapter on the youth of Cavour (pp. 119-141). D. ZANICHELLI, *Cavour* (1905), a solid study by a professor in the University of Pisa. N. BIANCHI, *La politique du Comte de Cavour de 1852 à 1861, Lettres inédites*, 419 pp. (1885), is an important collection of over two hundred letters of Cavour to Marquis Emmanuel d'Azeglio, the ambassador of Piedmont to England during the period. TREITSCHKE, *Cavour*, in vol. III of his *Historische und Politische Aufsätze*, a study first published in 1869, and KRAUS, F. X., *Cavour, Die Erhebung Italiens im Neunzehnten Jahrhundert*, with bibliography and illustrations (1902), may also be consulted; see, also, MAZADE, *Le Comte de Cavour* (1877). The parliamentary speeches of Cavour have been published in 12 vols., *Discorsi parlamentari* (1863-1874), and CHIALA, L., has edited his correspondence, *Lettere edite ed inedite di Camillo Cavour*, 2nd edit. (1883-1887), 10 vols. Chiala's extensive introductions and notes in these volumes are of great value. See, also, BERT, A., *Nouvelles lettres inédites de Cavour* (1889). Brief essays on Cavour are found in MARRIOTT's *Makers of Modern Italy*, and in HOLLAND's *Builders of United Italy*. Lord ACTON has a suggestive essay on Cavour, first published in 1861, and reprinted in 1907, in his *Historical Essays and Studies*, chap. VI. W. R. THAYER compares Cavour and Bismarck in the *Atlantic Monthly*, March 1909; same article, *Fortnightly Review*, March and April 1909. NIGRA, *Cavour and Madame de Circourt* (1894), contains some unpublished letters from the years 1836-1860. P. MATTER, *Cavour et l'Unité Italienne*, 3 vols., in process of publication. One volume was published in 1923; by a well-known French biographer. CADOGAN's *Life of Cavour* is worthless.

On Garibaldi the most recent work is G. M. TREVELYAN, *Garibaldi and the Thousand* (1909), an account of the Sicilian expedition, and *Garibaldi and the Making of Italy* (1911), an account of the conquest of the mainland. These, with the work already cited by the same author on *Garibaldi's Defence of the Roman Republic*, constitute the most scholarly account, in English, of Garibaldi's career. Their literary merit is high. Each volume contains a critical bibliography. W. R. THAYER's *Throne Makers* (1899) has a spirited essay on Garibaldi. H. R. WHITEHOUSE, *Collapse of the Kingdom*

of *Naples* (1899), gives a brief survey of affairs in Naples down to 1848, describes the reaction of the years 1850-1859, and then the catastrophe of 1860; an excellent book.

On the Papacy: see, R. DE CESARE, *The Last Days of Papal Rome (1850-1870)*, translated by HELEN ZIMMERN, with an introduction by G. M. TREVELYAN (Boston, 1909). *The Birth of Modern Italy* (1909) consists of the posthumous papers of JESSIE WHITE MARIO, edited by the DUKE LITTA-VISCONTI-ARESE; interesting for the careers of Mazzini and Garibaldi whose friend Madame Mario was; unjust toward Cavour; full of the emotion of the Risorgimento — at least of the republican agitation. DELLA ROCCA, *The Autobiography of a Veteran* (1898), is an interesting narrative by an important participant in events from 1848 to 1870.

The most elaborate Italian histories of the Risorgimento are: TIVARONI, C., *Storia critica del risorgimento d'Italia* (Turin, 1888-1897), 9 vols.; and, BERSEZIO, V., *Il regno di Vittorio Emanuele II; Trent' anni di vita italiana* (Turin, 1878-1895), 8 vols.

CHAPTER XII

BISMARCK AND GERMAN UNITY

There is no satisfactory work in English on the founding of the German Empire. WARD, A. W., *Germany, 1815-1890*, 3 vols., is accurate, judicial and dry. MALLESON'S *The Refounding of the German Empire, 1848-1871* (1893), is brief and concerned chiefly with military events. The articles in the *Cambridge Modern History* are unsatisfactory. WALPOLE, *History of Twenty-Five Years*, vol. II, chaps. X and XIII, is straightforward, informing, concerned mainly with diplomacy. SYBEL'S *The Founding of the German Empire by William I*, 7 vols. (1890-1898), is a monumental work, based chiefly upon Prussian state documents, to which he alone was allowed access by Bismarck. While a work of remarkable industry and erudition, it is a thorough-going defense and panegyric of the conduct of the Prussian Government. Moreover, in many important matters it is not subject to effective control. ZWIEDENECK-SÜDENHORST'S *Deutsche Geschichte von der Auflösung des alten bis zur Errichtung des neuen Kaiserreichs, 1806-1871*, 3 vols. (1905), is characterized by much the same partisanship, as is also OTTOKAR LORENZ'S *Kaiser Wilhelm und die Begründung des Reichs, 1866-1871* (Jena, 1902). On the other hand, the German scholarship which commands greater respect abroad as more critical and objective

is that of Marcks, Lenz, Delbrück, Meinecke, who are adhering to the Ranke traditions of historical writing. H. FRIEDJUNG's *Der Kampf um die Vorherrschaft in Deutschland*, is by an Austrian scholar and covers the years 1859–1866, 2 vols. (1898). It is the most important treatment we have of the relations of Prussia and Austria on the critical years before 1866. Contains also an excellent account of the Austro-Prussian war. The work is already in its seventh edition. One of the most brilliant and suggestive books on this period is by E. DENIS, *La fondation de l'empire allemand* (1906), a study covering the years 1850 to 1870, limited to a single series of facts, those which prepared and which explain the foundation of the German Empire. Large space is given to the evolution of ideas and to the economic transformation. The book is marked by profound and wide investigation, by penetration and subtlety of characterization, by an admirable impartiality. It contains no references, footnotes, or bibliography.

The literature on Bismarck is very extensive and is constantly expanding. His speeches have been published by KOHL, *Die politischen Reden des Fürsten Bismarck*, 14 vols. (1892–1905). There is an excellent selection in two small volumes, sold cheaply, entitled, *Otto von Bismarck, Setzen wir Deutschland in den Sattel, Reden aus der grossen Zeit*, edited by EUGEN KALKSCHMIDT (1907). A smaller collection is that of OTTO LYON, *Bismarcks Reden und Briefe* (Leipsic, 1895). Professor Hermann Schoenfeld has published a collection entitled *Bismarck's Speeches and Letters* (in German, 1905). *The Correspondence of William I and Bismarck, with Other Letters from and to Prince Bismarck*, translated by J. A. FORD, 2 vols. (1903), consists of about five hundred letters selected by Bismarck himself, to show his relationship to the Emperor and also to authenticate and supplement his *Reminiscences* in certain respects. *Prince Bismarck's Letters to His Wife, His Sister and Others, from 1844 to 1870*, translated by F. MAXSE (New York, 1878), are vivacious and entertaining.

BISMARCK'S *Reflections and Reminiscences*, 2 vols. (1899), are important but must be used with caution. For criticism of them, see, ERICH MARCK'S *Fürst Bismarcks Gedanken und Erinnerungen; Versuch einer kritischen Würdigung* (1899); also MAX LENZ, *Zur Kritik der Gedanken und Erinnerungen des Fürsten Bismarck* (1899); FRIEDRICH MEINECKE, in *Historische Zeitschrift*, Band 82, pp. 282–295; SOREL, *Études de littérature et d'histoire* (1901). On the new Bismarck historiography (writings of Busch, Blume, Bamberger, etc.), see, HANS DELBRÜCK, in *Preussische Jahrbücher*, Band 96, pp. 461–480 (June, 1899). There are many biographies of Bismarck.

The best in English is that by ROBERTSON, C. G., *Bismarck* (1919), appreciative, yet critical. Contains a very useful bibliography. HEADLAM, J. W., *Bismarck* (1899), briefer but well informed and judicial. MUNROE SMITH, *Bismarck and German Unity* (1898), is a clear epitome, with a slight bibliography. In French, P. MATTER, *Bismarck et son temps*, 3 vols. (1905-1908), full, critical, remarkably impartial, and very readable. In German, MAX LENZ, *Geschichte Bismarcks* (1902), compact and critical; ERICH MARCKS, *Bismarck, Eine Biographie*. The first volume appeared in 1909 and was entitled *Bismarcks Jugend, 1815-1848*. One may hazard the conjecture that this, when completed, will be the most satisfactory biography in German. ED. HEYCK, *Bismarck in Monographien zur Weltgeschichte*, is interestingly illustrated. ERICH MARCKS' *Kaiser Wilhelm I* (5th edition, 1905) is admirable in knowledge, criticism, and temper, an indispensable book both by reason of its presentation and interpretation of the Emperor's career and his relations to others, especially to Bismarck, and also because of its critical bibliography.

A clear account of the Danish and Austro-Prussian wars may be found in MURDOCK, *The Reconstruction of Europe* (1894), chaps. XV-XXI. HOZIER, H. M., *Seven Weeks' War*, is readable, founded on letters written from Bohemia to the *London Times*, well supplied with maps and plans. SYBEL's account of the war of 1866 is in vol. V, *The Founding of the German Empire*. See, also, FRIEDJUNG, *Der Kampf um die Vorherrschaft*, vols. I-II, and GORCE, *Histoire du Second Empire*, vol. IV, pp. 522-631; vol. V, pp. 1-80.

CHAPTER XIII

THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SECOND EMPIRE

The most recent account, well-informed, fresh and critical, is SEIGNOBOS, *Le Déclin de l'Empire et l'Etablissement de la 3^e République* (1859-1875), being vol. VII in LAVISSE, *Histoire de France Contemporaine*. A valuable account of the transformation of the Second Empire between 1860 and 1870 is in GORCE, *Histoire du Second Empire*, vol. III, livre XXII, and vols. IV and V. OLLIVIER, EMILE, *L'Empire Libéral*, 17 vols. (1895-1915), an elaborate personal apology under the guise of a history of the period, full of detail, conversations, notes, etc. Interesting and informing but needs to be controlled. BERTON, H., *L'évolution constitutionnelle du Second Empire* (1900), parts two and three, is full and trustworthy; an important monograph by a French lawyer. For the growth of

the republican party: WEILL, *Histoire du parti républicain*, chaps. XII–XV; TCHERNOFF, *Le parti républicain au Coup d'Etat et sous le Second Empire*. For labor movements: WEILL, *Histoire du mouvement social*, chaps. III–VI; for relations with the church: DEBIDOUR, *L'Église et l'État en France*, pp. 551–627.

CHAPTER XIV

THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR

PALAT, *Bibliographie générale de la guerre de 1870–1871* (1896), is indispensable for any detailed study of this period. There is a good account of the causes of the war in ROSE, *Development of European Nations*, vol. I, chap. I; also in WALPOLE, *History of Twenty-five Years*, vol. II, chap. VIII; ROBERTSON, *Bismarck*, chap. V; HEADLAM, *Bismarck*, chap. XIII. Vols. VI and VII of SYBEL's *Founding of the German Empire* contain an elaborate account of the events and diplomacy of the period; pronounced special pleading. These volumes have not the value of the earlier ones, as Bismarck did not allow the author access to the Prussian archives for the period after 1867. The seventh volume was composed under the inspiration of Bismarck himself, and is based on information largely furnished by him. Delbrück says it is "not history but diplomacy—and calculated to inspire laughter at that." (DELBRÜCK, *Das Geheimniss der Napoleonischen Politik*, p. 34.) Bismarck's description is in his *Reflections and Reminiscences*, chaps. XX–XXIII. Far the most judicial, as well as most interesting account of the causes of the war and of the war itself (down to Sedan) is in GORCE's *Histoire du Second Empire*, vols. VI and VII, volumes of absorbing interest, clear, vivid, admirably arranged, and written with scrupulous fairness. Two hundred pages of vol. VI are given to the Hohenzollern candidacy. An earlier but very able study is SOREL, A., *Histoire diplomatique de la guerre franco-allemande*, 2 vols. (1875). OLLIVIER's *L'Empire libéral*, 17 vols, (1895–1915), is an elaborate account of the Empire by one who was badly compromised by the war. On the bearing upon the fall of the Empire of Napoleon's relations to the Pope, BOURGEOIS et CLERMONT, *Rome et Napoléon III*, is important. The authors' thesis is that Napoleon's refusal to withdraw his troops from Rome occasioned the failure of the projected triple alliance with Italy and Austria, and that that was the cause of the subsequent disasters. See, also, DEBIDOUR, *L'Église et l'État en France*, pp. 551–627.

Debidour's account of the diplomacy of the period is found in his *Histoire diplomatique*, vol. II, chaps. VII-X. The numerous biographies of Bismarck, cited above, should be consulted; also MARCKS, *Kaiser Wilhelm I.* LORD ACTON has a study of the causes of the Franco-Prussian war in his *Historical Essays and Studies* (1907), chap. VII.

Of the war itself there is a good account in ROSE, *Development of the European Nations*, vol. I, chaps. II, III, and IV; also in MURDOCK, *Reconstruction of Europe*, chaps. XXIII-XXX. The most recent account is that given by SEIGNOBOS, in *Le Déclin de l'Empire*, pp. 209-314, in LAVISSE, *Histoire de France Contemporaine*, vol. VII. GEN. J. F. MAURICE, *The Franco-German War*, is a translation of a German work, edited by PFLUGK-HARTUNG, entitled *Krieg und Sieg* (1896); COL. L. HALE's *The People's War in France* (1904) is founded on HÖNIG, *Der Volkskrieg an der Loire*, and describes the latter part of the war, after Sedan. MOLTKE, *The Franco-German War* is important but technical. CHUQUET, *La guerre de 1870-1871* (1895), is an excellent account in a single volume. The extensive histories by the German General Staff and by Lehautcourt are too detailed and technical for general use. Probably the best account for the general reader is GORCE, *Histoire du Second Empire*, vol. VI, pp. 321-434, and VII throughout (comes down to September 4, 1870). E. B. WASHBURNE, *Recollections of a Minister to France*, 2 vols. (1887), a very interesting and important book by the United States Minister to France, the only foreign minister who remained at his post in Paris throughout the Franco-German war, and whose firm conduct won the praise of William I, Bismarck, Gambetta, and Thiers. There was published by the Government Printing Office, 1878, Senate Executive Document No. 24, a book of 222 pages entitled *Franco-German War and the Insurrection of the Commune. Correspondence of E. B. Washburne*. This includes the correspondence of Washburne with the State Department in Washington in relation to the war, together with correspondence with Bismarck, Bancroft, United States Minister to Berlin, and Motley, United States Minister to London. The letters cover the period from July 19, 1870, to June 29, 1871. Interesting volumes are BUSCH, *Bismarck in the Franco-German War* (1879); A. FORBES, *My Experiences in the War Between France and Germany* (1872); W. H. RUSSELL, *My Diary During the Last Great War* (1874); *Bismarck's Letters to His Wife from the Seat of War (1870-1871)*, translated by A. HARDER (1903); *Diaries of Emperor Frederick, During the Campaigns of 1866 and 1870-1871*, translated by F. A. WELBY (1902); HENRY LABOUCHERE, *Diary of the Besieged Resident in Paris* (1871); SIR EDWIN ARNOLD,

Inside Paris During the Siege (1871); JULES CLARETIE, *Paris assiégé*; F. SARCEY, *Le siège de Paris*. This attained its thirtieth edition within its first year. See THIERS, *Notes et Souvenirs*, on the years 1870–1873 (1903), for an account of Thiers' attempts to secure the intervention of foreign powers. RAYMOND, DORA NEILL, *British Policy and Opinion during the Franco-Prussian War* (1921), illuminating and extremely well-written. GASTON MAY, *Le Traité de Francfort* (1909). The most important study of the subject.

CHAPTER XV

THE RISE OF SOCIALISM

THOMAS KIRKUP, *A History of Socialism* (5th edit., 1913); R. C. K. ENSOR, *Modern Socialism, as set forth by Socialists in their Speeches, Writings and Programmes* (3rd edit., 1910); S. P. ORTH, *Socialism and Democracy in Europe* (1913); JOHN SPARGO, *Socialism; a Summary and Interpretation of Socialist Principles* (ed. 1909); O. D. SKELTON, *A Critical Examination of Socialism* (1907); V. G. SIMKHOVITCH, *Marxism versus Socialism* (1913); W. G. WALLING, *Socialism as it is: A Survey of the World-wide Revolutionary Movement* (1912); J. R. MACDONALD, *The Socialist Movement* (1911); JOHN RAE, *Contemporary Socialism* (4th ed., 1908); MORRIS HILLQUIT, *Socialism in Theory and Practice* (1909); M. BEER, *A History of British Socialism*, 2 vols. (1919–20); KARL MARX, *Capital: a Critique of Political Economy*, Eng. trans., 3 vols. (1906–1909); JOHN SPARGO, *Karl Marx, His Life and Work* (1910); EDWARD BERNSTEIN, *Evolutionary Socialism: a Criticism and an Affirmation* (1909); and (same author) *Ferdinand Lassalle as a Social Reformer* (1893); FRANK PODMORE, *Robert Owen, a Biography*, 2 vols. (1906).

CHAPTER XVI

THE GERMAN EMPIRE UNDER WILLIAM I

The fullest account of this period in English is DAWSON, W. H., *The German Empire, 1867–1914*, 2 vols. (1919). See also BARKER, J. E., *Modern Germany* (1915), informing on the industrial side of German development; WARD, A. W., *Germany, 1815–1890*, vol III. Useful brief accounts are to be found in SCHEVILL, F., *The Making of Modern Germany*, pp. 99–206, and PRIEST, G. M., *Germany since*

1740, pp. 124-184. FIFE, R. H., *The German Empire between Two Wars* (1916), has sections on the Empire Abroad, The Empire at Home, The Empire's Problems, etc. LICHTENBERGER, H., *Germany and its Evolution in Modern Times* (1913), treats particularly cultural history; K. HELFFERICH, *Germany's Economic Progress and National Wealth: 1888-1913* (1915); F. A. OGG, *Economic Development of Modern Europe* (1917). The treatment in ANDREWS, *Contemporary Europe, Asia and Africa*, is excellent. That in ROSE, *Development of European Nations*, vol. I, chap. VI, and vol. II, chap. I, is slight; that in HEADLAM, *Bismarck*, pp. 377-463, good. See also ROBERTSON, C. G., *Bismarck*. LOWELL, A. L., *Governments and Parties in Continental Europe*, vol. II., chap. VII, gives a clear outline of party history from 1871 to 1894. An extensive account is H. BLUM, *Das deutsche Reich zur Zeit Bismarcks*, covering the years 1871-1890 (1893), a book largely inspired by Bismarck himself. ONCKEN's *Das Zeitalter des Kaisers Wilhelm I*, vol. II, pp. 369-768, 952-1005, comes down to 1888. BULLE, *Geschichte der Jahre 1871-1877*, is useful. KAUFMANN, *Politische Geschichte Deutschlands*, covers the period from 1870-1888 very poorly. One of the most useful and readable accounts is in MATTER, *Bismarck et son temps*, vol. III, a book based on wide and careful investigation, impartial in tone, an interesting narrative. The writings of MARCKS and LENZ, cited above, should be used. F. PRIBRAM, *The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary, 1879-1914*, 2 vols. (1920); A. C. COOLIDGE, *The Origins of the Triple Alliance* (1917); SINGER, *Geschichte des Dreibundes*, all important for the Triple Alliance. See also GOOCH, *History of Modern Europe, 1878-1919* (1923), ch. II. J. V. FULLER, *Bismarck's Diplomacy at Its Zenith*, 1922. Treats Bismarck's diplomacy during the Bulgarian crisis of 1885-1887. A monograph of high quality, with an annotated bibliography. BISMARCK's *Reflections and Reminiscences*, vol. II, chaps. XXIV-XXXIII, concern the period 1871-1888. The *Memoirs of Prince Chlodwig of Hohenlohe-Schillingsfuerst*, 2 vols. (1906), are of importance. Hohenlohe was head of the Bavarian ministry 1866-1870, German ambassador to Paris 1874-1885, and Chancellor of the Empire 1894-1900. The *Memoirs* throw light upon the relations between the South German States and the North German Confederation, upon the conflict with the Roman Catholic Church, and upon French politics from 1874 to 1885. Of slight importance for the period after 1890. BÜLOW, B. von, *Imperial Germany*. By the man who was German Chancellor from 1900-1909. Describes Germany's foreign and domestic policies between 1888 and 1913 from the official point of view (Trans. 1914).

On the Kulturkampf: HAHN, *Geschichte des Kulturkampfes*; on

Social Democracy: E. MILHAUD, *La Démocratie socialiste allemande* (1903); KIRKUP, *History of Socialism* (1906), chaps. V, VII, IX (contains Erfurt programme in full, pp. 223-229); WERNER SOM-BART, *Socialism* (1898); A. SCHAEFFLE, *The Quintessence of Socialism*; W. H. DAWSON, *Bismarck and State Socialism* (1891); on protection: W. H. DAWSON, *Protection in Germany, A History of German Fiscal Policy During the Nineteenth Century* (1904), the best book in English on the subject, coming down to the tariff of 1902; on state insurance: F. W. LEWIS, *State Insurance*, chap. IV (Boston, 1909); also, J. G. BROOKS, *Compulsory Insurance in Germany*; LUDWIG LASS, *German Workmen's Insurance*; on government; KRÜGER, F. K., *Government and Politics of the German Empire* (1915), serviceable handbook; OGG, F. A., *The Governments of Europe* (1913), chaps. IX-XIV; JOSEPH BARTHÉLEMY, *Les Institutions de l'Allemagne contemporaine* (1915); B. E. HOWARD, *The German Empire* (1906), an exhaustive account of the structure of the imperial government, not a description of the manner in which it worked, a juridical rather than an historical study; LOWELL, *Governments and Parties*, chaps. V, VI, VII, an account of both structure and operation of imperial and state governments; COMBES DE LESTRADE, *Les monarchies de l'empire allemand, organisation constitutionnelle et administrative* (1904); probably the best, most complete account of German governments, imperial and state; describes the powers and functions of sovereigns, chambers, ministers, communes, financial and judicial systems, etc.; CHARLES BORGEAUD, *The Adoption and Amendment of Constitutions in Europe and America*, translated by C. D. HAZEN (1895), pp. 47-78. KLOEPPPEL, P., *Dreissig Jahre deutscher Verfassungsgeschichte, 1867-1897*; vol. I (1900) covers period to 1877; LABAND, P., *Das Staatsrecht des deutschen Reiches*, 4 vols. (4th edit., 1901), a very important work on German public law. Has been translated into French. A most informing book on Germany before the War is W. H. DAWSON's *The Evolution of Modern Germany* (1908), a book that aims to trace the economic and social transformation of Germany, her industrial and colonial expansion, the growth of socialism, etc. MARY EVELYN TOWNSEND, *Origins of Modern German Colonialism, 1871-1885* (1921), is a thorough, careful, scholarly monograph on an important subject. A useful recent book is CLAPHAM, J. H., *The Economic Development of France and Germany, 1815-1914* (1921). See, also, E. D. HOWARD, *The Recent Industrial Progress of Germany* (1907); "VERITAS," *The German Empire of To-day* (1902); ELTZBACHER, O. (or J. ELLIS BARKER), *Modern Germany, Her Political and Economic Problems* (1905).

CHAPTER XVII

GERMANY UNDER WILLIAM II

W. H. DAWSON, *The German Empire, 1867-1914*, 2 vols. (1919). Vol. II, pp. 261-502, treats of the reign of William II. Best account in English. G. P. GOOCH, *History of Modern Europe, 1878-1919* (1923), ch. 6, good short account. BISMARCK, *The Kaiser versus Bismarck* (1921), being the third volume of Bismarck's autobiography, gives the Chancellor's account of his dismissal and the causes leading up to it. G. M. PRIEST, *Germany Since 1740* (1914), pp. 146-184, and F. SCHEVILL, *The Making of Modern Germany* (1916), pp. 178-206, contain brief accounts of the reign. C. GAUSS, *The German Emperor as Shown in his Public Utterances* (1915), is useful. EMILE LALOEY, *La Diplomatie de Guillaume II* (1917), covers the period from 1888 to 1914. W. MARTIN, *La Crise politique de l'Allemagne Contemporaine* (1913), penetrating criticism. MAURICE MURET, *L'Orgueil allemand*, admirable study of a prominent aspect of German national psychology; also (same author), *L'Évolution belliqueuse de Guillaume II* (1917), excellent survey. A good German history is FRITZ HARTUNG, *Deutsche Geschichte von 1870 bis 1914* (1920), pp. 141-293, devoted to the reign of William II. A. HURD and H. CASTLE, *German Sea Power* (1913), describes the growth of the German navy. SCHMITT, *England and Germany* (1916), and SEYMOUR, *Diplomatic Background of the War* (1916), have excellent chapters on phases of recent German history. See also BEYENS, *L'Allemagne avant la guerre* (1915). English translation (1916).

WILLIAM II, *My Memories* (1922) and *Comparative History* (1922), are two volumes issuing from the former Emperor since the war and designed for self-vindication; of mediocre value.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE THIRD REPUBLIC

There is no satisfactory history of the Third Republic in English. WRIGHT, C. H. C., *A History of the Third French Republic* (1916), is a brief account, coming down to 1914. LOWELL, *Governments and Parties*, chap. II, has a clear outline of party history down to 1896. COUBERTIN, *Evolution of the Third Republic*, is not always clear, presupposes some knowledge of the subject, contains chapters on education, the army, literature, socialism; is poorly

translated. F. LAWTON, *The Third French Republic* (1909), covers in a superficial way the years 1871–1906, and has entertaining chapters on literature, science, art, education, the parliamentary system. W. G. BERRY, *France since Waterloo* (1909), devotes pages 249–368 to the years 1871–1908. An excellent single volume in French is M. Lhéritier, *La France depuis 1870* (1923). A work of great importance, detailed, authoritative, and brilliantly written is HANOTAUX, *Contemporary France*, 4 vols. (1903–1909), covering the years 1871–1882, a full narrative, abounding in vivid and instructive accounts of men and events. The best history of the Third Republic is contained in vols. VII, VIII and IX of LAVISSE, *Histoire de France (Contemporaine)* (1921), volumes by Seignobos, Bidou, and Gauvain. ZEVORT, E., *Histoire de la Troisième République*, 4 vols. (1896–1901), covers the years 1870–1894, a useful narrative, full of detail, fair, careful, pleasantly written. LABUSQUIÈRE, *La Troisième République, 1871–1900*, is vol. XII of JAURÈS, *Histoire Socialiste*. F. T. MARZIALS, *Life of Léon Gambetta*, in the Statesmen Series (London, 1890), is a brief account. Two excellent biographies of Gambetta, by DESCHANEL and STANNARD, have recently appeared. CHARLES DE MAZADE, *Monsieur Thiers, Cinquante années d'histoire contemporaine* (1884), is an interesting book. More important is the life of Jules Ferry by ALFRED RAMBAUD (Paris, 1903), a biography of a forceful and far-sighted statesman, a founder of the Republic, written by a trained historian. See, also, HENRY LEYRET, *Waldeck-Rousseau et la Troisième République, 1869–1899*.

On protection: see H. O. MEREDITH, *Protection in France*; on labor and social movements: G. WEILL, *Histoire du mouvement social en France, 1852–1902* (1905), pp. 133–472, with bibliography; on diplomatic history: HIPPEAU, *Histoire diplomatique de la Troisième République* (1888); A. TARDIEU, *France and the Alliances* (1908); BILLOT, M. A., *La France et l'Italie, Histoire des années troubles* (1905); the author was French ambassador in Rome, and treats of the period between 1881 and 1899—useful for French history, also for Italian; on colonial expansion: LEVASSEUR, *La France et ses colonies*, 3 vols. (1889); L. VIGNON, *L'expansion de la France* (1891), and by the same author, *Les colonies françaises, leur commerce, leur situation économique, leur utilité pour la métropole, leur avenir* (1886), containing a description of the different French colonies; DUBOIS et TERRIER, *Les colonies françaises: un siècle d'expansion coloniale, 1800–1900* (1902); on the Dreyfus case: REINACH, J., *Histoire de l'affaire Dreyfus*, 7 vols., 1901–1911; also by DREYFUS himself, *Five Years of My Life* (1901); STEEVENS, *The Tragedy of Dreyfus* (1899).

On state and church: ARTHUR GALTON, *Church and State in France, 1800-1907*, pp. 201-268. Of the first importance is DEBIDOUR, A., *L'Église Catholique et l'État sous la Troisième République, 1870-1906*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1906-1909). Vol. I covers the period 1870-1889; vol. II, 1889-1906; the fullest account concerning the separation of Church and State to be found is in vol. II, pp. 231-498; excellent bibliographies; many important documents, including the law of April 13, 1908, modifying certain articles of the law of December 9, 1905. See, also, BRIAND, A., *La Séparation des Églises et de l'État. Rapport fait au nom de la Commission de la Chambre des Députés, suivi des pièces annexes* (1905). On the government of France, an excellent description in English is LOWELL's *Governments and Parties*, chaps. I and II. This is far superior to BODLEY, J. S. C., *France*, 2 vols. (1898), a pretentious book which, with much information, is dominated by the melancholy thesis that parliamentary government is unsuccessful in France, because it is not the same as parliamentary government in England. The book contains many other preconceptions, more entertaining than important. LEBON and PELET, *France as It Is* (1888), is a useful book. GEORGE, W. L., *France in the Twentieth Century* (1909), contains chapters on the political institutions, relations of church and state, socialism, trades-unionism, colonies, education, etc. On Catholic Church and labor questions, PARKER T. MOON, *The Labor Problem and the Social Catholic Movement* (1921). A penetrating analysis of the French mind and character is W. C. BROWNELL's *French Traits* (1889). See also BARRETT WENDELL, *The France of Today* (1907). Useful collections of the constitutions of France are: DUGUIT et MONNIER, *Les constitutions et les principales lois politiques de la France depuis 1789* (2nd edit., 1908); HÉLIE, F. A., *Les constitutions de la France* (1880). Professor F. M. ANDERSON has rendered an important service to students by translating many of the important documents in the history of nineteenth century France in his *Constitutions and Documents* (2nd edit., revised and enlarged, 1909). PELLISSON, *Les orateurs politiques de la France de 1830 à nos jours*, pp. 381-434; contains extracts illustrating the history of the Third Republic from 1871 to 1889. BRYCE, *Modern Democracies* (1921), vol. I, pp. 208-326, a weighty discussion of French democracy and institutions; JACQUES, LÉON, *Les partis politiques sous la troisième république* (1912); BARTHÉLEMY, J., *Le gouvernement de la France* (1919), best brief description in French of the government of the Third Republic. The best account in English is SALT, E. M., *Government and Politics of France* (1921), excellent in every way. Important books on the foreign policies

and diplomatic history are, besides DEBIDOUR and BOURGEOIS already cited: G. H. STUART, *French Foreign Policy, 1898-1914*; PINON, RENÉ, *France et Allemagne (1870-1913)*, (1913); TARDIEU, ANDRÉ, *La Conférence d'Algésiras* (1909), and *Le Mystère d'Agadir* (1912); ALBIN, P., *D'Agadir à Serajevo (1911-1914)*, (1915); PRIBRAM, *Secret Treaties*, vol. II; ELIE DE CYON, *Histoire de l'entente franco-russe*; FREYCINET, *Souvenirs*, 2 vols.

CHAPTER XIX

THE KINGDOM OF ITALY

The literature on this period of Italian history is not extensive. STILLMAN's history may be used; pages 358 to 393 cover the years 1871 to 1886. LOWELL's account of party history down to 1896 is clear and his description of the political institutions adequate, *Governments and Parties*, vol. I, chaps. III and IV. See also OGG, F. A., *Governments of Europe*, chaps. XIX-XXI. STILLMAN's *Francesco Crispi* (1899) and JUSTIN MCCARTHY's *Pope Leo XIII* (1896) are useful biographies. A. BILLOT, *La France et l'Italie, 1881-1899*, 2 vols. (1905), a book by a former French ambassador to Italy. For conditions in Italy before the war: see, KING and OKEY, *Italy To-day* (2nd edit., 1909); W. R. THAYER, *Italica* (1908), containing an essay on "Thirty Years of Italian Progress," and one on "Italy in 1907"; ED. DRIAULT, *Les problèmes politiques et sociaux à la fin du XIX^e siècle* (1900), chap. II, La question romaine: le pape, le roi, le peuple.

Other books descriptive of Italy before the Great War are: R. BAGOT, *The Italians of Today* (1912); BORGHESE (G.), *L'Italie moderne* (1913); A. DAUZAT, *L'Italie nouvelle*; R. F. FOERSTER, *The Italian Emigration of War Times* (1919); E. LÉMONON, *L'Italie économique et sociale, 1861-1912* (1913); F. M. UNDERWOOD, *United Italy* (1912). On expansion, see W. K. WALLACE, *Greater Italy* (1917).

The *Encyclopedia Americana* contains more than thirty articles, mostly by Italian specialists, on various Italian institutions and conditions.

CHAPTER XX

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY SINCE 1849

On Austria and Hungary, there is very little that is important in English. LEGER, L., *History of Austria-Hungary* (1889), chaps. XXXIII-XXXVIII, is probably the most satisfactory treatment. WHITMAN, S., *Austria* (Story of the Nations Series), gives a brief account of the period from 1815 to 1898, pp. 308-381. *Cambridge Modern History*, vol. XI, chap. XV, contains an account of the reaction and reorganization in Austria, Prussia, and the German Confederation, by Professor FRIEDJUNG, of the University of Vienna. Consult, also, *Ibid.*, chap. XVI. SEIGNOBOS, *Europe Since 1814*, has useful chapters. VÁMBÉRY, A., *The Story of Hungary*, 1886, pp. 400-440. FLORENCE ARNOLD FORSTER, *Francis Deák, A Memoir*, first published anonymously (1880), is important for the period 1840 to 1876. SIR HORACE RUMBOLD'S *Francis Joseph and His Times* (1909) is an interesting and vivid account of this reign. The author was long British ambassador at Vienna. His book is useful, though frequently superficial and biased. Rumbold has, however, made much use of the solid works of Friedjung. A brief biography is RENÉ PINON'S *François-Joseph, Essai d'histoire psychologique* (1917).

The most important work on Austria after 1848 is H. FRIEDJUNG, *Oesterreich von 1848 bis 1860* (1908-1912). Vol. I, *Die Jahre der Revolution und der Reform, 1848-1851*, comes down to end of 1851; vol. II down through 1856. L. EISENMANN, *Le Compromis Austro-Hongrois*, is very valuable: on the period of reaction, 1849-1859, see pp. 149-203; on the various attempts at constitution-making, the struggle over the unitary and federal principles, see *Ibid.*, pp. 207-399. See, also, *Deák, A Memoir*, passim; A. DE BERTHA, *La Hongrie moderne, de 1849 à 1901* (Paris, 1901), a book by a native of Hungary, laudatory of men and things Hungarian, yet well-informed and useful. Chap. I describes Hungary under Austrian absolutism, 1849-1859; chap. II, Hungary under the provisional schemes, 1859-1865. H. FRIEDJUNG, *Der Kampf um die Vorherrschaft in Deutschland*, is invaluable for the period 1859-1866. On the making of the Ausgleich, 1865-1867: see, EISENMANN, *Le Compromis Austro-Hongrois*, pp. 403-657; FORSTER, *Deák, A Memoir*, pp. 113-322; BERTHA, *La Hongrie moderne*, chap. III, pp. 83-160; see, also, BERTHA, *La constitution hongroise* (Paris, 1898), a good outline and description containing chapters on the laws of 1848, on the attempts at centralization, on dualism, on Croatia, the nationalities, develop-

ment from 1867-1897; see, also, M. G. HORN, *Le compromis de 1868 entre la Hongrie et la Croatie* (Paris, 1907). BERTHA also has a book on *François-Joseph I et son règne, 1848-1888* (Paris, 1888). See, also, BEUST, *Aus drei Viertel-Jahrhunderten*, vols. I and II (Stuttgart, 1887). On the working of the Ausgleich: EISENMANN, *Le Compromis Austro-Hongrois*, pp. 659-680; on history of Hungary, 1867-1901: BERTHA, *La Hongrie moderne*, pp. 161-358. A clear and instructive account of party history in Austria-Hungary from 1867 to 1896, and a description of the political institutions of each country, and of the Dual Monarchy, is given by LOWELL in *Governments and Parties*, vol. II, chaps. VIII-X. The fullest account of Bohemia in the nineteenth century is to be found in E. DENIS, *La Bohême depuis la Montagne-Blanche*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1903); vol. II, pp. 381-670, covers the period from 1850 to 1901.

For descriptions of contemporary Austria and Hungary: GEOFFREY DRAGE, *Austria-Hungary* (1909); H. W. STEED, *The Hapsburg Monarchy* (3rd edit., 1914), the most informing volume on Austria on the eve of the Great War; SCOTUS-VIATOR (R. W. SETON-WATSON), *The Future of the Hungarian Nation* (1908), *Racial Problems in Hungary* (1908), *The Southern Slav Question and the Hapsburg Monarchy* (1911), and *German, Slav and Magyar* (1916). SETON-WATSON is the leading English authority on the problems and aspirations of the Southern Slavs; A. R. COLQUHOUN, *The Whirlpool of Europe* (1907). A careful, scientific study of the races and nationalities in the dual monarchy is AUERBACH, *Les races et les nationalités en Autriche-Hongrie* (1898). The leading authority on Austrian public law is ULBRICH, J., *Oesterreichs Staatsrecht* (3rd edit., Tübingen, 1904). See, also, for general conditions: ANDRÉ CHÉRADAME, *L'Europe et la question d'Autriche au seuil du XX^e siècle* (Paris, 1901, 452 pp.); DRIAULT, *Le monde actuel* (1909), chap. III.

On foreign policy of Austria-Hungary the following books are useful: J. LARMEROUX, *La politique extérieure de l'Autriche-Hongrie, 1875-1914* (1918), 2 vols.; A. FOURNIER, *Wie wir nach Bosnien kamen* (1909); T. VON SOSNOSKY, *Die Balkanpolitik Oesterreich-Ungarns seit 1886*, 2 vols. (1913-14); PRIBRAM, *The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary, 1879-1914*, 2 vols.; WERTHEIMER, *Graf Julius Andrassy*, 3 vols. (1910-13).

CHAPTER XXI

ENGLAND TO THE REFORM-BILL OF 1832

The best bibliographies on English history during the nineteenth century are in vols. XI and XII of HUNT and POOLE's *Political History of England*. These are arranged under topics and are not mere lists of titles but are critical and descriptive, and constitute a very valuable guide. There are lists, without criticism, in connection with the various chapters of the *Cambridge Modern History*. G. M. TREVELYAN, *British History in the Nineteenth Century* (1922). Admirable general account. Treats political, social and economic history of Great Britain and to some extent of the Empire. TRAILL, *Social England*, vol. VI, contains useful bibliographies on many subjects not included in the preceding lists, such as literature, arts, sciences, industries, social life, etc. One can find source material in a form available for class use in CHEYNEY, *Readings in English History Drawn from the Original Sources* (1908), pp. 663-767; ADAMS and STEPHENS, *Select Documents of English Constitutional History* (1901), pp. 507-555; ROBINSON and BEARD, *Readings in Modern European History* (1909), vol. II, pp. 239-337; KENDALL, *Source-Book of English History* (1900), pp. 381-465; LEE, *Source-Book of English History* (1900), pp. 497-585. The fullest and most informing general history of this period is WALPOLE, *History of England Since 1815* (1890), reaching to 1856, a work of solid scholarship and abundantly supplied with references to authorities; indispensable. MOLESWORTH, *History of England*, 3 vols., is particularly full on the reform movements; account of the reform of 1832 exceptionally good. BRODERICK and FOTHERINGHAM, vol. XI, in HUNT and POOLE, *The Political History of England*, covering years 1801-1837, a book marked by good judgment and accuracy, but overloaded with detail; a clear, substantial, and dry résumé. See, also, BRIGHT, *History of England*, vol. III; TRAILL, *Social England*, vol. VI, illustrated edit., more an encyclopedia of history than a history itself, with articles by specialists on many different departments of the national life, religion, laws, learning, arts, industry, commerce, manners. The political sections are the least satisfactory. The illustrations are numerous and admirable. A. L. CROSS, *A History of England and Greater Britain* (1914), pp. 867-1089 cover the period from 1815 to 1914. The *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, 1783-1919*, in process of publication under the editorship of Sir A. W. WARD and G. P. GOOCH, will undoubtedly be the standard work on this subject. Vol. I appeared in 1922 and covers

the period from 1783 to 1815, vol. II (1923), covers period from 1815 to 1866. OMAN, *England in the Nineteenth Century* (1899), a sketch of no great importance, readable but not always impartial. On Catholic Emancipation: see, BRYCE, *Two Centuries of Irish History*, pp. 272-314; W. E. H. LECKY, *Leaders of Public Opinion in Ireland*, 2 vols. (new edit., 1903). Vol. II is a life of O'Connell; SHAW-LEFEVRE, G. J., *Peel and O'Connell. A Review of the Irish Policy of Parliament from the Union to the Death of Sir Robert Peel* (1887), pp. 1-13; PARKER, C. S., *Sir Robert Peel*, 3 vols. (1899); vol. I, chaps. IX-XII; vol. II, chaps. III-V. On the movement for parliamentary reform: see, MOLESWORTH, *History of England*, vol. I; MCCARTHY, *Epoch of Reform*, a convenient and clear, brief account; ROSE, J. H., *The Rise and Growth of Democracy in Great Britain* (1898), chaps. I and II. An indispensable work for the understanding of the political system of England before the Reform is PORRITT, E and A. G., *The Unreformed House of Commons*, 2 vols. (1903), a clear, full, authoritative description of the representative system in England, not at all a description of the Reform itself. On the Reform consult, also, WALPOLE, *Life of Lord John Russell*; TREVELYAN, G. M., *Lord Grey of the Reform Bill* (1920) and STUART REID, *Life and Letters of Lord Durham*, 2 vols. (1906). Books important for understanding the movement of ideas are KENT, C. B. R., *The English Radicals* (1899); SIR LESLIE STEPHEN, *The English Utilitarians* (1900), both valuable for the history of the radical party; DICEY, A. V., *Lectures on the Relation between Law and Public Opinion in England during the Nineteenth Century* (1905), a masterly exposition, commentary, and criticism; indispensable for the history of the whole century; contains an admirable statement of the influence of Bentham upon the legislation; valuable footnotes. On the foreign policy of Canning, the *Life of Canning* by H. W. V. TEMPERLEY (1905) is useful. Written from the point of view of an advocate and defender. Chaps. VIII-XII contain some new material on England and the Holy Alliance, the Congresses, America, and Greece. STAPLETON's older *Political Life of George Canning*, 3 vols. (1831), is very valuable for foreign relations. W. CUNNINGHAM, *The Growth of English Industry and Commerce in Modern Times*, 3 vols., is best on the period before the nineteenth century. Vol. III, covering period from 1776-1850, does little more than touch on general aspects. Important matters are treated very slightly — as, for instance, the work of Huskisson.

CHAPTER XXII

ENGLAND BETWEEN TWO GREAT REFORMS

On this period, WALPOLE, *History of England Since 1815*, remains the most important account. Vols. III, IV, V, and VI cover the period from 1832–1856; and the same author brings his narrative down to 1880 in his *History of Twenty-five Years*, 4 vols. (1904–1908), of which vols. I and II concern the period treated in this chapter. MOLESWORTH'S *History of England* and TRAILL'S *Social England*, vol. VI, continue useful. The volume by LOW and SANDERS in the *Political History of England* covers the whole reign of Victoria (1837–1901), and is the best single volume on the subject. It is a clear, solid, and substantial history of political warfare and parliamentary proceedings, but is colorless and overloaded with details. Its critical bibliography is a very useful feature of the book. JUSTIN MCCARTHY, *History of Our Own Times*, covers the Queen's reign in 5 vols., is written by a journalist and active politician, is very readable, interesting for its portraits of important persons and its description of events, but is diffuse and sometimes trivial. MCCARTHY, J., *Short History of Our Own Times* (1908), 1 vol., treats the entire reign. HERBERT PAUL, *A History of Modern England*, 5 vols. (1904–1906), covers the years from 1846 to 1895, is a direct and vivid narrative limited largely to parliamentary proceedings, with, however, chapters on literature and theology and ecclesiastical disputes; no treatment of social and economic problems and changes; written with dash and emphasis, always confident, frequently partisan; standpoint that of a Gladstonian Liberal.

The biographical literature on this period is very extensive. Two excellent biographies of Queen Victoria are those by SIDNEY LEE (1903) and LYTTON STRACHEY (1921); both have useful bibliographies. Of very great value are *The Letters of Queen Victoria*, edited by BENSON and FISHER, in 3 vols. (1907). There are two editions of this work, one costing three pounds, the other costing six shillings, the latter not sold, at present, in the United States. This is a selection from the Queen's correspondence between the years 1837 and 1861, very important as proving the Queen's ability and worth, her seriousness and intelligence as a ruler; also, as throwing much light on the characters and conduct of important statesmen, Melbourne, Peel, Palmerston, Russell, and others. A work of great historical significance.

Brief biographies of the leading statesmen of the realm are contained in the series called *The Prime Ministers of Queen Victoria*;

edited by STUART J. REID, a volume devoted to each. MORLEY'S *Life of W. E. Gladstone*, 3 vols. (1903), and *Life of Richard Cobden* (1881); DALLING'S and ASHLEY'S *Life of Palmerston* (1879); MONYPENNY and BUCKLE'S *Life of Disraeli*, 6 vols. (1910-1920); ROBERTSON'S *Life of John Bright* (1889); G. M. TREVELYAN'S *Life of John Bright* (1913) and *Life of Lord Grey*; WALPOLE'S *Life of Lord John Russell*, 2 vols. (1879); S. J. REID'S *Lord John Russell* (1895); ROSEBERRY'S *Sir Robert Peel* (1899); SIR T. MARTIN'S *Life of the Prince Consort*, 5 vols. (1874-1880); HODDER'S *Life of the Seventh Earl of Shaftesbury*, 3 vols. (1886); FRANK PODMORE'S *Life of Robert Owen*, 2 vols. (1906); and GRAHAM WALLAS'S *Life of Francis Place* (1891), are among the most useful biographies on the period.

On Chartism: see, R. G. GAMMAGE, *History of Chartism* (1894); CARLYLE, T., *Chartism*; P. W. SLOSSON, *The Decline of the Chartist Movement* (1916); E. DOLLÉANS, *Le chartisme, 1830-1848*, (1912-1913); ROSE, *The Rise of Democracy*, chaps. VI, VII, and VIII; THOMAS COOPER'S *Life*, Written by Himself (1872). On Free Trade movement: ARMITAGE-SMITH, *The Free Trade Movement* (1898); MORLEY, *Life of Cobden*; DISRAELI, *Life of Sir George Bentinck*; PARKER, C. S., *Sir Robert Peel*, 3 vols. (1899), vol. III, an important collection of Peel's correspondence; also, *Memoirs of Sir Robert Peel*, 2 vols. (1856-1857). See, also, J. S. NICHOLSON, *History of the English Corn Laws* (1904). On factory legislation: B. L. HUTCHINS and L. HARRISON, *History of Factory Legislation* (1903). On the American Civil War: see, WALPOLE, *History of Twenty-five Years*, vol. II, chap. VIII. On constitutional questions: see, SIR THOMAS ERSKINE MAY, *Constitutional History of England*; TASWELL-LANGMEAD, *English Constitutional History*; G. B. ADAMS, *Constitutional History of England*.

CHAPTER XXIII

ENGLAND UNDER GLADSTONE AND DISRAELI

For this period, the general histories are: WALPOLE, *History of Twenty-five Years*, vols. II, III, and IV (coming down to 1880); PAUL, *History of Modern England*, vols. III and IV; BRIGHT, *History of England*, vol. IV, pp. 450-577; vol. V, pp. 1-87; MCCARTHY, *History of Our Own Times*, vols. II and III; LOW and SANDERS, pp. 223-376; TRAILL'S *Social England*. MORLEY'S *Life of Gladstone* is indispensable, written by a close personal friend, an experienced politician, and a master of historical prose. MONYPENNY and

BUCKLE's *Life of Disraeli*, 6 vols. (1910-20), is the standard biography; very valuable for the history of the period. FROUDE's biography of Beaconsfield in the Queen's Prime Ministers series, is brief, superficial, and is very poor on the administration 1874-1880. BRYCE has an essay on Lord Beaconsfield in his *Studies in Contemporary Biography* (1903), and SIR SPENCER WALPOLE one in his *Studies in Biography* (1907). T. S. KEBBEL, *Selected Speeches of the Earl of Beaconsfield*, 2 vols. (1882), is useful. Lady GWENDOLIN CECIL's *Life of Lord Salisbury* is important, 2 vols. (1922). FITZMAURICE, *Life of Earl Granville*, 2 vols. (1905), vol. II, and WINSTON CHURCHILL, *Lord Randolph Churchill*, 2 vols. (1906), are important for the period. On Ireland: JOHNSTON and SPENCER, *Ireland's Story*; BRYCE, J., *Two Centuries of Irish History* (1888); J. MCCARTHY, *Ireland and Her Story*; W. O. MORRIS, *Ireland, 1798-1898* (1898); W. P. O'BRIEN, *The Great Famine* (1896); R. B. O'BRIEN, *Parliamentary History of the Irish Land Question* (1880), *Fifty Years of Concessions to Ireland*, 2 vols. (1883-1885), *Irish Wrongs and English Remedies* (1887). G. SHAW-LEFEVRE, *English and Irish Land Questions* (1881); A. G. RICHEY, *The Irish Land Laws* (1880); E. BARKER, *Ireland in the Last Fifty Years, 1866-1918* (1919); D. A. CHART, *Economic History of Ireland* (1920); E. R. TURNER, *Ireland and England* (1919).

CHAPTER XXIV

ENGLAND FROM 1886 TO 1914

The most satisfactory account of recent English history is J. F. BRIGHT, *History of England*, vol. V, 1880-1901, a book of solid merits; clearness of arrangement, directness of narrative, and remarkable freedom from partisanship. For the period of this chapter; see also, LOW and SANDERS, pp. 366-489; PAUL, *Modern England*, vol. V; MCCARTHY, *Our Own Times*, vol. III, chaps. X-XXV. Of the first importance for the Home Rule bills is MORLEY, *Life of Gladstone*, vol. III, a book that by reason of Morley's intimacy with Gladstone at this time has practically the value of a source; see, also, CHURCHILL's *Lord Randolph Churchill*, vol. II, and FITZMAURICE's *Life of Earl Granville*, vol. II, chaps. XIII-XIV, authoritative biographies, based on letters and documents. Churchill's great influence on the Conservative party is clearly shown by the former. Consult, also, R. B. O'BRIEN, *Life of Charles Stewart Parnell*, 3 vols. (1898). Interesting personal descriptions and appreciations of Glad-

stone are JAMES BRYCE, *William Ewart Gladstone*, in his *Studies in Contemporary Biography* (also published separately), and SIR E. W. HAMILTON, *Mr. Gladstone, a Monograph* (1898). LORD ROSEBERY, *Lord Randolph Churchill* (1896), is also suggestive. TRAILL, *Life of the Marquis of Salisbury*, contains practically nothing after 1886. H. WHATES, *The Third Salisbury Administration* (1895-1900), is a useful book, containing maps and diplomatic papers bearing on the South African war. C. W. BOYD, editor, *Speeches of Joseph Chamberlain* 2 vols. (1914); MORLEY, *Recollections*, 2 vols. 1917.

On Ireland, a very important monograph is L. PAUL DUBOIS, *Contemporary Ireland* (1908). This is an English translation of *L'Irlande contemporaine* (Paris, 1907). Paul Dubois was the son-in-law of Taine. His book is largely historical and is useful for the whole nineteenth century. It contains a full discussion of the land question, and educational, economic, and religious problems.

On the revived interest in the question of Protection and Free Trade: see, G. ARMITAGE-SMITH, *The Free Trade Movement and Its Results* (1898); W. SMART, *The Return of Protection* (1903); W. J. ASHLEY, *The Tariff Problem* (1903); W. CUNNINGHAM, *The Rise and Decline of the Free Trade Movement* (2nd ed., 1905). These represent various points of view. While the theoretical economists like Marshall at Cambridge, and Edgeworth at Oxford, adhered to the belief in free trade, the economic historians, Cunningham and Ashley, adopted the Chamberlain programme on the ground that the rise of industrial rivals and the decline of her own resources had created a critical situation for England, and that one way of recovering or maintaining her leadership was a closer union of the empire, which, it was held, a system of protection would facilitate. An interesting general view by an outside observer is to be found in CARL JOHANNES FUCHS, *The Trade Policy of Great Britain and Her Colonies Since 1860*, a German book translated by C. H. M. ARCHIBALD (1905). On education: see, SIR HENRY CRAIK, *The State in its Relation to Education* (2nd edit., 1896); GRAHAM BALFOUR, *The Educational Systems of Great Britain and Ireland* (2nd edit., 1903), a comprehensive account of general education in the United Kingdom during the nineteenth century, based on departmental reports and the blue books of the numerous commissions which have investigated the subject; full of precise information. A very useful comparison of the systems of England, the United States, France, and Germany, is to be found in R. E. HUGHES, *The Making of Citizens: A Study in Comparative Education* (1902). On government: see, A. L. LOWELL, *The Government of England*, 2 vols. (1908), by far the most authoritative, comprehensive, and illuminating treatise on the

subject; a study, moreover, broadly conceived; indispensable not only for its profound and clear analysis and description of British government, imperial, national, and local, but for the light it throws upon party machinery and party programmes or tendencies. Other useful books on English government are the various volumes of the English Citizen Series, edited by HENRY CRAIK; also, A. V. DICEY, *The Law of the Constitution of the United Kingdom* (1885); SIDNEY LOW, *The Governance of England* (1904). An excellent brief description is T. F. MORAN, *The Theory and Practice of the English Government* (new edit., 1908). F. A. OGG, *The Governments of Europe* (1913), chaps. I-VIII. BAGEHOT, *English Constitution*, and BOUTMY, *The English Constitution*, are also useful. Of the first importance is ANSON, *Law and Custom of the Constitution*, 2 vols. (1892). See, also, ALPHEUS TODD, *Parliamentary Government in England*, 2 vols. (2nd edit., 1887-1889). A useful abridgment and revision of this work was made by Sir Spencer Walpole and published in 1892. SIR COURTNEY ILBERT, *Legislative Methods and Forms* (Oxford, 1901), is an authority. The fullest historical account of parliamentary procedure is REDLICH, J., *The Procedure of the House of Commons, a Study of its History and Present Form*, 3 vols. (1908). On political parties before the war see: LORD HUGH CECIL, *Conservatism* (1912); L. T. HOBBHOUSE, *Liberalism* (1911); A. W. HUMPHREY, *History of Labor Representation* (1912); S. P. ORTH, *Socialism and Democracy in Europe* (1913); ch. IX. On social legislation before the war see C. J. H. HAYES, *British Social Politics* (1913). Consult on history of trade unions S. & B. WEBB, *The History of Trade Unionism* (1911) and *Industrial Democracy* (1911).

CHAPTER XXV

THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

On the general subject of European colonial expansion, the most extensive work is ALFRED ZIMMERMANN's *Die europäischen Kolonien* (1896-1903). Five volumes have appeared. The first volume treats of the colonial policy of Spain and Portugal to the present, the second that of Great Britain to the American Revolution, the third that of Great Britain since the American Revolution, the fourth that of France to the present, the fifth that of the Netherlands. The volumes are well supplied with bibliographies and maps. CHARLES DE LANNOY and HERMANN VAN DER LINDEN have undertaken a work called *Histoire de l'expansion coloniale des peuples européens*, intended to

show how each nation has acquired its colonies, how it has developed them, what the characteristics of each are. Three volumes thus far since 1907 (Brussels), with bibliography and maps. They give an account of Portuguese and Spanish, Dutch, Danish and Swedish colonies. A useful book is PAUL LEROY-BEAULIEU'S *La colonisation chez les peuples modernes*, 2 vols. (6th edit., 1908).

On English colonial expansion in general: ZIMMERMANN, cited above; H. E. EGERTON, *A Short History of British Colonial Policy* (1897); covers the period from Cabot, 1497, down, treating British colonization as a continuous movement; the latter part concerns the nineteenth century; a careful, thoughtful book. By the same author, *The Origin and Growth of the English Colonies and of their System of Government* (Oxford, 1904), being an introduction to LUCAS'S *Historical Geography of the British Colonies*. Contains very interesting chapters on the labor problem in new colonies, on the introduction of responsible government, on the problem of the future relations between the colonies and the mother country; also, a chronological outline of the various acquisitions made by Great Britain during the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries. SIR CHARLES DILKE, *Problems of Greater Britain* (1890), had a great influence in educating English opinion to the importance of the Empire and is full of information; by the same author, *The British Empire* (1899), a sort of bird's-eye view. C. P. LUCAS'S *Historical Geography of the British Empire*, 7 vols., new edit., 1906-, in course of publication, is of the first importance, comprehensive, accurate, containing much historical matter. W. H. WOODWARD'S *Short History of the Expansion of the British Empire, 1500-1870* (Cambridge, 1899), is a useful epitome. E. J. PAYNE, *Colonies and Colonial Federations* (1904), studies the Empire from geographical, historical, economic, and political points of view. See, also, GRESWELL, W. P., *The Growth and Administration of British Colonies, 1837-1897* (1898). J. R. SEELEY, *Expansion of England*, is useful for an understanding of the general subject. *The British Empire Series*, 5 vols. (1899-1902), contains a large amount of information, historical, political, economic, conditions for colonization, outlook for the future, etc.; vol. I concerns India; vol. II, British Africa; vol. III, British America; vol. IV, Australia. BRYCE'S *Studies in History and Jurisprudence* contain very important studies on The Roman Empire and the British Empire in India, on Two South African Constitutions, and on the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia. Consult, also, on the Empire: LOWELL, *The Government of England*, vol. II, chaps. LIV-LVIII; *Cambridge Modern History*, vol. XI, chaps. XXVI and XXVII, with bibliographies; also, for colonial

development from 1815–1852, mainly in South Africa and Australia: WALPOLE's *History of England Since 1815*, vol. VI, pp. 325–379; also A. T. STORY, *The British Empire* (Story of the Nations Series). ALPHEUS TODD, *Parliamentary Government in the British Colonies* (2nd edit., 1894), is an authoritative treatment of the operation of responsible government in the colonies.

On India: see, *Cambridge Modern History*, vol. XI, chap. XXVI (from 1815 to 1869); R. W. FRASER, *British Rule in India* (Story of the Nations Series); BOULGER, *India in the Nineteenth Century* (1901); DIGBY, *Prosperous British India* (1901), a severe arraignment of British government in India; M. INNES, *The Sepoy Revolt* (1897); SIR JOHN KAYE, *The Sepoy War*, 3 vols. (1864–1876), completed by G. B. MALLESON (1878–1880); G. W. FORREST, *A History of the Indian Mutiny, Reviewed and Illustrated from Original Documents*, 2 vols. (1904); G. B. MALLESON, *The Indian Mutiny of 1857* (1891); LILLY, *India and Its Problems*. A. L. LOWELL has a valuable chapter on the Civil Service of India in his *Colonial Civil Service* (1900). SIR COURTNEY ILBERT, *The Government of India* (1898), is pronounced by LOWELL to be "by far the best work on the public law of India." The *Cambridge History of India*, will, when completed, be a most valuable work on Indian history in general. SIR VALENTINE CHIROL, *India Old and New* (1921).

On Canada: Bibliography may be found in the *A. L. A. Annotated Guide to the Literature of American History*, edited by J. N. LARNED (1902); bibliographies also in *Cambridge Modern History*, vol. XI, and in Low and SANDERS, *History of England, 1837–1901*. Good brief histories are: SIR JOHN BOURINOT, *Canada Under British Rule, 1760–1900*; C. G. D. ROBERTS, *History of Canada* (1904). Kingsford's elaborate history in ten volumes only reaches 1841. On Lord Durham's mission: see, F. BRADSHAW, *Self-Government in Canada and How it was Achieved, the Story of Lord Durham's Report* (London, 1903); eight chapters are devoted to a careful account of the history of Canada to the outbreak of the Rebellion, and show the growth of the demand for responsible government; see, also, S. J. REID, *Life and Letters of Lord Durham*, 2 vols. (1906), a very laudatory book but full of information concerning Lord Durham's work in Canada. LORD DURHAM's *Report* was republished in London in 1901. Perhaps the best manual dealing with the constitutional history of Canada is SIR JOHN BOURINOT's *A Manual of the Constitutional History of Canada* (1901). *Canadian Constitutional Development*, by H. E. EGERTON and W. L. GRANT (1907), contains speeches and despatches pertinent to the subject, with introduction

and notes; see, also, WILLIAM HOUSTON, *Documents Illustrative of the Canadian Constitution* (1891). *Canada and the Empire*, by E. MONTAGUE and B. HERBERT (1904), is written from an imperialist standpoint. HOLLAND, B., *Imperium et Libertas. A Study in History and Politics* (1901); pp. 95-190 treat Canadian history from 1763 to 1867. BRYCE, J., *Modern Democracies* (2 vols. 1921). Vol. I pp. 455-508 has an important treatment of Canadian government and politics.

On Australasia: see, the excellent *History of the Australasian Colonies* by E. JENKS (1895), which comes down to 1893; also, G. TREGARTHEN, *Australian Commonwealth* (Story of the Nations Series); comes down to 1891; also an admirable volume by J. D. ROGERS in LUCAS'S *Historical Geography of the British Colonies*, vol. VI (1907). The most valuable work for the recent constitutional development is *The Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth* by SIR J. QUICK and R. R. GARRAN (Sidney, 1901). This contains a full history of the movement toward federation and of each clause of the constitution. W. H. MOORE, *The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia* (1902), is an important commentary. BRYCE has a useful account of the making and character of the constitution in his *Studies in History and Jurisprudence*. See also, BRYCE, *Modern Democracies* (1921), vol. II. pp. 166-264 for a valuable examination of Australian history, parties and policies. Same volume, pp. 265-332 treats institutions and problems of New Zealand. On social and economic conditions and measures and experiments: see, REEVES, *The Long White Cloud* (1899), and *State Experiments in Australia and New Zealand*, 2 vols. (1902); H. D. LLOYD, *Newest England* (New Zealand and Australia) (1900); V. S. CLARK, *The Labor Movement in Australia* (1906). A serviceable book is by B. R. WISE, entitled *The Commonwealth of Australia* (Boston, 1909), a description of the country, of political institutions, of industrial legislation, etc. On New Zealand: see, also, SIR ARTHUR P. DOUGLAS, *The Dominion of New Zealand* (1909).

For South Africa: see, G. M. THEAL, *South Africa* (Story of the Nations Series, 1894); pp. 138-387 cover the years 1815-1890; FRANK R. CANA, *South Africa from the Great Trek to the Union* (1909). An excellent account of the history of Europeans in South Africa down to 1895 is contained in BRYCE'S *Impressions of South Africa* (1897), pp. 99-182. A clear account of the causes and early course of the Boer war is given in BRIGHT'S *History of England*, vol. V, pp 234-266. Many of the important state papers, mostly English, bearing on this war, are in LARNED, *History for Ready Reference*, vol. VI, pp. 456-517. For the Boer side of the case:

see, the *Memoirs of PAUL KRUGER*. SIR A. CONAN DOYLE, *The Great Boer War* (1902), is a useful narrative, from the British standpoint. The *TIMES History of the War in South Africa*, edited by L. C. AMERY, vols. I-IV (1900-1906), is very detailed. G. P. GOOCH, *History of Modern Europe 1878-1919* (1923), has a chapter of this war (ch. 9). On the literature of the South African War: see, *American Historical Review*, vol. XII, pp. 299-321. Concerning the federation movement: see, R. H. BRAND, *The Union of South Africa* (1909), which contains the South Africa Act of 20th September, 1909, an account of its elaboration and adoption and a study of its provisions. See also, W. B. WORSFOLD, *The Union of South Africa* (1912); B. R. WISE, *The Making of the Australian Commonwealth, 1889-1900* (1913).

On the reaction of imperialism upon the mother country: see, RICHARD JEBB, *Studies in Colonial Nationalism* (1905); contains chapters on Canada, From Colonies to Commonwealth (Australia), New Zealand, South African War, the Colonial Conference of 1902, Nationalism in Tariffs, and Imperial Partnership. See, also, J. W. ROOT, *Colonial Tariffs* (Liverpool, 1906); CARL JOHANNES FUCHS, *The Trade Policy of Great Britain and her Colonies Since 1860* (1905). See, also, BERNARD HOLLAND, *Imperium et Libertas* (1901), pp. 265-319. An important work concerning the colonies, is *The Legislation of the Empire: Being a Survey of the Legislative Enactments of the British Dominions from 1898 to 1909*. Edited by C. E. A. BEDWELL, with a preface by LORD ROSEBERY, 4 vols. (1909). Contains about 25,000 acts and ordinances.

CHAPTER XXVI

AFRICA

For explorations in Africa: see, *David Livingstone*, by THOMAS HUGHES (1889); (by LIVINGSTONE himself), *Missionary Travels and Researches in South Africa* (1857), and *Last Journals in Central Africa*, from 1865 to death, edited by WALLER (1875); H. M. STANLEY, *How I Found Livingstone; Travels, Adventures, and Discoveries in Central Africa* (1872); *Through the Dark Continent or the Sources of the Nile*, 2 vols. (1878); *The Congo and the Founding of Its Free State*, 2 vols. (1885); *In Darkest Africa*, 2 vols. (1890); *The Autobiography of Henry M. Stanley*, edited by his wife, DOROTHY STANLEY (1909), chaps. XIII, XV-XVIII; V. L. CAMERON, *Across Africa* (1876); CARL PETERS, *New*

Light on Dark Africa (1891). A very useful collection of contemporary accounts is, *Africa and Its Exploration, as Told by Its Explorers*, 2 vols. (London, Sampson Low, Marston & Co., no date). See, also, ROBERT BROWN, *Story of Africa*, 4 vols. (1894-1895).

On the partition of Africa, the most important book is J. SCOTT KELTIE, *The Partition of Africa* (1895); see, also, EMILE BANNING, *Le partage politique de l'Afrique d'après les transactions internationales les plus récentes, 1885-1888* (1888); A. S. WHITE, *The Development of Africa. A Study in Applied Geography* (2nd edit., 1892); for a short account, ROSE, J. H., *The Development of European Nations*, vol. II, chap. VII. SIR HARRY JOHNSTON, *History of the Colonization of Africa by Alien Races* (1899), is a very useful manual, compressing a large amount of information into a small compass; written by a man who is an authority on African affairs, having traveled extensively in that continent, and having been consul and administrator there; describes the efforts of the Portuguese, Dutch, English, and the other nations; has brief chapters on the history of the slave trade, of exploration, of missions, etc. SIR EDWARD HERTSLET, *The Map of Africa by Treaty*, 3 vols. (ed. 1909), invaluable; H. T. JOHNSTON; *The Opening up of Africa* (1911); H. A. GIBBONS, *The New Map of Africa* (1916).

On England in Egypt: ROSE, *Development of European Nations*, vol. II, chaps. IV-VI; CROMER, *Modern Egypt*, 2 vols. (1908), practically a history of Egypt from 1876 to 1908, of the Dual Control which was succeeded by the Single Control of England, by the man who was the British representative in Egypt for twenty-seven years. An invaluable book, marked by a wealth of precise information, by positiveness, by judicial temper, and by an extraordinary detachment of view. Is, to a considerable degree, an historical source as well as a history. For an important review of this book by LORD BRYCE, see, *American Historical Review*, vol. XIV, pp. 357-362. On the British intervention and the Gordon chapter one should consult in addition to Cromer: MORLEY's *Gladstone*, vol. III, and FITZMAURICE's *Granville*, vol. II. Other important books on Egypt are: SIR ALFRED MILNER's *England in Egypt* (11th edit., 1904); SIR A. COLVIN's *The Making of Modern Egypt* (2nd edit., 1906); A. METIN's *La Transformation de l'Egypte* (1903); J. C. ROUX, *L'Isthme et le Canal de Suez*, 2 vols. (1901). Popular accounts are E. DICEY, *Story of the Khedivate* (1902), and *The Egypt of the Future* (1906). The story of Kitchener's campaign is told by G. W. STEEVENS, *With Kitchener to Khartum* (1898). On the Congo Free State, ROSE, *Development of European Nations*, vol. II, chap. VIII.

CHAPTER XXVII

SPAIN AND PORTUGAL

There is no satisfactory history of Spain in the nineteenth century in English. BUTLER CLARKE'S *Modern Spain, 1815-1898*, is the fullest, but is overloaded with details, not effectively presented. Pages 91-470 cover the period of this chapter. A bibliography is appended. HUME, *Modern Spain, 1788-1898* (1899), is a shorter and more interesting account; pages 248-563 treat the period 1823-1898. There are brief chapters in *Cambridge Modern History*, vol. X, chap. VII, and vol. XI, chap. XX, bringing the history down to 1871.

HUBBARD, *Histoire contemporaine de l'Espagne*, 6 vols. (1869-1883), is useful, treating the period 1814 to 1868. Vols. III and IV cover the years 1833 to 1843, and vols. V and VI the reign of Isabella II, 1843-1868. YVES GUYOT, *L'Évolution politique et sociale de l'Espagne* (1899), is mainly a description of social, political, and economic conditions, not a history. Consult also A. MARVAUD, *La question sociale en Espagne* (1910); same author's *L'Espagne au XX^e siècle* (1913).

In German, see, BAUMGARTEN, H., *Geschichte Spaniens vom Ausbruch der französischen Revolution bis auf unsere Tage*, 3 vols. (1865-1871). Vol. II treats of the restoration of Ferdinand, the revolution of 1820, and the subsequent intervention (1814-1825); vol. III, the remainder of Ferdinand's reign and the Carlist wars. A more recent German work is GUSTAV DIERCKS, *Geschichte Spaniens von der frühesten Zeiten bis auf die Gegenwart*, 2 vols. (1895-1896); pp. 544-674 concern our period. E. H. STROBEL, *The Spanish Revolution, 1868-1875* (Boston, 1898), is a clear and comprehensive account of the parliamentary history of Spain during the six years from the overthrow of Isabella II to the restoration of Alfonso XII. The book also throws much light on the manipulation of parliamentary institutions in Spain. H. REMSEN WHITEHOUSE, *The Sacrifice of a Throne* (1897), is the best description we have of the election, reign, and abdication of Amadeo of Savoy. HANNAY, D., *Don Emilio Castelar* (1896), a life of the republican leader. On the colonies: see, J. W. ROOT, *Spain and Its Colonies* (1898); ZIMMERMANN, A., *Die europäischen Kolonien*, vol. I, *Die Kolonialpolitik Portugals und Spaniens* (1899); H. W. WILSON, *The Downfall of Spain* (1900), is a naval history of the Spanish-American war of 1898.

On constitutional history: see, GMELIN, *Studien zur spanischen Verfassungsgeschichte des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts* (Stuttgart,

1905); also, J. L. M. CURRY, *Constitutional Government in Spain* (1899). Curry was United States Minister to Spain from 1885 to 1889. The constitution itself is in DODD, *Modern Constitutions*, vol. II. On Portugal in the nineteenth century, there is a slight sketch of the years 1815 to 1880 in H. MORSE STEPHENS, *Portugal* (Story of the Nations Series, 1891), pp. 409-432; see, also, chapters in *Cambridge Modern History* cited above. On the colonies: see ZIMMERMAN, *op. cit.*; MARVAUD, A., *Le Portugal et ses colonies* (1912); G. M. THEAL, *The Portuguese in South Africa* (1896). Hans Meyer, *Das portugiesische Kolonialreich der Gegenwart* (1918); E. Peixotto, *Spain and Portugal* (1922). See, in general, GEORGE YOUNG, *Portugal, Old and Young* (1917).

CHAPTER XXVIII

HOLLAND AND BELGIUM AFTER 1830

For Holland and Belgium: consult, *Cambridge Modern History*, vol. X, chap. XVI, and vol. XI, chap. XXIII; LAVISSE et RAMBAUD, *Histoire générale*, vol. X, chap. IX, vol. XI, chap. XI, vol. XII, chap. VI; also SEIGNOBOS, *Political History of Europe Since 1814*, chap. VIII. The best history of Holland in the last century is: BLOK, *Geschiedenis van het Nederlandsche Volk*; vol. VII (1907) covers the French period and the history of the United Netherlands to the secession of Belgium; vol. VIII (1908) continues the narrative down to the opening of the twentieth century; an impartial, critical, scientific work, containing much more than simply political history. This work has been translated into English under the title *History of the Netherlands*, 5 vols. (1898-1912). CLIVE DAY, *The Policy and Administration of the Dutch in Java* (1904), is a book of the first importance. On Belgium: see, SMYTHE, C., *The Story of Belgium* (Story of the Nations Series, 1900); T. JUSTE, *Léopold I, Roi des Belges, d'après les documents inédits*, 2 vols. (1868); BERTRAND, L., *Léopold II et son règne 1865-1890* (Brussels, 1890); WILMOTTE, M., *La Belgique morale et politique, 1830-1890* (Brussels, 1902); MACDONNELL, J. de C., *King Leopold II, His Rule in Belgium and the Congo* (London, 1905); BERTRAND, L., *Histoire de la démocratie et du socialisme en Belgique depuis 1830*, 2 vols. (Brussels, 1907); comes down to 1905; FLANDIN, E., *Institutions politiques de l'Europe contemporaine* (Paris, 1907), vol. I, pp. 160-307; BANNING, E., *La Belgique au point de vue militaire et internationale* (Brussels, 1901); DUPRIEZ, LÉON, *L'organisation du suffrage universel en Belgique. Vote plural, vote obligatoire, repré-*

sentation proportionnelle (Paris, 1901). Constitution of Belgium in DODD, *Modern Constitutions*, vol. I. J. BARTHÉLEMY, *L'Organisation du suffrage et l'expérience belge* (1912), excellent study of Belgian political institutions. ROWNTREE, S., *Land and Labor: Lessons from Belgium* (1910). Author is an English sociologist. ENSOR, R. C. K., *Belgium* (1915), has informing chapters on the Belgian constitution, politics and parties, social conditions and art and literature. H. VAN DER LINDEN, *Belgium* (1920).

CHAPTER XXIX

SWITZERLAND

There are in English only brief accounts of Swiss history since 1815. See, *Cambridge Modern History*, vol. XI, chap. VIII, down to 1874; SEIGNOBOS, *Political History of Europe since 1814*, chap. IX; HUG and STEAD, *Switzerland* (Story of the Nations Series, 1890), pp. 382-421; comes down to 1889. McCracken, W. D., *The Rise of the Swiss Republic* (2nd edit., 1901), pp. 319-372; see, also, BAKER, F. G., *The Model Republic. A History of the Rise and Progress of the Swiss People* (1895), pp. 462-538. The most important work is SEIPPEL, PAUL, *La Suisse au dix-neuvième siècle*, 3 vols. (Lausanne, 1899-1900). A coöperative work by a group of Swiss writers. The section on the political history of Switzerland in the nineteenth century, vol. I, pp. 51-378, is by NUMA DROZ, a former President of the Confederation. The work also contains very valuable chapters on the history of institutions, on constitutional, civil, and criminal law, on the international rôle of Switzerland, on education, religion, economic history, arts, etc. KARL DÄNDLIKER, *A Short History of Switzerland*, translated by E. SALISBURY (London, 1899), has a section covering the period 1813-1874, pp. 237-294. On Swiss political institutions, the best book in English is J. M. VINCENT, *Government in Switzerland* (1900); contains the federal constitution and an excellent critical chapter on the literature of the subject. BORGEAUD, C., *Adoption and Amendment of Constitutions*, translated by C. D. HAZEN (1895), pp. 258-332, is important for the evolution of Swiss constitutional law. LOWELL, A. L., *Governments and Parties in Continental Europe*, vol. II, chaps. XI-XIII, contains an admirable description of the political institutions of Switzerland and of the party history after 1848. Other books descriptive of Swiss institutions are: ADAMS, F. O., and CUNNINGHAM, C. D., *The Swiss Confederation* (1889); WINCHESTER, B., *The Swiss Republic* (1891); LLOYD, H. D.,

and HOBSON, J. A., *A Sovereign People; a Study of Swiss Democracy* (1907). An interesting study of democratic government in one of the *Landesgemeinde* cantons is I. B. RICHMAN's *Appenzell, Pure Democracy and Pastoral Life in Inner Rhoden* (1895). Contains chapters on politics, laws, administration, cantonal and domestic economy, education, charities, etc. Useful for the study of the referendum, is DEPLOIGE, *The Referendum in Switzerland*, translated by C. P. TREVELYAN (London, 1898); by a Belgian lawyer. W. H. DAWSON, *Social Switzerland, Studies of Present Day Social Movements and Legislation in the Swiss Republic* (London, 1897); contains chapters on the organization and protection of labor, on industrial peace, the problem of the unemployed, poor law agencies, technical education, control of the liquor traffic. BRYCE, J., *Modern Democracies* (1921). Vol. I, pp. 327-454, is an important study of Swiss political institutions and parties.

CHAPTER XXX

THE SCANDINAVIAN STATES

There is very little in English on the subject of this chapter. Useful brief accounts are to be found in BAIN, R. N., *Scandinavia, A Political History of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, from 1513 to 1900* (Cambridge, 1905); chap. XVI concerns Denmark since 1814; chap. XVII, Sweden and Norway since 1814; *Cambridge Modern History*, vol. XI, chap. XXIV, Scandinavia 1815-1870; SEIGNOBOS, *Political History of Europe*, chap. XVIII; LAVISSE et RAMBAUD, *Histoire générale*, vol. X, chap. XVIII; vol. XI, chap. XII; vol. XII, chap. VII, give an excellent, though brief narrative, covering the period 1815-1900. H. H. BOYESEN, *The History of Norway* (Story of the Nations Series, 1886), pp. 516-538. GJERSET, K., *History of the Norwegian People*, 2 vols. (1915), most important work on this subject in English; by an American scholar of Norwegian origin. P. DRACHMAN, *The Industrial Development and Commercial Policies of the three Scandinavian Countries* (1915). On the Norwegian-Swedish crisis: see, FRIDTJOF NANSEN's *Norway and the Union with Sweden* (London, 1905); an historical sketch from the Treaty of Kiel, 1814, through the dissolution of the Union; presents the Norwegian side. K. NORDLUND, *The Swedish-Norwegian Union Crisis, A History with Documents* (Stockholm, 1905), presents the Swedish side and criticises Nansen. Consult, also, MOHN, A., *La Suède et la révolution norvégienne* (Paris, 1905); FAHLBECK, P.,

La constitution suédoise et le parlementarisme moderne (Paris, 1905), a brief sketch of Swedish constitutional history and government. The constitutions of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, are in DODD, *Modern Constitutions*. Much useful, miscellaneous information is contained in SUNDBÄRG, *Sweden, Its People and Industries* (1900); WEITEMEYER, H., *Denmark* (London, 1891); and CARLSEN, OLRIC, and STARCKE, *Le Danemark, État actuel de sa civilisation et de son organisation sociale* (Copenhagen, 1900); a work published on the occasion of the Universal Exposition at Paris in 1900.

CHAPTER XXXI

THE DISRUPTION OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE RISE OF THE BALKAN STATES

There is no adequate treatment in English of the Eastern Question in its entirety. An admirable French book is ÉDOUARD DRIAULT, *La question d'Orient depuis ses origines jusqu'à la paix de Sèvres* (1920) (8th edit., 1921), a book that may be cordially recommended to any one desiring a guide to a very complicated and widely ramified branch of history. The author's conception of the Eastern Question is large, including not only the fate of the Ottoman Empire in Europe, but the decline of Islam in Europe, Asia, and Africa. After a brief sketch of the Byzantine and Latin Empires, the conquests of the Turks, DRIAULT traces the history of the Eastern Question in the eighteenth century, Napoleon's Oriental projects, the Greek war of independence, the internal reforms in Turkey, the Crimean war and its consequences, the war in the Balkans, the rise of the various states. Recent phases of the general problem are then treated: the Armenian Massacres, the Cretan problem, the Greco-Turkish war, the Macedonian question, and the relations of Occidental powers with Islam in Asia and Africa, the European War and its effects. The chief merit of the work lies, not in research, but in the orderly and effective arrangement and presentation of a mass of widely scattered information. The book contains useful bibliographical references to important secondary material.

A brief and able study of the Eastern Question by an American scholar is S. P. DUGGAN, *The Eastern Question: A Study in Diplomacy* (1902).

For the Slavs, an admirable and indispensable work is that of R. J. KERNER, *Slavic Europe, A Select Bibliography in the Western European Languages* (1918).

There is a useful though limited bibliography on the Eastern Question by GEORGES BENGESCO, *Essai d'une notice bibliographique sur la question d'Orient. Orient Européen, 1821-1897* (Brussels, 1897). This concerns only the question of Europe in Turkey and is limited to works published in France and Belgium. Bengesco was formerly Roumanian minister to Belgium. T. E. HOLLAND, *The European Concert in the Eastern Question*, contains many treaties, etc., bearing on the general question (1885).

The best single volume in English on Balkan history from the early migrations down to the present is that by Ferdinand Schevill, *The Balkans* (1922). Other useful recent books are N. FORBES, and others, *The Balkans: A History of Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, Roumania, Turkey* (1915); A. H. E. TAYLOR, *The Future of the Southern Slavs* (1917); LOUIS ANDRÉ, *Les états chrétiens des Balkans depuis 1815* (1918); W. S. DAVIS, *A Short History of the Near East* (1922).

On the Greek war of independence, there is a long and interesting chapter, sketching the Greek renaissance and describing vividly the military and diplomatic aspects of the stirring story in FYFFE, *History of Modern Europe*, vol. II, chap. IV (or chap. XV, in the one volume edition). W. ALLISON PHILLIPS, *The War of Greek Independence* (1897), treats the years 1821 to 1833. Having no adequate introduction, the book lacks background, but the narrative of events is full, fair, and interesting. It is not based upon original investigation but upon works of Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, Finlay, Gordon, and Prokesch-Osten. FINLAY, G., *History of the Greek Revolution*, is an important account, drawn largely upon the author's first-hand knowledge of events. Tozer's edition, 1877, is the best as representing Finlay's matured views. The *Letters and Journals of Samuel Gridley Howe*, edited by his daughter, LAURA E. RICHARDS, are very valuable; vol. I, entitled *The Greek Revolution* (Boston, 1906), throws a flood of light upon the course of the war. The volume is based almost entirely upon the journal of Howe, who, graduating from Brown University in 1821, and from Harvard Medical School in 1824, went immediately to Greece, joined the Greek army, created a surgical corps and also distinguished himself as a commander. His journal, though marked by serious gaps, is a vivid historical source for the years 1825 to 1829. Howe's volume called *Sketch of the Greek Revolution*, published in 1828, also abounds in graphic descriptions at first hand of men and events. Interesting sidelights on the Greek war are also to be found in the works of LORD BYRON, *Letters and Journals*, vol. VI, edited by ROWLAND E. PROTHERO (London, 1904).

Perhaps the most important recent account of this whole chapter of Greek history is in STERN, *Geschichte Europas*, vol. II, chaps. VII and XIV; vol. III, chaps. IV–VI; vol. IV, chap. X.

On the Crimean War: see, WALPOLE, *History of England Since 1815*, vol. VI, chap. XXIV; MCCARTHY, *History of Our Own Times*, vol. I, chaps. XXV–XXVIII; PAUL, *History of Modern England*, vol. I, chaps. XVII–XIX, and vol. II, chap. I. Paul's characterization of Napoleon III is so overdone as to approach the ridiculous. KINGLAKE's monumental *Invasion of the Crimea* (8 vols., 1863–1887) is a brilliant performance in a way, picturesque and full of detail, but is frequently amusingly portentous and Homeric in tone; is marked by a pronounced dislike of Napoleon III; and is, moreover, incomplete, stopping at the death of Lord Raglan. Probably the most informing and most interesting account, judicial as well, is that of GORCE in his *Histoire du Second Empire*, vol. I, pp. 134–481, an excellent piece of exposition. An important phase of this war is well treated by H. FRIEDJUNG in *Der Krimkrieg und die oesterreichische Politik* (1907), a clear, scientific analysis of the peculiarly involved and difficult foreign relations of Austria during the years 1853–1856; a purely diplomatic study. An excellent brief treatment of the diplomacy of the period is contained in ANDREWS, *Historical Development of Modern Europe*, vol. II, chap. II.

On the re-opening of the Eastern Question, the war in the Balkans and the Congress of Berlin: WALPOLE, *History of Twenty-five Years*, vol. IV, chaps. XVII and XVIII; PAUL, *History of Modern England*, vol. IV, chaps. I and II; MCCARTHY, *History of Our Own Times*, vol. II, chaps. LXIV and LXV; ROSE, *The Development of the European Nations*, vol. I, chaps. VII–IX (includes a clear account of the Russo-Turkish campaign); HANOTAUX, *Contemporary France*, vol. IV, chaps. II and V; DEBIDOUR, *Histoire diplomatique*, vol. II, chap. XIII; BOURGEOIS, E., *Manuel historique de politique étrangère*, vol. III, pp. 783–815; MORLEY, *Life of Gladstone*, vol. II, pp. 548–583; BISMARCK, *Reflections and Reminiscences*, vol. II, chap. XXVIII; SKRINE, *Expansion of Russia*, pp. 243–265; SERGEANT, L., *Greece in the Nineteenth Century*, pp. 270–307; WHITMAN, S., *Reminiscences of the King of Roumania*, chaps. VIII–XI.

On Bulgaria since 1878: SCHEVILL, *The Balkan Peninsula*, ch. XXVI; ROSE, *Development of the European Nations*, vol. I, chap. X; MILLER, W., *The Balkans* (Story of the Nations Series), pp. 215–248 (comes down to 1896); A. H. BEAMAN, *Stambuloff* (1895); F. DICEY, *The Peasant State* (1894); ODYSSEUS (SIR C. ELIOT), *Turkey in Europe*.

On Roumanian history: The best account of the founding of the

Roumanian state is contained in King Charles' papers: *Aus dem Leben König Karls*, 4 vols., see also WHITMAN, *Reminiscences of the King of Roumania*, chap. XI; FRÉDÉRIC DAMÉ, *Histoire de la Roumanie contemporaine depuis l'avènement des princes indigènes jusqu'à nos jours. 1822-1900* (Paris, 1900); BELLESORT, A., *La Roumanie contemporaine* (Paris, 1905), a book of travel; G. BENDER, *Roumania in 1900*, translated by A. H. KEENE (London, 1900), with bibliography; contains chapters on history, political organizations, commerce, religion, art, etc.; A. DE BERTHA, *Magyars et Roumains devant l'histoire* (Paris, 1899); ELIADE, P., *Histoire de l'esprit public en Roumanie au XIX^e siècle* (Paris, 1905); FISHER, E., *Die Herkunft der Rumanen* (Bamberg, 1904); GEORGES BENGESCO, *Bibliographie Franco-Roumaine, depuis le commencement du XIX^e siècle jusqu'à nos jours* (Paris, 1907), a list of works edited or published in France concerning Roumania, French works published by Roumanian authors, doctoral theses sustained by Roumanians down to 1894 before French faculties. O. BRILLANT, *Roumania* (1915), is a useful work.

On Serbian history: see, H. W. V. TEMPERLEY, *The History of Serbia* (1917); MILLER, *The Balkans*, part III, chap. VII; very brief. Miller's book in general is very inadequate on period since 1878; P. COQUELLE, *Le Royaume de Serbie* (Paris, 1901). Covers the history from 610 A. D. down; pp. 215-298 concern the nineteenth century from 1815 to 1900; W. M. PETROVITCH, *Serbia, Her People, History, and Aspirations* (1915); E. DENIS, *La Grande Serbie* (1915).

On Greece under Otto: see, SERGEANT, L., *Greece in the Nineteenth Century* (1897), pp. 218-258; FINLAY, G., *History of the Greek Revolution*, book V, chap. IV (down to 1843). On reign of George I: see, SERGEANT, *Greece in the Nineteenth Century*, pp. 258-395. BICKFORD-SMITH, R. A. H., *Greece Under King George* (1893), is not a history but a description of economic conditions, education, army and navy, constitution, etc. On Greece: see, also, SIR RICHARD C. JEBB's *Modern Greece* (1st Edition 1880, 2nd Edition 1901). On later Greek history; P. F. MARTIN, *Greece of the Twentieth Century* (1913); H. A. GIBBONS, *Venizelos* (1920); WILLIAM MILLER, *History of the Greek People, 1821-1921* (1922).

On Turkey in the nineteenth century: see, SCHEVILL, *The Balkan Peninsula*, pp. 293-481; SEIGNOBOS, *Political History of Europe Since 1814*, chap XX; S. LANE-POOLE, *Turkey* (Story of the Nations Series, 1888), pp. 340-365; ODYSSEUS (Sir C. Eliot), *Turkey in Europe* (1900); LORD EVERSLEY, *The Turkish Empire: Its Growth and Decay* (1917); VILLARI, editor, *The Balkan*

Question (1905); BRAILSFORD, H. N., *Macedonia, Its Races and Their Future* (1906); W. M. RAMSAY, *Impressions of Turkey*; RENÉ PINON, *L'Europe et la jeune Turquie; les aspects nouveaux de la question d'Orient* (1911). On the Revolution: see, BARTON, *Daybreak in Turkey* (Boston, 1909); C. R. BUXTON, *Turkey in Revolution* (London, 1909); G. F. ABBOTT, *Turkey in Transition* (1909). SIR E. PEARS, *Turkey and its People* (ed. 1912); by an Englishman long resident in Turkey.

CHAPTER XXXII

RUSSIA TO THE WAR WITH JAPAN

The best history of Russia in English covering this period is SKRINE, F. H., *Expansion of Russia, 1815-1900* (1903); clear and free from partisanship; contains maps and bibliography. RAMBAUD, *History of Russia from the Earliest Times to 1877*, translated by L. B. LANG, 2 vols., vol. II, pp. 200-285, is useful. The last French edition is continued by HAUMANT to 1913. RAMBAUD's work was pronounced by Turgenieff "superior to any other history accessible to Western Europe." RAMBAUD, *The Expansion of Russia, Problems of the East and Problems of the Far East* (Burlington, Vt., 1900), a very useful résumé of the Russian advance into Asia. MORFILL, W. R. A., *History of Russia from the Birth of Peter the Great to the Death of Alexander II* (1902), contains a good deal of information, poorly presented. Pages 342-471 cover the years from 1815 to 1898. By the same author, *Russia* (Story of the Nations Series, 1890), chaps. XI-XIV. JAMES MAVOR, *An Economic History of Russia*, 2 vols. (1914), masterly treatment of the subject.

On the reign of Alexander I, the most important work is T. SCHIEMANN, *Russland unter Nikolaus I*, vol. I. This volume treats the reign of Alexander I, though not fully. Chap. IX, pp. 351-487, is a remarkably fine chapter on the conditions of Russia at that time. There are also chapters on Polish questions and a sketch of the career of Nicholas before his accession. STERN, *Geschichte Europas*, vol. III, chap I, has a valuable survey of the last ten years of Alexander's reign; consult, also, C. JOYNEVILLE, *Life and Times of Alexander I*, 3 vols. (1875).

On Nicholas I: SCHIEMANN, work cited, vol. II, covers the five years 1825 to 1830, and contains many important documents; STERN, *Geschichte Europas*, vol. III, chap. II; on the beginning of the reign, 1825-1827; BERNHARDI, T., *Unter Nikolaus und Friedrich*

Wilhelm IV (1893); THOUVENEL, L., *Nicholas et Napoléon III, 1852-1854* (1891); HAXTHAUSEN, *Étude sur les institutions nationales de la Russie*, translated from the German, 3 vols. (1847-1853); important for its description of the mir. On the reforms of Alexander II: see, SIR DONALD MACKENZIE WALLACE, *Russia* (revised edition, 1905), chaps. XXVII-XXXIII; ANATOLE LEROY-BEAULIEU, *The Empire of the Tsars and the Russians*, translated by Z. A. RAGOZIN, 3 vols. (1893-1896); vol. I devoted to the country and the people; vol. II to institutions; vol. III to religion and church affairs. These two are the best general descriptions of Russia and contain a great deal of history. See, also, for the reforms: MAXIME KOVALEVSKY, *Russian Political Institutions* (Chicago, 1902), chaps. VI-IX. On social unrest and nihilism: WALLACE, chap. XXXIV; LEROY-BEAULIEU, vol. II, Book VI; A. THUN, *Geschichte der revolutionären Bewegungen in Russland* (1883) — covers the period from 1863 to 1880 and has a good bibliography. The writings of a Russian refugee, STEPNIAK (pseudonym), *Underground Russia* (1882), *The Russian Peasant* (1888), are important, as describing conditions and state of mind of the masses; also, GOGOL, *Dead Souls*.

On the reign of Alexander III: see, H. VON SAMSON-HIMMELSTIERNA, *Russia Under Alexander III* (1897); CHARLES LOWE, *Alexander III* (1895); E. FLOURENS, *Alexander III* (1894); GEORGE KENNAN, *Siberia and the Exile System*, 2 vols. (4th edit., 1897); POBYEDONOSTSEFF, K. P., *Reflections of a Russian Statesman* (London, 1898); COUNT WITTE's *Memoirs* (1921).

On the reign of Nicholas II: consult, WALLACE, *Russia*, chaps. XXXVI-XXXIX; PIERRE LEROY-BEAULIEU, *The Awakening of The East, Siberia, Japan, China* (1900); for a description of the development of Siberia: VLADIMIR, *Russia on the Pacific, and the Siberian Railway* (1899); M. M. SHOEMAKER, *The Great Siberian Railway* (1903); G. F. WRIGHT, *Asiatic Russia*, 2 vols. (1902); A. KRAUSSE, *Russia in Asia* (1899), strongly partisan, Russophobe; COMBES DE LESTRADE, *La Russie économique et sociale à l'avènement de S. M. Nicholas II* (1896); M. KOVALEVSKY, *Le régime économique de la Russie* (1898), and W. DE KOVALEVSKY, *L'Agriculture en Russie* (1897) and *La Russie à la fin du XIX^e siècle* (1900); GEOFFREY DRAGE, *Russian Affairs* (1904). STEPNIAK, *King Log and King Stork, a Study of Modern Russia*, 2 vols. (1895), and PRINCE KROPOTKIN, *Memoirs of a Revolutionist*, 2 vols. (1899), throw much light on conditions of Russian life.

On Poland: see, MORFILL, *Poland* (1893), (Story of the Nations Series), chaps. XII-XIV, and BRANDES, G. M. C., *Poland, A Study*

of the *Land, People, and Literature* (1903), a recent book by a Danish literary critic; KOVALEVSKY, M., *Russian Political Institutions*, chap. X. ORVIS, JULIA, *A Brief History of Poland* (1916), best short history of the whole subject; W. A. PHILLIPS, *Poland*; E. H. LEWINSKI-CORWIN, *Political History of Poland* (1917).

On Finland: J. R. FISHER, *Finland and the Tsars, 1809-1899* (London, 1899); F. MOREAU, *La question finlandaise* (1900); H. DE WUNDT, *Finland as It Is* (London, 1901); KOVALEVSKY, M., *Russian Political Institutions*, chap. XI. H. NORMAN, *All the Russias* (1902), presents the Russian side of the Finnish question, pp. 84-95.

CHAPTER XXXIII

THE FAR EAST

The best English book on the relations between Europe and the East is SIR ROBERT K. DOUGLAS, *Europe and the Far East* (1904); contains a bibliography; treats of the opening of China and Japan to Western influences, the rise and re-organization of Japan, the Asiatic wars with European powers, the Chino-Japanese war, the Boxer insurrection, etc.; comes down to the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war. An admirable French book is EDOUARD DRIAULT, *La Question d'Extrême Orient* (1908); studies Chinese and Japanese civilizations, the history of the relations of Asia with Europe from the sixteenth to the twentieth century, gives an account of the Chino-Japanese and the Russo-Japanese wars and describes the situation at the opening of the present century. PIERRE LEROY-BEAULIEU, *The Awakening of the East* (1900), comes down to 1899 and contains a good chapter on Japan (pp. 81-182), and on China (pp. 183-289). For a briefer treatment: see, *Cambridge Modern History*, vol. XI, chap. XXVIII. The Library of Congress published (Washington, 1904) a *Select List of Books Relating to the Far East*.

On the opening of China: see, HENRI CORDIER, *Histoire générale de la Chine et ses relations avec les pays étrangers*, 4 vols. (1921), the best general history of China; REINSCH, P. S., *World Politics* (1900), pp. 86-257, very clear and illuminating; COLQUHOUN, A. R., *China in Transformation* (1898); SMITH, A. H., *China in Convulsion*, 2 vols. (1901), by an American, long a missionary in China; BROWN, A. J., *New Forces in Old China* (1904); MARTIN, W. A. P., *The Awakening of China* (1907). CORDIER, H., *Histoire des relations de la Chine avec les puissances occidentales*, 2 vols. (1901-1902), covers the period since 1860. A. H. SMITH's *Chinese Characteristics* (1890), a very informing book by a recognized authority

on China. MORSE, H. M., *The Trade and Administration of the Chinese Empire* (1908), by a Harvard graduate, for thirty-three years resident in China.

On Japan: see, MURRAY, D., *The Story of Japan* (1894), chaps. XIII–XV; GRIFFIS, W. E., *Life of Matthew Calbraith Perry* (1887), *The Mikado's Empire* (10th edit., 1903); *The Japanese Nation in Evolution* (1907); IYENAGA, *The Constitutional Development of Japan* (Johns Hopkins University Studies, Baltimore, 1891); GOLLIER, THÉOPHILE, *Essai sur les institutions politiques du Japon* (Brussels, 1903), a good account of the Japanese government; KNOX, G. W., *Imperial Japan* (1905). On the causes of the Russo-Japanese war: see, ASAKAWA, *The Russo-Japanese Conflict* (1904). For a list of books on the Russo-Japanese war: see, *Statesman's Year Book* for 1908, p. 1223. An important book is HERSHEY, A. S., *The International Law and Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War* (1906); contains, among others, excellent chapters on the causes of the war and on the Treaty of Portsmouth.

A very interesting account by a participant in one of the great events of the war is Capt. VLADIMIR SEMENOFF, *The Battle of Tsushima between the Japanese and Russian Fleets, Fought on 27th of May, 1905*. Translated by A. B. LINDSAY (London, 1906, 165 pp.).

MILLARD, T. F., *The New Far East* (1907); an examination of the situation of Japan and her relation to the Far Eastern Question, with special reference to the interests of the United States and the future of China; contains chapters on Japan in Korea, in Manchuria, the New China, Japan, China and the West; contains, also, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1905, the Treaty of Portsmouth, the Japanese-Korean Agreement of 1905.

DYER, HENRY, *Japan in World Politics* (1909), by a professor emeritus in the University of Tokio; has chapters on the Meeting of the Far East and the West, on the Rise of Japan as a World Power, on the Factors of National Life, on the Civilizations of the East and the West, etc.

On the recent history of the Far East see:

HORNBECK, S. K., *Contemporary Politics in the Far East* (1916), invaluable, treats the recent history of China, Japan, and the relations of those countries with the United States; COUNT S. OKUMA, *Fifty Years of New Japan* (1909); COUNT T. HAYASHI, *The Secret Memoirs of*, edited by A. M. POOLEY (1915), the memoirs of a Japanese statesman and diplomat; K. KAWAKAMI, *Japan in World Politics* (1917); W. W. McLAREN, *A Political History of Japan* (1916); A. S. HERSHEY, *Modern Japan* (1919), excellent recent

study. On China: HENRI CORDIER, *Histoire générale de la Chine et ses relations avec les pays étrangers*, 4 vols. (1921), best general history. A standard work is H. B. MORSE, *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire*, 3 vols. (1918); K. S. LATOURETTE, *The Development of China* (1921), good brief account; T. F. F. MILLARD's *Democracy and the Eastern Question* (1919) is by an American long resident in the East, critical of the Japanese; REINSCH, P. S., *An American Diplomat in China, 1913-1919* (1922), by the late American minister to China (1920); W. W. WILLOUGHBY, *Foreign Rights and Interests in China* (1920); H. A. GIBBONS, *The New Map of Asia* (1919), a popular account.

CHAPTER XXXIV

RUSSIA AFTER THE WAR WITH JAPAN

The most useful description of the events of this period will be found in the *Annual Register*. DODD, *Modern Constitutions*, gives the Fundamental Laws of the Russian Empire of May 6th, 1906, with useful notes. HARPER, S. N., *The New Electoral Law for the Russian Duma* (Chicago, 1908), is an excellent description of the electoral law. MILIUKOV, PAUL, *Russia and its Crisis* (Chicago, 1905), presents the Liberal theory of the crisis: a very instructive book. VICTOR BÉRARD, *The Russian Empire and Czarism*, translated by G. FOX-DAVIES and G. O. POPE (1905), has certain chapters describing the process of Russification attempted with the Poles, Jews, Finns, and Armenians. Other books that may be consulted are: PARES, B., *Russia and Reform* (1907); NEVINSON, H. W., *The Dawn in Russia* (1906); PERRIS, G. H., *Russia in Revolution* (1905); MARTIN, R., *The Future of Russia* (1906); KORFF, S. A., *Autocracy and Revolution in Russia* (1923).

CHAPTER XXXV

THE BALKAN WARS OF 1912 AND 1913

On the peace movement: see, HOLLS, F. W., *The Peace Conference at the Hague, and Its Bearings on International Law and Policy* (1900); an account of the First Conference of 1899 by a member of the delegation of the United States; HULL, W. I., *The Two Hague Conferences and Their Contributions to International Law* (1908), a comparative study of the discussions and achievements of the Con-

ferences of 1899 and 1907, well arranged and clearly presented; SCOTT, J. B., *The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907*, two elaborate and authoritative volumes (1909). Vol. I consists of lectures delivered at Johns Hopkins University by Scott, one of the delegates of the United States at the conference of 1907, lectures now much revised and enlarged; vol. II contains the official documents, the instructions to American delegates, their official reports, and the various texts drawn up at the Conferences and ratified by the participating powers; HIGGINS, A. P., *The Hague Peace Conferences and Other International Conferences Concerning the Laws and Usages of War* (Cambridge University Press, 1909); FOSTER, J. W., *Arbitration and the Hague Court* (1904).

On the régime of the Young Turks: GIBBONS, *The New Map of Europe*, Chap. XI, pp. 180-219; PEARS, *Forty Years in Constantinople*.

On the war between Italy and Turkey: GIBBONS, Chap. XIII, pp. 241-262.

On the war between the Balkan States and Turkey: GIBBONS, Chap. XIV, pp. 263-318; J. G. SCHURMAN, *The Balkan Wars* (1914), pp. 3-60; G. P. GOOCH, *History of Modern Europe, 1878-1919*, ch. 15; SEYMOUR, *The Diplomatic Background of the War*, Chap. X. G. E. GUESHOFF, *The Balkan League* (with documents), (1915).

On the war between the Balkan States: GIBBONS, Chap. XV, pp. 319-350; SCHURMAN, pp. 63-131; SEYMOUR, Chap. X. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; *Report of International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars* (1914).

On Albania: CHEKREZI, C. A., *Albania Past and Present* (1919); J. BOURCART, *L'Albanie et les Albanais* (1921); J. GODART, *L'Albanie en 1921* (1922).

CHAPTER XXXVI

THE WORLD WAR

GENERAL CAUSES OF THE WAR

General Causes of the War:

A good introduction to this whole subject is to be found in CHARLES SEYMOUR, *The Diplomatic Background of the War, 1870-1914* (1916), an interesting and informing book which shows clearly the relation of the crisis of 1914 to the history of Europe since 1870, the various factors of that crisis in their historical develop-

ment. Very useful is: F. M. ANDERSON and A. S. HERSHEY, *Handbook for the Diplomatic History of Europe, Asia, and Africa, 1870-1914* (1918). Consult also W. S. DAVIS, *The Roots of the War* (1918). See also, ACHILLE VIALATE, *L'Impérialisme économique et les relations internationales pendant le dernier demi-siècle, 1870-1920* (1923). GOOCH, G. P., *History of Modern Europe, 1878-1919* (1923), ch. XVI, brief statement.

The most extensive survey of the diplomatic history preceding the war is DEBIDOUR, A., *Histoire diplomatique de l'Europe depuis le Congrès de Berlin jusqu'à nos jours, 1878-1916* (2 Vols. 1917-1920). H. A. GIBBONS, *The New Map of Europe (1911-1914)* (1914), a popular account of the years immediately preceding the war. Essential for an understanding of the period is A. C. COOLIDGE, *The Origins of the Triple Alliance* (1917), an illuminating and thoroughly informed, compact volume, describing the formation and development of the most important single factor in the international situation. With this book as an introduction the student is in a position to use and greatly profit from F. PRIBRAM, *The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary, 1879-1914* (2 vols. 1920), English Edition by A. C. COOLIDGE, a work of the first importance, throwing a flood of light upon the origins of the Triple Alliance and upon Austrian Eastern policies, containing invaluable documents, treaties, correspondence, memoranda, collected since the war by a distinguished Austrian historian from the Austrian State Archives. Vol. II, pp. 3-180, contains an elaborate history of the negotiations between the nations concerned. The documents and the historical narrative have been carefully translated by D. P. MYERS and J. G. D'ARCY PAUL. A most instructive book on the deep-lying causes of the war.

Useful for international relations are the 162 *Handbooks Prepared Under the Direction of the Historical Section of the Foreign Office* (London, 1920), of uneven value.

There is a large literature on the foreign policies of the different countries before the war. A few useful titles are the following:

Germany:

W. H. DAWSON, *The German Empire, 1867-1914* (1919), vol. II, chaps. XV, XVI, XVII, XX-XXIV; B. E. SCHMITT, *England and Germany, 1740-1914*, excellent; G. W. PROTHERO, *German Policy before the War* (1916), good brief account; REVENTLOW, *Deutschlands Auswärtige Politik, 1888-1913* (ed. 1918), from standpoint of a Pan-German; P. ROHRBACH, *German World Policies* (1915) and *Germany's Isolation; An Exposition of the Economic*

Causes of the War (1915); BERNHARDI, *Germany and the Next War* (1914); BÜLOW, B. VON, *Imperial Germany* (1914), official point of view (the German edition of 1917, *Deutsche Politik*, contains matter not in the edition of 1914); ÉMILE LALOY, *La diplomatie de Guillaume II* (1917), covers period from 1888 to 1914; MORRIS JASTROW, *The War and the Bagdad Railway* (1917); R. G. USHER, *Pan-Germanism* (1913), a lively and popular book; ANDRÉ CHÉRADAME, *The Pan-German Plot Unmasked* (1917); FREIDRICH NAUMANN, *Central Europe* (1917); BARON BEYENS, *Germany before the War* (1915); D. J. HILL, *Impressions of the Kaiser* (1918), interesting and close observation and analysis of the Kaiser's personality and diplomacy; C. D. HAZEN, *Alsace-Lorraine under German Rule* (1917).

England:

BERNADOTTE E. SCHMITT, *England and Germany, 1740-1914* (1916), an admirable treatment of Anglo-German relations from the historical point of view. The best general survey. Treats with particular fulness the period since 1870. GILBERT MURRAY, *The Foreign Policy of Sir Edward Grey, 1906-1915* (1915), critical; G. H. PERRIS, *Our Foreign Policy and Sir Edward Grey's Failure* (1912), a severe attack; EGERTON, H. E., *British Foreign Policy in Europe* (1917); HASSALL, A., *History of British Foreign Policy* (1912), the last two general but useful for our purposes; TREVELYAN, G. M., *The British Empire*; SAROLEA, C., *The Anglo-German Problem*.

France:

R. PINON, *France et Allemagne, 1870-1913* (1913); ANDRÉ TARDIEU, *France and the Alliances* (1909); *La Conférence d'Algésiras* (1909), and *Le Mystère d'Agadir* (1912); P. ALBIN, *D'Agadir à Serajevo (1911-1914)* (1915); W. M. FULLERTON, *Problems of Power* (2nd ed., 1915).

Immediate Causes of the War:

Valuable books upon the attitude of different countries and upon the official negotiations and explanations at the beginning of the war are: J. B. SCOTT (editor), *Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War*, 2 vols. (1916); E. C. STOWELL, *The Diplomacy of the War of 1914* (1915), marked by much careful analysis of the documents; J. W. HEADLAM, *The History of Twelve Days, July 24 to August 4th, 1914* (1915); *Collected Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European*

War, published by Harrison and Sons, London; F. ROCHES, *Manuel des origines de la guerre*, clear and well documented, based on the multi-colored official books; BOURGEOIS et PAGÈS, *Les origines et les responsabilités de la grande guerre*, very useful. POINCARÉ, R., *Les origines de la guerre* (1921), a book of the first importance by the man who, at the outbreak of the war, was President of France. All these books contain important source material, and several of them much pertinent discussion and criticism. VALENTIN, *Deutschland Aussenpolitik*, good discussion by a German. O. P. CHITWOOD, *The Immediate Causes of the Great War* (1917), an excellent small volume; J. M. BECK, *The Evidence in the Case* (1914), effective and popular marshalling of the facts; J. H. ROSE, *The Origins of the War*; LEON VAN DER ESSEN, *The Invasion and the War in Belgium, with a Sketch of the Diplomatic Negotiations Preceding the Conflict* (1917); CHARLES DE VISSCHER, *Belgium's Case, a Juridical Enquiry*, translated by E. F. JAURDAIN (1916); ÉMILE WAXWEILER, *Belgium, Neutral and Loyal, the War of 1914* (1915), and the same author's *Belgium and the Great Powers* (1916); CHARLES SAROLEA, *How Belgium Saved Europe* (1915); ÉMILE HOVELAQUE, *Les causes profondes de la guerre* (1915), a suggestive brief study. Very important are: *The Disclosures from Germany*, edited and translated by MUNROE SMITH (1918) and containing the Lichnowsky Memorandum and the Memorandum and Letters of Dr. MUEHLON; and MUNROE SMITH, *Militarism and Statecraft* (1918), powerful and acute criticism of military strategy versus diplomacy in Germany in Bismarck's time and at the beginning of the war, and containing also an account of German land-hunger and other underlying causes of the war. Indispensable post-war publications from the archives of Germany and Austria are KARL KAUTSKY, *Die deutschen Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch*, 4 vols. (1919), and RICHARD GOOSS, *Diplomatische Aktenstücke zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges, 1914*, 3 vols. (1919-). SIDNEY B. FAY subjects some of the new literature on the subject to examination in several articles on *New Light on the Origin of the War*, published in the *American Historical Review*, 1920-21. Five altogether exceptional articles, revealing wide knowledge and the finest kind of criticism, are those by PIERRE RENOUVIN, lecturer at the Sorbonne, on *Les origines immédiates de la guerre mondiale* in the *Revue des Cours et Conférences* (1923). See also HEINRICH KANNER, *Kaiserliche Katastrophenpolitik; Ein Stück Zeitgenössischer Geschichte* (1922), a book based mainly on the documents published by KAUTSKY and Gooss. Important material, taken from the Russian Archives and published by the Bolshevik government, is to be found in E. LALOY, *Les documents secrets*, and in *Un*

Livre Noir, containing documents covering years 1910–1914. (Paris, 1923.)

The World War:

The literature is already enormous and is rapidly growing. Probably the best single volume history of the war is vol. IX of LAVISSE, *Histoire de France contemporaine*, 1922. The three new volumes of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (1922) contains a great number of valuable articles on every aspect of the war, military campaigns, political and diplomatic history, technical matter, biographical data. Of the very first importance for the study of certain aspects of the War is *The Economic and Social History of the World War*, which is being published by the Carnegie Endowment under the general editorship of James T. Shotwell. This elaborately planned survey deals with the economic and social effects of the war upon sixteen European countries. It will comprise, when finished, some hundred and fifty volumes, written by historians, economists, statesmen, men of affairs. Eleven volumes have already appeared (June 1923). The exceptional value of this great undertaking is already apparent. The student will have to go elsewhere for the military, political, and diplomatic events of the war, but within its carefully defined limits this history is a mine of information. A useful aid in the study of the war is S. B. HARDING, *A Syllabus of the Great War* (1918); also F. W. T. LANGE and W. T. BERRY, *Books on the Great War*, an annotated bibliography (1915); Serviceable short histories of the war are: C. J. H. HAYES, *A Brief History of the Great War* (1920), a clear, well-arranged, and balanced account, with an excellent bibliography; A. F. POLLARD, *A Short History of the Great War* (1920), by a distinguished English historian; H. VAST, *Little History of the Great War*, by a careful French historian; VICTOR GIRAUD, *Histoire de la grande guerre* (1920), more extensive than the former. Elaborate general histories of the war are: F. H. SIMONDS, *The Great War*, 5 vols. (1914–1920); JOHN BUCHAN, *A History of the Great War*, 4 vols. (1921–22); JOHN BUCHAN, *Nelson's History of the War* (1915–); HERMANN STEGEMANN, *Geschichte des Krieges*, 3 vols. (1917–19). *The London Times History of the War* and the *New York Times Current History of the War* are journalistic and uncritical but contain much information and many pictorial illustrations.

Special subjects are treated in the following: D. W. JOHNSON, *Topography and Strategy in the War* (1917), and, also, *Battlefields of the World War* (1921), both excellent, by an authority on geography; LOUIS MADELIN, *La Victoire de la Marne* (1919); JOHN MASEFIELD, *Gallipoli* (1916); LOUIS GILLET, *La Bataille de*

Verdun (1920); H. W. NEVINSON, *The Dardanelles Campaign* (1918); RAYMOND RECOULEY, *Foch, le vainqueur de la guerre* (1919), and (same author) *La Bataille de Foch* (1920); H. A. ATTERIDGE, *Marshal Ferdinand Foch* (1919); G. M. TREVELYAN, *Scenes from Italy's War* (1919).

Many accounts by participants in the war, military or civil, have appeared, of which a few are: LUDENDORFF, *My War Memories, 1914-1918*, 2 vols. (1919); HINDENBURG, *Out of My Life* (1920); TIRPITZ, *My Memoirs*, 2 vols. (1919); BETHMANN-HOLLWEG, T. VON, *Reflections on the World War*, Part I (1920); ERZBERGER, M., *Erlebnisse im Weltkrieg* (1920); SCHEIDEMANN, P., *Der Zusammenbruch* (1921). CHARLES SCHMIDT, *Les plans secrets de la politique allemande en Alsace-Lorraine, 1915-1918* (1922). BERNSTORFF, J. H. VON, *My Three Years in America* (1920); FRENCH "1914," *the Memoirs of Field Marshall Viscount French* (1914); HAIG, *Despatches December 1915-April 1919* (1920), edited by J. H. BORASTON; JELlicoe, *The Grand Fleet, 1914-1916* (1918). The memoirs of Lloyd George and Herbert Asquith are announced. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, *The World Crisis 1911-1914* (1923), by the man who was head of the British admiralty from 1911 to 1915. BRAND WHITLOCK, *Belgium, a Personal Narrative*, 2 vols. (1919), one of the great war books; BARON BEYENS, *La Belgique pendant la guerre* (1923), a brief, instructive account; HUGH GIBSON, *A Journal from Our Legation in Belgium* (1917); HENRY MORGANTHAU, *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story* (1918); JAMES W. GERARD, *My Four Years in Germany* (1917) and *Face to Face with Kaiserism* (1918).

On American participation in the war see: J. B. SCOTT (editor) *President Wilson's Foreign Policy*, messages, addresses, papers (1918); (same editor) *A Survey of International Relations between the United States and Germany, August 1, 1914-April 6, 1917* (1917); HENDRICK, B. J., *The Life and Letters of Walter H. Page*, 2 vols. (1922), an historical source of the first importance, as well as a fine addition to literature; A. W. LANE, *The Letters of Franklin K. Lane*, (1922); CHARLES SEYMOUR, *Woodrow Wilson and the World War* (1922), is a volume in the *Chronicles of America* series; LINDSAY ROGERS, *America's Case against Germany* (1917); J. B. McMASTER, *The United States in the World War*, 2 vols. (1919-20); J. S. BASSETT, *Our War with Germany, a History* (1919); CHAMBRUN and MARENCHES, *The American Army in the European Conflict* (1919); ARTHUR W. PAGE, *Our 110 Days' Fighting* (1920), a very accurate and precise account of the operations in which Americans were involved; SIMS, W. S., *The Victory at Sea* (1920).

CHAPTER XXXVII

MAKING THE PEACE

General Books on Post War History:

The *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, new volumes (1922), contain the largest body of historical and biographical information on the last few years easily available for students; BOWMAN, ISAIAH, *The New World, Problems in Political Geography* (1921), the most useful introduction to world politics of the present day, whose value is greatly augmented by its two hundred and eighty maps and its extensive bibliography; EISENMANN, BOURGEOIS, FOURNOL, and others, *Les Problèmes de l'Europe Centrale* (1923), an important series of lectures on the historical, political, territorial, economic, and financial problems of Central Europe; H. A. GIBBONS, *An Introduction to World Politics* (1922) journalistic, showing marks of haste in construction, judgments often too categorical; CHARLES A. BEARD, *Cross Currents in Europe Today* (1922); LORD BRYCE, *International Relations. Eight Lectures delivered in the United States in August, 1921* (1922); ACHILLE VIALATE, *L'Impérialisme Économique* (1923) pp. 221-294 on *La Guerre et ses conséquences*; L. HADEN GUEST, *The Struggle for Power in Europe, 1917-1921* (1921), a British physician's travel impressions and observations; A. MEILLET, *Les langues dans l'Europe nouvelle* (1918); MCBAIN and ROGERS, *The New Constitutions of Europe* (1922), invaluable for the student, contains English translations of thirteen new constitutions as well as useful notes and references; R. J. KERNER, *Slavic Europe; A Selected Bibliography in the Western European Languages* (1918); a scientific bibliography of great utility. While only brought down to the beginning of the war, it is very useful for an understanding of the later period; the works cited deal with the Russians, Poles, Czechoslovaks, Jugo-Slavs, and Bulgarians; F. M. ANDERSON and A. S. HERSHEY, *Handbook for the Diplomatic History of Europe, Asia and Africa (1870-1914)*, (1918); though only coming down to the war is nevertheless a valuable aid in the study of many of the problems of the subsequent period; B. POTTER PITMAN, *An Introduction to the Study of International Organization* (1922); JACQUES BARDOUX, *De Paris à Spa; la bataille diplomatique pour la paix française* (February, 1919-October, 1920), (1921), by a professor at the *École Libre des Sciences Politiques*. *The Statesman's Year Book*, *The International Year Book*, *The Annual Register*, the *Political Science Quarterly* annual supplements entitled *Record of*

Political Events, the *Round Table*, the *Current History Magazine*, the newly founded *Foreign Affairs* and the French weekly, *L'Europe Nouvelle* are extremely useful for a study of current events and problems. DENYS P. MYERS', *Manual of Collections of Treaties and of Collections relating to Treaties* (1922), of invaluable assistance in finding the text of treaties.

A very convenient and useful collection of material, treaties, correspondence, speeches, bearing upon contemporary history is the Documents of *The American Association for International Conciliation*.

The Conference of Paris:

The most elaborate work is H. W. V. TEMPERLEY (editor), *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris* (1920-). Six volumes have already appeared, one more is promised. Invaluable, contains much documentary material, and also historical and interpretative chapters, of uneven quality. Other volumes are C. H. HASKINS and R. H. LORD, *Some Problems of the Peace Conference* (1920); contains excellent chapters on the history of and the decisions concerning the most important territorial problems raised by the war; clear, explanatory, and accompanied by helpful bibliographical notes; HOUSE and SEYMOUR, *What Really Happened at Paris* (1921), the story of the Conference as told by certain of the American delegates; ROBERT LANSING, *The Peace Negotiations, a Personal Narrative* (1921) and (same author) *The Big Four and Others* (1921), important books by the American Secretary of State; R. S. BAKER, *What Wilson Did at Paris* (1919), uncritical, excessively laudatory; C. T. THOMPSON, *The Peace Conference Day by Day* (1920); A. P. SCOTT, *An Introduction to the Peace Treaties* (1920); E. J. DILLON, *The Inside History of the Peace Conference* (1920); BERNARD M. BARUCH, *The Making of the Reparation and Economic Sections of the Treaty* (1920). TUMULTY, J. P., *Woodrow Wilson as I Know Him* (1921), by the President's private secretary; ROTHBART, *Die Grossen Vier am Werk*, presents the German point of view.

R. S. BAKER, *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement* 3 vols., (1922); the third volume contains important documents.

The most enlightening account of the growth and formation of the Treaty of Versailles, and its most powerful explanation and defense are to be found in ANDRÉ TARDIEU, *The Truth about the Treaty* (1921). Tardieu was a leading member of the French delegation and was intimately associated with the work of the Conference in all its stages. Other studies and criticisms of the Treaty are:

LÉON BOURGEOIS, *Le Traité de Paix de Versailles* (1919); CHARLES BENOIST, *Les nouvelles frontières d'Allemagne et la nouvelle carte d'Europe* (1920); LOUIS BARTHOU, *Le Traité de Paix* (1919); GABRIEL HANOTAUX, *Le Traité de Versailles du 28 Juin, 1919* (1919). A bitter and exaggerated attack upon the Treaty, very feeble on the political side, is J. M. KEYNES'S *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* (1919), to which RAPHAEL-GEORGES LEVY'S *La juste paix* (1920) is a reply.

The Treaty itself has been published in several forms and is easily procurable. An edition that may be recommended for history classes is that published by the American Association for International Conciliation.

CHAPTER XXXVIII

GERMANY SINCE THE REVOLUTION

GEORGE YOUNG, *The New Germany* (1920); R. H. LUTZ, *The German Revolution of 1918-1919*. (1922); MAURICE BAUMONT and MARCEL BERTHELOT, *L'Allemagne, Lendemain de Guerre et de Révolution* (1922), excellent; MCBAIN and ROGERS, *The New Constitutions of Europe* (1922), contains translations of the new constitutions of Germany and Prussia; BOWMAN, *The New World*, ch. X; EDMOND VERMEIL, *La Constitution de Weimar* (1923), the most important study of the subject that has yet appeared; RENÉ BRUNET, *The German Constitution* (1922), an analytical discussion and exposition of the new constitution with an explanation of economic and social factors active in the overthrow of the old and the establishment of the new régime. The best treatment of the subject in English. HENRI LICHTENBERGER, *L'Allemagne d'aujourd'hui dans ses relations avec la France* (1922), the most penetrating book that has appeared on post-war German opinion and action. VICTOR CAMBON, *L'Allemagne Nouvelle*, 1923, a detailed description of the actual state of German industries, economic methods, etc. RENÉ LAURET, *Les conditions de la vie en Allemagne*, 1923, a carefully documented study; HERMANN BRINCKMEYER, *Hugo Stinnes*, 1921.

CHAPTER XXXIX

THE REPUBLIC OF CZECHO-SLOVAKIA

TEMPERLEY, *History of the Peace Conference*, vol. IV, pp. 236-277, excellent chapter by R. W. SETON-WATSON; BOWMAN, *The New*

World, ch. XIII; HASKINS and LORD, *Some Problems of the Peace Conference*, ch. VI; GUEST, *The Struggle for Power in Europe*, pp. 136-171; LOUIS EISENMANN, *La Tchécoslovaquie* (1921), best description of the institutions and component elements of the new republic; LOUISE WEISS, *La République Tchécoslovaque*, preface by EDWARD BENES (1919); CHARLES RIVET, *Les Tchécoslovaques* (1921); EDWARD BENES, *Bohemia's Case for Independence* (1916); T. G. MASARYK, *The New Europe* (1918); VLADIMIR NOSEK, *Independent Bohemia*, an account of the Czecho-Slovak Struggle for Liberty (1918); ETIENNE FOURNOL, *De la Succession d'Autriche* (1918); ALEXANDER BROZ, *The First Year of the Czecho-slovak Republic* (1921); E. STERN, *La législation ouvrière tchécoslovaque*; JEAN BOURLIER, *Les Tcheques et la Bohême contemporaine* (1918). LOUIS LEGER, *La Renaissance tchèque au XIX^e siècle* (1911), an excellent exposition of pre-war development; A. MOUSSET, *La Petite Entente*, (1923).

CHAPTER XL

THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND

HASKINS and LORD, *Some Problems of the Peace Conference* (1920), excellent chapter on the resurrection of Poland and boundary problems (pp. 153-200); HOUSE and SEYMOUR, *What Really Happened at Paris*, pp. 67-86; L. HADEN GUEST, *The Struggle for Power in Europe*, pp. 109-135; RALPH BUTLER, *The New Eastern Europe* (1919), has chapters on Poland in 1917, 1918, and 1919; ASKENAZY, *Danzig and Poland*, discusses the subject indicated by the title. See also BOWMAN, *The New World*, ch. XIX. Two instructive books on present-day Poland are RAY DEVEREUX (Mrs. DEVEREUX PEMBER), *Poland Reborn* (1922) and MARCEL PERNOT, *L'Epreuve de la Pologne* (1921). See also BRUCE BOSWELL, *Poland and the Poles* (1921), and CHARLES PHILLIPS, *The New Poland*, (1922).

CHAPTER XLI

ROUMANIA

R. W. SETON-WATSON, *Roumania and the Great War* (1915), a discussion of the Roumanian national problem; TEMPERLEY, *History of the Peace Conference*, vol. IV, pp. 213-236; GUEST, *The Struggle for Power in Europe*, pp. 210-244; TAKE JONESCO, *Souvenirs* (1919), a volume of much interest; D. IANCOVICI, *La Paix de Bucharest*,

Mai 7, 1918 (1918), and (same author) *Take Jonesco* (1918), a brief biography of the Roumanian Liberal statesman; Marcel Gillard, *La Roumanie nouvelle* (1922); the most informing book on contemporary Roumania; studies of Roumanian society, ethnic minorities, the economic crisis, the political evolution. A. Mousset, *La Petite Entente*; C. U. CLARK, *Greater Roumania* (1922), uncritical, strongly pro-Roumanian, but contains much information concerning the geography, resources, literature and recent history of the country.

CHAPTER XLII

JUGO-SLAVIA

TEMPERLEY, *History of the Peace Conference*, vol. IV, pp. 171-212; HOUSE and SEYMOUR, *What Really Happened at Paris*, ch. VI, by Professor D. W. JOHNSON on *Fiume and the Adriatic Problem*; KERNER, R. J., *Slavic Europe, a Selected Bibliography* (1918), and (same author) "The Jugo-Slav Movement" in the *Russian Revolution, and the Jugo-Slav Movement* (1918); R. W. SETON-WATSON, *The Southern Slav Question and the Hapsburg Monarchy* (1911), and (same author) *The Rise of Nationality in the Balkans* (1917); A. H. E. TAYLOR, *The Future of the Southern Slavs* (1917); H. W. V. TEMPERLEY, *History of Serbia* (1917); McBAIN and ROGERS, *The New Constitutions of Europe* (1922); A. MOUSSET, *Le Royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes* (1921), the best book that has yet appeared on the Jugo-Slav state. By the same author, *La Petite Entente*, (1923). There is an excellent chapter on Jugo-Slavia in BOWMAN, *The New World*, ch. XIV.

CHAPTER XLIII

THE REPUBLIC OF AUSTRIA

TEMPERLEY, *History of the Peace Conference of Paris*. Volume IV (pp. 462-484) contains an admirable chapter by A. C. COOLIDGE on *The New Austria*; BOWMAN, *The New World*, ch. XI; HASKINS and LORD, *Some Problems of The Peace Conference*, chap. VI, pp. 201-229; L. HADEN GUEST, *The Struggle for Power in Europe*, pp. 172-188; JEAN KERVÉGAN, *L'Autriche en 1921* (1921); MARCEL DUNAN, *L'Autriche* (1921), in the useful series *Les États Contemporains*, has chapters on the history, the soil and population, the institutions, the economic state, the letters, arts, and sciences of

Austria; J. TERSANNES, *Le problème autrichien et la menace du rattachement à l'Allemagne* (1921); KELSEN, *Die Verfassungsgesetze der Republik Oesterreich* (1919); KARL NEISSER, *Politische Chronik*, for 1918-1920; and (same author), *Ein Jahr Republik Oesterreich* (1920). McBAIN and ROGERS, *The New Constitutions of Europe*, gives the new constitution of Austria.

CHAPTER XLIV

HUNGARY SINCE THE WAR

TEMPERLEY, *History of the Peace Conference*, vol. IV, pp. 485-497, chapter by H. W. V. TEMPERLEY; HASKINS and LORD, *Some Problems of the Peace Conference*, pp. 231-262, chapter on Hungary and the Adriatic; BOWMAN, *The New World*, ch. XII; GUEST, *The Struggle for Power in Europe*, pp. 189-209. THARAUD, *Quand Israël est Roi* (1921), is a brilliant account of the Jews in contemporary Hungary, of the revolution of 1918, the Karolyi and Béla Kun régimes, etc. COUNT PAUL TELEKI, *The Place of Hungary in European History* (1922), lectures delivered at Williamstown in 1921; point of view that of the ruling Magyar class, reactionary. A. HEVESY, *Nationalities in Hungary* (1919).

CHAPTER XLV

BULGARIA AND THE TREATY OF NEUILLY

LÉON LAMOUCHE, *La Bulgarie*, 1923, the most informing book on contemporary Bulgaria; TEMPERLEY, *History of the Peace Conference*, vol. IV, pp. 444-461; HASKINS and LORD, *Some Problems of the Peace Conference*, chap. VIII; BOWMAN, *The New World*, ch. XVI.

CHAPTER XLVI

SOVIET RUSSIA

The background to recent Russian history is conveniently furnished by GREGOR ALEXINSKY, *Modern Russia* (1913); R. BEAZLEY, N. FORBES and G. A. BIRKETT, *Russia from the Varangians to the Bolsheviks* (1918); F. H. SKRINE, *The Expansion of Russia, 1815-1900* (1904); T. G. MASARYK, *The Spirit of Russia*, 2 vols. (1919),

a remarkable book; MAVOR, J., *The Economic History of Russia*, 2 vols. (1914), the most extensive treatment of the subject.

On recent history see particularly the articles by VINOGRADOFF in vol. XXXII of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*; M. J. OLGIN, *The Soul of the Russian Revolution* (1917); BARON S. A. KORFF, *Russia's Foreign Relations during the Last Half Century* (1922); SIR PAUL VINOGRADOFF, *Self-Government in Russia* (1915), and (same author) *The Reconstruction of Russia* (1919); S. ZAGORSKY, *La République des Soviets, Bilan Economique* (1921); A. ISWOLSKY, *The Memoirs of Alexander Iswolsky* (edited and translated by C. L. SEEGER), 1920; MAURICE PALÉOLOGUE, *La Russie des Tsars pendant la Grande Guerre*; has been translated into English under the title *An Ambassador's Memories* (London, 1923); PIERRE GILLIARD, *Thirteen Years at the Russian Court* (1922): by the tutor of the late Czarevitch; describes the last days of the various members of the Imperial Family; ROSEN, *Forty Years of Diplomacy* (1922); KORFF, S. A., *Autocracy and Revolution in Russia* (1923).

The literature on Bolshevism is extensive, most of it highly controversial: M. A. LANDAU-ALDANOV, *Lenine* (1919), a brief biography; NICOLAI LENINE (V. I. ULIANOV), *The State and Revolution* (1919), *Land Revolution in Russia* (1919) and *The Great Initiative* (1920); L. TROTSKY, *Our Revolution: Essays on Working-class and International Revolution, 1904-1917*, collected and translated by M. J. OLGIN (1918) and (same author) *The Bolsheviks and World Peace* (1918), present some of the views of the two most conspicuous Bolshevik leaders. Among the more significant books on Bolshevism are: JOHN SPARGO, *Bolshevism; The Enemy of Political and Industrial Democracy* (1919), *The Psychology of Bolshevism* (1919) and *The Greatest Failure in History* (1920), by an American Socialist; PAUL N. MILIUKOV, *Bolshevism; an International Danger* (1920), *History of the Second Russian Revolution* (1920), *Russia, Today and Tomorrow* (1922), by a leader of the Russian Liberals; BERTRAND RUSSELL, *The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism* (1920); KARL KAUTSKY, *The Dictatorship of the Proletariat* (1920), by the leader of the Marxian Socialists; KERENSKY, A. F., *The Prelude to Bolshevism* (1919); WILLIAM T. GOODE, *Bolshevism at Work* (1920); ARTHUR BULLARD, *The Russian Pendulum*; ÉMILE VANDEVELDE, *The Three Aspects of the Russian Revolution* (1918), by a leader of the Belgian Socialists; S. ZAGORSKY, *L'Évolution actuelle du bolchevisme russe* (1922). The Report of the British Labor Delegation which visited Russia is important and has been published by the *New York Nation* (September 25, 1920). K. LEITES, *Recent Economic Developments in Russia* (1922).

CHAPTER XLVII

FRANCE SINCE THE WAR

Encyclopaedia Britannica, vol. XXXI (1922); BOWMAN, *The New World*, ch. III; RAYMOND LESLIE BUELL, *Contemporary French Politics* (1920), an informing discussion of post-war conditions, tendencies and problems; WILLIAM MACDONALD, *Reconstruction in France* (1922), precise, detailed, authoritative; EDWARD M. SAIT, *Government and Politics of France* (1921), the chapters on Political Development and Parties have some account of France since the war; A. FABRE-LUCE, *La Crise des Alliances* (1922), an able, critical account of Franco-British relations since the armistice; PAUL BUREAU, *Quinze Années de Séparation* (1921), a study of the law of separation of 1905 in operation, hostile; MICHEL AUGÉ-LARIBÉ, *Le paysan français après la guerre* (1923): on the political situation and discussions after the war see, A. DE TARDE ET R. DE JOUVENEL, *La politique d'aujourd'hui* (1923); CELTUS, *La France à Gènes. Un programme français de reconstruction économique de l'Europe* (1922); ROBERT VEYSSIÉ, *La Paix par la Ruhr* (1923); on conspicuous French politicians of today see ETIENNE FOURNOL, *Le Moderne Plutarque* (1923) and an anonymous book entitled *Ceux qui nous mènent* (1922). On the colonies see, ALBERT SARRAUT, *La Mise en valeur des colonies françaises* (1923). On Alsace-Lorraine, GEORGE DELAHACHE, *Les débuts de l'administration française en Alsace et en Lorraine* (1921).

CHAPTER XLVIII

GREAT BRITAIN AND HER EMPIRE

On the Empire: BOWMAN, *The New World*, ch. II, on Problems of Imperial Britain; LIONEL CURTIS, *The Commonwealth of Nations* (1918); GEORGE LOUIS BEER, *The English-Speaking Peoples* (1917); A. B. KEITH, *Imperial Unity and the Dominions* (1916); H. DUNCAN HALL, *The British Commonwealth of Nations* (1920); A. B. KEITH, *The War Government of the British Dominions* (1921), one of the volumes of the Carnegie Endowment *Economic and Social History of the War*; J. A. WILLIAMSON, *A Short History of British Expansion* (1922). On Ireland: ERNEST BARKER, *Ireland in the Last Fifty Years, 1866-1918* (1919), a brief but illuminating examination of the Irish problem; HORACE PLUNKETT, *Ireland in the New Century*

(1904); *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, vol. XXXI, best treatment of recent Irish history; E. R. TURNER, *Ireland and England, in the Past and Present* (1919); FRANCIS HACKETT, *Ireland: A Study in Nationalism* (1918); MAURICE JOY, editor, *The Irish Rebellion of 1916* (1916); W. B. WELLS and N. MARLOWE, *A History of the Irish Rebellion of 1916* (1917), and (same authors) *The Irish Convention and Sinn Fein* (1918); STEPHEN GWYNN, *The Last Years of John Redmond* (1919); D. FIGGES, *The Irish Constitution* (1922); A. C. WHITE, *The Irish Free State: its Evolution and Possibilities* (1922); R. M. HENRY, *The Evolution of Sinn Fein* (1920); Gen. MICHAEL COLLINS, *The Path to Freedom* (1923). On India: particularly useful for very recent history is SIR VALENTINE CHIROL, *India, Old and New* (1921); discusses recent political reforms, the Gandhi movement, etc.; J. C. WEDGEWOOD, *The Future of the Indo-British Commonwealth* (1922): from the point of view of a radical; LAJPAT RAI, *England's Debt to India* (1917): an Indian view of the English occupation of India; L. CURTIS, *Dyarchy* 1921; E. A. HORNE, *The Political Systems of British India* (1922); C. P. ILBERT, *The Government of India* (1922); On Mesopotamia: see, Miss G. L. BELL's *Review of the Civil Administration of Mesopotamia* (1920), being a British official report giving the views of the chief Arab sheiks toward British administration of Mesopotamia. On Egypt see M. LABRY, *La Révolution Egyptienne* (1922), important, standpoint that of an Egyptian Nationalist. On Africa consult F. D. LUGARD, *The Dual Mandates in British Tropical Africa* (1922); E. ANTONELLI, *L'Afrique et la Paix de Versailles* (1921), contains an account of the war in Africa and the recent changes in the distribution of African territory.

CHAPTER XLIX

TURKEY SINCE THE WAR

MAURICE PERNOT, *La question turque* (1923); BOWMAN, *The New World*, chaps. XXIV-XXVIII. M. LHÉRITIER, *La Grèce*. (1922). *Annual Register* and current reviews.

CHAPTER L

BELGIUM DURING AND SINCE THE WAR

BARON BEYENS, *La Belgique pendant la Guerre* (1923); BRAND WHITLOCK, *Belgium, a Personal Narrative*, 2 vols. (1919) an invaluable

able source of information, by the American minister to Belgium from 1913 to 1917; HENRI PIRENNE, *Souvenirs de Captivité en Allemagne*, (1920); Belgium's leading historian's account of his imprisonment in Germany from March 1916 to November 1918, his observations, etc.; LEROY ROUSSEL, *Abrogation de la neutralité de la Belgique. Ses causes et ses effets*. (1923.)

Several volumes of great importance for the history of Belgium are included in *The Economic and Social History of the World War*, edited by James T. Shotwell, and have already appeared or are in press. They are: FERDINAND PASSELECQ, *Deportation of Belgian Workmen and the Forced Labor of the Civilian Population during the German Occupation of Belgium*; ALBERT HENRY, *Food Supply of Belgium during the German Occupation*; J. PIRENNE and M. VAUTHIER, *German Legislation with Reference to the Occupation of Belgium*; ERNEST MAHAIM, *Unemployment in Belgium during the German Occupation*; CHARLES DE KERCHOVE, *Destruction of Belgian Industry by the Germans*; F. J. VAN LANGENHOVE, *Economic Policy of the Belgian Government during the War*.

CHAPTER LI

CONTEMPORARY ITALY

PAGE, T. N., *Italy and the World War* (1921). By the ambassador of the United States to Italy during the war; ERNEST LÉMONON, *L'Italie d'après-guerre, 1914-1921* (1922); very informing; T. TITTONI, *Modern Italy* (1922); PAUL HAZARD, *L'Italie vivante*, 1923, an extremely interesting book of impressions and appreciations of men and things Italian, having reference particularly to the years 1921 and 1922; by a professor at the Sorbonne. BOWMAN, *The New World*, ch. V, describes the Italian situation on the morrow of the war. On Fiume see J. N. MACDONALD, *A Political Escape: The Story of Fiume and D'Annunzio* (1921).

CHAPTER LII

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

The League of Nations Starts: An Outline by its Organizers (1920), chapters by R. B. Fosdick, George Rublee, J. T. Shotwell, Léon Bourgeois, etc. S. P. DUGGAN, Editor, *The League of Nations, the Principle and the Practice* (1919); SIR GEOFFREY BUTLER, *A*

Handbook to the League of Nations (1919); LORD EUSTACE PERCY, *The Responsibilities of the League* (1919); SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK, *The League of Nations* (1919); J. C. SMUTS, *The League of Nations* (1919); D. W. MORROW, *The Society of Free Nations* (1919); D. J. HILL, *Present Problems in Foreign Policy* (1919) and *American World Policies* (1920); C. H. LEVERMORE, *Second Year Book of the League of Nations* (1922); RENÉ BRUNET *La Société des Nations et la France* (1921); F. B. SAYRE, *Experiments in International Administration* (1919); A. SWEETSER, *What the League of Nations has Done* (1922); J. L. GARVIN, *The Economic Foundations of Peace* (1919); G. G. WILSON, *The First Year of the League of Nations* (1921); H. W. V. TEMPERLEY, *The Second Year of the League of Nations* (1922). Among the publications of the League of Nations probably the most useful for the general student wishing to keep informed on the current activities of the League are the *Monthly Summary of the League of Nations* and the *Official Journal*. Many important special reports have also been published.

CHAPTER LIII

THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

R. L. BUELL, *The Washington Conference* (1922), the only comprehensive account in English; LÉON ARCHIMBAUD, *La Conférence de Washington* (1923), an admirable treatment of the subject; contains also a hundred pages of documents; W. W. WILLOUGHBY, *China at the Conference* (1922), valuable; GE-ZAY WOOD, *The Shantung Question; a Study in Diplomacy and World Politics* (1922), an able presentation of the matter, from the Chinese point of view; K. K. KAWAKAMI, *Japan's Pacific Policy* (1922), a moderate statement of Japan's policy at the Conference and the reasons justifying it.

CHAPTER LIV

THE ECLIPSE OF THE ENTENTE

For current history, the most useful aids are the various annuals published in different countries: in England, the *Annual Register*, published since 1758; in France, VIALATE, A., *La vie politique dans les deux mondes*, since 1907; in Germany, SCHIEMANN, T., *Deutschland und die grosse Politik*, since 1902; GLASER, F. W., *Wirtschafts-politische Annalen*, since 1906; SCHULTHESS, *Europäischer Ge-*

schichtskalender, since 1860; AEGIDI and KLAUHOLD, *Das Staatsarchiv. Sammlung der offiziellen Aktenstücke zur Geschichte der Gegenwart*, since 1861. Now edited by G. RÖLOFF.

The *Statesman's Year Book* is an indispensable source of varied statistical information, concerning all countries. *The New International Year Book*, edited by F. M. Colby, and *The American Year Book*, edited by S. N. D. North, are useful. Particularly helpful is *Record of Political Events*, published by Political Science Quarterly as an annual supplement.

Publications which will be found useful in the study of contemporary history, besides the more popular English and American reviews, such as the *Fortnightly*; *Contemporary*; *Nineteenth Century*; *Westminster*; *North American*; *World's Work*; *Review of Reviews*; *Current History*, are: *The Round Table*; *Edinburgh Review*; *Quarterly Review*; *National Review*; *American Political Science Review*; *Foreign Affairs*; *Political Science Quarterly*; *Yale Review*; *Annals of the American Academy*; *Economic Journal*; *Economic Review*; *Quarterly Journal of Economics*; *Socialist Review*; *Survey*; *Law Quarterly Review*; *American Journal of International Law*; *Revue des deux mondes*; *Revue de Paris*; *Revue bleue*; *Le Correspondent*; *Revue d'histoire diplomatique*; *Revue politique et parlementaire*; *Revue de droit international et de législation comparée*; *Archives diplomatiques*; *Revue de droit public et science politique*; *Annales des sciences politiques*; *Questions diplomatiques et coloniales*; *Revue générale de droit international public*; *Journal des économistes*; *Revue d'économie politique*; *Revue économique internationale*; *L'économiste français*; *L'Europe nouvelle*; *L'Opinion*; *La vie des peuples*; *Revue des sciences politiques*; *La Revue de Genève*; *Deutsche Rundschau*; *Preussische Jahrbücher*; *Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts*; *Archiv für öffentliches Recht*; *Zeitschrift für Völkerrecht und Bundesstaatsrecht*.

INDEX

- Aaland Islands, 1044
 Abbas Hilmi, 971
 Abd-el-Kader, 365
 Abdul-Aziz, 567
 Abdul Hamid II, 567, 579, 580, 642;
 deposition, 645
 Abdullah, 999
 Absolutism, Austria after 1849, 379;
 Prussia, 209, 210; Russia under
 Alexander III, 601; Russia under
 Nicholas I, 586
 Abyssinia, Italy at war with, 374, 375
 Accident Insurance, 292
 Adana massacres, 645, 646
 Adige River, 155
 Adrianople, 650, 652
 Adrianople, Treaty of, in 1829, 559
 Adriatic islands, 885, 890
 Adriatic problem, 889; Italy and Jugo-
 Slavia, 1024; settlement, 1026
 Ægean islands, 377
 Ægean seaports and Bulgaria, 917
 Afghanistan, 490
 Africa, appropriation by European na-
 tions, 512; conditions in 1815, 510;
 exploration, 510; French control, 365;
 German colonies, 294, 313; partition
 of, 509
 Agadir, 368
 Agram Treason Trial, 883
 Ahmed Fuad, 970, 974
 Aircraft, Germany, 757
 Aisne River, 715
 Aisne, Battle of the, 705
 Aix-la-Chapelle, Congress of, 47, 78
 Alabama claims, 455, 543
 Albania, 553; frontiers, 1044; indepen-
 dence, 1028; Italian control, 1027,
 new state of, 651, 654; principality
 of, 535-536
 Albanians and Turks, 646
 Albert, Prince Consort, 424
 Albert I, of Belgium, 535; reply to
 German ultimatum in 1914, 668
 Albert Nyanza, 511
 Alberta, 495
 Aleppo, 719, 720
 Alexander, of Greece, 1002, 1003
 Alexander I, of Russia, 5, 11, 15, 29,
 581; grants a constitution to Poland
 in 1815, 103
 Alexander II, of Russia, 295, 588; liberal
 reforms, 593; Polish policy, 594;
 vacillating character, 594; violence
 against, 600
 Alexander III, of Russia, 600; character,
 601; persecution of Jews, 602; policy,
 603
 Alexander John I, of Roumania, 566
 Alexander of Battenberg, 573
 Alexandria, 516
 Alfonso XII, of Spain, 524, 525; acces-
 sion, 527; death, 527
 Alfonso XIII, of Spain, 527
 Algéciras Conference, 368
 Algeria, 365, 960; conquest by France,
 365; relation to France, 367
 Algiers, 365
 Allenby, General E. H. H., 708, 974,
 995; Palestine campaign in 1917-18,
 719
 Allenstein, 798, 835, 840
 Allied Food Commission, 899
 All-Russian Congress of Soviets, 926, 927
 Alsace, 252; cession to Germany, 255
 Alsace-Lorraine, 282, 307, 727; cession
 in 1871, 331; recovery for France,
 729, 959
 Alsatians, treatment by Germany, 323
 Amadeo, of Spain, 525
 Ambassadors, 1050
 America. *See* United States
 American soldiers in the World War,
 714, 715
 Amiens, 711
 Anarchy, 276; Russia, 598
 Anatolia, 997, 1004
 Ancona, 106

- Andorra, 535
- Anglican Church, 400; education and, 477; inequalities, 401; Ireland, 441, 443; universities, 453; Wales, 485
- Anglo-French relations, 962; Versailles Treaty and, 968
- Anglo-Japanese treaty in 1902, 624, 1074
- Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, 691
- Angora Government, 998; France and, 1004; Treaty of Sèvres and, 1000
- Angoulême, Duke of, 50
- Annam, 366, 367
- Anti-Corn-Law-League, 429
- Anti-Semites in the Dreyfus case, 358
- Antwerp, Germans in, 669
- Anzacs, 679
- Arabi Pasha, 516
- Arabia, 720, 996
- Arabs and Jews, 1000
- Arbitration, international, 455, 640; Permanent Court of, 640, 1047
- Arc de Triomphe, 119
- Argentina, Italian immigration, 377
- Argonne Forest, 716, 717
- Aristocracy, 71
- Arkwright, Richard, 55, 63
- Armament reduction, 745; crux of the problem, 1071; League of Nations and, 1058; Washington Conference and, 1061, 1070
- Armenian massacres, 646
- Armistice of 1918, 723, 725; difference between armistice and peace, 730; execution, 728; provisions, 727
- Armored motor cars, 687, 757
- Arms and munitions, Germany and, 756
- Army, England, purchase system, 452; England, reform, 451; France, reorganization in 1818, 78-79; France, reorganization in 1872, 339; Prussia, 214
- Arndt, E. M., 34, 136
- Arras, 686, 704, 705, 711
- Article X of the Covenant of the League of Nations, 746; United States and, 763. *See also* League of Nations
- Artois, Count of, 75, 77, 82, 84
- Ashley, Lord, 421
- Asia, occupied by England, France, and Russia, 609
- Asia Minor, Greeks and, 1002, 1004. *See also* Anatolia
- Asquith, Herbert, 478; Irish Parliament, 484; ministry and the House of Lords, 483
- Association's Law, France, 360
- Associations of Worship, France, 362
- Astor, Lady, 966
- Athens, 557
- Atlantic Cable, 435
- Augustenberg, Duke of, 223
- Augustowo, 671
- Ausgleich of 1867, 383, 384, 880
- Australia, 495; Constitution, 498; convicts, 496, 497; federation of six colonies, 497
- Australian ballot, 454
- Austria, *Empire of*, 3; absence of unity in 1815, 18; absolutism after 1849, 379; acquisitions at the Congress of Vienna, 6; Bismarck's plan for war with, 223, 224; Bismarck's views on, 218, 219; Bosnia and Herzegovina and, 643, 644; Catholic Church and, 385; censorship in 1815-48, 21; condition in 1815, 19; conspiracy of Canons and Napoleon III against, 194; Constitution of 1861, 380, 384; Denmark and, 221; electoral reforms, 387, 389, 390; espionage in 1815-48, 21; evolution in 1815-48, 138; extension of principles of government in 1815, 30; Germanization attempted, 19; Germans in, dominant influence, 385, 387; Hungary, loss of, in 1848, 154; Hungary, punishment of, 379; Hungary, war with, in 1849, 160; independence recognized by Germany, 754; internal transformation after 1866, 384; invasion of Italy in the World War in 1917, 705, 706 (map); Italy and, in 1815, 42; Italy, victories in, in 1849, 161; liberal reforms after 1867, 385; mobilization on July 28, 1914, 661; nationalities and their demands, 386; nationality, growth of, 139; Peace Conference and, in 1919, 808; plan of a war against Serbia in 1913, 655; Prussia and, 27, 33, 34, 163, 219; Prussia's defeat of, in 1866, and its causes, 228; race struggles, 385; reaction after 1815, 18; reaction against revolution of 1848, 159; recoveries in Italy, 157; revolution in her provinces in 1848, 154; revolutionary disturbances in 1848, 152; St. Germain Treaty, terms of, 765; ultimatum to Piedmont, 195; ultimatum to Serbia on July 23, 1914,

- 657; university control in 1815-48, 21; World War, defeat in, 722
- Austria, *Republic of*, 765, 893; access to the sea, 900; area, 900; boundaries, 894, 900; character, 894; Constitution, 901; Constitutional Court, 901; economic condition, 899, 902; finances, 899, 902; Germany and, 896; government, 898; loan under auspices of the League, 902; political parties, 901; proclamation, 893, 898; provinces, 900
- Austria-Hungary, 379; anomalous government, 383; Ausgleich of 1867, 383, 384; character of ruling classes, 903; delegations, 383; disintegration after the World War, 722, 804, 807, 888, 893; dualism, 383; Lloyd George and Wilson on, 887; nationality and its divisive effect, 385; territorial losses and gains in the nineteenth century, 393
- Austria Irredenta, 895
- Austro-German Treaty of 1879, 296
- Austro-Prussian war. *See* Seven Weeks' War
- Austro-Sardinian war in 1859, 196
- Autocracy, 737
- Azeglio, M. T. d', 149
- Baden, 29; union with Prussia in the war of 1870, 250
- Bagdad, Berlin to, 707, 720, 721; capture by the British in 1917, 708
- Bagdad railway, 316, 916, 1004
- Baker, Sir Samuel, 511
- Bakunin, Mikhail, 276, 598
- Balaklava, 562
- Balbo, Cesare, 149
- Balfour, A. J., 470, 1066, 1079; ministry, 475
- Balfour Declaration, 999, 1000
- Balkan bloc, 873
- Balkan peninsula, 642
- Balkan states, 316, 393, 573, 575, 579; according to the Treaty of Bucharest (map), 653; Allied line in 1916 (map), 682; balance of power in 1914 and 1921, 919; international relations, 659; wars of 1912 and 1913, 648; World War and, 654
- Ballot, Prussian oral voting, 326; secret, 453. *See also* Suffrage
- Ballot Act of 1872, 453
- Baltic provinces, 943, 944
- Baluchistan, 490
- Banat, 864, 868, 891
- Bangruedo, Lake, 511
- Bapaume, 686, 711
- Barbary States, 365
- Barcelona transportation conference, 1046
- Bardine, Sophie, 599
- Baring, Sir Evelyn, 517
- Bashi-Bazouks, 568
- Bastille, 349
- Batak massacre, 568
- Baudin, Charles, 240
- Bauer, Gustav, 776, 796
- Bavaria, 22, 787; Constitution, 29; defeat in 1866, 228; republic proclaimed, 771; Saxe-Coburg and, 723; stock companies, 211; union with Prussia in the war of 1870, 250, 256
- Bazaire, F. A., 252
- Beaconsfield, Lord, 458. *See also* Disraeli
- Beatty, Admiral David, 692, 729, 963
- Beauharnais, Eugène, 41
- Bebel, August, 279, 289
- Beirut, 719
- Belgium *before the World War*, 4; Congo Free State and, 512, 513, 514; Constitution, 534; Germany violates neutrality of, 663, 664; independence declared in 1830, 101; independence endorsed by the powers in 1830-31, 102; Luxemburg, economic union with, 959; neutrality, 536; rise of the Kingdom of, 98; victim of the World War, 535
- Belgium *during and since the World War*, 1008; deportations, 1013, 1014; destruction of her liberty, 1012; espionage, 1011; exploitation of language differences, 1014; France and, 1020; invasion by Germany, 1009; League of Nations and, 1020; Martyrdom, 1011, 1018; neutrality, 1019; rehabilitation, 1020; Relief Commission, 1018; requisitions of material, 1012, 1018; suffrage, 1020; territorial gains, 1019; terrorism, 1010; tyranny, 1011; unemployment, 1013; universities, 1015
- Belgrade, 671, 680, 875
- Bell, Johannes, 742
- Belleau Wood, 713
- Benedek, Ludwig von, 227
- Benedetti, Vincent, 247, 248

- Benes, Edward, 811, 812, 873, 911; career, 822
- Bentham, Jeremy, 259; "Fragment on Government," 402
- Beresford, Lord, 529
- Berlin, 155; as capital, 256; center of interest in 1866, 245; intriguers at Court, 301; police regulations in 1851, 209; representation in the Reichstag, 327
- Berlin, Congress of, 295, 571
- Berlin, Treaty of, 295, 571, 572; defiance of in 1908, 643, 644
- Berlin Act of 1885, 513
- Berlin to Bagdad railroad, 316, 707, 720, 721, 916
- Bern, 538, 540
- Bernadotte, Marshal, 2, 547, 548
- Bernhard, George, 802
- Bernstein, Edward, 773
- Bernstorff, J. H. von, 699, 802
- Berry, Duchess of, 115
- Berry, Duke of, 81, 83
- Bessarabia, 563, 564, 570, 571, 868; land problem, 870
- Bethmann-Hollweg, Theobald von, 303, 321, 698; statement of Germany's injustice to Belgium, 664
- Biarritz, Bismarck and Napoleon III at, 224, 244
- Big business in Germany, 791
- "Big Five," 741
- Birmingham, 399
- Birth rate in France, 960
- Bismarck, Otto von, 27, 209, 210; appointed President of the Ministry, 216, 219; Austria, plan for war with, 223; Austria, views on, 218, 219; Catholic Church and, 285, 287; colonial policy, 293; diplomacy, 218, 220; early career, 216; German Confederation reform, 224, 225; German unity and, 208; Italian treaty in 1866, 224; Napoleon III and, 224, 244, 245-246; policy of blood and iron, 220; political ideas, 217, 220; prestige, 284; protective tariff policy, 287; quoted on William II, 727; representative government and, 329; reshaping of Europe and prosecution of three wars, 220; resignation, 301; retirement and death, 302; Schleswig-Holstein matter, 221; Socialism and, 289; Spanish crown and, 248; universal suffrage, 225; William II and, 299, 300; working classes, 291
- Bismarck Archipelago, 970
- Bissing, M. F. von, 1011; University of Ghent and, 1014
- Black Sea neutrality, 563, 564
- Black Shirts, 1037, 1040
- Blanc, Louis, 128, 167, 265
- Blanqui, L. A., 60-61
- Bliss, General Tasker, 739
- Bloc*, Balkan, 873
- Bloc*, French, 359
- Blockade of the German coast in the World War, 691
- Bloemfontein, 501, 505
- Blood and iron, 220; in Soviet Russia, 928
- Bloody Sunday, Russia, 632
- Board schools, England, 450, 477
- Boer War, 476, 505
- Boers, 501, 980; Gladstone and, 502; gold discovery and the Uitlanders, 504
- Bohemia, 18, 385; conditions in 1815, 20; Czechs and Germans, relations, 813; Czechs' demand for restoration, 386; democratic movement, 389; German and Magyar opposition, 387; historic rights recognized by Austria, 386; history, 810; Moltke's plan against, 227; national and racial growth, 139; revolution in 1848, 154; subjugation in 1848, 157
- Bologna, 106
- Bolsheviks, 702; Hungary and, 866; peace demands, 708; Poland and, 850; policy in Russia, 703
- Bolshevism, 925, 940, 941, 951; fear in Germany, 796
- Bonapartists, 119, 340, 343
- Bonn, University of, 297
- Bordeaux, 668; National Assembly in 1871, 331, 337; seat of government in 1870, 253
- Bordeaux, Duke of, 95, 112, 115. *See also* Chambord, Count of
- Bordereau, 354
- Boris III, of Bulgaria, 721, 919
- Borny, 252
- Boroughs, English, 397; suffrage, 398, 399, 417-418, 438; types, 398
- Borussia*, 297
- Boseligrad, 917
- Bosnia, 393, 571, 643, 645, 656, 877
- Botany Bay, 496

- Botha, General Louis, 881; Southwest Africa campaign, 980, 981
 Boulanger, General G. E. J. M., 352
 Boulé, 578
 Boulogne fiasco, 120
 Boundaries, national, European problem after the World War, 731
 Bourbon. *See* Réunion, 364
 Bourbon family, attempt at fusion of two branches, 341
 Bourbons, 72
 Bouresches, 713
 Bourgeois, Léon, 949
 Bourgeoisie, 270
 Boxer movement, 622
 Boy-Ed, Karl, 695
 Braga, Theophile, 531
 Bratiano, J. J. C., 740, 864
 Bratislava, 830
 Brazil, Germany and, 315; independence, 529; royal family of Portugal in, 529
 Bremen, 306
Breslau (ship), 672
 Brest-Litovsk, Treaty of, 678, 703, 709, 728, 755; Russian territory lost, 709, 710, 712 (map)
 Briand, Aristide, Washington Conference and — ship ratio and submarines, 1068, 1070
 Bribery, 453; England, 399
 Bright, John, 429, 437, 439, 447, 451, 455
 British Columbia, 495
 British Empire, economic measure for increasing trade within, in 1919, 966; expansion after the World War, 969, 970; extent at opening of the twentieth century, 507; in the nineteenth century, 486; unrest after the World War, 969
 British India, 975, 976
 British Labor Party in Elections of December, 1918, 964
 British North America, 490
 British North American Act, 494
 British South Africa, 500
 Brockdorff-Rantzau, U. K., 802
 Broglie, Duke of 113, 347
 Brook Farm, 264
 Brunn, 822, 830
 Brussels, 668; financial conference, 1046; rioting in 1830, 101
 Brussilov, General A. A., 687, 700
 Bucharest, 565, 689
 Bucharest, Treaty of, in 1886, 574
 Bucharest, Treaty of, in 1913, 652
 Bucharest, Treaty of, in 1918, 710, 728; Roumania and, 862
 Budapest, 153, 907, 908; as capital of Hungary, 384; Roumanian occupation in 1919, 866
 Budget in England, 1909, 481
 Bukowina, 687, 868
 Bulgaria, 567; after 1878, 573; compulsory labor for the community, 923; disposition by treaties of San Stefano and Berlin, 570, 571, 572; geographical position as factor in World War, 915; "Green" Socialists, 920; independence, 643; insurrection in 1876, 568; lands, 923; Macedonia and, 651; Neuilly, Treaty of, 766, 917; Treaty of Neuilly, military terms, 918; peasant government, 919; Roumania and, 652; Russian relations, 573; Serbia and, 574, 577; Southern Slavs and, 875; under Stambuloff, 575; World War, entrance into, 680, 914, 915; World War, participation, 916; World War, peace, 917; World War, surrender, 916; World War, territorial losses, 917
 Bulgarian atrocities, 568
 Bulgarian Peasant Union, 922
 Bulgarians, 553
 Bulguin, A. G., 632
 Bülow, Bernhard, Prince von, 303, 321, 325, 329, 330
 Bundesrat, 230, 282, 772, 783; Constitutional amendment and, 328
 Burma, 490
 Burschenschaft, 30, 33
 Bute, 398
 Byron, Lord, 557
 Cadiz, Siege of, 50
 Cairo, 516
 Cambodia, 366
 Cambrai, 705, 718
 Cambridge, Eng., 422
 Cameron, V. L., 511
 Camerons, 294, 368, 684, 959, 970; rebellions, 313
 Campbell-Bannerman, Sir Henry, 478
 Canada, 63; Dominion of, 494; Durham mission in 1837, 492; Fenian invasion, 443; independence, 495; Rebellion of 1837, 424; transportation and growth, 495; Upper and Lower, 490, 494

- Canadians in the World War, 675
 Canary Islands, 528
 Canning, George, 51, 52; foreign policy, 406
 Cantigny, 713
 Canton, 612
 Cantons, Swiss, 538
 Cape Colony, 500
 Cape Town, 507
 Capital, 68; German concentration, 793, 795; Lenin's compromise in 1921, 936
 Capital and labor, 68, 69; factory system and, 257
 Capitalism, 271; Socialism as the reply to, 258
 Caporetto, 721
 Caprera, 202, 205
 Caprivi, G. L., Count von, 303, 321
 Capua, 205
 Carbonari, 45, 90, 93, 145, 193
 Carinthia, 876
 Carlist war, 522, 523, 527
 Carlos, Don, 521
 Carlos I, of Portugal, 530
 Carlotta, 238, 239
 Carmen Sylva, 566, 860
 Carlsbad Decrees, 32, 35
 Carlyle, Thomas, 266
 Carniola, 388, 876, 885
 Carnot, M. F. S., 351; assassination, 354
 Caroline islands, 294
 Carthage, 509
 Cartwright, Edmund, 55, 63
 Casimir-Périer, J. P. P., 354
 Castelar, Emilio, 526
 Castelfidardo, 204, 205
 Catholic Association, 409
 Catholic Church, 233; Austria and, 385; England, political power, 407; France, 360; France, Concordat, 360; Germany and, 284; Italian war and, 233; Italy and, 372; Third French Republic and, 347
 Catholic Emancipation, 409, 442
 Caucasus republics, 943, 944
 Cavaignac, General L. E., 171, 176, 356
 Cavour, Camillo di, 188; conspiracy with Napoleon III to fight Austria, 194; death, 206; education and ideas, 189; his liberal newspaper, 189; moral of his life, 206; Napoleon III and, 188; policy of economic development, 190; policy of a military ally for Piedmont, 191; prime minister of Piedmont, 190; reputation, 192; resignation, 197; return to office, 199; Rome and, 206; Sicilian revolt and, 203; unscrupulousness and intrigue, 195
 Cawnpore, 488
 Censorship in Russia, 586. *See also* Freedom of the press
 Central Europe, 133; between revolutions (1830-1848), 133; diplomatic situation in 1914, 659; new arrangement, 810, 823; revolt in 1848, 152
 Central Executive Committee, of Soviet Russia, 927
 Centralization, 333; France, 333, 339; Switzerland, 543
 Cervera, University of, 520
 Châlon, 252
 Chamberlain, Joseph, 469, 473; imperialism, 475
 Chambord, Count of, 95, 340, 341
 Charles I, of Austria, 393, 807, 823, 824, 886, 893; attempts to recover throne of Hungary, 911; deposition as King of Hungary, exile, and death, 911-912; proclamation for federalizing Austria-Hungary, in 1918, 905
 Charles I, of Roumania, 566, 576, 860, 861
 Charles X, of France, 72, 84; abdication, exile, and death, 95-96; character, 84; Constitutional Charter, interpretation, 92; coronation, 85; indemnification of nobles, 85; law against sacrilege, 86; ordinances of July, 1830, 91; overthrow and exile, 91
 Charles XIII, of Norway and Sweden, 548
 Charles XIV, of Norway and Sweden, 548
 Charles XV, of Norway and Sweden, 548
 Charles Albert, Prince of Carignan, 48, 49
 Charles Albert, of Piedmont, 149; defeat and death, 161, 162
 Charles Felix, 48, 49
 Chartism, 265, 266, 424
 Chatalja line, 998
 Château-Thierry, 713, 714
 Che-ka, 927
 Chemists, German, 308
 Child labor, 69; England, 420; English coal mines, 432
 China, 610; Boxer movement, 622; British relations, 612; civilization, 610; foreign lease-holds in, 1078; government, 611; integrity of, 621, 623;

- international position, 1076; isolation, 611; Opium War, 612; postal system, 1076; republic proclaimed, 627; Russo-Japanese War, reaction, 626; safeguarding the interests of, 1078; transformation, 627; treaty ports, 612; Washington Conference and, 1072, 1076
- Chino-Japanese War, 620
- Chios, 556
- Christian VIII, of Denmark, 545
- Christian IX, of Denmark, 221, 545
- Christian X, of Denmark, 546
- Christian Popular party in Germany, 772, 802
- Christiania, 548, 550
- Christina, Regent of Spain, 521-522
- Christinos, 522
- Church and State in France, 359; in Italy, Papal Guarantees, etc., 371; in Prussia, 286
- Church of England. *See* Anglican Church
- Churchill, Lord Randolph, 473
- Cilicia, 1004
- Cities, 67; conditions of life, 67; Germany, rapid growth, 304
- Civil Service examinations, England, 452
- Clarendon, Lord, 439
- Class struggle, 270
- Clemenceau, Georges, 351, 740, 950, 951; character, 946; Peace Conference and, 947; retirement, 952
- Clericalism, 347, 360
- Clermont*, 56
- Coal, England, 64; England, strikes in 1920 and 1921, 967; Germany, 304-305
- Coal mines, nationalization question, England, 965, 967; Upper Silesia, 838, 839
- Cobbett, William, 403, 404, 405
- Cobden, Richard, 429
- Coblenz, occupation in 1918, 729
- Cochin-China, 366
- Collectivism in England, 434
- Collins, Michael, 986, 990; murder, 992
- Cologne, electoral classes, 326; occupation in 1918, 729
- Colonial preference, 478
- Colonies, 293; British, 456; British, responsible government in, 493; British increase after the World War, 969; German acquisition, 293; German policy, 312; self-government principle, 492
- Combes, J. L. E., 360
- Comenius, J. A., 819, 827
- Commons, House of, 396, 414; Chartist movement and its effect, 427; constituencies, 397; inequalities of representation, 397; local governments and, 423; membership, 462; middle class rule in, 436; predominance, 418
- Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 498
- Commune, Paris, 332; government of, 334; idea and importance, 333
- Communism in Hungary, and Béla Kun, 906
- Communists, Germany since the Revolution, 773, 775; Soviet Russia, 927, 943
- Competition, German unfair methods, 309
- Compromise of 1867. *See* Ausgleich
- Compulsory labor in Soviet Russia, 934
- Comrades, 272
- Concert of Powers, in 1815, 13
- Concordat of 1801, 360, 362
- Confederation of the Rhine, 23
- Conference of Paris. *See* Paris, Conference of, 1919
- Congo, 314, 960; French, 350, 368
- Congo Colony, 537
- Congo Free State, 512, 513, 514
- Congo River, 511
- Conservatives in England, 437, 472; in power in 1874, 456
- Constantine, Grand Duke, 104
- Constantine I, of Greece, 681, 721; recall, 1003; second abdication; death, 1004
- Constantinople, 564, 650, 995; affairs in 1876, 567; Allied attempt to capture, in 1915, 678; Greece and, 1001; grip of the Central Powers on, 915; location, 672; mutiny of troops in 1909, 645
- Constitutional Charter, 72, 110; Charles X and, 92; supporting parties, 76
- Constitutional Court, Austria, 901
- Constitutional government, 27; Austria, 1861, 380, 384; Belgium, 534; Canada, Upper and Lower, 490, 491; Denmark, 545, 546; England, 412; France in 1870, 241; France in 1875, 343, 350; France, postponement, 342; Germany, amendments to the Constitution, 328; Germany since the Revolution, 779; Germany's condition in 1815, 27, 29,

- 32; Holland, 532, 533; Hungary, 384; India, 977; Japan, 619; Louis XVIII and, 72; North German Confederation, 230; Piedmont, 188; Poland in 1815, 103; Prussia, beginning, 137; Prussia under Frederick William IV, 209; Prussia and the Constitution of 1850, 165; Sardinia, 165; Spain, 522, 523, 524, 527; Switzerland, 540
- Coolidge, A. C., 296
- Co-operation, 66
- Co-operative societies, 167
- Corfu, Serbians in, 681, 884
- Corfu, Manifesto of, 887
- Corn Laws, 403, 428; repeal, 431
- Corporation and Test Acts, 407, 408
- Cortes (Portugal), Constitution adopted, 529
- Cortes (Spain), 36, 50, 523; proclamation of Republic in 1873, 526
- Corvée*, 20, 970
- Cosgrave, William, 993
- Cotton, 62
- Council of People's Commissaries, of Soviet Russia, 927
- Counties, English, 397; suffrage, 397, 417, 438
- Counties, Scotch, 398
- County Councils Act of 1888, 471
- Courland, 943
- Court, World. *See* Permanent Court of International Justice
- Court of Arbitration, Permanent, 640, 1048
- Court of International Justice. *See* Permanent Court, etc.
- Couza, Alexander, 565, 566, 870
- Cracow, 6, 844; Republic of, 103
- Crete, 578, 643; incorporation in Greece, 650
- Crimean War, 186, 560, 562, 588; Piedmont's participation, 191
- Crispi, Francesco, 374; colonial projects, 374, 375
- Croatia, 140, 385, 391, 808; maltreatment, 880; national revival, 880
- Croatia-Slavonia, 876
- Croatia-Slavonia-Dalmatia, 876
- Croats, 391; Magyars and, 158, 879; Serbs and, 881, 882
- Cromer, Lord, 517, 970
- Crompton, Samuel, 55, 63
- Cruelty to animals, 407
- Cuban insurrection of 1868, 527-528
- Cunard, Samuel, 57
- Curia Romana, 371
- Curtis, G. W., 264
- Curtius, Ernst, 213
- Curzon line, 842, 852
- Cushing, Caleb, 613
- Custoza, 157, 227
- Cyprus, 571
- Cyrillic alphabet, 877, 887
- Czecho-Slovak Church, 831
- Czecho-Slovakia, 732, 754; activity, 829; area and population, 814; boundaries, 812; Chamber of Deputies and Senate, 816; Constitution, framing, 812; Constitution described, 815; Declaration of Independence, 811; democracy, 826; education, 830; foreign policy, 824; government organs, 815; land reform, 828; languages, 814, 817, 826; name, 810; Presidency, 815; religion, 830; republic, 812; scholars, 818-819; universities, 830
- Czecho-Slovaks, independence, 722, 807
- Czechs, 139; concessions to, 388; demand for Bohemia's restoration, 386; desertions in the World War, 806; divisions among, 389; Germans of Bohemia and, 813; national movement, 154; Slovaks and, 811
- Czernowitz, 688
- Dahomey, 366
- Dail Eireann, 986, 987, 992
- Daimios, 615, 617
- Dalmatia, 876, 885, 889
- Damascus, 719
- Danes, treatment by Germany, 323
- Danish West Indies, 546
- Dante, 43
- Danube River, 563
- Danubian confederation, 825
- Danubian Principalities, 552, 560, 561, 565
- Danzig, 753; disturbances in 1920, 837, 851; Free City of, 753, 836, 1046; Poland and, relations, 836
- Dardanelles, 678, 679 (map), 915
- Deák, Francis, 143, 381, 392
- Death penalty in England, 406-407
- Decazes, Elie, 78, 81, 82
- Decentralization, France, 339
- Delcassé, Théophile, 367
- Delhi, 488
- Democracy, 113; Bismarck's hatred of,

- 217; Bohemian movement, 389; England, 427, 436, 438, 460; France, 113, 346; Italy, 373; Prussia an obstacle, 324, 326, 328; Prussian repression in 1851, 209; Socialism and, 928; Sweden, 550; Switzerland, 541
- Denmark, 3; government, 544; loss of Norway, 8, 9, 544; possessions, 546; Prussian war with, 220; Schleswig-Holstein question, 545
- Derby, Lord, 415, 437
- Dernburg, Bernard, 313, 802
- Deschanel, Paul, 952
- Despotism, 736
- Deutsches Reich*, 781
- De Valera, Eamonn, 985, 986; repudiation of Irish Free State agreement, 990
- Devil's Island, 354
- Diaz, General Armando, 721, 1039
- Dillon, John, 985
- Dinant, 1010
- Diplomacy, 735; League of Nations and, 1041; old machinery, 1050; secret, 749
- Direct action, 965
- Disarmament, crux of the problem, 1071; League of Nations and, 745
- Disraeli, Benjamin, 436; attack on Land Act of 1870, 447; criticism of Gladstone's reform measures, 455, 457; colonial and imperial ideals, 456, 458; historic significance, 456; ministry, 456; Reform Bill of 1867, 438
- Dissenters, 400, 407
- Divine right of kings, 300, 320
- Divorce in France, 349
- Dobrudja, 570, 571, 862; Southern, 917
- Dodecanese, 648, 997, 1028
- Döllinger, J. J. I. von, 235
- Dominion of Canada, 494
- Dominion of New Zealand, 499
- Douaumont, 685
- Double vote, law of, 83, 111
- Drang nach Osten*, 315
- Dresden, 5, 6
- Dreyfus case, 354; second trial, 357; vindication of Dreyfus, 357
- Dual Alliance, 661
- Dual Monarchy, 765. *See also* Austria-Hungary
- Dublin, Easter rebellion in 1916, 984; Mansion House, 986
- Duma, 632, 633; *coup d'état* in 1917, 700; limitation, 634; opening, 635; second, 636; third, 637
- Dumba, C. T., 695
- Dumping, 309-310
- Dunwich, 398
- Durham, Lord, 492; Canada report, 492
- Dutch colonies, 533, 537
- Dutch in South Africa, 500
- Dyarchy in India, 977
- Dye industry, 305
- East. *See* Far East; Near East
- East Africa, Italy in, 374, 375
- East India Company, 487
- East Prussia, 752, 798, 835
- Eastern Front in the World War (map), 677
- Eastern Question, 122, 642, 643; contemporary form, 994; definition, 553, 564; Disraeli and, 458; in 1853, 560; in 1875, 566-567; international aspect, 660
- Ebert, Friedrich, 724, 771, 775, 785, 796
- Economic blockade, 949
- Economic interpretation of history, 269, 272
- Economic penetration, 310
- Economic pressure, 748, 749, 1056
- Economic prosperity, 809
- Edict of Emancipation (Russia), 589, 590
- Education, England, national system, 448; France, 349; Italy, 372
- Education Act of 1870, 451
- Education Act of 1902, 476
- Edward VII, 476, 483
- Egypt, 509; Britain's anomalous position in, 516, 517; British force in, 516; British occupation, 512; British protectorate, 971; British relations, 457; complex status, 971; English control, 970; finances, 515; French and English relations, 368; independence, 974; nationalists, 971, 972; protectorate, 519, 673; rebellion of 1919, 973; sovereign state, 970, 974; Turks and, 515; World War and, 971
- Eidsvold, Constitution of, 547, 549
- Eisenachers, 280
- Eisner, Kurt, 771
- Electoral franchise. *See* Suffrage
- Electoral reform in Prussia, 325, 327
- Electricity in Italy, 376
- Elgin, Lord, 493
- Emigration from Italy, 377
- Employers, liberty of, 421
- Empress of India, 458, 489

- Ems despatch, 248
 Ena, Princess, of Battenberg, 528
 Engels, Frederick, 267
 England, 4; acquisition in 1815, 7;
 Asia and, 609; conditions after 1815
 to the Reform Bill of 1832, 394;
 conditions between two great reforms
 (1832-1867), 419; conditions from
 1886 to 1914, 464; cotton manu-
 facture, 62; Education, 476; Educa-
 tion, national system, 448; European
 relations at the crisis of 1914, 661;
 foreign trade, 967; free trade, 288;
 French treaty in 1904 as to Egypt, 368;
 Gladstone and Disraeli ministries,
 439; Industrial Revolution, 53; In-
 dustrial Revolution, reason for leader-
 ship in, 61-62; inventive genius, 55,
 63; Irish relations, 440; Italian unity
 and, 199; Napoleon III and, 201, 234;
 natural resources, 64; neutrality in the
 Franco-German War, 250; peace
 efforts in 1914, 662; post-war difficul-
 ties (1919-21), 965; proposal for con-
 ference on Austrian-Serbian relations
 in 1914, 660; right of intervention
 and, 47, 50, 51; sea power in World
 War, 674; shifts in population and
 political power, 65; Spanish-American
 colonies and, 51; universities nation-
 alized, 453; World War, entrance into,
 664; World War services, 686, 692-
 693, 963. *See also* British Empire;
 Great Britain
 Entente Cordiale, 368, 963
 Enver, Pasha, 672
 Eritrea, 374
 Error, history of, 274
 Erzberger, M. L., 803
 Esperey, Franchet d', 720
 Essen, 308
 Established Church. *See* Anglican
 Church
 Esterhazy, Major, 355, 356, 358
 Esthonia, 943, 944
 Ethnic theories, 319
 Eugénie, Empress, 285
 Eupen, 798, 1019
 Europe, 1; boundaries after the World
 War, 731; reconstruction in 1815, 1;
 turning point in 1866, 245; United
 States intervention, 865
 Europe, Central. *See* Central Europe
 European civilization, 486
 Eviction in Ireland, 445
 Extraordinary Commission, of Soviet
 Russia, 927
 Facta ministry, 1035, 1036
 Factory Act of 1833, 421, 432
 Factory Act of 1847, 432
 Factory and Workshop Act of 1901, 433
 Factory and Workshop Consolidation
 Act of 1878, 433
 Factory councils, Germany, 788
 Factory system, 58, 394; advantages
 and disadvantages, 59; in Austria,
 139; in France, 127; Socialism as
 outgrowth of, 257
 Faidherbe, L. L. C., 366
 Faisal, Emir, 998
Falaba (ship), 696
 Falk Laws, Prussia, 286, 287
 Falkenhayn, General Erich von, 689
 Falkland Islands, 674
 Far East, 609; open door policy, 624;
 Washington Conference and, 1071
 Faroe Islands, 546
 Fascist movement, 1036
 Fascisti, 1031, 1034, 1037
 Fashoda incident, 368
 Faure, Félix, 354, 356
 Favre, Jules, 252
 Fehrenbach, Konstantin, 777
 Fellahin, 971, 973
 Fenian movement, 443
 Ferdinand I, of Austria, 21, 139; abdi-
 cation in 1848, 159
 Ferdinand I, of Naples, 42; character
 and government, 44; mendacity, 48
 Ferdinand, of Roumania, 861
 Ferdinand II, of Naples, 150
 Ferdinand VII, of Spain, 36; abolition
 of Constitution of 1812, 38; character,
 37; rage against liberals, 520; restora-
 tion, 50, 83
 Ferdinand of Bulgaria, abdication, 721,
 919; character, 914
 Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg, 575
 Ferry, Jules, 252, 312; education laws,
 349-350; obloquy, 351
 Feudalism in Japan, 615, 617, 618
 Fichte, J. G., 34
 Field, Cyrus, 435
 Fieschi, Corsican assassin, 118
 Finland, 9, 607; independence, 704;
 Russia's attack on, 607; Russian con-
 cessions, 634

First International, 276
 Fiume, 877; free port, 890; independence, 1026; Italian claim, 889
 Fiume, Resolution of, 881
 Five Great Powers, 752, 753
 Flamingsants, 1015
 Flanders, 711, 1017
 Flemish language, 1013
 Florence as capital of Italy, 370
 Florida, 51
 Foch, Ferdinand, 686, 711; German armistice delegation, 723; offensive of 1918, 715, 716; reputation, 719
 Forbach, 252
 Forced labor in Egypt, 970, 973
 Foreign trade of Germany, 305
 Forey, General, 238
 Formosa, 620
 Forster, W. E., 439; on education, 450
 Four Power Treaty, 1075
 Fourier, Charles, 264
 Fourteen Points, 737, 738; Italy's reservation, 1025
 France during the Restoration (1815-1830), 71; army reorganization in 1818, 78-79; civil rights, 73; clerical reaction in 1826, 87; Constitutional Charter 1815-48, 72, 74; double vote, law of, 83, 111; electoral law of 1817, 79; electoral law of 1820, 82; indemnification of nobles for confiscated property in 1825, 85; liberation in 1818, 78; Martignac ministry 1828-29, 89; nobility, 74, 75; parties in 1815, 75, 76; Polignac ministry 1829-30, 90; press law of 1819, 80, 83, 85, 88; primogeniture, 87; Restoration ended, 96; Revolution of 1830, 93; royalist reaction, 1820-30, 82; sacrilege, law against, 86; Ultra-royalists, 75, 77; Villèle ministry, 83, 88, 89. *See also* Charles X; Louis XVIII; Louis Philippe
 France under the Second Republic and Second Empire (1848-1870), 166; amnesty for Republican Exiles, 235; constitution of 1870, 241; court life and society, 184; flag question, 168; Labor Commission, 169; legislature and press muffled, 182; Liberal provisions, 235, 239; Mexican expedition, 236; National Constituent Assembly, 166, 171; National Guard, 168, 171; National Workshops, 169; President

and Legislative Assembly, 166, 177; Protectionists and Napoleon III, 234, 235; Provisional Government, its two elements and its achievements, 167; rise of Republicanism, 236, 241; Second Empire proclaimed, 180, 181; termination of the Second Empire in 1870, 242; termination of Second Republic, 180; Third Party, 241; transformation of the Second Empire, 233, 241; two divisions, 181. *See also* Napoleon III

France under the Third Republic (1870) to the World War, 253, 254, 331; army reconstruction in 1872, 339; Chamber of Deputies established, 344; Church and State, 359; colonial empire, 364, 609; Commune, 332; constitution-making deferred, 342; Constitution of 1875, 343, 350; decentralization idea, 333; education laws, 349; foreign policy, 350; form of government, question of, 337, 340; insurrection against the Government, 334; local government reorganization, 339, 349; military system, 339; ministry, 345; National Assembly, 331, 344, 346; organic laws in 1875, 343; parliamentary system, 345; payment of the Germans after the Franco-German war, 338; Presidency, 345, 348; Presidency and its relation to the Chamber of Deputies, 347; protective tariff, 353; public works, 350; reconstruction under Thiers, 336; religious orders, 359; Republican control complete, 348; revenge on the communists, 336; Rivet law and the Presidency, 337; Russian alliance in 1891, 353, 354; Senate established, 344, 350; separation of Church and State, 363; Septennate, 342. *See also* Franco-German War; World War

France since the World War, 946; birth rate, 960; colonial empire, 959; destruction wrought by the Germans, 955; elections in 1919-20, 950-951; finances, 957, 958, 959; German reparations problem, 954, 957; Germany, desire of security against, 948; League of Nations, criticism of, 948; losses in the World War, 954; national character, 946; Parliament's reception of the Treaty of Versailles, 948, 950;

- reconstruction problem, 956, 957;
 Vatican relations, 961; Versailles,
 Treaty of, criticism of the people, 950;
 Washington Conference and, 1067;
 World War acquisitions, 959; World
 War and, 684
- Franchise. *See* Suffrage
- Franchise Law of 1850 (France), 178
- Francis I, of Austria, 15, 805; policy,
 19
- Francis II, of Naples, defeat, exile, and
 death, 205; Sicilian revolt in 1860 and,
 201
- Francis Ferdinand, assassination, 656
- Francis Joseph I, of Austria, 159; Bosnia
 and Herzegovina, 643, 644; Constitu-
 tion granted and revoked, 1849-51,
 379; Constitution of 1861, 380; death,
 393; liberal reforms, 380
- Franco-American treaty, 950
- Franco-Anglo-American Alliance, 761
- Franco-British relations. *See* Anglo-
 French relations
- Franco-British treaty, 950
- Franco-German war, 243; declaration
 by France, 249; diplomacy preceding,
 245; Ems despatch, 248; foreshadow-
 ings, 246; French defeats, 252; French
 isolation, 250; French military condi-
 tions, 250, 251; Government of Na-
 tional Defense, 253; losses in the war,
 337; Metz, capitulation, 254; Paris,
 siege of, 255; peace treaty, 255
- Frankfort, 228; incorporation in Prussia,
 229; Prussian plan for reform of the
 German Confederation, 225
- Frankfort, Parliament of, 156, 163, 164.
- Frankfort, Treaty of, 1871, 255, 331;
 advantage to Germany, 307; France's
 indemnity, 338
- Frederick III, German Emperor, 283, 297
- Frederick VI, of Denmark, 544
- Frederick VII, of Denmark, 221, 545
- Frederick the Great, 301; wrongs righted
 in 1919, 752
- Frederick William III, 15, 29; adminis-
 tration, 134; death, 136
- Frederick William IV, 136; Constitu-
 tional interpretation, 209; Letter
 Patent in 1847, 137; refuses offer of
 imperial crown in 1849, 164
- Fredericq, Paul, 1016
- Free trade, 478; England, 428. *See also*
 Protective tariff
- Freedom, Germany's lack of, 330; of
 employers, 421; Socialism as related
 to, 259
- Freedom of the press, England in 1819,
 405; France, 80, 83, 85, 88, 91, 117,
 118, 183, 240, 349
- Freedom of speech, England in 1819,
 405; Napoleon III and, 240
- Freemen in England, 422
- French, Sir John, 675
- French bloc, 359
- French Congo, 350, 368
- French flags, 759, 761
- French Revolution, effects, 71; influence
 in England, 402
- French Revolution of 1830, influence in
 England, 411
- French Soudan, 367
- Friedjung Trial, 883
- Friedrichsruh, 302
- Frontiers. *See* Boundaries
- Fundamental Law (Holland), 532
- Gaeta, 205
- Galiccia, 676, 808; disposition, 840, 841
- Galicians, 386
- Gallipoli, 678, 679 (map), 915
- Gambetta, Léon, 240, 331, 336; famous
 phrases, 346-347, 347-348; Leadership
 in Republican propaganda, 343; opposi-
 tion to war in 1870, 249; Republic
 proclaimed, 252
- Gandhi, M. K., 979
- Gapon, George, 632
- Garbai, Alexander, 906
- Garibaldi, Giuseppe, 147; career, 201;
 Cavour and, 200; conquest of Sicily,
 and Naples, 203
- Gas, poison, 675, 711, 757
- Gasteni, Treaty of, 1865, 223, 224, 226
- General strike, Russia, 633
- General Workingmen's Association of
 Germany, 279
- Geneva, 543; League of Nations, 744;
 League of Nations, Secretariat, 1042
- Geneva Commission, 455
- Genoa, 3, 42
- Genoa Conference of 1922, 939; Supreme
 Council and, 942; United States and,
 940
- George I, of Greece, 578, 1006
- George III, 405
- George IV, 406, 410
- George V, 483

- German army, 769
 German *bloc*, 897
 German Chancellor, 783
 German colonies, 749; conquest in 1914 and 1915, 683
 German Confederation, 23; Bismarck's ostensible plan to reform, 224, 225; Diet and its jurisdiction, 23, 24; Prussia's withdrawal, 226; revival in 1851, 165; termination in 1866, 230
 German Crown Prince, 685, 686, 771
 German East Africa, 294, 684, 970, 981; insurrections, 313
 German Emperor, 282
 German Empire under William I, 282; Catholic Church controversy, 284; Catholic party, 285; composition, 283; creation, 256; legislation, 284; policy of protection, 287
 German fleet, 692; sinking at Scapa Flow, 761; surrender to the Allies, 729
 German imperialism, 801
 German National Party, 800, 801
 German navy, 757
 German People's Party, 794, 801
 German Reich, 781, 787; Austria's desire to join, 893, 896, 897
 German reparation, conferences, 954, 958; problem in France, 954, 957
 German Southwest Africa, 294, 684, 969, 980, 981; Hereros, 313
 Germanization, 310; policy, 323
 Germans, 19; influence in Austria, 385, 387; superiority, 318
 Germans *before the World War*, 2; Austrian independence recognized, 754; Austrian relations in 1914, 659, 660; Bismarck and German unity, 208; blockade of coast in the World War, 691; boundaries established by the Treaty of Versailles, 752; Brest-Litovsk and, 709, 710; censorship of the press in 1815, 33; Christian People's party (Centrists), 802; cities, rapid growth, 304; colonial policy, 312; colonies, 293; constitution at the Congress of Vienna, 24, 28; Constitutional amendment, 328; Democratic party, 802; difficult problem of unity in 1815, 25, 26; economic and intellectual growth in 1830-1848, 133; economic transformation in 1850-60, 211; emigration to the United States, 208; failure to attain unity in 1848, 164; First National Assembly, 156; flag, 781-782; foreign trade, 305; freedom lacking, 330; ignominy in Congress of Vienna, 8; immigration, 306; industrial and commercial expansion under William II, 303; industrial enterprises in 1850-60, 211; intellectual evolution, 212; invasion of Belgium in 1914, 670-671; invasion of Russia in 1915, 676; Liberals in 1815, 30, 34; markets, question of, 309, 314; militarism prevented, 755; military unity, 231; ministerial responsibility under William II, 325, 327-328; national conceit, 318; National party, 801; National Union, society, 213; national virtues, 308, 309; nationality, principle of, 322; nationality lacking in 1815, 24, 25, 28; naval expansion, 311; Near East and, 315; open door policy, 288; particularism, 778, 782; payment for the World War, 730, 733; People's party (Populists), 801; political institutions examined, 324; political parties described, 801; population changes, 306; prestige, 317; progress after 1867, 231; psychology, 318-319; reaction after 1849, 208; reparations provided for in the Treaty of Versailles, 758; republic proclaimed, 771; revolution in 1848, 155; revolution in 1918, 723; revolution in 1918, cause, 769, 770; revolutionary movements and repressive measures in 1830-32, 107; science, respect for, 308; Seven Weeks' War in 1866, 226; Shantung and, 622; Socialists, 803; subject nationalities, 322; submarine policy, 695; ultimatum to Belgium in 1914, 663; ultimatum to Russia and declaration of war against her and France in 1914, 661; under William II, 297; unhealthy condition of the nation under William II, 323-324; unification completed (1870), 255, 282, 787; United States, offenses against, 694; unity and liberty, 213; universities, value to industry, 308; university control, 32, 108; university ferment in 1815, 30; varieties of states in 1815, 22; Versailles Treaty provisions as to, 751; violation of neutrality of Belgium, 664; World War, armistice, 723; Zollverein, 136

- Germany *since the Revolution*, 769; agriculture, 792; Austria, Republic of, and, 896; changes, 791; Communists, 773, 775; Constitution of Weimar, 780; Counter-Revolution, 776, 777; Federal Republic, 782; finances, 799; foreign relations, 797, 798; framing of the Constitution, 779; governmental history, 772; industrial combinations, 792; Majority Socialists and Independent Socialists, 773-774; National Assembly of 1919, 779; National Economic Council, 788-789; political education, 792; political parties, 772, 800; Presidency, 785; Reichstag and Reichsrath, 783, 784; reparations question, 797; Russian Alliance project, 797; Russian treaty (Rapallo), 798; separatist tendencies, 778; Socialists, 772; Soviet Russia and, 941; suffrage, 783, 785; trade unions, 795
- Ghent, University of, 1015; controversy about, 1015; transformation, 1017, 1020
- Gioberti, Vincenzo, 148
- Giolitti, Giovanni, 655; ministry in 1920, 1032, 1034
- Gladstone, W. E., Boers and, 502; career, 439; denunciation of the Turks, 569; Disraeli and, 436; education bill, 449; electoral enlargement, 437; as finance minister, 434; foreign policy, 455, 459; fourth ministry, 472; Home Rule Bills for Ireland, 466, 472; Irish question and, 440; leadership, 440; ministry, 439; resignation, 474; second ministry, 453; third ministry, 466
- Gneisenau, Marshal, 34
- Goeben* (ship), 672
- Gold discoveries, 211
- Gompers, Samuel, 750
- Gordon, C. G., 519
- Goremykin, I. L., 635, 636
- Görgei, General, 161
- Gorizia, 688, 705, 706, 885, 889
- Gorky, Maxim, 710
- Gortchakoff, A. M., 295
- Goschen, G. J., 439
- Gotha, 280
- Gouraud, General Henri, 717, 729
- Gramont, Duke of, 247
- Granville, Lord, 517
- Gravelotte, 252
- Great Britain, China and, 612; empire, 962; Japanese treaty in 1902, 624; mandates, 969, 970; trade within, 966. *See also* British Empire; England
- Great Coalition, 1, 46
- Great Powers, 4
- Great Trek, 501, 502
- Great Western*, 57
- Grecia Irredenta, 579
- Greece, 577; attempt to execute the Treaty of Sèvres, 1001, 1004; Balkan Wars, 649; creation of the kingdom, 560; German influence in, 577; intervention of England, France, and Russia in war of independence, 558; results of defeat by Turkey, 1006; Roumania and, 873; Turkish victory over, at Smyrna in 1922, 1005; war of independence, 554
- Greek language, 555
- Greeley, Horace, 268
- "Green" Internationalism, 922
- "Green" Socialism, 922
- Greenland, 546
- Grégoire, Henri, 81
- Grévy, Jules, 174; election as president, 348; resignation, 352
- Grey, Earl Charles (1764-1845), 412
- Griffith, Arthur, 985, 986, 990, 992
- Guadaloupe, 364
- Guam, 294
- Guiana, 364
- Guinea, 366
- Guizot, F. P. G., 113; character, 123; government majorities and political manipulation, 124; ministry, 123; resignation, 130; rivalry with Thiers, 121
- Gulflight* (ship), 696
- Gustavus IV, of Sweden, 9
- Gustavus V, of Sweden, 550
- Haakon VII, 550
- Haase, Hugo, 773
- Habeas Corpus Act, Suspension in 1817, 405; Suspension in Ireland, 443
- Hague, The, 1048, 1049
- Hague Conferences, 639, 641, 736, 745, 1047
- Haig, General Douglas, 675, 686; special orders in 1918, 712-713
- Hainisch, Michel, 901
- Hallam, Arthur, 439
- Hamburg, 306
- Hamilton, Sir Ian, 679

- Hanover, 22; England's relation to, 424; incorporation in Prussia, 229; patriotic society in 1859, 213
- Hapsburg, House of, 6, 139, 160, 723, 765; downfall, 808; Jugo-Slav repudiation, 887; motto, 805; restoration question, 824, 825, 910
- Harbin, 622, 623
- Harcourt, Sir W. V., 475
- Harding, W. G., 1050
- Hargreaves, James, 55, 63
- Hatzfeldt, Countess, 277
- Hausmann, Baron, 185
- Hawthorne, Nathaniel, 265
- Healy, T. M., 994
- Hecker, Father, 265
- Hedjaz, 739, 759, 997; independence, 1000
- Hedley, William, 57
- Heffte, Herr, 326
- Heidelberg, 156
- Heine, Heinrich, 267, 277
- Helfferich, K. T., 800
- Heligoland, 674, 757; acquisition by Germany, 312
- Helmholtz, H. L. F. von, 212
- Henry, Colonel, 355, 356
- Henry V. of France, 341, 342
- Hereros, 313
- Herght, Oskar, 800
- Hertling, G. F., 303
- Herzegovina, 393, 643, 644, 877; Austrian occupation, 571; insurrection in 1875, 567
- Hertzog, J. B. M., 982
- Hesse-Cassel, incorporation in Prussia, 229
- Herre-Darmstadt, Constitution, 29
- Hetairia Philike*, 555
- Hindenburg, P. L. von, 671, 676, 686; National party and, 801
- Hindenburg Line, 704, 716; Second Battle of, 717
- Historians, German, character, 212, 213
- History, Economic interpretation, 269, 272; factors in, 273
- Hofer, Andreas, 895
- Hohenlohe, C. K. V., 303, 321
- Hohenzollern, Prince Leopold of, 247, 524-525
- Holland, 2; Belgium and, in 1815, 99. *See also* Netherlands
- Holstein, 220; assigned to Austria, 223; incorporation in Prussia, 229
- Holy Alliance, 11, 12, 31; England and, 406; triumphs in Naples, Piedmont and Spain, 50
- Holy Roman Empire, 23, 27
- Home Rule, Ireland, 464; formation of party, 464; Gladstone and, 466; Irish Government Bill and Land Bill of 1886, 467, 470; opposition to, 468, 473; second Home Rule Bill, 472; third Home Rule Bill, 484
- Home Rule League, 464
- Home Rule movement, 460
- Homs, 720
- Hong Kong, 612-613
- Hoover, H. C., 899, 1018
- Horthy, Admiral, 908; government, 913; regency, 910
- House, E. M., 739
- House of Commons. *See* Commons, House of
- House of Lords. *See* Lords, House of
- Hudson's Bay Company, 490, 495
- Hughes, C. E., on the Genoa Conference and trade with Russia, 940; Washington Conference proposal to limit naval armament, 1064-1066
- Hugo, Victor, 235
- Humbert I, of Italy, 372; assassination, 375
- Humboldt, William von, 277, 278
- Hundred Days, 10
- Hungarians, hatred of Roumanians, 909
- Hungary *before the World War*, 18; assertion of historic rights and personality, 382; Ausgleich of 1867, 383; Austrian, attitude toward, 381; character of ruling classes, 903; Communist revolution in 1919, 866; conditions in 1815, 20; Constitution restored, 385; Czecho-Slovakia and, 825; declaration of independence in April, 1849, 160; federalization proposal, 905; historic rights and personality, 382; independence, 722; Independence Party, 392; language question, 392-393; Magyar dominance, 381, 385; Magyarization in, 391; Magyars, 390; national and racial growth, 140; nationality, principle of, 385; parties and races, 381; practical independence of Austria in 1848, 153; punishment by Austria in 1849, 161, 379; race question, 391, 392; radicalism, 143; revolution of October, 1918, 905;

- rivalries, 158; Roumanian occupation, 908; Slavic peoples, 391; Trianon, Treaty of, 766, 912; war with Austria in 1849, 160
- Hungary *since the World War*, 903; Communists, 906; elections of 1920, 910; Jews, 907, 913; People's Republic, 905; Republic ended, 910; White Terror, 910, 913
- Huskisson, William, 406, 428
- Huss, John, 818, 827, 831
- Hussein Ali, 999
- Hussein Kamil, 971
- Hymans, Paul, 1020
- Ilchester, 414
- Illiteracy, Italy, 373; Portugal, 531; Roumania, 871; Ruthenians, 828; Spain, 528
- Illyrian Kingdom, 878
- Imperial federation, 507
- Imperialism, 666; England, 475; England under Disraeli, 456; France under Ferry, 350; Germany, 801
- Income tax in England, 1909, 481
- Indemnity, Act of, England, 400, 408
- Independent Social Democratic party in Germany, 773
- India, 63; acquisition by Britain, 487; British declaration of policy in, 977; control by Britain, 489; declared an empire, 489; dual form of government (diarchy), 977; Empress of India, 458; ferment, 975; Government of India Act of 1919, 977, 979; international basis, 978-979; Mohammedan element, 976; Nationalistic movement, 975; radicals, 979; road to, 457; self-government question, 489; self-government, training in, 977, 978; Sepoy Mutiny, 488; value to Britain, 976; World War and, 976
- Indigo, 308
- Industrial Evolution, 61
- Industrial Revolution, 53; consequences, 58; nature and progress, 59; Socialism and, 257; term, 60-61; various countries, 61
- Industrial state, 263
- Industrial unit, 264
- Industry, England from 1846 to 1866, 435; German combinations, 792; Socialization, 788
- Infallibility, papal, 285
- Inflation in Germany since the Revolution, 799
- Inglis, Sir Robert, 413, 415
- Inheritance in France, under Charles X, 87
- Initiative in Switzerland, 541
- Inkermann, 562
- Inquisition, Papal States, 44; Spain, 38
- Insurance, postal, 435; workmen's, in Germany, 292
- Inter-Allied Commissions of Control, 757
- International African Association, 512
- International Association of the Congo, 513
- International Association of Working Men, 275
- International Justice, Court of. *See* Permanent Court, etc.
- International Labor Bureau, 750, 751
- International Labor Conference, 750, 751
- International Labor Organization, 750
- International law, 733
- International organization, 735
- International tribunal, 1049
- International union of peasants, 922
- International workers, 272
- Interpellation*, 239
- Intervention, Metternich's doctrine, 47; recognition of principle by Russia, Prussia and Austria, 47
- Inventions, 53, 55, 63; value to England, 394
- Ionian Islands, 578
- Irak, Kingdom of, 998
- Ireland, 408; Anglican Church in, 441, 443; Articles of Agreement of Dec. 6, 1921, 988; Catholic claims and emancipation, 409; Council of Ireland, 986; education system, 454; election result in Dec. 1918, 964; eviction, 445; famine of 1845, 430, 442; German agents in, 984; Gladstone's interest in, 440; Government of Ireland Act of 1920, 986; history in the nineteenth century, 440; Home Rule Bills, 466, 472; independence, demand for, 984, 985; insurrections, 441; Irish Republic proclamation in 1916, 984; lands, 441, 445; Northern and Southern contest, 987; peasants' misery, 446; population decrease, 443; reform acts in 1868, 438; reform bills, 418; religious intolerance, 441; rents, 459;

- third Home Rule Bill, 484; tithe war, 444; two parliaments, 986; World War and, 983
- Irish Church, 443; Gladstone and, 444
- Irish Free State, 988; Constitution, 992; controversy between Irishmen, 990; Northern Ireland and, 989; religious belief, 989, 992; Southern Ireland and, 989
- Irish Freedom*, 983, 984
- Irish Government Bill of 1886, 467
- Irish Land Act of 1881, 459
- Irish Local Government Act of 1898, 476
- Irish Parliament, 484
- Irish Republic, 984; Lloyd George on, 987
- Irish University Bill, 454
- Iron, England, 64; Germany, 304-305; Upper Siberia, 839
- Isabella II, of Spain, 247, 521
- Ismail, Khedive, 515
- Isolation, national, 1059
- Isonzo River, 688, 705
- Istria, 378, 683, 876, 885, 889, 1026
- Italia Irredenta, 378, 683
- Italian War of 1859, 186
- Italy before the World War*, 2; administrative districts, 370; Austrian and French intervention in 1831 and 1832, 106; Bismarck's treaty in 1866, 224; Church and State, 371; colonies, acquisition of, 374; conditions after 1831, 144; Congress of Paris, 1856, and, 192; Congress of Vienna and, 41; Constitution adopted in 1861, 370; creation of the Kingdom of, 188; disposition in 1815, 7, 8; education of the people, 372; electoral reform, 373; emigration, 377; expansion, 377; foreign policy, 374; French treaty as to Tripoli and Morocco, 367-368; fusion of peoples of, 369; hindrances to unification in 1859, 198; illiteracy, 373; industrial growth, 376; Jugo-Slavia and, 889; Kingdom of, 41; Kingdom established, 369; Kingdom proclaimed in 1861, 205; Mazzini, 145; Napoleon's activity, 40; National Society, 193; parliamentary system, 370; reaction after 1848-49, 188; reconquered by Austria in 1849, 161; revolutions in 1831 and 1832, 105; riots in 1889, 374; riots in 1898, 375; Risorgimento, 149; ten Italian states, 42; Triple Alliance, 374, 378; unity a practicable ideal, 147; unity complete in 1870, 255; World War and, 665, 687, 1021; World War, entrance on the side of the Allies, 682, 1022; World War, invasion by Austria, 705, 706 (map); World War services, losses, victories, and results, 721, 1022; Young Italy, 146
- Italy since the World War*, 1021; colonial gains, 1028; Communism, 1033, 1035; cost of living, 1030; Fascisti, 1031; frontiers, problem of, 1024; Jugo-Slavia and, 1024; Mussolini, 1037; new boundaries, 1026; Parliament and Mussolini, 1040; parliamentary elections in 1919, 1032; parties, 1032; Secret Treaties and, 1023, 1024; sense of grievance at results of the peace, 1029; Socialists, 1031, 1032; strikes and violence, 1030, 1031, 1033, 1035; territorial gains, 1026, 1028-1029; workmen and the factories, 1033
- Ito, Hirobumi, 619
- Ivory Coast, 366
- Jahn, F. L., 34, 136
- Jameson Raid, 504-505
- Janina, 650
- Japan, 614; Anglo-Japanese treaty in 1902, 624; Chino-Japanese War, 620; civilization, 614; description, 614; education, 619; European institutions, 618; Europeans in, 616; expansion in 1895-1905, 626; intervention of European powers after 1895, 621; isolation, 615, 616; naval competition, 1064; political and economic expansions in recent times, 1072; positions in the Orient, 1080; Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, 625; seclusion broken, 617; transformation, 618; Washington Conference and, 1072; World War, entrance into, 673
- Jassy, 862
- Java, 533
- Jellachich, Joseph, 158
- Jellicoe, Admiral, J. R., 692
- Jena, University of, 30
- Jerusalem, entered by General Allenby, 708
- Jesuits, expulsion from France, 350; expulsion from Germany, 286, 287; in France, 87, 88; Franco-German

- War and, 285; Germany and, 284; suppressed in Spain, 524; in Switzerland, 539
- Jewish State, 1000
- Jews, Dreyfus case and, 355, 358; England, 408; House of Commons and, 434; Hungarian Soviet, 907; Hungary, 913; National Home, 998; Poland, 856; Russia, 602
- Joffre, J. J. C., 668
- Johannesburg, 504
- John VI, of Portugal, 529, 530
- Jonescu, Take, 873, and *Preface*
- Juárez, B. P., 237, 238
- Jugo-Slav Committee, 885
- Jugo-Slav legions in the World War, 885
- Jugo-Slavia, 732; area and population, 891; boundaries, 888, 890; constituent parts included, 891; Constitution, 890; foreign policy, 891-892; Italy and, 889, 1024; Italy's entrance into the World War and, 885; language, 891; linguistic differences, 877; Manifesto of Corfu, 887; national aspirations, 878, 879; nationalistic spirit, 875, 878; official title, 875, 887, 890; proclamation of kingdom, 888; racial composition, 875; religious differences, 877; resources, 892; unification of the work of years, 878; unity, question of, 891
- Jugo-Slavs, Austrian repression, 884; desertions in the World War to the Entente, 886; independence, 807
- July 14th, 349
- July Monarchy, 111. *See also* Louis Philippe
- July Revolution, 1830, 94
- June Days, Paris, 1848, 171, 172, 177
- Junkers, 210
- Jutland naval battle, 691, 1065
- Kagoshima, 617
- Kaiser, 300
- Kaiser Wilhelm's Land, 970
- Kaledin, General, 704
- Kamerun. *See* Cameroons
- Kapp-Lüttwitz coup d'état, 776, 796
- Karageorge, House of, 554, 882, 887
- Karolyi, Michael, 905
- Kautsky, Karl, 773, 790, 928
- Kemal Pasha, 996, 1029
- Kemalist Government. *See* Angora
- Kemel, Mount, 713
- Kerak, 999
- Kerensky, A. F., 701; as minister of war, 702; driven from power, 703, 709
- Khartoum, 517; Gordon and, 518
- Khedive, Britain as adviser to, 517; Suez canal shares, 457; title, 515
- Kiauchau, 313, 622, 1073, 1079; Japanese ultimatum to Germany as to, 673
- Kiel, 223, 692; mutiny in 1918, 723-724, 771
- Kiel, Treaty of, 544, 549
- Kiel Canal, 757; completion, 312; German fleet in, 674
- Kiev, 850
- Kings, 300, 320
- Kioto, 615, 618
- Kirk Kilissé, 649, 652
- Kissingen, 228
- Kitchener, H. H., 506; in the Soudan, 519
- Körriggrätz, 227, 228, 244, 245
- Körrigsberg, 835
- Koræes, Adamantios, 555
- Korea, 620; annexation by Japan, 626
- Kossuth, Francis, 392
- Kossuth, Louis, 143, 159, 904; President of Hungary, 160; resignation and flight, 161; revolutionary oratory, 152
- Kotzebue, A. F. F. von, 31
- Kramar, Karel, 740, 812, 822
- Kruger, Paul, 502
- Krupp, Alfred, 211
- Krupp works, 308
- Kulturkampf, 284
- Kumanovo, 649
- Kun, Béla, 866, 908, 910; career, 900
- Kuropatkin, General A. N., 625
- Kut-el-Amara, 707
- Labor, 276; compulsory, Bulgaria, 923; England, protection of, 433; England after the World War, 965; Germany under the new Constitution, 787; International Organization, 750; women and children, England, 432
- Labor and capital, 68, 69; factory system and, 257
- Labor code, 433
- Labor Commission (France), 169
- Labor party (England), 480; 1089
- Ladron Islands, 294
- Lafayette, Marquis de, 95, 113
- Laffitte, Jacques, 113
- Laharpe, Colonel, 582

- Laibach, Congress of, 48
 Lamarque, General, 116
 Lamartine, A. M. L. de, 126; candidacy for President of the Second Republic, 176; leadership, 130; on republican government, 167; on the red flag, 169
 Lancashire, 64, 65
 Land, 461; Bulgaria, 923; Czecho-Slovakian reforms, 828; disposition of war spoils by mandates, 749; England — landlords, farmers, laborers, 461; Poland, 854; Russia, 589
 Land Act of 1870, Ireland, 447, 448, 459
 Land Act of 1881, Ireland, 465
 Land Act of 1886, Ireland, 467, 470
 Land Act of 1891, Ireland, 471
 Land Act of 1903, Ireland, 471
 Land Purchase Bill of 1896 (Ireland), 476
Landesgemeinden, 541
Landsturm, 214
Landwehr, 214
Langensalza, 227
 Languages in Belgium, differences, 1015
 Lansing, Robert, 739
 Laon, 719
 Lassalle, Ferdinand, 277; career, 278; social production theory, 278
 Latvia, 943, 944
 Lauenburg, 222, 223
 Lausanne Conference of 1922-23, 1007
 Lausanne, Second Conference of, 1008
 Lausanne, Treaty of, in 1912, 648
 Law, Bonar, 1089
 League of Nations, 742; achievements, 1044, 1049, 1057; arbitration and investigation of disputes, 748; Article 10, 746, 1055; Article 16, 748, 949; Article 26, 1054; Assembly, 743, 1042, 1043; Assembly — actual rôle, 1052; Belgium and, 1020; center of authority, 1050; chief bodies — Assembly and Council, 743; Constitution, 1042; Council, 743, 1042; Council and Assembly — relative power, 1051; Council — enlargement, 1056; Covenant, 1042; Covenant — amendments to, 1053; Covenant, criticism of, 1053; decisions, 744; diplomacy and, 1043; disarmament problem, 745; economic pressure, 748, 749; French attitude toward, 948; humanitarian work, 1046; international disputes, treatment, 747; international military force and, 949; membership, 743; operation, 1042; prevention of war, 746; prevention of war — how far successful, 1058; seat, 543; seat and secretariat, 744; Secretariat, 1042, 1043; states included and excluded, 743; territorial integrity, 746; United States' refusal to join, 764, 1043, 1060; war threats and, 747
 League to Enforce Peace, 736
 Ledru-Rollin, A. A., 176
 Leeds, 399
 Legion of Honor Scandal, 352
 Legitimacy, doctrine of, 4
 Legitimists, 115, 340
 Leipsic, 5, 6
 Leitha River, 384
 Lenin, Nikolai, 703, 927; compromise with capital in 1921, 936; on liberty, 942
 Lenz, Max, 229
 Leo XIII, 287; accession, 372; France and, 353
 Leopold I, of Belgium, 101; reign and influence, 534
 Leopold II, of Belgium, 512; Congo Free State, 512, 513, 514; political questions in his reign, 534
 Leopold, Prince of Hohenzollern, 248, 524-525
Lèse-majesté, 324
 Lesseps, Ferdinand de, 515
 Li Yuan-Lung, 628
 Liao-tung peninsula, 620, 621
 Liao-yang, 625
 Liberal-Unionists, 469, 475
 Liberals, England, 438, 475, 480; Germany in 1815 and after, 30, 34; Gladstone's leadership, 440
 Liberty. *See* Freedom
 Libya, 1028
 Liebknecht, Karl, 771, 773, 774
 Liebknecht, William, 279, 289
 Liechtenstein, 535
 Liège, fortress of, 668; siege of, 668
 Life, 272
 Liggett, General Hunter, 717
 Lille, 719
 Lisbon, 529, 530
 Lissa, 228
 Lithuania, 602, 943, 944; boundary with Poland, 842
 Little Entente, 824, 825, 873, 911
 Little Russians, 826, 841
 Liverpool, 56

- Livingstone, David, 511
- Lloyd George, David, 478; budget of 1909, 481; comments on the treaty of Versailles, 760; Genoa Conference of 1922, 939, 941; international conferences since the World War, 968; ministry after the war, 964; on the Irish Republic, 987; overthrow of, 1089
- Local government, England, 396, 421; France, 339, 349
- Locomotive, 57
- Lodge, H. C., 764
- Lodz, 843
- Lombardy, 3; Austria defeated in, 1859, 196; Austrian rule, 161; Piedmont and, 198; recovery by Austria, 157
- Lombardy-Venetia, 42, 43; revolution in 1848, 154
- London, Treaty of, in 1827, 558-559
- London, Treaty of, in 1861, 237
- London, Treaty of, in 1913, 650
- London, Treaty of, in 1915, 885, 889; Italy and, 1022, 1023
- London Convention, of 1884, 503, 504
- London *Telegraph*, 328
- Lonsdale, Lord, 399
- Lords, House of, 396; Gladstone's attack on, 474; Liberal party and, 480; question of reform of, 482; rejection of the budget, 480; Reform Bill and, 416, 417, 418
- Lords' Veto, 482. *See also* Parliament Act
- Lorraine, 252; cession to Germany, 255; iron ore, 307
- Loubet, Émile, 356; visit to Rome, 362
- Louis I, of Portugal, 530
- Louis XVIII, 2; character, 74; Constitutional Charter, 72; death, 84; difficulties, 75; reign, 71; restoration, 2, 10; Ultra-royalists and, 75, 77
- Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, 119; career, 175; Constituent Assembly and, 175; coup d'état of 1851, 179; demand for Constitutional revision, 178; election as President of the Second Republic, 176; proclaimed Emperor of the French as Napoleon III, 180. *See also* Napoleon III
- Louis Philippe, 72, 94; accession to throne, 95, 96, 110; attempts on his life, 117-118; career, 109; character, 110; Constitution, revised, 110; durability of régime, 113; franchise, 111; government prosecution of republican journals, 117; laws of September, 1835, 118; liberalism, 109; Napoleonic legend, 119, 120; overthrow and exile, 131, 152; parliamentary history in 1830-40, 121; "reform banquets" in 1847, 129; reign, 109; Republican insurrections in 1832-34, 116; ruler in fact as well as theory, 122; title to throne, 110, 111
- Louvain, 1009, 1014; library of, 759 university and library, destruction of, 1010
- Lowe, Robert, 438, 439
- Lucca, 42
- Lucknow, 488
- Ludendorff, General Erich von, 1070; attack in World War in 1918, 713
- Lulé Burgas, 649, 652
- Lusitania* (ship), 684, 696, 697
- Luther, Martin, 284
- Lutsk, 688
- Luxemburg, 663; economic union with Belgium, 959; neutrality, 536
- Luxemburg, Rosa, 773, 774
- Lvov, Prince, G. E., 701, 842
- Lyons, 117, 127
- Maassen, K. G., 135
- Macaulay, T. B., 65, 69; on the Reform Bill, 415
- Macdonald, J. R., 1089
- MacDonald, William, 955, 956
- Macedonia, 571; question of, 572, 579; Serb and Bulgarian influences, 651; Turkish treatment, 646
- Machines, 55, 68
- Mackensen, General A. L. F. A., 676, 678
- MacMahon, Marshal, 252; chosen president of the French Republic, 341, 342; contest with Chamber of Deputies, 347; ministry, 346, 347; Republicans and, 347, 348; resignation, 348
- Madagascar, 350
- Maeterlinck, Maurice, 671
- Magenta, 196
- Magyar language, 142, 390
- Magyarization, 391, 827, 904
- Magyars, 19, 140, 806; Constitution Austria, 1861-65, opposed, 381; Croats and, 879; Croats rise against 158; determined spirit, 379; Hungary and, 390; Independence Party, 392; Roumanians and, 867, 909
- Mahdi, 518

- Mahratta confederacy, 487
 Majuba Hill, 502, 503
 Malmédy, 798, 1019
 Malta, 3
 Manchester, 56, 399; Anti-Corn Law League, 429
 Manchester Massacre, 405, 414
 Manchu dynasty, end, 627
 Manchuria, Russia in, 621, 623
 Mandarins, 611
 Mandates and mandatories, 749, 763; Washington Conference and, 1076
 Manifesto of Corfu, 887
 Manin, Daniel, 155, 193
 Manitoba, 495
 Manuel II, of Portugal, 530
 Manufacturing, domestic and factory systems, 58; Germany, 289; specialization, 66
 March Days, 152-156
 Marchand, J. B., 368
 Marches, The, 204, 205
 Maria Christina, of Spain, 527
 Maria da Gloria (Maria II), of Portugal, 530
 Marienwerder, 798, 835, 840
 Maritime Province, 614
 Mark, German, 799
 Marne, Battle of the, 669
 Marne, Second Battle of the, 715
 Mars-la-Tours, 252
 Marseilles, rioting in 1815, 77
 Marshall Islands, 673
 Martiguac ministry, 89
 Martinique, 364
 Marx, Karl, 267; ancestry and education, 267; associates and friends, 267; *Capital*, 268; *Communist Manifesto*, 268; internationalism, 276; studies and works, 268; teachings examined, 269; theory, breakdown of, 273
 Masaryk, Alice, 822
 Masaryk, T. G., 811, 812; career, 818
 Massawa, 374
 Maude, General Sir F. S., 707
 Maurenbrecher, Wilhelm, 298
 Maximilian, Archduke, 238, 239
 Maximilian of Baden, Prince, 303, 847
 May laws, Prussia, 286, 287
 Mayence, occupation in 1918, 729
 Mazzini, Joseph, 145; founder of "Young Italy," 146; imprisonment, 146; patriotism, 145; practical leadership, 147-148; Roman Republic and, 161, 162; unity of Italy as his aim, 147
 Mazuria, 840
 Mazurian Lakes, 671, 676
 Mecklenburg, 28
 Mehemet Ali, 122, 515, 552, 557
 Melikoff, Loris, 600
 Méline, F. J., 355, 356
 Memel, 753, 842
 Menelek, 375
 Mercier, Cardinal, 1014
 Mesopotamia, 707, 970, 995-997; British mandate for, 998; fate in the World War (with map), 720
 Messines, 713
 Metal industry in Upper Silesia, 838, 839
 Metternich, Prince, 3; Alexander I and, 584; diplomacy, 14, 16, 50; downfall, 153, 155; historical importance, 17; personality, 15, 16; system, 27, 30, 35, 46, 108; system checked, 50, 52
 Metz, 252, 255, 728; capitulation in 1870, 253
 Mexico, 237; Germany's proposed alliance with, 699; joint intervention by European powers, 237; Napoleon III and intervention, 237; Spanish expedition to, in 1861, 524
 Michaelis, Georg, 303
 Middle Classes in England, 425, 436; and of rule, 438
 Middle Europe, 690, 897; corridor, 707, 721; corridor to the East (map), 690
 Middle Kingdom, 611
 Miguel, Dom, 530
 Mikado, 615, 618
 Milan, 154; insurrection against Austria, 155
 Milan, King of Serbia, 577
 Milioukov, P. N., 607, 701, 702; on the Russian famine, 937-938
 Militarism, England, 474; Germany, 330; Germany restricted in future, 755
 Military education in Germany, 756
 Military expenditures, 638, 641
 Military service, England, 451; France, 339
 Military system of Prussia as an influence, 451
 Military tribunals, 758
 Mill, James, 259
 Mill, J. S., 259; woman suffrage, 438
 Millerand, Alexandre, 953
 Milner, Sir Alfred, 505, 973

- Mincio River, 155
 Ministerial responsibility, Canada, 492, 493; Germany, 325, 327-328
 Minorities treaties, 858, 859, 865; Roumania and, 864
 Miquelon, 364
 Mir, 582, 589
 Mirski, Sviatopolk, 630, 632
 Mistich, General, 681
 Missolonghi, 557
 Modena, 42, 197, 198; Piedmont and, 197, 198, 200
 Mohammed V, 645
 Mohammedans, 553, 995; in India, 976
 Moldavia, 552, 560, 561, 563, 564, 565
 Molé ministry, 122
 Moltke, Hellmuth von, 226
 Mommsen, Theodor, 213, 330
 Monaco, 42
 Monarchists in France, 337; attempt at fusion in 1873, 341; in 1870-71, 331; three sorts, 340
 Monarchy, 71, 72, 74; July Monarchy, 111
 Monastir, 649
 Monotony of labor, 66
 Monroe Doctrine, 51, 315, 749, 764
 Mons, 668
 Montagu, E. S., 977
 Montdidier, 711, 713
 Montenegro, 569, 649, 652, 654, 681; independence, 570, 571, 572; revolution of 1918, 888
 Montijo, Eugénie de, 184
 Moore, J. B., 1048
 Morley, Lord, 976
 Morocco, 367, 960; danger spot, 368; French interests, 368; incorporation in French colonial empire, 368
 Mukden, 625
 Mulcahy, Richard, 992
 Müller, Hermann, 742, 796; ministry, 777
 Munich, University of, 285
 Municipal Corporations Act, 423
 Municipal government in England, 421, 423
 Munitions in Germany, 756
 Murad V, 567
 Murat, Joachim, 4, 41
 Murmansk, 885
 Mussolini, Benito, 1037; character and career, 1039; Parliament and, 1040
Mutsu (ship), 1067
 Mutsuhito, 618
 Namur, 668, 1010
 Nanking, Treaty of, in 1842, 612
 Naples, Kingdom of, 4, 41, 42; Garibaldi's conquest of, 203; government of Ferdinand I, 44; plébiscite for annexation, 204; revolution of 1820, 45, 48, 49; revolution of 1848, 150; Sicilian revolt in 1860, 201
 Napoleon I, 1; activity in Italy, 40; adherents, 76; ideas according to Napoleon III, 181; second funeral, Paris, 1840, 120
 Napoleon III, 180, 181; Bismarck and, 224, 244; Bismarck and in 1866-67, 245-246; Bordeaux speech, 186; Cavour and, 188; character, 243; conspiracy with Cavour to fight Austria, 194; Decree of November 24, 1860, 235; doctrine of nationalities, 243; England's alienation from, 201; enterprises, 185; Italian war's effect on, 233; liberal concession, 237; marriage, 184; Mexican expedition, 236, 243; Nicholas I, of Russia, and, 561; opportunity lost in 1866 in Austro-Prussian war, 244; Piedmont and, 193; programme of Empire, 181; repressive policy, 184; service to Italy, 198; taken prisoner, 252; treaty of commerce with England, 234; Villafranca and, 196
 Napoleonic legend, 119, 120
 Nassau, Duchy of, incorporation in Prussia, 229
 Natal, 501
 National boundaries. *See* Boundaries
 National Constituent Assembly (France), 166; character, 171; dictatorship, 172; financial situation, 172; framing a Constitution, 173; question of Presidency, 173
 National Economic Council, Germany, 788-789, 790
 National Guard, France, 168, 171; abolition, 339; suppression in 1871, 333
 National Socialism, 277
 National Union, of Germany, 213
 National Workshops (France), 169
 Nationality, 282; Austria, Republic of, 894; Austria-Hungary, effect in, 385;

- Austria-Hungary and the ruling classes, 903; Belgium, awakening, 99; Germany, 322; Jugo-Slavs, 875, 878; principle of, 322; principle disregarded at Congress of Vienna, 9; Roumania and, 868; spirit of, 753
 Naumann, Friedrich, 315, 329, 802
 Naval armaments and the Washington Conference of 1922, 1063, 1066
 Navarino, 559
 Navigation Laws, 406, 428
 Navy, American, 1063; British, 472, 475; German, 299; German expansion, 311; Japan, 1064
 Near East, German ambitions in, 315
 Near Eastern Question, 1007
 Necessity and justice, 664
 Needle gun, 228
 Netherlands, 2; Belgian and Dutch friction in 1815, 99; colonial possessions, 533; Constitution in 1815 and friction over, 100; Constitution of 1848, 533; creation of the Kingdom of, 98-99; politics after 1830, 532
 Neuilly, Treaty of, in 1919, 766, 917
 Neuilly Wood, 713
 Neutral territories, 663
 Neutralized states, 536
 Neuve Chapelle, 675
 New Brunswick, 486, 490, 494
 New Caledonia, 336
 New Guinea, 294
 New Harmony, Ind., 262
 New Holland, 496
 New Lanark, 260
 New South Wales, 496
 New York *Tribune*, 268
 New Zealand, 495; government, 499; legislation; 499, 500
 Newcomen, Thomas, 53
 Newfoundland, 486, 490, 495
 Newspaper, France in 1819, 80, 83, 85, 88, 91; persecution in France in 1830-34, 117, 118; suppression in Prussia, 210
 Ney, Marshal, 77
 Nice, annexation to France, 200, 201
 Nicholas I, of Russia, 104, 585; assists Austria against Hungary, 160; Greek war of independence, 558; Napoleon III and, 581
 Nicholas II, of Russia, 605; abdication, 701; Duma in 1906, 635; Hague Conferences, 639, 641; more liberal path, in 1904-05, 630; supreme power as Tsar, 636
 Nicholas, Grand Duke, 678
 Niger region, 366
 Nihilism, 598
 Nikolsburg, Peace of, 226, 229
 Nile, 509, 510, 519
 Nippon, 614
 Nitti, F. S., 1031, 1033
 Nivelles, General R. G., 686
 No annexations, no indemnities, 702, 709, 710
 Nogi, Maresuke, 625
 Normandy, German withdrawal from, 338
 North German Confederation, 230; Constitution, 230; South German states, alliance with, 231, 232, 250
 Norway, 8; dissolution of Union with Sweden, 550; relations with Sweden, 546
 Noske, Gustave, 775
 Nova Scotia, 486, 490, 494
 Novara, 49, 162
 Noyon, 704, 711, 713
 Nuremberg, 661
 Nyassa, Lake, 511

 Obrenovitch, Milosch, 554
 O'Connell, Daniel, 409, 442
 O'Connor, Feargus, 426
 Oireachtas, 993
 Okhotsk, 609
 Oku, Yasukata, 625
 Old-Age Insurance, 292
 Old-Age Pensions, 478; Denmark, 546; New Zealand, 500
 Old Catholics, 285
 Old Sarum, 398, 413, 414
 Ollivier, O. E., 241, 248, 249
 Olmütz, 165, 218
 Omdurman, 519
 Open door, Germany, 288
 Open door policy in the Far East, 624, 1067, 1072, 1076, 1078, 1079
 Opium traffic, 1046
 Opium War, 612
 Orange Free State, 501, 502
 Orange River Colony, 506, 507
 Orient, World War in, 707
 Orlando, V. E., 1031
 Orleanists, 340
 Orleans, Duke of. *See* Louis Philippe
 Orsini, Felice, 193

- Oscar I, of Norway and Sweden, 548
 Oscar II, of Norway and Sweden, 548, 550
 Osman Pasha, 569
 Ostend, 669, 719
 Ottawa, 494
 Otto, of Greece, 560, 577
 Otto, Prince, 912
 Ottoman Empire, 522. *See also* Turkey
 Ouchy. *See* Lausanne
 Oudh, 488
 Owen, Robert, 260, 421; career and ideas, 261; New Harmony, Ind., experiment, 262
- Pacific question and the Washington Conference, 1069, 1076
 Pact of 1815 (Switzerland), 538, 540
 Paderewski, Ignace, 848; career, 848; prime minister of Poland, 848
 Palacky, Frantisek, 140, 819
 Palestine, 970, 996, 998; Allenby's campaign in 1917-18, 719; Arabs and Jews in, 999, 1000; British mandate for, 999; Germany and, 315; Holy places, 560; World War and, 708
 Palmerston, Lord, 436
 Pan-German League, 315, 801; character and work, 319
 Pan-German movement, 313
 Pan-Germanism, 319, 322, 896, 898
 Pan-Germans, Belgium and Holland and, 537
 Papacy, 107; annuity from Italy, 371; Italy and, relations after establishment of the Kingdom, 370; losses in Italian war, 233
 Papal Guarantees, Law of, 371
 Papal infallibility, 285
 Papal States, 42; defeat in 1860, 204; government, 44
 Pappen, Franz von, 695
 Paris, 2; bombardment in World War, 711; capital removed from in 1871, 332; civil war in 1871, 335; commune, 332; coup d'état of 1851, 179; Exposition of 1855, 185; Exposition of 1889, 353; insurrection of 1832, 116; July Revolution of 1830, 94; June Days, 1848, 171, 172; "Massacre of the boulevards," 180; palace of Archbishop of, 364; Republicanism, 332; revolutionary character of the people in 1871, 333; siege in 1870-71, 253; transformation under Baron Haussmann, 185
 Paris Commune, 276
 Paris, Conference of, 1919, 737; committees, 740; criticisms regarding treatment of Austria, 808; delegates, 739; general procedure, 741; sessions, 740, 741; small states and, 863, 864; unfavorable conditions, 741
 Paris, Congress of, 1856, 192, 563; Cavour and the Italian question, 192
 Paris, Court of, 341
 Paris, Treaty of, 1814, 2, 4
 Paris, Treaty of, 1815, 10
 Paris, Treaty of, 1856, 563
 Paris, Treaty of, 1898, 528
 Parish Councils Bill, 474
 Parliament, British, 396; Dissenters, Catholics, and Jews, 408; duration, 484; Irish members, 441; Irish members, exclusion question, 467, 472, 473; Irish membership, 484; Irish obstructionists, 465; Jews, and property qualification, 434; petitions in 1838-48, 425; reform agitation, 401, 403, 405; Wellington's eulogy, 411, women in, 966
 Parliament Act of 1911, 483, 485
 Parliamentary system, Austria in 1861, 380; French Third Republic, 345; Germany, 783; Italy, 370; Poland, 853; Spain, 527. *See also* Constitutional government
 Parma, 42; Piedmont and, 197, 198, 200
 Parnell, C. S., 464
 Particularism in Germany in 1815, 26
 Pasic, Nikola, 873, 887, 889
 Passchendaele Ridge, 705
 Passports, Russia, 586-587
 Patrimony of St. Peter, 206
 Peace, movement for, 638; William II and, 317
 Peace Conference. *See* Paris, Conference of, 1919
 Peace-making after the World War, 730; personal readjustments, 734; problems, 730; territorial problems, 730; world problems, 733
 Peasant proprietorship, 460
 Peasants, Bulgaria, 919; International Union, 922; Roumania, 870; Soviet Russia, 930, 932, 945
 Pedro I, of Brazil, 529

- Pedro IV, of Portugal, 530
 Pedro V, of Portugal, 530
 Peel, Sir Robert, 407, 409; Gladstone and, 440; ministry, 429
 Peers, creation, 483
 Peking, Legation rescued, 623
 Penal Code in England, 406
 People's Charter, 425
 Périer, C. P., 113; character and ministry, 114
 Permanent Court of Arbitration, 640
 Permanent Court of International Justice, 747, 1047, 1048
 Péronne, 686, 711
 Perry, Commodore M. C., 616
 Pescadores Islands, 620
 Pétain, H. P., 685, 728
 Peter I, of Serbia, 577
 Peterloo, 405, 414
 Petrograd workers' resolution in 1920, 935
 Phalanstery, 264
 Philippines, 528
 Phoenix Park murders, 465
 Piave River, 706, 721
 Picquart, M. G., 355, 356, 358
 Piedmont, 40, 42; central Italian states and, 197, 198, 200; Congress of Paris, 1856, and, 192; Crimean War, participation, 191; enlargement in 1860, 200; government of Victor Emmanuel I, 43; leadership in Italy, 188, 190; Lombardy and, 198; moral victory after 1848-49, 188; prosperity under Cavour, 190; reforms in 1847, 150; revolution of 1821, 48-49
 Pilsen, 829
 Pilsudski, Joseph, 846; career and character, 846
 Pinto, F. M., 616
 Piracy, 365
 Pirenne, Henri, 1009, 1016
 Pius IX, 149; death, 372; Italian Kingdom and, 371; protest against King of Italy, 206
 Pius X, 263
 Plehve, Venceslas von, 629; assassination, 630
 Plevna, 569, 570, 576
 Plombières interview, 194
 Plunkett, Count G., 986
 Plural voting, 463, 535
 Plutocracy in Prussia, 326
 Pobyedonostseff, K. P., 601, 605, 634
 Poincaré, Raymond, 951; address at Peace Conference, 740
 Poland *before the World War*, 6; Austrian, German, and Russian sections, 844; division into nobles and peasants, 595-596; insurrection of 1863, 594; restoration of Kingdom in 1815, 103; restoration recognized as necessary during the World War, 833; revolution of 1830, failure, 105; Russia and, in 1815, friction, 103; Russian relations, 583, 588; World War experiences and outcome, 832-833
 Poland, *Republic of*, 752, 832; access to the sea, 835, 836, 851; Allied mission to, in 1920, 851; area, population, and resources, 843; army, 847; Bolsheviks and, 850; boundaries, 834, 838, 840, 841-842, 852; Constituent Assembly, 846, 849, 852; Constitution, 852; Diet and Senate, 852; difficulties and dangers, 843; first President, 846, 848; independence proclaimed, 842, 846; industrial reconstruction, 855; internal complications, 844; Jewish question, 856; land problem, 854; political parties, 853-854; potentialities, 843; Presidency, 852-853; reconstruction problems, 845; Russian boundary, 842; suffrage, 852; Supreme Economic Chamber, 853; three sections, 844; wars, 849
 Poles, 323; American, 848; character, 843; three divisions, 844
 Police in Russia, 586
 Polignac ministry, 90
 Polish Legion, 848
 Polish National Committee, 848
 Polish Relief Association, 848
 Political reform, 265
 Pomerania, 6
 Pondicherry, 364
 Populists, in Germany, 801
 Port Arthur, 620; relinquished by Japan, 621; Russia's lease, 622, 623; siege of, 625
 Porto Rico, 528
 Portsmouth, Treaty of, in 1905, 626
 Portugal, 8; Congo claims, 513; from 1815 to 1909, 529; Republic proclaimed in 1910, 530-531; revolution in 1820, 46; World War participation, 691
 Portuguese explorers, 509
 Posen, 6, 835, 844, 857

- Postal savings banks in England, 435
 Potatoes, 430, 442, 445
 Pragmatic Sanction, 521
 Prague, 157, 829, 830; capital of Czecho-Slovakia, 812, 813
 Prague, peace of, 1866, 226
 Prague, University of, 388
 President of the French Republic, 337, 342, 344
 Press. *See* Newspapers
 Pressburg, 830
 Pretoria, 507
 Pretoria Convention of 1881, 503
 Preuss, Hugo, 780, 802
 Prevention of war, League of Nations and, 746
 Pribram, A. F., 296
 Prices in Italy after the war, 1030
 Prim, Juan, 524
 Primogeniture in France under Charles X, 87
 Prince Edward Island, 486, 490, 495
 Pripet Marshes, 687
 Private property in France, 167, 172
 Proletariat, 270, 276
 Proportional representation, 543, 546, 784, 993; Austria, Republic of, 901; Czecho-Slovakia, 816
 Protective tariff, Bismarck and, 287; Chamberlain's reform policy, 478; England, 428; England, reform, 429, 431, 434; France under Napoleon III, 234, 235; Great Britain in 1919, 966; Prussia, 135
 Protestantism in Germany, 284
 Proudhon, P. J., 267, 268
 Provisional Government (France), 143, 166; achievements, 168; two elements, 167
 Prussia, 3; annexations after the Seven Weeks' War, 229; army, 214; Austria and, 27, 33, 34, 163, 219; Congress of Vienna and, 5; constitution demanded, 137; Constitution of 1850, 165; constitutional but not parliamentary, 209; electoral system, 325; evolution in 1830-1848, 134; German unity in 1850, effort for, 164; government, and manipulation of the suffrage, 325; leadership in Germany, 780, 782; Liberal persecution in 1851, 209; North Germany conquered in 1866, 227; population and the army, 215; power not liberalism, 220; preponderance of political power, 326; pride, aggressiveness, and ambition, 318; South German states conquered in 1866, 228; strengthened by Napoleon III in 1864, 243; tariff policy, 135; taxation, 135; turning point in year 1866, 245; United Landtag, 137; Wars with Denmark, Austria, and France in 1864-70, 220; withdrawal from German Confederation, 226
 Prussian system, crash, 727
 Przemyśl, 671, 676
 Public meeting in England, 404, 405
 Puebla, 238, 239
 Punjab, 488
 Pupils Councils in Hungary, 907
 Quadrilateral, 155, 197
 Quadruple Alliance, 12, 14
 Race hatred, 358; Ireland, 441; South Africa and the Indians, 982-983
 Radetzky, Marshal, 155; success in Italy, 157
 Radicals, England, 424, 425; France, 351, 353
 Radoslavoff, Vassil, 680
 Railroads, 57
 Rand, the, 504
 Rapallo, Treaty of, in 1920, 798, 890, 941, 1025
 Rathenau, Walter, 794, 802
 Rayahs, 553, 554
 Red Army, 927, 943
 Red flag, 168, 334
 Red Sea and Italy, 374
 Red Shirts, expedition of, 203
 Red Terror, Hungary, 906; Soviet Russia, 927
 Redistribution Act of 1885 (England), 461
 Redmond, John, 985
 Referendum in Switzerland, 541
 Reform, 274
 Reform Bill of 1832; conditions leading up to, 394; debate on, 412; passage, 417
 Reform Bill of 1867, 438
 Reform Bills of 1884-85, 459, 461
 Reformers, radical, 259; revolutionary, 260
 Reichsrat, 387, 784
 Reichstag, 230, 282, 772; character, 329; political supremacy, 783; representation in, 327

- Religious instruction in England, 450
 Religious liberty, England, 400, 407;
 English universities, 453
 Religious orders in France, 359
 Rennes court-martial, 356, 358
 Reparation Commission, 758, 958
 Reparations, Germany, 758; 1083
 Representation in England before the
 Reform Bill, 400
 Representative government in Germany,
 329
 Republic, term, 342, 344, 346
 Republicans in France, 116, 117, 174;
 amnesty under Napoleon III, 235;
 control of Chamber and of Senate
 under MacMahon, 347, 348; factions,
 351, 353; persecutions, 343
 Réunion, 364
 Revolution, Austria in 1848, 152; Bel-
 gium in 1830, 101; Central Europe
 between 1830 and 1848, 133; Euro-
 pean in 1830, 98; European in 1848,
 151, 152; France in 1830, 93; France
 in 1848, 132, 133; French, effects in
 France, 71; Germany in 1848, 155;
 Industrial, 53; Italian States in 1848,
 155; Italy in 1831 and 1832, 105;
 Naples in 1820, 45, 48, 49; Piedmont
 in 1821, 48-49; Poland in 1830, 101,
 102, 104; Portugal in 1820, 46; social,
 271; Spain in 1820, 39; Turkey in
 1908, 579, 580; world, 936. *See also*
 French Revolution
 Rheims, 707, 716
 Rhine, 5; fortifications, 757
 Rhine Province, 728, 729
 Rhine provinces, 244
 Rhine states, 778
 Rhodes, 648
 Rhodes, Cecil, 505
 Rhodesia, 505, 507
 Richelieu, A. E. duP., Duke de, 78, 79, 81
 Riego, Rafael, 39
 Riga, captured by the Germans, 702
 Riga, Treaty of, of 1921, 842, 852
 Right to labor, 167, 169
 Ripley, George, 264
 Risorgimento, 149
 Rivet law, France, 337
 Roberts, Lord, 506
 Rodjestrensky, Admiral, 626
 Rohrbach, Paul, 315
 Romagna and Piedmont, 197, 198, 200
 Roman Catholics. *See* Catholic Church
 Romanoffs, end, 701
 Rome, 40, 44, 107; annexed to Italy,
 369; as capital of Italy, 256, 370;
 Cavour's idea about, 206; conquest
 by France in 1849; 162; conquest in
 1870, 255; declared a republic, 161;
 Garibaldi's threat against, 204; King-
 dom of Italy and in 1861, 206
 Roon, Albrecht von, 215
 Roosevelt, Theodore, 641, 693
 Root, Elihu, 1047, 1048, 1080; on sub-
 marine use, 1069
 Rosebery, Lord, 474
 Rotten boroughs, 389
 Roubaix, 719
 Roumania, 565; after 1878, 576; area,
 860, 868; boundaries, new, 684; Bul-
 garia and, 652; German relations, 860;
 Greece and, 873; Hungary, occupa-
 tion of, 866, 908; independence, 570,
 571, 572; industries, 871; land prob-
 lem, 870; Magyars and, 867; minori-
 ties treaty, 864; neutrality in the
 World War, 861; non-Roumanian
 population, 868; objections to treaties
 with Austria and Hungary, 864; Old
 and New, 869; Paris Conference and,
 863, 866, 867; political parties, 869;
 population, 868; resources, 871;
 treaties with Czecho-Slovakia and
 Jugo-Slavia and against Hungary in
 1921, 873; Triple Alliance and, 860
 unity, problem of, 868; World War
 campaign in (map), 689; World War
 entrance in 1916, 688, 861; World
 War reverses, 862
 Roumanians, 19, 140; origin, 390, 565
 Roumelia, Eastern, 571, 572, 573
 Roxburgh, 398
 Royal Statute of 1834 (Spain), 522
 Ruanda, 1019
 Rudini, Marquis di, 375
 Ruhr, 305
 Russell, Lord John (1792-1878), 412;
 Reform Bills, 412, 413, 416
 Russia, 4; acquisitions at the Congress
 of Vienna, 6; Alexander I, 581; Alex-
 ander II, 588; Alexander III, 600;
 Asiatic expansion, 609; Austro-Ger-
 man alliance against, 296; Bolshe-
 viki and peace, 708; Bolsheviki
 government, 703; classes of society,
 581; coalition against, in 1854, 561;
 Congress of Vienna, demands at, 5;

- conquests, 581; Council of the Empire, 634, 635; Duma, 632, 633; France, alliance with in 1891, 353, 354; general strike, 633; German Confederation and, 229; German treaty (Rapallo), of 1922, 798; industrial development, 603; intervention in behalf of Greece, 558; invasion by Germany in 1915, 676; Japan and, 621; Japanese War, 625; Japanese War, reaction upon Russia, 629; Jews in, 602; Manchuria and, 621; mobilization in 1914, 661; Nicholas I, 585; Nicholas II, 605; Nihilism, 598; Poland and in 1815, friction, 103; provocation by Austria's ultimatum to Serbia in 1914, 658, 659; Provisional Government voted by the Duma, 701; revolution, first, 629; revolution in 1917 and withdrawal from the World War, 700; serfs, 581, 587; serfs, emancipation, 589, 590, 592; Soviet, 925, (*See also* Soviet Russia); territory lost by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, 709, 710, 712 (map); Turkestan and, 610; Turkish (Crimean War, 560; Washington Conference of 1922 and, 1062; World War and, 687; World War victories in 1914, 671; zemstvos, 593
- Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic, 926. *See* Soviet Russia
- Russification, 596, 602, 603, 608
- Russo-German alliance, 798
- Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, 625
- Russo-Turkish War of 1828-29, 559
- Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, 569
- Ruthenians, 388, 826, 828; Galicia and, 840, 841
- Saar Basin, 305, 753, 959; coal, 307; intricate provisions for, 754; League of Nations and, 1046
- Saarbrücken, 326
- Sacrilege, law against, in France, 86
- Sadler, Thomas, 421
- Sadowa, 227, 244, 245, 449; "revenge for", 245, 246
- Sahara, French claims, 366
- Saint-Germain, treaty of, 765, 810, 900
- Saint-Mihiel, 716
- St. Pierre, 364
- Saint-Quentin, 718
- Saint-Simon, C. H. Count de, 128, 262
- St. Sulpice, 364
- Salic law, 521
- Salisbury, Marquis of, 464; ministry, 470, 472; third ministry, 475
- Salonica, 649, 681, 885, 916
- Samara, 606
- Samaria, 719
- Samoa islands and Germany, 294
- Samurai, 615, 618
- San Domingo, 524
- San Marino, 42, 535, 683
- San Stefano, treaty of, 570, 571
- Sand, Karl, 31
- Sand River Convention, 502, 503
- Sanders, Liman von, 679
- Santiago, Cuba, 528
- Sarajevo, 656, 742
- Sardinia, 3; constitutional government, 165; Napoleon III and, 193
- Sardinia, Kingdom of, 205. *See also* Piedmont
- Sardinians in the Crimea, 191
- Sarum, 398, 413, 414
- Saseno, 1027
- Saskatchewan, 495
- Savoy; annexation to France, 200, 201
- Savoy, House of, 188; leadership, 193
- Saxe-Coburg, 783
- Saxe-Weimar, 29
- Saxony, 5, 22; at the Congress of Vienna, 6; coal-fields, 305
- Scandinavian states, 544
- Scapa Flow, 761
- Scheer, Admiral Reinhold von, 692
- Scheidemann, Philipp, 771; ministry, 775, 776
- Scheurer-Kestner, Auguste, 355
- Schleiermacher, Friedrich, 34
- Schleswig, 220, 752; incorporation with Denmark, 221; incorporation in Prussia, 229; plébiscite results, 798
- Schopenhauer, Arthur, 212
- Schwarzenberg, K. P., Prince von, 160
- Science, German respect for, 308
- Scientific history, 273
- Scotland, 398; local government, 423; reform acts in 1868, 438; reform bills, 418; suffrage, 398
- Scrutin de liste*, 80
- Scutari, 650
- Sea power, 508; England, 674
- Séanad Éireann, 992
- Sebastopol, 562

- Empire. *See* France under the
 and Republic and Second Empire
 of December, 240
 and Republic. *See* France under the
 Second Republic
 Secret Ballot, 453
 Secret diplomacy, 749
 Secret police in Russia, 586
 Secret treaties, 1023, 1024; Woodrow
 Wilson and, 1024
 Sedan, 252
 Self-determination, Austria, Republic of,
 894; British Empire, 969; Egypt, 972;
 Resolution of Fiume, 882
 Self-government of colonies, 492
Sennius consultum of 1870, 241, 242
 Serbia, 364, 366
 Serbia, 782
 Sepoy Mutiny, 488
 Septennate, 342
 Serbia, 391, 564, 569; after 1878, 577;
 ambition, 644; Austria's plan against
 in 1913 and action in 1914, 655, 656,
 657; Bulgaria and, 574, 577; inde-
 pendence, 570, 571, 572; Macedonia
 and, 651; reply to Austria's ultima-
 tum in 1914, 658; rise of, 554; World
 War experiences, 680, 681, 884; World
 War, result, 732
 Serbo-Croatian-Slovene language, 891
 Serbs, 386, 391, 554, 644, 645; Croats
 and, 881, 882
 Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, Kingdom
 of, 875, 887, 890. *See also* Jugo-
 Slavia
 Serfs, 581, 587; emancipation, 589, 590
 Sergius, Grand Duke, 632
 Serrano, Marshal, 524, 526
 Seton-Watson, R. W., 821, 827, 880,
 883
 Seven Weeks' War, 226, 228
 Sèvres, Treaty of, 972; Angora and,
 999; terms, 997
 Shantung, 313, 762, 764; 1073; eco-
 nomic control, 1078; German influ-
 ence, 622; German rights renounced,
 755; Japanese occupation, 1079
 Sheffield, 399
 Shimonoseki, 617-618, 620
 Shipbuilding, 62; Germany, 305; United
 States, 1063
 Ships, capital, 1064, 1065
 Shogun, 615; treaty, foreign treaties
 and overthrow, 617
 Siberia, 609; exile to, 586, 600, 607;
 independence, 704; problem, 1079
 Sicilian, insurrection of 1860, 201
 Sicilies, the Two. *See* Naples, Kingdom
 of
 Sickness insurance, 292
 Siemens, C. F. von, 802
 Silesia, 305, 1045. *See also* Upper
 Silesia
 Sinn Fein, Irish Republic and, 987; re-
 vival in 1916, 985
 Sinn Feiners, 964, 983
 Skupshchina, 890
 Slave trade, 10, 419; Africa, 509-510
 Slavery, abolition by England, 419;
 English abolition and the Boers, 501
 Slavization, 388
 Slavonia, 385
 Slavonians, 391
 Slavs, 140, 567, 658, 806; Northern, 875;
 Southern, 875
 Slovakia, 811, 814; Magyar methods in,
 827
 Slovaks, 391; Czechs and, 811
 Slovenes, 386, 388
 Slovenia, 876
 Smith, Adam, "Wealth of Nations,"
 401
 Smuts, General J. C., 684; distinctions
 and qualities, 981; German East
 Africa campaign, 981
 Smyrna, 998; burning of, 1005; Turkish
 victory over the Greeks in 1922, 1005
 Sobranje, 573
 Social Democrat, 279
 Social Democratic Party of Germany,
 276; growth, 324
 Social Democratic Workingmen's Party,
 280
 Social evils, 69, 70
 Social legislation, 472
 Social production, 278
 Social reform, 265, 274; Bismarck and,
 291
 Social revolution, 271, 273
 Social Revolutionaries of Russia, 928,
 929
 Socialism, 257; Bismarck and, 289;
 Carlyle's influence, 266; definition,
 258; England, tendency toward, 434;
 first use of the word, 263; France, 127;
 German laws against, 290; growth,
 274; National, 277; scientific, 269;
 Soviet Russia, two schools, 928

- Socialistic Working Men's Party of Germany, 280
- Socialists, 167; France, 353; Germany after the Revolution, 772; Germany, strength, 324; Germany, divisions after the Revolution, 773; "Green", in Bulgaria, 920; Russia, in 1917, 701, 703; William II and, 303
- Socialization of industry in Germany, 788, 790
- Sofia, 575, 576
- Soissons, 713
- Solferino, 196, 197
- Somaliland, 374, 1027
- Somme River, Battle of the, 686
- Sonderbund*, 539
- Sophia, Queen of Greece, 1003
- Soudan, 367, 517
- Soult ministry, 122
- South Africa, 500; Nationalists, 982; race problem, 982; rebellion of 1914, 980; World War and, 980. *See also* Boer War; British South Africa
- South African Republic, 502, 503. *See also* Transvaal
- South African Union, 507
- South America, Garibaldi in, 202
- Soviet Russia, 925; authorities, 927; civil wars and insurrections, 943, 944; Che-ka, 927; commerce, nationalization, 935, 936; compromise with capital in 1921, 936; compulsory labor, 934; Constitution of July, 1918, 925-926; democracy, 926; dictatorship, 927, 929, 942; disruption of the state, 943; "economic retreat", 936; emigration of the bourgeoisie, 945; famine, 933, 937-938; finances, 938, 941; food requisitions upon the peasants, 932; foreign capital appealed to, 937; Germany and, 941; government title, 926; industry, militarization, 935; industry, nationalization, 930, 934, 935; labor armies, 935; land, nationalization, 929, 932, 936; land, ownership and possession, 932; Pauper Committees, 932; payment of past debts, 941; peasantry, representation, 943; peasants and the nationalization of land, 930, 932, 945; peasants' resistance, 933; political life, 927; population, 944; private property, 928, 929; private property and the peasantry, 932; Red Army, 927, 943; Socialism, two schools, 928; su and restriction, 926; trade with nations, question of, 939; tyrants, 927; Workers' Control, 934
- Soviets*, 701, 942
- Spa Fields, 404
- Spain, 8; after 1823, 520; colonial possessions and England, 51; colonial revolution, 38; Constitution of 1812, 36; of 1834, 522; of 1837, 523; of 1869, 524; of 1876, 527; inefficiency of government in 1815, 38; insurrection of 1865, 524; loss of American colonies, 521, 528; loss of Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines, 528; reaction in 1823, 50, 83; Republic of 1873, 526; revolution of 1820, 39; of 1868, 247
- Spartacists, 773, 774
- Specialization in manufacture, 66
- Speke, J. H., 511
- Spicheren, 252
- Spinning, 55
- Stamboliiski, Alexander, 914, 917; peasant movement under, 919, 921
- Stambuloff, Stephan, 575
- Stanley, H. M., 511; as organizer, 513
- State, rôle of, 260; working classes and, 291
- State Socialism, 292, 293
- Staten Island, 202
- States-rights, Germany in 1815, 26; Germany since the Revolution, 778
- Steam engine, 58, 56, 70, 395
- Steam navigation, 56
- Steel, 65
- Steel industry, Germany, 305
- Stefanisk, General, 811
- Stefano, Treaty of, 295
- Stegerwald, Adam, 796
- Stein, Baron, 34
- Stephens, James, 443
- Stephenson, George, 57
- Stinnes, Hugo, 793, 801
- Stockholm, 548
- Stolypin, P. A., 636
- Storthing, 547
- Straits, Zone of the, 997
- Strasbourg, surrender in 1870, 254
- Strikes, England after the World War, 965; general, Russia, 633; Italy since the World War, 1030, 1031, 1033, 1035
- Strumitz, 917
- Stumm, Baron von, 326
- Styria, 876

- Subject peoples, German loss of, 753;
 Turkey's treatment of, 646
 Submarines, 692; German policy, 695;
 Germany in future, 757; Washington
 Conference and, 1068
 Submit or resign, 347
 "Succession States," 809, 810, 826, 872,
 893
 Suez Canal, 515, 673, 680, 708 972
 Suez Canal shares, 547
 Suffrage, Austria, 387, 389, 390; Bel-
 gium, 534; Belgium after the War,
 1019; boroughs in England, 398, 399,
 417-418, 438; counties in England,
 397, 417, 438; England and the Re-
 form Bill, 413, 417; England, Catho-
 lics in, 410; England in 1918, 964;
 extension in England, demand for,
 418; Germany, 783, 785; Gladstone
 and, 437; Hungary, 393; Irish Free
 State, 993; Italy, 373; Poland, 852;
 Prussia, 325, 327; Scotland, 398;
 secret ballot, 453; Spain, 528; Spain
 in 1868, 524; women, 438
 Sun Yat Sen, 627
 Super-state, 1051, 1057
 Supilo, Dr., 881, 885
 Supreme Council, 1050
Sussex (ship), 698
 Suzerainty, 503, 504
 Sweden, 8; dissolution of Union with Nor-
 way, 550; relations with Norway, 546
 Switzerland, 8, 663; cantons and federa-
 tion, 538; Constitution of 1848, 540;
 democratic legislative processes, 541;
 development since 1848, 540; inter-
 national institutions, 543; language,
 543; League of Nations and, 1043;
 neutrality, 536, 543
 Sydney, N. S. W., 496
 Syria, 720, 995, 997; French mandate,
 960, 998
 Szamuely, Tibor, 907
 Széchenyi, Stephen, 141

 Taaffe ministry, 388, 389
 Taft, W. H., 736
 Tagliamento River, 706
 Talleyrand, C. M., 3, 6
 Tanganyika, Lake, 511
 Tanganyika Colony, 970
 Tanks, 687, 757
 Tannenber, 671, 676
 Tardieu, Andre, 950, 955

 Tariff. *See* Protective tariff
 Tasman, A. J., 496
 Tel-el-Kebir, 516
 Temesvar, 891
 Tenant right, in Ulster, 447
 Terrible Year, 331, 337
 Territorial integrity, 746
 Teschen, 850
 Test and Corporation Acts, 407, 408
 Tewfik, Khedive, 516
 Textiles, 55
 Thessaly, 578
 Thiers, L. A., 93; Chief of the Executive
 Power in 1871, 255, 331; Communists
 and, 335; Eastern Question and, 122;
 government, 336; ideas on govern-
 ment, 340; Liberator of the Territory,
 338; manifesto of July, 1830, 94; op-
 position to war in 1870, 249; resigna-
 tion, 123, 341; rivalry with Guizot, 121
 Thomas, Albert, 751
 Thousand, The, 203
 Thrace, 997, 1001; Bulgaria and, 917;
 Greek occupation, 1002
 Thrace, Eastern, 1007
 Thuringian duchies, 783
 Tientsin, Treaties of, in 1858, 613
 Tirpitz, Alfred von, 311
 Tisza, Count Kálmán, 905
 Todleben, E. I., 562, 570
 Togo, Heihachiro, 626
 Togoland, 294, 684, 959, 970
 Tokio, 618
 Tonkin, 350, 351, 367
 Torcy, 713
 Tories, 405; end of political control,
 412; losses in 1830, 411; reforms,
 406, 410. *See also* Conservatives
 Tours, seat of government in 1870, 253
 Townshend, General Sir Charles, 707
 Toynbee, Arnold, 61
 Trade unions, England, 433; England
 after the World War, 965; France,
 349; Germany, 795
 Transjordan, 999
 Trans-Siberian railroad, 621
 Transvaal, 502; annexation to the British
 Empire, 502
 Transvaal Colony, 506
 Transylvania, 140, 385, 688 808
 Travel, 54, 57
 Trentino, 378, 683
 Trianon, Treaty of, 766, 810, 912
 Tricolor, 341

- Trieste, 378, 683, 808, 889
 Triple Alliance, 296; Austria, Italy and its terms, 655; Italy and, 374, 378; Roumania and, 860; termination, 378
 Triple Entente, 662
 Tripoli, 365, 1028; French and Italian agreement about, 367; Italy's acquisition, 377, 647
 Tripolitza, 556
 Trochu, L. J., 253
 Troppau, Congress of, 47
 Trotsky, Leon, 703, 927; peace basis, 709
 Trumbic, Dr., 881, 885, 887, 889
 Trust, vertical, in Germany, 792, 793
 Tsar, 581, 636
 Tsaribrod, 917
 Tsinan-fu railway, 1079
 Tsushima, 626
 Tunis, 296, 365, 960; French control, 366; protectorate, 350
 Turcoing, 719
 Turin, 43; as capital of Italy, 370; parliament of 1861, 205; Piedmont parliament in 1860, 200
 Turkestan, 610
 Turkey, 315; Algeria lost, 365; collapse of the empire, 642, 648, 650; Constitution of 1876 restored, 580; decay, 552; German ambitions in, 315; German influence in, 672; revolution in 1908, 579; subject peoples, treatment of, 553; World War, defeat, 722; World War, entrance into, 672; World War and, 994. *See also* Angora Government
 Turkey since the war, 995; Allied delay and dissensions over peace, 997; defeat of Greece, 1005; France and, 1004; Lausanne Conferences and, 1007
 Turkification, 646
 Turko-Italian War of 1911, 647
 Tuscany, 42, 155, 161, 162; Piedmont and, 197, 198, 200
 Twenty-one Demands, 1073
 Tyrol, 687, 808, 1025; Northern, 894, 895

 Uitlanders, 504
 Ukraine, 943, 944; independence, 704; Polish invasion, 850
 Ukrainians, 841
 Ulster, Irish Parliament and, 484; opposition to Home Rule bill, 983; tenant right, 447
 Ulster party, 485
 Umbria, 204, 205

 Unemployment, England after the World War, 965, 967; National Workshops in France and, 170
 Union of England and Ireland in 1801, 442
 Unionists (British), 475, 478
 United States, 51; Civil War's effect in England, 436; declaration of war against Germany, April 6, 1917, 699; German immigration, 208; German offenses against, 694; German proposal to dismember, 699; League of Nations and isolation policy, 1059; programme for peace, 738; protective tariff, 288, 289; severance of diplomatic relations with Germany, 699; Spain and her American colonies, 51; Versailles Treaty, and discussion and rejection, 762; World War services, 693, 714
 Universities, English, 453; Irish, 454
 Upper Silesia, 752, 798; disposition, 838; importance, 838, 839; plebiscite, 838-839; provisional arrangements, 839
 Urundi, 1019
 Utopianism, 269, 272

 Valençay, 37
 Valona, 1027
 Vatican, France and, 961; prisoner of the Vatican, 371
 Vatican Council in 1870, 285
 Vaux, 685
 Venetia, 3, 206, 224; annexed to Italy, 369; cession to Italy, 229. *See also* Lombardy-Venetia
 Venice, 42, 154, 707; of all in 1849, 162; insurrection against Austria, 155
 Venizelos, Eleutherios, 681, 873; enforcing the Treaty of Sèvres, 1001; overthrow, 1002, 1003
 Verdun, 685, 716
 Verona, Congress of, 50
 Versailles, National Assembly at in 1871, 332
 Versailles, Armistice of in 1871, 254
 Versailles, Peace of, in 1871, 255
 Versailles, Treaty of, 742; accompanying treaties between France and Great Britain and between France and the United States, 761; effect on the relations of England and France, 968, 1084; German boundaries, 752; German breaches, 761; German militarism, 755; German reparations, 758; Ger-

- many's party of resistance to, 797;
 International Labor Organization, 750;
 League of Nations, provision for, 742;
 Lloyd George's comments, 760; popular
 discontent after, 768; ratification,
 761; revision question, 968; signature,
 742; United States discussion and re-
 jection, 762; United States Senate and
 reservations, 763
 Vertical trust, 792, 793
 Vesle River, 715
 Viborg Manifesto, 636
 Victor Emmanuel I, of Piedmont, 43
 Victor Emmanuel II, 162, 188; Cavour
 and, 197; conquest of Naples, 205;
 death, 372; enlarged Kingdom of
 Piedmont in 1860, 200; Plombière
 interview and, 194; proclaimed King
 of Italy, 205
 Victor Emmanuel III, 362; accession,
 375; Mussolini and, 1038
 Victoria (colony), 497, 500
 Victoria, Queen, 423; death, 476; edu-
 cation and marriage, 424
 Victoria Nyanza, 511
 Vienna, 22, 722; convulsions in 1848, 152,
 153; economic predominance, 900;
 hardships after the World War, 898;
 outbreaks and surrender in 1848, 159
 Vienna, Congress of, 3; criticism of
 its work, 8; Polish and Saxon
 questions, 6
 Vienna, Treaty of, 1864, 545
 Világos, 161
 Villafranca, 196, 198
 Villari, Luigi, 1030
 Villèle ministry in France, 83, 88, 89
 Vilna, 842, 1045
 Vimy Ridge, 705
 Vinogradoff, Paul, 606
 Virchon, Rudolf, 212
 Virgin Islands, 546
 Vittorio Veneto, 721, 1040
 Vladivostok, 610; foundation, 614; rail-
 road extension to, 621
 Voting, oral, England, 458; oral, Prussia,
 326; plural, 463, 535. *See also* Suffrage
 Waldeck, 327
 Waldeck-Rousseau, P. M., 359
 Wales, Anglican Church in, 485
 Wallachia, 552, 560, 561, 563, 564, 565
 Wallon amendment, 344
 Wallonia, 1017
 War, expenditures, 638; horrors, 197;
 League of Nations and prevention,
 1057; prevention problem, 746
 "War to end war," 735, 745
 War zone, 695
 Warsaw, 104, 677, 843; fall in 1831, 105
 Warsaw, Duchy of, 4, 5, 583
 Wartburg festival, 31
 Washington Conference of 1922, 1060;
 Anglo-Japanese Alliance and, 1074;
 China and, 1072, 1076; Four Powers
 Treaty, 1075; Japan and, 1072; mili-
 tary armaments, 1061, 1070; naval
 armaments, 1063; objects, 1061; Pa-
 cific question, 1067; representation,
 1061-1062; Shantung question, 1079
 Water power in Italy, 376
 Waterloo, battle of, 10
 Watt, James, 53, 56, 63
 Weaving, 55
 Weimar, 775, 776
 Weimar, Constitution of, 780; factory
 councils and socialization of industry,
 788; name of German state, 781
 Wellington, Duke of, 409; eulogy of
 the English Parliament, 411; foreign
 policy, 411
Weltpolitik, 316
 West Prussia, 835
 Western Front in the World War in
 1915 (map), 670; in 1918 (map), 718
 Westphalia, 305
 Wetherell, Sir C., 414
 Weygand, General Maxime, mission to
 Warsaw, 851
 Weyler, Valeriano, 528
 Whigs, 410, 412; period of control, 419.
See also Liberals
 White, Henry, 739
 White coal in Italy, 376
 White Mountain, Battle of, 812, 828
 White slavery, 1046
 White Terror, 77
 Whitlock, Brand, 1017
 Wilhelmina, Queen, 532
 William I, of Prussia and German Em-
 peror, 214; army programme, 214;
 attempts on his life, 290; character,
 214; controversy with Parliament,
 215-216, 219; German Empire under,
 282; proclaimed German Emperor,
 256; Socialism and, 289
 William I, of the Netherlands, 100, 532
 William II, German Emperor, 283; ab-

- dication and flight, 724, 725, 771; absolutism, 328-329; accession and proclamations, 297, 299; admiration for Bismarck, 298, 299; Chancellors, 303, 321; character, 298, 303, 317, 321; education, 297; Foreign Office and, 298; German leadership and prestige, 317; interview on British-German relations in 1908, 328; navy, 311; personality, 320; reign, 297; religious orthodoxy, 300; Socialists and, 303; trial provided for, 758
- William II, of the Netherlands, 532
- William III, of the Netherlands, 532
- William IV, of England, 410; death, 423; Reform Bill and, 417
- William of Wied, 654
- Wilson, Woodrow, appeal to the Italian people, 1025; arraignment of Germany before Congress, April 2, 1917, 699; Article 10 and, 1055; Fourteen Points, 737, 738; Italy's claims and, 1024; knowledge of the Secret Treaties, 1023; on Jugo-Slavia and Italy, 889; League of Nations, 736; on minorities, 865; notes to Germany, 695, 697, 698; "open covenants, openly arrived at," 741; personal attendance at Peace Conference, 739; programme for peace, 737
- Windischgrätz, A. C. F., 157, 159
- Wirth, Joseph, 777, 803
- Witte, Count S. Y., 604, 633, 635
- Wolff, Theodor, 802
- Wolseley, G. J., 516
- Woman Suffrage, 438
- Women in English Parliament, 966
- Wood, Leonard, 693
- Woolen industry, 62
- Workers' Control in Soviet Russia, 934
- Workingmen, Bismarck and, 291; England, 425, 433; First International, 275
- Workingmen's Councils in Germany, 788
- World Court. *See* Permanent Court of International Justice
- World opinion, 1052, 1080
- World Policy. *See* Weltpolitik
- World revolution, 936
- World War, 655; Austrian ultimatum, 657; Balkan states and, 654; beginning of the fighting, 666; Belgium and, 663, 664, 668; Eastern Front, 676, 677 (map); England's efforts for peace and her entrance, 660, 664; England's services, 686, 692-693; events in 1914, 667; events in 1915, 675; events in 1916, 684; events in 1917, 704; events in 1918, 711; France and, 662, 667, 684; Gallipoli campaign, 678; German invasion of Russia, 676; Germany's attitude, 659, 661, 664; Italy and, 665, 687; Italy, entrance on the side of the Allies, 682; Japan's entrance into, 673; Jutland, Battle of, 691; Marne, Battle of, 669; Marne, Second Battle of the, 715; Orient, fighting in, 707; origin, 656; peace overtures, 723; responsibility, 665, 730, 760; Russia's position, 658, 661; Russia's victories, 671; sea control, 674; Somme, Battle of the, 686; Turkey's entrance into, 672; United States' entrance into, 698; United States' services, 714; Western Front (maps), 670, 718
- Wörth, 252
- Württemberg, 22, 787; Constitution, 29; union with Prussia in the war of 1870, 250, 256
- Wyschaete, 713
- Xavier, Francis, 616
- Yalu, 620
- Yedo, 615, 618
- Yiddish, 856, 857
- Yorkshire, 64
- Young Ireland, 442, 443
- Young Italy, 146
- Young Turks, 579, 995; failure, 645, 647; hopes, 642
- Youth, 146
- Ypres, 713, 716; Second Battle of, 67
- Yser River, 669
- Yuan Shih K'ai, 627, 628
- Zaghlul Pasha, 973
- Zagrel, 888
- Zambesi River, 511
- Zara, 876, 890, 1025
- Zeebrugge, 719
- Zemstvos, 593, 630
- Zionism, 999
- Zionists and Poland, 858
- Zipangu, 615
- Zola, Émile, 355, 358
- Zolger, Mr., 889
- Zollverein, 136, 231
- Zurich, Peace of, 198, 380

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